WORLD WAR I AND THE END OF THE OTTOMAN WORLD

From the Balkan Wars to the Armenian Genocide

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INTRODUCTION

WORLD WAR I AND THE END OF THE OTTOMAN WORLD: FROM THE BALKAN WARS TO THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

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This book is part of a larger intellectual effort to understand the buildup to World War I outside the classic European theatres of war. Besides the vast amount of literature that has been published during the last decades on how to interpret the causes, the course, and the consequences of World War I, we are now witnessing a plethora of conferences and books dedicated to the issue. *World War I and the End of the Ottoman World: From the Balkan Wars to the Armenian Genocide* is a contribution to the endeavour to understand World War I in its global consequences, going beyond a narrow focus on Central Europe and expanding the perspective to include particularly the Ottoman Empire's Anatolian and Balkan possessions, as well, in a more contrasting manner, Palestine.

World War I and the End of the Ottoman World is also part of a larger effort in a second and more compelling sense. It is not only a book focusing on the Ottoman world, written from the perspective of those dealing with the history of the Ottoman Empire. We are in fact making a more substantive claim: that the history of modern Turkey and of the Middle East (as far as it had been part of the Ottoman Empire until 1918) cannot be understood without examining the cataclysmic

transformation that the region underwent in the years 1912–22. Beginning with the Balkan wars in 1912–13, continuing throughout World War I and the Armenian genocide, and finally reaching its climax with the Turkish War of Independence in 1922, this was a decade of intermittent warfare in the Ottoman world. This decade of violence and destruction fundamentally transformed the "Middle East"; or, to be more precise, and considering that the region came to be known under its name only from the 1920s,[1] it is this decade that made the Middle East as we know it and that appears to be facing its unbecoming now. In fact, many of the episodes of ethnic cleansing, mass violence, and genocidal dynamics we examine in this book have returned to the region. The deserts of Syria and the mountains of Iraq are witnessing further episodes of warfare against the civilian population and instances of genocidal violence as we write these introductory lines.

In order to disentangle these various dynamics, this volume extends the gaze beyond the imperial capital Istanbul, which still dominates mainstream historiography, and seeks to study three intertwined arenas of the Ottoman realm: Palestine, the mostly Kurdish–Armenian eastern provinces, and the western provinces consisting of the Aegean shores and the southern Balkans. In all three arenas, national movements questioned Ottoman viability and engaged in some form of territorial politics. All three have been theatres of conflict up to the present. The introduction, written jointly by the three editors of this book, opens up a large canvas in four sections. In section 1, "Violence, Viability and Culpability", we sketch the general historical setting and discuss the rationale of this book. We attribute decisive importance to the cataclysmic decade of 1912–22 for understanding the late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic up to the immediate present. The second section, "Imperial Entanglement: The Ottoman Empire as Subject and Object of New Imperialism", describes the "hybrid" situation of the Ottoman Empire, an empire being subject and object, actor and recipient of colonial pretension and forms of rule. The Ottoman Empire tried to maintain its imperial competitiveness by emulating – and simulating – the strategies and strengths of European imperialism but by that very principle fought against being absorbed completely into the international system of a European imperial *cum* economic "world order." Section 3, "The End of Ottomanity: Nationalisms, Quest for Territory, and Descent into Total War", forms

the core of the introduction, presenting the reader with the historical complexity and synchronicity of competing imperial, national, and even prenational claims and ventures at the eve of World War I. The fourth section, "Looking Back into the Future: Violence, Viability and Culpability in the Post-Ottoman Space Revisited", brings us back to the first lines of this introduction, confronting us with the worrying presence of the past. It urges us to be aware of the political and social commitment that accrues from being an historian. In the final section, we present the individual contributions in this volume.

Violence, Viability, and Culpability

In this volume we seek to elucidate the relationship between *violence* and *viability*[2] in the context of the late Ottoman Empire. How did the empire's decision makers deal with the loss of its European possessions in the First Balkan War: the lands that today form the nation-states of Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia, as well as parts of today's Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece? How did members of the Ottoman elite react to this traumatic loss of territories that had been a central part of the empire since the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries? Which consequences were drawn from the mass expulsions and massacres committed by the emerging Christian nation-states against Balkan Muslim communities? One of the first and most consequential results was undoubtedly the *coup d'état* of 23 January 1913 *(Bab-i Ali baskını)*, which prepared the ground for unfettered Young Turk rule until 1918 and the triumvirate of the three Pashas: Cemal, Enver, and Talaat.

Ottoman imperial governance had combined harsh rule in principle with leniency in the individual case. This long-established imperial routine, which had held the state intact despite strong centripetal forces, began to erode rapidly after 1912. By the time of the Armenian genocide, this tradition of governance had already ceased to exist, never to be resurrected again. To the Young Turks, modern and radical methods of rule and politics appeared necessary, both domestically and abroad. The struggle against superior imperialist forces could only be conducted in an aggressive war of survival. Much graver, however, were the consequences on the Ottoman home front. From 1913, violence exerted by the Ottoman state against its subjects reached unprecedented levels. A policy of demographic engineering set in that turned the

multiethnic and multiconfessional Ottoman lands of Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and Thrace into what would then become the ethnically cleansed Turkish nation-state.[3]

Given the overwhelming importance of this fateful decade, it is paramount to clarify at which stage Young Turkish radicalization began to bear its full impact on the empire's non-Muslim populations, and in particular on the Armenians. Yet there is even more to it. Debating World War I in its Ottoman and Middle Eastern context will unavoidably concentrate on the emerging Turkish nation-state as a central actor and as a key factor in historical analysis. First, Turkey is the only country among the successor states of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East that has successfully rejected a major post-World War I treaty, the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, and that has reached a rather favourable arrangement with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which guaranteed Turkey the status of a fully sovereign country. Second, Turkey is the only country among the Ottoman successor states that is the legal successor to the empire and sees itself – at least since the second half of the twentieth century and even more so since the beginning of the twenty-first – as the rightful heir of the Ottoman heritage. Third and most important, the decade from 1912 to 1922 has been decisive in that it has a lasting impact on the political culture of Turkey even today.

Revisiting the 1910s and early 1920s is an exercise far from historians' obsession with a certain time period. The very core of Turkish national identity, its content and limits, its form and ideology, and its political culture and modes of mobilization are intrinsically bound to these years. For decades, the German debate on World War I has been dominated by the *Kriegsschuldfrage,* that is, the question of which countries were responsible for the unstoppable escalation of the July crisis in 1914 into a pan-European and, eventually, a global war.[4] The Ottoman-Turkish equivalent to the *Kriegsschuldfrage* is undoubtedly the question of the Armenian genocide. In principle, the task of Turkish historiography is the same as in other comparable cases: to explain the transformation from empire to nation-state and to ascertain to what extent the policies of the nation-state were anticipated in the policy of the late empire.

Yet the question about culpability is one that has only just begun to be dealt with in the context of Ottoman and Turkish historiography and remains a taboo for large parts of the Turkish public and political elite.

Why has it been such a daunting task to take responsibility for the Armenian genocide in Turkey? Fear of restitution or compensation claims by Armenian diaspora organizations and individuals cannot be reason enough. Turkey has become wealthy enough to respond positively to such requests. Fears that Turkish "national honour" may be befouled are no explanation either, as this is standard nationalist rhetoric that is representative only of itself, not of any deeper collective sentiment. We are of the firm opinion, strengthened by the contributions in this volume, that the single most important reason for this inability to accept culpability is the centrality of the Armenian massacres for the formation of the Turkish nation-state. The deeper collective psychology within which this sentiment rests assumes that any move toward acknowledging culpability will put the very foundations of the Turkish nation-state at risk and will lead to its steady demise. This collective psychology also explains deep-seated fears of Kurdish autonomy and a very peculiar perspective on the Middle East, shaped by anti-imperialist fervour, orientalist transfiguration, and delusions of regional leadership, particularly among the current ruling elites.

As central as the question of the Armenian genocide is, it should not obstruct our view onto the larger constellations of the erosion of Ottoman rule in a much larger geography. The empire's demise and the destruction of its complex ethnic, religious, and social fabric in the 1910s is not only a defining event in the history of the Middle East and Europe and hence also constitutive of the global order. It was also a period of massive and lasting destruction of people and the built environment, nature, and cultural landscapes and an era of human suffering in all its sad variations. Only as the colonial settlements of the post-World War I consensus are breaking apart are we reminded of the cataclysmic nature of those years. These were years squandered in terms of peace, yet they witnessed the emergence of a fiercely contested new state in the Ottoman heartlands that would eventually become the Republic of Turkey. We employ the term *cataclysm* to highlight both the destruction and the new beginnings that mark this period.

The *Ottoman cataclysm* opened the door for revolutionary changes and war. It squandered possible chances for a peaceful evolution in a reduced imperial geography and in line with late Ottoman reforms. It cut the Gordian knot of the international Eastern Question as well as of what leading Young Turks finally considered incurable infirmities of the

empire. The Ottoman cataclysm is a decade of catastrophic change with fundamental consequences.[5] The roots of Turkey's unresolved conflicts, the decisive moment in the European colonization of the Middle East, the foundations of a Zionist state in Palestine, the fragility of the succeeding states, and, finally, the lingering ethnic conflicts in the Balkans can all be traced back to the decade between 1912 and the completion of the post-World War I order, which is now being reconsidered amid a set of new cataclysmic episodes.

Imperial Entanglement: The Ottoman Empire as Subject and Object of New Imperialism

Imperial states attained unprecedented levels of power in the nineteenth century. The emergence of modern weaponry, such as the machine gun and barbed wire, and the construction of new communication and transport infrastructures, such as the telegraph and railway lines, created conditions for rapid action and efficiency. This revolution of the infrastructure of war left the modern European imperial states without serious competitors in their own imperial domains. For the first time in history, empires and their leaders thought of themselves as possessing unlimited strength and power. In principle, the cadres of the Ottoman Empire were part of this seminal change. Following the example of "imperial nation-states" such as Great Britain and France, the Ottoman Empire developed its own ambitions of becoming an imperial – and, up to a point, also an imperialist – nation. The traditional Ottoman "repertoires of power"[6] were hence enriched by new imperialist role models and by European notions such as the mission and the task to civilize the subject peoples.[7] Even if emulated, an Ottoman *mission civilisatrice* extended from the imperial classroom to the cities as stages of progress: New state institutions, schools, banks, universities, barracks, train stations, and administrative buildings emerged in a self-confident neoimperial architectural style.[8] Turkish became increasingly important as language of the state and as *lingua franca*, complementing the classic merchant languages of Italian, Armenian, and Ladino.

The Ottoman Empire can be clearly distinguished from imperial nation-states such as France and Great Britain. From the nineteenth century on, the empire was caught between defending its status as imperial power and warding off encroaching European imperialism.

It suffered enormous territorial losses in the 1870s and 1880s, with an even more disastrous contraction in the First Balkan War from 1912 to 1913. Following the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the 1860s, more than 1 million Caucasian Muslims fled the region, most of them (around 800,000) for the Ottoman Empire. After its failed Russian campaign in 1877–88, the Ottoman Empire had to relinquish an area of approximately 200,000 square kilometres to the Russian Empire, including 5.5 million people, most of whom were Armenian and Georgian Christians in the regions of Batum and Kars.[9] Hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the lost territories in the Caucasus as well as the Balkans fled to the Ottoman core lands of Anatolia in the late 1870s. This massive loss of territory and shift of populations reversed the balance of Christian-Muslim relations in the empire. The Muslim subjects of the sultan had become the overwhelming majority, even before the almost complete loss of the empire's European territories in the First Balkan War.

Much like Russia, the Ottoman Empire was a product of the premodern[10] period and was similarly confronted with the challenges of "new imperialism" in the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire could not really implement a turn to new imperialism, with systematic territorial expansion as a key ingredient. It was simply too weak, militarily and economically, for such an endeavour. The Ottomans nevertheless developed new concepts of imperial self-representation in the nineteenth century different from the imperial routine of the preceding centuries. While they were trying to keep up with European imperial nations and their modern forms of power projection, they were also increasingly thinking of themselves as an "anti-colonial empire". The United States therefore exerted some fascination after first diplomatic relations started in the 1830s. A few decades later, however, American political and missionary ideals were considered by both Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks in power to be a dangerous challenge to the foundations of the Ottoman Empire.

Finally, the radicalization of European imperialism played a major role in radicalizing conceptions of warfare among Ottoman political elites. European imperialists developed new forms and mentalities of violence in their colonies beyond Europe. In the context of the Ottoman Empire, escalating violence was not experienced in faraway peripheries such as Yemen but in the imperial core regions, in particular during the

secession wars of the Balkan states, beginning with the Serbian uprising in the 1810s and ending with the Balkan wars in 1912–13. The authors and editors of this volume concur that the violent emergence of Christian nation-states in southeast Europe in the nineteenth century not only was traumatic for the Ottoman-Turkish elite of the early twentieth century but also came to be seen an example of how a modern nation-state has to be established.[11] It is widely accepted by now that it was this unfortunate "learning process" that shaped the Ottoman perspective on the Armenians and the equally European-influenced nation-building projects of Ottoman political elites.[12]

What is truly remarkable with the new imperialism of the nineteenth century, both in Europe's powerful imperial states and in the ailing Ottoman Empire,

> is the gap between the potential that nineteenth-century social and technological innovations made available to imperial rulers and the limited spaces in which the new means were actually deployed. The empires that seem, over the course of world history, to have the most resources with which to dominate their subject populations were among the shortest lived.[13]

What the European and Ottoman imperial(ist) ventures had in common was a fear of total failure based on the awareness that the resources to project power would never be sufficient to defend the imperial frontiers in moments of crisis. Around 1900, German society was deeply militarized, but the gap between the country's ambitious imperialist goals, on the one hand, and the lack of experience in exercising (military) power in the colonies, on the other, was remarkable.[14] Delusions of German grandeur and doubts whether enemies and competitors took the young empire seriously made "the fear of appearing weak become the fear of being weak".[15] From this sense of insecurity and fear of ridicule, it was only a small step to overcompensation and an excessively brutal suppression of rebellions. The genocide of the Herero and the crushing of the Maji Maji uprisings in German southwest and east Africa between 1904 and 1907 illustrate this rapid progression from weakness to genocidal violence in the colonial context.

The ambivalent venture of insisting on imperial prerogatives and simultaneously dealing with the reality of a semicolonized state was, no

doubt, a heavy psychological burden on the members of the late Ottoman elite. Ottoman bureaucrats and officers confronted with the empire's apparently unstoppable terminal decline may have become prone to a deep frustration of their imperial imaginations. The ever-widening chasm between reality and imperial pretensions must have caused an unbearable psychological stress for many an imperial officer. Yet psychology is only one of many explanatory categories, and we have already discussed many. What we can say with near certainty is that the Ottoman Empire's convoluted imperial entanglement with the major European powers led to a notion of "anti-Western Westernism" or "Westernism despite the West". This is typical of many societies that have been exposed to European and Western expansionism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But "Westernism despite the West" was also at the root of the genocidal destruction of the empire's Armenians, as well as of later episodes of ethnic cleansing and the "unmixing of people".

The End of Ottomanity: Nationalisms, Quest for Territory, and Descent into Total War

This volume's title, *World War I and the End of the Ottoman World: From the Balkan Wars to the Armenian Genocide,* may puzzle the reader. After all, the sultanate was abolished only in 1922, and the Republic of Turkey was declared one year later, when the Ottoman Empire legally ceased to exist. So why end the coverage of this book with the Armenian genocide of 1915? The editors of this volume, as well as its authors, consider the destruction of the Armenian communities of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 as a definitive break with the idea of a common and civic Ottoman future. In this respect, 1915 is a point of no return, prepared and executed by the modernizing cadres of the Young Turks, namely, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, or *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), once their political alliance with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF; in Armenian, *Dashnaksutyun*) had broken down. This is particularly stunning since it was the Committee and the *Dashnaksutyun* who had brought about the 1908 revolution together in favour of a common Ottoman constitutional state.[16] The year 1915 hence was the end of Ottomanity, that is, the notion of an inclusive Ottoman identity (*Osmanlılık*) and the viability of a multicultural, multireligious, and multiethnic modern polity based on relations of mutual obligations

between communities and between the sultan and his subjects. It was the definitive end of Ottomanism (*Osmanlıcılık*) as the legitimating ideology of the state and the conception of suprareligious patriotism and loyalty toward a common state, constitution, and country.

Ottomanism as state ideology and Ottomanity as a notion of shared belonging became most salient after the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908. The Young Turks organized in the Committee of Union and Progress reinstalled the Ottoman constitution and parliament, which had both been suspended by Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1878. The Ottoman idea, however, was soon challenged by domestic and international developments to which the relatively fragile central state could not effectively respond. All cabinets of the constitutional regime, which began in 1908, were short lived. The parliament failed to turn into a platform of peaceful conflict resolution and balance of interest. Strikes and boycotts were frequent, particularly in the larger urban centres, while public life was often excitable and polarized. Many of the political, economic, and cultural dividing lines coincided with the boundaries of religious communities. Fuelling this polarization was a sensationalist and partisan press (cf. Chapter 3 by Doğan Çetinkaya).

In the parliament, members of the Committee of Union and Progress not only constituted the majority but also managed to manipulate politics through behind-the-scenes interventions. Tensions between the CUP, their political adversaries, and conservative Muslims existed from the very first months of the constitutional regime. These erupted in the countercoup of April 1909, in which thousands of soldiers and religious students filled the streets. They demanded Islamic law (sharia) and the restoration of Muslim political privileges. Sultan Abdülhamid II and the liberal opposition seemed to profit from the situation without having initiated the coup. Because politics failed to find a solution, a CUP-organized Action Army from Salonika crushed the insurgents and thereby gave a lasting paradigm for military intervention in politics. The Ottoman capital remained in a permanent state of emergency that curtailed the freedom of press.[17]

The CUP managed to win the 1912 elections thanks to a climate of intimidation but lost power for a short while following a coup in July 1912. The loss of most of Macedonia in the First Balkan War (1912–13) was a crucial turning point that set into motion processes of

radicalization and nationalist mobilization among both CUP members and the larger Turkish Muslim public. It triggered yet another coup by the CUP in January 1913 and, in the same year, a party dictatorship that would last until 1918. The Balkan wars also led to waves of uprooted Muslim refugees from the Balkan provinces to the imperial capital and beyond. The Muslim refugees (*muhacir*) came as a reminder to the Turkish-speaking Muslims of Istanbul that the war was not a distant phenomenon anymore but had come to their doorsteps. Their very livelihood might be in danger. This realization played a major role in the emergence of policies for the comprehensive ethnic cleansing of Anatolia, which would finally lead to the ethnically and religiously cleansed and, at least superficially, Turkish and Muslim territory that would become the Republic of Turkey.

By 1913, CUP cadres were endorsing Turkish nationalism openly, if not exclusively. This particular brand of nationalism amalgamated Turkism and Pan Turkism as it was advocated by the Turkish Hearth and Turkish Home associations since their foundation in 1911. In favour of new ethno-Turkish belongings as well as stronger ties with anti-Armenian urban notables and Kurdish tribal chiefs in the eastern provinces, the CUP leadership terminated its cooperation with *Dashnaksutyun*, its partner in the 1908 revolution and ally in the elections up to 1912. More precisely, anti-Armenian actors, in particular in Diyarbekir, including the chief ideologue Ziya Gökalp, contributed to forming an anti-Armenian stance in the CUP.[18] *Dashnaksutyun*, on its part, had quit the alliance in summer 1912. As a result, Ottoman Armenians risked isolation in the power plays of the imperial centre and therefore turned their hopes toward European diplomacy and its promise to advance the Armenian reform question in late 1912 (cf. Chapter 8 by Thomas Schmutz). This, in turn, the CUP resented as a betrayal of common ideals by the Armenians during the fatal First Balkan War.

The "Armenian Question" was in fact one of the burning issues before the eruption of World War I. It entailed efforts for comprehensive reform in the eastern provinces, including the restitution by local feudal lords of private land and properties belonging to Armenian and other peasants – in other words the "Agrarian Question". The Berlin Treaty of 1878 had already stipulated measures addressing the volatile security situation of Armenians in the east, yet reform efforts had not materialized since then (cf. Chapter 7 by Mehmet Polatel). In addition to

the Armenian Question, the Balkans and the "Macedonian Question" were at the forefront of Ottoman concerns over the empire's immediate future, while Palestine and Zionist emigration and purchase of land was considered less of a challenge. Yet several dynamics eventually led to an articulation of these conflicts. Particularly, the Macedonian and the Armenian questions became intertwined in multifarious ways.

The Balkan wars deepened Muslim–Christian antagonism through the manifestations of ethnic cleansing and violence but also due to war propaganda. Intercommunity resentment and ethno-religious hatred soon spilled over into western Anatolia, home to about 2 million *Rûm*, that is, Ottoman Greek Orthodox Christians. Around 200,000 were expelled in June 1914 from the Aegean coast. This was the CUP's first step toward the methods of demographic engineering. In response to the uprooting of Muslim communities by Christian states in the First Balkan War, Turkists had sworn to turn Anatolia into a Turkish home (*Türk Yurdu*),[19] a safe haven and an economic base for the future of "Turks" (i.e., Muslims who were, at best, Turkish speaking) that could be defended against aggressive neighbours and European imperial advances.

In the Kurdish- and Armenian-populated Six Provinces (*Vilayat-i Sitte*), the balance of economic and political power between Armenians and Kurds had been upset for a while. Due to centralization efforts of the state, autonomous Kurdish principalities had been abrogated by the mid-nineteenth century, while many Armenian Christians had benefited from the changing economic structures and the empire's integration into the world market. A growing Armenian local bourgeoisie hence faced a disempowered Kurdish landlord class, as well as tribal groups and destitute villagers. The promulgation of the Land Code of 1858, which allowed for the individual purchase of land, created an avenue for compensating for this loss of Kurdish political power: Kurdish strongmen as well as urban notables were now able to purchase – or in many cases, forcibly appropriate – lands that had been cultivated by Armenian and Kurdish peasants for centuries. Thus emerged the Agrarian Question that constituted the core grievance for many Armenians: their dispossession by Kurdish overlords and urban notables.

Due to the strength of loyalty towards the Caliphate, Kurdish nationalism was a latecomer. There were beginnings with Sheik Ubeydullah's uprising after the Berlin Congress of 1878 and with Abdürrezak Bedirhan's post-1908 movement that aspired to the liberation

of Kurdistan with Russian help and established a committee called İrşad.[20] Yet a broad Kurdish national movement whose leaders questioned their Ottoman belonging and laid claims for territory in a collective sense emerged only at the eve of World War I. Kurdish mobilization both before and after World War I was also driven by the wish to reach an amnesty and to retain appropriated lands and properties. This and the fear of reforms and foreign influence explain why many Kurdish tribes were caught up in anti-Christian policies orchestrated by the government after 1913.

A decisive step toward a peaceful resolution of the Agrarian Question, which had pitted the CUP government against the ARF, was achieved, if only on paper, in the Reform Agreement of February 1914 (cf. Chapter 8 by Thomas Schmutz). It was a solid document that would have provided for equal Armenian participation in the regional administration and empowered Armenian communities all over the east. Such amelioration of the status of Armenians, however, would have also deepened the social cleavages between comparatively flourishing Christian communities, particularly in the cities, and poor Muslim communities in the eastern provinces.

Unlike the Kurdish movement, whose political imagination was not yet focused on a clearly demarcated territory but rather on achieving new arrangements within the imperial order, Zionist agents and settlers acted as part of a movement whose ultimate goal was the creation of a Jewish homeland, or *Eretz Israel.* Even though they were part of a territorial project, Zionists sought to benefit from the protection provided by Ottoman constitutionalism. For the Armenians in the Six Provinces, such protection was an existential issue, as Kurdish encroachment on their livelihoods was proceeding rapidly.

Most Armenians and Zionists chose to act within the Ottoman framework until 1915. The latter, however, enjoyed realistic post-Ottoman perspectives once this framework broke down. In waves of Ottomanization first motivated by constitutional Ottoman perspectives, then by the need to avoid expulsion, thousands of Jews applied for Ottoman citizenship up to 1915.[21] The Palestinian Arab journal *Filastin,* however, had good reasons to ask, in December 1912, if Palestine would become "a second Macedonia", because Zionists "buy village after village" and "eat the body of the homeland". According to a petition of Palestinian peasants, the settlers "created a little government of their own inside the country" (cf. Chapter 5 by Michelle Campos and Chapter 6 by Yuval Ben-Bassat).

In many ways, Ottoman Palestine is a contrasting and complementary case in this volume, albeit an important one. The cataclysmic force that destroyed the Ottoman world fully arrived in Palestine only after yet another cataclysm. Only with the Holocaust of European Jewry did the Zionist nation-building project gain sufficient international recognition to establish a state. Only then did it begin to unfold aspects of a machinery of nation building connected to hard power and well known from the Turkish case: ethnic cleansing and the destruction of cultural geography, with the aim to create national homogeneity.[22]

No Jewish organization wielded direct influence over or was represented among the men of power in the imperial capital after 1908. In contrast, Armenian CUP members, the Dashnaksutyun, and other Armenian representatives tied their destiny and that of their members almost entirely to the constitutional Ottoman perspective reestablished by the 1908 revolution. Macedonia and Anatolia were part of what were considered the political and economic core lands of the empire and therefore Turkish homeland (*Türk Yurdu*), not Palestine. In addition, Palestine was already wide open to European influence and hence beyond redemption from an Ottoman perspective. This was not the case in central and eastern Anatolia. Once Macedonia, and with it Salonika – the historical headquarters of the Committee of Union and Progress and birthplace of many of its leaders – was lost to Greece in December 1912, Anatolia emerged as the only contiguous territory that could be defended. Within this Turkish homeland, the CUP believed, non-Arab Muslims could easily be united around the project of Turkish nationalism.

Living in the centre, not the periphery, of the imperial geography, Armenians were at risk. Their risk increased dramatically after the start of World War I, when pan-Turkism loomed large in the CUP. Pan-Turkism gained momentum after a secret treaty was concluded with Germany on 2 August 1914, and the German ambassador accepted an additional proposal on 6 August. This proposal suggested a future correction of Turkey's eastern border "which shall place Turkey into direct contact with the Moslems of Russia" (cf. Chapter 1 by Hans-Lukas Kieser). Henceforth the CUP pursued an openly irredentist agenda for the "Turks" (Muslims) of Russia, particularly the Caucasus. At the same time, an unprecedented large-scale mobilization and military requisition hit Ottoman economic and political life in the whole country (cf. Chapter 2 by Yiğit Akın). The

declaration of *Jihad* on 14 November 1914, further exacerbated the tension, particularly in the eastern provinces.

The pan-Turkist agenda stood in stark contrast to the Reform Agreement, so it was no surprise that it was suspended in August and abolished by the end of 1914. Its suspension dangerously exposed the Armenians as well as all other Christians in the eastern provinces and created the conditions for genocidal escalation. Only a few, though decisive, steps were sufficient: Ottoman campaigns in the Russian Caucasus and northern Persia failed catastrophically and subsequently brutalized soldiers as well as militias on the eastern front. The allied attack against the capital in March 1915 shifted Muslim public opinion even more against the allies and all groups who were considered their beneficiaries. Propaganda disseminated by the Ministry of the Interior in April insinuated that Armenians were engaging in acts of treason and were planning a general revolt that would threaten the survival of Muslims in Anatolia. Finally, a comprehensive scheme for the removal of the Armenian communities of Anatolia to Syria began in May 1915. A large proportion of this population would never reach their final destination in the deserts of Syria, and the destination was deadly in its own right. Massacres at the start and during the removal, and finally, of survivors in the desert in 1916, mark the extremity of the episodes of (anti-Armenian violence).

Another crucial factor contributed to this general dynamic of radicalization in the Ottoman heartlands: Europe descended into total war. More than a million soldiers were killed in the first months of the war. From spring 1915, poison gas was introduced on the battlefields. Submarines began to target passenger ships of neutral powers, thereby extending the war to the civilian population. Yet, in contrast to Europe, total war in the Ottoman Empire was comprehensively fought against exterior enemies as well as groups marked as interior enemies, among them first of all the Armenians.

Looking Back into the Future: Violence, Viability, and Culpability in the Post-Ottoman Space Revisited

This volume deals with the history of the demise of the Ottoman Empire. It seeks to understand the viability of the notion of Ottoman sociability, which allowed for its many constituent communities to live

together well into the beginnings of the twentieth century, and the conditions of its violent destruction. This collection hence deals with history and its de- and reconstruction by historians of the Ottoman Empire. Despite this decidedly historical angle, however, the questions we encounter are relevant for us today, and a consideration of their meaning for the political challenges of our time is most appropriate.

This is all the more the case since even a perfunctory glance at the political universe of the Middle East and the Balkans, Anatolia, and Palestine in 2014 reveals frightening parallels to the early twentieth century. Mass violence, often with genocidal intent, has reemerged in this space since the 1980s. From the Kurdish war in Turkey, the genocidal *Anfal* campaign against Kurds in Iraq, and the anti-Muslim massacres in Bosnia to the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, the series of wars of destruction against the Palestinian people in Gaza by Israel, and the genocidal attacks of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant against Kurds, Shia, Christians, and Yezidis, the post-Ottoman space has come to be haunted by violence and destruction. The post-World War I arrangements, whether in the form of independent states in the Balkans and Turkey or as mandate governments in the Middle East, only barely suppressed the violence on which they were built, but all of them failed to face this history. All successor states of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and Turkey were shaped in the image of romantic or racist notions of often superficial and deeply exclusivist national projects. Some of them have partially opened up in the meantime. The Zionist project of Israel has hardened into what even prudent observers call an apartheid regime, using systematic discrimination and military power against civilian populations under its administration.

As in the period under study, politics in the region today are conducted in the context of relatively weak local governments and state structures that are often used by actors of greater imperial projects – only now the main actors are not France and Great Britain but the United States, the European Union (even though France and Great Britain remain at the hem of interventions in the region), and a largely ineffective United Nations. Instead of European dominance and resentful Young Turk reaction, today aspects of neoimperialism work hand in hand with neoliberal arrangements of dispossession for many and enrichment for some, to which radical, often Islamist organizations react. Yet the current dynamics seem to show some surprising parallels with the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries. Today's new forms of postmodern warfare – unmanned drones, supposedly surgical air strikes, and ruthless antiterrorism operations – facilitate the emergence of Islamist terrorists from Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

We are far from suggesting that history is repeating itself. This is certainly not the case. Yet we also have to emphasize that the core constellation of basic questions, Western intervention, and local radicalization in the Middle East today is more than just reminiscent of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What is more, these resemblances are a reminder that the demise of the Ottoman Empire, with its European-mandated eastern neighbours and the slightly better-off Balkan states, is still unfinished business. Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be seen as sustainable states with consolidated borders. In the east, the situation is even more daunting: Whether we will be speaking of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel in ten years from now or whether completely revised territorial and political arrangements will be in place is, at this point in time, impossible to say. And even though Turkey has made some strides toward Kurdish autonomy and group rights, Turkey's territorial integrity continues to face growing challenges. The big theme of "violence and viability" remains a major challenge for this entire region: how to find progressive forms of political arrangements and civil consensus that safeguard coexistence, sociability, and viability of difference in a given territory under conditions of a structurally unjust world order.

To insist on an analysis of complex causalities – to emphasize the circumstances whereby the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress were radicalized to the point of exterminating hundreds of thousands Armenians, to examine the uprooting of Balkan and Caucasian Muslims by Christian nation-states and empires, or to emphasize global power arrangements – should by no means be misunderstood as an apology for the late Ottoman and early Turkish nation builders. Neither should it pave the wave for a "denial light" or "neodenialism" as it crystallizes in current efforts of the Turkish government to win over world opinion and Armenian diasporas without accepting Turkish culpability.[23] Works such as those of Justin McCarthy, which show an indefensible bias toward the Turkish official position, are also to be rejected.[24] Fortunately, the postdenialist scholarly output on this era is growing fast.[25]

The relationship between scholarship and the course of history is complex. Overall, however, academics have very little impact on real world events. And still, both the editors and the authors of this volume believe that a thorough study of the chain of events that led to the demise of the Ottoman Empire and its underpinning notions of sociability provides important insights for the understanding of the current crises and conflicts in the larger post-Ottoman space.

The Chapters of This Volume

The volume follows a chronological trajectory in principle, as the experience of the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 is seen as the major catalyst to the CUP's radicalization and brutalization of policy beginning in 1914. A clear timeline is thus important to the argument of this volume. At the same time, this volume focuses on three separate but intertwined areas of the Ottoman realm: the western provinces on the Aegean shores and the southern Balkans; Palestine; and the mostly Kurdish-Armenian-populated eastern provinces. Yet we have decided not to discuss the Balkan wars themselves in detail. The events of the wars and their enormous importance for the destabilization of the European security system have been dealt with in many other publications.[26] The editors are also aware of the myopia of historians of the Ottoman Empire who lose their interest in southeastern Europe with the end of the Balkan wars, thus reproducing the imperial Ottoman stance and Turkish national collective memory. Yet we are convinced that the topic dealt with in this volume is important enough in itself to justify the focus on the three arenas of the late Ottoman world.

The first part addresses the repercussions of the Balkan wars on the Ottoman political elite and the effects of that experience on various fields of a steadily self-militarizing society. The second part of the volume turns to Palestine, considered more as a contrasting case, since the CUP cadres considered Palestine, Zionist emigration, and the purchase of Arab land as much less of a challenge than the Greek Orthodox and Armenian presence in Anatolia. Nevertheless, many key ingredients of the "Palestinian Question" had crystallized well before the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and before the fear arose that Palestine, too, might become a Macedonia, a territory to be lost to a rival nationalism. Part 3 finally turns to eastern Anatolia with its large Armenian population and

the CUP's "implementation policies" concerning military mobilization, ethnic cleansing, and the complete denial of the previous experience of Ottomanity, avowedly in order to avoid a second Macedonia.

Hans-Lukas Kieser's introductory piece, "The Ottoman Road to Total War (1913–15)", to which Mustafa Aksakal has contributed a good deal, gives an historical overview contextualizing the following specialized case studies. It argues that, in contrast to Europe, total war in the Ottoman Empire was comprehensively fought both against exterior enemies and against stigmatized groups at home. The Young Turks at the reins of power wanted to save the imperial state, to restore its sovereignty, and to reverse painful setbacks inflicted on the empire since the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 and the First Balkan War in 1912–13. They saw World War I as an opportunity to do so, thanks to the alliance with Germany. In reality, their "war at home" destroyed the last substantial Ottoman bonds and thus the base of the empire. Ottoman identity and viability therefore ended for good in the first year of World War I. The imperative of preserving Anatolia as a sovereign and safe Turkish and Muslim haven (*Türk Yurdu*) served as a compass for the Young Turks and their Kemalist heirs through all turbulences, including total war, genocide, imperial chimeras, and a widespread corruption largely linked to Armenian loot. Without pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist chimeras and the campaigns they motivated, a *Türk Yurdu* ideal alone would not have led to genocide. It could have been compatible with a modern constitutional state and have had the chance to deal peacefully with reform, territorial losses, the *muhacir* (Muslim refugee) problem, and the end of empire. If it therefore lost the empire, it could at least have saved constitutional Ottomanity in Anatolia and attained the crucial goal of an independent, sovereign, and internationally secure state.

Part One: Toward War

In contrast to Europe, total war in the Ottoman Empire was radically fought both against exterior enemies and against stigmatized groups at home, Hans-Lukas Kieser states in his chapter on "The Ottoman Road to Total War (1913–15)". This chapter examines the extent to which Ottoman total war differed from contemporary total war in the European war arena. The Young Turks at the reins of power wanted to save the imperial state, to restore its sovereignty, and to reverse painful setbacks

inflicted to the empire since the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 and the First Balkan War in 1912–13. They saw World War I as an opportunity to do so, thanks to the alliance with Germany. In reality, their "war at home" – the distinctive feature of Ottoman total war – destroyed the last vestiges of Ottomanity and thus the base of the empire. Ottoman identity and viability therefore ended for good in the first year of World War I.

As Yiğit Akın shows in his chapter "*Seferberlik*: Building up the Ottoman Home Front", the swift and humiliating defeat in the First Balkan War was the decisive moment that drew the CUP elite to mobilize all available resources for war purposes. The Law of Military Obligation of May 1914 proved to be a product of the CUP's wartime experiences, anxieties, and prejudices. The Ottoman Empire's involvement in World War I required the most comprehensive mobilization of men and resources in the history of the empire. Despite huge problems of logistics, the CUP government succeeded in mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans into the armed forces on short notice. Conscription, however, disrupted social relations throughout the empire, ruined local economies, and imposed enormous physical and psychological burdens on ordinary people on the home front. It dramatically altered the circumstances on the ground and constituted a key turning point of the cataclysmic events, which eventually brought about the demise of the Ottoman social, ethnic, and religious fabric.

Part Two: Demise of Ottomanity in the Balkans and Western Anatolia

Doğan Çetinkaya's contribution "'Revenge! Revenge! Revenge!' 'Awakening a Nation' through Propaganda in the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars (1912–13)" opens the second part of the volume. The ultimate defeat and humiliation that the Ottoman Turks faced in the Balkan wars radicalized the political elite's nationalist project. They paved the way for brutal clashes between different religious communities, whose already heightened tensions worsened after the wars. Atrocity propaganda, carried forward by civil organizations and official state institutions, contributed greatly to the stigmatization and demonization of non-Muslim populations. Illustrations and images enhanced the impact of atrocity reports. The call for revenge and vengeance was a continuation of a trend that the boycott

movement before the Balkan Wars had initiated. The call for revenge was a fundamental phase in the "othering" of Christians and in the creation of an "internal enemy" from native non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire became aliens as a whole in the Balkan wars and World War I. Therefore, during and after the Balkan wars, the call for solidarity was no longer based on Ottoman identity but on Muslim identity. Thereafter, the rising tide of nationalism began to exclude non-Muslims openly.

Emre Erol's piece on "The 'Macedonian Question' in Western Anatolia: The Ousting of Ottoman Greeks before World War I" follows up Çetinkaya's chapter. It shows that the sudden ousting of some 160,000 Ottoman Greeks in western Anatolia in 1914 was the result of an extension of the Macedonian Question to western Anatolia. Increasing polarization between Muslims and Christians, nationalism, economic pressures brought to bear by anti-Christian boycott movements, and growing insecurity caused many Ottoman Greeks to flee. Groups of bandits forced out many others. The CUP deliberately interjected the logic of nationalist mobilization in the Balkans into western Anatolia, which had been spared interethnic and intercommunal tensions when compared to the Ottoman Balkans. The ensuing exodus hence was not inevitable: It came suddenly and was largely unexpected. Erol shows that the brutal measure of uprooting the Ottoman Greeks as an "immediate necessity" for the "survival of the empire" soon evolved into significantly more radical dimensions with the mass deportation and murder of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915.

Part Three: Ottoman Perspectives in Palestine

Yuval Ben-Bassat's, "Palestine's Population and the Question of Ottomanism during the Last Decade of Ottoman Rule", is one of two contributions on Ottoman Palestine before and during World War I. Ben-Bassat explores reactions among Palestine's diverse population to the propagation of Ottomanism and the question of the empire's viability as a political entity. He examines in particular petitions submitted by Arab peasants and notables against Zionist activity in the years preceding World War I, the debate on Ottomanism in the ranks of the tiny Jewish population in Palestine *(yishuv)*, and correspondence between Istanbul and its officials in the provinces of greater Syria during the war concerning the situation there. Ben-Bassat suggests that in

prewar Palestine there was a surprisingly stable support for the empire, its legitimacy, and its continuation, both among the Palestinian Arab population and among considerable segments of the *yishuv*. At the same time, tensions were growing between Jewish settlers and Arab Palestinians, who were concerned about the way the empire handled Zionist activity on the ground.

Michelle Campos's "'The Ottoman Sickness and Its Doctors': Imperial Loyalty in Palestine on the Eve of World War I" is a thorough study of the Palestinian press of the time, extending from the political range of the local Arab press to local Jewish and Zionist newspapers. It resonates with Ben-Bassat's contribution in unearthing a surprising degree of support for the empire and widespread interest in developments in the Balkans and western provinces. The turning point was, yet again, the Second Balkan War, after which "further loss of land, demographic homogenization, and the perceived success of ethno-nationalist movements in breaking off from the empire all contributed to weakening an already frail Ottomanist project". This feeling of the loss of capacity of the empire was further aggravated by growing fears of a Zionist takeover of Palestine along the lines of Edirne's occupation by Bulgarian troops.

Part Four: Reform or Cataclysm in the Kurdo-Armenian Eastern Provinces?

Thomas Schmutz's chapter "The German Role in the Reform Discussion of 1913–14" shifts the focus to eastern Anatolia. In June 1913, Russia proposed a draft for an agreement to improve the status of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. After intense negotiations between the European powers and the Sublime Porte, an agreement was finally signed on 8 February 1914. Due in particular to German intervention, the agreement differed substantially from the initial Russian proposal. Another round of negotiations took place on the issue of two inspector-generals who would implement and monitor reforms in eastern Anatolia. These discussions, however, remained inconclusive, as they took place in early summer 1914 when Europe was already on its way to war. Schmutz, drawing on German diplomatic archival material, explicates how German concerns were expressed in the language of humanitarian concerns but were ultimately inspired by European rivalry. The reform question was seen as one issue among others like the Liman von Sanders mission or the question of arms deals. Germany acknowledged for the

first time the need to tackle the problems behind the Armenian Question but lost this issue from sight after the July crisis of 1914. It was unprepared when its ally began to "solve" the issue by means of removal and extermination in 1915.

In "The Effect of Land Disputes on the Reform Question in the Eastern Provinces", Mehmet Polatel analyzes the land question in terms of the reform plans for the eastern provinces. The lack of intent and capacity on part of the Unionist government to resolve the issue of land disputes and manage Kurdish reactions to the prospects of reform resulted in the emergence of a new social alliance including refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus, Kurds, and local Turks on the eve of the World War I. Although the Ottoman government took some steps to solve the land question after 1908 – thanks to the agreement between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – government policy turned to be much more equivocal from 1910 onward. The internationalization of the issue of reform in 1913 had many setbacks, among them the fact that international reform schemes were vague in terms of the resolution of land disputes and thereby helped to accelerate tension and anxiety at the local level on the eve of the war.

Vahé Tachjian's piece "Building the 'Model Ottoman Citizen': Life and Death in the Region of Harput-Mamüretülaziz (1908–15)" makes the case for the study of local history as an essential tool for understanding the social life and history of the Ottoman Empire's eastern provinces. Microhistorical studies still have a long way to go to become an established part of historical research. In this respect, the varied and rich materials written in Armenian language, such as memory books *(houshamadyan)*, memoirs, letters, and press articles, are crucial as they contain detailed descriptions of provincial life almost nonexistent in non-Armenian sources. Tachjian zooms in on the region of Mamuret ul-Aziz (or the plain of Harput) in the period 1908–15 and seeks to reconstruct the daily life of the local Armenian community. The primary sources written in Armenian open our view onto the world of village and town life and the rural and urban social milieus, describing changes in everyday life in impressive detail.

Uğur Ümit Üngör argues, in "Explaining Regional Variations in the Armenian Genocide", that the Armenian genocide has become less "controversial" and depoliticized and that a rough consensus among

scholars has been established. One among the still largely unresolved issues, he suggests, is that of the regional variations of the genocidal process. Üngör submits that in-depth research on the relationship between central decision-making processes and the implementation of mass murder at the local level has proven most fruitful. Analyzing how genocidal processes evolve at the provincial, district, city, or even village level allows us to understand how local power relations influence the course and intensity of genocidal processes. Given obvious disparities in the Armenian genocide from province to province, Üngör seeks to develop a model for systematic examination of regional differences in the Armenian genocide, by giving a comparative focus on the course of the genocide in several eastern provinces.

The Afterword by Hamit Bozarslan not only returns to the worrying presence of the past but also suggests a trajectory of irresponsible political engineering in the Middle East with roots, as he sees them, in the Unionist experience.

Notes

1. On the origins and meaning of the term *Middle East*, see Roderic Davison, "Where Is the Middle East?", *Foreign Affairs* 38 (1959/60), pp. 665–75; and Osamah F. Khalil, "The Crossroads of the World: U.S. and British Foreign Policy Doctrines and the Construct of the Middle East, 1902–2007", *Diplomatic History* 38, 2 (2014), pp. 299–344.
2. We owe this very apt phrase, "violence and viability", to Mustafa Aksakal during a workshop in June 2014 at the University of Zurich.
3. Cf. Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913–1918) (Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 2001).
4. See the ferocious debate on Fritz Fischer's *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag 1961; an English translation appeared in 1967 as *Germany's Aims in the First World War),* continuing into the immediate present, such as in the special issue, edited by Annika Mombauer, of *Journal of Contemporary History* 48, 2 (April 2013), "The Fischer Controversy after 50 Years".
5. The editors of this book are not the first to have applied the term *cataclysm* to World War I; see, e.g., David Stevenson, *Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy* (New York: Basic Books, 2005). For an example how the term *cataclysm* was applied to other wars, see also Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology* (Boston: South End Press, 1979).
6. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 3, 16.

7. Thomas Kuehn: *Empire, Islam, and Politics of Difference: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849–1919* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 2, 13, aptly uses the term *colonial Ottomanism* to characterize the hybrid policy of colonial domination and a centralizing *cum* nationalizing empire.
8. Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Zeynep Çelik, *Empire, Architecture, and the City: French-Ottoman Encounters, 1830–1914* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008); Malte Fuhrmann and Vangelis Kechriotis, editorial to "The Late Ottoman Port-Cities and Their Inhabitants: Subjectivity, Urbanity, and Conflicting Orders. In memory of Faruk Tabak (1953–2008)", special issue, *Mediterranean Historical Review* 24, 2 (2009), pp. 71–8 (see also all other contributions).
9. The loss of these eastern provinces had grave consequences for the overall demographic weight of the Ottoman Empire. The population of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire had been roughly the same (around 30 million) around 1850, while in 1901 the gap had widened considerably: Austria-Hungary had reached 45.2 million inhabitants, while the Ottoman Empire had fallen to 26 million. See Erik J. Zürcher: *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building. From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), p. 64.
10. "Premodern" is defined here as the period up to the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century in which (*a*) the Ottoman Empire was not integrated into the wider realm of European world economy and imperial power systems, (*b*) the 'infrastructural power' (in the meaning of Michael Mann's differentiation between "despotic" and "infrastructural" power) of the state was not yet pervasive or even not conceived as a desired state of affairs, and (*c*) the paradigm of nationalism and the ethnically homogeneous state had not been established. For (*b*), see Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results", in John A. Hall, (ed.), *States in History* (London: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 109–36.
11. See Tanıl Bora, "Turkish National Identity, Turkish Nationalism and the Balkan Problem", in Günay Göksü Özdoğan and Kemâli Saybaşılı (eds), *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order* (Istanbul: Eren, 1995), pp. 101–20, esp. p. 104, for a lucid analysis of Turkish feelings of having been victims of a Western conspiracy and betrayed by the former Ottoman subjects in southeastern Europe and the Arab provinces.
12. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, "Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing", in Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth (eds), *Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 87–139, esp. p. 93, characterize the massacres of 1894–6 against the Armenians as the early result of an Ottoman "learning process", i.e., "that Istanbul had learned the lesson of the ethnic majoritarianism that had won the Balkan nations their independence".
13. Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History,* p. 288.

14. Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 137.
15. Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, p. 178.
16. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 191–209.
17. Nader Soharabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 224–83.
18. Uğur Ü. Üngör, "Disastrous Decade: Armenians and Kurds in the Young Turk Era", in Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij (eds), *Social Relations in Ottoman Diarbekir, 1870–1915* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 270–5; Vahé Tachjian, "Yerel anlatılar ile genel anlatıları birleştirmek. Osmanlı Palusu'nda Ermenilerin hayatı", in Cengiz Aktar, (ed.), *Diyarbakir Tebliğleri: Diyarbakir ve cevresi toplumsal ve ekonomik tarihi konferansi* (İstanbul: Hrant Dink Vakfı Yayınları, 2013), p. 110.
19. Hans L. Kieser, *Türklüğe ihtida. 1870–1939 İsviçre'sinde yeni Türkiye'nin öncüleri* (Istanbul: İletişim), pp. 109–14 and 250–1.
20. Michael A. Reynolds, "Abdürrezzak Bedirhan: Ottoman Kurd and Russophile in the Twilight of Empire", in *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, 2 (spring 2011), pp. 411–50.
21. M. Talha Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria: Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914–17* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 83–4.
22. Particularly impressive is the study by Meron Benvenisti, whose father, a geographer, had contributed to transform the landscape of Palestine: *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
23. Kerem Oktem and Chris Sisserian, "Turkey's Armenian Opening: Towards 2015", *OpenDemocracy* 25 (June 2014); Sossie Kasbarian and Kerem Oktem, "Armenians, Turks and Kurds beyond Denial: An Introduction", *Patterns of Prejudice* 48, 2 (2014).
24. Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (London: Darwin, 1995).
25. İpek Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Fatma Müge Göçek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Tovmas G. Mkrtichean, Uğur Ümit Üngör and Ara Sarafian, *The Diyarbekir Massacres and Kurdish Atrocities* (London: Gomidas Institute, 2013); Ugur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); as well as many contributions in this volume.
26. See, e.g., Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2012), and his thorough discussion of how the Balkan wars fundamentally eroded the position of Austria-Hungary in European power relations.