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Afterword: A View from the Center

by George W. Stocking, Jr.
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Despite the apparently unifying embracesiveness of the term "anthropology," there is actually a great deal of diversity within the Euro-American anthropological tradition. The history of this diversity has yet to be written (cf. Diamond 1980); but it seems clear that anthropology is not so much a single science produced by some Comtean logico-historical process of intellectual differentiation as it is an imperfect fusion of quite different traditions of inquiry: biological, historical, linguistic, sociological. The outcome of this fusion has varied in different national intellectual traditions, with the sharpest contrast between those with a more strongly embracive approach (most especially, albeit problematically, the Anglo-American) and those of the European continent in which the term anthropology has traditionally referred to the physical study of man.

Within the Euro-American tradition one may also distinguish between anthropologies of "empire-building" and anthropologies of "nation-building." The character of anthropological inquiry in Great Britain has been primarily determined by experience with dark-skinned "others" in the overseas empire. In contrast, in many parts of the European continent, the relation of national identity and internal otherness tended, in the context of nineteenth century movements of cultural nationalism, to be a more focal issue; and strong traditions of Volkskunde developed quite distinctly from Völkerkunde. The former was the study of the internal peasant others who composed the nation, or potential nations within an imperial state; the latter was the study of more distant others, either overseas or farther back in European history.

Granted that there is a great deal of historically conditioned diversity among the national anthropological traditions of the center, it is nonetheless clear that from the perspective of the periphery, an important unity can be seen. Beyond the specific intellectual and institutional influences of particu-
lar metropolitan traditions, whether they are positively or negatively viewed, there seems to be an entity called "international anthropology" that is informed by "the anthropological spirit." No doubt this might also be construed negatively as a kind of post-colonial "multinational" anthropology; more positively, it might be viewed as a disciplinary ideal to be realized somehow by mediation between the anthropologies of the Euro-American center and those of the post-colonial periphery. But there is also a sense in which a certain current of Euro-American anthropology itself has in the recent historical past become more "international."

The ultimate basis for such underlying unity as Euro-American anthropology manifests — and by extension, for the unity of "international anthropology" — has probably been what Kenelm Burridge has called the "reach into otherness" (Burridge 1973:6). Allowing also for its manifestation in relation to the "internal" otherness of European diversity, it is the fascination with the external "other" encountered during the expansion of modern Europe that has provided historically the lowest common denominator of Euro-American anthropology. No doubt this fascination has been linked to such concerns as the essentials of human nature or the origins of European civilization. But despite a recent and perhaps inevitable shift toward the study of more complex societies, in long-term historical perspective the broadest unity of Euro-American anthropology is to be found in its substantive focus on the study of the non-European "other."

Given the fact that non-European "others," contrasting sharply in skin-color and culture, have been subject to over four centuries of systematic expropriation and exploitation by Euro-Americans, it is not surprising that Euro-American anthropological speculation has always had a strongly "ideological" character. Although notions of extreme racial disjunction were always countered by the underlying monogenism of the Biblical tradition, the lowest ideological common denominator of Euro-American anthropology throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century was a belief in the hereditary or cumulative environmental physical and cultural inferiority of non-European others (Stocking 1968). The evolutionary viewpoint, which provided the intellectual basis for the most broadly embrace concept of anthropology, also provided an intellectual justification for that presumed inferiority, and by extension for the exploitation it in turn justified. Euro-American anthropology carries until this day the burden of this racialist ideological baggage. Most modern anthropologists, however (and many in the nineteenth century), have seen themselves as friends and defenders of the non-European others they studied. Indeed, the dominant ideological thrust of "the anthropology which was created after the turn of the century, as an alternative to the great evolutionary schemes," has been liberal, reformist,
anti-racialist, and culturally relativist (Velho; supra: 142). Serving as the "bad conscience" of European colonialism, it has defended the capacities and the cultures of native peoples and called into question many unexamined ethnocentric assumptions of European "civilization" — without, however, fundamentally questioning the fact of European domination, and perhaps in some ways functioning to sustain it.

Although the establishment of the modern disciplinary ideology is too complex to be explained simply in these terms, it is clearly related to the emergence of a mode of inquiry that has distinguished modern anthropology from other humanistic and social scientific disciplines: fieldwork by participant observation in a small community where the investigator, entering as a non-threatening and sympathetic stranger, becomes (to a limited extent) part of the system of face-to-face relationships. This style of inquiry has in turn been related to certain generalized methodological values: the value placed on fieldwork itself as the basic constituting experience both of anthropologists and of anthropological knowledge; the value placed on a holistic approach to the entities that are the subject of this form of knowledge; the value placed on the equal valuation of all such entities; and the value placed on their uniquely privileged role in the constitution of anthropological theory (Stocking 1982). This style of inquiry coexists in unresolved tension with a more scientific comparativism that is still anthropology's heritage from the evolutionary era, and it does not of course characterize all of the work carried on by anthropologists in all national or sub-disciplinary traditions. Nevertheless, it has been normative in those that have done the most to define the character of "international anthropology": American cultural and British social anthropology.

The convergence of these two orientations, whose distinguishing features have become more the reflection of their traditional academic and ethnographic settings than of fundamental difference of theoretical assumption (cf. Murphy 1971:3-35; cf. Diamond 1980:15), has been the critical factor in the emergence of "international anthropology." Although it is in their respective national traditions that the concept of an embrace general anthropology has been historically strongest, in both cases the discipline as a whole has long been dominated by socio-cultural anthropology, so that its methodological values have tended to be accepted by all who call themselves anthropologists.

Proportionate to the world community of anthropologists, the numbers of Anglo-(and especially of North) American anthropologists are very large indeed. (Counted in terms of its faculty, current graduate students and past degree recipients my own department at the University of Chicago is larger than most of the national anthropologies represented in this volume, and it
grants less than a twentieth of the total number of doctorates produced annually in the United States.) Furthermore, the sphere of Anglo-American activities has been as broad as the combined realm of the pre-World II British empire and the postwar Point Four-Peace Corps "empire" of the United States. And when in the postwar period "international anthropology" began to achieve, through quadrennial congresses and the publication of Current Anthropology, a certain institutional structure, significant numbers of the non-Anglo-American anthropologists who helped to constitute it had in fact received their training within the Anglo-American tradition.

If, then, one were to define "international anthropology" historically as it emerged in the 1950s and 1960s (rather than normatively, as it might conceivably reconstitute itself in the 1980s), the definition would have to reflect the various influences just considered: the deeply-rooted and broadly unifying substantive concern with darker-skinned non-European "others"; the dominant ideological commitment to liberal anti-racialism along with certain ideological and conceptual residues from the evolutionary era; the methodological values associated with fieldwork by participant observation; the theoretical convergence of Anglo-American sociocultural anthropology (augmented more recently by French structuralism); and the demographic and institutional dominance of North American anthropologists — all within a tradition still giving a certain residual commitment to the idea of "general anthropology."

The "international anthropology" thus described was of course still essentially Euro-American. What is missing from this characterization is precisely the new center-periphery relationships that developed in the very same period that "international anthropology" emerged. The era of direct European colonial dominance was coming rapidly to a close, and there was a transformation of the relations of Euro-American anthropologists and the "others" who had traditionally provided the privileged substantive focus of anthropological speculation. It was not simply that sociocultural transformation seemed on the verge of finally accomplishing the long-heralded disappearance of "primitive" and "tribal" peoples. The groups these increasingly problematic categories described were now being incorporated into "emerging nations" intent not only on asserting national identity and power against erstwhile colonial masters, but on transforming the techno-economic infrastructure that was their heritage of colonial dependency, with all the ramifying sociocultural changes that such national transformation implies — all this in a world context in which two major communist power centers played a constantly growing role. Largely through the medium of several major episodes of bloody decolonizing warfare, this changing post-colonial situation reacted upon the domestic Euro-American intellectual context, so that the substan-
tive, ideological, methodological, theoretical and demographic/institutional features that characterized the just emerging "international anthropology" were all called into question.

In the face of both rapid sociocultural change and restrictions on access by outside investigators, it was no longer realistic, even normatively, to regard the recovery of pure, uncontaminated non-European "otherness" as the privileged substantive focus of anthropological inquiry. That focus had never, of course, entirely excluded interest in the component groups of more complex societies and in the processes that generated them. But these more "sociological" and "historical" interests now came towards the forefront. In the anthropology of the periphery, this took the form of pragmatic concern with highly political "practical" problems of national development. In the center, it was manifest in the proliferation of adjectival anthropologies, many of which found their subject matter in the contemporary life of the anthropologist's own society, as well as in the exploitation of a variety of historical materials, including the reanalysis of previously collected ethnographies.

In this changing substantive context, the ideology of "bad conscience" became itself a victim of bad conscience. It had served in a reasonably self-satisfying manner the needs of culturally marginal anthropologists aspiring to the privileges of an endowed academic alienation, whence they might mediate between the dominating culture into which they had been bred and the dominated ones with which they had chosen by profession to identify. Now, however, they were called upon to take sides in the political and military struggles of the decolonizing world. Anthropological research that might be used for political or military purposes, which during the historical moment of struggle against Nazism had seemed even laudable, became now a bitterly controversial ethical issue. This ideological bouleversement affected cherished anthropological positions: functionalism was now retrospectively perceived by many as the ideological buttress of a mature colonialism rather than its humanizing agent (Asad 1973); cultural relativism, which had buttressed the attack against racism, could be perceived as a sort of neo-racialism justifying the backward techno-economic status of once colonized peoples.

In this new ideological climate, the style of inquiry that had sustained the generalized methodological values of anthropology became now doubly problematic. Aware now of the "colonial situation" that had facilitated if it had not made possible traditional field research by participant observation, anthropologists now began to call into question both the ethical and the epistemological status of their inquiry. Simultaneously, the transformation of this colonial situation made traditional fieldwork more difficult to carry on, even as new research priorities required modification of traditional fieldwork.
methodology. A turn toward more reflexive study, both in the periphery and in the center, made much more problematic the privileged relationship of intrusive individual marginality that characterized traditional participant observation; simultaneously, the shift toward more sociological and historical problems threatened to reduce its relative methodological importance.

The loss of methodological innocence was accompanied by a reevaluation of sociocultural theory. As the focus of substantive interest shifted away from tribal societies treated in isolation from or in passive relation to world historical processes, there was a movement from essentially homeostatic theoretical orientations toward more dynamic ones. The reaction against synchronic "structural-functionalism" was accompanied by a general critique of positivist scientism, by a reassertion of the importance of history (both as process and as a mode of anthropological understanding), and, for the first time in the Anglo-American tradition, by the legitimation of Marxism as a significant component of the theoretical armory of anthropology.

Finally, there were significant changes in the demographic structure and the institutional framework of anthropological inquiry. In the 1970s, the continuing absolute numerical predominance of Anglo-American anthropologists took on a new significance. With the end of the great educational explosion of the post-World War II period, the annual waves of anthropology Ph.D.s produced in the center began to fill all of the no longer rapidly increasing departmental pools. For the first time, they spilled in large numbers outside the universities and museums in which anthropology had traditionally found its institutional niches, and beyond which it had yet to establish a viable claim to significant domestic "social utility". At the periphery, they faced challenges from emergent corps of native anthropologists, both for control of research and for jobs in the growing number of peripheral anthropological institutions. After several decades riding a rising tide, confident that growing numbers of anthropologists would spread the tolerant critical humanism of "the anthropological spirit" throughout the world, the profession suddenly faced what some perceived as a general post-colonial "crisis of anthropology," in which its long run future existence was very much in doubt (Hoebel 1982).

It was of course a time of general malaise in the human sciences, and it was possible to view the current difficulties of anthropology simply as a phase in its development — analogous, perhaps, to the depressed years of the 1930s, which certain elders were inclined to recall when faced with the prospect of their students' unemployment. Indeed, there were many whose residue of prelapsarian confidence or sense of the weight of institutional inertia convinced them that the discipline would surely carry on indefinitely. Others foresaw its transformation into sociology, or the final realization of
Maitland's prophecy that it must eventually become history or be "nothing at all," or perhaps a centrifugal fragmentation along the lines of the multitudinous adjectival anthropologies, with one or more major disciplinary neighbors serving as residuary legatees. But there was a significant minority that sounded the call for a thoroughgoing "reinvention of anthropology," calling into question its substantive focus, its ideological basis, its methodological assumptions, its theoretical orientations and its institutional structure — even to the point of suggesting that the whole century of its academic institutionalization had somehow been a great mistake (Hymes 1973).

What was ultimately at issue was the reversibility, the reflexivity, and the universality of anthropological knowledge. Was anthropology simply the discourse by which Europeans had interpreted to themselves the non-European "others" encountered over the centuries of European expansion, and a means of defining an oppositional identity for themselves (and any "others" who aspired to emulate European civilization)? Or did it provide a reversible way of understanding human diversity, valid for non-European peoples looking at themselves and at each other, or back at Europe? To what extent could it be effectively self-reflexive, either for Europeans or for "others," and still maintain its uniquely disciplinary perspective? What were its claims to universality, either as a summation of the various perspectives that might be achieved by a multiplicity of anthropologies, or as the single scientific mode of investigating human diversity? What, ultimately, is the significance of the differential "shaping of national anthropologies"?

These are not issues that can be laid to rest here; history, not historiography, will resolve them. But it is in some such context as this that the present accounts of seven national anthropologies of the periphery should be considered.

* * *

To begin with, it may be helpful to comment on them as a sampling of the variety of world anthropology. If one were to list what could be called the "hegemonic" national traditions, the list might include those same countries that are or have been dominant in the history of modern science: Britain, France, Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union — the latter less for its place in the development of the anthropology of the center than as the most strongly institutionalized anthropological embodiment of an orthodox Marxist viewpoint. Thanks to the inclusion of Poland, and allowing for the fact that German anthropological influence has long since been reduced to post-imperial secondary status, the seven cases embody (usually in somewhat
hybrid form) the influence of every hegemonic tradition. Although the furthest periphery (sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, the Far East and the Pacific) is unrepresented, there are anthropologies from each of the major continental areas. And they also include a range of what one might a priori expect to be "types" of anthropological traditions other than the hegemonic: the "secondary metropolitan" (Sweden and Poland); the "white settler" (Anglophone Canada, Quebec, and Brazil); and the "ex-colonial" (India and Sudan). The categories are by no means exhaustive; neither do they adequately characterize the complexity of each particular national anthropology. Viewed from the perspective of the institutionalized enforcement of hegemonic intellectual influences, Poland might be regarded as a colonial anthropology; similarly, Anglophone Canada from the perspective of the numbers of permanently resident expatriates.

But despite its potentially alienating terminology, the typology does serve to distribute peripheral anthropologies along a spectrum of possible relations to "otherness". At one end, the two "secondary metropolitan" anthropologies both derive from a continental European museum-oriented tradition in which Völkerkunde dealt with the culture history of external others and Volkskunde with the historical others of the national cultural tradition. In neither case, however, has the internal other been the object of serious expatriate anthropological interest, and both have moved in recent years toward a "social anthropological" orientation in which overseas fieldwork has played a more important role. In this respect they emulate the hegemonic anthropologies: studying others, within and without, they are by and large not the subject of expatriate study. The three "white settler" anthropologies all study groups who, although now internal to their national societies, were originally encountered as culturally alien others and are still the subject of significant expatriate anthropological inquiry. They differ among themselves, however, in two ways. Both Canadian anthropologies (unlike Brazil and like the two secondary metropolitan ones) also study others overseas, although this interest is to a considerable extent associated with a large resident group of expatriate metropolitan anthropologists. On the other hand, both Quebec and Brazil (unlike the Anglo-American metropolitan tradition and like those of the European continent) focus a great deal of attention on internal groups more directly component of their national cultural identity. The "paradox" of being an anthropologist in a country "traditionally identified as the object of anthropology" (Velho, supra 133) is most strongly evident at the other end of the spectrum, where (leaving aside the seven Indian anthropologists able to do overseas fieldwork with expatriate funding) the two "ex-colonial" anthropologies focus on internal others who to this day are also the external others of expatriate inquiry.
Despite their wide range of metropolitan influences and of relationships to "otherness", these seven peripheral anthropologies share many features in common. That most immediately evident in the material presented here is the English language. It is of course clear in several instances that internal anthropological discourse is either bilingual or carried on predominantly in the national tongue, and in others that the use of English is problematic from the point of view of the politics of national cultural life. But on the whole their interpreters are comfortably anglophonic, and while this fact no doubt reflects such other influences as the language of this publication, it seems also clearly to be associated with the pattern of hegemonic relations. Anthropology at the periphery may (as the introduction to this volume suggests) be considered in terms of the historical development of different hegemonic influences as manifest in specific sociometric networks or spheres of anthropological influence. However, the cases presented here suggest that with the exception of the Soviet Marxist influence on Poland, which from 1956 has been qualified by a strong turn to the West, and allowing for the French current particularly evident in Quebec and Brazil, it is Anglo-American anthropology that has exercised the predominant influence on the anthropologists of the periphery.

This influence is of course most problematic for the ex-colonial anthropologies, the only ones for whom a radically "reinvented" or "alternative" anthropology seems to be an issue of serious concern. For the rest, the influences of the center seem to be positively valued: "international anthropology" provides a "wider range of possibilities than the small professional community" of a secondary metropolitan anthropology can offer (Hannerz, supra, 168); it is one of the "privileges of underdevelopment" (Velho, supra, 139) — although scarcely, one might add, unique to it — that it can combine a variety of metropolitan influences; in the case of Poland, western hegemonic orientations are clearly perceived as liberating counterbalance to orthodox Marxism. Elsewhere, Marxism seems less in evidence than one might have expected. One assumes that it is a primary component of the "radical approaches" that have been adopted in the Sudan since the mid-1970s, but although one of the "most popular new theoretical approaches" in Quebec, it is seen as having led to the substitution of one form of utilitarianism for another. Only in Brazil are we given evidence that it has provoked significant theoretical reconsideration.

Indeed, on the basis of what is presented here, anthropology at the periphery seems neither so nationally varied nor so sharply divergent from that of the center as the conception of "the shaping of national anthropologies" might have implied. While the accounts of intellectual influence, institutional development, and substantive concerns differ of course in specific detail,
there is little that qualifies as reinvented or radically alternative anthropology, and not too much specifically national uniqueness. In Sweden (the only case where the influence of "national character" is, somewhat inconclusively, considered) what is offered as evidence of the "internal dynam·c" within Swedish anthropology (the interest in symbol and ritual of the three professorial appointments in the 1970s) seems also a local manifestation of one aspect of the involuntary development of "international anthropology" in this period. In Poland, reinvention consists precisely in the importation of various currents from the Western anthropological center. Despite a great deal of concern with the "Canadianization" of its personnel (which seems likely to be resolved only by the naturalization or retirement of tenured expatriates), there seems little that is "distinctively Canadian" in the anthropology of Anglophone Canada. Similarly, despite the asserted uniqueness of "large scale and longitudinal team research" (cf. Foster et al 1979), there is nothing "sufficient to suggest a Québécois school of thought within an international discipline." And while in Brazil there is a conflict between "local demands" and "Anthropology as a science," capitalization assumes the ultimate indivisibility of the latter. In India, the issue of how an intellectual orientation arising in one civilization is "domesticated in another" is specifically addressed, but any alternative to "international anthropology" remains implicit in the suggestion that the Western tradition should be treated as a historically particular "foil" for Indian self-understanding. Finally, despite the pressing need to "reinvent" rather than merely to "rethink" anthropology in Sudan, "few inventions have appeared."

This apparent failure of either reinvention or national specificity may be to some extent an artifact: the authors of this volume seem for the most part to represent in their own contexts "establishment" rather than "radical-critical" points of view. Beyond this, it may reflect the growing pains of locally recently established disciplines. Most of the authors note the recency of the development of a social anthropological orientation in their countries. Almost all of them refer to a preoccupation in the 1970s with its professional and institutional development, and to problems either of dearth or glut of personnel. While in only two instances (Anglophone Canada and Sudan) is the continuing activity of expatriate anthropologists and the nationalization of personnel explicitly an issue, it is clear that the effect of patterns of training and recruitment in which visiting or resident expatriates and metropolitan-trained or oriented local anthropologists have dominated the discipline at the periphery must be to reproduce the methodological and theoretical approaches of the metropolis. While the appeal to the youth of the discipline is a rather old one in the social sciences, and an active institutional involvement has in fact historically been a marked feature of the emergence of well-
defined theoretical schools within the metropolitan centers, one might still assume that over a longer period of time some significant methodological or theoretical differentiation might develop, if the "privileges of underdevelopment" do not turn out to be merely sequential exposure to the intellectual fads of the metropolis.

On the other hand, one might also suggest that the nation is not the level on which a significant differentiation is most likely to be manifest now or in the future. Without denying the sociocultural determination of knowledge — an anthropological postulate from which the discipline can not presume to exempt itself entirely — one might argue that significant national differentiation is more likely to occur in the early stages of its international development. In the case of marginally (or non-) scientific inquiries such as anthropology, the major general orientations and paradigmatic alternatives within them, although perhaps first elaborated in particular national intellectual contexts, are limited in number and by now generally available. While the possibility of a radically different anthropology (based, perhaps, on the Eskimo or the Chinese concept of human nature) has been suggested, (Krader 1980) and we may still envision the possibility of "alternative great traditional" orientations emerging in the future, such alternatives seem at present quite hypothetical. What seems more likely is elaborations and recombinations of possibilities already defined within the traditions of the center. There will be differences in style, focus and problem orientation depending on the specific history of intellectual influences, the academic and ethnomorphic settings, the context of political and social concern, and the resources available to sustain diversity. While these may be manifest occasionally on a national level, the present case material suggests that more significant contrasts may be evident between the types of national anthropologies proposed above, or more generally between the hegemonic traditions of the center and those of the periphery as a group.

Certainly, such contrasts are quite marked in the case of the anthropologies considered here. The presumably "distinctive" features of Quebec anthropology — "a focus on rural studies /and/ an emphasis on practical anthropology" (Gold and Tremblay, supra, p. 124) may perhaps be better viewed as features common to anthropologies of the periphery. The concern with the rural-urban transition, or the relation of smaller peripheral social units to the society and the culture of the national center, and the emphasis on "practical" problems of national development and integration are present in almost all cases. Although the influence of resident expatriates or of hegemonic models may involve them in some residual or vicarious participation in the anthropology of empire, these peripheral anthropologies are predominantly "nation-building" anthropologies. This fact has consequences in regard to
each of the dimensions in terms of which "international anthropology" was discussed above.

Substantively, it has meant an emphasis not only on internal "others," but on these groups who are seen as more problematic for the construction of an integrated national society and culture — in some cases (e.g. Brazil) to the neglect of still accessible "exotic" others of the sort who have traditionally provided the subject matter of anthropology. Ideologically, it has tended to subordinate or even to sacrifice the role of society's "bad conscience" to a more positively social utilitarian identification with the struggle for national culture and social unity. At the center, where anthropology has been more securely institutionalized within a strongly established tradition of academic autonomy, it has enjoyed the privileges of a merely generalized and critical social relevance (qualified to some extent by its claims of colonial utility). At the periphery, where the discipline is more recently established, directly utilitarian "local demands" are strongly asserted against the more disinterested tradition associated with the "international community of scholars." Certain concomitants of nation-building peripherality may also be reflected in anthropological theory. In the context of the shift away from the homeostatic synchronic modes characteristic of the earlier phases of "international anthropology," we may perhaps anticipate "the development of theoretical models which deal with humans as forward-looking explorers of the possible rather than as conservators of the past" (Fahim et al 1980:651). On the other hand, the focus on policy-oriented "applied" issues may have a generally constraining effect on theoretical speculation itself — assuming that a certain degree of freedom from immediate social or institutional demands is one of the conditions of its development. As far as the institutionalization of anthropology is concerned, the impact of peripherality is reflected not only in ways already suggested, but by the fact that regardless of the particular form of anthropology originally present or implanted, the most significant disciplinary boundary relation today is that with sociology — whether the outcome be blurring, or merger, or a sense of sharpened competition for societal status and governmental support.

From the perspective of the transformation of the discipline, however, the most significant effects of peripheralization may be those on the mode of inquiry that has made modern anthropology so distinctive. By and large, this is less explicitly problematic in the cases presented here than the issues already noted — a fact that reflects both the centrality of certain value-laden methodological assumptions to the definition of "international anthropology" and their continuing influence on the anthropologists of the periphery. The instances in which method is mentioned, however, do provoke thought. The "long term team research" mentioned in Quebec, although clearly more "so-
ciological" in tendency, seems not inconsistent with the traditional anthropological mode, inasmuch as extended observation has long been a desideratum, and team research a legitimate (albeit less valued) alternative to the "lone investigator" (cf. Foster et al 1979). The problem of fieldwork in India as a "soft experience in one's home area, often with already familiar people" (Saberwal, supra, p. 43) and the shift from "participant observation" to "participant intervention" in Sudan (Ahmed, supra, p. 74), however, suggest perhaps more fundamental reorientation.

"Otherness" is no doubt a multidimensional phenomenon, which may be envisioned in terms of the number of boundaries that must be crossed: language, color and body type, urban-rural residence, sex, age, occupation, class, power, nationality or nation-state affiliation, as well as all the other differences that anthropologists treat under the rubrics of society and culture. While from this perspective any group may be an "other," and the status of "insider" and "outsider" must always be relative, we may assume that the number and type of such boundaries that must be crossed will have significant effects on the relations involved in inquiry, the kinds of information elicitable, and the sorts of understanding possible in ethnographic research. But if "internal others" may in fact be quite distant in these terms from an anthropological professional within the same nation-state, nation-state affiliation is a particularly salient boundary in defining "insider/outsider" relations. Indigenous anthropologists, too, tend to study "down" rather than "up", and while their prior familiarity will often be greater, so also may be their involvement in structures of power with an active commitment to changing the "otherness" that is being observed.

As with most of the other effects of peripherality being considered here, the consequences may be variously evaluated. From the perspective of the distinguishing mode of anthropological inquiry, we may assume that anthropological knowledge may be enriched in a variety of ways: new standards of linguistic competence, greater familiarity with historical context and available documentary materials, the criticism of other local scholars, etc. as well as such benefits as may flow from the contrast of "insider" and "outsider" observational perspectives (Fahim et al 1980:646). On the other hand, a shift from "participant observation" to "participant intervention," while perhaps justifiable in terms of compelling social concerns, seems likely not simply to augment but fundamentally to reorient that mode of inquiry. Anthropologists have always themselves been unconscious or conscious agents of change, and have never escaped implication in the power structures impinging on the "others" they observed. But while at various points in the development of the discipline a case has been made for "applied anthropology," "action anthropology," and "partisan participation," for the most part active identification
with the interests of the small communities anthropologists have studied has taken the form of what might be called "defensive advocacy" — a posture that closely articulates with the generalized methodological values and the implicit epistemological assumptions of its distinctive mode of inquiry. From this point of view, it can be argued that a more active, committed identification with the larger social units in which their small communities are embedded, if it does not "constitute a potential danger to the epistemological unity of the discipline" (Fahim et al 1980:649), is quite likely to have profound implications for its distinctive methodological orientation, and in ramifying ways for the discipline as a whole. In short, it may be argued that despite their failure so far sharply to differentiate themselves or to present radical alternatives to "international anthropology," the development of peripheral "nation-building" anthropologies in the context of the post-colonial "crisis of anthropology" may yet contribute to the transformation of a discipline whose most distinctive form was molded in the experience of empire.

Whatever transforming potential may exist at the periphery, however, does not seem to have imbued the authors of the present case studies with a uniform sense of assurance as to the present status or future prospects of their respective national anthropologies. In Sudan, the political elite seems to regard indigenous anthropology as guilty by association with colonialism, while at the same time both allowing expatriate graduate students to pursue socially-irrelevant "exotic" fieldwork and relying on the advice of "hit and run" expatriate experts on development problems. Despite the relative institutional success of social anthropologists in India, we are told of their descent "from cooperative inquiry to personal bickering and gossip" in an atmosphere of pervasive intellectual parochialism. In Brazil, the price of studying "avant-garde" themes unorthodox to traditional anthropology has been "a very direct extra-academic social control of what is being produced." In Quebec, anthropology was "peripheralized" during the period of its greatest growth and has been "unable to systematically influence policy-makers." In Anglophone Canada, the contrast is drawn with the "vibrant growth" of a "distinctive Canadian perspective" among younger sociologists. In Poland, the "actual participation and influence of ethnographers on state cultural policy" is much less than that of sociologists. And in Sweden — the closest to the hegemonic model — the view to the year 2000 is overcast by problems of jobs, access and funding. Despite the rapid growth of personnel and institutions, despite the move toward a more socially relevant research, anthropology at the periphery seems often to have failed to achieve social or governmental support; its status in relation to its most significant disciplinary other (sociology) is often weak; and where its position is more secure, there are doubts about the cost or worries about the future.
While such problems may be viewed as temporary aspects of the shedding of dependency, these resonances of the sense of malaise at the center suggest that the identification with "nation-building" has not enabled peripheral anthropologies entirely to escape involvement in the post-colonial "crisis of anthropology." What the outcome of that involvement may be is beyond the scope of these comments. It may be that "international anthropology" will turn out to have been a "diffused technic" exported "in various permutations and combinations to academic centers" all over the world (Diamond 1980:11). It may be that some of these centers will become "centers of a different type." It may be that "international anthropology" will even yet be "reinvented." Or it may be that it will turn out to have been an historically delimited phenomenon, and that the fate of socio-cultural anthropologists everywhere is to disappear into sociology, history, or other residuary disciplines, or to become students of the "classics" of non-literate societies. What does seem likely is that institutional inertia will carry on a certain "business as usual" until the year 2000 — at which point those of us who are still around may judge for ourselves.

REFERENCES