sent to the administrative court and was finally settled by a compromise between the two levels of government. In the redevelopment of Les Halles, a huge transportation hub and shopping complex in the center of Paris, the state was not directly involved, but it influenced the project through a state-owned transportation company. Finally, the state gave the city complete discretion in renovating Château Rouge, a predominantly ethnic community at the north fringe of the city. Together, the three cases reveal the competition, compromise, and collaboration between the city and the state, through which urban preservation in Paris is gradually changed from state monopoly to a joint venture between the city and the state.

I conclude by synthesizing the results of the book and describing the implications of the study for urban preservation, social justice, and broader urban changes. I examine the explanatory power of the theory of political fragmentation by discussing its potential application to the preservation practice in a number of major world cities. Although these cities differ in history, culture, regime type, and economic conditions, political fragmentation provides institutional constraints and shapes their policy processes of urban preservation. I also discuss how urban preservation influences social justice by presenting potential challenges to the human conditions in cities. I conclude with reflections on the impact of the current global institutional changes on cities and urban policymaking.

CHAPTER ONE

The Logic of Political Fragmentation

> The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide.
> —LUO GUANZHONG, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*

In this chapter, I develop a general theory of how political fragmentation influences the policy process. I identify three major types of political fragmentation, namely, functional fragmentation, territorial fragmentation, and intergovernmental fragmentation, and I specify the effects of each type on the policy process. Using this theory, I detail more specific propositions about the relationship between political institutions and the policy process of urban preservation, which are explored through comparative and historical analyses in chapters 2 to 4. I also highlight alternative explanations of the policy process, and of urban preservation policy more specifically, as the basis for comparison with the propositions I advance here.

The focus on political fragmentation is rooted in scholarly research investigating the relationships between institutions and patterns of political decision making. Institutions have been an enduring concern of political science since ancient times, but recent studies of historical institutionalism have tackled institutional questions with renewed vigor and creativity. Historical institutionalists attempt to illuminate how political struggles "are mediated by the institutional settings in which [they] take place" (Ikenberry 1988, 222–23). They work with a definition of institutions that includes both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct (Hall 1986). The fundamental point of historical institutionalism is that institutions influence political outcomes because they shape actors' power and strategies and mediate their relations of cooperation and conflict (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Steinmo

2001; Shapiro, Skowronek, and Galvin 2006; Lieberman 2009). Despite the focus on how institutions constrain and refract politics, institutional analyses do not deny the role of other variables: the players, their interests and strategies, and the distribution of power between them. Instead, they put these factors in context, showing how they relate to one another by drawing attention to the way political situations are structured (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Hall 1986).

The theory of political fragmentation contributes to the studies of historical institutionalism by revealing how and why different types of political fragmentation have affected the patterns of policymaking and implementation in different ways. It demonstrates that what matters for the policy process is not only whether a political system is fragmented but how it is fragmented. In so doing, it provides more general insights on the relationship between political institutions and policy processes that permit comparisons across political systems. In the remainder of the chapter, I develop the logical foundations of the theory of political fragmentation.

Defining Political Fragmentation

Political fragmentation is a frequently used term in political science research. Like a big umbrella covering a variety of things, it is often associated with different meanings in different contexts. In the literature of federalism, *political fragmentation* refers to the tensions and conflicts that exist between the center and territorial authorities (Pierson 1995; Rodden 2004), whereas in studies on state governance, it describes the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government (Friedberg 2000). In comparative politics, it implies the disintegration and fragility of nation-states due to class and ethnic cleavages (Lieberman 2003; Kohli 2004); however, in urban politics it refers to the segmentation of municipalities throughout metropolitan areas, paralleled by the spatial division of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups (Danielson 1976; Orfield 1974–75; Teaford 1979; Miller 1981; Weiher 1991; Morgan and Mareschal 1999; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961).

Despite the widely existing scholarly interest in the phenomenon of political fragmentation, there is no consensus on an analytical definition of this term. A main reason for the lack of such a definition is that scholars often underestimate the independent function of political fragmentation and tend to conceive it either as something to be explained by other factors or as a background against which political and social interactions take place. Different from previous studies that recognize the importance

of political fragmentation, this book treats political fragmentation as an independent variable that puts varied factors in context and shapes political and social realities.

In order to systematically investigate the impact of political fragmentation on the policy process, we need an analytical definition of the concept. In this book, I define political fragmentation as *the dispersed allocation of decision-making authority among multiple jurisdictions*. Jurisdictions are bounded areas to which political agencies apply their right or authority (Abbott 1988; Lamont and Molnár 2002). In David King's (1997) words, jurisdictions are "property rights over issues": they distinguish one political agency from another and set boundaries on what political actors can and cannot do. Reconfiguring jurisdictions usually results in reallocation of resources and power and redefinition of the rules of the game, which explains why battles over jurisdictions are so hard fought (King 1997). Political fragmentation is a critical characteristic of government institutions. This is not only because nearly every modern political system is multijurisdictional but also because political agencies' interests, agendas, and priorities are increasingly diverse across jurisdictional boundaries.

The distinction must be made between political fragmentation and veto players. Veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement is needed for a change of the status quo. The potential for policy change decreases when there are more veto players and diminishes even more when there is a lack of congruence and cohesion between these players (Tsebelis 1995; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Immergut 1992). Although the existence of veto players increases political fragmentation, the two concepts have substantial differences. First, veto players are political agencies, whereas political fragmentation is an institution that broadly includes agencies, formal organizations, and informal rules and procedures. Second, the role of veto players is more determinative, as their objections kill the policy initiative. By contrast, political fragmentation provides a tendency for blockage, which can be overcome by effective coordination between political actors.

Political fragmentation displays an institutional pattern in which the degree of structural unity is weakened in a significant and largely stable fashion by the configuration of jurisdictional boundaries. However, a fragmented political system is not necessarily without centralized authority. On one hand, upward shifts of authority from governments of the lower level to the higher level take place in some highly fragmented, federalist political systems. They generate a pattern of "fragmented centralization," in which channels of centralized control are created (Meyer and Scott

1983; Meyer, Scott, and Strang 1987). On the other hand, many centralized states face a lack of administrative coherence (Suleiman 1987). In studies on Chinese bureaucracy, for instance, the term *fragmented authoritarianism* is coined to describe the disjointed allocation of authority among the national ministries below the peak of the centralized Chinese state (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal and Lampton 1992). In a word, political fragmentation may exist in both decentralized and centralized systems and function under centralized authority. In fact, the fragmented political structure may well be purposefully created by political leaders at the top, as it increases the power of the leaders over the policy process by giving them chances to step into the jurisdictions of various agencies and solve the problems of collective action (King 1997).

The consequences of political fragmentation have been the topic of immense scholarly and policy debate for decades. Some studies demonstrate that political fragmentation causes troubles within the policy process by increasing the difficulty of coordinating activities between various political agencies, preventing the building of consensus around policy solutions, or slowing down the policy process. For example, King (1997) contends that political fragmentation destroys the effectiveness of the U.S. congressional committees so that the Congress cannot speak with a strong and coherent voice about any national problems at all. Hedrick Smith (1989, 699) describes the costs of political fragmentation plainly: "Fragmentation often leaves our politicians wallowing in deadlock because the government lacks the cohesion to form the durable coalitions needed to resolve the nation's most demanding problems." In the urban politics literature, scholars also note the negative impacts of political fragmentation on metropolitan development, as it increases the difficulty of achieving economies of scale, equitable distribution of public funds, and comprehensive zoning and planning policies at the metropolitan level. Consequently, centralized regional governments are considered the solution to the problems caused by fragmented metropolitan governance (Tiebout 1956; Savitch and Vogel 2000; Feiock 2004, 2007; Vicino 2008).

Despite the costs of political fragmentation, some degree of fragmentation might benefit the policy process. First, some degree of political fragmentation may be informationally efficient because there are "more people at the table when important decisions are being made" (King 1997, 144). The presence of a more heterogeneous group of people reduces bias in the decision-making process. Second, a fragmented political context can facilitate better matching of citizen preferences and government policy through sorting and can lead to smaller, more efficient, less corrupt

government and, under some conditions, more secure markets and faster growth (Rodden 2004, 481–82; Friedberg 2000). Specifically, polycentrists in urban politics argue that small, fragmented governments are preferable because competition between local units attracts economic growth (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961). Third, political fragmentation dismantles the monopolies of certain political agencies by increasing the points at which various interest groups can access the policy process. The destruction of these issue monopolies makes it more likely that new voices will be heard (King 1997; Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

A Typology of Political Fragmentation

A political system can be fragmented in various dimensions. In order to theorize the impacts of political fragmentation on the policy process, we need to identify the various typologies. This section defines three ideal types of political fragmentation: functional fragmentation, intergovernmental fragmentation, and territorial fragmentation. When ideal types are considered, few political systems are pure cases of any one, and some may reflect a mix of elements of the various types. Nonetheless, the primary goal of specifying this limited number of ideal-type fragmentations is to suggest major qualitative differences in political structure, providing a strong sense of system-level variation.

Functional fragmentation is characterized by the segmentation of authority between bureaucratic agencies at the same administrative level. As one of the main features of the modern bureaucracy, the functional division of responsibility between bureaucratic agencies is supposed to generate greater efficiency for the activities around which each bureaucracy was organized (Weber 1978). However, bureaucratic agencies are constrained by their own professional norms and departmental interests, so that they often function without much reference to one another, and the leadership of each is self-perpetuating and not readily subject to the control of any higher authority. According to Sayre and Kaufman's (1960) and Lowi's (1967, [1969] 1979) studies of New York City, professionally organized, autonomous career bureaucratic agencies have become "islands of functional power," which make the modern city well run but ungoverned.

The political structure of Beijing provides a good example of functional fragmentation. Although Beijing is the capital city of the centralized Chinese state, the roles of both the central government and the municipal mayors are limited to making general principles for urban policies. The real power over specific policy issues belongs to the municipal bureaucracies, a

total of forty-seven bureaus, with urban preservation housed in at least five of them. Although so many bureaucratic agencies appear to be involved in urban preservation, each agency has its own slant on different parts of the bill, like a patchwork quilt, so that there is no comprehensive protection of the built environment. This is a particularly serious problem for the preservation of historic neighborhoods, because none of the bureaus considers the issue as within its own jurisdiction. Although the municipal government attempts to facilitate the cooperation between bureaus, its efforts remain fruitless.

Different from function-oriented bureaucratic segmentation, *territorial fragmentation* entails a spatial division between government units at the same tier of the state apparatus. It is usually associated with the uneven distribution of resources or population across territorial boundaries (Brunn 1974; Holmes 1944). Territorial fragmentation exists at different levels of the state apparatus. For example, there is spatial differentiation and disintegration between different regions of the nation-states. Subnational territorial fragmentation provides the basis for exploring the unbalanced economic and political development across regions (Putnam 1993; Lieberman 2003; Kohli 2004). The segmentation between municipalities is another level of territorial fragmentation and as such has become a critical problem facing American metropolitan areas. In many cases, local governments implemented exclusive zoning and economic policies in order to prevent racial minorities from entering their borders. These efforts increased residential segregation and impeded metropolitan development (Danielson 1976; Orfield 1974–75; Teaford 1979; Miller 1981; Weiher 1991; Morgan and Mareschal 1999).

Territorial fragmentation is not limited to metropolitan areas. It also exists within the city limits. Chicago is well known for having a centralized political machine and strong mayoral authority; however, local politics in the city is deeply shaped by the territorial fragmentation between submunicipal units, or wards. The city is divided into fifty wards, each presided over by an alderman. The aldermen respect the mayor's authority on citywide or major development issues, and, in return, the mayor rewards the aldermen with enormous discretion on issues within their wards, including urban preservation. When the city council votes on specific issues within a ward, especially those related to land use, council members usually defer to the local alderman for decisions. This aldermanic privilege turned wards into aldermen's local monopolies and has effectively fragmented the entire city along ward boundaries. However, ward boundaries rarely coincide with those of the city's officially recognized community areas or informally defined neighborhoods. As a result, many local communities

are divided by ward boundaries, and their development is jeopardized by territorial fragmentation.

Intergovernmental fragmentation is the segmentation between government units at different tiers of the state apparatus. Whereas functional fragmentation and territorial fragmentation are horizontal, intergovernmental fragmentation is a vertical relationship. There are two major types of government systems: federalist systems and unitary systems. Intergovernmental fragmentation is often considered an inherent feature of the federalist system, because federalism not only creates clear divisions between the central authority and constituent political units but also guarantees the constituent units significant political autonomy (Riker 1964; Pierson 1995). However, it is important to note that intergovernmental fragmentation also exists in the unitary system (Tarrow 1977; Ashford 1982; Gourevitch 1978). In unitary states, local authorities could obtain enormous power and challenge the implementation of national objects, depending on such factors as their wealth, their strategic significance, and the personal connections, ambition, and acumen of their leaders. Meanwhile, decentralization reforms launched in many unitary states have formally increased the power of subnational units and increased the tensions and conflicts between tiers of the state apparatus (Schmidt 1990; Tarrow 1977).

Intergovernmental fragmentation generates the main political discord in Paris. Different from most cities in the modern era, Paris did not have an elected mayor until 1977. Under the tradition of state centralism, the capital city of France was once governed by a prefect directly appointed by the central authority. The national government implemented strict protection of the urban environment through a group of highly specialized civil servants, which created a monopoly by the state and constrained the autonomy of the municipality. This competition between the municipality and the state generated a great deal of political tension, which increased after the election of the first Parisian mayor. The autonomy of the municipality was formally increased by decentralization reforms beginning in the 1980s. As a means of exercising its discretion over the urban territory, the city began to propose its own agenda of urban preservation, and some of the initiatives have challenged the traditional jurisdiction of the state. But even when the city expanded its boundary of power, the state did not withdraw from the decision-making process.

The Effects of Political Fragmentation on the Policy Process

The three ideal types of political fragmentation provide the foundation for exploring how fragmented structures affect decision making. In general,

political fragmentation acts as a filtering mechanism that creates a tendency for blockage in the policy process. A policy initiative is more likely to be implemented if it is within the boundary of one jurisdiction and less so if it is situated across jurisdictional boundaries. For policy initiatives across jurisdictional boundaries, different types of political fragmentation are associated with predictable patterns of policy processes and settlements. The following section examines each type of political fragmentation by looking at four indicators: the ambiguity of boundaries, the inequality and interdependence between jurisdictions, and the likelihood of overcoming fragmentation. A comparison of the three types of political fragmentation provides the logical foundations for understanding their discernible settlements of policy initiatives across jurisdictional boundaries.

Functional Fragmentation

An important feature of functional fragmentation is that the jurisdiction of bureaucratic agencies is not immutable (Hooghe and Marks 2003). First, different from the visible geographic boundary between localities, the division between functional bureaus is conceptual and disputable. For instance, it is controversial whether school physicians and nurses should be under the authority of the Department of Health or the Department of Education. Second, because of the changes in political and social realities, the jurisdiction of functional bureaus is undergoing constant transformation. This can take the form of the birth of new bureaucratic agencies, the elimination or absorption of old ones, or major modification of existing ones (Sayre and Kaufman 1960). Despite the large number of state regulations defining the jurisdiction of each agency, these regulations are often ambiguous and sometimes contradictory, leaving blurred and permeable areas for contests in practice (Halliday and Carruthers 2007). Blatter (2004, 534) describes the ambiguities of jurisdiction between functional agencies as "fuzzy scales," which sometimes precipitate turf wars between those actors.

In the situation of functional fragmentation, bureaucratic agencies at the same administrative level appear to be equal. However, they have different statuses because of their various political capacities, and typically those with more resources have more weight in the policy process. Bureaucratic agencies are independent from one another for two main reasons: each agency is designed to handle a specialized issue area and is directed under its own organizational rules and professional norms. Nonetheless, bureaucratic agencies are also interdependent because every one of them

is a functional component of a larger political organization. The degree of interdependence between bureaucratic agencies is further increased by the complexity of the modern political world, in which fewer and fewer policy issues can be solved without the mutual accommodation of various agencies (Sayre and Kaufman 1960; Lowi [1969] 1979; Lowi 1967).

In order to handle issues across the boundaries of multiple jurisdictions, bureaucratic agencies need to develop common understandings and build alliances by negotiation and agreement. However, different professional norms and departmental interests of bureaucratic agencies increase the cost of collective action and make it difficult to achieve collaboration across jurisdictions (Olson 1971). To avoid administrative rivalry and protect the interests of their organizations, bureaucrats often choose to ignore issues that are across or near the jurisdictional boundaries (Sayre and Kaufman 1960). In other words, suspension is one of the most common treatments for cross-boundary issues in functional fragmentation. Although many bureaucratic agencies appear to be involved in the policy area, none of them takes responsibility for cross-boundary issues, so that those issues eventually fall into no-man's land.

Aside from suspension, there are two other possible settlements for issues being ignored in the context of functional fragmentation. First, political authorities at the higher levels may create interagency task forces to mobilize and integrate the resources of different bureaucratic agencies and to handle the cross-boundary issues (Sayre and Kaufman 1960). Usually temporary, interagency task forces may not become stakeholders themselves, meaning that they do not necessarily increase fragmentation. However, it is questionable whether they could effectively facilitate multijurisdictional cooperation. Without a strong mandate, those agencies are no more than symbolic entities that provide new battlefields for diverse bureaucratic interests.

The second settlement is de facto devolution of power from bureaucratic agencies to political authorities at a lower level. Such settlement enables political agencies at the lower level to exercise their discretion and make decisions on specific issues or projects affecting their jurisdictions. For example, functional segmentation between the planning and transportation bureaus in the municipal government may inhibit the making and implementation of citywide regulations for road construction. Therefore, when a road is to be built in a local district, the district governor might have the discretion to decide on the details of the project. However, political fragmentation between upper-level bureaucratic agencies may impede the exercise of power at the lower level. According to King (1997),

public managers in Washington fear jurisdictional fragmentation between congressional committees because their multiple masters occasionally give conflicting demands. Sometimes these conflicts appear trivial, but they can tie up an agency's decision making for months.

Territorial Fragmentation

Similar to functional fragmentation, jurisdictions in territorial fragmentation are subject to change. The reorganization of territorial boundaries is often dictated by changes in social geography and political goals (Paddison 1983; Brunn 1974). For example, U.S. congressional and state legislative districts are redrawn almost every decade under uniform geographic standards. Similarly, ward boundaries in Chicago are redrawn after each federal census in order to equalize populations in every ward (Suttles 1972; Guterbock 1980). The redistricting process might be manipulated by politicians in order to create special territorial boundaries favorable to their partisan or personal interests, which is called gerrymandering (Bullock 2010).

Although territorial boundaries are constantly subject to change, they are more clearly defined than the boundaries of functional agencies, which Blatter (2004, 534) describes as "clear-cut scales." Because there is less ambiguity about the visible geographic boundaries between localities, the probabilities of turf wars are lower in the situation of territorial fragmentation. However, the incongruence between sets of territorial boundaries provides another source for tensions and conflicts. For instance, the boundaries of school districts and police districts in a city are often mismatched. Similarly, ward boundaries in Chicago rarely coincide with those of the city's officially recognized community areas or informally defined neighborhoods (Suttles 1972; Guterbock 1980). The incongruence of territorial boundaries within certain geographic areas makes the territories more fragmented and increases the conflicts of interests between political agencies.

Among territorial authorities, there is a high degree of equality and mutual exclusion with one another's jurisdictions. Regardless of the uneven distribution of resources and population across territorial boundaries, territorial authorities at the same administrative level have the same legal status and autonomy (Lieberman 2003; Kohli 2004). Meanwhile, territorial authorities enjoy significant independence from one another. First, because of the clarity of territorial boundaries, it is easier for territorial authorities to distinguish issues within their own jurisdictional boundaries from those outside. Second, the territorial authorities usually

have complete autonomy over their own jurisdictions, so that they do not need the accommodation of others to manage their local issues. As a result, they make general plans independently and jealously guard their prerogatives around land use and development. Typically, there is neither incentive nor platform for these players to work together (Innes, Booher, and Di Vittorio 2011). This situation is complicated by their need to compete for business, investment, and market opportunities to their territories.

The high levels of equality and independence between jurisdictions make it extremely difficult to overcome the hurdles of territorial fragmentation. Instead, territorial authorities tend to maintain a balance of power in order to preserve their own fiefdoms. Facing policy initiatives across territorial boundaries, any single territorial authority is unlikely to take over those initiatives on its own, because by doing so it risks violating the autonomy of others. Such actions would break the balance of power between territorial jurisdictions and put its own autonomy under the threat from others. Therefore, the optimal choice for territorial authorities is to ignore cross-boundary issues and maintain the balance of power. Using river restoration in the United States as an example, projects within one state's jurisdiction are more likely to be implemented, whereas those across state boundaries are more time consuming and more likely to be suspended (Lowry 2003).

In some circumstances special authorities are created to handle cross-boundary issues in territorially fragmented systems. Although the special authorities may effectively handle the work that no other government institution is legally equipped to do, they might become independent stakeholders and increase fragmentation in the metropolitan area. In the history of urban America, the most powerful special authorities are probably those created by Robert Moses in the 1930s, including the Port of New York Authority and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (Caro 1984). To deal with the issues of transportation and recreation, these agencies transcended the tangled network of boundary lines of the 1,400 cities, boroughs, counties, townships, villages, sewer districts, fire districts, police districts, and water districts in the New York metropolitan area. Possessing not only the power of a large private corporation but some of the power of a sovereign state, those special authorities became an independent empire whose operation was out of the control of any officials the people had elected, including the mayor. Although the special authorities were efficiently run under the mandate of Moses, the entire City of New York was ungovernable by the mid–twentieth century (Caro 1984; Sayre and Kaufman 1960).

Intergovernmental Fragmentation

In order to investigate the characteristics of intergovernmental fragmentation, we first need to review how the government systems are organized. There are two major types of government systems: federalist and unitary. In a federalist system, sovereignty and power are shared between the central authority and constituent political units. The constituent units, usually named states or provinces, have significant political autonomy, and their power cannot be unilaterally abrogated by the central government. By contrast, the unitary system is governed as one single unit in which the central government is supreme, and any subnational units exercise only powers that the central government chooses to delegate. Furthermore, the central government can abrogate or curtail the power that it delegated to the subnational units (Le Galès 2006).

Just as governments at the upper tier are superior to those from the lower tier in unitary systems, intergovernmental relations are also unequal in federalist systems. A federalist system is more than a loose alliance of independent agencies. The fact that some political privileges, powers, and resources are exclusively concentrated at the upper tiers gives the upper-tier governments, especially national governments, ultimate dominance and long-run ability to direct the flow of policy decisions (Schattschneider 1960). Meanwhile, many federalist systems also have unitary structures in their lower tiers, in which the power of the local governments is devolved from the state or provincial governments. For instance, although the United States is a federalist system, the states themselves are unitary structures under Dillon's Rule, meaning that counties and municipalities have only the authority granted to them by the state governments.

Although there is substantial inequality across jurisdictional boundaries, there is also a high degree of interdependence between tiers of governments. On one hand, the lower-tier governments depend on the upper tier for political power and resources. In most cases, the power of the lower-tier governments is granted by the upper tier and can be curtailed or abrogated by the upper tier. The upper-tier governments also provide the lower tier with resources, including regular budgets and funds for special purposes. Even in the federalist system of the United States, local governments heavily rely on federal funds for community development and urban renewal (Hyra 2008). On the other hand, the upper-tier governments need the assistance and support of the lower tier in order to successfully intervene in local affairs (Webman 1981). Resistance from the lower tier may jeopardize the implementation of policies made by the upper tier. In other words, neither upper-tier nor lower-tier governments

can fulfill their complete function or operate successfully without the agreement of the other.

Many unitary states launched decentralization reforms in recent decades as an effort to reduce the fiscal burden of central governments and to increase the effectiveness of policies at the local level (Schmidt 1990; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Globalization and continental integration are among the major impetuses for decentralization. For example, it is in the context of European integration that many European Union member states witnessed the decentralization and multiplication of layers of governance, which facilitate the regional cooperation between subnational actors across the borders of nation-states (Blatter 2004; Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Keating 2003).

Although decentralization often leads to a more autonomous level of governance on the subnational level, very rarely do central governments fully cede autonomy to subnational governments. Central governments are still important sources of power and resources for subnational governments. To use France as an example, more than 40 percent of local budgets still come from the central government even after decentralization reforms (Savitch and Kantor 2002). Therefore, rather than increasing the independent authority of state and municipal governments, decentralization entails a move from complete central dominance to joint involvement of the center and one or more subnational tiers (Rodden 2004). It often creates a more complex, intertwined form of governance and increases the interdependence between tiers of government.

The high degree of interdependence between tiers of governments makes it easy to overcome the hurdles of intergovernmental fragmentation. When differences do occur between tiers, the matter might be unresolved at the beginning, but usually a process of political negotiation will ensue, allowing some compromise to emerge, so that all tiers of governments can modestly or partially, if not completely, fulfill their goals. Policy initiatives across jurisdictional boundaries are often settled under the collective action of different tiers of government, in a pattern of overlapping, shared, and contested control, a pattern often colloquially called "marble cake" (Grodzins 1966). Nonetheless, because of the differentiation of interests between tiers of government, the process of negotiation might be lengthy and fraught with contests. Because political agencies at different levels of government could intervene to advance their concerns at any point in the course of a program, projects are subject to change, and minimalist strategies are often adopted (Webman 1981).

We can draw two main conclusions from Figure 1, which summarizes the characteristics of the three types of political fragmentation. First, there

is no clear association between the ambiguity of jurisdictional boundaries and the likelihood of overcoming political fragmentation. However, more ambiguity in the jurisdictional boundaries would lead to more uncertainties in the policy process and could precipitate turf wars between political agencies when the issue in dispute is appealing to both. Second, the extent of inequality and interdependence between jurisdictions is positively related to the likelihood of overcoming political fragmentation. The more unequal the power relations between jurisdictions, the more likely it is for the powerful one to take actions to break the stalemate and initiate negotiation. Meanwhile, the interdependence between jurisdictions reduces the chances of confrontation and increases the prospect of coordination. Among the three types of political fragmentation, intergovernmental fragmentation demonstrates the highest degrees of inequality and interdependence between jurisdictions, and therefore it has the highest likelihood of overcoming fragmentation.

In terms of the impacts of political fragmentation on the policy process, the central prediction from the preceding discussion is that different types of political fragmentation are likely to have discernible effects on the implementation of policy initiatives across jurisdictional boundaries (Figure 2). Among the three types of political fragmentation, intergovernmental fragmentation is more likely to implement the cross-boundary initiatives through modest compromise and collaboration across jurisdictions, whereas functional fragmentation and territorial fragmentation are more likely to leave those cross-boundary issues alone. Compromise and collaboration in the context of intergovernmental fragmentation might produce only lowest-common-denominator policies instead of perfect solutions, but they could still mitigate the cost of political fragmentation on the policy process. In systems dominated by functional fragmentation or territorial fragmentation, some special agencies can be created to handle the cross-boundary issues. However, there is the risk that those agencies will grow into independent stakeholders and increase fragmentation or merely become battlefields for different political interests.

In sum, as an institutional structure of the political system, political fragmentation creates a tendency for blockage in the policy process. Some policy initiatives are more likely to be implemented than others, depending on their relations to the jurisdictional boundaries. Nevertheless, the hurdles of political fragmentation are not insurmountable. They can be overcome by effective coordination, despite the fact that the likelihood of overcoming the hurdles varies between types of political fragmentation. Coordination is often associated with tacit understandings and informal arrangements;

	Functional Fragmentation	Territorial Fragmentation	Intergovernmental Fragmentation
Ambiguity of Boundary	High	Low	Medium
Inequality between Jurisdictions	Medium	Low	High
Interdependence	Medium	Low	High
Likelihood of overcoming fragmentation	Medium	Low	High

FIGURE 1. Comparing the three types of political fragmentation.



FIGURE 2. How political fragmentation shapes the policy process.

therefore, it is important for us to pay attention to not only the formal structures but also the informal relations in a fragmented political system.

Implications for Urban Preservation

Political fragmentation is likely to shape the policy process of urban preservation in several ways. First, preservation initiatives within the boundaries of single jurisdictions are more likely to be implemented than those across multiple jurisdictions. For the preservation initiatives within single

jurisdictions, political actors in charge of those jurisdictions tend to have complete discretion over the policy processes. They can mobilize resources and implement projects in a more coherent, timely manner, without being interrupted or constrained by other agencies. As a result, those initiatives are more likely to be transformed into policy outputs. On the contrary, implementing the cross-boundary initiatives usually requires consensus and collaboration between various jurisdictions. However, the differentiated interests, values, and policy priorities of various political agencies might generate conflicts, struggles, and stalemates in the policy process, which would increase the challenges of coordinating collective action and prohibit the implementation of those cross-boundary preservation initiatives.

Second, in a city dominated by functional fragmentation, the likelihood for preservation initiatives to be implemented depends on the complexity of the initiatives. Less complex initiatives are usually within the jurisdiction of a single bureaucratic agency, so they are more likely to be implemented. Specifically, policy initiatives to preserve historic monuments are more likely to be implemented than those to preserve historic districts. Because the former are concerned primarily with the physical form of individual buildings, they are more likely to be within the jurisdiction of a single bureaucratic agency and thus more likely to be implemented. By contrast, the latter involve varied factors, including housing renovation, urban infrastructure improvement, and resident allocation. Such initiatives are more likely to cross the boundaries of bureaucratic agencies so that they tend to be blocked by the hurdles of functional fragmentation. As chapter 2 shows, functional fragmentation between municipal bureaus in Beijing has generated different policy processes of preserving historic monuments and historic districts. Whereas significant historic monuments are renovated and restored, historic districts are largely marginalized by the bureaucratic anarchy, and urban preservation eventually becomes icon making.

Third, in a city dominated by territorial fragmentation, whether or not the preservation initiatives can be implemented depends on the geographic scale of the initiatives (i.e., size of the geographic area covered by the initiatives). The preservation initiatives concerning smaller geographic areas tend to be within the boundary of a single territorial authority and are more likely to be implemented by their home authorities. In contrast, the initiatives concerning larger geographic areas are often across the jurisdictional boundaries of multiple territorial authorities and are more likely to be ignored or suspended by those authorities. Consequently, a citywide preservation agenda is not likely to develop in the context of territorial fragmentation. Instead, the preservation areas might look like mosaics

scattered in the urban landscape, each of them confined within the jurisdictional boundary of a single territorial authority. Chapter 3 demonstrates how territorial fragmentation along ward boundaries transformed urban preservation in Chicago into a ward-based business, which facilitates the implementation of preservation initiatives within single wards but prohibits the implementation of those across multiple wards.

Fourth, in a city dominated by intergovernmental fragmentation, how easily the preservation initiatives can be implemented depends on the political significance of the initiatives. If the preservation initiatives are politically more significant, they might induce more involvement of the higher-tier governments, and thus they constrain the autonomy of local authorities and create more conflicts and struggles across jurisdictional boundaries. These conflicts and struggles can interrupt or slow down the policy process of urban preservation. In contrast, if the preservation initiatives are politically less significant, they are more likely to be left to the discretion of the local authorities. When fewer tiers of governments are involved, there is less political contest, and the preservation initiatives are more likely to be implemented. As we will see in chapter 4, intergovernmental fragmentation between the central and local authorities in Paris turned the protection of cultural heritage into a political debate, which eventually transformed the policy process of urban preservation from state monopoly to a joint venture between the city and the state.

Fifth, among the three types of political fragmentation, intergovernmental fragmentation is most likely to implement cross-boundary preservation initiatives through modest compromise and collaboration between jurisdictions. Because of the differentiation of interests between tiers of government, there might be lengthy negotiations until agreements are reached, and the compromise and collaboration might only partially fulfill the goals of various political agencies. Nonetheless, the collective action between tiers of the state apparatus could mitigate the negative effects of political fragmentation on the policy process of urban preservation.

Alternative Explanations

It is my central thesis that the theory of political fragmentation helps explain the policy process of urban preservation, but this does not mean that other factors are inconsequential. Indeed, many other factors influence policymaking in predictable ways, such as elite interests, political resources, regime types, and government budgets. Therefore, it is important to assess the explanatory power of my argument relative to others.

Moreover, if the types of political fragmentation have observable effects on political processes, we need to know whether the effects are independent or whether they are washed away when we control for other factors. Here I critically review three alternative explanations and examine their relations to the theory of political fragmentation.

Elite Interests

One prominent alternative account of variations in the policy process of urban preservation focuses on the interests and preferences of elites. One could hypothesize that some preservation initiatives are more likely to be implemented than others because they are in the best interests of political and economic elites. This argument builds on the elitism assumption that society is hierarchically constructed between the powerful and the powerless. The policymaking process is considered to work to the advantage of the most powerful and the detriment of the least powerful (Hunter 1953; Mills 1956; Domhoff 1967). To explain how elites make decisions, the rational choice model contends that the decisions of elites are often based on calculations of cost and benefit (Gilboa 2010). Among a wide range of policy initiatives they might implement, elites will choose the ones that are most likely to be popular and easily implemented and to provoke little resistance, because those initiatives would help them maximize political and economic returns at the lowest costs. In the area of land use, the growth machine theory argues that it is in the best interest of elites to intensify land use in order to maximize economic returns, so that they often prioritize demolition and redevelopment over preservation (Logan and Molotch 1987).

The key problem with the elitism arguments is that they assume elites are a unitary, cohesive group of people who share the same interests. This proposition ignores the fact that the interests of elites are largely differentiated; a policy initiative that works to the advantage of some elites may impose costs on others. The rational choice model falls short in dealing with elite preferences at the level of assumption, without much concern about how elites define their self-interest. The growth machine theory neglects the fact that the practice of urban preservation is extremely diverse and can be used by elites as a strategy to promote their economic and political interests. In an effort to fill in the gaps in elitism arguments, the theory of political fragmentation demonstrates that elite members' different positions in political and social institutions may provide structural constraints on their understandings and calculations of costs and benefits, so that elite groups and individuals may develop different opinions on the same policy initiative. It does not deny the importance of elite interests and preferences but complements elitism arguments by showing how the interests and preferences of elites are shaped by calculations relevant to boundary politics.

Political Resources

Pluralism provides a different understanding of the policy process of urban preservation by focusing on the allocation and mobilization of political resources. According to pluralism, various kinds of political resources are distributed unequally between different groups so that political leaders cannot entirely dominate all decision-making processes without the involvement of other actors (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1963). In order to fulfill their policy goals, political actors must mobilize the political resources in the hands of stratified citizens. Therefore, the policy process is considered to be open to any groups that are active, organized, and willing to use their resources (Dahl 1961; Truman 1960; Sayre and Kaufman 1960). To apply the pluralism theory to the policy process of urban preservation, one could hypothesize that some preservation initiatives are more likely to be implemented because the political actors can mobilize sufficient political resources to support their action.

Whether or not political actors can mobilize sufficient political resources is an important factor in the success or failure of policy processes of urban preservation. However, the argument falls short if we try to understand why political resources can be more easily mobilized in some contexts than in others. In other words, we gain more analytical leverage if we consider the mobilization of political resources as part of the puzzle that needs to be explained rather than as an exogenous determinant of the policy process. Taking a historical institutionalist approach, the theory of political fragmentation recognizes the importance of political resources but places those resources in context. It demonstrates how political structure constrains the choices of political and social actors and conditions the distribution and mobilization of resources by the actors.

Regime Types

A central task for students of comparative politics is to characterize the relationship between the nature of political regimes and the action of states. For this study, an obvious question is whether the policy initiatives

of urban preservation are more likely to be implemented in democratic states than in other political regimes. It is easy to advance conflicting theoretical propositions to explain the relations between regime type and the policy process of urban preservation. One can imagine that democracies provide fertile conditions for public participation, so that preservationists have more chances to influence decision making and promote implementation of preservation initiatives (MacPherson 1977; Pateman 1970; Harrop and Miller 1987). Alternatively, one can also argue that authoritarian governments might be more effective in implementing preservation initiatives because they may be better at limiting the number of dissenting opinions and they may be more willing to use coercive and invasive tactics in policy implementation (Collier 1979; Walzer 1981). Thus, there are reasons to believe that the likelihood that a preservation initiative will be implemented may be either positively or negatively associated with democratic regimes. And of course, it is possible that the effects are mixed. The conflicting propositions suggest that regime types probably have no independent effect on the policy process.

Other Factors

Besides the three prevailing alternative explanations, other factors are critically important for the policy process of urban preservation. For example, culture often shapes attitudes toward urban preservation and influences the implementation of preservation projects. The Western tradition is to revere the marks of time on their monuments, so that people attempt to retain as much as possible of the original fabric and material of old buildings. By contrast, some East Asian cultures are inspired by the will to escape the action of time and by the desire to perfect. People in those countries periodically renovate or rebuild historic structures so that they continue to look the way they did when first constructed (Tung 2001). In Japan, people sometimes construct exact replicas of an original temple and then destroy their earlier copies (Choay 2001). The ritual reconstruction of historic monuments is culturally bound and relevant to the fact that most buildings in Japan have wood frames that do not last as long as stones.

Besides the culture of preservation, technical proficiency, the financial capacity of government, types of property rights, and the overall quality of historic architecture all influence the implementation of preservation projects (Fitch 1982; Frank 2002; Datel and Dingemans 1988). Individual personalities and accidental historical circumstances also shape the policy process of urban preservation (Tung 2001). This book does not deny the impacts of those factors; rather, it illustrates the impacts of those factors

in each city in the chapters that follow. However, I approach the analysis of urban preservation as a social scientist, in the sense that I am more concerned to identify general patterns and relationships that go beyond the particularities of any individual country's circumstances. In this regard, political fragmentation is a vital, yet not well explained, influence that conditions the impacts of other factors and helps us better understand the politics of urban preservation in a cross-national context.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided theoretical accounts of how political fragmentation might affect the policy process. With the greater structural complexity of government institutions and the greater differentiation of interests between political agencies, political fragmentation has become pervasive in the modern political world. It serves as a filtering mechanism for the policy initiatives of urban preservation, and it sometimes creates a tendency for blockage in the policy process. A policy initiative is more likely to be implemented if it is within the boundary of one jurisdiction and less so if it is situated across jurisdictional boundaries. The chapter discusses three major types of political fragmentation, each associated with predictable patterns of policy processes and settlements when the policy initiatives are handled across jurisdictional boundaries. It demonstrates that what matters for the policy process is not only whether the political system is fragmented but how it is fragmented.

Although the theory of political fragmentation puts a spotlight on the institutional structure of the political system, it does not deny the impacts of various other factors. Instead, it puts these factors in context, showing how they relate to one another by drawing attention to the way political situations are structured. Theories that focus on the characteristics and preferences of political actors themselves could not account for why actors with similar organizational characteristics and similar preferences could not always influence policy in the same way or to the same extent in different political contexts. The theory of political fragmentation approaches the problem by revealing that the strategies and relative power of those actors, as well as their choices of coalition and coercion, are defined by the institutional context in which the political game is played. Such ideas lay the groundwork for an explanation of why the policy processes of urban preservation vary in different cities.