Resourcing International Organizations: Resource Diversification, Organizational Differentiation, and Administrative Governance

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Abstract
This article introduces, summarizes and contextualizes the key questions and findings of a special issue of Global Policy on the resourcing of international organizations (IOs). The article sets out trends in the financial resources available to IOs; discusses their organizational consequences; and highlights analytical implications for the study of IOs. We discuss resource diversification associated with growing complexity of the origins and types of funding available to IOs; the importance of non-state actors in IO funding; and contestation over the classification of resources. Resource diversification encourages organizational differentiation, manifested in major shifts in resource-related actor constellations and their impact on the autonomy of IOs; adjustments to budgeting procedures; and functional differentiation within IOs and the emergence of new types of IOs that are partly driven by resourcing. These observations invite an analytical perspective in the study of IOs that pays systematic attention to the administrative governance dimension of IOs; the entrepreneurial character of many IOs; and organizational fields as a focus of analysis. Read together, the 11 contributions to the special issue underline that paying attention to their resourcing can advance our understanding of IOs.

At a time when newly elected US President Donald Trump announces severe budget cuts to the United Nations system, the relevance of resourcing for the functioning of international organizations (IOs) can be in no doubt. It has long been recognized that access to financial and other resources is critical to the evolution of IOs and to the realization of their global policy ambitions (Wright, 1957). Complaints from the leadership of IOs about inadequate resources also have a long tradition, and the mismatch between IO mandates, as set by member states, and available resources to carry out those mandates effectively is a recurrent concern (see Annan, 1993, for the UN). Some IOs, such as the African Union (Engel, 2015) or UNRWA (Bocco, 2010) appear to suffer from chronic underfunding. Others have a long history of repeated funding 'crises', typically brought about by either the unexpected partial withholding of member state contributions (for the United Nations see Claude, 1964; Taylor, 1991; for UNESCO see Hüfner, 2017; Eckhard et al., 2016). In other cases, resource mismatch has been the result of unforeseen demands on IO budgets, as in the case of refugee crises or natural or man-made disasters (McDermott, 2000). In view of these challenges, the need to reform UN financing and resource politics has been recognized and many proposals have been put forward over the years (see Muttukumaru, 2016 for a present-day reform proposal).

A central finding of this special issue is that there are several critical issues that matter when studying the resourcing of IOs, beyond the overall levels of funding available and the details of resource allocation. Among these issues are: (1) the mix of sources of funding, namely, who provides the finances of IOs; (2) the types of funding, notably the distinction between mandatory and voluntary funding and between core (or general-purpose) funding and contributions that are in some way earmarked by contributors; (3) the stability and predictability of IO funding streams; and (4) whether funds can be accessed 'in time' when the need arises.

So far, neither the quality of data on IO resourcing nor scholarly attention to the processes and outcome of IO resourcing match their practical importance. It is often surprisingly difficult to gain reliable budgetary information on individual IOs. Some, like ASEAN, do not have dedicated budget websites, and others, like the International Maritime Organization (IMO), only publish financial statements instead of their full budgets. Where data exists, the variety of categorizations used and the notoriously patchy landscape of information sources make it very difficult to produce reliable studies that cover both individual IOs' finances as well as the overall population of IOs, for example, those that make up the UN Development System (UNDS) (see Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2015; Jenks and Topping, 2016). In the UN system alone, there are over a dozen terms used to describe core and non-core contributions and types of budgets (see Muttukumaru, 2016).

There is also a variety of ways in which budgets are defined and put together. Some UN organizations such as UNHCR have budgets that are partially financed by the UN's regular budget, but have separate budgets and funds for operational activities. In organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO), the budget figures adopted do not represent a fully financed budget but revenue and expenditure targets that the organization wants to reach in the following biennium. In these cases, budget figures gathered from one central budget document may not reflect the reality of how these organizations are resourced. And in the EU, commitment appropriations that allow to incur future spending and payment appropriations that allow for actual spending in a given budget year are effectively negotiated in separate processes (cf. Benedetto, 2017). Recent developments in EU resourcing, such as the creation of a European Fund for Strategic Investments (often referred to as the 'Juncker Plan') in 2015 (Patz and Goetz, 2015a) have added leveraging models to the range of major instruments in how IOs acquire and disburse resources. The multiplication of trust funds is another relevant development, not just in the UN system (Reinsberg et al., 2015, forthcoming), but also in the EU. The creation of multiple trust funds for external action (European Parliament, 2015), such as the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, has increased the complexity of funding instruments financed through both EU and voluntary member state contributions.

Coming to grips with the complex processes that lead to decisions on levels, sources, and types of funding is made more difficult by the fact that academic interest in IO resourcing has been uneven both over time and with regard to the issues covered. The same is true for interest on budgetary time frames, on budget allocations, and on related aspects such as accounting, which have received varying degrees of attention over time. What we know about early IO finances and budgeting relates to the pre-WWI international unions (Reinsch 1911), the pre-WWII League of Nations (Ames, 1923; Hill, 1927; Kunstenaar, 1932; Jacklin, 1934, 1938; Jenks, 1942; Singer, 1957; Sumberg, 1946; Völlmar, 1924; Zahariade) and, mainly to the United Nations system up until the 1960s (Mower, 1964; Singer, 1959, 1961; Szawlowski, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1970). During the 1970s, Hoole developed a theoretically guided perspective on IO finances that tested incrementalist hypotheses on IO budgets (Hoole, 1976; Hoole et al., 1976, 1979), but these analyses were not followed-up in IR/IO studies. Overall, descriptive case studies on the core UN budget and, especially in later contributions, peacekeeping finances dominated (Diehl and PharoKhan, 2005; Ingadóttir, 2011; Mendez, 1997; McDermott, 2000; Müller, 1995; Nimikas, 2004; Singer, 1961; Sommer, 1951; Stoessinger, 1965; most recently: Cogan, 2016; Larhant, 2016). They were joined by only a few, mainly descriptive analyses of budgeting in the UN system as a whole (Elmandjra, 1973; Hüfner, 1997a, 1997b, 2006; JIU, 1989). Comparisons with organizations outside the UN system are rare (for instance in Szawlowski 1970). Research on the EU's finances and budgeting (notable Becker, 2014; Becker et al., 2017; Benedetto and Milio, 2012; Goetz and Patz, 2016; Laffan, 1997; Lindner, 2006; Strasser, 1975), including a range of theoretically guided research perspectives, has remained mostly self-contained within the wider field of EU studies, without links to broader debates on IO finances.

This special issue comes at a time when the increasing role of voluntary and earmarked contributions in the financing of IOs (Bayram and Graham, 2016; Graham, 2011, 2015, 2017a; Graham and Thompson, 2015) as well as the rise of trust funds and the increased channelling of bilateral aid through multilateral organizations (Reinsberg, 2017a; Reinsberg et al., 2015) have generated renewed comparative interest in IO finances, especially in the UN system, but also beyond (see, e.g., Engel, 2015 on the African Union). While alternative modes of IO funding are as old as the League of Nations (Ranshofen-Wertheimer, 1945) or even as old as the international unions preceding the League (Reinsch, 1911), the trend towards new modes of financing observed in the UN system, in particular, has raised questions about whether resource politics in IOs are changing the dynamics of multilateralism (Browne, 2017; Graham, 2015, 2017b). New questions also arise with regard to how this trend affects the provision of development finances by and through IOs (Nielson et al., 2017). Nevertheless, compared to the increased attention to international and global public policy-making over the past two decades (see the review by Bauman and Miller, 2012) or to the attention to non-financial IO policy-making tools, including authority (e.g., Liese and Busch, 2017; Zürn et al., 2012), the complex processes by which IOs acquire and allocate financial resources have remained underexplored.

Against this background, the contributions to this special issue on 'Resourcing International Organizations' seek to advance the debate on the resourcing of IOs and highlight analytical implications for the study of IOs. The focus is on understanding the complexity of the sources and types of financial resources on which IOs rely; on the evolving actor constellations and resourcing processes; and on the organizational implications, such as the linkage between resourcing trends and IO autonomy or power shifts within IOs. The remainder of this article draws on a variety of sources, including our own comparative research on IO budgeting (Goetz and Patz, 2016; Patz and Goetz, 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 2017); recent and ongoing research on international bureaucracies and their role in international public policy within the context of the multi-project Research Unit on International Public Administrations, coordinated at the University of Munich (Bauer, Knill and Eckhard, 2017; Eckhard and Ege, 2016; Knill and Bauer, 2016); the research articles and practitioners' contributions assembled in this special issue; and wider scholarship on IO resourcing.

1. Resource diversification

The first set of empirical observations emerging from this special issue concerns the diversification of IO resources. Over time, new sources of funding have complemented the traditionally predominant member states contributions in many IOs. Traditional mandatory contributions that have been in place since the early international unions have been joined by other types of funding. Several recent reports highlight the extent to which IOs have become reliant on a multitude of financial instruments to support their activities

(Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2015; Jenks and Topping, 2016). Assessed contributions that member states pay as IO membership fees and that are employed in pursuit of collectively agreed goals through traditional programming and budgeting are less and less central to the realization of policy ambitions beyond the nation state (OECD-DAC, 2015). As a consequence, there has been greater contestation over the classification of resources (Bergmann and Fuchs, 2017).

In recent years, trust funds for multi-bi aid have multiplied (Reinsberg, 2015), and the availability of voluntary resources has become central to the funding of international action, challenging the multilateral nature and execution of international public policies (Graham, 2011, 2015, 2017a). Accordingly, resource mobilization has become a key administrative task, whether in the UN system (Patz and Goetz, 2017) or in the EU (Patz and Goetz, 2015a). In fact, some IOs' core purpose is the mobilization or management of funds. For example, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is not linked to a single IO, but implements programmatic goals through other international governmental and non-governmental organizations to which its funds are directed (Graham and Thompson, 2015). 'Vertical funds', such as GAVI (The Vaccine Alliance), are managed jointly by governments, IOs, and private actors. They are set up to mobilize funds from a variety of sources for specific policies (Browne, 2017; Future United Nations Development System, 2015). Private donors gain in importance in the financing of international action. In the World Health Organization (WHO), the Gates Foundation is now the second-largest donor, reflecting the evolution of globalized philanthropy (Martens and Seitz, 2015; Seitz and Martens 2017). These dynamics have existed for longer, but have become more influential in recent years (Graham, 2017a). For example, UNICEF started raising funds through individual donations on a large scale from its early days, allowing it to work without assessed contributions from the UN budget (Morris, 2010 [2004]). UNICEF co-finances projects operated by a number of UN agencies such as WHO. Funds with specific purposes are typically allocated within wider organizational fields, for instance in the domain of climate policy and climate finance (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2013; JIU, 2015). In these cases, a number of IOs compete for attention, trust and recognition of their expertise to use earmarked funds effectively and efficiently. With the adoption of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, this shift towards policy-oriented earmarked financing is set to increase further, and more competition for policy-earmarked funding is to be expected in an environment of limited core resources.

A number of recent contributions have explored the impact of changing actor constellations on the distribution of power and influence within IOs. Concepts such as 'minilateralism' and 'philanthrolateralism' seek to capture how changes in the sources and types of funding affect the very essence of IOs. Seitz and Martens (2017), e.g., argue that the growing importance of philanthropic foundations and private corporations for UN activities run 'the risk of turning UN agencies, funds and programmes into contractors for bilateral or public-private projects, eroding the multi-lateral character of the system and undermining democratic global governance'. But it is not just foundations and corporations that change the actor constellations in IO resourcing. At least two further trends are worth highlighting. First, IOs are not just recipients of funding, but many act, in turn, as funders for other IOs. For example, UN agencies, funds and programmes have for a long time interlinked through very complex interorganizational financial flows (see Elmandjra, 1973, for the earliest overview). The EU, principally funded by its member states, is a major contributor to the budgets of many IOs, including large parts of the UN system (cf. EuropeAid, 2017) or the African Union (Engel, 2015). These dynamics have been conceptualized as 'double-delegation', and new empirical and theoretical discussions emerge on why and how member states decide to accept such complex resource flows (Michaelowa et al. 2017a, 2017b). Second, as the article by Bergmann and Fuchs (2017) makes clear, international, private sector standard setting bodies can assume a critical role in IOs' resourcing. As they highlight, the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS), developed by the International Public Sector Accounting Standard Board of the International Federation of Accountants, play a critical and contentious role in the classification of resources available to IO, notably as regards 'voluntary' contributions. And even where states and private donors do not provide direct funding to IOs, outside actors can have an influence through resource politics. In the case of multilateral development banks, private credit rating agencies have a crucial influence on the ability of these banks to raise capital, thereby shifting bank portfolios against the original mandates of these banks (Humphrey, 2017).

One important consequence of resource diversification – in terms of the origins, types of funds and actor constellations – has been that there is often considerable uncertainty and contestation over the classification of resources. Distinctions between mandatory and voluntary contributions; core and non-core funding; or conditional versus unconditional funding are suggestive of fairly clear-cut classifications; but the terminologies used by different IOs and for different purposes are not necessarily congruent. For example, as Bergmann and Fuchs (2017) show, there are significant differences in how different UN system organizations assess the 'conditions' (or 'liabilities') attached to voluntary funds. They note that the conditionality of voluntary funding is a major issue, since conditional 'contributions may impose a lack of flexibility, neutrality, efficiency and effectiveness'. Accordingly, differences in the recognition of conditional liabilities might not just reflect 'that different organizations come up with different judgements on what imposes a condition', but also 'that different UN System Organizations decide strategically to shift away from conditional voluntary funding'.

2. Organizational differentiation

The discussion so far has drawn attention to the changing funding patterns of IOs, but also provided some first hints at their organizational implications. In this section, three organizational developments closely associated with resourcing will be highlighted.

Several contributions to this special issue provide evidence of the complex links between resourcing and relations of power and influence, both between IOs and third actors and also within IOs. A long-standing concern has been the degree of autonomy that IOs can maintain *vis-à-vis* their member states (Bauer and Ege, 2014; Ege, 2016). Squatrito (2017) takes a closer look at the dependence of international courts from their member states in their resource-related decision-making. Another line of argument relates to IO dependency on other sources of funding, notably from foundations and corporations (Seitz and Martens, 2017). The implications of resource diversification for the relative power and influence of IOs *vis-à-vis* their financiers are far from clear-cut. Thus, Graham (2017b), in her discussion of the growth of voluntary and earmarked funding, emphasizes 'how private actors are empowered by their ability to earmark resources as they emerge as major funders' and how the rise of multi-donor trust funds leads to a rise in 'minilateral governance'. Reinsberg (2017b) makes a similar point in his analysis of the rise of trust funds. As his research suggests, 'global funds challenge the autonomy of the established multilateral organizations by exclusively providing earmarked funding'. Moreover, donors have also increasingly created special-purpose trust funds hosted within multi-lateral organizations, in an attempt to seek influence on the programmatic priorities of IOs, as well as on staffing policies (cf. Thorvaldsdottir, 2016). The power of donors is also stressed in Browne's (2017) analysis of 'vertical funds', although in his 'tests of multilateralism', he notes that the effects of such funds on the relationships between funders and the recipient of funds do not uniformly point to an increase in influence of the former. Perhaps the most critical assessment is offered by Seitz and Martens (2017).

Seitz and Martens (2017) also note the consequences for shifts in funding *within* individual organizations, a theme that runs through several of the contributions to this special issue. Thus, they suggest that 'a profusion of earmarked projects undermines coherence, planning and coordination'; and raises, amongst other things, the danger of 'programme and mission distortion' and what they call 'philantrocapitalism', that is, the application of 'business and often market-based approaches to development'. Different dimensions of internal organizational differentiation are also stressed by Graham (2017b). Thus, Graham highlights how the creation of multi-donor trust funds fosters intra-organizational differentiation as 'within the same IGO, each fund is governed by a distinct set of actors', leading 'to a diverse set of minilateral arrangements that govern the pooled funding mechanisms at many prominent IGOs'.

The resource diversification mentioned above is associated with changes in IO budgeting practices.[1] Budgeting is a defining organizational process, and changes to budgeting indicate important shifts in intra-organizational dynamics. Budgeting as one of the most complex procedures in an IO is typically regulated through a dense set of formal and informal rules and reflected in entrenched organizational routines. Recent research on IO budgeting (Patz and Goetz, 2016) has examined in detail the regulation and organizational setup of budget processes in the UN as well as in a sample of 12 UN specialized agencies. Drawing on a new dataset, this research has traced the routinization of the budget proposal and budget adoption stages in the UN system over the past decade (2006–15), covering not just the UN regular budget process and budget routinization in the 12 UN specialized agencies, but also in several UN funds and programmes. Two main findings emerge from this empirical analysis.

First, despite substantive changes in the international system and repeated financial crises, core formal budget procedures in the UN system have remained largely unchanged in recent decades. With few exceptions, budget routines have also remained stable over the past decade. This suggests that international public administrations are capable of ensuring effective budget drafting and adoption. Thus, on the surface, the budgetary bureaucracy works.

Second, however, this routinization of core budgeting tells only part of the story. Bureaucracy can at best partly contain the strains on the core budgeting processes resulting from financial crises (Eckhard, Patz and Schmidt, 2016; Hüfner, 2017) or the challenges of finding agreement among complex principals (cf. Patz and Goetz, 2017). Below the surface of seemingly stable and routinized budgeting procedures, there are a host of new types of complementary arrangements and organizational solutions through which IOs deal with budget pressure and resource diversification. Through resource politics, member states attempt to increase their control (Eckhard and Dijkstra, 2017; Reinsberg, 2017b); there is stronger coordination from the administrative centre (Patz and Goetz, 2017); and one sees new procedures allowing for a better prioritization of voluntary contributions, such as the financing dialogues introduced first in WHO and more recently in UNESCO (modelled on WHO). These practices lead to an increasing complexity of budgeting and resource politics in the UN system, challenging or superseding the political compromises and power relations embedded, sometimes decades ago, in the core administrative budgetary procedures. This ranges from completely separate budget procedures in the case of the UN for peacekeeping and for special political missions, to the creation of various forms of trust funds administered outside the core budget system of the respective organizations. Where internally differentiated budgeting and resource mobilization reach their limits, one can observe the creation of semi-autonomous offices affiliated with IOs or the establishment of completely autonomous funding organizations with their own governing systems, some multilateral, some public-private partnerships (Browne, 2017). These dynamics further fragment the administration of income and expenditure in the UN system.

In sum, past political compromises embedded in bureaucratic routinization still matter for IO budgeting; but innovative budgetary practices and new types of organizations have largely developed in an *ad hoc* manner outside the core organizations, as principals and administrative agents could not agree on revisions of core procedures.

Further evidence of the differentiating organizational effects of resource diversification emerges when we turn from organizational processes to personnel. Both Heldt and Schmidtke (2017) and Ege and Bauer (2017) document the extent to which IOs have come to rely on non-permanent staff, eroding traditional conceptions of an international civil service. In their comparative analysis that encompasses the EU, GATT/WTO, the IMF, the WHO, UNESCO and the World Bank Group, Heldt and Schmidtke (2017) show how the number of permanent staff has declined in several organizations during the 2000s, including WHO, the IMF and UNESCO. Drawing on a wider sample of 15 IOs, Ege and Bauer (2017) demonstrate how the growing reliance of many IOs on voluntary contributions is directly related to a rise in the proportion of staff with fixed-term contracts in IOs: 'the more an IO depends in voluntary resources (. . .), the more it will adjust its staffing practices by reducing the ratio of staff with permanent contracts'. Thus, within the UN system, more and more employees are classed as 'non-staff personnel', amounting to about 50 per cent of staff overall. Erosion of core funding is identified as a key driver behind this development, including 'budgetary restrictions, lack of resources, unpredictable funding and a need for flexibility (JIU, 2014, p.10).

The rise of 'non-staff' personnel linked to changing funding regimes leaves a deep imprint on IOs, the most obvious of which is the growing divide between a relatively shrinking international civil service, whose members enjoy extensive employment protection, and a growing number of 'hired hands', who often live from contract to contract. As Ege and Bauer (2017) note, the functional implications of this shift in staffing are subject to debate, notably as regards its effects on the ability and willingness of IOs to work with longer-term policy horizons. In this connection, arguments about a distinct temporality of 'permanent' administrations as opposed to frequently changing political decision bodies deserve particular attention. For example, with reference to the EU, Hartlapp (2016) has recently suggested that the European Commission, with its extensive permanent staff resources, is 'empowered' by its distinct temporality that allows it to work with extended time horizons, although empirical evidence for this claim is not yet sufficiently robust. The growing reliance of many IOs on 'non-staff' personnel may not just impair this long-term orientation, but alter organizational cultures more broadly. As Ege and Bauer (2017) suggest, 'if the amount of time that staff members are allowed to stay within an organization decreases and long-term career prospects deteriorate (. . .) their identification with organizational goals and values' may suffer.

Taken together, these three resource-related trends – resource diversification and the resulting shifts in relations of power and influence; increasing complexity of budgeting arrangements; and the changing composition of staff resources in IOs – point to the emergence of administrative governance modes at international level that are more diverse than traditional notions of multilateral organizations may suggest.

3. An administrative governance perspective

What are the analytical implications of the observations on empirical trends in IO resourcing and their organizational repercussions that emerge from this special issue? The key argument to be developed in the following is that a sustained focus on the administrations of IOs through an 'administrative governance perspective' promises to yield substantive insights into the drivers, diversity and organizational and policy consequences of IO resourcing. The Research Unit on International Public Administration (IPA),[2] coordinated from the University of Munich, has developed such an administrative governance perspective to the study of IOs that emphasizes the importance of administrative governance 'tools' (Hood, 2007) and administrative strategies (Knill and Bauer, 2016). This perspective highlights the linkages between tools, strategies and both substantive IO policies and institutional policy, to understand how IPAs shape the design of IOs and influence policy-making (cf. Eckhard and Ege, 2016). Finally, there is a growing understanding that it is necessary to move from the observation of individual IOs and their administrations to wider organizational domains and inter-administrative relations between IOs and IPAs (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2013; Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009; Johnson, 2013; Vetterlein and Moschella, 2014). Viewed from such a perspective, at least three analytical implications for the study of IO resourcing deserve highlighting.

The first point to emerge is that IO resourcing cannot be understood without paying systematic attention to IPAs. IPAs are not just key players in all stages of the budgeting process (Patz and Goetz, 2015a, 2015b), from budget preparation to implementation; they also have a critical role in devising, adopting and implementing increasingly complex strategies for raising resources from variable sets of member states, other IOs, and also private sources. They do not simply 'adjust' to the diversification in resourcing, as outlined in Sections 1 and 2, but they are often actively shaping these trends. Thus, although a nuanced 'principal-agent' framework can be helpful in understanding how IPAs respond to complexity in donor constellations (Patz and Goetz, 2017), they often enjoy high degrees of organizational autonomy, affecting not just substantive global public policy, but also, critically, institutional policy relating to organizational structures, procedures and personnel. A focus on administrations and resourcing thus underscores the extent to which IPAs are actors in their own right. This point is beginning to be made forcefully in a host of recent publications that have examined both the policy and institutional effects of IPAs. However, as has recently been set out at greater length in a joint publication of the Research Unit on International Public Administrations (Bauer et al., 2017), both the mainstreaming of administrative perspectives into IR-based accounts of IOs and the systematic study of the administrations of IOs by Comparative Public Administration and Comparative Public Policy are still very much evolving.

Second, the focus on IPAs and IO resourcing underscores the extent to which many IOs exhibit entrepreneurial features. Knill et al. (2017, p. 50) have recently suggested that some IOs exhibit an entrepreneurial administrative style which they associate with

> the institutionalization of administrative routines that entail intensive bureaucratic advocacy in policy-making. This relates not only to the administration's role in the identification and definition of political problems, but also to its engagement in the development of solutions to these problems and its strong role as policy broker and process manager.

An entrepreneurial IO administrative style is, thus, related to, amongst other things, an administration that has strategic ambitions and capabilities. More generally, the example of IO resourcing underscores the extent to which many IPAs operate in a highly competitive environment. They need to generate demand for their established and novel services through marketing and, in increasingly competitive processes, need to secure financial resources to cover their cost base. At the same time, IPAs need to develop internal structures, procedures and personnel and information systems that allow them high degrees of flexibility and adaptability.

This point deserves brief further elaboration. Competition for competences, mandates, resources, authority, and recognition leaves a deep imprint on many IOs. Some smaller IOs operate in functionally specialized niches with little or no overlap or competition from other IOs. Their powers and responsibilities are clearly delineated from national authorities and from third sector private organizations. The Universal Postal Union (UPU) or the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) might serve as examples. As a recent survey of IOs (Hooghe and Marks, 2015) makes clear, however, many others, typically with broader policy remits, operate in densely populated organizational environments in which other IOs compete, often jointly with national public agencies, international and national NGOs, and also private foundations, for responsibilities, attention and resources. Competition for 'turf' is not, of course, unique to IPAs, but is a classical topic in the study of national administrations (see Wilson, 1989). However, many IOs do not just face horizontal competition from other IOs and international and transnational agencies – public and private – engaged in policy-related work, but also from national bodies. Moreover, whereas national administrations can typically rely on predictable streams of revenue from taxation covering most or all of their expenditures, many IOs spend increasing amounts of time on seeking to secure resources in competitive environments. For most of them, the option of going into deficit is not available, threatening organizational survival in the case of sudden 'shocks' to their revenue base (see, e.g., Hüfner, 2017 for the case of UNESCO). In short, the administrations of many IOs operate in crowded 'markets' for policy ideas and services, and they compete intensively over mandates, competences, financial and other policy-related resources, and also reputation with state and non-state actors. Moreover, the fact that their legal or *de facto* ability to act in a hierarchical manner *vis-à-vis* other IOs or member states is often strictly limited, makes them highly dependent on the willingness of others to 'buy into' what they have to offer or to act as orchestrators (Abott et al., 2015b).

Third, and following on from the previous point, a focus on IPAs and resourcing underscores that studying IOs and their administrations as 'stand-alone governance actors' (Abott et al., 2015a, p. 7) does not provide enough 'insight into how populations of organizations become viable (or fail), behave, and evolve' (Abott et al., 2016). As highlighted in several of the contributions to this volume, many IOs, especially in the UN system, are interconnected through complex resource flows which can make it difficult to get an accurate picture of both revenues and expenditures. Viewed from the perspective of resourcing, organizational boundaries appear much less clear-cut and more permeable than a focus on formal-legal structures may suggest. Former funding IOs, such as the UNDP, may become operational agencies, whereas subordinate funds may be outsourced and develop into independent funding IOs. Regional organizations like the EU are both recipients of resources but also co-financing other IOs. From a resource perspective, we find, thus, intensive competition, cooperation, and interdependencies.

Following trends in organizational studies, IO scholarship has become increasingly sensitive to the implications of these observations in terms of research designs. Thus, since the 1980s, conceptual and theoretical discussions on organizational fields have evolved considerably, and in many directions (see reviews in Scott, 2014; Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). This body of scholarship has shown that field-level analysis adds to the traditional study of 'organisation-level activity' by expanding the view to wider '[d]omains of contest, conflict, and change' and the '[d]ual-directional [interface] between field and organization' (Scott, 2014, p. 257). This implies looking beyond single organisations as actors and to include the relational systems in which actors are embedded. Resource flows are part of these relations shaping the international organizational system. Such an interorganizational perspective also requires some notion of the boundaries of the organizational fields one attempts to study (Scott, 2014). Accordingly, the 'organizational turn' in the study of IOs (Ellis, 2010) has to include environmental, interorganizational and organizational field perspectives. Debates on international regimes and regime complexity (Betts, 2009) or discussions about international public policies and the actors involved in these policies (Bauman and Miller, 2012) are difficult to grasp when the focus is primarily on single IOs or IPAs.

The recognition of the need for more systemic approaches is manifested, first, in the recent application of well-established institutional and organizational theories to the study of the interrelations of IOs and their respective IPAs, among themselves and with their environment. This includes studying populations of IOs within the framework of a wider organizational ecology (Abott et al., 2016; Gehring and Faude, 2014). Second, new concepts and approaches have been developed more specifically for the context of IR, such as orchestration (Abott et al., 2015b) or the study of world organizations (Koch, 2015). By adding an explicit administrative governance and resource dimension to these considerations, one can expect to find dynamics of power and influence, cooperation and competition, as well as the organizational dimensions of these dynamics that shape the present-day international system.

Conclusions

The contributions to this special issue highlight critical issues in the study of IO resourcing, including, in particular, resource diversification, the complexity of related actor constellations, and organizational differentiation that goes hand in hand with resource diversification. The findings documented in these contributions reveal how IOs seek to obtain and allocate funds and how resourcing-related concerns pervade their organization, whether it relates to their structures; key organizational processes, such as budgeting or policy-making; or, importantly, staffing. But a focus on resourcing does not just add valuable empirical insights to the study of IOs. As suggested in the previous section, it also illustrates the value-added of an approach to the study of IOs that hones in on their administrations, their capacity for strategic action and their interconnectedness, in short, an 'administrative governance perspective'. In short: IO resourcing matters both practically and analytically.

Recent developments suggest that resourcing will further increase in salience in the coming years, highlighting the links between power, finance, IO organizational development and policy capacity. The era of multilateralism might not be at its end, but it is under intense pressure. The announcement of the Trump administration to seek substantive cuts in its contributions to several major UN agencies and programmes underlines that established multilateral institutions face threats that may severely disrupt their operations (Lynch, 2017). In Europe, the decision of the United Kingdom to trigger the process of leaving the European Union means that both short-term and long-term assumptions about EU financing will need to be rethought, as the UK has long been a major net contributor to the EU budget. Much of the debate about both the terms of leaving and the future relationship between the UK and the EU will be about finances (Centre for European Reform, 2017; Jacques Delors Institut, 2017). In short, debates about resourcing IOs will continue. For scholars of IOs, it 'pays' to focus on resources (see also Michaelowa, 2017).

Notes

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1. This section draws heavily on Patz and Goetz (2016, 2017).
2. See http://ipa-research.com.

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