




# Going beyond Security Community and Balance of Power: South America's Hybrid Regional Security Governance

RAFAEL DUARTE VILLA   
University of São Paulo, Brazil

FABRÍCIO H. CHAGAS-BASTOS   
University of São Paulo, Brazil  
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

AND

CAMILA DE MACEDO BRAGA   
University of São Paulo, Brazil

Regional security in South America cannot be explained simply by considering balance of power or security-community governance mechanisms. In this article, we present and discuss a hybrid security-governance approach for talking about governance security in the Americas, particularly, South America. We hypothesize that there exists a new security-governance configuration in which the traditional governance mechanisms—balance of power and security community—are not mutually exclusive, but overlap and coexist, leading to the emergence of a regional hybrid security architecture. Beyond explaining the reasons and causes for the overlap between security community and balance of power, we show the hybrid nature of regional security governance and point out how taking the hybridity conceptual approach fills the gaps within current research. We first offer a critique of two leading approaches to thinking about security in the Americas (balancing and security communities). Next, we show how the overlapping configurations in South America's regional security governance happen, testing Adler and Greve's (2009, "When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance." *Review of International Studies* 35[S1]: 59–84) framework against historical evidence. Last, we provide evidence of a hybrid security governance in the region. We complement our analysis with qualitative data from interviews with scholars, political, diplomatic, and military actors conducted in various countries across the region. Our contribution is a significant step toward understanding how security-governance formations come about in non-Western regions of the world, privileging its specificities. More importantly, we offer a novel angle to escape straitjacket hypotheses to security governance grounded in Western hegemonic ideal types, which have focus either on balance of power or on security-community models.

La sécurité régionale en Amérique du Sud ne peut être expliquée seulement par les mécanismes de gouvernance d'équilibre des forces ou de communauté de sécurité. Dans cet article, nous présentons et discutons une approche hybride de la gouvernance de la sécurité pour comprendre cette gouvernance sur le continent américain, en particulier en Amérique du Sud. Nous émettons l'hypothèse qu'il existe une nouvelle configuration de la gouvernance de la sécurité dans laquelle les mécanismes de gouvernance traditionnels—équilibre des forces et communauté de sécurité—ne sont pas mutuellement exclusifs mais se chevauchent et coexistent, menant à l'émergence d'une architecture hybride de la sécurité régionale. En plus d'expliquer les raisons et les causes du chevauchement entre communauté de sécurité et équilibre des forces, nous montrons la nature hybride de la gouvernance régionale de la sécurité et mettons en évidence comment l'approche conceptuelle par hybridité comble les lacunes des recherches existantes. Nous commençons par une critique des deux principales approches de réflexion sur la sécurité en Amérique (équilibre et communautés de sécurité). Ensuite, nous montrons comment les configurations de chevauchement interviennent dans la gouvernance régionale de la sécurité en Amérique du Sud en confrontant le cadre d'Adler et Greve (2009) à des preuves historiques. Enfin, nous fournissons des preuves d'une gouvernance hybride de la sécurité dans la région. Nous complétons notre analyse par des données qualitatives issues d'entretiens avec des chercheurs et des acteurs politiques, diplomatiques et militaires qui ont été menés dans divers pays de la région. Notre contribution est un pas important vers une compréhension de la façon dont la gouvernance de la sécurité se construit dans les régions non occidentales du monde en soulignant ses spécificités. Plus important encore, nous offrons un nouvel angle permettant d'échapper aux hypothèses de gouvernance de la sécurité fondées sur les idéaux-types hégémoniques occidentaux qui se concentrent soit sur l'équilibre des forces, soit sur les modèles de communauté de sécurité.

El tema de la seguridad regional en América del Sur no puede explicarse simplemente analizando el equilibrio de poder o los mecanismos de gobernanza de comunidad de seguridad. En este artículo, se presenta y analiza un enfoque de gobernanza de seguridad híbrido que replantea la seguridad en América Latina, en particular, en América del Sur. Nuestra hipótesis sustenta la existencia de una nueva configuración de gobernanza regional de seguridad en la que los mecanismos tradicionales de gobernanza (equilibrio de poder y comunidad de seguridad) no se excluyen, sino que se superponen y coexisten, dando lugar a la aparición de una arquitectura de seguridad híbrida regional. Este artículo investiga las razones y las causas de la superposición entre la comunidad de seguridad y el equilibrio de poder, así como la naturaleza híbrida de la gobernanza de la seguridad regional destacando como el enfoque conceptual de la hibridez cubre las lagunas de la investigación actual.

Rafael Duarte Villa is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of São Paulo's Department of Political Science.

Fabício H. Chagas-Bastos is an Assistant Professor and EU Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the University of Copenhagen's Department of Political Science. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the University of São Paulo's International Relations Research Centre.

Camila de Macedo Braga is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of São Paulo's International Relations Institute.

Villa, Rafael Duarte et al. (2021) Going beyond Security Community and Balance of Power: South America's Hybrid Regional Security Governance. *Global Studies Quarterly*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab036>

© The Author(s) (2021). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

De esta manera, primero ofrecemos una crítica de dos enfoques principales que piensan la seguridad en Latinoamérica (equilibrio de poder y comunidades de seguridad). Segundo, se indica cómo se producen las configuraciones superpuestas en la gobernanza de la seguridad regional de América del Sur, poniendo a prueba el marco teórico de Adler y Greve (2009) cuando contrastado con la evidencia histórica. Por último, se presentan evidencias de la gobernanza de seguridad híbrida en la región. Complementamos nuestro análisis con datos cualitativos procedentes de entrevistas con académicos y actores políticos, diplomáticos y militares realizadas en varios países de la región. Nuestra contribución es un paso significativo para entender cómo surgen los procesos de gobernanza de la seguridad en regiones no occidentales del mundo, privilegiando sus particularidades. Sobre todo, ofrecemos una perspectiva novedosa que avanza más allá de las hipótesis sobre la gobernanza de la seguridad basadas en los tipos ideales hegemónicos occidentales, los cuáles se centran en el equilibrio de poder o en los modelos de comunidades de seguridad.

Although a burgeoning literature on regional security governance has started to explore more systematically the dynamics on why and how mechanisms of balance of power and security community overlap across non-Western regions (e.g., Khoo 2015; Bagayoko, Eboe, and Luckham 2016; Feraru 2018; Cannon and Donelli 2020), scant attention has been paid to Latin and, more specifically, South America. Prior to the 1980s, scholarship characterized South America's security governance as dominated by hard power-balancing discourses and practices—the result of trenchant historic geopolitical rivalries (e.g., Argentina and Brazil, Bolivia and Chile, or El Salvador and Honduras; Barletta and Trinkunas 2004; Martín 2006). In contrast, from the 1990s onward, security community-oriented practices and narratives emerged and developed, leading some analysts to state the end of balance of power configurations in South America (Hurrell 1998). Moreover, the absence of relevant interstate wars in the region over the twentieth century and the consolidation of the strong sociability ties in the regional security-governance architecture accentuated the confidence on procedural and operational mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts across the region.

By and large, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the underlying rationale of security governance in South America is couched solely neither on balance of power nor on security-community discourse and practices. Beyond the prevalent exclusion or overlapping (Adler and Greve 2009) frameworks to explain security governance across the region, recent research has argued that these are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, have been formed and exist in a hybrid form (Villa, Chagas-Bastos, and Braga 2019; Villa, Braga, and Ferreira 2021).

In this article, we present and discuss a hybrid security-governance approach for talking about governance security in the Americas, particularly South America. We hypothesize that there exists a new security-governance configuration in which the traditional governance mechanisms—balance of power and security community—are not mutually exclusive, but overlap and coexist, leading to the emergence of a regional hybrid security architecture.

Our contribution is a significant step toward understanding how security-governance formations come about in non-Western regions of the world, privileging its specificities. Also, it is a much-needed step toward a broadly framing of hybridity within security studies and IR theory replication testing. More importantly, we offer a novel angle to escape straitjacket hypotheses to security governance grounded in Western hegemonic ideal types, which have focused either on balance of power or on security-community models.

The paper is structured in three parts. We first offer a critique of two leading approaches to thinking about security in the Americas (balancing and security communities). Next, we show how the overlapping configurations in South America's regional security governance happen, testing Adler and Greve's (2009) framework against histor-

ical evidence. Last, we provide evidence of a hybrid security governance in the region, in which traditional governance mechanisms coexist, overlap, and intertwine—all at the same time.

### Framing Security-Governance Mechanisms

The concepts of balance of power and security community have been constantly instrumentalized to address security dynamics in South America, particularly when emphasizing the emergence of security-community practices in the region or, at least, in the Southern Cone. Security communities are conceptualized as transnational regions comprising sovereign states whose people maintain the expectation that the members of the community will not fight each other physically and will seek conflict resolution by peaceful means. This might occur in two different ways. On the one hand, there is a “tightly coupled” security community, which shows a strong tendency toward cooperation commitments, a high level of military integration, coordination in internal security, shared forms of governance and decision-making rules, and free movement of people. On the other hand, security communities assume a “loosely coupled” fashion: a less institutionalized and intense form of security community in which the absence of war between member states remains even in remote forms (Adler 1997; Adler and Barnett 1998).

The emergence of security-community narratives and practices in South America is associated with three factors that represent the core of more broad Latin American modes of managing interstate interactions: First, a strong legalist conciliation culture in the region (Kacowicz 2005; Burges and Chagas-Bastos 2016; Kacowicz and Mares 2016); second, the institutionalization of a democratic identity across the Western Hemisphere that has led to long-term commitments, indicating a set of behaviors different from those realism would predict (Barletta and Trinkunas 2004); and third, the role of diplomacy as the *natural* practice to exclude violence as a political tool and how actors institutionalize reassurance as opposed to deterrence. The indivisible and comprehensive characters of *cooperative security* are the *natural* practices of security communities (Merke 2015; Burges and Chagas-Bastos 2016).

Actors that collectively constitute security communities align consciously with common projects, turning security governance into a day-by-day practice of peace. For instance, a senior Latin American diplomat (Guatemalan Diplomat 2019) recently pointed out that “the balance of power was never really present in the region. The realist paradigm of relations and major geopolitical conflicts belong to the realm of the great powers.” The roles played by diplomatic practices based on *concertación* and *cordialidad* moved the *ultima ratio* of politics toward a negotiated solution instead of the use of violence (Burges and Chagas-Bastos 2016). This also includes a disposition toward expanding the

security community through explicit or implicit socialization, joint defense training and exercising, policy coordination, unfortified borders, and the implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs; e.g., military cooperation, joint planning and exercises, intelligence exchanges, revision of army doctrines from traditional war-fighting to post-conflict reconstruction).

The long absence of interstate armed conflict and the continuous institutionalization of security-community practices, however, do not account for the multiple instances in which states in the region instrumentalized the potential (or actual) use of force in their relations. Neorealist-oriented analysts, for instance, pointed out that secondary regional powers, such as Argentina, attempted to counter Brazil's rise and regional prominence by increasing their own capabilities through internal balancing or soft balancing (Flemes 2010; Schenoni 2014; Flemes and Wehner 2015; Friedman and Long 2015). Yet, little research has addressed the discussion in terms of hard balancing or militarized tensions in the region (Runza 2008; Guimarães and Almeida 2018). Although the meaning of balance of power remains theoretically contested (Paul 2004), mainstream literature adopted a systemic approach. The central premise is that balancing behavior is a product of perceived hegemonic threat in the regional or international systems. Balance of power as a mechanism of security governance rests on the "availability of war [. . .] as an order-sustaining or creating tool" (Adler and Greve 2009, 67), with an underlying concept of power predominantly couched on material and coercive capabilities.

Some scholars have also considered the differences between soft- and hard-balancing behaviors. Soft balancing does not directly challenge the military preponderance of a global or regional military power. It uses, instead, nonmilitary instruments to delay, frustrate, or undermine unilateral policies of a predominant power (Pape 2005). Flemes and Wehner (2015) observed that soft balancing as a foreign policy strategy is a rational decision for a secondary power in its relations to regional great powers in those spaces where competitive patterns have replaced rivalry interactions, as in South America. The purpose of soft balancing is to even out or ameliorate the existing asymmetric distribution of power and to frustrate the powerful actor's achievement of foreign policy goals by increasing its costs of action (Paul 2004; Pape 2005). Hard-balancing definitions tend to be more consensual, as they relate to the traditional notions of power and responses to power imbalances within regional and international systems, such as alliance formation (external balancing; Walt 1987) and/or the state's investment in its own capabilities (i.e., internal balancing, Beckley 2010). The general aim is to include potential threats in the configurations of systemic power equilibrium and toward system stability.<sup>1</sup> Some analysts describe how nonmilitary tools have been used to sidestep unilateral policies of superpowers using soft-balancing strategies—in particular, via economic statecraft, diplomacy, and international institutions (Pape 2005).

#### *When Security Community Meets Balance of Power*

Adler and Greve (2009, 64–5) proposed an analytical framework to understand and explain how distinct security practices and discourses may influence the stability of regional political orders and governance challenges. On

their view, security governance is "a system of rule conceived by individual and corporate actors aiming at coordinating, managing, and regulating their collective existence in response to threats to their physical and ontological security," in which the underlying mechanisms are a "more or less, clearly delineated set of rules, norms and practices, and institutions that coordinate security relations between actors in the international system." Unlike others (see Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007), the authors do not conceive balance of power and security-community practices as mutually exclusive, and they open space to conceptualize the existence of an overlap between both practices that are based on a mixture of discourses and evolving institutional apparatuses. The idea of an overlap allows for an analytical angle that captures the systemic transition between distinct security orders, from balance of power to security community and vice versa. The overlap happens because "different orders, and in particular the security systems of governance on which they are based (such as balance of power and security community), often coexist in political discourse and practice" (Adler and Greve 2009, 59). As an analytical tool, the existence of an overlap between security mechanisms indicates that one security-governance system transitions into another and, at the end, a more robust and peaceful order would emerge, based on the security-community rationale. To characterize such processes, they present four dimensions in which security-governance mechanisms overlap: (1) temporal/evolutionary, (2) functional, (3) spatial, and (4) relational.

The *temporal/evolutionary* overlap approach considers that security orders vary or develop over time, generating communitarian practices, without completely erasing practices and discourses of balance of power. As such, one set of institutions, mechanisms, norms, or ideas does not fully replace another—they rather coexist. A temporal/evolutionary overlap is observed when old practices and mechanisms have not completely disappeared, and emerging mechanisms have not entirely been consolidated. The new practices and mechanisms of the security community may still be only partly institutionalized. Finally, the return to, or continued relevance of, balance of power thinking may be conditioned by the strength or weakness of the rising security-community mechanism (Adler and Greve 2009, 73).

Security mechanisms and practices may also overlap across their *functional* sectors or domains. They represent the plurality of perceptions, practices, courses of action, and choices on security issues that can be made across different parts of the foreign policy, military, and civil bureaucracies. It would be expected from defense and military actors to perform more pronounced balance of power discourses and practices than diplomats. It would also be expected of the diplomatic corps—or the part of the bureaucracy responsible for foreign policy—to engage more fully with the practices and discourses of security community (Adler and Greve 2009, 76).

The third dimension refers to the *geographic space* in which security-governance mechanisms develop (Adler and Greve 2009, 78). It comprises the different defined regions that exhibit several conceptions of security order. This means that, within a single region, there may be in one segment a strong trend toward community-security practices and in another segment a tendency to privilege stronger balance of power practices. The authors argue that the reason for such an overlap can be that one segment might have not been entirely exposed to security-community practices for the same amount of time as other segments of the region.

<sup>1</sup>Balance of power behavior may include deterrence, military planning, and institutional building to monitor the distribution of military capabilities, among others (see Nexon 2009).

The fourth dimension comprises the *relational aspects* of overlapping configurations. It is not linked directly to the *location* of the actors themselves but to their security relations to one another in each geographic space, for example, the Greek–Turkish relationship within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Two actors who maintain conflicting security relations over a historic period may have cooperative relations on a specific security issue that affects their relations. These interactions, in general, happen in a forum or mediated by a third party, and practices and institutionalized norms then start to be oriented by a logic of security community.

#### *South American Security-Governance Hybrid Features*

Unresolved territorial disputes<sup>2</sup> over South American history produced deeply rooted conflict patterns that bore implicit assumptions on the other's malign intentions (Centeno 2002; Schenoni et al. 2020). Such disputes, however, created limited incentives among elites to solve long-standing conflicts via violent means because interstate conflicts were not seen as sufficiently intense to generate perceptions of existential threats. As a direct outcome, the possibility of choosing between balance of power or security-community behaviors remained standard practice across the different levels of decision-making involved in the region's security governance.

Balance of power, as hinted above, is seen as the provider of order to political systems where rational mistrust predominates, that is, through rational risk-taking calculations considering others' behaviors. Recent research, however, has raised doubts over the alleged thesis that balance of power practices has disappeared from the region since the 1980s (Barletta and Trinkunas 2004; Martin 2006).

Burgeoning scholarship observes both the continued presence of balance of power and developed security-community practices, suggesting that there is an overlap between balance of power (soft and hard), security community, and conflict formation mechanisms (Battaglini 2012; Mares 2012). It further suggests that security governance in South America from the 2000s onward has been driven by hybrid security governance, that is, the outcome of a continuous overlap between balance of power and security-community practices (Villa, Chagas-Bastos, and Braga 2019). Such hybridity, a marked characteristic of Latin American international thought (Tickner 2008; Chagas-Bastos 2018, 2021), develops from the practical needs and the possible means to face systemic and regional contingencies across the region. This means that hybridity in security governance is born from the evolutionary and coconstitutive process of different (and overlapping) practices and discourses over time, space, function, and relations (Villa, Chagas-Bastos, and Braga 2019; see also Krause 2012). Also, hybridity is born in those moments in history in which some new practices and discourses do not fully replace old

<sup>2</sup>The low level of major interstate conflicts over the last 150 years reinforces the idea of emerging security community practices in South America. Only two conflicts in the region escalated to militarized aggressions during the second half of the twentieth century: The Football War, between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, and the Cenepa War, between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. If we consider extraregional powers, we must also count the Falklands/Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982. In this context, some scholars argue that the resort of war is a declining institution in South America even when possibilities of the use of violence are not entirely discarded, but some territorial disputes—for example, between Colombia and Venezuela, Bolivia and Chile, Chile and Peru, and Colombia and Nicaragua—are still in play in the region (Borges and Chagas-Bastos 2016; Mares 2017).

ones, in which neither security community nor balance of power overlapping and intertwining security-governance rationales, discourses, and practices prevail.

A hybrid security governance displays practices and discourses that bear a mixture of features of both balance of power and security community, not only a mere overlap between each governance system. Novel forms emerge leading to a myriad of possible combinations, for instance, hard-toned discourses and the creation of trust mechanisms via third parties as observed in Chile–Bolivia's relations (as we develop later in the article). That is, unlike the clearly defined expectations of mechanism balance of power or security governance, hybrid security governance entails a complex and nonlinear phenomenon that does not have a predefined end-state. It is continuously (re)defined, even though we may be able to trace back its origins (see Villa, Chagas-Bastos, and Braga 2019; Villa, Braga, and Ferreira 2021).

It explains why, for instance, even though a variable evolution of community-building institutions has emerged since the 1980s, and South American states have engaged in numerous CBMs, the sustainability of security-community practices is still not consolidated. The continued relevance of soft or hard balance of power logic and how it plays itself out in practice in each of these cases may be conditioned by the strengths (or weaknesses) of the rising security-community mechanisms. Also, hybridity offers an alternative analytical framework to address systemic changes in South America security governance. Last, the concept of hybridity opens the space for new possibilities while analyzing regional security governance, in which we must consider issues such as the rise of transnational non-state actors, transnational criminality, increasing inequalities within and between regional states, and the complex forms of social and political violence affecting all levels of security governance.

#### **The Overlapping of Security-Governance Mechanisms in South America**

We next analyze the security-governance configurations that have emerged in South America since the 2000s, considering how this set of mechanisms has evolved over the last two decades. We gather our evidence from South America's security-governance discourses and practices from the 1980s onward, observing how resilient power-balancing responses have contributed to (weakening or strengthening) the consolidation of security-community mechanisms in the region. What is more, we complement our analysis with qualitative data from interviews with scholars, political, diplomatic, and military actors conducted in various countries across the region between September 2019 and March 2020. We pay special attention in our interviews to civil and military sources with a profile of experience in “military diplomacy”, that is, individuals with experience in both military and diplomatic affairs.

#### *Temporal/evolutionary Dimension*

Security community–related mechanisms in South America first took form in the 1980s when balance of power was still the “dominant game in town.” The Peace and Friendship Treaty between Argentina and Chile, in 1984, can be set as its starting point, and other mechanisms contributed to a deepening, particularly with the signature of the Cruz

del Sur Agreement in 2006.<sup>3</sup> Argentina–Brazil advanced these early regional security community-oriented practices in 1985 with the Brazilian–Argentine agreement on nuclear materials and technology, which further evolved to the South American Defence Council in 2008. It is also noteworthy that even in an uncoordinated manner, in the 1990s, Brazil and Argentina adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, putting an end to the military purposes of their nuclear programs (see [Mallea, Spekter, and Wheeler 2015](#)).

Regional integration arrangements across the region (e.g., the Andean Community and Mercosur) have introduced “democracy clauses” (for a review, see [Genna and Hiroi 2015](#)) that conditioned regional—and, more broadly, systemic—socialization to the promise of members to abide by democratic political competition and practices, leading to delegitimization of practices based on security dilemmas ([Barletta and Trinkunas 2004](#)). A variety of deterrence-based behaviors, however, can still be observed over the first two decades of the twentieth-first century, ranging from the concentration of weapons at disputed border zones (e.g., Chile–Peru) to highly militarized tensions (e.g., between Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela; see [Mares 2017](#)).

Even though balance of power-oriented practices has been delegitimized in many ways, residual behaviors of conflict remain. Active tensions and aggressive behaviors have come from the most authoritarian countries in the region. In multiple instances, for instance, Venezuela made moves on the Essequibo area in Guyana, even putting pressure on Suriname. Both drew very strong responses from Brazil and extremely clear signals that Caracas should stop. Moreover, the tensions between Chile and Bolivia come down to a requirement for posturing and positioning under international law so that Chile does not cede position and Bolivia could maintain a claim through the International Court of Justice.

Over time, however, historical conditions challenged the consolidation of security community-oriented practices and institutions in the region. Although many CBMs are reported each year to the Organization of American States (OAS), and several multilateral or bilateral institutions have emerged—potentially increasing trust between South American states—they were built without entirely replacing the older balance of power-discursive layers and practices between South American states. Neither the new security-community governance mechanisms have become hegemonic nor the old order that dictated the balance of power died.

#### *Functional Dimension*

Adler and Greve argue that the coexistence of balance of power and security-community systems organizing security governance in a region could not only be the product of state or governmental will but also be the product of different preferences of political elites, diplomatic corps, armed forces, and even subnational grassroots groups. The overlap is a result of the different strategies of national interest groups and bureaucracies that, according to their functions, chose to act under distinct security rationales, which may relate to power-balancing or security-community mechanisms.

This is true for security-governance mechanisms varying across different parts of the foreign policy and military

bureaucracies in the region. Most military institutions adhere to the logic of balance of power and realpolitik toward regional security order. In contrast, other parts of the bureaucracy—especially diplomatic corps—have deeply internalized the logic of security community in their discourse and practices ([Flemes and Radseck 2010](#)). [Nelson Jobim \(2020\)](#), former Brazilian Defence Minister, points out that “military commanders at the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College [. . .] work with hypotheses of war. They formulate these hypotheses, including [. . .] exercises that are done annually based on the possibilities of war. [For instance] hypotheses of invasion of Venezuela etc. [. . .] There is a chance for everything.” His statement sheds light on how different parts of the bureaucracies (in particular, the armed forces) adopt different policy-making choices and how, by the nature of being war professionals, military could be more inclined to choose, or continue to maintain, discourses and practices based on balance of power.<sup>4</sup> In contrast, an example of a discourse related to the security-community rationale is given by [Celso Amorim \(2015\)](#)<sup>5</sup>: “the Brazilian strategy towards South America is strongly cooperative. Then, will the concept of anarchy be appropriate to describe the relationship between our states? (Which work collectively under the sign of the integration?). The concept of security community seems to me to be more appropriate to the reality and, above all, to the goals we have in South America.”

Border defense, the purchases of sophisticated weapons for defensive purposes, and the exchange of strong nationalist overtones seem more predictable to be expected from senior members of the South American military corps. Still, it is remarkable that the hard-toned discourses linked to balance of power rationales appeared in the declarations of Chile and Peru’s military commanders, within rising tensions between both countries over the 2000s. The Chilean Ministry of Defence announced in December 2005 the purchase of second-hand F-16 fighter jets from the Netherlands. In December 2010, Chile received eighteen aircraft. That was sufficient for aggressive statements from Chilean and Peruvian Air Force commanders. Ricardo Ortega, Chilean Air General, stated that “we do not intend to hit anyone. The concept of deterrence says: do not mess with me because I hit those who bother me hard. To those who are looking at us, all those around us, they know that we are able to hit hard. It is better to leave us alone” ([Agência Estado 2002](#); [El Mostrador 2005](#); [Perú21 2010](#)). The commander of the Peruvian Air Forces, Air General Carlos Samamé Quiñones replied in the same tone: “[w]e hit twice more. The one that hits me, I hit [him] twice. And if I have to sacrifice myself, I am going to sacrifice myself. I have no more [options left]” ([Europa Press 2010](#)). Despite the use of multilateral communitarian measures through mechanisms, the hard tone of the discourse between military actors from Chile and Peru exposed a background of hostile relations inconsistent with the practices and discourse of security community adopted in regional organizations, such as the Unasur or Andean Community.

We expect that security thinking and practices from foreign policy-making bureaucracies closely associated with security-community discourses, and balance of power ideas

<sup>3</sup>In the Cruz del Sur Agreement, a Binational Force was organized for future joint troop deployments to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions ([Wachholtz and Alves 2018](#)).

<sup>4</sup>To illustrate, in September 2020, at the peak of political tensions between Brazil and Venezuela, the Brazilian Army spent BRL six million to simulate an invasion war game in the Amazon. The Brazilian military created a war scenario in which an alleged “Red” country (perhaps Venezuela?) invaded a “Blue” country, and it was necessary to expel the invaders ([Sassine 2020](#)).

<sup>5</sup>Former Brazil’s Foreign Affairs (between 2003 and 2010) and Defence (between 2011 and 2015) Minister.

and practices to be more pronounced in the military establishment. There is no automatic socialization, however, on either mechanism for foreign policy or military institutions. In some cases, some security community-oriented discourses and practices could be incorporated and socialized in the military and defense corporations even when historical fragments of balance of power did not disappear entirely.

These processes of internalization and socialization of security-community mechanisms inside military corporations appear in the speech of one of the most famous Brazilian military officials, Divisional General [Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz \(2020\)](#), former United Nations (UN) peacekeeper force commander in Haiti and Congo, who stated that “the hypothesis of war [in South America] has lost a little strength, not only because of the awareness of other countries that it is not a good deal, but also because of the multilateral mechanisms interfere a lot. When you see the risk of conflict, you also see 550 the movement of the OAS or the United Nations. So, you see the countries’ posture, with no economic interest in the conflict; also, because of the interference of multilateral mechanisms.” Santos Cruz provides evidence of a perception that a functional overlap cannot be predetermined by the political or military nature of the actors. It complicates an initial perception that South American military corps tend to *automatically* favor the balance of power logic.

#### *Spatial Dimension*

Adler and Greve note that different geographical regions exhibit different conceptions of security governance and, by consequence, how the spatial dimension of overlap between balance of power and security-community mechanisms is expressed. According to them, in North America, there is a pluralistic security community among Canada, Mexico, and the United States, which was partly institutionalized by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In a similar vein, in South America, the Southern Cone has recently evolved into a pluralistic security community, which includes Argentina and Brazil, the two regional powers, along with minor partners such as Paraguay and Uruguay ([Hurrell 1998](#)). Argentina and Brazil’s abandonment of a nuclear power race (between 1985 and 1991) and their replacement of an economic competition by integration initiatives through the Mercosur (in 1992) also account for the most outstanding practical changes in the transition from power-balancing to security community-oriented dynamics in the region.

Despite the incorporation of the OAS in post-Cold War multiple security community-building practices, it is not yet possible to consider the existence of a hemispheric emerging security community. The CBMs submitted to the OAS—in compliance with resolution AG/RES 2398 (XXXVIII-O/08) regarding 2016—account for long-standing historic conflicts, particularly in the Northern Andes. For instance, in 2008, Venezuela and Colombia came close to a state of war because Hugo Chávez supported Rafael Correa’s Ecuador’s protests when the Colombian Army invaded the Ecuadorian territory to capture and kill guerrilla men of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In 2012, however, Colombia invited Venezuela to participate as an international observer in the negotiations that led to the peace agreements between the Colombian government and the FARC in 2016.

#### *Relational Dimension*

A relational overlap happens either when two or more states that historically have engaged with power–balance

relations in a region review their conflicting relationship or when third parties<sup>6</sup> act as mediators (e.g., another state or an international organization) to stimulate behaviors of a security-community relationship. In South America, typical balance of power practices and speeches—more specifically, hard balancing—appears in bilateral relations between states, such as the recent militarized declarations between Colombia and Venezuela, Venezuela and Guyana, and Chile and Peru. These conflict-forming relationships, however, are reconfigured at the regional or systemic levels in cooperative discourses and practices of security communities. For instance, Chile and Peru reached a historic agreement in 2014 on the territorial delimitation of maritime areas in the Pacific through the mediation of the International Court of Justice despite the heated discourse militaries that both countries often exchange ([BBC News 2014](#)).

The Pacific War in the late-nineteenth century between Bolivia and Chile cut off Bolivia’s access to the Atlantic and posed a deep scar in Bolivia’s national memory. As a result, the countries have broken diplomatic relations since the late 1970s, still have frictions, and have not yet developed dependable expectations of peaceful change. Although both countries practiced various CBMs over the early 2000s,<sup>7</sup> they maintain a latent state of conflict, which from time to time gives place to harsh diplomatic or military statements. As a commander of the Bolivian navy pointed out that “with Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela we practise all [ongoing] confidence measures, we have a lot of exchange with [military] academies in those countries. Even with Spain. With Chile, we have none. We do not trust them!” ([Bolivian Navy Commissioned Officer 2019](#)). Bolivia and Chile, however, mutually accepted the democratic clauses established by regional organizations, such as the Unasur and the Andean Community, and even hemispheric ones, such as those proposed by the OAS. Likewise, Venezuela and Guyana reciprocally mobilized troops on their borders in 2015 and 2018, because of historical tensions based on territorial claims. Both countries, however, maintained the Venezuelan territorial claims on diplomatic grounds, which were mediated by the representative of the UN Secretary General ([Radio Voice of America 2015](#); [Huancavilca 2018](#)).

#### **Beyond the Overlapping Framework**

We apply in this final section the concept of hybridity to regional security governance to overcome the limitations that Adler and Greve’s framework faces. Beyond explaining the reasons and causes for the overlap between security community and balance of power, we show the hybrid nature of regional security governance and point out how taking the hybridity conceptual approach fills the gaps within their framework.

Two relevant issues deserve further attention. Adler and Greve assume a state-centered approach by focusing on state actors’ preferences for conflict management and resolution. Also, the framework is suited to explain security-governance mechanisms based on hard balancing but has less

<sup>6</sup>Regarding these third parties, states with a history of balance of power practices are expected to align with speeches or practices related to security community mechanisms.

<sup>7</sup>The confidence-building measures announced by both countries included: (1) the destruction of antipersonnel mines that Chile disseminated along the border with Bolivia during the Pinochet dictatorship years, (2) the training of several Bolivian soldiers (in Chile) in anti-landmine activity, (3) the exchange of Bolivian students in Chilean military academies, and (4) permanent consultation mechanisms and antidrug cooperation efforts.

explanatory power when examining behavior expressed under the form of soft balancing, as in South America.

Secondary regional powers, such as Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, have undertaken soft-balancing strategies and reorganized their alliances (external balancing) to counterbalance Brazil's predominance in South America (Gómez-Mera 2013; Flesmes and Wehner 2015). For instance, Argentina used a soft-balancing approach by refusing to support Brazil's quest for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). When the discussion about the extension of permanent members of the UNSC reopened in the 1990s, the same intentional balancing—with the support of Mexico—was crafted by Argentina, aiming again at promoting a soft-balancing approach against Brazil's intention of occupying a potential permanent seat in the organization.

The most recent intergovernmental effort to form an alternative community-building institution in the region, for example, Unasur, has experienced a process of agony and disintegration since 2014. The evolution of security-community practices does not suggest that the weakening of institutions, such as Unasur, or the persisting balance power dynamics entails a return to harsh deterrence practices. A temporal overlap does not lead to a full return of past configurations, given that it occurs under present conditions.

As hinted above, although loosely oriented community-security discourses and practices have been socialized, vestiges of conflict hypotheses remain entrenched in defense bureaucracies. This means that community-security practices are only partially socialized between military actors, and balance of power discourses and practices have not disappeared from their minds and hearts. The *functional* dimension does not strictly fit the South American case, where some more cosmopolitan military sectors tend to internalize community practices and discourses more than hard balance of power ones. Perhaps military personnel with more cosmopolitan views of the world and more experience in international conflict mediation—such as General Santos Cruz—can have different perceptions than the ones held by military fellows who have made their careers limited to national contexts. They would be, therefore, more likely to think about regional security orders in terms of balance of power.

We argue that generations of politicians, military, and bureaucratic corps that were socialized within (re)democratization practices across Latin America, or in the various attempts to build regional integration institutions (e.g., Mercosur, Andean Community, Unasur, Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)), do not rationalize deterrence-based practices under the same conditions as the generations preceding them, even if such practices continue to exist as per the evidence showed above. Furthermore, the armed forces in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru offer training programs to their peers across the region. For example, the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College offers yearly training programs to other Latin American countries, which end up creating bridges among military personnel and mitigating images of past geopolitical rivalries.

As pointed out by Amorim (2020), the behaviors toward the international system are based on deterrence practices, whereas the same practices focusing on the region are based on cooperation. The evolving political conditions since the 1980s (such as democracy, institutional integration, and human rights accountability) have worked as channels to filter, structure, or even contain power-balancing discourses and practices. The former Secretary-General of the South

American School of Defence, Antonio Jorge Ramalho (2020), observes that the relational dimension of security governance in the region follows a prevalent trend of “overcoming conflicts through negotiation and diplomacy. The exception may be the cases between Venezuela and Colombia, and Venezuela and Guyana.” This means that South American countries build community security-oriented institutions and norms at the regional level but replicate in their bilateral relations the history of security dilemmas that evolved from unresolved territorial conflicts.

Our findings suggest that the primary reason for a *spatial* hybrid feature lies at suspicions maintained by historical territorial conflicts. This is particularly true for decision-makers in the Andean subregion who also invest less in practicing CBMs. Adler and Greve's argument on the exposure to security-community practices fails to consider the nuances the region exhibits. We suggest that in the *relational* dimension practices and discourses on security community between South America countries happen at the regional and systemic levels mediated by regional and UN system organizations.

Furthermore, Adler and Greve argue that the reason for such an overlap could be that the region might have not been exposed to security-community practices for the same amount of time than other regions. On one hand, the long history of sociability and norms diffusion toward peaceful conflict resolution in Latin American security-governance architecture has accentuated the confidence in procedural and operational mechanisms (Kacowicz 1998, 2005). However, this has not been entirely true across South America. Countries in the Northern Andes present markedly traditional behaviors of conflict formation (i.e., tendencies to balance of power practices), which coupled with the strong activities of non-state violent groups—such as guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers—have had an impact on the loosely institutionalization and practice of CBMs. Villa and Weiffen (2014) note that commitment levels with CBMs are stronger in the Southern Cone than in the Andean region, giving rise to differential patterns of evolution in military forces in both regions (see also Hirst 2003). In the end, the hybrid approach might explain why mechanisms of a loosely pluralistic security community could rise in the Southern part of South America in the 1990s after years of predominant balance of power behavior.

Likewise, it would be difficult to apply the same spatial dimension to South America as a whole. When classic problems of information asymmetry, poor communication, and even the low-level institutionalization of CBMs among regional actors are in place, the conditions for the resurgence of distrust, fueling false representations and security dilemmas, are back to the stage. The Andes presents an interesting case. In its Northern subregion, the spatial hybrid feature exhibits security-governance mechanism oriented with stronger balance of power influences, whereas in its Southern region, these influences are less hard-toned. To a greater or lesser extent, however, security-community mechanisms are present across both different security complexes.

Ecuador and Peru still have remnant hard feelings from the 1995 Cenepa War and eventually revive speeches based on security dilemmas. For instance, in 2017, on the celebration of the 22nd anniversary of the conflict, the Ecuadorian Defense Minister, Ricardo Patiño Aroca, after mentioning each one of the Ecuadorean soldiers killed, stated that “[h]ere are the names of the national heroes that we have promised never to forget, the honour achieved in combat in Cenepa” (Ecuador 2017). All this happens though both countries have shared and been historically aligned with

the US antidrug policy and security approach toward Latin America (Villa, Rodrigues, and Chagas-Bastos 2015). For instance, Ecuador recently even offered to the United States logistical facilities in the Galápagos islands due to its strategic position for operations and fight against drug trafficking. Peru followed the same path (América Economía 2018; Voice of America 2019).

Finally, the framework Adler and Greve propose, although in some of its dimensions, particularly the functional one, points out to the formation of diversified preferences for one or another security-governance model (balance of power or security community) depending on the profiles of bureaucracies (diplomatic or military). In South America, however, the application of this framework remains state-centric, overlooking the fact that the main security dynamics in the region revolve around non-state actors, such as the Criminal Bands (BACRIM) in Colombia<sup>8</sup> and the First Command of the Capital (PCC) in Brazil. The rise of transnational and non-state-based security threats adds another layer of complexity to the international relations in the region. The interaction between social violence levels perpetrated by non-state and transnational actors and interstate security dynamics across the region can also condition security governance mechanism. Non-state actors produce security dynamics and their own governance rules, especially in border areas (Kacowicz, Lacovsky, and Wajner 2020; Villa, Braga, and Ferreira 2021). Moreover, an asymmetric balancing derivative of interstate-level interactions and state versus non-state interactions may arise (Paul 2004). It could include the use of insurgency or terrorism by a weaker state to mitigate the power of a relatively stronger adversary. For instance, Venezuela often accuses Colombia of using paramilitary groups, FARC dissidents, and mercenaries to either undermine its border defences or create domestic instability.

Some of the main tensions of the last two decades between South American countries—as in the Andes, for example—have been produced not by state armies but by the intervention of irregular non-state actors. The tensions originated by these actors are not contemplated in the state-centric premise Adler and Greve originally take. For example, as mentioned earlier, the 2008 crisis between Colombia and Ecuador was caused because of the long-standing conflict between the Colombian state and the FARC guerrilla. By the same token, in May 2021, eight Venezuelan military personnel were kidnapped by a FARC splinter group after the Venezuelan government carried out one of the largest military operations in decades to fight these irregular groups in the Apure region, on the Colombian border. It displaced thousands of people and killed sixteen Venezuelan military personnel (Singer 2021; Venezuela 2021).

### Concluding Remarks

In this article, we addressed the dimensions and underlying rationale of hybrid regional security governance in South America. We show how overlapping institutions, norms, and ideas while following distinct rationales may develop into hybrid configurations across the region. We moved beyond Adler and Greve's framework by proposing that the analysis for non-Western regions should examine the hybrid forms of security governance. We observe that loosely institutionalized security-community practices have not consistently de-

veloped over time in South America or have not been sustained in the long run. Cooperative security and defense institutions appeared over time across the region, even though they are fragile and unstable or quickly disappear. In turn, the remaining segments of discourse and practices of balance of power have been mitigated but still co-exist with the fragile practices and institutions of security communities.

In general, the overlap between balance of power and security community happens when territorial disputes, militarized discourses, and hard and soft balance of power behaviors occur during periods where cooperation and trust-building processes are also taking place. Nevertheless, we showed evidence that both rationales and associated practices in regional security governance have overlapped and intertwined, assuming hybrid configurations. On the one side, low-intensity security dilemmas have not disappeared from the practices and discourses of South American countries. On the other side, the socialization of mechanisms of self-restraint and nonintervention has resulted in the institutionalization of mechanisms for conflict resolution.

Future research should investigate historical and present conditions in which the overlapping and hybrid practices and mechanisms of security governance develop. These may focus, for example, on the inclusion of new actors in practices and narratives of security governance, such as non-state armed groups, including the emerging transnational organized crime and how it has influenced the strategic behavior of state actors within South and Latin America. Also, researchers may study the perceptions of regional security orders by military and national political groups and how their behavior towards security governance are reflected on or feedback into them. Last, a promising research agenda can also be found on the investigation on how the hybrid dynamics in security governance might cause tension with democratic peace framework.

### LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

- BOLIVIAN NAVY COMMISSIONED OFFICER. Interview held in Puerto Suárez (Bolivia) on September 6, 2019.
- BRAZILIAN ARMY COMMISSIONED OFFICER. Gal. Carlos Alberto Santos Cruz (retired). Interview held in Brasília on February 13, 2020.
- BRAZILIAN POLITICAL ACTOR A. HON. CELSO AMORIM (FORMER BRAZILIAN FOREIGN AFFAIR AND DEFENCE MINISTER). Interview held in Rio de Janeiro on February 27, 2020.
- BRAZILIAN POLITICAL ACTOR B. HON. NELSON JOBIM (FORMER DEFENCE MINISTER BETWEEN 2007 AND 2011). Interview held in São Paulo on January 22, 2020.
- GUATEMALAN DIPLOMAT. MR LUIS ALBERTO PADILLA (RETIRED). Personal correspondence exchanged by email on November 25, 2019.
- SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN SCHOOL OF DEFENCE. PROFESSOR ANTONIO JORGE RAMALHO. Interview held in Brasília on January 14, 2020.

### Acknowledgments

We thank the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) for the Visiting Researcher Award that made this research possible (2019/18932-3). We would like to thank the editors and reviewers for their thoughtful comments. Last, we thank Professor Anthony Spanakos for his careful reading of our manuscript.

### References

- ADLER, EMANUEL. 1997. "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations." *Millennium* 26 (2): 249–77.

<sup>8</sup>The dissident groups of the FARC and other guerrilla groups that have not yet been reintegrated to civil life and moved to criminal activities.



- ADLER, EMANUEL, AND MICHAEL BARNETT. 1998. "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities." In *Security Communities*, edited by E. Adler and M. Barnett, 29–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ADLER, EMANUEL, AND PATRICIA GREVE. 2009. "When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance." *Review of International Studies* 35 (S1): 59–84.
- AGÊNCIA ESTADO. 2002. "Bolívia e Peru criticam compra chilena de aviões F-16." January 31. Accessed December 10, 2020. <http://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,bolivia-e-peru-criticam-compra-chilena-de-avioes-f-16,20020131p44083>.
- AMÉRICA ECONOMÍA. 2018. "EE.UU. y Perú acuerdan seguir colaborando en lucha contra las drogas." February 5. Accessed December 10, 2020. <https://www.americaeconomia.com/politica-sociedad/politica/eeuu-y-peru-acuerdan-seguir-colaborando-en-lucha-contra-las-drogas>.
- AMORIM, CELSO. 2015. "A política de defesa de um país pacífico." September 11. Accessed December 10, 2020. <http://www.vermelho.org.br/noticia/270091-1>.
- BAGAYOKO, NIAGALE, EBOE HUTCHFUL, AND ROBIN LUCKHAM. 2016. "Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice and Legitimate Public Authority." *Conflict, Security & Development* 16 (1): 1–32.
- BARLETTA, MICHAEL, AND HAROLD TRINKUNAS. 2004. "Regime Type and Regional Security in Latin America: Toward a 'Balance of Identity' Theory." In *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, edited by T.V. Paul, J. Wirtz and M. Fortmann, 334–59. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- BATTAGLINO, JORGE. 2012. "The Coexistence of Peace and Conflict in South America: Toward a New Conceptualization of Types of Peace." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 55 (2): 131–51.
- BBC NEWS. 2014. "Corte de Haia põe fim a disputa histórica entre Chile e Peru." January 27. Accessed December, 2020. [https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2014/01/140127\\_haia\\_decisao\\_chile\\_peru\\_fn](https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2014/01/140127_haia_decisao_chile_peru_fn).
- BECKLEY, MICHAEL. 2010. "Economic Development and Military Effectiveness." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33 (1): 43–79.
- BURGES, SEAN, AND FABRÍCIO CHAGAS-BASTOS. 2016. "Latin American Diplomacy." In *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*, edited by C. Constantinou, P. Kerr and P. Sharp, 372–84. London: SAGE.
- CANNON, BRENDON, AND FEDERICO DONELLI. 2020. "Asymmetric Alliances and High Polarity: Evaluating Regional Security Complexes in the Middle East and Horn of Africa." *Third World Quarterly* 41 (3): 505–24.
- CENTENO, MIGUEL. 2002. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- CHAGAS-BASTOS, F. 2018. "La invención de la inserción internacional: fundaciones intelectuales y evolución histórica del concepto." *Análisis Político* 31 (94): 10–30.
- . 2021. "International Insertion: A Non-Western Contribution to IR." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*.
- ECUADOR. MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA. 2017. "Discurso del Ministro de Defensa Ricardo Patiño Aroca en el vigésimo segundo aniversario de la Guerra del Cenepa." January 25. Accessed December 10, 2020. [https://www.defensa.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2017/03/02\\_25-ENE-2017-Discurso-en-el-vigesimo-segundo-aniversario-de-la-guerra-del-Cenepa.pdf](https://www.defensa.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2017/03/02_25-ENE-2017-Discurso-en-el-vigesimo-segundo-aniversario-de-la-guerra-del-Cenepa.pdf).
- EL MOSTRADOR. 2005. "Gobierno chileno oficializó compra de 18 aviones f-16 usados a Holanda." December 16. Accessed December 10, 2020. <http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2005/12/16/gobierno-chileno-oficializo-compra-de-18-aviones-f-16-usados-a-holanda/>.
- EUROPA PRESS. 2010. "Perú advierte a Chile de que tiene la capacidad de 'pegar dos veces' si es agredido." January 29. Accessed December 10, 2020. <http://www.notimerica.com/politica/noticia-chile-peru-peru-advierte-chile-tiene-capacidad-pegar-dos-veces-si-agredido-20100129174408.html>.
- FERARU, ATENA. 2018. "Regime Security and Regional Cooperation among Weak States." *International Studies Review* 20 (1): 101–26.
- FERREYRA, WACHHOLTZ, AND VÁGNER ALVES. 2018. "A Força Binacional Cruz Del Sur e a Evolução Da Confiança Entre Argentina e Chile." *Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval* 24 (1): 14–38.
- FLEMES, DANIEL. 2010. "O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: Soft balancing numa ordem global em mudança?" *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53 (1): 141–56.
- FLEMES, DANIEL, AND LESLIE WEHNER. 2015. "Drivers of Strategic Contestation: The Case of South America." *International Politics* 52 (2): 163–77.
- FLEMES, DANIEL, AND MICHAEL RADSECK. 2010. *Creating Multilevel Security Governance in South America*. GIGA Working Paper, 117. Hamburg: GIGA.
- FRIEDMAN, MAX PAUL, AND TOM LONG. 2015. "Soft Balancing in the Americas: Latin American Opposition to U.S. Intervention, 1898–1936." *International Security* 40 (1): 120–56.
- GENNA, GASPARE, AND TAEKO HIROI. 2015. *Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality: How Democracy Clauses Help Democratic Consolidation and Deepening*. New York: Routledge.
- GÓMEZ-MERA, LAURA. 2013. *Power and Regionalism in Latin America: The Politics of Mercosur*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- GUIMARÃES, FELICIANO, AND MARIA HERMÍNIA ALMEIDA. 2018. "Brazil's Entrepreneurial Power in World Politics: The Role of Great Powers and Regional Politics for Successful Entrepreneurship." *International Journal* 73 (4): 518–34.
- HIRST, MONICA. 2003. "Seguridad regional en las Américas." In *La seguridad regional en las Américas*, edited by W. Grabendorff, 25–80. Bogotá: Cerec/Fescol.
- HURRELL, ANDREW. 1998. "An Emerging Security Community in South America?." In *Security Communities*, edited by E. Adler and M. Barnett, 229–64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- KACOWICZ, ARIE. 1998. *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- . 2005. *The Impact of Norms in International Society. The Latin American Experience, 1881–2001*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- KACOWICZ, ARIE, AND MARES DAVID. 2016. "Security Studies and Security in Latin America: The First Two Hundred Years." In *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security*, edited by A. Kacowicz, and D. Mares, 11–31. New York: Routledge.
- KACOWICZ, ARIE, EXEQUIEL LACOVSKY, AND DANIEL WAJNER. 2020. "Peaceful Borders and Illicit Transnational Flows in the Americas." *Latin American Research Review* 55 (4): 727–41.
- KAUFMAN, STUART, RICHARD LITTLE, AND WILLIAM WOHLFORTH, (eds). 2007. *The Balance of Power in World History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- KHOO, NICHOLAS. 2015. "The ASEAN Security Community: A Misplaced Consensus." *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 2 (2): 180–99.
- KRAUSE, KEITH. 2012. "Hybrid Violence: Locating the Use of Force in Post-conflict Settings." *Global Governance* 18 (1): 39–56.
- MALLEA, RODRIGO, MATIAS SPEKTOR, AND NICHOLAS WHEELER, eds. 2015. *Origens da cooperação nuclear: uma história oral crítica entre Argentina e Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- MARES, DAVID. 2012. *Latin America and the Illusion of Peace*. New York: Routledge.
- MARES, DAVID. 2017. "The Zone of Violent Peace." In *Power Dynamics and Regional Security in Latin America*, edited by M. Suárez, R. Villa and B. Weiffen, 225–46. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- MARTIN, FÉLIX. 2006. *Militarist Peace in South America: Conditions for War and Peace*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- MERKE, FEDERICO. 2015. "The Primary Institutions of the Latin American Regional Interstate Society." *International Politics* 52 (2): 178–92.
- NEXON, DANIEL. 2009. "The Balance of Power in the Balance." *World Politics* 61 (2): 330–59.
- PAPE, ROBERT. 2005. "Soft Balancing against the United States." *International Security* 30 (1): 7–45.
- PAUL, T.V. 2004. "Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance." In *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, edited by T. V. Paul, J. Wirtz and M. Fortmann, 1–25. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- PERÚ21. 2010. "Chile advierte: 'No se metan conmigo porque pego fuerte si me molestan.'" January 26. Accessed December 10, 2021. <http://archivo.peru21.pe/noticia/404935/chile-advierte-no-se-metana-conmigo-porque-pegofuerte-si-me-molestan>.
- RADIO HUANCABILCA. 2018. "Guyana aumenta presencia de tropas en frontera con Venezuela." February 18. Accessed December 10, 2021. <https://radiohuancabilca.com.ec/guyana-aumenta-presencia-tropas-frontera-venezuela/>.

- RUNZA, RICARDO. 2008. *La construcción de una comunidad de seguridad de seguridad en América del Sur a la luz de las adquisiciones de armamentos*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Policy Papers, 20. Buenos Aires: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- SASSINE, VINICIUS. 2020. "No auge da animosidade com Venezuela, Exército fez simulação de guerra sem precedentes na Amazônia." *O Globo*. October 14, Accessed December 10, 2021. <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/no-auge-da-animosidade-com-venezuela-exercito-fez-simulacao-de-guerra-sem-precedentes-na-amazonia-24690839>.
- SCHENONI, LUIS. 2014. "Unveiling the South American Balance." *Estudos Internacionais* 2 (2): 215–32.
- SCHENONI, LUIS, GARY GOERTZ, ANDREW P. OWSIAK, AND PAUL F. DIEHL. 2020. "Settling Resistant Territorial Disputes: The Territorial Boundary Peace in Latin America." *International Studies Quarterly* 64 (1): 57–70.
- SINGER, FLORANTONIA. 2021. "Los militares venezolanos secuestrados por disidencias de las FARC piden la intercesión del chavismo." *El País*. May 24, Accessed December 10, 2021. <https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-05-23/los-militares-venezolanos-secuestrados-por-disidencias-de-las-farc-piden-la-intercesion-del-chavismo.html>.
- TICKNER, A. 2008. "Latin American IR and the Primacy of lo práctico." *International Studies Review* 10 (4): 735–48.
- VENEZUELA. MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR PARA LA DEFENSA. 2021. "G/J Padrino López: Capturados 11 Criminales en Apure." July 14, Accessed December 10, 2021. <http://www.mindefensa.gob.ve/mindefensa/2021/07/14/g-j-padrino-lopez-capturados-11-elementos-en-asure/>.
- VILLA, RAFAEL, AND BRIGITTE WEIFFEN. 2014. "South American Re-armament: From Balancing to Symbolizing Power." *Contemporary Security Policy* 35 (1): 138–62.
- VILLA, RAFAEL, CAMILA BRAGA, AND MARCOS ALLAN FERREIRA. 2021. "Violent Non-state Actors and the Emergence of Hybrid Governance in South America." *Latin American Research Review* 56 (1): 36–49.
- VILLA, RAFAEL, FABRÍCIO CHAGAS-BASTOS, AND CAMILA BRAGA. 2019. "Hybrid Security Governance in South America: An Empirical Assessment." *Latin American Politics and Society* 61 (4): 72–94.
- VILLA, RAFAEL, THIAGO RODRIGUES, AND FABRÍCIO CHAGAS-BASTOS. 2015. "South America in the Post-Cold War Era: War on Drugs and the Reshaping of the U.S. Security Agenda." *Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval* 21 (1): 33–62.
- VOICE OF AMERICA. 2015. "Tropas venezolanas en la frontera con Guyana." September 22, Accessed December 10, 2020. <https://www.voanoticias.com/venezuela/guyana-acusa-venezuela-de-enviar-tropas-la-frontera>.
- . 2019. "Ecuador ofrece a EE.UU. Facilidad logística para combatir narcotráfico y pesca ilegal." June 19, Accessed December 10, 2020. <https://www.voanoticias.com/estadosunidos/ecuador-ofrece-ee-uu-islas-galapagos-facilidad-logistica-combate-narcotrafico-pesca>.
- WALT, STEPHEN. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.