

Edited by

Marcial A. G. Suarez; Rafael Duarte Villa; Brigitte Weiffen

POWER DYNAMICS AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA



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FOREWORD

Latin America's security studies have become an important topic in international relations and Latin American studies. In this excellent edited volume, the editors take the challenge that David Mares and I suggested last year in our edited *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security* of broadening the research agenda for the study of Latin American security. Suarez, Villa, and Weiffen, together with their contributors, offer a coherent and innovative analytical framework that reflects on the impact of global and regional power shifts since the end of the Cold War upon Latin American regional security nowadays. As a central theme in the book, they also focus upon the role of regional organizations in managing security governance. Finally, they assess some of the regional and state-level responses by significant state actors (i.e., Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil) to regional security challenges, including border conflicts, political violence, terrorism, drug trade, domestic and transnational organized crime, gang warfare, and illegal migration.

Global power shifts (such as the decline of the US hegemony in the Americas) and especially regional power shifts have led to the fragmentation and multiplication of regional institutions dealing with regional security in Latin America in the last twenty-five years, including overlapping organizations in a plural and sometimes confusing institutional

architecture. Moreover, regional security challenges and new transnational threats pose challenges to both regional institutions and states, creating 'intermestic' agendas that blend international and domestic security concerns, blurring the distinction between domestic and international politics.

Hence, the different chapters of this collection deal with important questions and puzzles and suggest very relevant insights to make sense of a reality of multi-dimensional security that might be overwhelming at times. Those include the domestic nature of security threats that inhibits regional security governance and cooperation; the links between role theory and geopolitical thinking; the hybrid characteristics of regional security governance encompassing both mechanisms of balance of power and pluralistic security community; the ambiguous and even contradictory role played by overlapping regional institutions in managing and resolving conflicts; the persistence of domestic violence and interstate militarized threats against the background of formal peace; and the policies adopted by states such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico in securitizing or de-securitizing security challenges such as terrorism, the war on drugs, and organized crime. Thus, by reading the different chapters we get the opportunity of elucidating the complexity, potential, and limitations of security governance and cooperation in Latin America.

This book is a fine collection of fourteen chapters by sixteen authors that work or come from Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, some of them at the beginning of their academic careers, and some of them from experienced and world-recognized scholars. I commend the editors for finding a common denominator as a rigorous and novel attempt to elucidate some of the puzzles mentioned above, addressing the crowded but unexplored agenda of Latin American regional security governance. Not only students of Latin America, but also policy practitioners and readers interested in the security problematique of other regions of the world will find this volume challenging and compelling, drawing important and useful insights and comparisons. After all, the repercussions of global and regional power shifts for regional security governance, the use of regional institutions for the management of security challenges, and the security priorities of states in dealing with those challenges pose analytical and policy challenges that transcend the particular realities of Latin American regional security.

Arie M. Kacowicz

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (<i>Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América</i>)
ALN	<i>Ação Libertadora Nacional</i> (Brazil)
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CACM	Central American Common Market
CAFTA-DR	Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
CALC	Latin American and Caribbean Summit
CAN	Andean Community of Nations (<i>Comunidad Andina de Naciones</i>)
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CARSI	Central American Regional Security Initiative
CASA	South American Community of Nations (<i>Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações</i>)
CBM	Confidence-building measures
CDS	South American Defense Council (<i>Consejo de Defensa Suramericano</i>)
CEED	Center for Strategic Defense Studies (<i>Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de Defensa</i>)
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (<i>Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños</i>)
CENDRO	National Center for Drug Control (<i>Centro Nacional para el Control de Drogas</i>) (Mexico)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (United States)

CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (<i>Comisión Interamericana para el Control de Abuso de Drogas</i>)
CICTE	Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (<i>Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo</i>)
CISEN	Center for Research on National Security (<i>Centro de Investigación para la Seguridad Nacional</i>) (Mexico)
CNTE	Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (Mexico)
COW	Correlates of War
CRIES	Regional Coordination for Social and Economic Research (<i>Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales</i>)
CSBM	Confidence- and security-building measures
CSN	South American Community of Nations (<i>Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones</i>)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (United States)
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency (United States)
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ELN	<i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i> (Colombia)
EPP	<i>Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo</i> (Paraguay)
EPR	<i>Ejército Popular Revolucionario</i> (Mexico)
EU	European Union
EZLN	<i>Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional</i> (Mexico)
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i>)
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)
FENCOMIN	Federación Nacional de Cooperativas Mineras de Bolivia
FMA	Foreign military aid
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GSOMIA	General Security of Military Information Agreement
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HIHK	Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IADB	Inter-American Defense Board
IADC	Inter-American Democratic Charter
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
IIRSA	Initiative for the Integration of South American Infrastructure
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies

IMF	International Monetary Fund
INM	National Immigration Institute (<i>Instituto Nacional de Migración</i>) (Mexico)
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Agency (United States)
IO	International organization
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JIATFS	Joint Interagency Task Force South (United States)
LAFTA	Latin American Free Trade Association
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South (<i>Mercado Común del Sur</i>)
MID	Militarized interstate dispute
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIR	<i>Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria</i> (Chile)
MIST	Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey
MR-8	<i>Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro</i> (Brazil)
MST	<i>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra</i> (Brazil)
MTST	<i>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto</i> (Brazil)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAMSI	North American Maritime Security Initiative
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDIC	National Drug Intelligence Center (United States)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NORAD	North American Air Defense Agreement
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAS	Organization of American States
PC	Plan Colombia
PCC	<i>Primeiro Comando da Capital</i> (São Paulo, Brazil)
PFP	Preventive Federal Police (<i>Policía Federal Preventiva</i>) (Mexico)
PGR	Office of the Attorney General (<i>Procuraduría General de la República</i>)
PMOP	Military Police of Public Order (<i>Policía Militar del Orden Público</i>) (Honduras)
RESDAL	Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
SEDENA	Defense Secretariat (<i>Secretaría de Defensa</i>) (Mexico)
SELA	Latin American Economic System (<i>Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe</i>)
SEMAR	Navy Secretariat (<i>Secretaría de Marina</i>) (Mexico)
SG	Secretary General
SICA	Central American Integration System (<i>Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana</i>)
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SIVAM	System for the Surveillance of the Amazon (<i>Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia</i>)
SPP	Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
TCO	Transnational criminal organizations
TIAR	Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (<i>Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca</i>)
TIGRES	Intelligence Troop and Special Security Response Teams (<i>Tropa de Inteligencia y Grupos de Respuesta Especial de Seguridad</i>) (Honduras)
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations (<i>Unión de Naciones Suramericanas</i>)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPKO	United Nations peacekeeping operations
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Re-Thinking Latin American Regional Security: The Impact of Power and Politics

Brigitte Weiffen and Rafael Duarte Villa

INTRODUCTION: WHY STUDY LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL SECURITY?

This book studies the impact of global and regional power shifts on the rationale and dynamics of Latin American regional institutions as well as responses to regional security challenges. In the period following the Cold War, issues linked to global security lost importance, as there was only one security actor with a global agenda: the United States. Under this unipolar security dynamic, regions gained relevance, and the 1990s are often characterized as a period that saw a resurgence of regionalism (Hurrell 1995; Mansfield and Milner 1999). Apart from a number of new or revitalized regional economic integration projects, regions also gained relevance as a security space and as a sphere where power relations between states are negotiated.

Thus, both power and security dynamics happen at the level of regions. States and societies are often more worried about power relations and specific threats in their respective region than about what the United States proclaims as global threat – even though it is true that especially the ‘global war on terrorism’ under the leadership of the United States has brought about counterterrorism responses in different regions and

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regional organizations across the world (Gheciu 2008; Beyer 2010; González Serrano 2014). Security priorities vary across different regions, and each region generates its own dynamics of power and security. This equally applies to Latin America.

In debates about international security, Latin America usually does not appear as a ‘problematic region’ and thus does not figure prominently on the global agenda. Particularly an exclusive focus on traditional security, that is interstate war, has often led experts and policy-makers to believe that Latin America is a ‘zone of peace’. Only two militarized conflicts escalated to war during the second half of the twentieth century: the so-called Football War between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 and the confrontation between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. In addition, Argentina started the Falkland/Malvinas war with Great Britain in 1982. According to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, only Europe had a lower number of interstate conflicts during the period from 1946 to 2014 (UCDP and PRIO 2015; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).

However, traditional interstate security concerns are not obsolete, as the region continues to exhibit numerous dormant or small-scale disputes and rivalries fueled by ideology, hegemony, territory, resources, and migration (Mares 2012). At the same time, Latin American countries are affected by pervasive threats to people’s lives. Presently, Latin America is the world’s most violent region, with an average homicide rate of 16.3 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012, which is more than twice the world’s average (6.2 per 100,000 inhabitants) (UNODC 2014: 22). Public security is considered by Latin Americans to be the most important problem in their countries. Drug trafficking, organized crime, and the legacy of civil wars and political violence are the principal factors behind rising criminality levels in the region. In light of these conditions, the book shows that disregarding Latin American regional security issues and its idiosyncrasies blinds out major themes that other world regions are equally confronted with and that are extremely important for the global security agenda as well.

For a long time, there has clearly been a gap regarding scholarly work on security in Latin America. Edited collections on regional security published in the 1990s were strongly influenced by the wave of democratization in the region and the pervasive topic of reorganizing civil-military relations after periods of military dictatorship (Domínguez 1998; Mares 1998). Other books focused on particular security problems, such as border conflicts (Domínguez 2003; Mares 2001, 2012), or US security policy toward Latin

America (Loveman 2006). Additionally, an increasing number of publications addresses the ‘new’ non-traditional security challenges posed by violent non-state actors and illicit activities like drug-trafficking (Koonings and Kruijt 2004; Sanchez 2006; Bruneau et al. 2012; Maihold and Córdova 2014; Maihold and Jost 2014; Bagley and Rosen 2015; Bagley et al. 2015).

A number of broader treatises are available only in Spanish language and thus are not accessible to a wide audience (Grabendorff 2003; Bodemer and Rojas 2005; Tulchin et al. 2005). The mission of the recently published *Routledge Handbook on Latin American Security* (Mares and Kacowicz 2016) is to look at the position of Latin America in international security, but it does not specifically focus on regional security. In turn, Rodrigo Tavares’ recent book on South America concentrates on the contributions of specific states and regional organizations to traditional and human security (Tavares 2014). While a useful inventory of relevant actors, it does not systematically analyze the driving forces behind their actions and transformation. Likewise, several compilations that offer a comparative perspective on regional security or regional security organizations around the world contain individual chapters with a cursory overview of Latin America’s security challenges (Crocker et al. 2011), its security governance, and security organizations (Tavares 2010; Kirchner and Dominguez 2011; Breslin and Croft 2012; Aris and Wenger 2014; Winther 2014).

The aim of this book is to go beyond a mere description of actors and/or problems. While they are certainly important, our intention is to discuss regional security issues and actors against the background of an international order in transformation. We will thus connect the analysis of regional security challenges and the specific policies adopted in reaction to such challenges to broader regional and global political developments such as the rise of emerging powers, the changing role of the United States both globally and in the Western hemisphere, power dynamics between regional and secondary regional powers, and the proliferation of regional organizations in Latin America. This introductory chapter explores the elements of our analytical framework and presents an outlook on how the individual contributions substantiate our argument.

THE IMPACT OF POWER AND POLITICS

The chapters of this book examine the connections between power dynamics and regional security in Latin America, highlighting the impact of global and regional power shifts on the evolution of regional institutions




Fig. 1 Power dynamics and regional security
Source: Authors' elaboration

and the management of security challenges. We assume that shifting power dynamics on the global and regional levels have both a direct and an indirect impact on policies adopted to deal with security challenges (see Fig. 1). Power shifts have led to a reconfiguration of regional institutions and, more specifically, regional security cooperation (as depicted by the arrow running from power shifts to regional institutions). This is evidenced by the creation of ever more multilateral security institutions and new interpretations of the concepts of regionalism and regional cooperation. These changes, in turn, affect the definition, perception, and management of regional security challenges, such as border conflicts, terrorism, arms trade, drug traffic, and migration (as depicted by the arrow running from regional institutions to management of security challenges). In some cases, power shifts directly bring about changes in security perceptions or priorities, and they have an impact on how challenges are tackled by individual states (as depicted by the arrow running from power shifts to management of security challenges).

Global and Regional Power Shifts

Latin American security is still frequently viewed through a Cold War lens. This is attributable to a historical peculiarity of the region: the strong role of the United States in regional security and regional power dynamics. The Cold War period was characterized by a constellation of ‘overlay’ (Buzan and Waever 2003), meaning that great power interests dominated the region so heavily that the local dynamics of security interdependence virtually ceased to operate. Interference from the United States, which is part of the hemisphere, yet from a Latin American perspective mostly perceived as an external actor, became particularly intense after the Cuban Revolution, when Latin America turned into a battleground in the confrontation between communism and capitalism. The United States

repeatedly backed anti-communist authoritarian regimes with the declared aim to defend the region against the intrusion of international communism. In the 1990s, the United States retained its position as regional hegemon, albeit with a more cooperative and multilateral posture. At that time, processes of democratization and economic liberalization in Latin America led to an alignment of US and Latin American interests in support of the prevailing agenda for free elections and free trade.

Since then, the global and regional scenarios have changed. In the last two decades, the international system transformed from a unipolar world into a multipolar structure. In addition to the economic and political rise of China, a diverse group of formerly peripheral states such as India and Brazil, but also South Africa, Indonesia, and others that are commonly referred to as ‘emerging powers’, have begun to act with growing assertiveness (Nel 2010; Schweller 2011). Recently, an increasingly proactive and nationalistic Russia has returned to the world stage. Emerging powers became more influential in international affairs not only as individual actors, but also as members of multilateral institutions or as participants of Global South groupings such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), or MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey). Both Brazil and India are demanding permanent seats in the UN Security Council. With a more assertive Global South challenging the post-World War II world order, North-South relations began to be transformed.

The importance of emerging powers is reflected through the growing foreign policy attention given to them by traditional major powers. Invitations to the presidents of Brazil, India, and South Africa to high-profile international gatherings such as the G8 and the World Economic Forum meetings reflect widespread recognition of these states’ regional leadership role by the wealthiest and most powerful nations. Additionally, a number of Southern countries such as South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina now sit at the influential G20 summit meetings. In security and political affairs, the governments of the IBSA partners have been encouraged by the Western powers to take responsibility while responding to regional crises. At the same time, traditional global multilateralism is in crisis: The UN remains feeble after the unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration; the reputation and legitimacy of the global financial institutions are damaged due to the negative impacts of the Washington Consensus and the global financial crisis; and the failure of the Doha Round weakened the World Trade Organization (WTO). Recently, the BRICS states established the New Development Bank to

complement the global financial system and to foster financial cooperation between emerging economies and developing countries.

The long-standing predominance of Western powers in world affairs is challenged. The European Union (EU) faces multiple crises, and the long stalemate in the management of the Greek debt crisis, the deep rift between the EU member states in addressing the refugee crisis, and the 'Brexit' referendum have left ugly scratches on the previously successful model for regional integration. The United States is widely perceived to be in decline. In *The End of American World Order*, Acharya (2014) argues that while the United States will remain a major force, it has lost the ability to shape the world order after its own interests and image. As a consequence, the United States will be just one among a number of actors playing a role in an interdependent 'multiplex' world, including emerging powers, regional forces, and a concert of the old and new powers.

Latin America shifted from a marginal toward an increasingly assertive role in international affairs. The countries in the region started to liberate themselves from traditional North American and European interference and to reinforce their Latin American or South American identity. Brazil as one of the BRICS countries is a regional power with global aspirations, while states like Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela are considered 'secondary regional powers'. In the face of its economic success and more assertive diplomacy, Brazil began to be perceived as an emerging power. During President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's mandate (2002–2010) Brazil's foreign policy changed toward a proactive role in its own neighborhood and beyond (Grabendorff 2010; Villa and Viana 2010). At the regional level, Brazil created the Community of South American Nations, turned into the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008. Additionally, the country took steps to reach out beyond the region, such as its initiatives to found the G20 and to strengthen South-South cooperation by the establishment of the IBSA Dialogue Forum and the BRICS group. Other players in the region have also entered into extra-regional partnerships. Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica have signed bilateral free trade agreements with China, and Chile has long ago established special links to Asia with its membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Pacific Alliance was founded in 2012 by Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico in order to advance free trade with a clear orientation toward Asia.

Another aspect influencing regional power dynamics was the electoral victory of the Left in many countries. While the 1990s were characterized

by a convergence of Latin American and US policy preferences around capitalism and liberal democracy, the tide turned in 1998 when Hugo Chávez won the presidential elections in Venezuela. Thanks to oil revenues, he launched social programs designed to meet the needs of the poor and proclaimed ‘twenty-first century socialism’. With the passage of time he asserted increasingly authoritarian control of the country’s political apparatus, his discourse became more and more anti-American and he forged a close alliance with Cuba’s Fidel Castro as well as with Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, the more radical of the newly elected leftist presidents.

The Left turn reflects an increasing ideological distance of much of Latin America from the models of the 1990s. It meant that the United States had to face persistent criticism from leaders representing popular opinion in their countries. It also led to profound political divisions between Left and Right in Latin America, meaning that the region would no longer unanimously follow US leadership. Liberal content and discourses associated with free markets and representative democracy were challenged by alternative economic projects and direct, participatory and plebiscitary democratic experiments (Ellner 2012). The continent-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), scheduled to come into effect in 2005, was one casualty of these changes.

As a consequence of both these ideological ruptures and the 2001 terrorist attacks and the ensuing ‘global war on terrorism’, US foreign policy attention turned away from Latin America and became less cooperative and more unilateral again. However, the perception that the United States neglects its Southern neighbors is unwarranted in the field of security. In the midst of Latin American growth, international assertiveness, and diversification of markets and of diplomatic relations, the United States has continued to expand its presence in the region on many fronts (Tokatlian 2013). This is particularly so for the region’s ‘northern half’ (Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean), but also holds for parts of South America. Initiatives like Plan Colombia, Plan Mérida, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, the 2008 re-launching of the US Fourth Fleet, and the massive US training programs of Latin American military personnel provide evidence that the United States renewed its military presence in Latin America. Much of this is justified in terms of the so-called ‘new threats’ – that is drug trade, international organized crime, gang warfare, and illegal migration – which are more manifest in the region’s northern tier than in South America and which affect US domestic security.

The current problem of inter-American relations is thus not a lack of attention on the part of Washington toward Latin America and the Caribbean. US restraint may even have opened more space for Latin America's increased autonomy in the conduct of its international affairs. The issue, rather, is Washington's oscillation between 'leadership' and 'partnership' in both rhetoric and behavior, which frequently results in a drifting apart of US and Latin American approaches on issues like the war on drugs or the reaction toward the *coup d'état* in Honduras (Muno and Brand 2014; Heine and Weiffen 2015).

At the same time, extra-regional emerging powers engage more forcefully in Latin America and displace the traditional partners United States and Europe. Russia at some point started to re-establish its relations with Latin America, now somewhat suspended because of the Ukraine conflict. At the same time, Asian-Pacific countries, particularly China, are forming ever closer cooperation with Latin America, primarily with the intention to gain access to the region's natural resources. While the impact of China's rise is mainly political and economic, it also has a number of implications for security (see Ellis 2015, 2016). China emerges as a political and economic alternative to the West, while US leverage in areas such as trade, democracy and human rights is diminishing. Attention of Latin American political and business leaders as well as the general public is increasingly directed toward China and transpacific relations more generally. Chinese investments and loans have contributed to the perseverance of populist regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia and the economic viability of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) as a political block hostile to the United States. According to Ellis (2015, 2016), China also has a direct impact on the armed forces and defense policies in the region: Latin American and Caribbean militaries have gradually expanded their education and training interactions with the People's Liberation Army, and they have bought arms and equipment from Chinese vendors. With the expansion of transpacific trade, organized crime may become more viable, and thus a new security concern.

In the new century, Latin America is adapting to a changing international environment, in which the balance of power shifts from North to South, from a unipolar to a multipolar system, and from a hegemonic to a post-hegemonic one (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012). For the Latin American countries, the pluralization of their external relations and the decline of US leadership opened up a larger room for maneuver. However,

this has so far not led to a stronger international insertion of the region as a whole. Rather, regional power shifts have resulted in fragmentation and a multiplication of regional institutions.

Regional Institutions

Since the end of the Cold War, the importance of regional interactions increased immensely. From international economics to security, regional orders have become fundamental layers of contemporary world governance (Katzenstein 2005). Yet, the context and character of regionalism changed over time. The formation of regional institutions of the 1990s was influenced by economic globalization and neoliberalism as well as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the East-West bloc confrontation. In contrast, current regionalism is shaped by many diverse and sometimes contradictory trends and processes, such as the ‘war on terror’, the responsibility to protect, changing understandings of government and governance, a multilayered global order, the rise of emerging powers, and recurrent economic and financial crises that have exposed the limitations of neoliberal economic models (Shaw et al. 2011; Fioramonti 2012; Söderbaum 2016).

The demise of superpower rivalry intruding into the affairs of third states meant that regional powers and secondary regional powers encounter a greater room for maneuver in regional politics, which is where they express many of their claims for legitimacy, leadership, and soft power. Power dynamics in Latin America are characterized by a set of political realignments that rearticulate ideas about regionalism and regional integration. As the neoliberal era came to an end and as various countries in the region moved to left-center governments, trade-driven integration was subject to strong criticism. New agendas and approaches to Latin American regionalism emerged with the establishment of organizations such as ALBA, UNASUR, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) or the Pacific Alliance, some of them with strong focus on South-South cooperation and increasing autonomy from the United States, while the previously established sub-regional trading blocs such as the Andean Pact and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) as well as the Organization of American States (OAS) and other groups linking the North with the South are still persistent.

One important motive or side effect of the creation of new regional organizations is the demarcation of sub-regions. These organizations are

aimed at redefining and reshaping the region and launching new regional projects. Additionally, they reveal variations of power distribution among regional powers, who are important drivers of this process. Brazil and Venezuela seek regional leadership in South America by the mobilization of coalitions and international institution-building, with UNASUR and ALBA as the most politically visible projects. Mexico, for its part, played a key role in the creation of CELAC. But secondary powers also matter, such as Argentina in the case of MERCOSUR, and Chile, Colombia, and Peru in the case of the Pacific Alliance.

ALBA, launched in 2004 by then Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to institutionalize cooperation with Cuba, includes mostly smaller countries adhering to Chávez' project of twenty-first-century socialism and/or dependent on Venezuelan oil. However, ALBA (and with it Venezuelan claims for regional leadership) was debilitated following the death of Chávez in March 2013 and the drop in oil prices. The creation of UNASUR in 2008 established a political platform that focuses exclusively on South America. UNASUR covers various issue areas by means of its sectorial councils. One of these entities, the South American Defense Council (CDS), is the only regional institution in South America with a clear mandate in security.¹ CELAC was created in 2010 to articulate the common interests of Latin American and Caribbean countries and to represent the region vis-à-vis third parties, as in the case of the EU-CELAC summits (since 2013). Although CELAC is the successor of the Rio Group which emerged out of two ad hoc coalitions that tried to end the civil wars in Central America in the 1980s, it did so far not adopt security-related conceptions and practices.

The way how power dynamics is reflected in new regionalist projects has led to a vibrant new research agenda on Latin American regionalism, and in particular, the invention of a variety of different labels for its multifaceted nature (Gardini 2015; Deciancio 2016). The new regional groupings are characterized as post-liberal, emphasizing their rejection of the neoliberal project and their focus on cooperation in non-trade issues (Sanahuja 2012; Chodor and McCarthy-Jones 2013), or post-hegemonic, highlighting the decline of US power and the increasing autonomy of Latin America (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012; Legler 2013).

While according to these perspectives power dynamics have led to a revitalization of regionalism, more skeptical perspectives are concerned about the ever larger number of political and trade forums and suggest that this differentiation has led to greater fragmentation (Malamud and

Gardini 2012; Gómez Mera 2015). In fact, the countries of the region have opted for different definitions of the region and different paradigms regarding regional cooperation, international insertion and relations with the United States. Likewise, the turn of some of the Latin American states toward China and the Asian-Pacific region entailed changes in the orientation toward each other. Regional trade integration lost steam also as a consequence of the increasing importance of extra-regional relations. Ideological cleavages on the regional level have developed around economic issues, as manifested in the divergence between ALBA and the Pacific Alliance (Evan 2015: 224).

The process of sub-regional differentiation and identity-building led to an overlap between regional projects regarding members, but also mandate. The consequences of this are subject to intense debate: Whilst for some this overlapping represents a potential gain in flexibility, for others it is a sign of Latin American regionalism's structural weakness. One group of analysts argues that institutional overlap introduces resource ineffectiveness, transaction costs, unaccountability, and political competition that end up compromising the objectives of international cooperation. Multiple memberships in (sub-) regional organizations in Latin America create frictions between and within those organizations and fuel divisions instead of unity in the region (Malamud and Gardini 2012; Gómez Mera 2015).

On the other hand, Tussie and Riggiozzi (Tussie 2009; Riggiozzi and Tussie 2012) argue that the emergence of a greater diversity of intersecting regional forms of cooperation is an expression of increasingly intense regional relations. According to Herz (2011: 77), the plural architecture of governance 'enhances the ability of countries to coordinate policies, and provides forums more flexible to the changing political reality in the region and to the different issues that require international coordination and norms'. Gardini (2015) describes the same phenomenon as 'modular regionalism', where states 'pick and choose' membership of regional integration projects reflecting their national interests and foreign policy priorities in specific areas.

Management of Security Challenges

Security challenges in the new millennium are not too different to those Latin America faced during the 1990s in the wake of the Cold War. To be sure, some threats have intensified, expanded, moved to other settings, or started to involve other actors, and there are also increasing interconnections between different types of threats. More substantial changes can be

registered in the way security challenges are managed, which is a result of the questioning of hemispheric cooperation, the rise of regional powers with their respective counter-hegemonic regional projects, and the dynamics of institutional overlapping (Trinkunas 2013).

In the 1990s, the wave of democratization and liberalization that swept through Latin America gave rise to the hope that the region would move away from traditional geopolitical tensions and toward a cooperative regional security agenda. At that time, the OAS was the main actor working on a redefinition of the concept of regional security. The Declaration on Security in the Americas, adopted at an OAS Special Conference on Security in Mexico City in 2003, proclaims a multidimensional concept, including ‘traditional and new threats, concerns, and other challenges to the security of the states of the hemisphere’ (OAS 2003: paragraph 2). It acknowledges that security challenges became more dynamic, resilient, and diverse, arising from problems like terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, corruption and asset laundering, urban violence and gangs, human trafficking, smuggling, and often illegal immigration and refugee flows. The list of new security risks in the Declaration on Security also included genuinely socio-economic problems like extreme poverty, social exclusion, diseases and health risks. While the term ‘human security’ has hardly taken hold in the Latin American debate (Goldstein 2016), the issues captured by it are of high relevance in the region and are intricately related to issues like violence and crime.

The problem of a multidimensional security concept is that the inclusion of a broad range of concerns renders the term diffuse and limitless. The boundaries of security tasks are no longer fixed through a clear understanding of what security is (and what it is not), and more and more problems may become securitized. On the other hand, for the case of Latin America it has been argued that the multidimensional concept fulfills an integrative function, as it represents the wide range of security problems affecting the different sub-regions.

‘New’ threats are not unique to Latin America, but have been equally identified by policy-makers, academics and journalists in other world regions. They mainly originate from violent non-state actors and are transnational in scope and impact and thus present new challenges to sovereignty, identity, and borders. Their specific feature is the blending of internal and external security, meaning that a clear separation between external defense and public security is no longer possible. As a result, security agencies are under stress: the specific fields of competence of

military and police/internal security forces, their missions, and their traditional guidelines and beliefs concerning their tasks are dissolving. Bigo (2001) captured this new topology of security through the metaphor of the Möbius ribbon, where the internal and the external are intimately connected and it is thus impossible to determine where the inside ends and where the outside begins. This metaphor gives a sense of the merging of internal and external security problems.

Latin America is disproportionately affected by transnational threats. It is widely considered to be the most violent region in the world (UNODC 2014) and the only one where lethal violence increased in the first decade of the new millennium. Particularly strong increases were registered in Mexico, Central America, and Venezuela. As of 2014, Honduras, El Salvador, and Venezuela occupy the top positions in global homicide rates. The United States is deeply concerned about non-state threats, especially drug-trafficking (due to the repercussions of this problem in their own society). In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US government also made an effort to extend the counterterrorism agenda in the Western hemisphere. Governments facing domestic insurgencies – such as Colombia and to a lesser extent Peru – were quick to reclassify their domestic enemies as terrorists in order to secure US assistance. At the same time, the post-9/11 counterterrorism agenda faced skepticism in the Southern Cone because of the association of counterterrorism with the military-led ‘dirty war’ in the sub-region in the 1970s (Trinkunas 2013). Generally, in matters with intense US involvement, it is sometimes difficult to establish to what extent the threat definition is a result of Latin American autonomous dynamics or determined by the United States.

The blurring of boundaries between internal security and defense also has implications for civil-military relations, which is another item on the Latin American security agenda. After a long period of military dictatorships, the civilian subjugation of the armed forces and their exclusion from domestic security provision and from interference in domestic political affairs in general are considered achievements of the democratization process (Diamint 2004; Norden 2016). Security organizations in Latin America developed mechanisms to support democratic processes and to defend democracy in the event of an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order through a military coup. Confidence-building measures are also related to democratization, because they are useful devices to manage civil-military relations in countries still in the process of

consolidating democratic institutions. Thus, the tendency to question the distinction between domestic and international security (and the corresponding divide between police and armed forces) met with reluctance especially in the Southern Cone countries, which see the danger that employing the armed forces for domestic purposes might authorize a remilitarization of policing and make public security a military domain (Machillanda 2005).

Regarding traditional security threats, Latin America seems to be a paradoxical case in which interstate relations have become more peaceful while intra-societal relationships became more violent. In other words, there has been a negative correlation between interstate peace and social peace. Yet, traditional security threats are not irrelevant. Throughout the twentieth century, the region experienced a number of militarized interstate disputes. Nowadays, some areas are particularly notable for potential sources of conflict, and many more unresolved interstate disputes exist (Mares 2012).²

But while those conflicts occasionally lead to diplomatic tensions, they are unlikely to be settled through violent means. It is a widely held belief that the region has passed from a 'conflict formation' with a strong emphasis on rivalries, balance of power and alliances in the direction of a security community based on common norms and values (for example, democracy and regional integration) and characterized by practices of peaceful conflict settlement (Hurrell 1998; Kacowicz 2005). The majority of civilian elites in South America's policy-making bureaucracies and diplomatic corps adhere to the logic of security community and rely on diplomacy and international law to resolve interstate disputes. As a result Latin American decision-makers think of conflicts less in terms of power and security capacities than in terms of perceptions. They have established patterns of friendship and enmity based on threat perceptions and not material capabilities. Even concerns about military modernization in neighboring countries and the resulting military balance have not prevented governments from pursuing cooperation. For example, the relatively high amount of Chilean military expenditure and arms purchases generates less uneasiness in Argentina nowadays than it would have generated 30 years ago. In terms of the security dilemma, one would expect Argentina to respond to the Chilean military buildup in a similar way, but that does not happen.

Nevertheless, there are concerns that recent developments in the region might contribute to a revitalization of traditional threats. For example, the

expansion of extra-regional trade relations leads to increased competition between states about access to resources, trade routes, or foreign investment in infrastructure projects. Furthermore, transnational security threats in conjunction with the porosity of borders may have an incremental effect on interstate disputes. Illicit activities concentrate around borders and thus have the potential to fuel mutual suspicions and rekindle border conflicts. Another dangerous factor is external interference in the management of transnational issues, as exemplified by the US-Colombia-Venezuela constellation.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

The contributions to this volume focus on one or several of the elements introduced above – power shifts, regional institutions, and the management of security challenges – and explore the connections between them. Each of the three parts of the book revolves around one of the three arrows in [Fig. 1](#).

Part I studies the repercussions of global and regional power shifts for regional security governance. It presents new takes both on the role of states – how they perceive and position themselves and how they pursue their interests within and outside the region – and on the concept of security governance. Starting from the diagnosis of US hegemony in decline, Joseph S. Tulchin points to an increase in Latin American autonomy and agency, as new regional organizations are formed, trade groups diversify, and individual countries expand their influence in the international arena (chapter ‘Regional Security in Latin America after US Hegemony’). In his chapter ‘Security Governance in Latin America’, Roberto Dominguez expresses the view that power shifts in the region do not only operate at the hemispheric level, but also at the level of individual states, with a domestic fragmentation of power brought about by criminal organizations. Analyses of security governance need to take into account a spatial dimension, that is, the correspondence between the geographical reach of threats and of the policy instruments designed to address these threats. Dominguez concludes that the domestic nature of many security threats in Latin America inhibits a deepening of security cooperation at the regional level.

Rather than on concrete instruments, Rafael Duarte Villa focuses on the logics underlying security governance (chapter ‘Security Community

or Balance of Power? Hybrid Security Governance in Latin America'). He shows that the seemingly incompatible logics of balance of power and security community coexist and overlap in Latin America and explores the causes for the emergence of this hybrid pattern of security governance. Leslie E. Wehner and Detlef Nolte resort to role theory as a burgeoning approach of foreign policy analysis (chapter 'Role Theory and Geopolitical Thinking in South America'). They argue that role-based interactions are crucial to understand geopolitics in South America and show how states play various roles in processes like the construction of South America as a distinct region and the securitization of natural resources.

Part II concentrates on the use of regional institutions as integral part of the management of security challenges. A consistent finding throughout the chapters is the existence of a plural institutional architecture in the region, whose emergence reflects the power shifts going on at the global and regional level. In their chapter 'Regional Organizations, Conflict Resolution and Mediation in South America', Monica Herz, Maira Siman and Ana Clara Telles identify four characteristics of regional conflict resolution, namely a plural institutional architecture, a legalist framework with strong preference for non-interventionism and peaceful conflict resolution, the separation between domestic violence and international peace, and the tendency to rely on ad hoc arrangements based on presidential involvement. The authors consider regional institutions to be social spaces where those narratives and practices of conflict resolution are enacted. In contrast, Kai Enno Lehmann (chapter 'Is Regionalism Still a Viable Option for the Creation and Maintenance of Peace and Security in Latin America?') comes to rather pessimistic conclusions regarding the contribution of regionalism to peace and security. He attributes regional institutions' lack of effectiveness to divergent narratives on their purpose and use. In Central America, this divergence is internal (between government and civil society), whereas in South America it runs between governments and/or regional organizations.

Looking at various types of security challenges, Lehmann's chapter and the following chapters by Brigitte Weiffen and Marcos Valle Machado da Silva all offer insights on the question whether a plural institutional architecture in South America is beneficial or detrimental for security management. A mixed picture emerges. Lehmann, focusing on their role in addressing intrastate conflict and violence, finds that the proliferation of regional organizations has led to fragmentation and ineffectiveness.

Weiffen compares regional organizations' actions to mitigate domestic political crises and to defend democracy (chapter 'Institutional Overlap and Responses to Political Crises in South America'). She shows that the redundancy of regional democracy clauses yields different effects, depending on whether the prevalent regional power dynamics is cooperative or competitive. In the latter case, inter-organizational competition may emerge which runs the danger of undermining the very norms that the organizations once set out to protect. In turn, Valle studies the role of the UN, the OAS and UNASUR in interstate conflict management in South America and concludes that institutional overlap is beneficial on the whole, as the three organizations' activities have complemented or reinforced each other (chapter 'Interstate Conflict Management in South America: The Relevance of Overlapping Institutions').

Part III explores the security priorities of states and investigates how power shifts shape the prevalent responses to those security challenges. The chapters 'The Zone of Violent Peace' and 'Defense Management in South America: Bureaucracy and Diplomacy' analyze how states manage traditional security challenges in a changing environment, while the focus of the chapters 'Counterterrorism Policies in Brazil: A Securitization Syndrome?', 'Desecuritizing the "War on Drugs"' and 'Mexico and Its Role in North America's Security: Between Terrorism and Organized Crime' is on non-traditional security challenges. In his chapter 'The Zone of Violent Peace', David R. Mares shows that contrary to the widely held perception of Latin America as a 'zone of peace', militarized behaviors have not been eliminated from the region. He argues that militarization is actually incentivized by the contemporary situation in Latin America – in particular by domestic instability, recent military modernization that fuels mutual suspicion, and the proliferation of regional institutions that opens the possibility of 'shopping' for the institution most favorable to one's position in a dispute. Rut Diamint studies the challenges of defense management in South America (chapter 'Defense Management in South America: Bureaucracy and Diplomacy'). Against the backdrop of regional attempts to build a South American defense identity, two crucial issues come to the fore: the continuing difficulty to establish civilian control due to the dominance of the military in both national and regional defense institutions; and the tensions and contradictions between defense and foreign policies.

The next three chapters analyze how the global security agenda in general, and US influence in particular, impact on the security priorities of key

regional players like Mexico, Colombia and Brazil. Marcial A.G. Suarez, Fernando L. Brancoli and Igor D.P. Acácio resort to the Copenhagen School's concept of securitization to reconstruct how shifting emphases in global security policies after 9/11, promoted by the United States as well as global institutions, have led to a securitization of terrorism in South America and to an adoption of a counterterrorism strategy by Brazil (chapter 'Counterterrorism Policies in Brazil: A Securitization Syndrome?'). Carolina Cepeda Másmela and Arlene B. Tickner focus on Colombian-US bilateral relations in order to trace the securitization of illicit drugs and the evolution of the US-designed 'war on drugs' (chapter 'Desecuritizing the "War on Drugs"'). They argue that the shortcomings of this policy have created opportunities to discuss alternative approaches that would amount to a desecuritization of the drug issue. In his chapter 'Mexico and Its Role in North America's Security: Between Terrorism and Organized Crime', Raúl Benítez Manaut recounts the evolution of interdependence between the United States and Mexico in the wider context of North American regional cooperation. North American security efforts have focused on the fight against organized crime, considered to be the most dangerous threat in the region. The 9/11 terrorist attacks reinforced the strategic relationship overall, but led to priority shifts such as a stronger focus on border protection.

NOTES

1. It is important to mention, however, that UNASUR did not emerge in a political vacuum, but drew to a large extent on security conceptions and practices that developed in the inter-American system since the 1940s, with the OAS at its core, as well as on bilateral experiences in security cooperation.
2. According to Mares (2012), the Latin American 'hot spots' are Colombia and its neighbors, particularly Venezuela; Nicaragua-Costa Rica; Bolivia-Chile; the Dominican Republic-Haiti; and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

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PART I

Power Shifts and Regional Security
Governance

Regional Security in Latin America after US Hegemony

Joseph S. Tulchin

INTRODUCTION

The power dynamics in the Western Hemisphere began to shift with the end of the Cold War and are still in a state of flux. In the first years following the fall of the Berlin wall, there was a brief moment of euphoria that the world had entered a period of peace and development – the ‘End of History’, as Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) put it. An essential element of that euphoria was the belief that the world would be governed by a set of rules or norms adopted informally by consensus and that every nation, no matter how small or weak, would play a role in making the rules for this new world community. Of course, Fukuyama took for granted that liberal democracy and market capitalism were the accepted modes of governance in this international community. His argument was that the historical dialectic between modes of governance had ended with the triumph of one over the other. As the leader of the triumphant mode, the USA naturally would be the leader of the emerging world community. At the same time John Williamson provided a similar analysis for the international economy in which he observed a similar broad agreement as to how the international economy was to run, which he called ‘the Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 1990). The central

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elements of that consensus were the importance of fiscal discipline, transparent exchange rates, and the efficiency of markets.

But the euphoria did not last long and the optimistic views of Fukuyama and Williamson – as well as the hubris behind them – were quickly and widely contested. In Latin America, because of the contemporaneous transition to democracy in so many countries, the notion that liberal democracy was, or should be, the desired mode of governance was embraced by many and with great ardor. It was a Latin American initiative that drove the Democracy Declaration through the Organization of American States (OAS) at the meeting of the General Assembly in Santiago in 1991.¹

Certainly, in countries such as Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Costa Rica, Costa Rica and Mexico, there was considerable sympathy for the idea of a rules-based community of nations along with a determination to participate in making the rules of that community. The democrats in Latin America also took to heart the message of the globalization optimists who argued that technology, especially the Internet and telecommunications more generally, was making the world ‘flat’ (Friedman 2005).

Although the view that the world would be more united and peaceful as peoples and nations were drawn together by the forces of globalization was grossly overdrawn, the period following the end of the bipolar struggle between the West and the Soviet Union did give rise in Latin America to a sense that all nations could play a role in the global community and that all nations had sufficient autonomy of action to exercise some form of agency in that community.²

In realizing their growing agency, the nations of Latin America have had to overcome two obstacles. The more difficult one has been the heavy legacy of a century of US hegemony. The legacy has left the USA with a powerful sense of entitlement in its hemispheric leadership which makes it difficult to take nations in the region seriously and engage them, either bilaterally or in multilateral frameworks as equals or partners. The same legacy has left many Latin Americans deeply embittered and hostile to US leadership. It is no exaggeration to say that the only thing that unites all Latin Americans is opposition to US intervention in the hemisphere. And, yet, ironically, to the extent that national actions or policies are determined by reactions to the behavior or policy of the USA, such reactions generally preclude careful understanding of the long-term national interest and the nation’s capacity to act in a regional or global framework. Anti-Americanism is a perverse form of autonomy.

The second obstacle to the exercise of Latin American agency is the very real asymmetry of power between the USA and the other nations in the hemisphere. The asymmetry cannot be wished away, although it might be altered by collective action. But that does not resolve the problem of how to deal with the USA as an actor in the quest for regional security.

The argument of this chapter is that to understand the power dynamics of regional security in the Western Hemisphere today we must juxtapose the decline of US hegemony with the rise of Latin American agency to create a framework that will give us an idea of how individual countries see their roles in the international community and help us evaluate the potential viability and capacity of new regional organizations. In other words, the willingness to make new regional organizations robust will be the result of an awareness among Latin American policy makers of how they understand relations with a post-hegemonic USA and what space in the international system Latin American leaders believe they have. How they anticipate using that space is their exercise of agency. In reaching for agency, each nation has been driven by interests and by values to seek networks of partners and to join regimes that serve their purposes.

REGIONAL POWER DYNAMICS

It is clear in retrospect that President Barack Obama was naive or overly optimistic in his expectation that the nations of Latin America – individually or collectively – would embrace his project of post-hegemonic partnership in the pursuit of common goals. Indeed there were many in the USA that were not prepared to accept the proposition that the country was not a leader in important policy questions and in making the rules of the hemispheric community. At the same time, most, like the president himself, were sensitive to the limits of US power. The lesson this majority took away from the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan was that overwhelming power could not guarantee specific political outcomes or protect US interests. Like Woodrow Wilson in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic a century earlier, or Calvin Coolidge in Nicaragua, in the 1920s, Obama saw that the use of US military force – even overwhelming military force – in Iraq or Afghanistan did not produce the desired outcome (T. L. Friedman 2015).

The president's view – what came to be called the Obama Doctrine – was that long-term protection of national interests required the projection of national power in collaboration with partners who shared US core values and who would join in the defense of rule-based communities.

The question, the president said, is not that the USA will lead, but how it will lead.³ Latin American policy makers, in contrast, go to extraordinary lengths to avoid US hegemonic control, and want to participate in making the rules for their community. In other words, US leaders see little cost in the history of hegemony whereas Latin Americans feel that the USA must pay a very significant price, although they are not certain what that price should be. For the moment, it appears to be exclusion from their community.

For the past decade, Latin American leaders have been seeking forms of regionalism without the USA through which they might express their agency in collective action. Despite their many disagreements the Latin American nations are seeking ways to express their common identity, autonomous of the USA, through regional organizations that, as Heraldo Muñoz, Chilean Foreign Minister, put it, stress ‘convergence within diversity’.⁴ This may be the most important reason the Obama partnership project made so little headway. By the time Obama tried to find partners in the hemisphere, the symbol of Latin American resistance had become the opposition to the US embargo and to the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS. It was one issue on which all the nations in the hemisphere could agree in their opposition to US hegemony. Support for Cuba had become a symbol of Latin American unity in resistance and a backdrop to forms of collective action. The question left unanswered is whether in seeking a rapprochement with Cuba, President Obama had succeeded in stripping away that symbol, and if so, how this would affect the new regionalism. We shall return to the question of Cuba when we evaluate agency in Latin America and the new regional organizations.

A crucial buttress to this new sense of agency in the hemispheric and global communities has been the credibility provided by the emergence of the policy process as a crucial feature of the transition to democracy. In democracy, the people have a voice in the formulation of public policies and the media has a role in discussing those policies. For the first time in the history of most of the countries in the region, since the Cold War, foreign policy has been debated in the press, made the focus of new graduate programs in universities, and considered a vital part of the contestation for power. That active debate makes elected government more permeable to ideas in public discourse about foreign policy. While the process still varies widely from country to country depending on the overall strength of democratic governance, it is dramatically more evident even in the least robust democracies of the region than it was only one

generation ago. As they become increasingly committed to the policy process and to their accountability, leaders in Latin America have become enthusiastic supporters of transnational networks and increasingly respectful of soft power – their own and that of other nations. These new networks, both in the public and in the private sectors, bring their own rules of community governance with them and reinforce the legitimacy of the policy process.⁵

In Latin America, the double revolution – globalization and the transition to democracy – established the conditions for the policymaking process that had been lacking in so many countries. Together, the dual revolution has had a profound impact on long-standing nationalistic policies in communications, strategic commodities, and the transfer of capital that had dominated civilian and military governments in Latin America since the days of Import Substitution Industrialization in the 1930s and that had exerted pressure on leaders to look inward. The growing interest of the Latin American public in foreign affairs is a central feature of their emerging agency of their nations in world affairs. So, too, is the epistemological community of foreign policy experts with their increasingly sophisticated theoretical framework for understanding policy.⁶

GLOBAL POWER DYNAMICS

The new international community is one with increasing popular participation expressed through social media as well as through more traditional modes such as street demonstrations and voting.⁷ Yet, not everyone shares the optimistic view of globalization and many are uncomfortable with the rules that the most powerful countries attempt to impose on the wider community. Skeptics convoked the first Anti-Globalization conference in 2001, and, as the World Social Forum (WSF), have held annual meetings around the world since that first conference (Stiglitz 2003; Rapoport and Brenta 2012; Fiori et al. 2008; Muhr 2013; Burbach et al. 2013). The WSF is a mélange of civil society organizations and government representatives. They are hostile toward a capitalist system they consider imposed on people around the world by nations, led by the USA, that benefit from the asymmetry of economic power and from the rules that govern the dominant system. This opposition to the existing rules of the game has become a source of tension in the global community, especially following the financial implosion in the USA in 2008. As China challenged its Asian

neighbors by moving to control islands in the China Sea, Russia challenged Europe and NATO by seizing Crimea and sponsoring separatists in eastern Ukraine. In Latin America, China became an important trading partner and a critical investor, thereby offering nations an economic alternative to the USA.⁸ While opposition to rules of the game gave to the agency of individual nations or non-state actors greater potential significance, the question of responsibility for their actions remained dangerously fuzzy.⁹

The most concrete proposal to alter the rules of the game and shift the global balance of power was the consolidation of the group of emerging powers known as the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. First coined by a Wall Street analyst to refer to a set of potential fields for investment, the acronym took on life in an informal meeting of foreign ministers during the UN General Assembly meeting in 2006. After some preliminary meetings to fix the protocol of such a diverse group with diverse agendas that overlapped only on matters of international economics and their wishes to change the dominant system, there was a summit meeting of national leaders in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. Since that time, there has been a summit meeting each year, rotating hosts from one member country to another. In Fortaleza, Brazil, in 2014, the members issued a very ambitious Declaration and Action Plan in which they committed themselves to ministerial meetings in the next two years, called for peace in many of the world's hot spots, and declared their intention to launch a development bank. The last, potentially, was the most significant because it would project the influence of the countries as a group to many others in the international community. The declaration also specified that Russia and China sympathized with the interests of India and Brazil in playing a more prominent role in the United Nations.¹⁰

Then, in 2015, China announced the new financial institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to compete with the Bretton Woods institutions (E. Friedman 2015). Despite the fact that the USA opposed the new bank, many allies of the USA were among the 46 founding members. The bank's director says the new institution will be 'lean, clean, and green'. It remains to be seen how the rules are set and enforced at the new institution.¹¹ By refusing to join, the USA has shown its post-hegemonic tendency to remove itself from discussion of changes in the rules of the international economic system.¹²

In Latin America, the legacy of living under US hegemony and, willingly or grudgingly, following US leadership is reflected in the fact that in none of the global hot spots – Crimea, Syria, South China Sea, Libya – has

a Latin American nation taken an active role, although in several there was some discussion about the crisis and how important it would be to take an active role in its solution (Heine and Bitar 2013; Pellicer 2014).¹³ Most of the nations in the region remain hesitant to express their agency outside the hemisphere and the new regional organizations reflect this reluctance. The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), whose roots go back to the time before the end of the Cold War, has acted as an organization in negotiating trade agreements with other trade groups, but does not take a position on issues other than trade.

ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, is the exception to the pattern of reluctance as its members have taken positions in the UN which consistently oppose the USA and its European allies when for example they wish to criticize violations of human rights in places like Syria. The ALBA states have also tried to weaken the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and other organizations that might be considered enforcers of the rules of the hemispheric community under US hegemonic influence. ALBA and its members question the rules and insist that they have the agency to make their own rules and they will do what they can to block the enforcement of those rules they consider imposed on them by the USA.

The most often debated issue in the international community is how to enforce rules (Mele 2013).¹⁴ In the USA, even opponents of the unilateralism practiced by George W. Bush are split as to how the country is to use its power in a post-hegemonic mode¹⁵ and are discomforted by the absence of an international consensus as to how shared rules are to be enforced.¹⁶ Those who deny the end of US hegemony denounced Obama for upsetting the global order (Kagan 2014) and lamented that America 'has lost faith in itself'. It seems that working out the tactics of a post-hegemonic national strategy, as Obama put it, was going to be 'complicated' (Bruni 2014; Kristof 2014; Collins 2014).¹⁷

AGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA

Through his two terms, the Obama Doctrine in Latin America sought to enhance cooperation through a variety of modest programs, conducted for the most part at the cabinet or ministerial level, which sought to enhance partnerships with key countries, such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The president also offered specific responses to intermestic issues where domestic politics required some action, such as immigration, through an executive order offering a path to citizenship for millions of illegal immigrants and

the relatively small aid program for Central America through which the administration sought to reduce the flow of illegal immigration from the violent countries of the northern triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) (Biden 2015; Feinberg et al. 2015). These were modest efforts to enhance security of the hemispheric community through partnerships.

The most dramatic move by the Obama administration to deal with the legacy of hegemony was the announcement in December 2014 that the administration had concluded years of secret negotiations with the government of Cuba and would move to resume normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. This move had an immediate, profound effect in Latin America and may prove to be the key to freeing the USA and Latin America from the stultifying legacy of US hegemonic pretension in the hemisphere (Lagos 2015). The rapprochement between Cuba and the USA and the re-incorporation of Cuba into the hemispheric community is central to the ongoing debate in Latin America as to how autonomy and agency are to be expressed. Now that the symbolic focus of anti-hegemony has been removed through the rapprochement between the US and Cuba and Fidel's death in November 2016, how are the nations of the hemisphere to deal with the reluctant hegemon? Opposition to hegemonic pretension no longer is sufficient justification for foreign policy. Nor, by itself, would expression of triumphalism in the decline of the USA or the end of US hegemony make the policymaking process in Latin America more effective or more democratic (Gardini and Lambert 2011; Drekonja Kornat 1993; Russell and Tokatlian 2003; Rodríguez Giavarini 2004).

The end of hegemony has opened space for autonomous action in trade, in the exploitation of natural resources and in the creation of new regional organizations without the USA (Bilal et al. 2011; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012; Saguier 2014; Saguier and Tussie 2014).¹⁸ Latin Americans had an opportunity to formulate their own policies and gain control over their own destiny (Russell and Tokatlian 2003; Tulchin and Espach 2004). The dilemma remains how to use these new networks and the new regional organizations to deal with the USA (Serbin et al. 2012).¹⁹

Regional Organizations

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the nations of Latin America have expended enormous political energy and will to reform existing regional organizations and to create new ones that would better serve their

interests and better reflect their collective identity. At first, in the 1990s, Latin Americans were key players in reforming the OAS to give them greater voice in the proceedings and to put issues of concern to them on the agenda of the organization. More specifically, a set of nations that were in the process of transitioning from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico – pushed through reforms of the OAS that called for protecting democracy as the favored form of government in the hemisphere. There is another dimension to the value of the OAS as an organization to defend values and interests of Latin American nations despite its history of serving as an instrument of US policy. In the years since the end of the Cold War, civil society organizations have created powerful, tight networks throughout the hemisphere and beyond. They form lobbies that operate comfortably with and within the OAS. Until and unless new organizations like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) prove their worth in the defense of these core values, the OAS will continue to serve the interests of at least some of the nations in the hemisphere.

The decision-making structure of the OAS was also changed, creating commissions that could deal with sensitive issues, such as arms control and drug trafficking, without paying heed to the dominance of the USA. And, it was through Latin American initiatives that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was given greater power and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights was given greater autonomy and authority, the latter located in San José, Costa Rica.

The culmination of this reform effort came in 2000 when the Mexicans succeeded in convincing the US Senate that the unilateral ‘certification’ of nations as to their commitment to the war on drugs was an infringement on their sovereignty and that the goals of the Congress could be achieved in the Western Hemisphere through the new commissions of the OAS and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, which would undertake to evaluate the struggle against the illegal traffic in drugs in each member state.

So powerful was the urge to make the architecture of hemispheric organizations compatible with the new sense of agency in Latin America that the president of Mexico, Vicente Fox, proposed on 9 September 2001 that the Inter-American Defense Treaty should be abrogated because it no longer was relevant and gave too much authority to the USA. Days later, in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the USA invoked that very treaty and summoned the representatives of all of the countries to

rally behind the USA and their collective defense. That, in effect, ended the Latin American effort to have existing organizations serve their collective ends in the hemisphere. They would have to look elsewhere.

Since 2001, the effort has shifted to creating organizations without the USA that would defend the interests of the countries in the region and project their common identity. The first, ALBA, was created in 2004, as the brainchild of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez who wanted nations in Latin America to build a future that would not be dictated by the dominant neo-liberal economic and political model. They also insisted on framing ALBA as an anti-imperialist movement, specifically identifying the USA as the imperialist force in the Western Hemisphere. Progressive-populists regimes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, and eventually, a set of island nations in the Caribbean, also joined. The latter were brought in mainly by guarantees of cheap petroleum provided by the government of Venezuela through a new organization called Petrocaribe. There has been little institution building by ALBA, although Evo Morales, the president of Bolivia, did negotiate a cooperation agreement with the government of Iran in 2011 to build an ALBA Defense Academy in Santa Cruz, though it has not been put to use as of 2016. There are annual summits and a full set of ministerial councils. But, again, there is little evidence of a bureaucratic structure nor any norms and statutes for the secretariat to enforce.²⁰

Even progressive governments such as those of Brazil and Chile have made it clear that they would not join ALBA and that its objectives did not fit their sense of how the community should act collectively. Other governments, especially the Kirchners in Argentina, expressed sympathy with the anti-imperialism of ALBA but did not join the organization. Since Chávez's death, the president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, has attempted to take on the role of the organization's leader, but without much success. There is a website for ALBA, and the Venezuelan government issues notices to the press on ALBA's activities. The Bank of the South, created by Chávez, is reported to have invested US\$170 million in unspecified social projects. As Correa has lost support in Ecuador and decided not to run in the presidential elections of 2017, ALBA has fallen into a semi-comatose condition.

Chávez tried to insinuate ALBA into the pre-existing trade pact among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, MERCOSUR, but was rebuffed by Lula, the Brazilian president at the time. In part as a response to the pressure from ALBA, and as an effort to link MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, to further South American integration, Brazil, together with the governments of Argentina and Chile, organized

UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations, in 2008. An office was created in Quito and a substantial Secretariat building was constructed, thus giving the new organization a prehensile institutional structure. The leaders of the UNASUR countries have created a Defense Council and indicated their intention to create a total of 14 ministerial councils to deal with issues like health, social development, infrastructure, education, drugs, economics, and energy. It should be added that UNASUR also formulated a 'Protocol on Commitment to Democracy' in 2010, ratified by a majority of the members by 2014.²¹ The current (since 1 August 2014) Secretary General is the Colombian Ernesto Samper. There is real energy in the activities of UNASUR, especially in the Defense Council, and the organization has acted in an effort to maintain peace among its members and to restore some semblance of stability in Venezuela although with little success.

The most notable effort to build a hemispheric architecture without the USA is CELAC, which grew out of a meeting in Mexico of the Rio Group in 2010 and was formalized at a summit meeting in July 2011, in Caracas. Canada and the USA are excluded, as are the European territories in the Caribbean, while Cuba is included. Comments by the presidents of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela expressed the hope that CELAC would be a weapon to end US hegemony. But that was not why Felipe Calderón, president of Mexico, the host of the original Rio Group meeting in 2010, supported the effort. He was concerned that the region could not go on so divided. At the Caracas meeting in December 2011, Chávez and the president of Chile, Sebastián Piñera, were appointed to frame the regulations for the new organization. The final statement at the end of that meeting included a Declaration for Democracy.

In passing the Democracy Declaration, CELAC brought into relief one of its foundational problems. By insisting that Cuba be admitted, the members agreed to close their eyes to the nature of the regime in Cuba. There is little democracy in Cuba. The same issue came up when the opposition in Venezuela complained that the regime was systematically reducing the space they had in which to express their dissent. On several occasions, there were violent clashes between the opposition and the government, and it was pointed out that the latter was heavily reliant on Cuban military advisers who could not be considered experienced with peaceful political contestation. On the other hand, the opposition was closely linked to civil society groups that support human rights and democratic governance. When the violence escalated in February 2014, it was UNASUR that attempted to intervene and bring the adversaries to the negotiating table, not CELAC.

And, in 2015, when the US government tried to impose sanctions on members of the Venezuelan government because of their involvement in drug trafficking, UNASUR made it clear that opposition to US intervention was stronger than any effort to defend democracy in Venezuela.

To this point, neither UNASUR nor CELAC seems interested in dealing as a collective agent with actors outside the hemisphere, such as China, which might play a role in insulating Latin American nations from US hegemony. The new Chinese-led development bank might well prove to be a factor in the evolution of regionalism in Latin America. For the moment, there is no evidence that China intends to undermine the US position in the hemisphere.

On balance, it seems that the creation of new regional organizations in Latin America will help all of the countries in the region to come to terms with their agency in the international system. It is likely that the growth in mutual confidence among the members will take time and effort. In this process, it is important to keep in mind that the nations of the region have as many issues that separate them from one another as they have elements of identity to bring them together. Yet, each of the new organizations is a forum to work out historical differences and rivalries and each makes it more possible to resolve the remaining territorial disputes that keep the region from any true integration (Tavares 2014; Thomas 2002; Weiffen et al. 2013).²²

Heraldo Muñoz, as Chilean ambassador to the OAS, played a critical role in the commitment to democracy in the OAS in 1991, and in getting CELAC to include a declaration on democracy. He has been a forceful advocate of Latin American regionalism, focusing on achieving a Latin American identity and of forging convergence within diversity. For Muñoz, while there are problems ahead, the effort is liberating and the direction in general is positive. As Muñoz has made plain, for Chile, regionalism is part of its multilevel agency within the international community. For Chile, Latin American regionalism should enhance Latin American agency in world affairs.²³

Individual Countries

Ultimately, how each country grasps the opportunity of its agency in international affairs and how it chooses to participate in multilateral organizations is a matter of its own capacity and aspirations. In South America, the key country is Brazil. It is the only country that has asserted for itself the status of global power and considers itself the hegemonic power within

South America. When President Fernando Henrique Cardoso came to power in January 1995, he was convinced that Brazil should be a global rule-maker and that in order to fill that role the country had to end its dependence on imported energy and technology, the ultimate strategic commodities, and reduce inequality, which deprived Brazil of the influence (soft power) necessary to sit at the table with the world's great powers. He was also determined to maintain the political stability and economic balance he considered indispensable in a global economy. To an amazing degree, he was successful. So successful, that his successor, Lula, continued and extended the social programs which moved the index of social welfare, continued the fiscal policies that kept the currency stable, and kept within the rules of the game so that political stability was maintained.

It was only in energy that Lula slipped. His party, the PT, could not help itself from taking advantage of Petrobras as a cash cow, so that within a very short period of time, production in Petrobras stagnated. During the presidency of his successor, Dilma Rousseff, the financial scandal in Petrobras of massive payments to the PT threatened to undermine her ability to govern. The Petrobras scandal exacerbated the growing malaise in the country created by the general slowdown in the economy which was primarily a response to the decline in Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities. That malaise, which began in 2013, sent hundreds of thousands of people into the streets of the country's cities and nearly cost Dilma her re-election in 2014. As the Petrobras scandal unfolded in 2015, the street demonstrations resumed, now with demands for Dilma's impeachment. The decline in oil prices will make it difficult for the government to benefit from the export of oil and the weakness of the economy with the polarization of Brazilian politics in general will make it harder for Dilma to govern. That, in turn, will weaken the capacity of Brazil to project its influence overseas. With all of these problems, Brazil remains the most powerful country in Latin America.

Yet, the debate over how or in what manner Brazil should exercise its influence regionally and globally has been going on for more than a decade. Lula thought his predecessor's plan to make Brazil a world power was an excellent idea. However, his advisers were split over how that new agency was to be exercised. One group, led by the foreign ministry, Itamaraty, thought that global influence would best be achieved by extending the country's historical influence in South America, the so-called Rio Branco model. Others in his group of intimates, who were old colleagues from the decades of the Cold War, refused to contemplate

Brazil's activity on the global stage if that would appear as if the country were following the lead of the USA. In one critical episode, Lula was convinced to join his Turkish colleague to negotiate with the government of Iran to rein in Iran's nuclear program. Lula's trip to Iran in 2010 was ill-timed. It came precisely as the USA was shepherding through the UN Security Council a resolution to impose sanctions on Iran for not allowing international inspection of its nuclear program. Instead of showing him as a new world leader, the trip dashed whatever expectations Lula had of exercising greater influence at the international level.²⁴

The failure to produce a consensus, either during Lula's two terms or in the two of his successor, Dilma Rousseff, has undermined Brazilian efforts to use its undeniable economic power and the great respect it enjoys, to increase its agency. The question for Brazilians seems to be whether the country should maintain its historic role as a dominant country in South America, or whether it should aim for a role in the Security Council of the UN and for a wider role in world affairs.²⁵ Brazil's hegemonic pretension in South America is a constant leitmotif in UNASUR and other regional organizations. Argentina, most prominently, sets itself against Brazilian pretensions. According to a recent study, Argentina is not alone in attempting to find a 'soft balance' with Brazil and that the only thing that prevents such a balance is the lack of state capacity and internal instability in Argentina and other countries (Schenoni 2015).²⁶ One Chilean analyst and former diplomat has suggested that Brazil intends to use UNASUR as a vehicle to exercise its hegemony in South America (Portales 2014).

Brazil's sense of its own power – asymmetrical within South America – and how to use it reflects a heterodox combination of realist calculation of power and interest with heavy reliance on historical and cultural values.²⁷ Among members of the PT, there has been added the notion that Brazil can play a leadership role globally in the anti-establishment movement, a form of soft power, which appeals to countries in the BRICS group, but has very little resonance in Europe or the USA. In this exercise of agency, Brazil has shown little interest in making rules for a new community, but it is consciously exercising its agency in forums or regimes on various geographic levels and in a multitude of issue areas, using its hard and soft power with equal confidence. Brazil, along with Chile, maintains a blue-water navy; Brazil is the major Latin American player in the use of international aid (Borges 2008, 2014). Brazil's military participation in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was crucial to the Latin American role in that UN peacekeeping effort.

Chile is the other country in Latin America for which the new regionalism must complement, not replace or constrain, its efforts to exercise agency in the global arena. Chile continues to use its soft power to exercise its considerable international influence at the regional and at the global levels. After years of negotiations, it survived the decision of the International Court of Justice to settle the maritime boundary dispute between Peru and Chile (Tulchin 2014). In discussing the UNASUR mission to Caracas, Muñoz stated that the effort was to give a Latin American identity to the intervention, the same argument he had used a decade earlier, as Chilean ambassador to the UN, in creating MINUSTAH, the UN peacekeeping effort in Haiti. By implication, he pointed to the possibilities inherent in the new regionalism without the USA, although he made it clear that the identity to which he referred would not in any way be anti-American. Chile and Brazil represent the moderate view of the future of Latin American regionalism. They work with CELAC and UNASUR while they continue to support the OAS. Chile also uses the regional organizations to fend off the most threatening features of Brazilian hegemonic pretensions. Chile has indicated that it is prepared to pay the price for global influence and evaluates its agency within that framework. Brazil is less sure about paying the price, but the inertial force of such a powerful country, once the current economic malaise has been surmounted, is toward greater agency at the global level.

Costa Rica and Uruguay represent an interesting new category of very small states, one in Central America and one in South America, which are enjoying significant influence in the international community as a consequence of their stability, their public advocacy of core values such as human rights and democracy, and their deliberate exercise of agency based on this influence and advocacy.²⁸ Both countries explicitly reject military solutions to dispute resolution. Costa Rica has no military; Uruguay's is too small to consider a measure of the country's hard power.²⁹ Both are social democracies and both play by the rules of the international market to attract foreign investment; and both were strong allies of the USA during the Cold War. Uruguay was the only nation in the hemisphere to come to the rescue of the Obama administration by taking prisoners from the Guantanamo prison. Uruguay also supports CELAC, but its former foreign minister, Luis Almagro Lemes, was elected in 2015 to succeed José Miguel Insulza as secretary general of the OAS. The president of Costa Rica, Luis Guillermo Solís, has indicated his support for CELAC, although San José continues as the seat of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. These two, with their firm stand on the defense

of core values, may prove to be key players in bridging the gap between the OAS, with its ties to the USA, and the newer regional organizations. Both are strong supporters of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, both of which have been the targets of opposition from Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina.

Trade Groups

Finally, a word about trade groups, the most traditional of multilateral organizations based on shared interests. Four such groups exist, with four different profiles making any generalization about how they affect regional power dynamics extremely difficult. They are MERCOSUR, the Andean Community (formerly the Andean Pact, 1969–1996), the Central American Integration System (formerly the Central American Common Market, 1960–1993), and the Pacific Alliance. The Central American and Andean groups are the product of the development impulse of the 1960s, formed with the help and blessing of the USA and the World Bank. Both have elaborate institutional frameworks, including a legislature, central secretariat, and court to resolve disputes, although the state of these institutions suggests that they are more like skeletons than active frameworks. Venezuela withdrew from the Andean Community in 2006 alleging that the group had fallen under the sway of the USA by signing free trade agreements. The most significant achievement of each of these today is that they have been instruments or vehicles for reaching out to nations outside their boundaries. The Central Americans have brought the Dominican Republic into their fold and as a group they have established trade agreements with the USA. The Andean Community has taken on new life in negotiations as a group with Brazil and MERCOSUR.

MERCOSUR is the most solid of these groups, although current problems (2016) indicate that Brazil is distracted from participating while the new government of Mauricio Macri in Argentina is eager to participate but reluctant to accept subordination to Brazilian hegemony. That hegemony, in this case, does not appear to be as gentle as Minister Amorim claimed (Schenoni 2017).

The Pacific Alliance is still very young, having been created in 2012, but in the few years of its existence it has made great progress and gives every indication that it will grow stronger very quickly. Perhaps it is a historic coincidence that the four member states – Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile – share a willingness to open their markets, to live with transparent

exchange rates, to negotiate a convergence of regulatory regimes governing international trade, and to abide by international norms of macroeconomic stability. Even in the short time since signing the alliance, the member states have found more and more interests in common to encourage convergence among them, convergence that goes beyond the original sharing of economic interests that first brought them together. Most interesting is the possibility presented in the alliance of serving as an agent on behalf of its members in negotiating their participation in the much larger Trans-Pacific Partnership, in which the USA also is a participant. This is collective agency of unusual promise. In it the members demonstrate that they understand that multiple regimes on different levels can be complementary and should not be understood as part of a zero-sum game.

CONCLUSION

There are many ways to be in the world.³⁰ We can expect in the future that countries in the region will become more confident in dealing with troublesome issues within the hemisphere, such as political violence in Venezuela, international drug trafficking, and criminal violence. For the moment, with the exception of Chile and Brazil, the nations of Latin America appear uncertain what their role outside the hemisphere should be. In dealing with issues that are fundamental to the region, such as governance, the new regional organizations do not yet appear to offer solutions and no one appears to be in a position to resolve the historical differences that divide the countries. Normative and strategic fragmentation makes building institutions difficult and makes cohesive collective action more complicated.³¹ As optimists, we may expect this to change as regional organizations provide forums for open discussions of common problems. As US hegemony declines and as Cuba loses its importance as a symbol, the nations of Latin America – individually or collectively – must be prepared to expand their agency.

NOTES

1. Formally, this was the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, and was accompanied by Resolution 1080 which enabled the OAS to take action in the event of an interruption of the democratic constitutional order.
2. Agency is a concept used across a wide range of social science disciplines. My use has its origins in psychology, where it refers to an individual's sense of his

or her capacity for action. It assumes that action takes place within the constraints of an institution, a group, or system. It implies consciousness and will. It makes no assumptions as to power or capacity. The interplay between US hegemony and the rise of Latin American agency is the subject of my book, *Latin America in International Politics: Challenging US Hegemony* (Tulchin 2016).

3. As the president put it in his last National Security Strategy published in February 2015, 'The question is never whether America should lead, but how we should lead.' Also see Nye (1990).
4. Speech by Muñoz, 'Diálogo sobre integración regional: Alianza del Pacífico y Mercosur', 24 November 2014, available at: http://www.minrel.gob.cl/minrel/site/tax/port/all/taxport_2_77__1.html.
5. An easy entrée to the vast literature on this phenomenon is Friedman (2005).
6. One significant example is the project conducted by Guadalupe Gonzalez at CIDE in Mexico (Gonzalez et al. 2011, 2013), which can be followed online at <http://www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/>. On the growing theoretical debate, see Tokatlian and Carvajal (1995), Tokatlian and Russell (2003).
7. Friedman modified his views over time. He began by seeing in the popular demonstrations a strong push for freedom he called the Arab Spring. By 2014, he had come to accept the fact that popular uprisings by themselves could not achieve democratic government. He came to see the world divided into forces of order and disorder (Friedman 2014). The classic statement of the belief in the inexorable drive for human freedom and decency is Camus (1965).
8. For an analysis of geopolitical thinking in China, see E. Friedman (2015); on China's new role in Latin America, see the work of Ariel Armony at the University of Miami, <http://www.as.miami.edu/international-studies/people/faculty/ariel-armony/> and a project at UNAM, www.economia.unam.mx/cechimex/index.php/.
9. Federico de la Balze (2014) sees centrifugal forces threatening globalization and says that it requires 'a political architecture that supports it: A hegemonic nation or a concert of great powers that define and administer the rules of the game'. Moises Naim (2012) sees in these forces a declining ability to exercise power but a rise in the ability to thwart or stop the exercise of power. Both de la Balze and Naim wonder who will enforce the sanctions that the USA and European nations call for to chasten the nations that break the rules of the international community.
10. The results of the summits are at <http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/>. Also see Mello (2014), Romero (2014) and Kornegay and Bohler-Muller (2013).
11. The editorial board of the *New York Times* was unhappy with Obama's handling of the new bank, asserting that the president had no plan to counter the Chinese move; 'U.S. Allies, Lured by China's Bank', *The New*

York Times (20 March 2015): A28; also see ‘Rush to Join China’s New Asian Bank Surprises All, Even the Chinese’, *The New York Times* (3 April 2015): A5; ‘New China-Led Bank Pledges to Fend off Graft’, *The New York Times* (12 April 2015): A13. Although it is too early to know with confidence, it is just as plausible that by bringing China into an institution in which rules are set by the collective membership, in the long run, the USA will have enhanced its security by making China a more stable member of the international community.

12. Moises Naim (2015) laments this tendency on the part of the Republican dominated US Congress to refuse to participate in the reforms of multilateral institutions. He considers these self-immolating blows against US prestige.
13. For criticism of Latin American reticence, see Carl Meacham, ‘Where is Latin America in the Fight Against ISIL’, 21 October 2014, <http://csis.org/publication/where-latin-america-fight-against-isil>.
14. This is similar to Moises Naim’s notion of the end of power. Litwak (2012) deals with the issue of enforcement.
15. Joseph Nye (2013) urged the US government to take a more aggressive but constructive posture toward China. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2011) was insistent that the USA should act forcefully against Muammar el-Qaddafi. She also thought its policy toward Syria was feckless (Slaughter 2014). For a European view, see Wergin (2014). But Nye (2015) continued in his belief that the USA still was the most powerful country in the world. Obama’s use of sanctions against Iran and Russia among others has stirred a fierce debate among academics as to whether such measures are effective.
16. ‘Is Democracy in Decline?’ Special section in *Journal of Democracy* 26 (1), 2015.
17. Some in Latin America saw these statements as evidence that the USA had lost influence in Latin America (Navia 2014). Others warned against mistaking policy diffidence for declining US power (Jaffe 2013).
18. Saguier (2011) has identified a new regime which is called Social Solidarity Economy.
19. The Regional Coordination for Social and Economic Research (CRIES) and its journal *Pensamiento Propio* are important outlets for this perspective. The *Anuario de la Integración Regional* (Serbin et al. 2012) includes several articles by Cubans. Including Cuba is the code imbedded in the notion of the Gran Caribe. A similar view is Bonilla (2014). The two best summaries of the recent history of regionalism in Latin America are Tokatlian (2012) and Portales (2014).
20. Muhr (2014) offers a favorable discussion of ALBA as part of the unending struggle against capitalism.

21. UNASUR also has taken action to defend democracy by suspending Paraguay in 2012 and in attempting to mediate the internal conflicts in Venezuela since 2014.
22. Also see the interview with the President of Costa Rica, Luis Guillermo Solís, on CELAC as the ‘Future of Latin America’, <http://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/view/124649-entrevista>. On the slow development of norms or regimes in sectoral matters, see Barbero and Rodríguez Tornquist (2012). The authors describe new modes of cooperation on a regional level that ignore or bypass political conflicts.
23. All of Muñoz’s speeches as foreign minister can be found at http://www.minrel.gob.cl/minrel/site/tax/port/all/taxport_2_77_1.html
24. In her volume of memoirs, Hillary Clinton follows this narrative of Brazilian meddling (Clinton 2014). The Brazilian foreign minister at the time, Celso Amorim, has published his memoirs in which he states that Secretary Clinton knew of the Brazilian plan in advance and did nothing to alter the timing of Lula’s visit (Amorim 2013).
25. The Brazilian literature on foreign policy has become enormous. There are several journals dedicated to international affairs and a burgeoning production of books and articles chronicling the ongoing debate. See, for example, Fonseca (2011); Schenoni (2014) denies that Brazil is a true hegemon; Guilhon Albuquerque (2013) argues that the scheme to use regional influence as a springboard to global agency is confused. Also see Barbosa (2014).
26. In an interview during his stay at Harvard, former minister Amorim in referring to Brazil’s role in South America, said that ‘[Brazil] is a gentle hegemon’ suggesting that the USA was not gentle. ‘Celso Amorim discusses Brazil’s role in the world and US-Brazil ties’, 8 July 2011.
27. Some analysts would call this strategic culture.
28. Both nations also have historical experience as buffer states, protecting themselves from powerful and sometimes aggressive neighbors. See Chay and Ross (1986); also see ‘Regional Contestation to Rising Powers’, Special Issue of *International Politics* 52 (2), 2015.
29. See www.Globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. Uruguay ranks 109 out of the 126 countries on the list. Brazil, at 22, is the highest-ranking Latin American country, Mexico is 31, and Chile is 43.
30. The index of global presence most followed in Latin America does not include Cuba in its list of important countries. Perhaps it should. On that list, Mexico is the most ‘present’ Latin American country at rank 20, followed by Brazil (25), Venezuela (38), Argentina (39), Chile (43) and Colombia (44). See Elcano Global Presence Index (2011), <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/EGPI>.

31. For an excellent discussion of this dilemma see the Workshop Report 1 and 2 of the University of Aberdeen project on Latin American security, <https://www.abdn.ac.uk/global-security/news/8347/>.

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Security Governance in Latin America

Roberto Dominguez

INTRODUCTION

While electoral democracy has flourished and economies have grown in Latin America since the early 1990s, countries in the region continue experiencing weak implementation of the rule of law, high levels of inequality and protracted violence perpetrated by organized crime. Why is Latin America facing this apparent contradiction? Illiberal practices of democracy, faulty institutional inertias, lack of development and rampant corruption, among other reasons, converge to undermine the positive effect of some of the political and economic achievements in the region. In the area of security, the contrasting faces of Latin America range from a region free of nuclear weapons since 1967 to countries confronting the highest homicide rates in the world. Particularly after the collapse of the rigid security model of the bipolar order, more areas were included as part of the security agenda and scholars responded by developing more studies to explain these contrasting dimensions by underscoring the quality of regional peace (Kacowicz 1998), the relevance of militarized inter-state disputes (Mares 2001), the shifting agenda of regional organizations (Weiffen 2012) and the role of emerging powers (Kacowicz and Mares 2016), among others.

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In the past two decades, scholarly works assessing security governance have proliferated in order to develop frameworks of analysis more inclusive of the variety of topics and actors related to the production of security at the national, regional and global levels (Adler and Greve 2009; Kirchner and Dominguez 2011; Breslin and Croft 2012). From military actors to non-governmental organizations and from environmental degradation to terrorism, security governance allows a more comprehensive framework of analysis in contrast to fragmented conceptualizations of security based on one sector or one actor. This chapter argues that, while different frameworks of security governance have advanced a more comprehensive understanding of security around the world, an emerging analytical challenge entails balancing the broad picture of security challenges and identifying a hierarchy of priorities in the regional agendas to allow the development of instruments to prevent or ameliorate potential and current sources of disruption to stability and peace. With its particular focus on Latin America, this chapter highlights the disparities between a variety of security risks and threats, on the one hand, and the lack of instruments at different political levels of aggregation (national, bilateral, regional and hemispheric) to address them in an effective way, on the other. Based on this premise, it is argued that the main security concerns in the region are largely driven by domestic (public security, for example) rather than regional (nuclear equilibrium) or global (terrorism) sources of threat. Hence, the domestic nature of insecurity and the lack of a shared regional perception of threat inhibit deepening cooperation; and in areas where mechanisms of security governance are already in place, they tend to remain modest, incipient and often rhetorical in character.

The chapter develops the argument across three sections. After outlining the characteristics of power shifts in Latin America, the first section argues that power shifts in the region have operated not only at the hemispheric level with the relative declining presence of the United States and the emergence of Brazil, but also at the level of individual states when countries have experienced a domestic fragmentation of power, leading to new challenges produced by criminal organizations. The second section characterizes security governance in Latin America, arguing that spatial issues have to be taken into account when identifying the nature of threats. It is suggested that solely a regional (rather than the global) perspective is not enough: The region must be further disaggregated in order to locate the sources of threats and risks. The next step, then, is finding the appropriate instruments to counter those diverse security

challenges. Focusing on the correlation between geographical reach and policy instruments (Oelsner 2014), the third section examines the main sources of security threats in the region (intra-state, inter-state and trans-national), and the security instruments to address them from the perspective of four political levels of aggregation (hemispheric, regional, bilateral and domestic); furthermore, it contends that the capacity of these instruments varies depending on the centrality of the main actors (states or regional organizations) and the strength of security mechanisms (that is, their legal capacity and the resources allocated).

REGIONAL POWER SHIFT IN LATIN AMERICA

One of the main characteristics of the post-Cold War world is the transformation in the relative power of states around the world. The multi-polar, multi-centric or poly-centric world has been in the making for more than four decades and taken more defined shapes in the past 25 years (Vasconcelos 2012). The current architecture of the international system is the result of the simultaneous process of the relative decline of the United States and Europe, on the one hand, against the increasing role of several countries around the world, on the other. While most scholars acknowledge the ‘rise of the rest’ (Zakaria 2008), numerous inquiries have been posed with regard to the consequences of this new architecture and the changing interactions among its actors in the area of global and regional security governance. Extensive literature has been devoted to study the role of several prominent countries in the international system. A variety of acronyms (BRICS and MIST)¹ and concepts such as regional, middle or emerging powers have been coined to describe the steady changes in the increasing role of countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and Turkey, among others. From the perspective of security studies, concepts such as global swing states (Fontaine and Kliman 2013) or pivotal states (Chase et al. 1998) have been developed to explain how these and other countries play a relevant role in providing regional and in some cases global security.

The power shift in Latin America has been largely explained by the disengagement of the United States. Buzan and Weaver (2003) have argued that security among Latin American countries remained almost off the regional agenda because of domestic vulnerabilities, weak inter-state dynamics and regular interventions by the United States. The post-Cold War world opened up an opportunity to lessen domestic vulnerabilities with

several countries moving away from authoritarian regimes to more inclusive and democratic ones. Likewise, as more robust inter-state dynamics started taking place among Latin American countries and there was a revival of economic regionalism, the general definition of US interests shifted from security to economic issues.

The role of Latin America in the overarching US foreign policy agenda remains relatively modest in comparison to the instability in the Middle East, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the military balance of power in Southeast Asia. Against this background, the US disengagement from Latin America is more nuanced when the relationship with individual countries is analyzed. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba contrasts with the increasing tensions between the United States and Venezuela. Another example is the US war on terror, which brought up disagreements not only between the United States and the region, but also among Latin American countries, particularly with regard to the 2003 UN Security Council resolution endorsing the invasion of Iraq. Out of 34 Latin American and Caribbean countries, seven supported the war in light of their economic or military links with the United States: six countries (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Panama) were engaged in trade negotiations with the United States at the time of the resolution and the seventh, Colombia, was receiving more than USD 600 million a year in US military aid (Hakim 2006).

While the role of the United States in Latin America has been quite significant in the definition of security governance from a regional perspective, power shifts have also taken place on a different level: within the state. The opening of political systems and the implementation of more inclusive political practices in Latin America have strengthened the vibrant role of civil societies, while also produced channels for further collaboration among transnational crime networks that often surpass the capacity of response of Latin American countries. In other words, while the increasing role of civil societies and political parties has underpinned the process of democratization in the region, some other forces, such as criminal organizations have taken control of areas where the state is fragile or absent, weakening the rule of law and fragmenting the capacity of states to provide security (Naím 2013). The main challenge of dealing with the negative consequences of this fragmentation of power is to resort to flexible mechanisms which not only increase the number of stakeholders, but also produce mechanisms of coordination able to deal with the changing

nature of security risks and threats. Governance approaches, as it will be explained below, provide a framework of analysis in such a direction.

REGIONAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE AND LATIN AMERICA

The concept of governance has been approached from different a broad array of perspectives over the past two decades. Most of the analytical frameworks have sought to provide mental maps to make sense of the variety of actors interacting at distinct levels of political organization in a globalized world. Woodward (2011) has grouped the merits of governance debates within three overarching frameworks. The first is *Multilevel Governance*, which concentrates on interrogating the dispersal of decision-making competences across different tiers of governments specifically focusing on the European Union. The second is *Trans-governmental Network*, an approach that argues that the building blocks of global governance are not the states but rather the ministries, regulatory agencies, executives and legislatures composed of political and bureaucratic linkages formed within and across sovereign borders (Slaughter 2004; Keohane and Nye 1974). The third is *Neo-medievalism*, which postulates that today's world resembles the crisscrossing and competing fiefdoms emblematic of medieval times, where in untidy boundaries and fissured loyalties are somehow jeopardizing sovereignty (Cerny 1998).

The three groups in Woodward's view emphasize different expressions of governance in the twenty-first century. Multilevel governance privileges the analysis of a diversity of areas of articulation of interest and decisions; trans-governmental networks the variety of actors; and neo-medievalism the forms of exercising sovereignty. The spatial dimension of governance also inextricably binds it to the concept of globalization, paving the way to the definition of global governance, which 'refers to the entirety of regulations put forward with reference to solving specific denationalized problems or providing transnational common goods. The entirety of regulations includes the processes by which norms, rules, and programs are monitored, enforced, and adapted, as well as the structures in which they work' (Zürn 2013: 408). Based on these initial premises, two variables of governance are significant for this chapter: nature of threats and spatial dimension.

The focus on the nature of threats constitutes a significant variable in the security governance analysis because it helps to understand that actors adopt a variety of strategies depending on the specific characteristic of

threats. The goals and means of individuals involved in guerrilla activities differ from groups conducting extremist terrorist actions or criminal activities. The inclusion of the nature of threats in the analysis will help to overcome limited categorizations of realist models and respond to what Christou and Croft (2011) as well as Lucarelli et al. (2013) have acknowledged as the ‘need to take the constructivist turn in security studies seriously in order to allow us to move beyond security as an objective phenomenon that is out there and can be measured or analyzed through linear or deductive methodology . . .’ (Lucarelli et al. 2013: 10). Along the same lines, Breslin and Croft (2012) coined the term ‘Comparative Regional Security Governance’ advocating the use of a comparative methodology that ‘is not dominated by a single theoretical frame but seeks to use a common frame for understanding regions, security and governance to map the modes in which security governance can be seen to operate in a variety of sites around the world’ (Breslin and Croft 2012: 2).

The spatial dimension of security governance provides an empirical base in which actors and practices converge within a geographical area. Changes at the end of the Cold War were conducive for promoting regional cooperation through regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) in the 1990s. High expectations were created in Latin America under the assumption that regional organizations are better equipped than global organizations to provide security, due to several reasons: members of an organization share the same cultural background; as the members of a regional organization are the ones who suffer more directly from the impacts of a conflict, they have a vital interest in preserving regional stability; regional organizations may offer a more timely response in times of crisis, compared to bureaucratic global organizations such as the United Nations; they enjoy more legitimacy and are better received; and regional management is also likely to be less costly and logistically easier to sustain (Tavares 2010).

While all these rationales of action explain the viability of regional organizations, theorizing or developing policies under the premises of regional governance in Latin America remains problematic, particularly focusing exclusively on the role of regional organizations. In contrast to the European Union, security governance as a theoretical device and political practice remains underdeveloped in Latin America. Five reasons have influenced the slow advancement of security governance in the region. First, the dominant security agenda in Latin America was developed around

domestic sources of instability and the role of the military in policy-making, which produced an extensive literature on civil-military relations and inhibited innovative forms of security cooperation beyond the context of the military area. Second, though Latin America is considered one of the regions in the world with the lowest degree of inter-state conflict, 'old geopolitical tensions persist, and domestic authorities often look at their neighbors as if they were potential enemies, demonstrating a traditional realist approach' (Diamint 2004: 46). Third, the OAS has had a modest impact in forging security governance in the region. As indicated by Chanona (2011), the OAS has expanded its security agenda in a variety of areas through numerous agreements, but its influence in the region is limited due to the skeptical perceptions held by several Latin American countries of the OAS as an instrument of the United States. Fourth, defense budgets in the region not only remain limited, but also are mostly focused on domestic issues relegating regional and international military cooperation. Finally, security cooperation among Latin American countries is often limited and lacks long-term sustainability, because agreements, meetings and summits are viewed as personal commitments instead of state policy (changing when a new political party takes office).

That incentives to develop overarching mechanisms of security governance in Latin America have remained weak is also attributable to the fact that the effects of risks and threats vary from region to region within Latin America. The incentives for developing institutions to create and preserve collective goods vary accordingly. For instance, the phenomenon of drug trafficking affects the national governments of Central America more pervasively than the US states of Colorado or Alabama. Focusing not only on the diverse nature of threats, but also on different levels of aggregation can enhance the explanatory power of regional governance. Thus, the region has developed sub-regional forms of cooperation that privilege territorial proximity or alliances with dominant security actors, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) or the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) in the early twenty-first century.

The logic of territorial proximity, as Buzan and Wæver (2003) explain in their Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), reveals how security concerns are clustered in geographically shaped regions. The RSCT offers the possibility of identifying specific threats and evaluating the obstacles or likelihood of cooperation in order to mitigate factors producing instability. From the perspective of regional security governance, the premises of

the RSCT constitute the first step to understanding that the security of one state may affect the security of the other actors in the same region depending on the depth of their interdependence. In this regard, Buzan and Wæver mapped two RSCs in the Americas, namely, North America and South America. North America ‘became centered early (by the 1860s) and supported a great power (and later superpower) role for the United States’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 340). Within the North American security complex, Central America is considered a sub-complex secondary to the core of the North American RSC. South America, inversely, has increasingly developed into two sub-complexes with contradictory trends. The Southern Cone has taken the route to stability and reinforced the role of Brazil as the main leader of security based on three key developments: (a) rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil; (b) regional integration in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and (c) resolution of border questions (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Oelsner 2014). The second sub-complex is located in the Andean part of the subcontinent in which security is increasingly structured by the drug issue, US involvement (Colombia) vs. US rejection (Venezuela), and domestic instability that keeps border conflicts latent.

THREATS AND INSTRUMENTS OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Based on the scholarly work described above, this section presents an overview of the security threats in the region and the main instruments of security governance on four levels of aggregation. The assumption of ‘governance *with* governments’ is significant to understand the dynamic of security governance in Latin America. Rather than adopting a model of governance that reduces security interactions to a single logic (for instance, regional organizations), it is more beneficial to examine the region as constellations of security arrangements entailing variations in perceptions of threats, involvement of actors and development of governance instruments (Oelsner 2014).

The rationale of privileging a plurality of security agendas in the region is based on the premise that there is neither an overarching threat nor an international actor shaping the agendas in the region homogenously. In other words, there is a plurality of interpretations for conceiving threats and engaging in collective forms of action. Drawing on the analysis of

Brousseau and Dedeurwaerdere (2012) about public goods, this chapter argues that the sense of belonging to a community (Latin America) is only the first step in the production of a collective good (security governance). It is crucial to recognize the existence of a given public or collective good, accept the legitimacy of constraints placed on each individual state by the group and assume the costs and benefits in the implementation for the production of common good. Hence, from the perspective of this chapter, a regional security agenda in Latin America entails a cohabitation of numerous regional agendas and is explained by the differentiated sources of the threats as well as the willingness of member states to deal with them either through individual or collective mechanisms.

Threats in Latin America

One of the main challenges in managing global and regional security threats is the gap between the Westphalian (to some extent static) conception of sovereignty, on the one hand, and the demand for collective governance of threats, on the other. The former often shields the legitimacy of the state as an ‘independent’ entity for providing security to its citizens and hardly finds incentives to cooperate with other actors; the latter results from the proliferation of threats emerging beyond territorial borders that escape the control of one state. The challenge of security governance as a theoretical device or policy-making approach is finding a balance between the Westphalian view and the demand for mechanisms of regional governance. From this perspective, the sources of threats can be understood based on the levels of exclusiveness of the state to deal with them: the state is legally and territorially empowered to manage all security threats occurring within its borders and its capacity to do so dissipates when the sources of such threats involve actors or dynamics beyond its borders. This chapter maps the sources of threats in three different categories, intra-state, inter-state and transnational, each entailing different capacities of states to manage them and a different demand for cooperation with other actors to deal with them.

The first category includes domestic or intra-state threats such as *coups d'état*, guerrillas, political polarization and inequality. While international conditions may be conducive to agitate or ameliorate domestic instability, intra-state threats have been largely explained as a result of the lack of state capacity to provide core functions such as regular elections, rule of law and development, *inter alia*. Since the end of the Cold War, Latin America has

experienced situations of political instability leading to severe institutional crisis – attempts, not always successful, to remove heads of state, and in some cases *coups d'état*. Examples include Ecuador (2000, 2005 and 2010), Haiti (1991 and 2004), Venezuela (1992, 2002 and 2016), Argentina (1990), Panama (1990), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993) and Honduras (2009) (Powell 2015).

With regard to non-state armed groups, some of them decided to disarm in the context of the wave of democratization at the end of the Cold War, others reduced their activity in the course of the 1990s, and some others continue their struggles, often in association with organized crime. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the most active groups are in Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Ecuador. Another domestic source of threat is inequality and the exclusion of social groups. On the one hand, Latin America remains the continent with the highest inequality rate (GINI coefficient) in the world, despite modest improvements in the past decade (Velasco 2015).² On the other hand, in spite of economic growth in several countries, indigenous groups are still relegated to societal margins; their situation is even more acute in those countries where indigenous groups went through civil wars and the rule of law is still defectively implemented (Elías 2012). Based on the *Conflict Barometer* 2014 (HIIK 2015), Table 1 presents the main internal conflicts in Latin America (due to its transnational nature; drug trafficking is included in Table 2).

Another dimension of intra-state conflict is domestic organized crime. This threat is to some extent the summation of the contradictions and disruptions produced by inequality, weak rule of law, social exclusion and transnational and local organized crime. In comparison to other developing countries, Latin America faces acute problems with regard to violence. While homicide rates have been decreasing in most of the world, Latin American countries are the exception, possibly only accompanied by some sub-regions of Africa. In the period 2000–2012, eight Latin American countries ranked among the top 20 countries with the highest reported homicide rates in the world. For instance, Honduras has one of the highest murder rates in the world, at 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012, in comparison with the rate in United States, which stands at 4.7 per 100,000 (UNODC 2013).

The second category of conflicts is focused on inter-state disputes (Mares 2012). While the prospects of a major war between Latin American countries are distant, some tensions remain with regard to unresolved disputes. Examples of the salient border and territorial disputes

Table 1 Internal conflicts in Latin America, 2014

<i>Country</i>	<i>Conflict parties</i>	<i>Intensity</i>
Bolivia	Coca farmers, police officers, FENCOMIN vs. Government	3
Brazil	MST, MTST vs. Government	3
	Indigenous vs. Government	3
Chile	Rapa Nui vs. government	1
	Mapuche groups vs. government	3
	Anarchist groups vs. Government	3
Colombia	ELN vs. government	3
	FARC vs. Government	4
	Indigenous groups vs. Government	3
Ecuador	Opposition vs. Government	3
Guatemala	Opposition vs. Government	3
Haiti	Opposition vs. Government	2
Honduras	Land owners vs. Farmers	3
	Anti-government activist vs. Government	3
Mexico	EPR vs. Government	1
	EZLN vs. government	3
	Opposition vs. government	2
	CNTE et al. vs. government	3
Nicaragua	Various opposition groups vs. government	3
Panama	Opposition vs. Government	1
Paraguay	Farmer organizations/EPP vs. Government	3
Peru	Shining Path vs. government	3
	Opposition vs. government	3
Venezuela	Opposition vs. Government	3

Source: Compiled from Conflict Barometer 2014 (HIIK 2015)

Intensity: 5 = War; 4 = Severe crisis; 3 = Crisis; 2 = Manifest; 1 = Latent

in the region include Argentina and the United Kingdom (Falkland Islands) or Colombia and Nicaragua (offshore oil exploration sectors in disputed Caribbean waters). While some of those conflicts (listed in [Table 3](#)) are dormant or latent and eventually might escalate beyond mere tension, there is no evidence of a major severe inter-state crisis or war emerging in the near future.

The third source of threat to the states in region is transnational organized crime. Violence produced by drug trafficking organizations affects local communities, but the international link between supply and demand is the main incentive in the development of criminal activities encompassing drug or human trafficking. These are the cases of drug cartels (Tijuana, Sinaloa) and gangs (Maras and Zetas). Central

Table 2 Transnational conflicts in Latin America, 2014

<i>Country</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>Intensity</i>
Brazil	Drug trafficking	3
Colombia	Drug trafficking	4
Guatemala	Drug trafficking	3
El Salvador	Gangs (Maras)/Drugs	3
Honduras	Drug trafficking	3
Jamaica	Drug gangs	3
Mexico	Drug cartels	5

Source: Compiled from Conflict Barometer 2014 (HIIK 2015)

Intensity: 5 = War; 4 = Severe crisis; 3 = Crisis; 2 = Manifest; 1 = Latent

Table 3 Inter-state conflicts in Latin America, 2014

<i>Country</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>Intensity</i>
Argentina-UK	Falkland Islands	2
Bolivia-Chile	Access to sea	1
Dominican Rep. vs. Haiti	Border-migration	1
Guatemala vs. Belize	Territory	3
Nicaragua vs. Colombia	Sea border	2
Nicaragua vs. Costa Rica	Rio San Juan	1
Peru vs. Chile	Territory	1
Chile vs. UK	Antarctica	1
USA vs. Mexico	Border security	3
USA vs. Venezuela	System	2
USA vs. Cuba	Guantanamo	1
Venezuela vs. Colombia	Monjes Islands	1

Source: Compiled from Conflict Barometer 2014 (HIIK 2015)

Intensity: 5 = War; 4 = Severe crisis; 3 = Crisis; 2 = Manifest; 1 = Latent

America has registered significant economic, political and social transformations in recent years, but these achievements have mostly been eclipsed by the deterioration in security conditions. Together with Guatemala and El Salvador, Honduras forms part of the so-called Northern Triangle, a doorway of cocaine into Mexico, as well as an area of expansion for Mexican cartels. On the other hand, in El Salvador, a country of 6 million inhabitants, there are estimates of 30,000 gang members, who are part of the legacies of domestic armed conflict and establish transnational contacts with US-based

gangs or organized crime in Mexico (an element of which is increased deportation from the United States back to El Salvador) (Shifter 2011).

Instruments of Security Governance

Latin American countries have developed numerous instruments of security cooperation, which involve a variety of actors, institutions and resources. This chapter combines two dimensions to map security governance instruments in the region: centrality of the main actor (states or regional organizations) and the strength of governance mechanisms (legal status and resources). With regard to the centrality of the main actor in the governance process, the overall assessment is that security governance in Latin America remains strongly determined by states, but other actors such as international organizations or processes of bilateral cooperation play an important role as well – although in comparison to regional security governance in Europe where the European Union is a significant actor in the policy-making process, regional organizations in Latin America remain secondary players. Hence, security governance in Latin America is developed and based on the combination of a variety of forms of articulation of actors that aggregate their efforts at different levels. In this regard, the centrality of actors varies in accordance with the levels of aggregation whether it be hemispheric (OAS), regional (UNASUR, SICA, for example), bilateral/trilateral (Plan Colombia or Merida Initiative) or domestic (internal security policies).

The second dimension, which complements the centrality of the main actor, is the strength of the governance mechanisms. One of the main limitations in the study of regional security governance in Latin America is an exclusive focus on regional organizations as the main driving force for providing security. In contrast to European regional institutional thickness, most regional organizations in Latin America merely provide indicative and normative mechanism of security. A great number of security instruments of UNASUR or the OAS are non-binding, and only in some cases binding agreements create a framework for cooperation and monitoring practices in multiple of areas of security. But even then, UNASUR or the OAS do not – or barely – provide human, economic and military resources for addressing immediate threats. It is at the bilateral/trilateral and domestic levels of policy-making where the instruments of governance are most empowered with resources and mandates to address the main risks and threats in the region. Against this background, observing

different levels of cooperation allows capturing the spatial dimension of governance: In some cases states can manage security threats by means of a domestic or bilateral approach, while in others they opt for sub-regional or hemispheric mechanisms.

At the hemispheric level of aggregation the OAS is the most significant actor. Despite the comparative advantage of regional organizations over the UN, the OAS has partially been effective to fill in the space for the coordination of collective actions to provide security, particularly from two different angles. First, from a collective defense system perspective, for several decades OAS attempts to enhance cooperation were disproportionately influenced by the membership of the United States, which produced distrust among members. For almost half a century, the region was immersed in a politico-security regime based on anti-communist ideology designed to curtail any further expansion of the Soviet bloc, which was formalized by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, commonly known as the Rio Treaty or TIAR (Rojas Aravena 1994). While in 2001 the United States invoked the Rio Treaty after the 9/11 attacks, Mexico formally withdrew from the treaty the following year. Second, from a broader perspective of security, OAS members have responded to the changing matrix of threats by adapting the OAS agenda and implementing significant normative innovations and operational activities (Herz 2011; Weiffen 2012). In fact, the 2003 OAS Declaration on Security encompassed issues such as cyber-crime, human trafficking or climate change as part of the regional agenda (Marcella 2013). Yet, in spite of the diversification of its agenda, the OAS still has to develop a coherent project alongside more focused sub-regional organizations such as UNASUR (Weiffen et al. 2013).

Beyond the definition of security challenges, the OAS has played a role in providing a framework for diplomatic dialogue in cases of promotion of transparency and protection of democracy. Based on the 'Guidelines on Developing National Defense Policy and Doctrine Papers' adopted in 2002, the OAS has helped to improve the levels of transparency in military spending in the recent years, but far more efforts are necessary to provide greater openness and accountability on the use of off-budget funding as well as on clarifying data on military pensions and levels of disaggregation of budget, among others (Bromley and Solmirano 2012). Particularly important for purposes of transparency is the use of extra-budgetary funding for military operations and/or acquisitions. Some countries have used those sources for historical reasons (Chile), while for others the

establishment of additional funding provides a convenient means of tapping into newly developed sources of revenue such as commodity export earnings (Peru, Bolivia, Honduras) (IISS 2015).³

Another area where OAS normative power is displayed to encourage better governance practices is the protection of democracy. In addition to monitoring elections since 1962, the OAS has actively reacted to institutional political crises in accordance with the 1991 General Assembly Resolution 1080. This resolution empowers the Secretary General to call a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council if there is any sudden or irregular interruption of the domestic political institutional process. Member states went farther in 1992 when they adopted an amendment to the OAS Charter allowing the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote to suspend any member whose democratically constituted government had been overthrown by force. This amendment, known as Washington Protocol, went into effect in 1997. While the OAS has invoked Resolution 1080 in several cases, it is counter-intuitively to give exclusive credit to the OAS as the only influence in providing stability in cases of political crisis. It is more accurate to argue that OAS influence runs parallel to other domestic and international forces working simultaneously to preserve democracy and stability. 'In fact, the most important OAS influence is likely to occur by encouraging and supporting other international and domestic actors' (Hawkins 2008: 377). The most recent instrument for strengthening democracy is the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was invoked during the constitutional crises in Venezuela (2002) and Honduras (2009).⁴

Regional organizations are the main actors on the regional level of aggregation. As a result of the hemispheric institutional vacuum, Latin American countries are increasingly looking for solutions among themselves, forming their own regional organizations that exclude the United States. From this perspective, regional security approaches can be more effective because they 'take into account the particular and differing circumstances of each group of nations, as well as the potential for varied partnerships with like-minded groups of northern nations' (Braveboy-Wagner 2009: 8). In 2008, Brazil spearheaded the creation of UNASUR, which, in the view of Crandall (2011), seeks to replace the OAS as the default regional body in South America. UNASUR started moving forward with the creation of several institutions to address a comprehensive conception of security. The most relevant one is UNASUR's South American Defense Council (CDS), which has launched several initiatives, including the South American School of Defense, which

was opened in Quito in April 2015; the development of a joint multi-role training aircraft (UNASUR I or IA-73), in which Argentina's Aircraft Factory (FAdeA) is leading the project and other UNASUR countries have offered assembling different parts; and the KC-390 military transport aircraft under development by Brazilian aerospace manufacturer Embraer, which concluded its critical design review in 2013 (IISS 2014).

In cases of domestic crisis, such as different modalities of *coups d'état*, UNASUR's mechanisms of governance have been activated. Fernando Lugo was removed from office following the decision of the majority in the Paraguayan parliament in June 2012. The reaction of regional and hemispheric actors was diverse in the aftermath of the crisis and entailed different approaches to mitigate the crisis. From the bilateral angle, Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela withdrew their ambassadors, while Chile called its ambassador for consultation; Argentina and Venezuela called the crisis a *coup d'état*; Venezuela suspended the delivery of 7,500 oil barrels per day to Paraguay, and Ecuador called for UNASUR to suspend Paraguay under the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty. Once the crisis was elevated to the regional level, all other 11 UNASUR members removed their ambassadors from Paraguay, and suspended Paraguay from the organization based on the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR. The then-Secretary General of the UNASUR, Alí Rodríguez Araque, affirmed that there was a parliamentary *coup d'état*. MERCOSUR, on the basis of its 1998 Ushuaia Protocol, equally suspended Paraguay but avoided economic sanctions since they would have produced unnecessary harm to Paraguayan people. The OAS took a more passive approach: it rejected a suspension of Paraguay, but created an observatory commission to follow the case until the new elections in 2013 (Weiffen et al. 2013).

At the same time, ALBA has lagged behind in the development of security mechanisms and its role as regional actor has declined in recent years, particularly after the death of Hugo Chavez. Beyond ALBA, the US relationship with most of the ALBA members is characterized by disagreements and tends to be polarized with regard to security debates in the region and cooperation. For instance, US ambassadors have been expelled from Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia in the past few years.

In Central America, the Central American Integration System (SICA) has also included security in its agenda. SICA announced new initiatives, mostly supported by external donors such as the United Nations, the European Union and the United States, for improving security coordination. In 2013, SICA signed the Regional Accord on Border Security to

coordinate security initiatives and draft joint border security plans. Likewise, in order to limit small arms proliferation, cooperation has continued through the SICA/UNDP Central American Program on Small Arms Control. Another ongoing initiative coordinated with SICA is the US Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which allocated USD 162 million for the Fiscal Year 2014 (IISS 2014). SICA also announced in 2014 its integration into the database of Ameripol, the hemispheric police-cooperation mechanism (IISS 2015).

The bilateral level of aggregation is mostly focused on attempts by two states to manage specific security risks and threats. When security governance is observed from this angle, the role of the United States is significant as a provider of security. The United States is the largest provider of foreign military aid (FMA) to states in Latin America, which comes in the form of arms transfers, military education and training, support for peace operations, as well as counternarcotic, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, demining and other related programs (Bromley and Solmirano 2012). In order to deal with the transnational threat of drug trafficking, the implementation of bilateral mechanisms between the United States and individual Latin American countries or sub-regions is emblematic of this area of governance.

One emblematic mechanism is Plan Colombia. In 1999, the US government presented the Pastrana administration with an unprecedented USD 1.3 billion aid package that consisted primarily of military-related armaments intended to assist the Colombian government in rolling back the gains made by the guerrillas and drug traffickers during the previous years. As President Pastrana's efforts to negotiate peace with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) collapsed, the Bush administration shifted Plan Colombia policy to focus more heavily on counterinsurgency and narcoterrorism as another primary focus of US policies with regard to Colombia (Crandall 2008). In Latin America, Colombia has been the largest recipient of US military aid via Plan Colombia, which received over USD 6 billion between 2000 and 2008.

The second emblematic program is the Merida Initiative between the United States and Mexico/Central America. As a result of the violence produced by the war against the drug cartels under the administration of President Felipe Calderon (2006–2012), the United States has provided military aid through the Merida Initiative, which relative to Plan Colombia is quite limited in the type of assistance and resources allocated. Some of the recent military acquisitions in Central America and Mexico have

been supported by Washington, under the Merida Initiative, and include, for instance, a US government donation of 74 light-armored Four-by-Fours to Central American countries and training of police forces (IISS 2015).

There are additional mechanisms of cooperation at the bilateral level between the United States and Central America, such as the Joint Maritime Agreement US-Costa Rica, in which the US military, with some 46 warships and 7,000 troops off the coast, has been granted permission to enter the country should the need arise. Another mechanism is the assistance through CARSI, which supports law enforcement and judicial institutions in the region as well as an array of social and economic programs. Also, Operation Martillo is spearheaded by the US Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS) and aims to weaken the capabilities of criminal groups operating along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts (IISS 2014).

Bilateral cooperation also takes place between Latin American countries. Colombia and Peru have cooperated to implement coastal operations as part of measures against the FARC and Shining Path guerrilla groups. In the border area between Peru and Brazil, both countries have developed surveillance mechanisms around the System for the Surveillance of the Amazon (SIVAM). To enhance its monitoring capacity, in 2014 Peru bought four land-based air-surveillance radars and awarded a USD 203 million contract to Airbus to build the country's first earth observation satellite (IISS 2015).

Security governance also includes a domestic level of aggregation, in which the state is in the driving seat of security even when it is the recipient of external aid. A comprehensive security governance approach incorporates issues from poverty reduction to preservation of ecosystems in the medium and long term. However, in the immediate or short term, decreasing criminality that has already produced numerous casualties in Latin America is one of the top priorities for several countries in the region. From this perspective, two policies have been at the forefront of the domestic security agendas: reforming police institutions and increasing the capacity of law enforcement bodies to combat the lethal power of organized crime.

In addition to the human cost, Ungar (2011) has indicated that citizen insecurity and weak implementation of rule of law undermine democracy in Latin America, which is why police reforms are integral to improve security. The main challenge in the long run is to create and consolidate national police bodies accountable to the law, detached from unconditional

allegiance to authoritarian regimes and focused on citizens as the main priority (Mota Prado et al. 2012). After several years of increasing bloodshed in the war against organized crime, Mexico and Central America have reformed their police forces (professionalization and accountability) and included a military component in the creation of new units. Mexico promised a new approach with more emphasis on social and economic policies in 2012 and launched the National Gendarmerie in 2014, which was endowed with an initial force of 5,000 personnel. However, there are still questions regarding the extent to which the new force is an improvement on its predecessors. Also in 2014, Honduras created two new security agencies dedicated to the fight against criminal groups: the Public Order Military Police (PMOP), which deployed 2,000 members; and the Intelligence Troops and Special Security Response Teams (TIGRES), which deployed 1,000 personnel (IISS 2015). In Guatemala, the Task Force Tecun Uman (250–750 members) has focused on illicit activities on the border, particularly with Honduras (IISS 2014). In South America, Peru more than doubled the budget for security investment in the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro river valleys (VRAEM) in 2013 and the navy boosted its riverine capabilities with a second patrol craft and four additional hover crafts (IISS 2014). In order to combat criminal and guerrilla networks, the Colombian air force established the seventh Air Combat Command (CACOM-7) and the Naval Force East in 2013 (IISS 2014).

High levels of criminal activity have also demanded strengthening the military capacity of several countries in Latin America, which poses a new dilemma to security governance in the region: on the one hand, the militarization of public security has been an immediate and short term remedy to lower the levels of criminal activity; on the other, the continuous role of the military as provider of public security may be detrimental for countries where democracy remain weak or vulnerable. Responding to the former premise of implementing the militarization as part of the short term solution, military expenditure has increased in the region since 2005: in Central America by about 90 percent and in South America by about 48 percent. Among the 15 top countries with the highest military expenditures, Brazil is the only Latin American country, which was ranked number 11 and spent USD 31.7 billion in 2014. While the economic slowdown of the Brazilian economy has also slightly reduced the military expenditure in the recent years, Brazil's spending is still 41 percent higher than in 2005. This general trend represents Brazil's military modernization program, which includes the signing of a contract in 2014 to purchase

36 combat aircrafts from Sweden for USD 5.8 billion. Meanwhile, Mexico's military expenditure has doubled since 2005 as Mexico continues to use its armed forces, regular police and gendarmerie in its actions against drug cartels (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2015). On the other hand, the share of military expenditure as percentage of GDP has remained relatively modest in the region reaching an average of 1.47 percent in 2009, 1.26 in 2011 and 1.28 in 2014 (IISS 2015).

CONCLUSION

Globalization has opened avenues to emerging actors for improving living standards of Latin American societies, but also to disruptive forces that have taken advantage of the weaknesses of the states in the region. As indicated in this chapter, the main effect of the redistribution of global power on Latin America has been the retrenchment of the United States from the region, coupled simultaneously with a fragmentation of power within the states in the region. In light of these power shifts and the capacity of institutions to address security challenges, the adoption of security governance as a theoretical device and policy-making model contributes to the exploration of the challenging gap between the various security risks and the lack of instruments at different levels of aggregation to address them in an effective way.

The diagnosis about the object study of governance seems to be uncontroversial: 'multiple, overlapping, and at times, even contradictory systems of governance operating in different issue domains across the globe today' (Biersteker 2011: 9). A more complex challenge is to determine how political actors, from global organizations to sub-state groups, articulate their perceptions, priorities and commitment to work together to produce a collective good. The study of security governance in Latin America needs to adopt the theoretical innovation that has taken place in Europe, but also adapt it to the specific circumstances of the region. Similar to other regions in the global south, Latin America continues to be sovereignty-guarding and to view regionalism as an adjunct to nationalist policies, and 'much of institutional change in the south is driven by the need to survive in a system in which it is northern countries that are most capable of molding matters to suit their interests' (Braveboy-Wagner 2009: 212). In sum, several historical and contextual factors continue preventing the creation of incentives for enhancing institutionalized forms of security

governance in Latin America: states still perceive regional and international security risks to be of low intensity; the great number of sources of conflicts are internal; and while the regional and hemispheric agendas have diversified the concept of security and implemented more collective actions, the effectiveness of these instruments remains limited.

NOTES

1. BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. MIST: Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey.
2. From 2000 to 2010, the GINI coefficient rose in rich countries from 29.8 to 30.4 and it fell in Latin America from 55.1 to 50.2, which made the continent still the world's most unequal region (Velasco 2015).
3. According to the IISS (2015), the oldest mechanism is Chile's 1958 copper law, which after several modifications now allocates 10 percent of the export revenues to purchases of military equipment. Established in 2005, Peru's National Defense Fund equally distributes part of the revenues from natural gas extraction of the Camisea Gas Project between the army, air force, navy and national police. Other cases include Bolivia and Honduras: Bolivia announced in August its plans to create a defense fund using income from an existing tax on hydrocarbons and Honduras introduced a security bill raising revenue from certain financial transactions.
4. The OAS expelled Honduras as a result of the crisis in 2009 based on Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

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Security Community or Balance of Power? Hybrid Security Governance in Latin America

Rafael Duarte Villa

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Latin American region is witnessing an unprecedented level of regional integration and cooperation that is all too evident even in the field of ‘high politics’ such as security and defense. A variety of bilateral and multilateral security initiatives – most prominently, the establishment of the South American Defense Council (*Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano*) under the umbrella of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) – points to elaborate schemes (even if rudimentary) of institutionalized security cooperation in the region. Some authors tend to view the developments in the Latin American region as tantamount to a loosely defined security community with dependable expectations of peaceful change (Hurrell 1998; Oelsner 2016). At the same time, in recent years, several Latin American countries have notably increased their military spending. Key regional actors such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela are engaging in armament and strategic partnerships with external powers, namely France, the United States, and Russia (Villa and Weiffen 2014). In the light of more than ten territorial border conflicts that remain unresolved in

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South and Central America, the ability of the currently existing institutionalized security cooperation to resolve the security dilemma in the region is hardly encouraging. Therefore, the deeply entrenched prevalence of national sovereignty has a greater propensity to generate conflict and bring into sharp relief the existing historical, ideological, and resource conflicts between neighboring states. This also shows that the idea of balancing and bandwagoning are still relevant concepts in understanding contemporary security relations among some Latin American countries.

Existing scholarship on Latin American security recognizes these different trajectories of interactions among states in the region. Yet, they tend to focus on one and err on the other side. In consequence, some scholars concentrate on the logic of balance of power and claim that it prevails over the idea of security community in the region. Others focus on aspects of institutionalized cooperation and explain that the logic of security community prevails over that of balance of power in the region. This chapter seeks to overcome this bifurcation and sets out to explain how security governance in the Latin American region is aptly described as an overlap of balance of power/conflict formation and security community discourses and practices. In this manner it follows the suggestion of Adler and Greve that 'it is theoretically and empirically promising to make the overlap a key subject of research *in its own right*. This means going beyond *acknowledging* overlap in principle; it means understanding and explaining overlap and inquiring into empirical consequences for regional security governance' (Adler and Greve 2009: 60, emphases in original). Therefore, this chapter converges on the idea that states still see military force as a crucial component in interstate relations that is beset with historical and territorial problems in the region (Villa and Weiffen 2014); yet at the same time, these states institutionalize diplomacy, norms, and interstate cooperation in order to maintain peace and create practices of security community among themselves. The puzzle is to account for the causes of this hybrid governance mechanism in the security governance practices of states in the region.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first section introduces the idea of overlapping mechanisms of balance of power and security community: It presents the general theoretical foundations and examines different and contending approaches from scholars that analyze the logic of security community and the logic of balance of power in the Latin American context. In the second section, the article presents empirical evidence for both mechanisms of governance. The objective in this section is to highlight the coexistence of security community and balance of power in concrete historical practices

among Latin American states. The third section discusses the main causal mechanisms that could explain the hybrid pattern of security governance. The chapter concludes with a brief exploration of avenues for further research.

THE OVERLAPPING MECHANISMS OF BALANCE OF POWER AND SECURITY COMMUNITY

Theoretical Foundations

Building on the seminal work of Karl Deutsch et al. (1957), Adler and Barnett (1998) conceptualize security communities as transnational regions comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain the expectation that the members of the community will not fight each other physically and will resolve any conflictive issues by peaceful means. A necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a security community is the absence of war among the states. Adler and Greve (2009: 71–2) specify five practices associated with a security community: dependable expectations of peaceful change based on the practice of self-restraint, that is, abstention from the use of force; consciousness of commonality in day-to-day practices; naturalization of cooperative security and diplomacy, that is, states institutionalize guarantees rather than deterrence; disposition toward socialization in communicative interactions; and implementation of specific confidence-building measures (such as military cooperation, planning and joint military exercises; exchange of information; review of military doctrines ranging from traditional war to post-conflict reconstruction, coordination policy, and border opening).

In turn, Adler and Greve (2009: 67) understand balance of power as a logic that ‘rests on the notion of the international system as being composed of competing centers of power that are arranged according to their relative capabilities and are, in the absence of an overarching authority, locked into the security dilemma which might generate prisoner-dilemma dynamics of arms races and wars’. They define bandwagoning as alignment with a rising power that presents a potential security threat (Adler and Greve 2009: 70) and endorse Schweller’s (1994) redefinition of bandwagoning: ‘Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain. The presence of a significant external threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to bandwagon’ (Schweller 1994: 74). While Adler and Greve’s research focuses on balance of power and security communities and not on bandwagoning, this chapter

introduces a conceptual variation of their dichotomy of balance of power and security community by also considering bandwagoning behavior among Latin American states' security practices and discourses.

In thinking about regional and international political order, Adler and Greve (2009) establish an important point of departure that offers a 'multi-perspectival' vision of security governance, focusing on mechanisms of balance of power and security community, each of which are based on a distinct set of practices. Specifically, they emphasize that both mechanisms might not be entirely mutually exclusive and can (and indeed do) coexist and overlap at the regional level. This represents an important theoretical contribution to the study of regional security orders that works with procrustean notions of security logics and cooperative dynamics traditionally divided between realists on the one hand and liberalists and constructivists on the other. By foregrounding the overlapping mechanisms, Adler and Greve open up the theoretical space to interrogate the practices that go with security governance.

Crucially, they offer four broad ways of thinking about the overlap of security mechanisms: (1) temporal/evolutionary; (2) functional; (3) spatial; and (4) relational. First, security mechanisms, such as balance of power and security community, can overlap across time, which is an evolutionary overlap where 'Old practices and mechanisms may still not have disappeared, but the future really has not entirely set in; new practices and mechanisms may still be experimented with, and may only be partly institutionalised' (2009: 73). Second, security mechanisms may vary across functional environment – that is, across sectors, bureaucracies, and issues areas. Functional overlap across domains impacts on the logics of balance of power or security community. It will be greater 'the more contested security governance systems and practices are' (2009: 77). This insight is intuitively plausible when, for example, the ministry of defense emphasizes the logic of balance of power in its foreign and security policy interactions whereas the ministry of external affairs concentrates on the logic of security community. This functional overlap might lead to contested security governance systems. Adler and Greve highlight that 'such functional overlap may be to some extent dependent on temporal overlap' (2009: 77).

Their third way of conceptualizing overlapping security orders is based on the spatial category. The spatial overlap between balance of power and security community mechanism is not new. The fact that different geographical regions exhibit different logics of security governance has received a

lot of theoretical and empirical attention (Buzan and Waever 2003). Finally, the fourth category to understand the overlap of security mechanisms is based on examining the security relations among actors.

All the above-mentioned types of overlap could be either automatic (that is, overlap occurs without being actually intended) or manual (that is, based on the implicit or explicit intentions of actors to practice balance of power or security community logics): ‘The agential/manual side can be expected to dominate at crucial junctures when an overall review of strategy is likely to take place, e.g. after major wars or in situations of perceived major change and (epistemic and ontological) uncertainty like after 11 September, 2001’ (Adler and Greve 2009: 80). In sum, those dimensions offer a preliminary hunch of the theoretical mechanisms that could explain why different logics of security order – predominantly balance of power and security community – overlap in regional security governance.

Latin American Perspectives

It is on the basis of these broad ideas that we can identify serious engagement of scholars with the idea of a security community as well as with the logics of balance of power in the region. Many analyses of security community in Latin America begin with a simple but powerful emphasis on the legalistic and multilaterally institutionalized interactions among policy-making elites in the region. On the one hand, regional order can be understood in the sense of stable and regular patterns of interactions with a shared understanding of peaceful resolution of conflicts, an emphasis on growth and development, and a unique Latin American identity. On the other hand, the existence of this pattern of institutionalized interactions that sustain dependable expectations of peaceful change is purposively and to some extent functionally geared to prevent great powers (predominantly the United States) from coercing states in the region with impunity. This is a beguilingly simple enumeration because, as we shall see, the logic of security community in the region overlaps with the logic of balance of power, which is often hard to disentangle.

Arie Kacowicz (1998, 2005) approaches the phenomenon of Latin America’s long peace with a norm-based system-level argument that is akin to the ordering principles of security community. He concentrates on a number of factors that lie at the heart of interstate interactions in the region: a strong legalistic and conciliatory culture, successful consolidation of nation states after a first post-independence period that in turn marked the

settlement of border wars, for example Paraguayan War (1864–1870) and the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), and the rise of independent states in the region. The consolidation of regional peace with the emergence of a tradition of peaceful resolution of disputes through the principle of *uti possidetis ita possideatis* promoted the shared vision of the organization of regional security governance (Kacowicz 2005; Tulchin, 2005).

Although the mechanism of security community in the region offers some ground for optimism, it is important to recognize the nuanced debates surrounding the idea and the main issues raised by its critics. Two important contentions within the analysis of security community stand out. The first concerns skepticism over the very conception of Latin America as a zone of peace. In its classic form scholars debate if the region can be considered a positive, negative, or a hybrid zone of peace (Holsti 1996; Merke 2011; Battaglini 2012). The second contention expands on the idea of a security community in Latin America and argues that the region rather is a partial security community (Buzan and Waever 2003; Domínguez 2007; Oelsner 2007, 2009).

In a direct challenge to the diagnosis of a security community, some scholars argue that Latin America is a pluralist international society sustained primarily by a regional balance of power and yet without the institutionalized elements of peaceful change toward a security community as established by its proponents (see Merke 2011). This scholarly intervention foregrounds the idea that in practice the situation is more complex. Merke offers a trenchant observation: ‘[M]any of the conflicts that remain today among states [in the Latin American region] are over territorial issues and natural resources, which means that, in some cases, security dilemmas are unresolved. Finally, the dark side of civil society – drugs, arms and people trafficking and organized crime – has become a real challenge for regional society’ (Merke 2011: 29). In this light ‘If Latin America is a zone of peace in terms of the absence of war between states, Latin America is [also] a very violent zone in terms of the presence of criminal gangs, guerrillas, drug traffickers and youth violence which makes it the most violent region on earth’ (Merke 2011: 15). In direct contrast to this idea of negative peace in the region, Holsti (1996: 179–80) argues that South America is better conceived as a region that is moving from a negative war zone to a zone of peace. Others such as Battaglini (2012) develop the notion of South America as a zone of hybrid peace that is ‘characterized by the simultaneous presence of: (1) unresolved disputes that may become militarized, yet without escalating to an intermediate

armed conflict or war; (2) democracies that maintain dense economic relations with their neighbor countries; and (3) regional norms and institutions (both old and new) that help to resolve disputes peacefully. The most relevant cases of hybrid peace in South America are Chile-Peru since 1990 and Colombia-Venezuela since 1991' (Battaglini 2012: 142).

As for the second perspective, the trend to identify partial or loose security communities in Latin America is related to the necessity to examine the functioning of security communities rather than offering a deductive proof of their unequivocal spread. These debates are a welcome caution against the all-too-optimistic assessment of the mechanism of security community in the region. The diagnosis of little propensity for conflict in the post-Cold War period seems to apply particularly well to the Southern Cone countries. Thus, the finding that a security community is developing in the region usually relates to the Southern Cone rather than to the Andean sub-region (Hurrell 1998; Villa 2007). Likewise, Buzan and Waever (2003) supported the idea that there are two differentiated security sub-systems in South America: one in the Andean countries, characterized by military competition and territorial conflicts, and one in the Southern Cone, characterized by the emergence of a security community. The distinction of sub-regions is reinforced by the stances taken by South American policy-makers who emphasize differentiated security priorities. In the Special Conference on Security of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 2003, 'the adopted solution – the concept of multidimensional security – barely hid the conceptual distance between, for example, the emphasis of Brazil and Argentina on poverty as a threat to security and more traditional concerns of Ecuador and Venezuela with state military threats' (Cepik 2005: 6–7). The same argument surfaces in the analysis of Monica Hirst (2003) for whom the two major developments in security and defense in South America at the beginning of the new millennium were the diversification of options and priorities for security and the differential patterns of evolution of the military in the Southern Cone and the Andean region. Similarly, for Domínguez (2007), the mechanism of pluralistic security community only exists in 'the southern part of South America'. According to him, the balance of power which played a central role since the nineteenth century ended in the 1990s and was replaced by a pluralistic security community. Therefore the elites of those states in the Southern Cone of South America built new interests and identities and internalized the norms thereby enabling the institutionalization of peaceful resolution of disputes (also see Oelsner 2007, 2009). The idea of security community thus appears variegated in the actual practices of agents in the region.

Obviously these debates show that the meaning of security community in Latin America remains contested and elastic. While its functioning has been evident, our understanding of its impact and scope has been debated enormously. Proponents have found ways to argue for a solidarist security community in the region built around legalistic traditions and norms of peaceful conflict resolution. However, as the discussion above has elaborated, the identification of security community as the only mode of security governance in the region might be mistaken not only because of its variegated spectrum but also because of its overlap with another important logic of regional order: the mechanism of balance of power.

A number of scholars look at the region through the lens of balance of power and security dilemma (Child 1989; Mello 1996; Rezende 2005; Mares 2001, 2012a, 2012b; Battaglini 2012). Yet, studies on the practices and discourses of balance of power in Latin America – as opposed to the analyses of security community – are fragmentary and limited in their conception of order and security governance. This is not due to the predominance of utopian ideas in the region, but due to the diversity of approaches to the very concept of balance of power. For proponents within the English School of international society, balance of power is one of the core concepts similar to international law, ‘Great Powers’, diplomacy, and war. In turn, the positivist conception of the logic sees the emergence and maintenance of balance of power in terms of material capabilities alone. Scholars publishing in Spanish and Portuguese language have a classical understanding of balance of power in the region that is generally ignored in the current debates (Battaglini 2010).

Some scholars discuss balance of power in the region but use the concept of ‘violent peace’ (Mares and Bernstein 1998; Mares 2001) or, as discussed above, elaborate on ‘zones of hybrid peace’ to accentuate the mechanism of balance of power in the region (Battaglini 2012). There is an emphasis on (low-intensity) war that could create an adversarial balancing or bandwagoning actions among states in the region. David Mares (2012a, b) in a challenge to the diagnosis of Latin America as a ‘zone of peace’ points out the various sources of tensions: border disputes, illegal trade, drugs and the power of organized crime, conflict over ideology, and energy and natural resources. It is unclear if Mares derives logics of balancing among states as a result of these tensions; yet, he regards specific practices that undergird balancing, such as rational mistrust of other states, as characteristic feature of political relations between Latin American

countries. This multifarious engagement with the concept of balancing and bandwagoning in the region reflects the same diversity that is currently existent in the larger International Relations literature – as a policy, theoretical claim, empirical observation, and a normative prescription for the pursuit of security governance.

While it is important to theoretically acknowledge the overlap of the logics of balance of power and security community, it is also the onus of researchers to show its empirical manifestation. With regard to Latin America, research has to find evidence of the logics of balance of power and security community as practiced in the region and thereafter identify the main causal mechanisms explaining their overlap. In this manner, the deductive conceptualizations presented by Adler and Greve (2009) can be balanced through inductive inquiry, testing the implications of their theoretical categories by means of matching them with empirical reality. The following section explores how the logics of security community and balance of power work in Latin America.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF SECURITY COMMUNITY AND BALANCE OF POWER IN LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, we can delineate a repertoire of foreign and security policy practices that sustain the security community and balance of power mechanism. An empirical analysis of security communities mechanisms in the region is possible on the basis on the practices that Adler and Greve (2009: 71–2) identify: dependable expectations of peaceful change based on practice of self-restraint; consciousness of commonality in day-to-day practices; naturalization of cooperative security and diplomacy; disposition towards socialization in communicative interactions; and implementation of specific confidence building measures. A series of developments in the past 15 years of Latin American security governance points to the existence of mechanisms of security community.

First, Latin American states, particularly Brazil and Argentina which had active nuclear programs during the Cold War period, aligned their consciousness and shifted toward common enterprises, projects, and partnership into the day-to-day practice of peace in recent times (Oelsner 2009). Their decision and adherence to the denuclearization and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America through the Tlatelolco Treaty and their subsequent adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) is evidence of the characteristic feature of dependable expectations of peaceful change based on the practice of self-restraint among states in the region. Since 1991, the system of nuclear monitoring is regulated by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) that has institutionalized the norm of consultation on security issues in the region. This adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation regime is also a form of cooperative security that institutionalized reassurance rather than deterrence in the region.

Second, since the end of the Cold War, Latin American states have engaged in more specific confidence-building measures (CBM) (Tulchin et al. 1998). The growing cooperation and revision of traditional animosities between Chile and Argentina and Argentina and Brazil, respectively, are a case in point. Quite similar to the practice of diplomacy of advanced Western European states, the idea of militarized warfare between these erstwhile adversaries has, to some extent, become unthinkable in the diplomatic settings. The rules of mutual trust between Brazil and Argentina include the institutionalization of communication channels between the two presidents and senior officials (mimicking the European diplomatic habits), discussions about joint participation in peace missions, and the establishment of cooperation in the triple border area (Argentina – Brazil – Paraguay) in order to address aspects of drug trafficking, smuggling and terrorism. Joint actions from Brazil and Argentina have also included the development of the light combat vehicle (called ‘Gaucho’), which is in its final phase of operational evaluation in both countries before the start of production. Since 2002 the countries have forwarded reports on CBMs to the OAS, following General Assembly Resolution 2398 ‘Confidence- and Security-Building in the Americas’, adopted in 2008, which establishes the annual submission of reports on CBMs practiced by the countries of the hemisphere. This annual submission procedure institutionalizes the logic of sustained dialogue among states and is predicated on its efficacy. CBMs can take a bilateral or multilateral nature; in the latter case, they are carried out with the participation of military forces from more than two countries or through organizations like UNASUR in South America or the integration organizations in Central America.

Third, the mechanism of security community is manifest in the production of White Books on defense and security issues (Donadio and Tibiletti 2012). Countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Barrachina 2008), Brazil (D’Araujo 2012), and the Dominican Republic have engaged

in the preparation of a White Book as a way to intensify the sense of community and communicate the importance of security dialogue in the region (Barrachina 2008). The joint participation of Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Paraguay) in United Nations peace-keeping operations (UNPKO) in Haiti undergirds the participatory security community mechanism in the region.

At the same time, we can delineate a repertoire of foreign and security policy practices that sustain or potentially lead to balancing and bandwagoning. First, the presence of unresolved disputes could create adversarial balancing or bandwagoning actions among states in the region. The deeply rooted conflict patterns create implicit assumptions on the malign intentions of the ‘other’ that erode mutual understanding and might lead to unintended consequences. Currently, there are ten unresolved disputes involving at least one Latin American country: Argentina-United Kingdom; Bolivia-Brazil; Brazil-Uruguay; Bolivia-Chile; Colombia-Venezuela; Venezuela-Guyana; Colombia-Nicaragua; Costa Rica-Nicaragua; El Salvador-Honduras, and Belize-Guatemala (Taringa 2016). These unresolved disputes do not automatically lead to erstwhile European patterns of hard balancing and alliance formation. However, they could lead to habitual ascription of malign motives by actors and create – as Adler and Greve (2009: 68) put it – a fear of entrapment of being dragged into a war over interest of the ally that one does not share.

Second, since the post-Cold War period the fear that is triggered by the dynamics of sophisticated arms purchases by other countries in the region has not dissipated in search of liberal peace. Even the emergence of security communities has not contributed to the reduction of the security dilemma arising out of these increases in material capabilities. Particularly among countries that have a history of geopolitical and territorial rivalries (Colombia and Venezuela; Peru and Chile; Bolivia and Chile, Honduras and El Salvador, Colombia and Nicaragua), mutual suspicions are very common.

Third, the repeated occurrence of militarized interstate disputes potentially leads to balancing behavior among states and preparations based on ‘worst-case’ scenarios. David Mares recorded at least 17 militarized disputes between Latin American countries between 2005 and 2011, involving 13 countries from Central and South America (Mares 2012b; also see the chapter ‘The Zone of Violent Peace’).

Fourth, the impact of violent political and intrastate conflicts on regional borders (Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela)

along with ad hoc conflict management strategies regarding border issues, for example the paper industry conflict between Argentina and Uruguay in 2006, brings out into open issues that as matter of expediency could potentially lead to misunderstandings among actors and a loss of control over political balance in the security governance.

Fifth, there is an increasing frustration among smaller states in the region with powerful and hegemonic states like Brazil. In an attempt of ‘soft’ balancing, some of those small states have bandwagoned with Argentina and effectively challenged Brazil’s quest for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, for example. The members of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) have bandwagoned with Venezuela. In 2006 Bolivia and Venezuela signed a military agreement, stipulating that Bolivia, with Venezuelan technical assistance, would build 24 military bases in the Bolivian border with its neighboring non-ALBA countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Paraguay).

As these examples show, important elements of security governance in the region cannot be reduced to either of the analytical categories. It is important to acknowledge the overlap of multiple mechanisms – both the practices of security community and balancing and bandwagoning behavior. The very existence of militarized interstate disputes – as argued by Mares (2012b) – within the context of well-established principles of mutual trust, diplomacy, and international law – as argued by Kacowicz (2005) – illustrates the overlap of different mechanisms of regional security governance.

Firstly, there is a functional overlap. Although most military institutions adhere to the logic of balance of power and *realpolitik* view of regional security order, other parts of the policy-making bureaucracy in Latin American countries, particularly the diplomatic corps, have deeply internalized the logic of security community in their discursive practices (Flemes and Radseck 2012). With the increasing practical commitments of the bureaucracies to the maintenance of regional order – in the intervention in Haiti in 2004 for example – significant cohorts in military bureaucracy underwrite the logic of peaceful resolution of disputes and turn into proponents of an ‘internationalist grand strategy’ (Solingen 1998) in line with the logic of security community, as Mani (2011) has shown for the case of the Chilean military. The fact that much of the functional overlap has arguably not led to radical contestations on regional governance in the public realm is a testimony to the idea that self-restraint has become a dependable disposition in the region. The tradition of non-interference in

the internal affairs of other states and the consistent emphasis on multi-lateral solutions shows the limitations of the concept of adversarial balance of power mechanism.

Secondly, over time, there has been a greater adherence to diplomacy and international law – with the strong legalistic tradition in the region – that accounts for the temporal/evolutional overlap of the mechanisms. The resolution of interstate disputes in the region both through diplomatic channels and through the resort to international law is a reflection of this development (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007). At the same time, this overlap showcases the weakness of regional mechanisms of conflict resolution and thin institutionalization of security dialogue that are not able to avoid security dilemmas. The OAS's inability to resolve conflicts in Latin America and examples like the troubled functioning of the Binational Commission on borders between Colombia and Ecuador shows the fragility of the security community mechanism in the region.

It is important to also note that the overlap of factors driving and constraining militarization practices and perpetuation and dissipation of the security dilemma does not only result from divergent elite preferences, but also from a transformation of the entire Latin American region that shapes these preferences. In this sense the practices of balance of power can be used both for the purpose of non-traditional security goals and for efficient achievement of regional and global goals (Villa and Weiffen 2014). The current (re)emergence of Latin American countries, such as Brazil, with global aspirations is a new situation for many smaller states in the region. Furthermore, Brazil's identity as a regional power and its discourse to partake in multilateral global governance only reinforces the coexistence of balance of power (for its rising power ambitions) and security community (for its multilateral global governance ambitions) discourses and practices.

CAUSAL PROCESSES OF HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA

The discussion of the overlap of security community and balancing behavior in Latin America raises crucial questions about the causal processes in operation. Causality is understood here not as a cause-effect relation in positivist terms, but in the sense of causal processes. That said, causal factors to account for the hybridity of security governance are multiple and non-hierarchical.

This chapter identifies two sets of causal factors – domestic and regional (which, however, are closely interrelated) – to explain the hybrid governance system in the region.

First, security governance in Latin America was influenced by the democratization processes in countries such as Argentina and Brazil (Hurrell 1998; Villa 2007). The process of democratization provided Argentina and Brazil with a common vision of mutual interests and reshaped their identities and their sense of common purpose. Above all, both countries realized the vulnerability and fragility of the democratization process and the close link between conflict resolution abroad and democratic consolidation at home. Thus, bilateral cooperation on defense policies began to be a common shield against domestic threats to the democratization process – even when these threats were greater in Argentina, where the military movement of the ‘painted faces’ (*‘carapintadas’* in Spanish) tried to undermine the democratic institutions in the late 1980s. In this situation, the Brazilian government noted that the maturing of democracy in the country depended much on the fate of the Argentine democracy. Regional peace and democratic stability therefore became central to the management of civil-military relations at home (Hurrell 1998).

However, despite these positive influences of democratization on security cooperation, perceptions and practices of balance of power persisted and even countries with democratic governments selectively resorted to them when it suited their interest. During the Menem presidency, Argentina tried unsuccessfully to join NATO, but attained the status of ‘non-NATO ally’ of the United States. The initiative provoked suspicions in Brazil (Candeas 2005). During the past 20 years, perceptions about Brazil’s use of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) as a forum for power games and as an instrument for its own world political projects consolidated among Argentine decision makers. Even more, regarding the debate on a reform of the UN Security Council, the Argentine governments of the 1990s and the new century resorted to the traditional view that – despite the great geo-economic differences and relative power – there is a competition between Argentina and Brazil over the dominant position in the region and the claim to represent the region in the world (Bernal-Meza 2008: 165–6). In short, even though for both governments the democratization process was important for the emergence of a partial security community in the Southern Cone, the impact of democracy was not strong enough to completely ward off behavior and discourses of balance of power.

The second causal process for hybrid security governance is the growing division within domestic interest groups in all Latin American countries on issues of defense and security. Historically, domestic groups did not focus on questions of foreign and security policies and accepted the authority of the elites in their respective country to steer security governance. However, in recent times the monopoly of the state in security governance is increasingly questioned by several groups both within and outside the region. Particularly with the shift in the very meaning of security that includes minorities, ethnic groups, indigenous people among others, as well as issues of biosphere and environment, a wide range of domestic interest groups with active links with transnational civil society groups play a small but important role in regional security governance. This development spirals when some groups within the same country exhibit preferences for balancing behavior while others work towards institutionalized cooperation. In this context, a state's grand strategy remains essentially complex and difficult to disentangle. Solingen (1998) argues that policymakers in such situations also define their state's foreign relations in a complex and not in a homogeneous manner: they navigate between an 'internationalist grand strategy' where leaders prefer economic and security cooperation, and a 'national-statist grand strategy' where actors see more benefits in military competition.

The third cause is related to weak conflict resolution mechanisms in the region that perpetuate, to some extent, the overlap of security community and balancing behavior. This weakness might be due to the fact that great wars have been absent in Latin America for over 80 years. Therefore, much of the procedural and operational mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts remain implicit, governed by traditions, and largely conventional. However, in the face of the increase in low-intensity conflicts and weapons acquisition programs for the sake modernization of armaments in some states such as Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, the tradition of conventional and implicitly driven conflict resolution comes under heavy strain and struggles to deal with the security dilemma in the region.

The asynchrony in adopting confidence-building measures in Latin America reinforces this development. Looking at the external motives, traditional concerns such territorial disputes are still relevant, as exemplified by Chile's strained relations with Peru and Bolivia and the Venezuelan-Colombian rivalry. While CBMs have played a positive role in offsetting the negative impact of arms acquisitions on interstate

relations in the past 20 years, levels of adoption and application remain uneven, with participation in CBMs stronger in the Southern Cone than the Andean region (Bromley and Perdomo 2005).

The fourth causal process is the presence of transnational threats originating from non-state actors that inhibits both an exit from the balancing disposition and a significant drive towards the logics of security community. It is a commonplace in the security governance of Latin America that the region is beset with a wide range of threats relating to drug trafficking and criminality that triggers militarized solutions among elites. Of the total of 17 interstate militarized conflicts between 2005 and 2011 described by Mares (2012b), six were attributable to challenges derived from non-state dynamics. In other words, the presence of transnational threats and threats originating from non-state actors suggests that a great deal of instability and insecurity persist in the region, and given the inability of many states (such as Peru, Colombia, and Mexico) to deal with these problems, the preference is to sustain the hybridity rather than settle to one solution.

A fifth important regional factor is the absence of war in Latin America. The last war, with a duration of only one month and less than 1000 battle-deaths, took place in 1995 between Ecuador and Peru (Herz and Nogueira 2002). As Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2007: 81) show, 'Civilians do not believe their neighbors are a threat because history has shown that their neighbors rarely attack, so they pay little attention to defense policy and avoid funding strong militaries.' Counter-intuitively this perception leads to the perpetuation of territorial disputes in the region – Colombia and Venezuela, Bolivia and Chile, Chile and Peru; Colombia and Nicaragua, for example – as there are limited incentives for elites to solve these problems. In other words, interstate conflicts are not sufficiently intense in Latin America to generate perceptions of existential threat among states. Similarly, the absence of an expansionist power in the region further reinforces the continuity of the status quo in the region. From a historical point of view, in Latin America there are no experiences of territorial expansionist states comparable to the European case. Maybe for this reason some scholars have claimed that Brazil is an international soft revisionist (Bernal-Meza 2010), that is, Brazil is more interested in operating changes in norms and rules in the international society that promote security dilemmas and classic geopolitical expansion.

Thus, the absence of war in the region amounts to a complex causal process over time and triggers different expectations and standard operating procedures among elites in the region. Taken together with the increase in non-traditional threats, the choice between specific practices of security community or balance of power remains an empirical possibility for both types of security challenges. As regions are socially constructed, the competent performance of Latin American agents in discursive practices sustains the logic of hybrid security governance in the region.

The overlap of mechanisms results from a sixth cause: the transformation of the Latin American region. In this context, the overlap itself becomes a functional strategy adopted and driven by the geopolitical concerns of emerging powers in the region. For Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Venezuela, the overlap improves their political positions and bargaining power at the regional and global levels and creates favorable diplomatic channels for managing contested negotiations. The steady armament purchases and the participation of these states in UNPKO illustrate the enticing double game that hybrid governance offers to elites in the region. It is possible for them to simultaneously increase armaments, engage in multi-lateral governance, and also be prepared to manage eventualities in the anarchic international system. On the one hand, military strength that arises out of balancing dispositions boosts a country's international profile even in circumstances where there seems to be no immediate danger of militarized conflict. It symbolizes status and the political leverage of a state in the regional or global context. The use of the military for extra-territorial tasks such as the participation in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations is a typical manifestation of this orientation since it often functions as a catalyst for greater international exposure for countries with externally oriented doctrines and as an opportunity for smaller states to project themselves on a global stage (Kenkel 2010, 2013; Sotomayor 2010). On the other hand, institutionalized cooperation that arises out of the mechanisms of security community boosts positive interactions among agents (as seen between the armed forces of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay in the MINUSTAH peacekeeping operation in Haiti) and allows for a high level of training of troops in those countries that face potential traditional and non-traditional threats. Therefore, hybrid governance is a double victory particularly for rising powers that have reasons to ensure that disaffected states in the region do not inhibit their access to the high-tables of managing international order.

This leads us to a seventh causal process that goes beyond the functionalist arguments and concerns the soft revisionism of agents in the region. Scholars have paid little attention to the variety of balancing practices of emerging countries, particularly in Latin America. In the past, rising powers were considered ‘revisionist states’ that expressed a general dissatisfaction with their relative position in the international system. It was assumed that they would attempt to alter their position in the international system through war (Organski and Kugler 1980). However, contemporary emerging powers at the regional or global level seem to play the role of ‘soft revisionists’: instead of using the military for traditional revisionist purposes, they employ military means along with economic and political means to pursue regional or global political goals.

Soft revisionism seems to apply to Latin American countries like Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela where the military build-up is just one way to justify their ascension to a regional leadership position or to leverage their position in regional or global decision-making processes. Albeit to a different extent, all three states share the aim to establish themselves as important players on the regional or global level. For that purpose, they use military power as a representation of political importance and – with the exception of Venezuela – the participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations as a strategy of global insertion. Chile with its tradition of middle-power diplomacy has tried to reassert itself as an agenda-setter in multilateral institutions after its return to democracy. Similarly, Brazil and Venezuela seek regional leadership in South America by the mobilization of coalitions and international institution-building, with UNASUR and ALBA as the most politically visible projects. Both countries have also made an appearance on the global level – Venezuela mainly by means of political provocation, Brazil through initiatives fostering South-South cooperation. Therefore, in the balance of power behavior at the regional level – especially between Chile and Venezuela as well as between Brazil and Venezuela, or Brazil and Argentina (who compete for regional leadership) – the competition is political and not military in a framework of non-conflict-driven strategic considerations. The new function of armament then is to symbolize the rising power of emerging states and to foster their political insertion on the regional and global level (Villa and Weiffen 2014). This soft revisionist disposition could largely account for patterns of hybrid security mechanisms in the region.

CONCLUSION

As this article has shown, both security community and balance of power logics can reside side-by-side within a region and even within individual countries, as conditions that motivate or constrain militarized behaviors. While common wisdom would expect one of these logics to prevail over the other at some point, overlap is a predominant feature in Latin America. This chapter discussed the overlap of security community and balance of power mechanisms to illustrate hybrid security governance in Latin America. In the sections that elaborated on the concepts of security community and balancing/bandwagoning behavior in the region, the chapter showed the repertoire of foreign and security policy practices and the nuanced debates surrounding these ideas and presented empirical examples of both practices, proving their coexistence. Thereafter it analyzed the causal processes accounting for hybrid security governance in the region: the impact of democratization; divisions within domestic interest groups; weak conflict resolution mechanisms; the presence of transnational threats originating from non-state actors; the absence of war in Latin America; functionalist strategies of elites; and soft revisionism of rising powers in the region.

This chapter concludes with some reflections on the avenues for future research on hybrid security governance. On the theoretical side, the chapter has only highlighted the main security governance practices. There may be more types and variations of regional security governance mechanisms that require detailed investigation. As the discussion on the causal processes showed, there may also be different levels of explanation for the hybrid pattern. Potential additional factors like culture and identity were only briefly mentioned in this chapter. On the empirical side, the intention of this chapter is to encourage a more detailed historical inquiry on security governance practices in the region and beyond. From a historical perspective, the picture of security governance in Latin America might look very different during and before the period of the Cold War or even before the two World Wars. One may also find multiple processes driving the evolution and institutionalization of security governance practices in the region. From a comparative perspective, it would be interesting to explore whether an overlap of logics can also be detected in other world regions. An important contribution for future research thus would be to compare hybrid governance in other regions, for example in South Asia, and examine whether rising powers within the region (Brazil and India, respectively) instrumentally benefit from this hybrid security governance.

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Role Theory and Geopolitical Thinking in South America

Leslie E. Wehner and Detlef Nolte

INTRODUCTION

South America has become a distinct region in world politics with balanced ties to extra-regional actors such as the US, Europe and major Asian countries (Cohen 2009). The social construction of this ‘new’ region/international actor has been conducted through the strategic use of geopolitical narratives by important states such as Brazil and Venezuela that expect the emergence of a South American region to present opportunities for consolidating their foreign policy objectives. However, the social construction of South America as a distinctive regional space also responds to perceived security challenges of states and regional groups of states advancing and consolidating their notion of a geopolitical region. This inside-out making of a South American region is also shaped from the outside-in. Regions are characterized by openness, as global developments permeate regional phenomena as much as regional developments shape global trends (see Prys 2010). In fact, the social articulation and changing international position of South America respond to global power shifts

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where the US hegemonic position in world affairs has been undermined and China has risen to the status of a global power. The prioritization of the Middle East by US foreign policy as a consequence of 9/11 facilitated the articulation of a South American narrative and the positioning of Brazil as a regional power and key agent in advancing such a notion (Nolte and Wehner 2016). From an institutional social constructivist approach, wherein international regions are seen as the political constructions of nation-states (Powers and Goertz 2011; Nolte 2016), the notion of South America as a narrative takes on substance in the making and subsequent consolidation of regional organizations such as the Union of South American Nations (*Unión de Naciones Suramericanas* – UNASUR).

The UNASUR project, legally constituted in 2008, is the expression of a convergence of different states' foreign policy interests and security concerns in South America (with regard to Argentina see Comini 2016). UNASUR is concerned with the delineation of boundaries to what falls outside of South America (including the rest of Latin America), and with regional projects of states and their shared security challenges. Thus, this chapter analyses the development of new currents of geopolitical thinking in South America and how these influence the development of common security conceptions and practices at the state and regional level (such as the issue of natural resources protection). The chapter develops an analytical framework grounded on role theory to understand the type of geopolitical roles policy-makers seek to advance on behalf of the state and regional groupings in order to confront pressing common security challenges.

We argue that states are developing and playing various roles to change and/or sustain their status within and outside the region (with regard to status seeking in international politics see Paul et al. 2014). States speak for themselves as a way to transmit their expectations and interests, but when they do it on behalf of a regional group, they also concede a degree of agency to the regional group itself. Although UNASUR is part of the wave of new post-hegemonic regional projects (see Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012) and can be linked to a tradition of geopolitical thinking which some authors label the geopolitics of integration (see Rivarola 2011), the new organization also possesses specific features that are not salient in other South American regional projects. UNASUR has the objective to articulate a comprehensive security agenda as a regional group. The security dimension as developed in

UNASUR's South American Defense Council (CDS) is ambitious in scope and unique vis-à-vis previous and coexistent regional groups. As such UNASUR is the expression of states' (or their foreign policy elites') way of thinking in terms of an interplay of territory, geography and politics within a regional space (South America), that is, geopolitics (see Cohen 2009; Kacowicz 2000; Kelly 1997). Geopolitical narratives are role-based as UNASUR delineates a region and creates a regional role for the member states.

The chapter proceeds as follows: First, we provide an overview of the field of geopolitics in general and of geopolitical thinking in South America in particular. This section looks at geopolitical narratives from a foreign policy analysis perspective. Second, we present an analytical framework grounded in recent works on role theory (see Thies 2010; McCourt 2012; Wehner 2015; Wehner and Thies 2014). Third, we present two examples illustrating how role-based interactions are crucial to understand geopolitics in South America: On the one hand, we analyze the development and consolidation of UNASUR as an expression of a South American region where common security dilemmas are a key aspect in the social construction of both UNASUR and the notion of a 'geopolitical' South American region. On the other hand, we provide a more specific view regarding the securitization and regionalization of a security challenge, in this case natural resources, which has been translated into both conceptions and practices within UNASUR's South American Defense Council. Finally, in our conclusion we assess the increasing use of geopolitical narratives in South America in light of the analytical framework developed.

NEW GEOPOLITICAL THINKING IN SOUTH AMERICA

Even though geopolitical thinking and narratives are experiencing a revival in world affairs and thus receiving scholarly attention (see Guzzini 2012), South America has always been a region in which geopolitical thinking has been present in the narratives of policy-makers when they set the states' foreign policy goals and framed different foreign policy challenges. However, there are old and new geopolitical narratives in South America which tend to coexist within the way foreign policy elites see the world and especially their most immediate surroundings (Nolte and Wehner 2016).¹ In fact, some tensions between states in this region are still driven by border issues which have been important in traditional geopolitical thinking. However, the creation of regional groups with a common security agenda

and a common geo-economic agenda also reflects a new trend which scholars define as geopolitics of integration (Rivarola Puntigliano 2011). One of the differences to previous attempts of regional integration is the presence of a strong and pivotal state in South America, that is, Brazil as a regional power with a geopolitical project (Rivarola Puntigliano 2011).

Geopolitical thinking especially in its applied version has experienced a gradual change without totally leaving behind the classical issues of sovereignty, the penetration and domination of territory, territorial disputes, and the drawing and defense of boundaries. Nolte and Wehner (2016) detect six megatrends in the new geopolitics of Latin America in the post-1990s. First, Latin America has become geopolitically less marginalized in international politics, and as a side effect of this development the geopolitical perspective has become broader. In other words, Latin American and South American states diversified their foreign and economic relations beyond the US and Europe (to Asia, Africa, the post-Soviet countries and the Middle East). Second, geopolitical thinking has moved from the national to the regional or continental level, giving room to geopolitics of integration. Third, as part of this development South America has been created as a new geopolitical region, with Brazil as the major regional power therein, despite existing contestation about an exclusive notion of a South American region from different states (see Wehner 2015). Fourth, the US has lost centrality in South America and extra-hemispheric actors such as China have become major players in Latin America. Fifth, as a result of global power shifts and the new international positioning of Latin America, both the Pacific Basin and the South Atlantic (including the Antarctic) have become more important in Latin American geopolitical thinking. Sixth and central to this chapter, natural resources have turned out to again be a central issue in the geopolitical thinking and narratives of foreign policy elites, leading to their increasing securitization and to new territorial disputes (especially related to maritime borders). Such securitization of natural resources is present at both the state and the regional level, the latter within the frame of regional groups (Nolte and Wehner 2016).

Notwithstanding the continuous presence of geopolitical thinking in Latin America, studying it in a systemic way has not been a pressing topic for scholars. In fact, many of the studies adopt a historical perspective (Rivarola Puntigliano 2011). Others, still a minority, prefer to use the conceptual repertoire of critical geopolitics to deconstruct and re-construct

existing geopolitical discourses and the discourses on territorial projections (see Cairo et al. 2007; Preciado and Uc 2010; Cabrera 2011). However, ‘neoclassical geopolitics’ (Guzzini 2012) is the dominant perspective in Latin America. It is a policy-oriented approach, which conceptualizes foreign policy challenges and the international politics of a state in light of its geographical features (or its position on the map), and it formulates guidelines for conducting statecraft based on this analysis, which can lead to environmental and structural determinism. Recently, Nolte and Wehner (2016) have suggested that the study of geopolitical thinking in Latin America in its old and new versions could analytically benefit from using theories and approaches from other sub-disciplines in international relations such as foreign policy analysis and its related approaches such as role theory.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: GEOPOLITICAL THINKING FROM A ROLE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Roles

Role theory has once again gained visibility in the field of foreign policy analysis since the seminal contribution of Kalevi Holsti (1970) (see Harnisch 2011; McCourt 2012; Thies 2010). Part of scholars’ renewed interest in role theory lies in the fact that roles contain both a behavioral and an identitarian dimension. Role theory has descriptive, organizational and explanatory value. The descriptive value of role theory is based on its rich conceptual vocabulary to describe and understand different events, while its organizational value lies in its ability to cross different levels of analysis (people, state and system) and bridge them. Finally, role theory’s explanatory value derives from its capacity to adapt and be incorporated into other theoretical approaches (Thies 2010: 1; Walker 1987: 2). In essence, role theory supposes that people and any type of corporate social actor can enact and play roles which are also shaped by the surrounding environment. In this sense, roles are both positions within an organized group and categories of actors it is possible to belong to in social life (see Thies 2010; Harnisch 2011; Wehner and Thies 2014). In addition, a role conception encompasses the actor’s self-definition, on the one hand, and the expectations of others through social cues and demands as well as by direct socialization, on the other

(Smith and Elgström 2006). Thus, role theory is relational, as any role needs an implicit or explicit counterrole (Thies 2010). At the same time, role theory also includes a notion of structure that shapes but does not entirely determine the possible roles a state can enact (Wehner and Thies 2014). Materiality is still important in role theory as not every role can be chosen by actors if they do not possess enough material capabilities (McCourt 2012).

Geopolitical Roles

As Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992: 192–3) argue, geopolitics should be understood ‘as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas’. From this perspective geopolitics is a field that offers itself for role theory, because geopolitics is about defining a state’s foreign policy role using geographic markers (population, territory, resources, and so on) to differentiate a state’s position and role vis-à-vis other states. Geopolitical narratives thus include a notion of identity. In fact, the social construction of national and group identities is linked to the notion of boundaries. At the same time, boundaries created via groups’ identity action also have an ordering effect, be these national, regional or international orders (Newman 2001; Guzzini 2012). In fact, Guzzini (2012: 49–57, 69–70) advances the link between geopolitics and the roles a state has or can cast in the future to solve its identity crisis. He argues that geopolitical narratives are a welcome fix for policy-makers when a crisis of self-understanding of the own role and role recognition is occurring to a state or any other type of international corporate actor. However, Guzzini (2012) conceives roles only as a process of self-understanding or what role theorists call National Role Conceptions (NRC) (see also Holsti 1970; Wehner and Thies 2014). Symbolic interactionist role theory’s added value is that it links identity and action (Wehner and Thies 2014), as a role set of an actor or the number of roles an actor possesses in its social life captures important aspects of the identity of a state (Thies and Nieman 2014). Role theorists in international relations/foreign policy analysis have advanced theoretically and documented empirically that roles are relationally cast in a constant process of exchanges between a self-understanding (the self, or ego), vis-à-vis others’ expectations (the other, or alter) (Harnisch 2011; McCourt 2012; Thies 2010; Wehner and Thies 2014; Wehner 2015).

Roles are constructed by using agents' ability to act with creativity to interpret, read and change the surrounding environment, like for example the role of a leader, a mediator, an integrator, a security provider or a protector of natural resources, as well as by developing new notions of structuring elements such as the limits of a region, or developing new narratives of understanding natural disasters not as a national security challenge but as a regional one when these disasters happen at the borders involving different states.

Thus, roles in geopolitical narratives are not only the result of one's self-definition but of an interaction with others. The other can be either a general or a significant one. A general other takes the form of social cues and demands of a system from where the self reads social cues by putting itself in the shoes of the other (Beneš and Harnisch 2015). In the case of geopolitical thinking in South America, actors defining their roles incorporate the cues and demands of the regional and international system, which includes the actors' traditions, the interpretation of the geographical and spatial factors, and the security concerns at the national and regional level as well as those posed by outsiders to the region. A significant other is an actor or set of them that have a direct impact on the role socialization of the self. A significant other is not always a role model to be emulated but it could also be a negative other in the sense of being a counterpoint for the self on what type of actor (s)he does not want to be (Beneš and Harnisch 2015). In terms of geopolitical thinking in South and Latin America at both the national and regional level, the US is a significant other, meaning that the self (a state like Brazil or Venezuela, or a regional group as UNASUR) defines the type of actor it wants to be, its interest as well as its boundaries and identity, with regards to the hegemonic role of the US in the region.

GEOPOLITICS AND ROLES IN SOUTH AMERICA

Role-based interaction of agents is key to understand the geopolitics of regional integration, which includes the casting of a new geographical region in terms of defining boundaries, the development of an institutional apparatus reflecting that geographical notion and serving as a pillar for the newly defined region (for an institutional social constructivist approach see Powers and Goertz 2011; Nolte 2016), and the securitization of common strategic issues concerning both intra-regional and extra-regional actors.

Roles can take the form of a master role (or master status) and auxiliary roles. The former concept refers to the most salient attribute of a specific actor, such as great power, middle power, regional power or regional secondary power, while auxiliary roles are functions of an actor to sustain and give meaning to its master role such as enacting role activities of a mediator, leader, and conflict manager (see Thies 2012; Wehner 2015). The US as an external other has the master role of hegemonic power, a role that has been extensively documented in the US approach to Latin America. Brazil has the master role of regional power and enacts different auxiliary roles such as leader, integrator, security provider, mediator and crisis-manager. In addition, Brazil has become the main agent in unfolding a securitization narrative regarding natural resources in South America. Some of these roles are enacted more actively within the institutional apparatus of UNASUR (see Wehner 2015). Other actors, such as secondary powers in South America, enact different roles. For instance, Venezuela has contested the leadership role of Brazil in UNASUR by trying to enact a leader role as well. Argentina and Chile, following their successful experience of bilateral security cooperation, have played the role of security cooperation experts and advanced a security agenda in UNASUR. Yet UNASUR, when states speak on its behalf, has been able to enact the role of mediator and crisis-manager to solve governance crises in some countries and to reduce tensions between states (see Flandes and Wehner 2015; Wehner 2015; Nolte and Wehner 2016).

UNASUR and the Social Construction of South America

South America as a geographical region has not always been present in the imaginary of states from this region. Latin America was traditionally more salient than South America in the rhetoric of states to frame their spheres of interest. The presence of the US in Latin America, especially in Central America has been strong, exerting its role as a hegemonic power. Latin America as a region shows characteristics of overlay where the US has not only a dominant position, but it is also depicted as a negative other creating a sense of ontological insecurity for different state actors. In other words, the notion of Latin America and of South America as security regions are partly defined by outside powers (Buzan and Wæver 2003), in this case by the US in its role of hegemonic power. Yet, insecurity is not dominant in other issues such as trade where most of the states from the region have an asymmetrical economic dependence on the US. In the

economic domain all states (but to a different degree) trade with the US, depend on the US market, and some states perceive the trade relationships as beneficial for their economic growth.

Conversely, Latin America is also a region for power projections by potential regional powers such as Mexico and Brazil. Mexico has mainly exerted a role of leader and partner of Central American states (see Wehner and Thies 2014). Brazil in its quest to *grandeur* had enacted a narrative of a Latin American regional power. Yet, for the sake of sustaining its strategy of becoming a regional and world power, Brazil experienced a change in the notion of region in terms of boundaries and identity. Since the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil started to prioritize South America as a way to protect integration schemes such as Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) where joint leadership roles were played along with Argentina, as well as to prevent the consolidation of the US hegemonic role in the region via its project of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This notion and imaginary of a South American region was also deepened during the mandate of Luiz Inácio da Silva (Lula) (2003–2010) (Malamud 2011; Rivarola Puntigliano 2011).

Three roles are salient in Brazil's process of advancing the new concept of South America as a region. First, the role of integrator played by Brazil along with Argentina was crucial to construct the notion of a South American region with MERCOSUR as its core, where the new region gained visibility and became politically articulated. Second, a leader role is also part of Brazil's repertoire to cast and socialize a notion of a South American region (Flemes and Wehner 2015; Wehner 2015) which gives meaning to its master role as regional power. Moreover, when Brazil unfolded the narrative of South America in order to protect the regional integration schemes from external forces, Brazil received both the recognition and attribution of states like Venezuela and, more reluctantly, Argentina (Wehner 2015; Comini 2016; Nolte and Comini 2016) for their own security and economic reasons (Rivarola Puntigliano 2011: 858). The third role played by Brazil that has not received sufficient scholarly attention in the articulation of regional schemes and the social construction of South America is that of an agenda setter. Holding a master role as regional power, Brazil had the ability to set and frame an agenda in terms of integration as well as of creating a narrative of security challenges and key outside actors that were used to frame the notion and the scope of the new South American region.

However, the paramount aspect in the consolidation of the new socially created region was the idea of a new regional project. The South American Community of Nations (*Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones* – CSN) under Lula’s (or Brazil’s) leadership was the last stepping stone toward the political project of matching the geographical notion of South America and the political project of bringing together the Pacific and the Atlantic axis of regional integration (Malamud 2011; Rivarola Puntigliano 2011; Wehner 2015). The CSN – later renamed UNASUR – was created in 2004 and legally constituted in 2008.

Once again similar roles were played by the Brazilian and other governments to negotiate the scope of this new project. First, Brazil became an agenda setter in creating the demand for a new regional scheme. Second, Argentina (hesitantly, according to Comini 2016; Nolte and Comini 2016) and Venezuela recognized Brazil’s leader role with regards to the creation of UNASUR. Third, both states saw in UNASUR a possibility to constrain Brazil’s regional power and global ambitions. As Malamud (2011) sustains, Venezuela tried to take a leader role in UNASUR and to compete with Brazil from within the regional group, contesting Brazil’s leadership once the new regional organization had been created. Fourth, Argentina and Chile started to play the role of agenda setters and security experts to shape the security conceptions and practices of UNASUR’s South American Defense Council, which converge with Brazilian interests (Nolte and Wehner 2014; Wehner 2015). Fifth, Brazil as well as Argentina and Chile have tried to use the regional platform as springboard for framing and regionalizing their own security concerns. In its quest to global power status it is Brazil’s interest of representing a stable region, UNASUR has become a security provider to establish a security purpose and to react to immediate challenges such as the crises in Bolivia 2008 and Ecuador 2010, and the tensions between Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia in 2010. Finally, most states’ role interactions within UNASUR have given an identity and a degree of agency to the new regional organization. Brazil and secondary powers such as Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, but also small states such as Bolivia and Ecuador, have started to speak on behalf of UNASUR rather than on their national interest, in order to legitimate the roles enacted by this regional group (or its main speakers) when crises jeopardize the region. Thus, UNASUR via the narrative of its main states (but also of some of its smaller members) has enacted a mediator, bridge-builder and crisis-manager role. In these narratives of state actors, the perfect match between the geographical area

of South America and the political project of South America, that is, UNASUR, has become routinized and institutionalized. However, some current security challenges have only partially been ‘regionalized’ (such as the conflict between the government and the FARC in Colombia), or they have a broader reach beyond South America (terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration and so on) as they are framed from outside the region by the US as a major external actor.

Thus, the interaction between Brazil and other states in South America as well as with extra-regional states is produced and reproduced within a regional space that is politically meaningful through the boundaries created and articulated by leaders, security providers, bridge-builders and external security challengers. Regional powers’ interactions with different states of the region and significant others outside the region like the US contribute to the social construction of a region. In fact, the agency of states is the main force delineating and revising the boundaries and the social identity of a region (see Wehner 2015).

The Securitization and Regionalization of Natural Resources

The abundance of natural resources has always been an important element in Latin American development (and underdevelopment), and has continually attracted the interest of foreign companies and countries. Latin America is rich in natural resources. South America alone has a participation in the global production and reserves of copper (production: 43 percent/reserves: 36 percent), silver (32 percent/42 percent), selenium (6 percent/33 percent), gold (16 percent/15 percent), zinc (18 percent/13 percent), manganese (6 percent/17 percent), tin (18 percent/33 percent), boron (37 percent/20 percent), antimony (4 percent/17 percent), nickel (12 percent/14 percent), molybdenum (22 percent/16 percent), bauxite (17 percent/18 percent), lead (9 percent/10 percent), iron ore (16 percent/18 percent), niobium (92 percent/98 percent), lithium (64 percent/85 percent) (CEPAL and UNASUR 2013; OLADE and UNASUR 2013). South America also possesses a rich biodiversity, as well as important freshwater reserves.

The topic of natural resources was from the beginning part of the agenda of UNASUR. The creation of UNASUR was announced during the first South American Energy Summit in Isla Margarita (Venezuela) in 2007 (Saguier 2013). Natural resources have been a national security concern of most states with abundance of natural resources such as

minerals, water, food and fuels (gas and oil). These concerns have to do with fears of possible restrictions of the state's sovereignty with regard to the exploitation or preservation of natural resources. These apprehensions are related to the strategies and policies of foreign companies, the influence of international NGOs (Garcia 2012) and global norms regulating and restricting the exploitation and protection of natural resources. At the same time, the securitization of natural resources based on their global scarcity (independent of the current drop of world market prices) has made states conscious of their lack of material capacities to precisely pass from a securitization narrative to more concrete actions in terms of dealing with their own vulnerabilities.

For instance, forest and water resources are abundant in Amazonia, but Brazil as owner of the vastest geographical area in this zone is confronted with problems in dealing with the existing security challenges (including the challenges from transnational criminal organizations). In fact, part of its securitization narrative involves transborder cooperation with countries which border on its territory, such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. However, these states do not put the security of Brazil at risk. The Brazilian military sees the prevention of interference from extra-regional powers as the main concern in protecting Amazonia, a view that it is shared by Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Venezuela, one of the main oil producers in the world, does not only show solidarity with its ideological peers' vulnerabilities but it also seeks to protect its oil resources. In addition, Brazil has security concerns regarding the protection of the oil and gas reserves that were discovered in the continental shelf in front of its coast. The Brazilian military developed the innovative narrative of the 'Blue Amazon' with the objective to underline its geopolitical claims related to the maritime space and its exclusive economic zone. Consequently, Darnton (2016: 198) argues that the concept of the 'Blue Amazon' demonstrates how these resources are of utmost importance for Brazil's development as well as how these resources create new security vulnerabilities. It is this new sense of vulnerability that caused Brazil to pursue a securitization strategy of its resources and geo-strategic areas such as the Amazon and the South Atlantic (Nolte and Wehner 2016).

Likewise, Argentina's quest to regain sovereignty rights on the Malvinas/Falklands is motivated by a geo-economic interest due to the potential existence of oil and gas below the waters surrounding the islands. At the same time, additional vulnerabilities are related to water reserves. For instance, both Argentina and Chile have securitized their water reserves in

Patagonia and the Antarctic. A similar process of securitization of water resources is taking place by states with territory in the Amazonia where water resources are also abundant (Nolte and Wehner 2016).

Brazil, as holder of the master role of regional power, has developed a foreign and security policy to consolidate its current position in South America. In fact, Brazil has 27,000 troops deployed in the Amazon region with the objective to protect its territory and to promote military cooperation with its neighboring countries with similar security challenges (Marcella 2016: 168). According to Battagliano (2016: 238), one conflict scenario outlined in Brazilian defense policy is the protection of the Amazon against a Great Power. In the National Defense Strategy of 2008, the Brazilian military declares that it should be prepared to defend the Amazon and its resources vis-à-vis a military power with a superior material capacity (Ministry of Defense 2008). The National Defense White Book 2012 points to the recent discovery of oil reserves in front of the Brazilian coast as factor that has driven the government to invest in the navy with the purpose of protecting these resources from external powers (Ministério Da Defesa 2012). Yet, as Battagliano (2016) notes, in none of the above-mentioned official reports does Brazil name the actors which may become a potential threat.

Although for most South American states the vulnerability and subsequent securitization of natural resources is a pressing issue in their national security strategies, a leadership role of Brazil as regional power and of secondary powers such Argentina and Venezuela and to a lesser degree Chile were essential to include this issue area within the institutional apparatus of UNASUR. The securitization of natural resources is also high on the agendas of the CDS and the South American Energy Council. The aforementioned states, especially Brazil, enacted the role of leaders to frame the strategic importance of protecting natural resources beyond national efforts (agenda-setter role), that is, via regional cooperation and coordination. In this sense, Brazil along with the other states has unfolded a securitization narrative that also shapes the security conceptions of the CDS. In other words, Brazil has enacted the role of securitizer that to some extent converged with the expectations of Venezuela. In fact, these states along with Argentina are the ones (beside Ecuador and Bolivia) that have identified potential threats and conflict scenarios coming from states outside the region (Battagliano 2016: 239). These threats are envisaged to be a source of cooperation within UNASUR (Nolte and Wehner 2016).

However, UNASUR has so far only developed security conceptions and not yet practices regarding the protection of natural resources. In fact, the SDC is in a process of reaching a consensual agenda on this matter as this issue area is considered of strategic importance for achieving the CDS goal of building a common view on defense matters. In fact, the CDS through the Center for Strategic Defense Studies (*Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de Defensa* – CEED) included in its work plan 2014 an annual conference on ‘Defense and Natural Resources’, which was carried out for the first time in Buenos Aires in June 2014 (see Bruckmann et al. 2015; CEED 2014). The CEED work plan also introduces the idea of establishing a research area of prospective analysis and strategy, in which security analysts will develop an executive work plan called *South America Prospective Study 2025*. Within this CEED area, specialists will identify and study potential security risks for the member states and the region and build scenarios about possible courses of action to minimize existing risks. In a first phase of the *South America Prospective Study 2025*, priority is given to the projection of the demand for natural resources and the possible repercussions for the defense policies of states and the region (CEED 2014: 3–4).

It is possible to observe different role relationships in the making of a security agenda covering natural resources at the interplay of the national and the regional level, even though the securitization agenda of natural resource protection is still in a phase of conceptualization at the regional level. First, states like Brazil and Venezuela (but also Bolivia and Ecuador) have been playing a leader role in highlighting the importance of this issue and the need for it to become a constitutive part of the security agenda of UNASUR. When the former energy and foreign minister of Venezuela Ali Rodríguez was secretary general of UNASUR (2012–2014) the topic of natural resources was especially high on the UNASUR agenda (Gastaldi 2014). In June 2014 the defense ministers of UNASUR met in Buenos Aires to discuss the topic of ‘defense and natural resources’.² While Brazil, together with Venezuela, has been the main agenda-setter, other states such as Bolivia and Ecuador have similar concerns but lack the material capacity to enact the roles of agenda-setter and leader on their own in South America. These smaller states cannot securitize the issue of natural resources on their own and raise them to the regional level. Other states such as Argentina and Chile have also been active in acknowledging the importance of including this issue area as a part of the security agenda of UNASUR. Second, Brazil has acted in the role of main *securitizer* in the region in order to protect its natural resources in the Amazon and South

Atlantic coast. Once again there is convergence and acceptance from other South American states of this securitization narrative. In addition, the CEED as a sub-organ of the CDS has played a coordinator and expert role to analyze the vulnerability of states over their natural resources vis-à-vis external actors and to forecast courses of action for UNASUR. In addition, we observe that the CEED has become the main framer and agenda-setter in the elaboration of UNASUR's security conceptions and potential practices regarding natural resources, which is a reaction to the role expectations of different states (mainly Brazil and some secondary regional powers) that were key in articulating the need of finding regional responses to national security challenges in South America. Yet there is still a transition pending from role conception to practice in the regional securitization process of natural resources.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has analyzed two key aspects of new geopolitical thinking in South America, which are the geopolitics of integration (or cooperation) of a security-driven regional institution (UNASUR) and the security challenge of natural resources vulnerability at the state and regional level as an integral part of the security agenda of UNASUR. As geopolitical thinking involves an interplay of territory, politics and geography, the analysis of UNASUR included the study of the main state actors' narrative to frame and reframe their notion of spatiality, or in this case of region. UNASUR has become the main social institutional construct that reflects a new narrative of a South American geographical region that brings together the Pacific and Atlantic sides. In addition, UNASUR and the South American region have become intertwined because of the perceived security threat posed by external actors. The role of the US as hegemonic power has been important for states (for example, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela) for framing their security positions and detecting existing vulnerabilities. In this sense, one of the main vulnerabilities for most states in the region is protecting their abundant natural resources in a global context of future scarcity. While most states have advanced and developed defense conceptions and practices to secure their natural resources, this process has gone hand in hand with a regional securitization narrative coming from UNASUR member states. UNASUR via the CEED has been able to frame natural resources as security issue and has started to develop security conceptions that are not yet security practices.

The different narratives to frame, securitize and regionalize an issue such as natural resources, or to cast a new notion of 'regionness' which becomes reified in a regional organization, were analyzed from a role-theoretical perspective. This approach is not the only way to study geopolitics, but role theory has already been applied in geopolitical studies (for example in Guzzini's 2012 work regarding Europe) without entirely developing its full scope. Thus, this chapter has added the relational dimension of role theory and role-counterrole interactions to analyze the patterns of behavior and the social positions of states and regional groups when advancing regional securitization narratives to cope with new security challenges. The proposed framework needs to be scrutinized further regarding its utility for understanding other geopolitical phenomena. Nevertheless, in this chapter role theory has shown its potential to mitigate the lack of theoretical reflections in the study of geopolitics in Latin America.

The geopolitical narrative of South American integration was mainly developed by Brazil and to a lesser degree by Venezuela. It is an instrument of a regional power (as an existing master role) to delineate a sphere of influence/interest against outside actors such as the US and its role as hegemon and significant other for most South American states' security agendas. At the same time, the geopolitical narrative of South American integration unfolds to advance common positions of UNASUR member countries by articulating functional roles such as leader, mediator, securitizer and agenda-setter that underpin their master roles. Finally, the geopolitical narrative of natural resources has both an offensive and a defensive component. On the one hand, it is defensive as it articulates the common fear of a resource-rich region of interventions, globalization and external actors such as the US and NGOs. On the other hand, it is offensive in the case of Brazil which, as holder of a regional power role, marks geopolitical and geo-economic claims such as the Blue Amazon and the concept of the South Atlantic as part of its security narratives.

NOTES

1. Nolte and Wehner (2016) present a recent review of old and new geopolitics. On geopolitical thinking in Latin America pre-1990s, see Child (1979).
2. See <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1698135-unasur-una-vidriera-para-cris-tina> (12 February 2016).

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PART II

Regional Institutions and the Management
of Security Challenges

Regional Organizations, Conflict Resolution and Mediation in South America

Monica Herz, Maira Siman and Ana Clara Telles

INTRODUCTION

Conflict resolution mechanisms have been in place in the Western hemisphere and South America in particular since the end of the nineteenth century.¹ Several agreements, documents and relevant meetings have incorporated the theme, generating a collective imaginary on peace and conflict resolution which has impacted on the development of regional organizations and on the production of knowledge and expertise on this domain. In this chapter we discuss the narrative and practices of regional conflict resolution and mediation, focusing on the role regional organizations and arrangements have played as social spaces where these practices and narratives were able to develop. They are the social contexts that condition and enable conflict resolution and mediation processes in

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the region involving values and norms that express the meeting and dialogue between the South American experience and the global experience. This chapter analyzes the role the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Andean Community (CAN), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) have played as social spaces where narratives and practices of conflict resolution are enacted.

The peculiarity of regional governance is its attachment to a geographic space beyond the nation state (Herz 2014). Regions are areas of the world formed by a number of countries that are economically and politically interdependent and are defined politically by the actors involved in building regional institutions. In a nutshell, regions are social spaces in constant process of construction. They are part of the interactions that generate governance, not solely the stage where this process takes place. Moreover regional governance mechanisms are the result of regionalism which can be defined as a state-led political project to promote intergovernmental collaboration within the region. This may involve the generation of regional identities and the building of regional political communities.

The phenomenon is today widespread and present throughout the global system. Both spatially and functionally, it is a major part of international relations. The focus on regional governance is part of a broader debate on global governance, or on who governs what, and has profound political implications reflecting and transforming power relations. The rules, structures and institutions we look into here guide, regulate and control social life mostly in line with the tenets of stability established by the liberal order (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 2; Finnemore 1996). They are an expression of what Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall call institutional power or ‘indirect control over the conditions of action of socially distant others’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 12). As governance can be generated by an array of actors including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational social movements, networks, coalitions and epistemic communities, intergovernmental regional organizations provide a focus for analysis as they often are the hub of regional interaction leading to the generation of rules and normalized routines and practices.

The administration of international security increasingly reflects a preoccupation of regional organizations with security in their region. This has been a trend since the 1990s as it became clear that the United Nations would not be able to face the task of global security governance on its own. The negotiation of territorial disputes or intra-state conflicts, and the creation of security regimes, the development of confidence-building measures or the structuring of peace operations increasingly take place within or with the assistance of regional organizations. The Agenda for Peace, written by Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the outset of his tenure as UN secretary-general in 1992, promoted the activities of regional agencies; and the 2000 Brahimi Report sought to regulate the relationship between the United Nations and these regional actors. Thus, regional organizations became increasingly relevant for the administration of international security and more specifically for international conflict resolution (Weiss 1998; Pugh and Sidhu 2003). The relation between regional and global governance also acquires meaning when we look at the historical relation between the United Nations and regional organizations. Regions were specifically mentioned in Chapter VIII of the Charter, and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations became part of the debate on the reform of the UN system after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, regional organizations incorporate the discourse and practice that have become hegemonic globally and have legitimized their role in an increasingly homogeneous manner.

The regional organizations we look into here are the social space where shared meanings or collective representations are produced, contested and (re)negotiated. The construction of these representations² is partly possible due to interaction within regional organizations and to the institutions and symbolic networks they enable. Collective representations constitute institutions, or images of the forms of social interaction (Castoriadis 1998) taking place in the region. In the case of South America, the images that constitute and characterize the regional experience in conflict resolution and mediation are (a) a plural institutional architecture; (b) a legalist framework with strong preference for non-interventionism and peaceful conflict resolution; (c) a separation between domestic violence and international peace; and (d) ad hoc arrangements based on presidential involvement. These four images are part of public life and are important for understanding collective action in the region. They constitute a particular symbolic network which is bounded up with history (Castoriadis 1998). They are constantly on the move and exposed to contradictions although a

discourse on continuity has been developed by the local elites (Castoriadis 1998; Domingues 2013) and has been constantly reproduced through decision-making practices on peace and conflict in the region. Moreover, the images discussed in this chapter provide an interpretative tool for a better understanding of the social environment in which conflict resolution mechanisms can be built and developed in South America. We thus move to show how these four images are developed and reenacted in South America.

PLURAL ARCHITECTURE

One of the images of the conflict resolution experience in South America is a plural institutional architecture (Weiffen et al. 2013; Tavares 2014). The institutions that have conflict management experience in South America are hemispheric, involving South, Central and North American countries, as in the case of OAS; sub-regional, referring only to South America, for instance UNASUR; and lately also Latin American regionalization projects, such as ALBA and CELAC. Thus regional governance is based on different definitions of the region and on distinct forms of regionalism.

As the countries of the region have opted for different paradigms regarding regional cooperation, international insertion and relations with the United States, different arrangements for conflict resolution are in demand and can be created. Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua elected left-wing governments with projects to transform these societies and sought radical international realignments. In turn, Colombia has a strategic alliance with the United States, and Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay are ruled by governments that foster diversified relations in the international scenario.

These different symbolic and material conceptions of the region have allowed for regionalization processes with diverse regional bases and the creation of corresponding governance mechanisms. Some organizations were established during the Cold War and have been going through a process of structural change since the beginning of the 1990s; others have been created just recently. Today the plural architecture is widely consolidated and socially accepted and what we observe are movements of change regarding different emphasis on the role these organizations can play. In some cases the hemispheric architecture is seen as more suitable, or is just available, and in others South American mechanisms are in focus. In South America there is an emphasis on the role of UNASUR as a

conflict resolution forum but the OAS played a significant role in the 1990s and still has institutional capacities that we do not find elsewhere. CAN is a sub-regional organization created during the Cold War and CELAC is the newest addition to this architecture that can yet play a relevant role in terms of the discourses and practices it may enact.

The OAS is the most institutionalized and oldest regional organization, having been created in 1948 and tackling different kinds of security problems in the American hemisphere, including South America. It expresses a nineteenth-century view of the Americas as a region with clear predominance of the United States. Moreover, it has been seen as a policy instrument of the United States and is thus often criticized by actors who seek more autonomous political and normative projects. The range of activities in which it is involved grew after the end of the Cold War with the generation of new capabilities. The expansion of the international security agenda and the concept of security itself, the introduction of the concept of human security and the adoption of a multidimensional definition of security since 2003 have allowed the organization to expand its practical and symbolic engagement in conflict resolution. The 2003 Special Security Conference which took place in Mexico is considered a reference point for the discussion of security in the Western hemisphere. The final declaration (Declaration on Security in the Americas) defines security in multi-dimensional terms, calls for a flexible security architecture including different levels of association and presents a broadened vision of hemispheric security encompassing political, social, health and environmental aspects. The discourses and representations articulated in this document institute a reality that reaffirms the plural architecture image discussed here.

In fact, the hemispheric organization no longer holds the monopoly in the field of security. The narrative of 'South America' as a distinct region acquired particular importance since the 1990s. The regional dimension was clearly conceptualized in the 1990s in terms of the need for physical integration, that is, communication, transport and energy (Galvão 2009). The Initiative for the Integration of South American Infrastructure (IIRSA), stemming from the perception of an urgent need for physical integration, is a potent symbol of the new drive toward the definition of South America as source of identity.³ It drew on economic necessities, but also on the idea that South Americans are barred from each other by a geographic reality that needs to be surpassed, more specifically the Andean mountains and the Amazon basin. The reaction to the asymmetries of globalization or, in other terms, the consequences of the neo-liberal

agenda of the 1980s and 1990s, was an additional part of the discourse that created the possibilities for the generation of a collective representation of South America as a separate region and led to the demise of the project of regional economic integration in the Americas after 2005.⁴ The existence of left-leaning governments in several countries which stressed the importance of South American integration in the context of social and political change, and the change in foreign policies of important countries such as Chile (Heine 2006) also contributed to the construction of the idea of a South American region with a common destiny and common interests. Brazilian leadership has been crucial in this regard. Since the government of Itamar Franco (1992–1993), Brazil has opted for an emphasis on regional cooperation in South America (Hurrell 1998) and has been investing conceptually and pragmatically in this direction.

At the same time, the foreign policy of the United States toward the region also stimulated a differentiation between the sub-regions of the hemisphere (Hirst 2003). The creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, the preferential regime involving the Caribbean and Central America, the formation of the Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in 2002, and the definition of a zone of security which includes Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, are policies and conceptualizations emanating from Washington that have also stimulated the emphasis on South America as a distinct region,⁵ especially after the attacks of 11 September.

Thus, the articulation of the idea at the South American Summit of Heads of State in 2000 paved the way for the creation of the Union of South American Nations. The Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR was signed on 23 May 2008, at the third Summit of Heads of State, held in Brasília. The Permanent Secretariat is located in Quito, Ecuador. On 15 December 2008, during one of UNASUR's summits, the South American Defense Council was created for the coordination of military technology, resources and operations. In 2011 the Center of Strategic Studies on Defense was launched. The organization has drawn on the hemispheric organization as a model to follow and a process of norm diffusion from the OAS and from global institutions such as the United Nations is taking place. The Statute of the South American Defense Council makes direct references to the principles and purposes of the United Nations and of the OAS but also acknowledges that UNASUR may re-interpret and adapt these norms.

The Andean Community was created in 1969⁶ and the membership today includes Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, since Venezuela left

the organization in 2006. Chile is an associate member. CAN is geared toward regional trade integration and political coordination. A Free Trade Area has been in effect since 1993. Beyond its commercial relevance, the Andean Community can be seen as a social space with great symbolic relevance in terms of the regional representations it enacts. Since 2003, social development has been incorporated into the organization's objectives. In 2007, the Council of Indigenous People was created, involving for the first time a significant proportion of the population, a crucial issue for this part of the world. In the last 15 years, the organization has also played a role in defining meanings and practices of regional security, including the coordination of actions against drug trafficking.

The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA)⁷ was created in 2004 under the leadership of the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, and the Cuban president, Fidel Castro (Briceño Ruiz 2014). As an alternative to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), ALBA is based on the idea of the social, political and economic integration of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean.⁸ According to David Harris and Diego Azzi, ALBA represents a first attempt of regional integration that 'is not based primarily on trade liberalization but on a new vision of social welfare and equity' (Harris and Azzi 2006: 3).

One particularity of the discourse articulated in the ALBA refers to its confrontationalist and activist character. While UNASUR elaborates a more conciliatory regionalist discourse – which articulates much more a perspective of non-alignment with the US proposals – ALBA's discourse constructs the idea that a conflict exists between the ideal of a united Latin America and the social and economic model imposed on the region by North American imperialism. As suggested by Harris and Azzi, ALBA 'endeavors to re-write the core power structure and *raison d'être* for international cooperation while the CSN [Community of South American Nations] is . . . an effort to smooth out the bureaucratic obstacles in the way of the functioning of the current system' (Harris and Azzi 2006: 10). Moreover, ALBA can be defined as project supporting not only a counter-hegemonic perspective but specifically an activist discourse which elaborates on the necessity of all Latin American and Caribbean countries to engage in the realization of deep social and political reforms.

ALBA members have used their regular summits to define their positions within international organizations, where they regularly vote as a block (see Diamint 2013). Although ALBA's policy agenda includes some security and defense related issues,⁹ conflict resolution is not a central topic. On one

occasion, President Chávez was accepted as a mediator in the Colombian conflict; but since his death in 2013 there are no signs of ALBA advancing as a conflict resolution mechanism. Nevertheless, although the future of ALBA remains uncertain, it has been successful in articulating a singular and different representation of the region which eventually may impact on the prospects of peace, conflict and development – and on their inherent relationships – in the South American region.

The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was established in Mexico in 2010 with the merging of the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Summits process (CALC) (Sanahuja 2014). As a regional mechanism for political dialogue and for strengthening cooperation, CELAC is the only grouping which represents all 33 Latin American states and which deliberately excludes the United States and Canada. CELAC is the largest regional initiative since the creation of the OAS and it seeks to overcome the shortcomings of the hemispheric organization, especially in terms of its credibility as a conflict resolution mechanism that is not under the influence of the United States in Latin America. The presence of both Mexico and Brazil in a regional project may be a turning point for the region if the organization acquires symbolic and practical relevance. Although some countries such as Ecuador claim that CELAC should replace the OAS as main forum for conflict resolution, decisions taken so far do not point in this direction. On the contrary, the Latin American conflict resolution architecture is each day more plural and complex.

The image of plural architecture is thus reproduced as new and older organizations live side by side in the region and the creation of new organizations shifts resources, attention and roles but does not lead to the demise of older ones. In this perspective, the plural architecture plays an important part both in the definition of the forms of social interactions that take place at the regional level in South America and in the collective meanings assigned to the region itself.

LEGALISM, NON-INTERVENTIONISM AND PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

South America is a region of mostly small countries and has been affected since the independence wars of the 1820s by disputes between great powers, such as those between Great Britain and France; between the

United States and the Soviet Union; and today between the United States, the EU and China over influence and resources. In this context, national elites saw multilateralism as a form of protection from the asymmetry of power that marks the international insertion of the region. A rule-based system grounded on the legalist tradition of *jurisdicismo*¹⁰ and the lawful and peaceful resolution of controversies are considered essential to preserve the sovereignty of countries lacking significant power resources and to institutionalize the principle of non-intervention (Herz 2010, 2011).

The presence of the rule on peaceful conflict resolution is evidenced by the role of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), which encourage transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, and the level of investment made in this field. The Contadora Group, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, originally launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to South America (Rojas Aravena 2000). This was facilitated by the democratization of South American countries and the US government's move toward a more multilateral approach to the region in the 1990s. In addition, given the region's history of military intervention in public administration, local elites acquired greater interest in the subject due to the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in South America and the search for new roles and identities for the military. The approval of the American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999 at the OAS, the development of ECLAC's (Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean) common standardized methodology for the measurement of defense expenditures and the Inter-American Defense Board's preparation of an inventory of military security- and confidence-building measures put forward an agenda of transparency. Common military operations and mutual visits created a friendly relationship between the military establishments in the region. The OAS has been a major forum for the process of generating regional rules on security more generally and the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control. In the same vein, UNASUR developed a common methodology for the assessment of military spending and procedures and the South American Defense Council is tailored for a relevant role in enhancing confidence in the region. The regional organizations have been a social space where this image of relations based on peaceful conflict resolution has been repeatedly enacted for more than 30 years.

Numerous instances of dispute management between rivals present further evidence of the prevalence of the image of lawful and peaceful conflict resolution, such as the boundary dispute between Peru and Ecuador, which was finally settled after a conflict that left nearly one thousand dead combatants in 1995 (Herz and Nogueira 2005), or the improvement of relations between Brazil and Argentina and between Argentina and Chile after the mid-1980s. The OAS played a crucial part in the construction of the image in focus here. Since its creation, it served as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict. Apart from the OAS Charter, the 1948 Pact of Bogotá functions as a symbolic reference, reinforcing the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. Negotiation, mediation, technical support, verification and observation missions are the instruments available to the organization and in most instances the OAS has supported the return to stability or *status quo*. Regarding boundary disputes that are not arbitrated, the OAS has proven to be the most active regional forum for conflict resolution. In 2000, the organization created the Fund for Peace (commonly known as the Peace Fund), designed as a supportive tool for the peaceful resolution of border and territorial disputes – perceived as ‘a serious risk to hemispheric security’.¹¹ Since then, the Fund has aided in the achievement of peaceful solutions to disputes. Similarly, the OAS participated as a de facto mediator in the conflict between Colombia and Venezuela (1987) over the waters of the Gulf of Venezuela. Along with the International Court of Justice, it also played a role in the conflict between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel (1971–1984), facilitating mediation by the Vatican and acting in the background (Laudy 2000).

An OAS verification commission was also created to deal with the tensions between Ecuador and Colombia (2008). Colombia continuously accused Ecuador of harboring FARC guerrillas and Ecuador, in turn, accused Colombia of violating its sovereignty as a result of military incursions. The OAS was the forum where the issue was debated; the organization adopted a resolution stating that Colombia violated Ecuador’s sovereignty by launching a military raid into its territory, but a formal condemnation was avoided. A commission was created to visit Ecuador and Colombia to investigate the Colombian incursion. Colombia and Ecuador established three bilateral working groups: security and anti-crime measures; border development; and ‘sensitive matters’. The Carter Center and the OAS helped mediate the latter group.

Since the creation of UNASUR, inter- and intra-state crises in South America have increasingly been addressed by sub-regional instances rather

than by the OAS. Weiffen et al. (2013) argue that UNASUR has developed important ad hoc practices for crisis management in South America, even though crisis response initiatives were not part of its original mandate. According to these authors, these developments might be interpreted as an attempt to substitute the OAS with regard to conflict resolution in South America in order to prevent the US involvement in the region. Three specific cases exemplify how UNASUR has been taking a leading role in addressing intra- and inter-state crises in South America: the internal crisis in Bolivia in 2008; the regional crisis ignited by an agreement between the United States and Colombia for the deployment of American military personnel in Colombian bases in 2009; and tensions between Colombia and Venezuela in 2010. These situations show that UNASUR has become the social space through which Latin American countries could deal with and limit the US presence in the region (Flemes et al. 2011: 118–22).

During the internal crisis in Bolivia in 2008, UNASUR proved to be a relevant forum for conflict resolution. The provinces of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija demanded higher revenues from the hydrocarbon tax as well as regional autonomy from the central government and even threatened to secede. The conflict escalated in September 2008, and clashes between President Evo Morales's sympathizers and those supporting autonomy resulted in approximately 30 deaths. UNASUR supported Bolivia's constitutional government, territorial integrity and negotiations on crucial issues regarding the federation. Former Chilean Foreign Minister Juan Gabriel Valdés was appointed as UNASUR's special envoy to Bolivia. In this case the existence of this forum was crucial as the legitimacy of a purely South American forum was greater. Yet, it should be noted that Dante Caputo, a former Argentine Foreign Affairs minister and then head of the OAS Secretariat for Political Affairs, was also present in Bolivia as a special envoy from OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza.

During the 2009 summit of UNASUR in Argentina, the regional tensions generated by the new accord between the United States and Colombia regarding the use of Colombian bases by US armed forces were the focus of debates and negotiations. UNASUR was the forum where regional states were able to express their concern and reach a common position. The resolution mentions both the importance of the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism and the respect for sovereignty of the countries of the region in the case of the presence of foreign military forces. The need to discuss the war in Colombia in a multilateral context

was also put forward, and it was made clear that Colombia should share information on the deal with the United States and that activities of US forces should take place only within Colombian territory (Battagliano 2015).

In 2010, UNASUR played a central role in mitigating the crisis between Colombia and Venezuela when President Uribe accused Venezuela of harboring FARC fighters. The Colombian government requested an urgent extraordinary session of the OAS Permanent Council to investigate the sheltering of FARC leaders in Venezuela. In response, President Chávez stalled all diplomatic relations with Colombia and called for an emergency meeting of UNASUR's foreign ministers. He declared that he would only accept UNASUR's mediation as from his point of view the OAS was a platform for US interventionism and had no jurisdiction to intervene. After the election of Juan Manuel Santos the two countries announced that they would restore diplomatic relations and establish five commissions to deal with the different issues that had originally provoked the bilateral tensions.

As the South American Defense Council started to work on measures to prevent crises and reduce regional uncertainty, UNASUR became a more relevant and institutionalized actor in the field of conflict resolution (Battagliano 2012). Mechanisms for consultation, information sharing and evaluation of risks for peace were put in place. UNASUR's short existence already allows us to verify that it also is a social space where the regional norms are being reproduced. Thus the defense of legality and sovereignty can be observed in the practice of the organization. Similarly, as CELAC starts its work it also became a forum where this image of legalism, non-interventionism and peaceful conflict resolution is enacted. In 2015, in the framework of the third CELAC Summit, member states adopted a declaration reiterating their full support for Argentina's 'legitimate' rights over the Falklands/Malvinas and calling again on the good offices of Ban Ki-Moon to help start negotiations on the Argentina/UK dispute.

The scope of peaceful conflict resolution was broadened in the 1990s as the concept of security in South America was expanded to incorporate not only new dimensions and sources of threat, but also a growing concern with international norms, such as the Western hemisphere's democratic paradigm (Herz 2010). Institutional crises in the countries of the region that threaten to undermine democratic procedures are treated as a regional governance issue. Regional conflict resolution practices were expanded to

deal with one of the most traditional domestic conflict resolution mechanism, democracy itself. The OAS took the lead in generating the hemispheric paradigm that associates security and democracy. Regarding internal crisis management, since the 1990s the OAS has acquired experience and developed a normative basis and institutional devices to intervene in the case of a threat to the democratic institutional process. In 2001 the Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalizing the democratic paradigm and creating procedures both for cases of disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a *coup d'état* was attempted against President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela in 2002. Mechanisms employed by the OAS to defend democracy include dialogue tables (*mesa de diálogo*) or mediation missions to foster dialogue. Moreover the Secretary General or his deputy has a role to play in crisis situations. The Secretary General's special representatives and envoys are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere's trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS missions (Cooper and Legler 2006).

The other regional organizations also adopted rules regarding democracy as a legitimate governing regime. When a group of soldiers kidnapped President Correa in Quito in 2010, UNASUR condemned the attempted coup and later on decided to adopt an Additional Protocol to the organization's Constitutive Treaty. The Protocol stipulates a number of institutional, political and economic sanctions (including the closure of borders and the suspension of political and commercial relations) that may be imposed on any member country that breaks or attempts to break the constitutional order.¹² Two years later President Lugo of Paraguay was impeached. Both UNASUR and MERCOSUR considered the procedure to be undemocratic and treated it as an interruption of the constitutional order, and hence the country was suspended. Within CAN, the Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement establishes democracy as a norm, providing for the suspension of member states in the case of a break with democratic regimes. CELAC adopted the Special Statement on the Defense of Democracy and Constitutional Order at its first summit in 2011, which also condemns the break of constitutional orders and allows for the issue to be brought to discussion within the organization.

All above-mentioned cases exemplify how hemispheric norms that associate security and democracy add to the regional tradition of peaceful conflict resolution by offering novel governance mechanisms for dealing with political instability within and between South American countries

(Herz 2010). Nonetheless, they also pose a challenge to the traditional concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention, as they may allow for a greater degree of interference in the internal political affairs. These tensions certainly prevented the emergence of clear, institutionalized mechanisms of conflict resolution at the regional level and, in turn, favor the tendency to rely on ad hoc arrangements for the peaceful settlement of conflicts (as will be addressed below).

In sum, the sometimes reinforcing, sometimes tense interaction between the three principles of peaceful conflict resolution, legalism and non-intervention deeply impacts on how South America deals with conflicts at the regional level. Regional mechanisms of conflict resolution have historically evolved in relation to the concern over US interventions. Recently, the prominence of UNASUR as a forum for discussing and dealing with regional crises has demonstrated that the South American countries tend to privilege sub-regional mechanisms of conflict resolution rather than resorting to a hemispheric institution, such as the OAS. Additionally, since the 1990s, the expansion of the principle of peaceful conflict resolution due to the emergence of the democratic paradigm created tensions with the principle of non-intervention. Although the concepts of legalism, non-intervention and peaceful conflict resolution have been traditionally imagined in South America as a package of mutually reinforcing principles, they are not free of tensions and contradictions between each other. Still, this image of legalism, non-interventionism and peaceful conflict resolution is related to the forging of an image of South America as a 'zone of peace', which crystallizes the divide between domestic and international conflict dynamics, as will be discussed below.

SEPARATING THE DOMESTIC AND THE INTERNATIONAL

The image of a separation between domestic violence and international peace in South America institutes a reality which is informed by historical experiences of social interaction in the region. Historically there is a low level of external rivalry and violence among South American countries. The end of colonialism and of imperial rule in the region has been supported by a collective understanding and a normative framework in which practices of intervention are regarded as exceptional. Nevertheless, violence is pervasive in social interaction in the region. The historical process leading to the constitution of South American states in the post-colonial period have generated faulty bureaucracies, rigid political

hierarchies and strong social exclusions, challenging the implementation of democratic and human rights. Moreover, since many countries in the region have a recent past of conflict or authoritarian rule, violence is often normalized as a means of solving disputes internally.

If we focus on inter-state wars, as generally understood by the specialized literature, South America is indeed a peaceful and stable region when compared to other parts of the world, accounting for no more than two inter-state wars since the end of the Second World War: between Peru and Ecuador in 1995 over territorial demarcation; and between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982 regarding sovereignty rights over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. The specialized knowledge on peace and security has highlighted this characteristic. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, since the end of the Cold War the Americas have been the second most peaceful region in the world.¹³ The region has often been described as a ‘zone of peace’ or as a pluralistic security community (Hurrell 1998; Kacowicz 2000; Domínguez et al. 2003; Oelsner 2003; Miller 2007), where international conflicts are scarce and frequently settled via peaceful means.¹⁴

Regional organizations have been the chosen social space where this narrative has been built, consolidating an image of peaceful external relations. The reference to the region as a *zone of peace* or a *zone free of weapons of mass destruction* has been repeatedly made. In 1991, the Cartagena Declaration on Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was issued, supporting the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1999, MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile declared a Zone of Peace.¹⁵ As part of the process for the building of a specifically South American regional process in 2002, the Presidents of South America met in Ecuador and declared South America a Zone of Peace and Cooperation.¹⁶ Later several UNASUR declarations reiterated this idea.

The Andean Charter for Peace and Security and the Limitation and Control of the Expenditure on Foreign Defense was agreed by the Foreign Ministers in 2002 and established a peace zone in the Andean Community.¹⁷ The Charter includes several commitments: to ban landmines; to eradicate the illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and related materials; to consolidate the ban on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; to have Latin America declared a zone free from air-to-air missiles beyond visual range and medium- and long-range strategic missile; and to continue the application and the strengthening of various

confidence-building measures (such as agreements on prior notice of military exercises, establishing mutual confidence or security zones in border areas, rounds of talks between military high commands, and joint exercises). Two years later CAN adopted the Guidelines of the Andean Policy on External Security which further reinforces the discourse on peaceful relations in the sub-region. Reiterating the same image in 2014, CELAC leaders adopted a declaration in Havana proclaiming Latin America and the Caribbean as a ‘zone of peace’.

Nevertheless, the region is only peaceful from this very specific point of view. Peace in the outside has been matched with violence inside – a situation that Miguel Angel Centeno has called a ‘violent form of peace’ when referring to Latin America (Centeno 2002). Twelve intra-state wars occurred in Latin America since the 1950s, according to the Correlates of War Project.¹⁸ When measured by the homicide rate, Latin America has 14 of the 20 most dangerous countries in the world.¹⁹ Drug trafficking, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and the institutional fragilities of states generate violence and do not allow for social and economic development to spread. Most local law enforcement agencies are poorly funded and equipped and are unable to deal with the level of criminalization sweeping the region. One cannot forget that in the last decade more than one million people died in the broader Latin American and Caribbean region as a result of criminal activity.²⁰ Still, local elites have been relatively successful in building a narrative that insulates this reality of domestic violence from international politics. Such understanding is sustained by two moves: drawing a divide between the *domestic* and the *international* that characterizes the modern Westphalian system of sovereign states (Herz 2010) and constructing a discourse of a peaceful region as we have just seen.

In spite of that, a number of conflicts and crises make it clear that a definitive division between ‘domestic violence’ and ‘international security’ is difficult to be promoted in practice. Transnational criminality creates a huge challenge to this narrative, making this approach increasingly unsustainable. In this context, although different mechanisms that deal with ‘transnationalized’ domestic problems from a regional security perspective have been created, they hardly dialogue with a narrative of conflict management. Thus, regional organizations have dealt with criminality and more specifically drug trafficking separately although as yet ineffectively.²¹

The civil war in Colombia stands out regarding this situation. Although being a result of complex internal dynamics of violence, the Colombian

conflict has been the object of international mediation and conflict resolution attempts at least since the 1980s (Bayer 2013). This was largely a consequence of the internationalization of the conflict, due to the spillover effect on the neighboring countries,²² the US presence in the form of military aid and military advisors, and the intercession between the war and transnational criminality (Viana 2009). The most recent – and successful – attempt to mediate the conflict was put forward by national and international actors alike (the latter being Cuba and Norway). Notably, in Cuba, delegations from the Colombian government and from the FARC discussed a broad range of issues related to the conflict, including matters that would be considered of ‘domestic concern’, such as drug policy reform, but that came to be interpreted as essential for reaching a successful settlement for this last-longing national and regional crisis (Dario 2014).

Similarly, a militarized approach to fighting transnational criminality and insurgent activity also impacts on inter-state relations within South America, the most recent examples being the reiterated crises between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Beyond the already mentioned regional crisis provoked by the military cooperation agreement between Colombia and the United States in 2009 – which was explicitly and collectively addressed by UNASUR as a regional security problem – a controversy revived the animosity between those three neighbors in 2008, as Ecuador and Venezuela claimed that a Colombian military operation against FARC violated Ecuadorian territorial sovereignty. Military incursions against the guerrilla groups in Colombia were significantly intensified in the 2000s when the anti-drug and anti-terrorist narratives converged on the political agenda and Colombia repeatedly accused Venezuela of sheltering FARC leaders on its territory (Fuentes and Fuentes 2004).

In sum, although the region has developed different mechanisms to deal separately with ‘domestic security concerns’ and ‘regional and international security issues’, this divide is hardly sustainable. Indeed, the depiction of South America as a ‘zone of peace’ is contestable, as countries are confronted with complex internal violence which also impacts on regional relations at the inter-state level. Additionally, recent developments have shown that international approaches to conflict resolution, as in the case of Colombia, need to go beyond this narrative to address ‘transnationalized’ domestic problems, such as criminality, drug trafficking, guerrilla activity and so on, in order to be effective.

AD HOC MECHANISMS

Ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty, the Summits of the Americas, the Meeting of Defense Ministers and the Summit Meetings of South American Presidents, have played a relevant role in conflict resolution in South America and Latin America more generally by fostering an environment favorable to peaceful conflict resolution. The most prominent example is the Contadora Group, formed by the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, which played a crucial part in proposing peaceful solutions to the Central American civil wars in the 1980s together with its support group formed by Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay. The Rio Group was established in 1986 as a result of the merger of the Contadora Group and the support group.

The Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty are a group of four countries (United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile) established by a 1942 Rio Protocol which was intended to bring the long-running territorial dispute between the two countries to an end. Observers from the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile co-signed the document, thus becoming 'Guarantors of the Protocol'. After the 1995 Cenepa War a ceasefire was brokered by the four guarantor countries, and subsequently the Itamaraty Peace Declaration was signed on 17 February 1995. The group mediated the negotiations between Peru and Ecuador that ultimately led to the signing of a definitive peace agreement (the Brasilia Presidential Act) on 26 October 1998.²³

As the region moved toward greater coordination of activities on the hemispheric level in the 1990s, meetings between heads of states and ministers became a common feature of the regional political landscape. Institutionalized gatherings of the heads of state and government of the Western hemisphere have occurred since 1994 to define the economic, political and security agendas for cooperation. The first Summit of the Americas took place in Miami in 1994, the most recent one in Panama in 2015.²⁴ The Miami Summit in 1994 also established the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, which took place for the first time in 1995. The agenda included confidence-building measures, the role of the armed forces, the military and the protection of the environment, mine clearing, economic development and political stability, peace operations and drug-traffic, as well as the production of white papers on defense policy.

The South American Summit of Heads of State was convened for the first time in 2000 as part of the process of building a South American identity (that later on led to the foundation of UNASUR). The role played by presidents and foreign ministers in negotiations and the lack of more institutionalized conflict resolution arrangements inside UNASUR has defined the shape of conflict resolution experiences in South America and contributed to strengthening the image of ad hoc initiatives. This experience can be understood as part of a political culture where presidential leadership is considered fundamental and fits well with the principle of inter-governmentalism which is a core part of the regional imagination. It allows for flexibility and adaptation but hinders the construction of institutional capability in the field of conflict resolution and mediation.

The tendency to rely on ad hoc groups to solve disputes in the region reveals how the images discussed previously in this chapter are conceptually and pragmatically interrelated. A recent situation illustrating this argument occurred after the MERCOSUR Summit in July 2015 when the President of Guyana David Granger requested that Brazil mediate the long-standing territorial dispute between his country and Venezuela. The disagreement between the two states had come to the fore because of the discovery and exploration of offshore oil in the maritime area in dispute. Contesting the position taken by Guyana, the president of Venezuela recently announced that he will bring the issue to the next UNASUR Summit while he has also requested the United Nations to mediate the dispute. In this regard, plural institutional architecture, peaceful conflict resolution and ad hoc processes are confirmed as part of the way the South American region has been collectively represented and formed into practice.

CONCLUSION

The regional organizations we look into here have been the social space where four images have been developed, reproduced and legitimized: a plural institutional architecture; a legalist framework and strong preference for peaceful conflict resolution; a separation between domestic violence and international peace; the tendency to rely on ad hoc arrangements based on presidential involvement. The images discussed in this chapter help to interpret the social environment in which conflict resolution mechanisms are built in South America. Moreover, rather than being

perceived as a reflection of an external political reality in South America these four images are politically constitutive of this (regional) reality. It means that they are not merely a passive medium in which social action takes place. These images, and the region they enact, are social constructs that are created in political, economic, cultural and administrative practices and in discourses (Paasi 1986; Neumann 1994, 2003).

Interactions inside regional organizations such as those approached in this chapter are part of a broader region-building process in which particular definitions of the South American region are articulated, imagined and enacted. This chapter has shown how the ‘institutionalization of the region’ (Paasi 1986) in South America takes place through the creation of collective representations and specific images of social interaction in the domain of conflict resolution. Of course other social spaces such as forms of elite interaction within the state apparatus and in other forms of associations are also crucial for the production of the four images presented here.

As we have seen, regional governance mechanisms are the result of political projects to promote intergovernmental collaboration within a region. Thus we cannot forget that the images in place can be transformed, particularly when elements of the image change, as in the case of the legalist framework, where the expansion of peaceful conflict management to the defense of democracy challenges the principle of non-intervention; when they are unsustainable, as in the case of the separation between a peaceful region and domestic and transnational violence; or when more investment is needed in order to create capabilities, an effort which is blocked by the image of ad hoc conflict resolution. On the one hand, the regional organizations discussed here have had success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating; on the other hand a debate exists on the (still) low level of accumulated institutional capability to deal with conflict resolution. In particular, the limitations and institutional fragilities of those organizations that exclude the northern part of the hemisphere (ALBA, CELAC and UNASUR) is striking and will demand attention if the image of plural architecture is to move toward a combination of acceptance of plurality and the development of creative conflict resolution mechanisms. The plural architecture image may be confronted with competitive dynamics between regional organizations, as evidenced by the ongoing competition between the OAS and UNASUR for relevance and resources. Yet, given the embeddedness of this image in the region, there is a tendency toward complementarity, the fulfillment of different roles and eventual common projects.

NOTES

1. The term 'conflict resolution' is commonly used to refer both to the *process* (or the intention) of changing the violent behavior and hostile attitudes of parties in conflict and to the *completion of a process* of peaceful change, including addressing the deep-rooted sources of a conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 31). In this chapter, 'conflict resolution' refers to institutional mechanisms created to resolve disputes peacefully, such as via negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and so on.
2. For this concept and discussion, see Onuf (1989).
3. The South American Regional Integration Initiative, created in late 2000 with the participation of the 12 countries of South America, seeks the physical interconnection of the region, energy integration and changes to legislation, rules and national regulations that hinder commerce and investment.
4. In 1994, 34 countries in the Western hemisphere agreed to construct a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), but by 2005 it became clear the project would not come to fruition. Also in 1994 Canada, Mexico and the United States signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), creating a trilateral trade bloc in North America.
5. The relation between Colombia and the United States is an exception since these countries have developed a strategic partnership based on a narrative of cooperation and assistance (see the chapter by Cepeda and Tickner in this volume).
6. Its initial name was Andean Pact; it was renamed Andean Community in 1996.
7. It was initially called 'Alternative' instead of 'Alliance', but the name was changed on 24 June 2009.
8. Since its founding in Cuba in 2004, ALBA has grown from two to eleven members: Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela.
9. ALBA members have expressed their desire to establish a military component as part of the counter-hegemonic agenda of the bloc. During the seventh ALBA Summit in Bolivia (2009) a mutual defense pact was discussed and, although this pact has not evolved, a Regional Defense School was established in Santa Cruz, Bolivia.
10. Understood as a traditional foreign policy image conceived regionally and related to the respect for international normative frameworks. *Jurisdicismo* also refers to a political argument commonly used as a reference for the definition and evaluation of foreign policy discourses and practices in the region.

11. See the Organization of American States' webpage on the Peace Fund, available at <http://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/peacefund/> (28 June 2015).
12. In the case of MERCOSUR the Ushuaia Protocol of 1998 established the connection between the integration process and the existence of democratic institutions (Ribeiro Hoffmann 2005), and also stipulated that any rupture in the member-states' democratic system would be submitted to due procedures, from diplomatic consultations to sanctions. The Montevideo Protocol of 2011 includes additional possibilities of sanctions in the case of democratic rupture in a member state. On regional democracy clauses, also see the chapter by Weiffen in this volume.
13. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2008, available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/graphs/charts_and_graphs.htm (2 July 2015).
14. For an alternative view see Mares (2001) and the chapter by Mares in this book.
15. Political Declaration of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile as a Zone of Peace, available at <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/70988.htm> (28 June 2015).
16. OAS, 'A History of Peace Initiatives in the Americas', available at https://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/publications/Peace_Initiatives_in_the_Americas.pdf (28 June 2015).
17. Refer to the record of the Foreign Ministers' conference, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/actas/compromiso_lima.htm (2 July 2015).
18. Colombia, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Chile and Haiti.
19. Number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, according to Instituto Igarapé's Homicide Monitor, available at <http://homicide.igarape.org.br> (5 November 2015).
20. UNODC Global Study on Homicide, available at <https://www.unodc.org/gsh/> (2 July 2015).
21. Recent efforts to add non-traditional conflicts in accounts on conflict resolution include Fuentes and Fuentes (2004) in an attempt to look at conflict resolution efforts through the concept of Latin American 'vulnerabilities'; a compilation organized by the School for Conflict Resolution and Analysis at George Mason University in partnership with the University for Peace (Pfund 2014); and the works of organizations such as Conciliation Resources, the Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research (CRIES) and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF).
22. Colombia shares a 1,367 mile border with Venezuela, approximately 1,000 miles each with Peru and Brazil, and smaller borders with Ecuador and Panama.
23. Another example for ad hoc initiatives is the group of friendly states to the peace talks in Colombia – Costa Rica, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela.

24. Heads of state have met to define the economic, political and security agendas for cooperation in the hemisphere. After the first Summit of the Americas, the event was also organized in 1998, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2012 and 2015. The Summit Implementation Review Group is the core management body of the Summit Process.

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Is Regionalism Still a Viable Option for the Creation and Maintenance of Peace and Security in Latin America?

Kai Enno Lehmann

INTRODUCTION

Latin America is one of the most peaceful regions on earth in terms of military conflicts (UCDP 2008). At the same time, it is the continent which is home to the world's longest-running civil conflict in Colombia and three of the world's most violent countries (Venezuela, Honduras and El Salvador), making it the most violent region on earth outside warzones (UNODC 2014).

The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the role of regionalism in addressing this paradox. Its particular focus is on intra-state conflict and violence, with all the consequences these phenomena have for social, economic and political development. Such an undertaking takes on extra significance considering the crisis that many commentators – such as Malamud (2012) – have argued is currently afflicting Latin American regionalism. This crisis, as will be shown, is primarily due to the fact that Latin American states have very different ideas about the role regionalism should play in the region. This is reflected in the aims, objectives and political processes of the numerous regional and

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sub-regional organizations that exist in Latin America, which are marked by overlapping memberships, aims and objectives, and weak institutional structures, making it anything but easy for these organizations to develop a clear and consistent line of action, and leaving them hostage to the changing political will of member states. In short, Latin American regionalism is characterized by lack of common ground and too many differences, leading to political weakness.

After a historical review, the chapter will look into the repercussions of intra-state conflict and the current security situation in Central America and Colombia as specific case studies with the aim of answering the question as to whether regionalism does and *can* play a significant role addressing the immense, but evolving, security challenges faced by Latin America and, if so, how this can be done. In answering these questions, the empirical part of this work relies substantially on interviews with senior diplomats and policy-makers from the region conducted between 2013 and 2015.

THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Regionalism – understood as a concept whereby ‘state and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region’ (Fawcett 2005: 24) – has a long history in Latin America. In 1826 Simon Bolívar convened the first Pan-American Congress in response to the emergence of the Concert of Europe in 1815 and the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which declared Latin America a region of strategic interest to the United States (Pastor 2005). There were three more meetings of a similar nature in subsequent decades and, towards the end of the century, the foundation of the Pan-American Union set off another series of international conferences. However, Bolívar’s dream of Pan-American unity never got off the ground, hindered by disagreements about the specific aims and scope of the project, foreshadowing a recurring problem which haunts Latin American regionalism until today (Malamud 2010).

It was only after the Second World War that regionalism returned to occupy a prominent position on the political agenda (Nogués and Quintanilla 1993: 280). During the next 20 to 30 years a large number of initiatives were launched, most notably the Organization of American States (OAS 1948), the Latin American Free Trade Association

(LAFTA, 1960), the Central American Common Market (CACM, 1960) or the Andean Pact (1969), amongst others. What is noticeable about these organizations was, first, their heavy economic focus and, second, the *sub*-regional nature of the vast majority of them, with the notable exception of the OAS, to be analysed in more detail below. This was a consequence of profound disagreements over the strategic objectives to be pursued and different views on some of the key issues facing and shaping the respective organizations (Lehmann 2013). Whilst, for instance, Latin American countries mainly pursued a strategy of ‘closed’ regionalism in terms of economic development – for instance through import substitution (Cheibub et al. 2011) – there were profound political disagreements with regard to the Cold War and the relationship with the United States. For some of its southern neighbours, regionalism was an instrument to shield Latin America from the influence of the United States, seeing it as one way of rescuing or recovering some of its own autonomy. For others, in turn, it was a way of ensuring American influence, anchoring the participant countries to the American block and enjoying security in return. Often these competing visions led to severe tension between and within Latin American countries (Smith 2007).

It therefore comes as no surprise that the first wave of regionalism had relatively few tangible results (Keen and Haynes 2008). Regardless of Latin American states’ position towards the United States, that country exercised an enormous influence over the region so that room for manoeuvre was limited – even more so in the systemic context of the Cold War, cementing the perception of a relationship between ‘unequal partners’ (Pastor 2005). However, this fact only reinforces the broader argument that *states*, and their presidents in particular, continue to be the dominant players in the development of regionalism in the Americas, at the expense of international organizations that have been deliberately kept weak in institutional and political terms (Keen and Haynes 2008) – a regionalism marked by ‘presidentialism’ (Cheibub et al. 2011).

It was only during the second wave of regionalism, from the early 1990s onwards, that South American governments arrived at some sort of consensus about what regionalism should be for: inspired by the processes of re-democratization in the region, the end of the Cold War, and the success of initiatives like the European Single Market, regionalism became a vehicle for democratic consolidation, economic openness and

political liberalism (European Commission 2009). It was *not*, as will be spelled out in the case studies below, primarily an instrument for the management of regional security.

Yet, little of this unity survives today, and the region and its regional groupings are facing significant difficulties in both strategic and practical terms. One key factor explaining these difficulties is a definite cooling of interest in regionalism. As Malamud (2012) put it, ‘sovereignty is back, integration out’. One senior Central American diplomat put it equally succinctly when he stated that ‘we talk about regionalism in our meetings but forget all about it as soon as we get back [to our countries]’.¹ This trend has to do with how regionalism is seen by many governments in the region: a pragmatic tool to resolve specific problems, as one Brazilian ambassador put it.² A second factor is the general perception amongst policy-makers that the region is marked by ‘stability’ and ‘democracy, democracy, democracy’.³ Therefore, there is often no apparent need for regionalism. Thirdly, regionalism has always been ‘done’ in a context in which any *infringement* on the sovereignty of other members was politically impossible. In fact, as hinted at above, for some, regionalism was a tool precisely to *protect* sovereignty (Lehmann 2013). As such, regionalism has often had a *negative* connotation, something to be done to protect oneself *against* someone else, be it the United States or former European colonial powers (Lehmann et al. 2014).

The above plays into another factor: increasing divergence amongst regional governments about the models to be pursued in search of economic development and bigger international influence. There are, on the one hand, governments like the one in Venezuela, which are seeking to ‘overthrow’ the current liberal economic order in pursuit of the ‘socialism of the 21st century’ (Tayler 2014). On the other hand, one can find the ‘free-marketeers’ in Latin America, principally Chile – a country that has largely stayed at the margins of regional organizations – and Colombia, at odds with its neighbour Venezuela, and clearly intent on inserting the country deeper into the world economy, as the recent Free Trade agreement (alongside Peru) with the European Union (EU) demonstrates (European Commission 2012a). This leaves a third group of what one might call ‘pragmatists’, such as Brazil (Lees 2014).

Bearing this panorama in mind, regional security cooperation has always been difficult, especially since all regional and sub-regional organizations in the Americas explicitly reject any notion of constructing frameworks for supranational integration (Nolte 2014). However, this

is not to say that there were no attempts at all of using regional institutions to address such questions. In fact, the OAS, in particular, clearly can be evaluated as a security institution.

SECURITY AND REGIONALISM: THE OAS AS THE ODD ONE OUT?

The OAS has to be seen in the context of the Cold War. Ever since the end of the Second World War there was a concern about the security of the United States' 'backyard' in the context of the superpower dispute with the Soviet Union. According to Keller (2013: 547), there was broad agreement between the United States and Latin America for the need of some type of security cooperation. Out of this emerged, during the 1947 Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, commonly known as the Rio Treaty or Rio Pact which stated clearly that 'an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered an attack against all the American States' (OAS 1947). Yet, even this treaty was not quite as unequivocal as it seems. It left it up to individual member states 'to decide its own immediate response to any assault until a collective agreement could be reached' (OAS 1947). At no point was a *pooling* of sovereignty envisaged.

The Rio Pact was a forerunner to the OAS, which was formed with the signing of the Charter of the OAS and the Pact of Bogotá in 1948, the most tangible result of the ninth conference of the Pan-American Union already mentioned above, which had first met in 1989–1990. The aim of the OAS was to 'achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence' (OAS 1948). The charter stated clearly that it did not interfere with the sovereignty of any of its signatory states, a commitment which laid the ground for a key principle of the OAS *modus operandi*: it can only act if asked by member-state governments to do so.⁴

Over the years, there has been an intense debate about the role the OAS has played in Latin America, especially during the Cold War. For its critics, the organization essentially served United States' interests. Rabe (1999) argued that the OAS was a tool to contain any possible communist advance into the Americas, as had occurred in Cuba. However, others claimed that the OAS, at times, had a key role in re-establishing or

preserving stability and security in Latin America. According to Herz (2008: 12), the OAS ‘has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating’. Critically, this applied to inter- as well as intra-state conflicts, suggesting that the OAS became an accepted forum for conflict prevention and resolution in the Americas, such as the war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969. Keller (2013: 13) specifically refers to Nicaragua as a case where the OAS ‘played [a] crucial role in helping resolve the long internal conflict by serving as mediators, proposing compromises that neither side could have suggested without appearing weak, and monitoring the implementation of the peace agreements’. However, one should also not overstate the security role of the OAS. As Shaw (2004) has illustrated, in several key conflicts during the Cold War, the organization was noticeable for its absence. For instance, the 1981 territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru was not mediated through official channels at the OAS, but via ad hoc negotiations with shifting participants. Equally, the OAS remained passive in the face of the 1989 invasion of Panama by the United States. In other words, geopolitical circumstances impacted significantly on whether and how the organization acted.

With the end of the Cold War, three key developments emerged. One is the changing nature of the security threats faced by the region (Pothuraju 2012). Second, the region passed through a process of re-democratization and democratic consolidation. Together, these developments left regional organizations with an urgent need to re-evaluate their role, purpose and objective. The third trend is the proliferation of regional and, in particular, sub-regional organizations (Glickhouse 2012). All three points are interlinked.

In relation to the first, Herz (2011) has shown that the security priorities of the OAS changed considerably since the 1990s. Rather than being concerned about civil wars or interstate conflicts, today the main security threats in the region are considered to be ‘illegal drug trafficking, increased crime rates, illegal firearms, extreme levels of social inequality and poverty’ (Pothuraju 2012: 1). One-third of all the world’s homicides are committed in Latin America. Countries like Honduras, El Salvador and Venezuela are amongst the most violent countries on earth (UNODC 2014).

In relation to the second point, the key focus for the OAS during the 1990s was the consolidation of democracy and the reorganization of civil-military relations. Herz (2011: 75) has called this the ‘rationalizing role of an international organization’ in order to ensure the ‘maintenance

of order'. To this end, the OAS adopted Resolution 1080 of 1991, followed by the Washington Protocol of 1992 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001, which oblige member states to maintain a democratic political system with the threat of suspension from the OAS should the democratic order be dismantled (OAS 1991, 2001; also see Heine and Weiffen 2015).

In respect of the third key development, the OAS served as something of an example to follow in the subsequent decades which were marked by a proliferation of (sub-)regional organizations. Virtually all of them developed activities also covered by the OAS, such as the adoption of democracy clauses, fostering dialogue between different political and social actors, confidence building measures between old adversaries as well as actions to foster economic development, which has often been linked to the problem of violence and state weakness (see Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012).

What one could witness, then, since the 1990s was a widening, both in terms of the number of regional organizations that exist and in terms of the issues these organizations seek to tackle. For instance, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was formed between 12 South American states with the aim of 'developing cooperative mechanisms to resolve various security challenges', ranging from drug trafficking and extraordinary levels of violent crime to occasional political instability in a number of countries (Pothuraju 2012: 2). One of the key aims of UNASUR was the physical integration of the region as a way of improving the clearly deficient regional infrastructure, but also to create mechanisms and processes through which common challenges could be identified, discussed and addressed (Briceño Ruiz 2010). Equally, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), created in 2010, has sought to encourage 'respectful dialogue among all countries in the region in areas such as social development, education, nuclear disarmament, family farming, culture, finance, energy and the environment' (CELAC 2011). With this, the concept of 'security' was broadened considerably to include human security, human rights, and social and economic well-being. Security, therefore, became a concept much more focused on groups of people and the individual rather than merely on regional macro-level security. It evolved into a concept which included a host of domestic security concerns for citizens rather than interstate violence.

Yet, this broadening of the security agenda, as well as the proliferation of organizations concerned with, at least, some aspects of this agenda does not

represent a maturing of Latin American regionalism. Instead, this development underscores significant problems that Latin American regionalism is facing in finding a significant role. As will be shown, the new security challenges, while differing somewhat between Central and South America, are part of a broader pattern of problems that are common to the entire region.

CENTRAL AMERICA: WEAK STATES AND THE CHALLENGE OF CAPACITY BUILDING

Perhaps more than any other sub-region of the Americas, Central America represents a test-case for the role of regionalism as an instrument for confronting evolving security challenges. Marked during the Cold War by almost constant instability and conflicts, and today a classic case of a region which faces the ‘new’ types of security challenges touched upon above, it is also a region which has, at least on paper, embraced regionalism as a political instrument to resolve these issues.

Multilateral efforts to influence Central America during the Cold War were always problematic due to geo-political realities (Hoste 1999). This reality is reflected by the fact that the OAS intervened somewhat selectively in the numerous Central American crises during this period. For instance, the OAS did not prevent the Guatemalan coup of 1954. Equally, in numerous instances the organization did not uphold the principle of non-intervention, but tolerated interference into domestic affairs, mostly by the United States (Herz 2008). Bearing in mind the dominant role of the United States in the region, it should not come as a surprise that most attempts at integration in Central America during this time focused on economic and trade issues, culminating with the declared aim of establishing a CACM in 1960 (Abrahanson 2008: 4).

Yet, the absence of a *formal* process of regionalism in the security sphere did not mean the absence of *any* kind of regional initiatives in order to address the conflicts that swept the region, nor does it mean that particular objectives cannot be realized. For instance, critical in the peace processes which eventually brought stability and relative peace to Central America in the latter half of the 1980s was the so-called ‘Contadora Group’. As Dabène (2009: 20–1) detailed, this group emerged out of diplomatic initiatives taken by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama in 1983 to offer ‘mediation in the Central American conflicts’, and was later joined by Argentina, Peru and Uruguay. Meeting with fierce

resistance by the United States (Kaufman Purcell 1985), the so-called Act of Contadora was never accepted by the majority of Central American governments, but ‘served as an inspiration for the 1987 Arias Peace Plan that would eventually bring peace to the region’ (Dabène 2009: 20).

This initiative is critical for demonstrating various important features. First, it is noteworthy that the Contadora group was an *informal* grouping of countries outside any organizational structure. Second, the initiative was focused on very clear and specific aims: ending the various conflicts in Central America. Third, the group emerged during a time of relative American weakness coming, as it did, in the aftermath of the United States defeat in Vietnam, which generated certain resistance against United States involvement in the region (Schlesinger and Kinzer 2006). Therefore, the initiative was facilitated by particular circumstances and guided by a clear objective, which was peace. Outside the formal structures of organizations, channels of communications were easier and power differentials not that important. In other words, there was, at the same time, coherence in terms of objective and flexibility in terms of process. Interestingly, the EU acknowledged the importance of the group in the process which eventually led to the Esquipulas Agreements I and II of 1986 and 1987, showing that informal regional arrangements can play an important role addressing regional problems.

This argument is also underlined by the fact that the re-emergence of a *formal* process of regionalism in Central America took time and was, at least initially, concentrated on economic issues. There was a convergence of economic policy which facilitated ‘open regionalism’ during the 1990s. Its aims were significantly inspired by those of the EU and its single market and, in fact, the EU has invested significant financial and political capital in the Central American Integration System (SICA) (Guillemette and Villa 2007). Yet, despite the fact that there is now a functioning single market among the members of SICA, this has *not* led to a more prosperous or less violent region. What *has* changed is the type and the source of that violence.

All Central American states to a greater or lesser extent are facing the corrosive influence of the international drug trade which contributes significantly to extremely high levels of violent crime. One senior Honduran diplomat claimed that 70 per cent of homicides committed in Honduras are linked to drug trade.⁵ Other problems are the weakening of state structures, rampant corruption, an ineffective police and justice system, as well as the existence of parallel power structures in many areas of the

region (Boot 2013). Things have become so acute that Boraz and Bruneau (2006) wondered whether the Maras, the street gangs that dominate significant regions of Central America, were ‘overwhelming governments in Central America’. The scale of the security challenges facing Central America has been acknowledged by the states in the sense that the agenda of SICA has expanded considerably over the years to include the question of criminal violence. This is clearly reflected by the Central American Security Strategy of 2011, which lists amongst its strategic priorities the fight against organized crime, combating drug trafficking, the fight against gangs, the extremely high number of homicides and the fight against corruption (SG-SICA 2011).

Yet, the emergence of ‘new’ security challenges on the agenda of SICA does not mean that effective mechanisms and policies to address these challenges have been developed. One senior EU diplomat with considerable experience in Central America said that there was often a preference of ‘process over result’, which meant that many of the policies and initiatives to deal with the problems at regional level were not as effective as they might.⁶ In fact, serious barriers towards effective action have been highlighted over recent years. They can be explained by two main factors.

The first of these is state capacity.⁷ Even senior officials from Central American countries admit that their respective states struggle to confront the challenges presented by widespread violence, particularly due to corruption. International NGOs dealing with that question frequently highlight the level of corruption especially in the three countries of the Northern Triangle – Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador (Transparency International 2014). Yet, there are significant differences between the interested parties about what this means in practice and what to do about it at both national *and* regional level. For many actors and international organizations working in Central America, lack of state capacity is a matter of and for the state. For instance, the EU considers the creation of SICA and the association agreement between the two organizations an important step ‘for reinforcing democratic values, respect for human rights and principles of the rule of law, individual freedom, state reform and public administration’ (European Commission 2012b). OAS diplomats equally stress the need to invest in ‘state building’, such as reforms of the justice system and ‘eradication’ of corruption.⁸

Yet, for other analysts of Central America these issues, whilst important, do not get to the heart of the matter. For them, focusing on state capacity ignores two essential issues. First, in many parts of Central America the

state simply does not exist in any meaningful way and enjoys no legitimacy. Instead, large swaths of Central America are controlled by gangs, drug traffickers and so on (Jütersonke et al. 2009). As a result, any reform of the state would be largely meaningless until and unless the state increases its reach and exerts the *accepted and only* legitimate power over any given territory. The fact that this, according to this line of argument, is not happening is linked to an additional key problem: the unwillingness of many state actors to reform, simply because they benefit from the current system. As one Honduras specialist put it, ‘Some of Honduras’ biggest drug-traffickers sit in the government’.⁹ As long as there is no *incentive* to reform, any investment in reform is ineffective. In fact, such investment is counterproductive in the sense that it legitimizes and reinforces illegitimate governments and power structures.¹⁰

The second factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of regional mechanisms is a disconnect between the states and regional organizations on the one hand and civil society actors on the other. Many civil society organizations see the state as part of the problem rather than part of the solution and argue that there is not enough engagement with those actors who, crucially, have contacts both upwards towards the governments and downwards to those directly affected by violence, the lack of effective justice, the parallel power structures, the lack of educational and work opportunities, and so on. In other words, there is not enough engagement with civil society. Failure to engage at this level, however, means that regionalism becomes an instrument for *sustaining* current patterns of societal development and relations rather than reforming them. Problems are defined, and solutions are sought, without much thought on how these could be *scaled* across all levels of the system or indeed whether and how any reforms will alter the patterns that have led and sustained the current situation in the first place. In other words, whilst there is acknowledgement that security problems in Central America have evolved over time, there is no real engagement across time and space with the question what this change *means* for tackling these new issues.

It is interesting to note that there *are* initiatives at the regional level to reconcile these different perspectives. With the support of the EU, SICA created a consultative committee in order to foster engagement between governments and civil society (European Commission 2010). Yet, it is doubtful whether such an initiative can be successful in the absence of deep structural reforms at state level. Even those who work with this committee acknowledged that it had not (yet?) led to a

transformation in how SICA works or how it treats specific issues like criminal violence in Central America.¹¹

With regard to Central America, then, one can observe several interdependent developments. First, there has been a clear evolution of the regional architecture from the ad hoc arrangements of the Contadora Group to the formalized structure of the SICA. This formalization has been accompanied by a considerable expansion of the regional agenda, which now incorporates diverse issues ranging from trade to security. This expansion, in turn, responds to the evolution of the security challenges being confronted, which have moved from ‘traditional’ conflicts to incredible levels of criminal violence that impact upon the entire region and which are closely linked to issues such as economic inequality, corruption and ‘state-building’ in general. Yet, whilst there is agreement on the importance of these issues, there is strong disagreement about whether regional organizations such as SICA are capable of confronting such complex challenges. Sceptics argue that regionalism is being used to preserve the status quo rather than affect reforms. In this sense, regionalism is an instrument for extending and preserving state power.

SOUTH AMERICA: ALIGNING PERCEPTIONS AND ACTIONS ACROSS TIME AND SPACE

In South America, the role of regionalism as an instrument of peace and security has always been more contested and complex than in Central America. First, there were fewer conflicts in South America. Shaw (2004: 72–4) only lists four instances during the Cold War when the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty were invoked in response to a regional security threat. Interestingly, amongst these cases we do *not* find the Colombian conflict. Second, just like in Central America, the Cold War had a significant influence on the way regional or sub-regional organizations could act. During this time, the overriding objective, especially for the United States, was the maintenance of stability and the permanence of South America in the Western Bloc. As a result, the Americans actively supported or, at least, accepted several military coups, be they in Chile, Argentina, Brazil or Peru (Grandin 2004). *Realpolitik* often trumped any normative considerations.

With the end of the Cold War, the dynamics governing regional organizations in South America changed significantly. There was a shift of

focus in terms of activities as well as an expansion in terms of the number of such organizations. In relation to the first point, the region saw a change in the concept of security. There was a clear shift away from ‘hard’ security and a narrow definition of peace as the ‘absence of conflict’ towards emphasizing the conditions for the maintenance of peace, stability and individual well-being, in particular, the guarantee of human rights and the maintenance of the democratic system. The Democratic Charter adopted by the OAS in 2001 set an important precedent in this respect, even though the effectiveness of such charters has been called into question (Levitt 2006). Nevertheless, it did signal a sustained engagement at the regional level with the question of how to preserve the democratic order and political stability in the Americas (Heine and Weiffen 2015). Other organizations formed during the 1990s and 2000s, such as the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) (1991) or UNASUR (2008), by now all have so-called Democratic Charters that oblige their member states to preserve their democratic order.

The emergence of an ‘alphabet soup’ of (sub-)regional organizations (Glickhouse 2012) addressing a host of issues broadly connected to questions of security in South America has sparked a lively debate about how to analyse and judge the effectiveness of these organizations. This debate encompasses methodological, as well as practical, questions and has significant implications for how, where and why organizations can and should act in security matters. It is worth briefly reviewing this debate here. Nolte (2014) argues that the developments of the last two decades have led to the emergence of a ‘regional governance complex’ in South America which encompasses many different and often interdependent policy areas, including security. Yet, as he himself acknowledges (Nolte 2014: 7), this concept is, as yet, relatively poorly defined, arguing that the term refers to

international institutions/organizations and normative/ideational constructs as well as to the process that creates these institutions and norms [...]. It is not restricted to a single organization but refers to the set of relevant regional organizations and their interaction patterns.

Accepting the existence of such a complex suggests that, in order to evaluate the *effectiveness* of regionalism as an instrument of managing security, it is necessary to look at the entire regional architecture rather than individual organizations (Nolte 2014). The concept therefore allows

for analysing one of the most striking features of South America's regional security architecture, the overlapping of regional and sub-regional organizations, such as, for example, the OAS and UNASUR (see Weiffen et al. 2013).

So far, there is no consensus on the question whether this proliferation is an indication of the strength of regionalism as an instrument of regional security policy or of its weakness (Nolte 2014). Whilst for some this overlapping represents a potential gain in flexibility (see Tavares 2014), for others it is a sign of South American regionalism's structural weakness, impeding effective action across time and space (Malamud 2013). In line with the latter argument, it is worth noting that recent years have seen the re-emergence of debates that characterized South American regionalism during the Cold War, namely the role of sovereignty and the relationship to the United States. Unresolved tensions with regard to these questions continue to have a significant impact on *actions*, as the case of Colombia and the current crisis in Venezuela demonstrate.

The Colombian conflict has been one of the longest-running civil conflicts in the world. It has clearly had regional implications, putting political strains on the relationship between Colombia and Ecuador and, particularly, Venezuela (Ramírez and Cadenas 2006). One senior Ecuadorian diplomat argued that, besides Colombia, Ecuador has most suffered with the conflict, owing largely to the significant number of Colombian refugees residing on its territory and the enormous resources required caring for them and trying to secure the border.¹² Politically, the strains between Colombia and its neighbours can also be put down to the fact that interpretations about the causes, and therefore the possible solutions, to the conflict have differed widely between them (Ramírez 2011). The three countries also have widely diverging views on the role of the United States. In the early 2000s, the United States was a key ally of the then Colombian President Uribe in defining the conflict in military and 'hard' security terms as part of the broader War on Drugs and the subsequent War on Terror. Nothing represents this position better than the so-called 'Plan Colombia', a program of military and financial assistance from the American government to Colombia with the aim of significantly disrupting or destroying drug trafficking. This plan caused severe divisions within South America, leading the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez to accuse the United States of militarizing the region (Isacson 2005).

A further recurring theme in relation to the Colombian conflict is the question of sovereignty. For all the obvious regional consequences that the conflict has had (see below), there is a clear and consistent line in the region which sees the war as an internal affair for the Colombian people to resolve.¹³ Based on the above information, it is not surprising that the current peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), taking place in Cuba, count on the mediation of Cuba, Norway, Venezuela and Chile rather than one of the numerous South American regional organizations.

With such a panorama, the overall impact of regional organizations on the Colombian conflict has been limited. Critically, everything that is done by the organization needs the support of the particular target state. As such, the organization can only *offer* help and mediation but it cannot *oblige* any of its member states to do anything or accept anything.¹⁴ It was not until 2004 that the government of Colombia and the OAS agreed that the organization should open an office in support of the peace process. The objectives of this OAS mission are rather broad and do not specifically get to the root causes of the conflict. Rather, they aim to facilitate *national* efforts at peace and reconciliation, an enabling rather than a determining role. In relation to the peace process, for instance, the aim is to ‘verify’ this process and to ‘support’ any initiatives by government or other entities. In a practical sense, one of the key tasks is to ‘verify’ the handing over, guarding and destruction of arms held by illegal armed groups. Finally, the mission has the aim of supporting local initiatives to reduce violence, promote reconciliation and strengthen democracy (OEA 2014). Yet, even in pursuit of these objectives, the mission often has to look for external funds, as one representative pointed out.¹⁵

This, then, in many ways ties in with the change of focus which the OAS adopted during the 1990s and early 2000s towards an organization which seeks to create the *conditions* for stability or *facilitate* such processes for internal actors. At the same time, it is also simply a reflection of what it is *possible* to do. In other words, in the case of the OAS, such a focus is the result of a process of adaptation to both old and new realities in South America. As mentioned above, part of the new realities is the proliferation of other (sub-)regional organizations. The impact of this can be seen by looking at the crisis in Venezuela that developed after the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013.

Venezuela is passing through a profound economic crisis, as evidenced by the highest official inflation rate in the world and severe social unrest (CFR 2014). According to a Colombian journalist with detailed knowledge of the country, the domestic situation in Venezuela has rendered any chance of regional cooperation on most issues as unrealistic: 'We do not understand what goes on [in Venezuela] and even [if we did] we have no way of influencing it'.¹⁶ Representatives of several regional organizations have expressed concerns about the situation in the country as well as its possible regional spillover effects.¹⁷ There are clearly concerns, for instance, about a breakdown of the democratic order, considering that many people have died in anti-government demonstrations whilst several opposition politicians are currently in jail (Shifter 2015).

Yet, in the case of the OAS, the organization has only stated that 'it is ready to help if asked',¹⁸ but the Venezuelan government has rejected OAS involvement. Instead, UNASUR has been trying to broker some kind of deal between the government and the opposition (O Globo 2014). At the same time, MERCOSUR, another purely South American organization of which Venezuela is a member, has been severely criticized for not invoking its democracy clause, even though, according to this argument, there is clear evidence that the democratic order in Venezuela has, at best, been compromised (Senado Federal 2015). The lenient treatment of Venezuela stands in sharp contrast to the decisive action taken against Paraguay which was judged to have broken the democratic order when its parliament removed elected President Lugo from office in 2012. In this case, the country was suspended from MERCOSUR, and during the suspension, Venezuela was admitted as a full member, something that had been held up by the Paraguayan Congress (Exame 2012).

What all of this indicates is that regionalism is being hampered by fragmentation and politicization. As Lehmann (2013) has pointed out, there is currently no consensual political or economic model which is being pursued throughout the region. Nor is there agreement on what the various regional organizations are supposed to achieve. All of this suggests that the proliferation of regional organizations in South America over the last 25 years is not so much the result of a coherently articulated concern regarding particular problems, but the result of pragmatic considerations, what one Brazilian diplomat called 'pragmatic regionalism'¹⁹ or what Gardini (2015) has called 'modular regionalism'.

LATIN AMERICAN REGIONALISM AND SECURITY: DETECTING TRENDS

What, then, can we say in general terms about the role of regionalism in the management of security in Latin America? It is noticeable how there has been an expansion of regionalism in Latin America both in terms of the number of organizations and of the agenda they tackle. Within this, the concept of security has been broadened considerably, both in what it entails and how problems of security should be addressed. Yet, this broadening of the security agenda has also created considerable problems, which differ somewhat between Central and South America.

In Central America, one of the key problems is one of capacity brought about by the weakness of the state, a problem which has never been adequately addressed since the end of the military conflicts in the region. Regionalism, then, is seen as a strategy to strengthen state capacity in order to confront the problems of violence, drug trafficking and corruption that this weakness brings about and sustains. In this sense, the recent broadening of the regional agenda in Central America, such as the adoption of a Central American Security Strategy which deals with these issues and acknowledges that ‘security’ today is a very different concept to what it was 30 years ago should be welcomed. Other initiatives have taken place outside the formal structures of SICA, such as the plan by the governments of the Northern Triangle states for an Alliance for Prosperity (Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras 2014). Yet, critics have pointed out that such strategies are nothing new and that, oftentimes, these regional initiatives are, in the end, not intended to bring about change but to give the *impression* of acting whilst, in reality, solidifying the status quo (Lehmann et al. 2014). Following this line of argument, what is lacking is not capacity but political will to fundamentally reform the state in order to change the conditions that sustain the type and level of violence witnessed in the Northern Triangle. Regionalism will do nothing to change this, however well thought-out strategies are, if there is no change in political attitude.

In South America, regionalism has also evolved significantly since the end of the Cold War. Here, too, there has been a broadening of the political agenda and recognition that the question of security goes beyond interstate conflict. There has also been an expansion in the number of South American regional organizations, yet, just as in Central America, this has not led to more effectiveness in terms of action. Instead, in keeping with the argument

brought forward by Malamud (2013), the proliferation of regional organizations can be seen as a sign of fragmentation of the region in political terms. There is no coherent narrative within which regionalism can evolve as an instrument for regional security policy. In fact, the same countries often use different narratives to justify their presence in one or the other organization, whilst there are also deep divisions between member states of the same organization in terms of what the particular objectives are or should be (The Economist 2009). Such incoherence, however, is worrying bearing in mind the difficult security challenges South America may well face in the near future: What, for instance, will become of Colombia in a post-conflict scenario? How will the political future of Venezuela be resolved peacefully? Can political reforms in countries like Bolivia proceed without generating severe social tensions? In all these cases, the potential for regional consequences is significant and would require a regional response. Is that possible in a context of many different organizations with often overlapping responsibilities and which do not have a clear narrative to guide their actions, amongst other things because there often is very little agreement about what the security challenge being faced is, how severe it is and, therefore, what to do about it?

For all their differences, therefore, both Central and South America confront similar patterns which will make it difficult to act effectively as the regions try to adapt to the new security environments they face. Whilst both have embraced regionalism as a tool to deal with security challenges, effectiveness is hampered by a divergence of narratives guiding their respective endeavours. In Central America, these differences are more internal (between governments and civil society) whilst in South America they run between different governments, as well as between different organizations.

CONCLUSIONS

Taking the above together, it seems clear that there is a need and a role for regionalism as a policy instrument to confront security issues in Latin America. These issues – and the new conception of security they entail – have often been recognized. Yet, none of the principal actors seem to have either the capacity or the will to utilize the regional level consistently and coherently to tackle these problems.

In order to reverse this trend, a regional debate about the basic question *what* the most critical security problems are is essential. For different

reasons this debate is occurring neither in Central nor in South America with any intensity. Yet, it is necessary to identify common interests in order to come to an agreement on *how* to tackle the problems identified. In simple terms, it needs to be clear what it is that holds the approach of, say, the OAS or UNASUR together. Likewise, a debate is needed between those organizations about what they understand by ‘security’ in the regional context and what that means in practical terms. Currently, there seems to be very little interest in initiating such a debate. In short, Latin America as a whole lacks a strategic vision as to how to define and approach ‘security’ in the region, and which objectives and actions this should entail. A debate about these issues is urgent.

NOTES

1. Personal interview by author with El Salvadorian diplomat in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, January 2014.
2. Personal interview with senior Brazilian diplomat in Brasília, December 2013.
3. Interview with EU Ambassador in South America, December 2013.
4. The importance of this principle was stressed by all OAS officials interviewed for this research.
5. Interview with Honduran Ambassador in Latin America, December 2013.
6. Interview with senior EU diplomat in Honduras, February 2014.
7. This issue was emphasized by government officials, representatives from regional organizations and civil society actors in all the interviews conducted in Central America.
8. Interviews conducted in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala during 2014.
9. Interview, November 2013.
10. Interview with Honduras specialist, November 2013. Similar points were made in an interview with the country manager of a large NGO in Honduras, March 2014.
11. Interview with senior SICA official at SICA Headquarters in El Salvador, February 2014.
12. Interview with senior Ecuadorian diplomat at the time based in Brazil, September 2013.
13. This was a feature of all the interviews undertaken with Latin American diplomats and policy-makers during the course of this research.
14. Interview with OAS officials in Bogotá in February 2014.
15. Interview with senior official in Bogotá, February 2014.
16. Interview in Bogotá, February 2014.

17. Interviews conducted by the author in a number of countries with diplomats and policy-makers during 2013 and 2014.
18. Interview with OAS representative in Caracas, February 2014.
19. Interview with senior Brazilian diplomat in Brasília, November 2013.

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Institutional Overlap and Responses to Political Crises in South America

Brigitte Weiffen

INTRODUCTION

Recent times have witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of institutionalized cooperation in various issue areas both on the global and on the regional level. States tend to be members in several regional institutions at a time; as a consequence, institutions in a given geographical region overlap with regard to membership and frequently also with regard to their mandates and activities. This trend seems to be particularly pronounced in Latin America. While by 1990 there were only seven major multipurpose regional and sub-regional organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, this number increased to 13 by 2010 (Goltermann et al. 2012: 12–3; Börzel 2013: 509). Not only with respect to trade and economic integration but also in the field of security, states are facing an increasing redundancy of institutional venues to pursue their agendas or to resolve crises and controversies. The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) with its Defense Council has become a contender to the older

This chapter builds on joint research with Detlef Nolte on overlapping regionalism in Latin America. I would like to thank Detlef for the constant, fruitful exchange of opinions and ideas.

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Organization of American States (OAS) in various areas of security governance (Weiffen et al. 2013). Additionally, almost all organizations active in South America by now dispose of mechanisms to respond to internal political crises. Political instability is considered a security risk and in light of the experience of military dictatorships, the interference of the military in political affairs is considered particularly dangerous. After transitions from authoritarian rule, South American leaders early on agreed to establish a multilateral framework to strengthen democratic norms and practices and to avert coups d'état (Farer 1996; Heine and Weiffen 2015: 30–49).

While a research agenda on comparative regionalism has emerged over the last decade, overlapping regionalism has not yet received much scholarly attention.¹ The phenomenon is widespread and important, not least due to the potential consequences for states and regions regarding the attainment of policy objectives and the strengthening of common norms. This chapter studies the consequences of institutional overlap for the management of political crises in South America. The first section briefly introduces the burgeoning field of research on overlapping regionalism. Drawing on previous attempts to identify causal mechanisms, theoretical assumptions regarding the consequences of overlapping regionalism are derived. The impact of overlap is visible in three different, but interdependent areas: the strategies adopted by actors (mainly states and coalitions of states) in response to overlap, inter-organizational dynamics, and the policy outcome regional organizations produce. The second section analyzes six episodes characterized by an overlap of action between at least two South American regional organizations in reaction to a political crisis. It is shown that the effects of institutional overlap have changed over time, reflecting a shift of regional power dynamics from cooperative to competitive.

STUDYING INSTITUTIONAL OVERLAP

Institutional overlap can take different forms. In terms of membership, regional organizations might be 'nested' like matryoshka dolls, meaning that all members of a smaller organization also participate in a larger organization (yet, both organizations are autonomous and independent from each other). In South America, OAS and UNASUR are an example of this constellation. Alternatively, membership can intersect like overlapping circles in a Venn diagram. One group of states belongs to one organization only, another group of states to a second organization, and an intersection of states belongs to both organizations. UNASUR and the

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) are an example of such intersection: while Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia participate in both of them, ALBA and UNASUR each have a number of members that are not part of the other organization (Weiffen et al. 2013).

When analyzing the dynamics of overlapping organizations, it is imperative to clarify whether they cover the same issue area in their mandate only, or also in their actions. Overlap in mandate refers to the tasks and functions that the organizations have subscribed to in their treaties and declarations. Organizations may overlap in one or more of the dimensions of their policy competencies, and this overlap can be almost complete or only marginal. The mandate of an organization can be subdivided into conceptions and practices (Aris and Wenger 2014).² Conceptions comprise the policy program, that is, the stated mission and the fundamental behavioural and distributive norms and rules of an organization. For security organizations, the security aims, the definition of security threat, the prioritization of different security threats, and the question whether the focus is predominantly traditional or non-traditional in nature are part of their conceptions. In turn, practices refer to operational activities such as the concretization of norms and rule specification for the implementation of those norms; their active implementation through the international organization; monitoring of their implementation by member states; adjudication in cases of disputes about member states' non-compliance; and the imposition of sanctions in case of non-compliance (Rittberger and Zangl 2006).

While 'overlap in mandate' refers to the policy program as well as the setup of specialized bodies, instruments, and norm enforcement mechanisms, 'overlap in action' refers to the actual usage of these provisions (Hulse et al. 2015). This is a useful distinction, especially when considering that in the face of acute crises, international organizations occasionally engage in ad hoc actions not explicitly foreseen in their mandate.

Consequences of Overlap: State of the Art

Scholars studying the proliferation of overlapping institutions are particularly interested in the consequences of this overlap on the politics and effectiveness of global and regional governance (Raustiala and Victor 2004; Alter and Meunier 2009; Orsini et al. 2013; Gehring and Faude 2014). They have asked how the overlap among various institutions in the same issue area affects the ability of states to manage transnational problems through cooperation; under what conditions institutional overlap

facilitates or impairs the goals of international cooperation; and to what extent and in what ways institutional overlap influences the strategies and choices of states. On the one hand, institutional overlap may have positive feedback effects that enhance cooperation and the effectiveness of existing institutions. On the other, it could encourage self-interested behaviour and competition among actors and organizations, ultimately undermining the success of cooperative initiatives.

Observers of the Latin American region make contradictory assessments of whether overlapping regionalism improves cooperation or leads to unnecessary replication, contestation, and inefficiency (Malamud and Gardini 2012; Malamud 2013; Weiffen et al. 2013; Nolte 2014, 2015; Gómez Mera 2015). So far, the debate on the proliferation of regional and sub-regional organizations has focused on economic integration. The dominant impression in this policy field is that overlapping regionalism leads to a high level of potential conflicts in rules and policies amongst affected regional organizations and facilitates cross-institutional political strategies, opportunistic behaviour, and competition between states, thus eroding regional cohesion and rendering regional cooperation overall less effective (Malamud and Gardini 2012; Gómez Mera 2015).

Few studies exist on the consequences of overlap for cooperation in other policy fields. For security cooperation, overlapping mandates seem to be unproblematic as long as norms and rules do not contradict each other. Latin America is characterized by shared norms of peace and security (Kacowicz 2005; also see Herz et al. in this volume). Thus, even if new organizations like UNASUR claim to represent a specific (sub-) regional security culture in their rhetoric, their practices often emulate pre-existent organizations like the OAS (Weiffen et al. 2013). However, the picture is more ambiguous when looking at instances where several organizations became involved in the management of a crisis or conflict. In his analysis of seven episodes, Nolte (2015) shows that the overlapping of regional organizations and the adoption of cross-institutional political strategies by their member countries sometimes advanced international cooperation and at times led to blockades.

Theorizing the Consequences of Overlap

The literature on the consequences of overlap has major shortcomings. First, much of it concentrates on overlapping economic integration arrangements. Trade agreements stand out because they comprise a very detailed

set of rules, which inevitably brings about rule ambiguity and legal fragmentation when states are members of several such agreements. In most security institutions, the mandate is less specific. Hence, an overlap in mandate does not per se generate positive or negative effects. There may be a lot of overlap of competences between different organizations with few practical consequences, because many regional organizations coexist with no noteworthy interaction, let alone competition. In turn, it is more reasonable to expect practical consequences of overlap in action. But even when the activities of international institutions do overlap, it still needs to be proven that such overlap translates into competition, divergence, or conflict. In many instances, organizations with overlapping mandates may act together and exercise their competences in common (Prost and Clark 2006: 344). In order to study consequences of overlap in security cooperation, one should therefore identify episodes where overlap in mandate resulted in overlapping activities of at least two organizations (Nolte 2015).

Second, theoretical considerations on how overlap acts as an independent variable are still in their infancy. Existing studies often do not explicitly name the various causal mechanisms at play. Based on several attempts to compile and systematize potential consequences of overlapping (Hofmann 2011; Gómez Mera 2016; Nolte 2015), three main causal mechanisms can be distilled. The first of them concentrates on actors and the influence of overlap on the strategies they adopt. A second causal mechanism focuses on the institutional level. It highlights inter-organizational dynamics caused by overlap, such as spillovers, functional overlaps, and interaction patterns between institutions, as well as the impact on institutional development over time. A third set of explanations investigates positive and negative effects of overlap on the policy domain in which the institutions are active, assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of overlapping institutions to respond to concrete problems, as well as the long-term effect on norm development in a given policy domain.

It would be erroneous, however, to understand these causal mechanisms as competing hypotheses. Instead, they are interdependent and influence each other in the sense of a sequence of effects (or causal chain). The starting point when studying the repercussions of institutional overlap is the observation that it brings about redundancy with regard to the tasks and the administrative and human resources of the involved organizations (Nolte 2015).

The first consequence following from this observation is how actors deal with overlap. Whether overlap leads to problems depends on the strategies of states which are members of several organizations. The structural

constellations brought about by overlap provide national governments and coalitions of states with opportunities to behave opportunistically and circumvent costly commitments, or to promote more effective cooperation. Member states can pursue strategies of forum shopping, regime shifting, hostage taking, turf battles, and muddling through (Hofmann 2011; Gómez Mera 2016). Overlap may also serve the purpose to form new coalitions and challenge the existing institutional status quo. For example, in the case of regime shifting, governments (or a coalition of states) dissatisfied with the rules and practices of one institution shift to an alternative multilateral institution with a more favourable mandate and decision rules, and use this new forum to challenge standards or reduce the authority of the original institution. In the case of competitive regime creation, a coalition of dissatisfied states creates a new institution that more closely represents its interests (Morse and Keohane 2014).

The second consequence is the resulting interaction pattern between international organizations. They can coexist, coordinate, or compete with one another in a given policy domain and at a certain point in time. Which of those interaction patterns prevails depends heavily on actors' preferences and the strategies at their disposal. Interaction patterns are likely to be competitive if states employ cross-institutional political strategies in the sense of regime shifting or competitive regime creation and give preference to one organization in order to circumvent or displace another one, or to avoid cooperation with a specific state or coalition of states that dominates the other organization. If there are no such frictions in the region, coordination is the likely interaction pattern. It can result in a division of labour, meaning that organizations share basic values and goals, but clearly divide tasks among themselves in terms of issue area or geographic scope of activity; it can also amount to cooperation, meaning that organizations act hand in hand to achieve the same goals and their activities reinforce each other.

Inter-organizational dynamics also have repercussions as to how the various institutions develop over time. The rules and institutionalized practices of a challenging institution may emulate and resemble, or may conflict with, the rules and institutionalized practices of a pre-existing institution. Strategic decisions in one institution may have influence on the strategic options in other institutions, constrain their scope of activity, or even entail a modification of their mandate.

The third consequence of overlap is the impact on the policy domain, which ranges from the positive (i.e. its potential to strengthen the ability of all actors to secure adequate performance in line with mandates) to the

negative (i.e. the generation of inefficiency and ineffectiveness) (Hofmann 2011). If a competitive interaction pattern between various international institutions prevails, institutional efficiency is likely to be negatively affected. In turn, a coordinative pattern will most likely improve policy outcomes in the domain under consideration.

The impact on the policy outcome can be analyzed from two different angles. First, overlap may make institutions more or less effective when it comes to immediate problem-solving (Nolte 2015). Institutional overlap may lead to blockades, for example when some governments involved in a negotiation process question the legitimacy of the forum, deliberately interrupt the process, and turn to a different organization. Yet, more flexibility for member states to push for their policy preferences in different overlapping organizations may also be beneficial, creating a bypass to circumvent blockades. Bargaining failures become less likely when, once negotiations stall in one forum, states can move the issue to a different one.

Second, overlap may have longer-term positive or negative repercussions for international organizations' normative standards (Nolte 2015). On the one hand, interactive dynamics between organizations may lead to the reinforcement and the raising of normative standards via an emulation of best practices or learning effects. On the other hand, it has been argued that 'the simple multiplication of international institutions weakens the unity and integrity of international law' (Prost and Kingsley Clark 2006: 343). Overlap may thus create fragmentation and rule ambiguity. The operation of overlapping organizations at various levels of multilateralism (e.g. pan-regional, regional, and sub-regional) may open possibilities for context-specific norm adaptation and implementation. Again, this can be viewed positively or negatively. Acharya (2011: 97) coined the concept of norm subsidiarity 'as a process whereby local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors.' Norm subsidiarity might thus be a means to adapt general or global norms to (sub-)regional circumstances. Yet, the insistence on context specificity may also serve as a pretext to switch disputes over the application of international norms to parallel organizations with lower normative standards. Thus, interactive dynamics between organizations regarding normative standards may result in norm subversion and the watering down of norms (Nolte 2015).

In sum, overlap changes the strategies open to national and international actors to achieve their preferences. Acting upon this new set of strategies will influence the development not only of a single institution but also its

interactions with other institutions, potentially leading to competitive interaction patterns. In this case, institutional efficiency is likely to be negatively affected. However, if various institutions coordinate in the form of cooperation or a division of labour, this will most likely lead to positive policy outcomes.

Looking at the phenomenon of overlap in the context of power dynamics, it is important to keep in mind that states do not just react to a given constellation of multilateral institutions, but that overlapping is the result of the activities of member states. Competition and conflict generally do not exist between organizations, but between states that act through these organizations. One might thus argue that it is not the overlapping of regional organizations which leads to competition, but that it is power competition between states/governments which entails institutional overlap. In a regional setting, power shifts and the emergence of regional and secondary regional powers thus are moderator variables impinging upon the consequences of institutional overlap.

OVERLAPPING RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CRISIS IN SOUTH AMERICA

The 1990s were a period of multilateralism and convergence of Latin American and US policy preferences. The countries of the hemisphere unanimously adhered to free markets and representative democracy and supported neoliberal economic reforms, a revision of the concept of security towards a more cooperative version, and a regional commitment to democracy. Following their democratic transitions, it was of particular interest to Latin American countries to construct regional mechanisms for the defense of democracy, meant to deter and prevent returns to authoritarian rule. Their aim was to set in motion a ‘lock-in effect’, that is, to embed newly attained norms in a binding regional regime as a means to stabilize the domestic status quo and tie the hands of future leaders (Moravcsik 2000).

The hemispheric consensus was questioned by the wave of leftist, nationalist, and, in some cases, anti-US, governments which came to power in many countries in the region since the late 1990s. It reflected an increasing ideological distance of much of Latin America from liberal content, including representative democracy, and a turn towards direct, participatory, and plebiscitary concepts of democracy (Ellner 2012; Wolff 2013). This development potentially undermines regional democratic norms. Instead of

a confrontation between pro-democratic and anti-democratic actors, political crises are now often caused by a clash of divergent visions of what democracy is all about. Increasingly, regional democratic norms collide with reformist governments' alternative political projects on the domestic level. It then becomes subject to interpretation whether certain alterations of the constitutional order signify a democratic decline or rather a democratic innovation. Assertions about the necessity of constitutional government cannot themselves tell us what the content of constitutionalism should be (Schnably 1994).

Along with those ideological divides, power shifts in the region contributed to the foundation of new regional organizations. The emergence of regional powers and the weakening of US influence in Latin America led to an increasing disaffection with hemispheric institutions and a shift from hemispheric to sub-regional cooperation. For a long time, the OAS had been the prime institution in the Western hemisphere to deal with security and other political matters. Meanwhile, several sub-regional organizations that had originally been designed as trading blocks, such as the Andean Community (CAN) and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) also started to strengthen the coordination of foreign, security, and defense policies of their member states. The organizations created in the first decade of the new millennium, such as ALBA, UNASUR, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), included political issues from the outset. They were launched, among other reasons, to challenge the role of the OAS in the Americas, and they expressly exclude the United States.

Increasing Overlap in Mandate

From its inception in 1948, the OAS endorsed the principle of representative democracy. But only against the background of democratic transitions in the region in the 1980s, it began to strengthen its commitment to democracy. In 1985, the Cartagena Protocol made representative democracy one of the organization's central purposes. Resolution 1080, adopted at the General Assembly in Santiago in 1991, for the first time stipulated procedures how the OAS should react to 'interruptions of the democratic political institutional process'; in 1992 the Washington Protocol opened the possibility to suspend a member state if a forceful, extra-constitutional overthrow of a democratically constituted government occurred. At the time when Resolution 1080 of 1991 and the Washington Protocol of 1992 were drafted, their creators had in mind the sanctioning of coups and coup attempts. Ten years later, the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC)

of 2001 emerged as a reaction to a different type of threat, the so-called self-coups and other instances of authoritarian backsliding of the 1990s. To address those challenges, the distinction between unconstitutional interruptions and alterations was introduced (Lagos and Rudy 2004; Heine and Weiffen 2015: 50–73). The IADC was invoked in several situations of political crisis across the region, including Venezuela in 2002, Nicaragua and Ecuador in 2005, and Honduras in 2009 (Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007; Legler 2007; Heine and Weiffen 2015: 74–131).

Sub-regional organizations increasingly joined the OAS in the effort to protect democracy. With the notable exception of ALBA, all of them have issued a statement endorsing democracy; many have gone further by adopting institutionalized mechanisms for the defense of democracy (see Table 4). While the bilateral agreements between Argentina and Brazil

Table 4 Regional democracy clauses in South America

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Key documents</i>	<i>Adoption</i>	<i>Ratification</i>	<i>Application</i>
OAS	Resolution 1080	1991	n/a	✓
	Washington Protocol	1992	1997	–
	Inter-American Democratic Charter	2001	n/a	✓
MERCOSUR	Presidential Declaration on Democratic Commitment	1996	n/a	✓
	Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment	1998	2002	✓
	Montevideo Protocol on Democratic Commitment	2011	Open	–
CAN	Presidential Declaration on Democratic Commitment	1998	n/a	–
	Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement: Commitment of the Andean Community to Democracy	2000	2008	–
UNASUR	Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on Commitment to Democracy	2010	2014	–
CELAC	Special Declaration on the Defense of Democracy and the Constitutional Order	2011	n/a	–

Source: Author's elaboration (as of June 2016)

n/a = not applicable

which preceded MERCOSUR were driven not only by the impulse to strengthen economic cooperation, but also to consolidate democracy (Dabène 2012; Gardini 2010), MERCOSUR in its original design aimed at the creation of a common market, and democracy was not even mentioned in the founding Treaty of Asunción (1991). It only came back on the agenda in the face of a coup threat in Paraguay in 1996, where the presidents reacted by issuing the ‘Presidential Declaration on Democratic Commitment’ that stipulated a number of possibilities to sanction a state whose democratic order has been altered or interrupted by force (Ribeiro Hoffmann 2007). Two years later, the idea of defending democracy was turned into a legally binding document with the Protocol of Ushuaia. It was invoked during the political crisis in Paraguay in 2012, where MERCOSUR (along with UNASUR) decided to suspend the country in response to contested impeachment proceedings against President Lugo (Marsteintredet et al. 2013). In 2011, MERCOSUR issued an expanded version, the Protocol of Montevideo (also referred to as Ushuaia II).

The CAN (or to be precise, the Andean Pact as its predecessor) adhered to democracy already in its founding treaty, the Cartagena Agreement of 1969, as well as in later agreements. But only in 1998, a ‘Presidential Declaration on Democratic Commitment’ formulated the idea to establish democracy as a prerequisite for participation in the integration process and to create provisions to defend democracy in times of crisis. In 2000, an additional protocol to the Cartagena Agreement, ‘Commitment of the Andean Community to Democracy’, adopted a number of instruments to react to interruptions of the democratic order in a member state. So far, these mechanisms have never been applied.

The defense of democracy had been a priority of the South American summits that preceded the creation of UNASUR, but the issue lost salience in the mid-2000s. UNASUR’s 2008 Constitutive Treaty includes only a very brief mention to strengthening democracy. A few months later, however, the Bolivian crisis – when calls for secession from the resource-rich eastern departments escalated into violence – forced UNASUR to take action. In September 2010, UNASUR was again compelled to react when a police mutiny in Ecuador appeared to threaten the incumbent President Rafael Correa. During its summit in November 2010, UNASUR adopted the ‘Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on Commitment to Democracy’, which entered into force in March 2014. CELAC followed the trend and issued a ‘Special Declaration on the Defense of Democracy and the Constitutional Order’ in 2011, just one year after its foundation.

The newly created provisions clearly adapt elements from the OAS defense of democracy regime. Yet, the most recent instruments of MERCOSUR and UNASUR go beyond the IADC, by setting up a more comprehensive toolkit of measures to sanction constitutional interruptions – such as closing the borders, interrupting trade relations, or promoting the suspension from other international organizations.³

The various provisions could complement or reinforce each other, but they could also undermine and delegitimize each other when they result in contradictory conclusions on whether a situation is a democratic crisis that warrants an international response, and on who has violated democratic standards. As will be shown below, in the 1990s there was a consensus on democratic norms and the ways to protect democracy, and inter-organizational dynamics were characterized by a coordinative logic. While the sub-regional provisions formulated in the new millennium do not openly contradict the IADC, the growing ideological divergence has found expression in a more ambiguous definition of democratic standards, especially in UNASUR and CELAC. CELAC's concept of democracy is rather vague, and it does not dispose of norm enforcement mechanisms. UNASUR's mechanisms to protect democracy show a strong bias towards the incumbent government (Closa and Palestini 2015). Regional organizations are now frequently driven by a competitive logic when acting in response to political crises.

Overlap in Action: From Consensus to Competition

Although Latin America has made impressive democratic gains over the past decades, democratic stability remains elusive. What in some cases could be viewed as democratic stability might be described in other cases as democratic stagnation. In some other countries, there are in fact distinctly regressive tendencies. While the quality of democracy has remained on average nearly the same since 2001 – as positive and negative developments tend to cancel each other out – expert assessments reveal significant deficiencies in a number of countries along different dimensions of democracy. Many countries in the region have been affected by acute political crises: their democratic political institutional order has been exposed to challenges of such a kind and degree that it is facing a potential breakdown, or structural changes of a fundamental character (Heine and Weiffen 2015). A survey of threats to democracy in Latin America identified more than 60 different episodes of crisis for the period 1990–2011 (McCoy 2012). Since 1985, more

than a dozen elected presidents in the region were forced to leave office before the end of their regular term.

Some of those crises result from clearly illegal activities of elected or unelected actors – such as the classic military coup, as well as its variant, the self-coup. Other crises are more ambiguous in nature, and their origins are more variegated (Heine and Weiffen 2015: 76–82). On the one hand, situations of ambiguous crises include attempts by elected incumbents to betray the will of the people – by stealing elections, usurping the powers of one or more government branches, or silencing the media. On the other hand, presidents may face challenges both when they are too weak and when they are too strong. While clear-cut military coups have receded, military officials and other unelected actors have learnt to adapt their strategies in the face of international norms supportive of democracy, and tend to use more discreet ways to pressure and intimidate elected presidents while publicly demonstrating respect for the constitution (Boniface 2009: 186). Another ambiguous threat to democracy are situations where elected presidents step back in the face of pressure from mass protests demanding their resignation. Popular protest seems to have replaced military interference as the main extra-institutional source of political crisis (Legler 2007; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Boniface 2009). Executive–legislative confrontation or gridlock is another frequent variant of political crisis. Empowered by situations of divided government – that is, the executive’s lack of a power base in the legislature – legislative alliances have in several countries sought to weaken or impeach presidents for questionable ends.

The remainder of this section recounts six short episodes of overlapping regional reactions to political crises. In line with the causal sequence laid out above, special attention is paid to inter-organizational dynamics and their repercussions for the policy outcome. The sample is restricted to South America, excluding Central America and the Caribbean in an attempt to focus on those cases where regional organizations (and not the United States or the UN) were the key external actors. Table 5 presents an overview of the cases included.

Paraguay, 1996

During the 1990s, Paraguay’s nascent democracy was repeatedly threatened by military insubordination. After decades of military rule, the civilian Juan Carlos Wasmosy had been elected president in 1993. But the head of the army, Lino Oviedo, became ever more powerful, to the point that, in April 1996, he attempted a coup against Wasmosy.

Table 5 Overlapping responses to political crises in South America, 1991–2016

	<i>OAS</i>	<i>MERCOSUR</i>	<i>UNASUR</i>
Paraguay 1996	X	X	
Paraguay 1999–2000	X	X	
Bolivia 2008	X		X
Ecuador 2010	X		X
Paraguay 2012	X	X	X
Venezuela 2013–2016	X		X

Source: Author's elaboration (as of June 2016)

The ensuing emergency meeting of the OAS Permanent Council in Washington was marked by confusion about the applicability of Resolution 1080, given that an interruption of the constitutional order had not yet occurred. The OAS ultimately condemned Oviedo's refusal to submit to civilian authority, and OAS Secretary General César Gaviria travelled to Asunción to offer his support to President Wasmosy. Further actions were not necessary, though, as a wide range of international actors, including MERCOSUR, the EU, and the US government supported Wasmosy, insisting that the president hold his ground. Since a democratic breakdown would have significantly damaged the reputation of MERCOSUR, diplomatic pressures from MERCOSUR, under the leadership of Argentina and Brazil, were particularly strong, and the threat of economic sanctions proved crucial in forcing Oviedo to give in.

Albeit there was no formal coordinated effort, as MERCOSUR did not dispose of a democracy clause at the time, the 1996 coup attempt in Paraguay is an example of cooperative inter-organizational dynamics, where the actions undertaken by the OAS and MERCOSUR had a synergistic effect and helped to quickly mitigate the crisis. In addition, institutional overlap contributed to an elevation of normative standards in the region. Prompted by the coup attempt, two months later MERCOSUR issued its 'Presidential Declaration on Democratic Commitment', and in 1998, its members signed the Ushuaia Protocol, formalizing the organization's commitment to democracy.

Paraguay, 1999–2000

Despite his failed coup in 1996, General Oviedo gradually emerged as a populist leader and almost ran for president in the 1998 elections. In 1999, he was implicated in the murder of the vice-president, and in 2000

his followers staged another coup attempt. While neither the OAS nor MERCOSUR formally invoked their democracy clauses, both exerted diplomatic pressure to end the crisis. The OAS issued a resolution that vehemently condemned the attack on the democratic order and supported the elected president. MERCOSUR warned that an ouster of the civilian government would lead to international isolation and the exclusion of Paraguay from the economic bloc, and the member states discussed the application of the Ushuaia Protocol. After some hesitation, the Paraguayan military finally ended its rebellion and Oviedo went into exile.

Once again, both organizations coincided in their assessment of the situation and unanimously condemned the coup plotters. Although they took no concrete action to mediate the crisis, their strong statements reiterated and thus fortified the regional consensus regarding the anti-coup norm.

Bolivia, 2008

The Bolivian crisis of September 2008 was the culmination of a longer phase of mounting polarization in the country. The central government was challenged by the resource-rich provinces of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija; their prefects demanded higher revenues from the hydrocarbon tax as well as regional autonomy from the central government, and even threatened to secede. The conflict escalated, and clashes between President Evo Morales's sympathizers and those supporting autonomy resulted in approximately 30 deaths.

In the context of a highly contentious referendum for approving Bolivia's new constitution, the OAS had already monitored the political situation since May 2008, and special representatives visited Bolivia repeatedly to provide assistance to the government to construct a process of dialogue with the opposition. In reaction to the violent clashes of September, Chilean president Michelle Bachelet, then president pro tempore of UNASUR, called a special meeting in Santiago. The OAS Secretary General, José Miguel Insulza, was also invited, apparently to consider the option of joint OAS/UNASUR actions to mediate the crisis. Ultimately, however, UNASUR decided to set up its own mission, although the OAS SG would have preferred a joint mission. Some observers think that the activities of the UNASUR mission turned out to be more important than those of the OAS in the resolution of the crisis (Nolte and Wehner 2014).

In response to this crisis, inter-organizational dynamics between OAS and UNASUR showed a mix of coordination and competition (Nolte 2015). On the one hand, the fact that both organizations took a clear stand against secessionist movements strengthened the position of the central government. There was no forum shopping by the Bolivian government, which accepted the support from both organizations. The redundancy of organizations' activities turned out to be helpful for finding a solution for the conflict between the government and the provinces. On the other hand, the option of a joint mission was discarded by UNASUR, claiming that UNASUR should search for South American solutions to South American problems. The promoters of UNASUR utilized the successful conflict resolution episode to legitimate UNASUR's role as a mediator in preserving democratic stability and peace in the region without external interference. This can be interpreted as a move towards a context-specific adaptation of international norms.

Ecuador, 2010

On 30 September 2010, police and soldiers staged a mutiny to exert pressure on Rafael Correa's government to veto a law regarding a public service reform that would affect the interests of the security forces. They demonstrated on the streets, seized the main airport and stormed congress. President Correa tried to resolve the conflict directly by visiting one police establishment in an attempt to negotiate. After a tear gas canister exploded near the president, he was transferred to the Police Hospital in Quito, where he was held hostage by the dissident police units that controlled the building. Although it is not clear whether the original intention of the police was to overthrow Correa, he and his government called the events a coup attempt.

External support for the Ecuadorian president came from both the OAS and UNASUR. Faced with the imminent risk of an alteration of the constitutional order, the OAS Permanent Council held an emergency meeting and adopted a resolution by acclamation on the same day as the police uprising, repudiating the events in Ecuador. The SG travelled to Ecuador on 1 October to express his support for President Correa. Brazil as regional leader initially called for coordinated action from UNASUR, the OAS, and MERCOSUR. Yet, UNASUR proceeded by itself. The South American presidents convened in Argentina on the very day of the Ecuadorian crisis and announced ad hoc measures to prevent the breakdown of democracy, such as the closing of the borders and the

interruption of all trade relations with UNASUR member states, with the objective of isolating Ecuador in case of success of the coup attempt.

Like in the case of Bolivia, the involvement of both OAS and UNASUR had positive policy impacts. Their overlap of action supported President Correa and dissuaded the possible coup plotters. What is more, the Ecuadorian crisis resulted in a reinforcement of norms for defending democracy and the protection of elected governments in South America. As a consequence of the crisis, the presidents of the UNASUR member states decided to adopt its 'Commitment to Democracy' as an additional protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR. At the same time, inter-organizational dynamics had a competitive undertone. OAS and UNASUR did not compete directly, but due to the higher visibility and greater agility of presidential diplomacy, UNASUR was perceived as more proactive and decisive in this crisis.

Paraguay, 2012

A severe conflict between the executive and the legislative branches occurred in Paraguay in June 2012. Fernando Lugo, who since 2008 was the first freely elected leftist president, lacked support in both legislative chambers, and the conservative opposition had been waiting for an opportunity to move against him and activate his impeachment. Their chance came when a clash between police and landless squatters resulted in the deaths of 11 farmers and six officers. As a consequence, Lugo was impeached on 21 June 2012 for 'poor performance of his duties'. While the impeachment process formally followed the provisions laid out in the constitution, Lugo was given barely 24 hours to prepare his defense, which created an aura of illegitimacy. Hence Lugo and his supporters denounced the impeachment as a 'parliamentary coup d'état'.

The presidents of Paraguay's neighbor states shared this interpretation. During a joint summit of UNASUR and MERCOSUR on 29 June, both organizations decided to suspend Paraguay on account of its having violated the democracy clause of both organizations; yet, they did not implement further sanctions. The rapid decision taken by MERCOSUR and UNASUR pressurized other actors to respond not only to the situation in Paraguay, but also to the South American organizations' definition of the situation. While they reacted speedily within a week, the OAS was more hesitant in its response. There were several meetings to assess the situation and a visit of SG Insulza to Paraguay in early July, followed by the presentation of a report. Yet, the organization did not issue an official

declaration, nor did it make use of the mechanisms provided for in the IADC. Instead, the OAS deployed several observer missions over the following months to foster political dialogue and help the country on its way to the elections in 2013.

During the Paraguayan crisis of 2012, there were overlapping actions by regional organizations. Yet, the redundancy of venues did not ease the way to find a solution, and a competitive dynamics prevailed between UNASUR and MERCOSUR on one side, and the OAS on the other. It is difficult to interpret whether the competition between those organizations raised the normative standards for the defense of democracy or whether these standards were watered down (Nolte 2015). In favour of the first interpretation, one might argue that the defense of democracy has been broadened beyond a purely institutionalist view by questioning a process that was formally legal, but deemed illegitimate – thus exploring ways to deal with ambiguous crises. On the other hand one might also interpret this as a watering down of standards. Norm ambiguity has been created because there was no longer a consensus among regional organizations on whether what happened in Paraguay was an attack on the democratic institutional order. The fact that the other MERCOSUR members took advantage of the Paraguayan suspension to ratify the accession of Venezuela (which had been blocked by the Paraguayan senate), despite the country's questionable democratic credentials, might be considered norm subversion.

Venezuela, 2013–2016

Since the death of Hugo Chávez, Venezuela is immersed in a political and economic crisis, still ongoing at the time of writing. A democratic solution looks increasingly remote, not least because OAS and UNASUR have embarked on a particularly fierce inter-organizational competition, in which each organization has responded to, and tried to undermine, any initiative of its adversary.

The result of the presidential elections of April 2013, won by a small margin by Chávez' designated successor, Nicolás Maduro, was questioned by the opposition. Since then, political polarization intensified, violence between both camps repeatedly erupted and the economic situation deteriorated. Debates in the OAS Permanent Council on the issue of Venezuela in February and March 2014 pitted 29 Latin American countries, wary about another orchestrated attempt at a coup d'état aimed at destabilizing the regime in Venezuela, against the United States, Canada,

and Panama, who denounced the violation of civil liberties and freedom of expression by the Venezuelan government. Meanwhile, UNASUR foreign ministers approved a resolution that expressed support for a dialogue between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. UNASUR was subsequently involved in several mediation attempts, including a delegation of three foreign ministers (Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador) together with the UNASUR SG, and, most recently, a dialogue process led by three former heads of government from Spain, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. The Maduro government repudiated the OAS as a mediator, but accepted UNASUR in this role. Likewise, the OAS despite its many years of experience in electoral observation, was not invited to monitor the 2013 presidential and the 2015 parliamentary elections. Only UNASUR was allowed to ‘accompany’ the vote.

In November 2015, in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, the new OAS SG Luis Almagro brought the organization back into play by sending an open letter to the head of Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, in which he accused Maduro’s governing party of taking unfair electoral advantages in its use of public resources in the campaign, access to the press, and the disqualification and incarceration of key opposition figures. Following the opposition’s triumph in the December 2015 elections, President Maduro neutralized the parliament and decimated judicial independence. He also tried to obstruct the opposition’s initiative for a referendum to recall the president. In May 2016, following mutual insults between Maduro and Almagro in a series of Twitter posts, the OAS SG invoked the IADC and asked for a special session of the Permanent Council, submitting a comprehensive report that laid out the case against Venezuela’s violations of democracy and human rights. Yet, shortly before the scheduled meeting, UNASUR managed to create a platform within the OAS where former Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero presented the work of the UNASUR process of dialogue in Venezuela. During the special session of 23 June, Venezuela’s allies in the region (largely identical with the ALBA member states) used the UNASUR initiative as a pretext to reject the activation of the IADC, arguing that the ongoing dialogue process should not be undermined by a confrontational condemnation of the situation in Venezuela by the OAS.

A competitive dynamics between OAS and UNASUR is quite obvious in the Venezuelan case, and it has entered a spiral of escalation since the inauguration of the new OAS SG in 2015. The government of President Maduro clearly adopted a strategy of regime shifting, turning to

UNASUR and putting into question the legitimacy of the OAS, accusing it to be an instrument of US imperialism. The redundancy of regional organizations made this option viable. However, it is questionable whether the OAS would have advanced more in mitigating the political crisis without the existence of UNASUR. In general, slow-motion democratic decline where the culprit is the government is far more difficult to tackle by regional mechanisms to protect democracy than classic coups d'état. Thus, it is not clear whether forum shopping by member states of overlapping regional organizations advanced or blocked crisis management in the Venezuelan case.

While UNASUR was not able to solve the Venezuelan crisis, it has made constant reference to its Protocol on Commitment to Democracy to keep the OAS out of South American affairs. This could be considered a case of norm adaptation to local contexts. Yet, one might also argue that in this episode of overlapping in action, the competition between OAS and UNASUR led to a watering down of international standards with regard to the protection of democracy. Whereas the IADC contains a clear-cut definition of representative democracy, the UNASUR democracy clause is characterized by an ambiguity of substantive definitions. In the Venezuelan case, the concept of 'democratic breach' has been interpreted as actions against the elected government, making it inapplicable to situations where the elected government violates democratic standards (Closa and Palestini 2015). Furthermore, the OAS with its long-standing experience in electoral observation was not invited to monitor the 2013 and 2015 elections. Instead, Venezuela turned to the new UNASUR Electoral Council, which it had itself helped to create. This Council coined the concept of 'accompanying missions' which makes a mockery of the original purpose of election monitoring – namely to validate the election or criticize electoral misconduct.

CONCLUSION

With the emergence of new regional organizations that explicitly pursue a strategy of distancing from the OAS, there are an increasing number of instances of competition between them and the OAS in the management of political crises. This chapter has shown that the redundancy of regional democracy clauses yields different effects, depending on whether the prevalent regional power dynamics is cooperative or competitive. In the latter case, inter-organizational competition may emerge which runs the danger

of having negative effects on the policy outcome and undermining the very norms that the organizations once set out to protect.

When faced with traditional military threats to the nascent Paraguayan democracy during the 1990s, the OAS and MERCOSUR coincided in their assessment of the situations as a political crisis and in their choices of diplomatic responses, leading to a reinvigoration of regional democratic norms. The cases of Bolivia in 2008 and Ecuador in 2010 exhibit a mix of coordinative and competitive inter-organizational dynamics. The redundancy of OAS and UNASUR activities effectively contributed to a resolution of the crises; at the same time, it reflected the emergence of UNASUR as a competitor to the OAS in South America. Finally, Paraguay in 2012 and Venezuela since 2013 are cases where different organizations' assessments of the situation and the instruments chosen to deal with them clearly diverge, hampering a solution of the crises and creating norm ambiguity and norm subversion. In those two episodes, overlapping actions to defend democracy are characterized by a struggle for competence and for the power to define the nature of the crisis. Venezuela is so far the most extreme case where the competitive dynamics between OAS and UNASUR have drastically surfaced.

It is hard to speak of either an overall coordination or outright rivalry between the various international institutions in crisis management. Rather, we observe elements of both at different times and on different decision-making and implementation levels. First, the fact that competitive dynamics at play in one situation impede positive policy outcomes does not necessarily preclude consensus or coordination in other episodes. The recent example of very similar expressions of concern from both OAS and UNASUR surrounding the impeachment proceedings against President Dilma Rousseff in Brazil illustrates that the trend towards competition is not an irreversible path, but that competition can alternate with consensus and cooperation.

Second, as the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia show, competitive dynamics do not necessarily impede positive policy outcomes. Besides overlap and inter-organizational dynamics, other influential factors have to be considered. The nature of the political crisis seems to play a crucial role. It is a lot easier to agree on reactions to an unambiguous attack on the democratic institutional order than to find common ground in the face of ambiguous situations – which, however, have become more numerous in the new millennium. The increase and variegated nature of ambiguous crises might also offer an explanation why regional actors frequently resort to ad hoc crisis resolution rather than to formal mechanisms, that tend to lag behind

the empirical reality. Ambiguous crises are also more likely to lead to contestations about norms, as it is often subject to interpretation whether a situation affects or breaches the democratic institutional process. While these issues are already difficult to solve within one single organization, they become even more complex when regional power dynamics lead to institutional overlap and competitive dynamics between several organizations.

NOTES

1. A related and more voluminous body of literature deals with regime complexity. However, regional organizations are different from regimes, and overlapping regional organizations are different from overlapping regimes. Regimes tend to be task-specific, while regional organizations tend to have a much broader policy mandate. Most studies on regime complexity focus on international treaties or conventions and how they affect one another, rather than on formal organizations. Yet, there are some commonalities regarding the theoretical specification of causal mechanisms underlying the consequences of overlap.
2. Rittberger and Zangl (2006) refer to these dimensions as ‘policy programs’ and ‘operational activities’. Likewise, Morse and Keohane (2014) state that contestations between multilateral institutions can take place with respect to their missions, rules, or practices. Organizational ‘mission’ coincides with what Rittberger and Zangl (2006) call policy program; ‘rules’ are the rules governing operational activities, and ‘practices’ refers to the actual operation of an institution (denoted ‘overlap in action’ below).
3. Even though those instruments have not yet been invoked, there have repeatedly been discussions about their application. In addition, regional organizations have exhibited a tendency to resort to ad hoc initiatives of crisis management instead of invoking formal instruments.

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Interstate Conflict Management in South America: The Relevance of Overlapping Institutions

Marcos Valle Machado da Silva

INTRODUCTION

South America is usually perceived as a continent free of interstate military conflicts.¹ Its countries' defense spending is lower than other regions', such as North America, Europe, Asia, Oceania and the Middle East, and they are just ahead of the African continent's expenditure, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).² This optimistic perspective is challenged, however, by authors like David Mares (2012), who points to the 'myth of Latin America as a region of peace'. In fact, there are some serious territorial disputes not only within the region, but also related to a South American state (Argentina) and a European power (the United Kingdom). Bolivian claims against Chile for an outlet to the sea and potential crises as a result of a spillover effect of the Colombian internal conflict to neighbouring countries like Ecuador and Venezuela are other examples.

This chapter addresses the apparent paradox that, even though an outbreak of interstate armed conflicts is a current possibility, the continent might be considered, in a broad sense, free from such issues. It is argued

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that this is attributable to prevalent norms and practices of searching for negotiated bilateral or multilateral solutions. In the case of unresolved disputes in a dormant status, international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization of American States (OAS) and, more recently, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)³ and its South American Defense Council (CDS)⁴ emerge as relevant organizations to prevent military conflicts in the region.

Recent research has looked at the phenomenon of overlapping regional organizations in the economic sphere, but also in security, and with a particular view to South America (see Flandes and Radseck 2012; Weiffen et al. 2013). This chapter is a contribution to the debate on the relevance of overlapping security institutions in South America, and how they can deal with interstate conflict in the region. It will explore the following questions: Which institutions are available for the interstate conflict management in South America? Do these institutions have overlapping functions and purposes? If so, is such an overlap an advantage or disadvantage when trying to resolve territorial conflicts in the continent or at least to keep them latent? Based on these questions, it is argued that the massive participation of South American states in institutions whose purpose is to promote cooperation and prevent the outbreak of conflicts among its member states is a major factor in maintaining peace in the continent.

In order to pursue answers to the proposed questions and corroborate the formulated assumption, this study proceeds in three steps. The first section identifies and analyses current interstate security institutions in South America, clarifies their respective roles, and highlights (if existent) those overlapping purposes that might contribute to preventing interstate conflicts in the region. In the second section, some of the main potential conflicts among South American states are addressed, looking in particular at the formerly identified roles of institutions to prevent the onset of armed conflict, or to cause them to be quickly resolved. The concluding third section briefly discusses these institutions' performance in a regional scenario and evaluates their potential to maintain interstate peace.

INSTITUTIONS RELATED TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

To understand the role of intergovernmental institutions in conflict management for the South American countries, it is necessary to remember that a high value has been attached to multilateralism and the prevalence

of international law throughout the history of South American foreign policy. As Andrew Hurrell (2004: 2) has shown:

Within South America, a shared cultural and historical experience, particular patterns of state formation and ongoing international interaction all combined to produce a strong regional diplomatic culture – a regional society of states which, although still often in conflict, conceived themselves to be bound by a common set of rules and shared in the workings of common institutions.

Thus, multilateralism and the peaceful resolution of disputes have their origins in the formation of the South American states. Since the early nineteenth century, the states of the region considered international institutions to be a tool for the protection of their sovereignty against more powerful states (Herz 2010: 332). Over the years, there was a growing perception that multilateral forums are essential to peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes and, eventually, they are also useful to prevent a security dilemma in case one or more South American states consider a modernization of their military apparatus.

At the end of the Cold War, multilateral forums related to security management gained momentum, as it became ever more obvious that international cooperation was needed to cope with international and transnational issues such as environmental degradation, drug trafficking and organized crime, human rights protection, and so on, that affect more than one single country. These issues were no longer attached to the East-West conflict. In this context, South American countries relied on international organizations such as the UN and the OAS. Years later, but in line with this perception, the South American countries established a new regional organization in 2008: the UNASUR. These organizations – UN, OAS and UNASUR – and their purposes and importance will be further discussed in this study.

United Nations (UN)

The participation of South American states as UN members dates back to its foundation. In December 1945, except for Guyana and Suriname, all South American states were members of the UN.⁵ Article 1 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter (United Nations 1945) defines as main purpose of the organization:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to

the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

All South American states recognize the UN as the main global security organization and as the most important forum to address and manage crises and threats to international security. They have also sought active involvement in security issues discussed at the UN. This can be seen through two indicators: participation in peacekeeping missions and participation as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. With respect to peacekeeping, except for Suriname all South American countries have contributed with personnel and material to this type of operation. Some states, such as Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay each have over 30 different participations in such missions.⁶ A current example showcasing the joint participation of South American countries in UN peacekeeping operations is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) where Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay have deployed both military and police personnel in Haiti.⁷

The other indicator for engagement with the UN is participation in the Security Council. The Council is composed of 15 members: 5 permanent members, and 10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Until November 2015, except for Suriname, all South American countries had been elected as non-permanent members at least once and up to 10 times.⁸ Given that more than 60 UN member states have never been represented in the Security Council, the repeated election of South American states as non-permanent member is evidence of an impressive presence in the UN.

Organization of American States (OAS)

The OAS is the oldest hemispheric institution for the management of international relations in the security field (Herz 2010: 338).⁹ According to Articles 1 and 2 of its 1948 Charter, the OAS is a regional agency complementary to the UN. Among its essential purposes are: 'To strengthen the peace and security of the continent' and 'To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States' (OAS 1948).¹⁰ Since its inception in 1948,

the Charter was amended by reform protocols on four occasions: Buenos Aires, 1967; Cartagena, 1985; Washington, 1992; and Managua, 1993.

After a long phase of stagnation in the context of the Cold War, in the 1990s, its members sought to adapt and revitalize it for facing threats, challenges and concerns that the Americas confront. One important innovation of the 1990s was the creation and application of confidence-building measures (CBM). As pointed out by Alcides Costa Vaz (2006: 60–1), the concept of CBM has expanded in recent decades:

Originally, it designated the actions to identify and implement prevention measures against irrupted armed hostilities; then it went on to comprise measures to ensure better military relations, except from disarmament or arms control. Eventually, it has addressed actions to enforce policies and adoption of concrete measures in response to various joint forms of perceived security threats.

In summary, CBM encompasses tools which adversary states can use to mitigate tensions and avert the possibility of military conflict. These tools include communication agreements (e.g. ‘hotlines’ or direct lines between capitals), restrictions on positioning of military forces (e.g. demilitarized zones), transparency (e.g. exchange of data and information) and verification measures (e.g. on-site inspections). Also, ‘CBM usually precede the negotiation of formal agreements on arms control or are added to arms control agreements to strengthen them’.¹¹

Via the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB),¹² the OAS has played a role in creating and applying CBM. Already in 1995, OAS Permanent Council Resolution 650 (1031/95) assigned the IADB the task to prepare an inventory of security and military CBM in the hemisphere (Herz 2008: 19). After IADB was formally incorporated into the OAS in 2006, it is still in charge of the inventory of CBM, in addition to being a forum that provides technical, advisory and educational advice on defense matters to the OAS and its member states (Herz 2010: 338). CBM are now considered fundamental for building and keeping peaceful relations among OAS member states, as they generate spirals of trust and transparency. Also, they reduce the likelihood of eventual escalation of crises into armed conflict.

Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)

UNASUR is another organization in charge of regional security and defense management. As the most recent regional organization, its essence

and purpose cannot be understood without a brief chronological explanation and without considering Brazil's role as a protagonist in UNASUR's establishment. The rapprochement between Brazil and Argentina, and between Argentina and Chile, started in the 1980s and it was consolidated over the following 30 years. It allowed developing cooperation on some security projects in South America. In this context, Brazil has been playing a key role in promoting regional integration, for several reasons (Gama 2010: 346):

- It has borders with 10 countries in South America;
- Its territory encompasses nearly half of the continent;
- In demographic terms, Brazil accounts for about half the population of South America;
- Brazilian investments in the region have grown significantly, as well as the participation of Brazilian companies in major regional infrastructure projects;
- The economic weight of Brazilian economy in South America, as Brazil's GDP is greater than the sum of all other South American countries' GDP.¹³

In short, in several respects Brazil has a major relevance in the South American context. As a consequence, political ambitions of inserting the country on the global level and playing a leading role in South America have emerged and paved the way for a project on regional security and defense issues. In the first place, however, Brazil articulated a regional integration project based on shared interests with the other South American states in political, economic and social areas (Gama 2010: 346). Thus, in August 2000, during the first summit of South American Presidents, held in Brasilia, the discussion agenda had five major topics: democracy; trade; infrastructure; illicit drugs and related crimes; and information, knowledge and technology. This meeting led to the Initiative for the Integration of South American Infrastructure (IIRSA), which continued in the second summit of South American Presidents, held in Ecuador in 2002.

Results from this initiative materialized in December 2004, when 12 South American countries' representatives signed the Cuzco Declaration, creating the South American Community of Nations (CASA). Later, in April 2007, during the first South American Energy Summit, held on Isla

Margarita, it was agreed that CASA would be renamed the UNASUR (Gama 2010: 346–7). The UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was approved by the 12 member states’ representatives during the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Brasilia on 23 May 2008. Article 2 of the Treaty defines the objectives of UNASUR:

The objective of the South American Union of Nations is to build, in a participatory and consensual manner, an integration and union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, prioritizing political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, among others, with a view to eliminating socio-economic inequality, in order to achieve social inclusion and participation of civil society, to strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries within the framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States.¹⁴

Article 3, letter s) of the Treaty mentions ‘The exchange of information and experiences in matters of defense’ as one of the specific objectives of UNASUR. Consonant with this specific objective, UNASUR member states have created the South American Defense Council (CDS), whose statute was approved on 16 December 2008, during the Extraordinary Summit of UNASUR, held in Salvador. The Statute (UNASUR 2008) defines the general purposes of the CDS in the following terms:

- a) To consolidate South America as a zone of peace, basis for democratic stability and development of our peoples, and as a contribution to world peace.
- b) Construct a South American identity in defense, taking into account the sub-regional and national characteristics and contribute to strengthening the unity of Latin America and the Caribbean.
- c) Build consensus to strengthen regional cooperation in defense.

The Statute defines 11 specific objectives, the most significant ones being the aim to promote ‘the exchange of information and analysis on the regional and international situation, with the aim of identifying risk factors and threats that may affect the regional and global peace’ and to ‘strengthen measures of confidence and disseminate lessons learned’ (UNASUR 2008).

Gama (2010: 347–8) points out that in the Brazilian perspective, the CDS could contribute to the formation of a South American identity in

defense founded on shared values and principles, such as peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for sovereignty, the subordination of the military to democratically elected governments and the prevalence of human rights. It can fill the gap in the analysis of political, military and strategic issues from the perspective of South America countries that are democratic, culturally close, distanced from major conflict zones, with relatively low defense budgets and a minimum level of interstate conflict.

Considering the recent creation of UNASUR and the CDS, it is important to note that a process of entrenchment will be necessary and it should take some time to evaluate their effectiveness in tangible terms. Yet, when comparing the main institutions involved in South America's interstate conflict management, the convergence between their purposes and objectives is obvious. [Table 6](#) summarizes this overlap so as to offer clear visualization.

Table 6 Organizations and purposes

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Purpose/Objective</i>
UN	'To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace'.
OAS	'The Organization of American States, [...] proclaims the following essential purposes: a) strengthen the peace and security of the continent; [...] c) To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States; d) To provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression; e) To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise among them; [...]'].
UNASUR/CDS	'The consolidation of South America as a zone of peace, a base for democratic stability and the integral development of our peoples and a contribution to world peace; the creation of a South American identity in defense, taking into account the sub-regional and national characteristics [...]; the generation of consensus to strengthen regional cooperation on defense'.

Source: Compiled from Charter of the United Nations, [Chapter 1](#) (United Nations 1945); Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS 1948); Statute of the South American Defense Council (UNASUR 2008)




Fig. 2 Overlapping institutional arrangements for conflict management
Source: Author's elaboration

Thus, the region is characterized by an overlapping institutional arrangement involving the UN, as an organization and forum for managing global security; the OAS, as a hemispheric organization covering the Americas; and UNASUR with its CDS, with specific regional reach in South America. Fig. 2 represents this overlapped institutional arrangement. Building on this finding, the next section will address main potential conflicts among South American states and analyse whether those institutions and the fact that they overlap play a role to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict, or to cause them to be quickly resolved.

MAJOR POTENTIAL INTERSTATE CONFLICTS IN SOUTH AMERICA

As 'disputes between nation-states or violations of the state system of alliances', intrastate conflicts may be 'either manifest, recognizable through actions or behaviors, or latent, in which case it remains dormant for some time' (Miller 2005: 22). Thus, when referring to potential interstate conflicts, we are talking about an interstate conflict that remains dormant. According to our main assumption, the fact that South American conflicts keep their dormant status is attributable to the massive participation of South American states in institutions whose purpose is to promote cooperation and prevent the outbreak of conflicts among its member states.

For a brief overview of the main interstate conflicts in South America, it is necessary to go back in time to the 1930s, where numerous territorial disputes involving South American states existed, including Argentina and Chile; Argentina and the United Kingdom; Chile and Peru; Chile and

Bolivia; Paraguay and Bolivia; Peru and Ecuador; and Venezuela and the United Kingdom (later Venezuela and Guyana). These disputes resulted in four military conflicts throughout the twentieth century: the Chaco War involving Paraguay and Bolivia (1932–1935); the struggle between Peru and Ecuador for Zarumilla region (1941); the Falklands/Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom (1982); and again the conflict between Peru and Ecuador, this time about the Cenepa region (1995). As pointed out by Domínguez et al. (2003: 20), these conflicts produced between 500 and 1,500 deaths as a result from the fighting, except for the Chaco War which had a death toll of more than 100,000.

Three major potential conflicts in South America have been resolved in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Argentina and Chile, Chile and Peru, and Peru and Ecuador all established treaties and agreements that put an end to their territorial disputes. The first of these conflicts related to disputes over territorial waters and control of the islands Picton, Lennox and Nueva in the Beagle Channel area between Argentina and Chile, which almost waged war in 1978. The dispute was settled by international arbitration and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed in 1984, ended the question. Later, other agreements signed in the early 1990s decided 24 other questions relating to the demarcation of borders between the two countries, ending all existing disputes between Argentina and Chile (Domínguez et al. 2003: 31).

On 27 January 2014, the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Chile and Peru came to an end with the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the issue.¹⁵ This decision was accepted by the two states in question, which signed on 25 March 2014, the Cartographic Technical Group Agreement which defines precisely the geographic coordinates of the maritime border between the two countries.

The Ecuador-Peru dispute over the possession of Cenepa region resulted in conflict between the two countries in 1995, causing over a 1,000 deaths and injuries. In this case, the OAS played a significant role in a cease-fire negotiation (1995) and, subsequently, in the settlement of the conflict. A treaty was signed between these countries in Brasília in 1998, and eventually implemented in 1999.

Despite these improvements in the resolution of territorial disputes involving South American states, potential issues for military conflict in the region still persist. The demand for the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, involving Argentina and the United Kingdom; Bolivia's claim against

Chile for an outlet to the sea; and the risk of Colombian internal conflict's spillover effect to neighbouring states are among them. These issues will now be discussed.

Argentina and the United Kingdom

Argentina still has territorial disputes over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, that may lead to the emergence of new military conflicts. Both Argentina and the United Kingdom have claimed sovereignty over those islands, and, even though United Kingdom effectively occupies the islands and maintains a strong military apparatus to ensure they can exercise their sovereignty, the question seems to be still open. The Argentine invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands triggered the 1982 conflict, which lasted 10 weeks and ended with Argentine surrender. This conflict took place in the context of the Cold War and is thus characterized to some extent by the institutional inertia that existed in that period both within the UN and the OAS. At the same time, the case is unique since both conflict parties belonged to the same pole of the bipolar power structure extant in the international system.

After the Falklands/Malvinas War, the two countries began a slow rapprochement and normalization of diplomatic relations. However, in February 2010, as the United Kingdom began oil exploration in the region, Argentina-United Kingdom relations turned strained again. Responding to the British initiative, the Argentinean government has restricted communication between the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and Argentina. In 2012, with the 30-year anniversary of the 1982 conflict, the two states launched a diplomatic offensive defending their sovereignty rights over the islands.

The international institutions under survey here diverged in their assessment of the conflict. In 1982, the UN Security Council condemned Argentine military action in its Resolution 502 (1982), demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.¹⁶

As for the OAS, the Falklands/Malvinas War was an instance where United States' and Latin American interests did not coincide. While the United States backed the position of its NATO ally rather than Argentina's, the OAS denounced the actions of the United Kingdom and supported Argentina's rights of sovereignty over the islands.¹⁷ Since then, the General Assembly has adopted a resolution on the Falklands/

Malvinas issue annually since 1982.¹⁸ All 33 resolutions mention that the Falkland/Malvinas Islands question is of permanent interest to the whole hemisphere. In addition, the resolutions exhort the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to resume negotiations aimed at seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute, and usually expresses the OAS' satisfaction with the reaffirmation of the Argentine government's will to continue exploring all possible ways to secure a peaceful solution to the controversy and particularly its positive considerations on the inhabitants of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

UNASUR has repeatedly affirmed its support of the legitimate rights of Argentina in the sovereignty dispute regarding the Malvinas. Still in the context of the CASA at the Second South American Summit in the city of Cochabamba on 9 December 2006, the conflict was framed as a question of decolonization, and the heads of state emphatically called on both governments

[. . .] to resume the negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a fair, peaceful and lasting solution to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and the maritime surrounding areas in conformity with the resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on Decolonization of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.¹⁹

The sixth UNASUR meeting of Heads of State and Government (2012), held in Lima, issued a similar statement:

UNASUR member states reiterate their firm support for the legitimate rights of the Republic of Argentina in the sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas and ratify the permanent regional interest in that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland agree to resume negotiations with the Republic of Argentina in order to find - as soon as possible - a peaceful and definitive solution to this dispute, pursuant to the guidelines of the international community and the relevant resolutions and declarations of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS).²⁰

The issue of sovereignty remains open, given the claim of both states over the islands. However, two crucial factors keep the dispute latent:

first, the current military inability of Argentina to attempt an occupation such as in 1982 and second, the institutional framework represented by the UN, OAS and UNASUR. While on the one hand UNASUR and OAS support the Argentine claim, on the other it should be emphasized that any unilateral military action carried by Argentina would put the country in the ‘aggressor’ position, preventing the regional and hemispheric support for such action. In other words, the overlapping arrangement is working fine in this dispute, acting to prevent the risk of an interstate military conflict between Argentina and United Kingdom. In summary, this is an issue that remains latent, but due to the above two factors, it is unlikely to escalate in the near future to a military conflict.

Chile and Bolivia

Territorial disputes between Chile and Bolivia can be evaluated by the fact that these two countries have strained diplomatic relations. The issue dates back to the War of the Pacific (Chile versus Peru and Bolivia), which occurred between 1879 and 1883. That war had causal factors such as the exploration of mineral resources from the Atacama Desert and imprecise demarcation of borders among the three states in that region. At the end of the conflict in 1883, Chile annexed the province of Tarapaca, then belonging to Peru, and the province of Antofagasta, which was part of Bolivia’s territory and its only access to the Pacific Ocean.

In 1883, the Treaty of Ancon was signed between Chile and Peru, but was not respected by either state. In 1929, a new agreement was signed, brokered by the United States, resolving that the Tacna region would be held by Peru, whereas the city of Arica and its nearby region would be held by Chile, which would also pay \$6 million dollars of compensation to Peru. In 1999, the two countries settled and also came to terms for the final procedures for full implementation of the treaties of 1883 and 1929 with Peru getting concessions for the use of the Chilean port of Arica (Domínguez et al. 2003: 33).

In the case of Bolivia, an armistice with Chile was signed in 1884. According to a 1904 treaty, Chile kept its territorial gains in exchange for the construction of a railway connecting La Paz to Arica port and allowing Bolivian trade through Chilean ports. However, successive Bolivian governments never considered this arrangement as final and the

recovery of territory lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific is a national issue, contained in the current Bolivian Constitution:

Article 267

- I. The state of Bolivia declares its indispensable and irreversible right over the territory that gives it access to the Pacific Ocean and its maritime space.
- II. The effective solution to the maritime problem is to be carried out by peaceful means and the exercise of sovereignty over said territory, constitutes permanent objectives and indispensable ones of the Bolivian State.²¹

The OAS manifested itself for the first time on this issue in 1979, when a General Assembly Resolution recommended to the states concerned with this problem to open negotiations for the purpose of providing Bolivia with a connection with the Pacific Ocean. These negotiations should take into account the rights and interests of the parties involved, and might consider the creation of a port area for integrated multinational development as well as the Bolivian proposal that no territorial compensation be included.²² In the following years and until 1989, the issue was the subject of annual resolutions of the General Assembly, each of which stressed the need to provide Bolivia with a free and sovereign territorial link with the Pacific Ocean.²³ Since 1989, with the apparent efforts of the governments of Chile and Bolivia to find a common solution, the question no longer appeared in OAS resolutions.

Concerning the UN and UNASUR, both organizations don't play any active role in this issue, which has meanwhile been submitted to the ICJ in The Hague. Yet, UNASUR has proved on several occasions, such as the recurrent tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, that it is capable of putting a halt to the escalation of interstate conflicts. Like the issue between Argentina and the United Kingdom, the conflict between Chile and Bolivia remains unresolved, but latent. The main factors that contribute to the fact that this potential military conflict remains latent is Bolivia's military weakness in relation to Chile, and the institutional framework represented by the UN, OAS and UNASUR that restricts the possible use of force by the two states.

The Spillover of Colombia's Civil War

Civil War in Colombia is the most long-standing armed conflict in South America. It dates back to the 1960s, where it started with the activities of two armed groups, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) and *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) which aimed at establishing a communist regime in Colombia. The conflict took on transnational dimensions for many reasons, such as the occasional pursuit of refuge by Colombian guerrillas in the territories of neighbouring countries as well as the symbiosis of these revolutionary groups with drug trafficking.

The incident where Colombia violated Ecuador's territorial integrity in 2008 became an example of spillover effect to a neighbour country and exposed how the conflict might be dangerously internationalized. On 1 March 2008, the Ecuadorian airspace and territory were violated by the Colombian Armed Forces who carried out Operation Phoenix and attacked a FARC camp in Angostura, killing 22 people, including Raul Reyes who at the time was the FARC's second in command. Subsequently, the Colombian government said it had found documents and digital files in the FARC camp that suggested ties among Ecuador, Venezuela and the FARC. The military action and subsequent declarations of the Colombian government exacerbated tensions and escalated the crisis between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Two days after the Colombian incursion, the Venezuelan government ordered the reinforcement of troops on the border with Colombia and withdrew its ambassador from Bogotá (Villa 2008: 189).

In the ensuing crisis of the Colombian military action, the OAS played a major role in its management. This was probably the most recent and relevant test of their effectiveness in preventing the outbreak of interstate military conflict in South America. Shortly after the above events, the OAS Permanent Council adopted on 5 March 2008, the Resolution CP/RES. 930 (1632/08), which clearly recognizes that Colombian military action was 'a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador':

That on the morning of Saturday, March 1, 2008, military forces and police personnel of Colombia entered the territory of Ecuador, in the province of Sucumbíos, without the express consent of the government of Ecuador to carry out an operation against members of an irregular group of the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia who were clandestinely encamped on the Ecuadorian side of the border;

That that act constitutes a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international law;

That that act has triggered a serious crisis between those two countries, leading to the breaking off of relations between the two states and grave tension in the region; [...]

RESOLVES

1. To reaffirm the principle that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever.
2. To constitute a commission, headed by the Secretary General and composed of four ambassadors designated by him, to visit both countries, traveling to the places that the parties indicate, to submit the corresponding report to the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and to propose formulas for bringing the two nations closer together.²⁴

Likewise, the states of the Rio Group meeting in the Dominican Republic on 9 March articulated diplomatic efforts to arrive at a honourable solution for Ecuador against the injury suffered by the Colombian incursion. Diplomatic efforts during the following days achieved that the Colombian government presented a formal apology to Ecuador which was publicly accepted by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, who declared to consider the matter closed. Following these events, the Venezuelan government said it would seek to normalize relations with the Colombian government (Villa 2008: 190).

Regarding the role of the OAS, the point to be noted is that the actors directly involved in the crisis (Ecuador and Colombia) and the state indirectly involved (Venezuela) recognized and considered the OAS as a legitimate and appropriate forum for the resolution of the conflict. Moreover, the diplomatic representatives of the OAS member states were able to conduct negotiations as a non-zero sum game, which helped to find a solution to the crisis all conflict parties could feel comfortable with: Ecuador felt that its complaint of violation of sovereignty was upheld, and Colombia was satisfied for not being sanctioned (Villa 2008:191–2).

The performance of the Rio Group played a significant role in strengthening the OAS resolution, because it served as a forum that even without United States representatives was also recognized as suitable for the dialog of the parties directly involved in the crisis. Another factor that contributed to the peaceful outcome of the crisis was the role played by some South American states, notably Brazil and Chile which condemned the Colombian military action, but acted decisively in finding the solution which would address the concerns of both Colombia and Ecuador (Villa 2008: 192–3). Taken together, all these factors converged so that the Colombian government issued an apology, the Ecuadorian government accepted it, and thus, the crisis was de-escalated. Without OAS action, the crisis might have escalated into a military conflict and with a potential risk of involving Venezuela.

CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR INTERSTATE SECURITY IN SOUTH AMERICA

The objective of this chapter was to identify and analyse the existing institutions for the management of interstate security in South America, as well as their respective roles and purposes in order to highlight any existing overlaps and their implications for preventing conflicts among states in the region. The hypothesis was that the massive participation of South American states in institutions whose purpose is to promote cooperation and prevent the outbreak of conflicts among its member states is a major factor in maintaining peace in the continent. In particular, the chapter focused on the overlapping institutional arrangement involving the UN, the OAS and UNASUR. This institutional setting presents the UN as an organization and forum for managing global security, the OAS as hemispheric organization covering the Americas, and UNASUR and its CDS with specific regional reach in South America.

The study sought to examine these institutions' role through three selected cases involving disputes or crises that have been militarized and sometimes escalated to open conflicts: Argentina-United Kingdom, Chile-Bolivia, and the Colombian Civil War's spillover effect. In each of the three cases, at least one of the international institutions played an important role in preventing the outbreak of military conflict or contributed to resolve them in a short time. The evidence points to the relevance of the

OAS in interstate conflict management in South America. It can be seen as an appropriate forum, though discreet, for building consensus and articulating solutions for issues concerning interstate conflict. The Falklands/Malvinas conflict was an exception, as both the UN and the OAS were ineffective either to prevent the outbreak of conflict or to resolve it. It should be noted, though, that this was the only one of the three cases that occurred in the context of the Cold War.

The participation of South American states in institutions whose purpose, directly or indirectly, is to promote cooperation and prevent the outbreak of conflicts among its member states is a major factor in maintaining peace within the continent, even with serious pending territorial disputes between some states in the region. Since the creation of the OAS and the UN, there have been only two open military conflicts in the region: Argentina-United Kingdom and Peru-Ecuador. Since the creation of UNASUR and its CDS, there were no open conflicts among the states of the region, and potential conflicts such as the one between Ecuador and Colombia (and Venezuela) were prevented.

While there are still disputes among states of the region around border delimitation and territorial claims, all these potential conflicts can be resolved, minimized or kept dormant with institutions perceived as legitimate and relevant by South American countries. In this context, the existence of an institutional arrangement with overlapping purposes is a positive factor in interstate conflict management in South America. The overlapping arrangement among UN, OAS and UNASUR (with its CDS) has proven effective to keep dormant the potential threat of military conflict in South America, both among South American states and between them and countries exogenous to the region.

However, a caveat is in order. As pointed out by Jorge Domínguez and his coauthors (2003: 14), institutional arrangements might produce adverse side effects such as the so-called ‘moral hazard’, a possible aggressive or intransigent interstate behaviour. States, notably those states that are weak militarily, can militarize disputes in the certainty that international institutions will intervene to prevent an open conflict. States can also resist making compromises over border disputes equally certain that the risk of undesired outcomes is low. That is, the challenger expects existing institutions to act in order to mitigate tensions and prevent the outbreak of military conflict. This is the opportunity to seek a fait accompli by the militarization of a dispute with a reduction in costs of an eventual military aggression (Domínguez et al. 2003: 27).

In this sense, the South American states should ensure that the existing institutional arrangement does not create an unwanted incentive for the militarization of existing disputes. South American states look back on a long tradition of valuing the role and relevance of international law and conflict management institutions. The current overlapping institutions for interstate conflict management have produced results that meet the aspirations of its South American members as it has proven to be able to minimize the occurrence of military conflicts between South American states as well as to prevent the spread of conflict over time. The arrangement formed by the UN, OAS and UNASUR/CDS strengthens and develops cooperation and reduces the expectation of conflict between neighbouring states. Thus, this arrangement should be on guard against the potential dangers of ‘moral hazard’ to continue to operate efficiently and increasingly effectively.

NOTES

1. The term ‘interstate conflict’ is used as presented in the *Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies* (Miller 2005: 22): ‘Interstate conflicts are disputes between nation-states or violations of the state system of alliances’. The term ‘interstate military conflict’ refers to those conflicts where military force is used or there is the threat to use it by one of the states involved in the conflict.
2. See *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, available at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database (23 February 2015).
3. This is the Spanish acronym: *Unión de Naciones Suramericanas* (UNASUR). The Portuguese acronym is UNASUL: *União de Nações Sul-Americanas*.
4. This acronym comes from Spanish: *Consejo de Defensa Suramericano* (CDS).
5. Dates for admission as member states were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay – 24 Oct. 1945; Peru – 31 Oct. 1945; Colombia – 5 Nov. 1945; Venezuela – 15 Nov. 1945; Ecuador – 21 Nov. 1945; Bolivia – 24 Nov. 1945; Uruguay – 18 Dec. 1945; Guyana – 20 Sep. 1966 and Suriname – 4 Dec. 1975 (United Nations, ‘Member States of United Nations’, available at <http://www.un.org/en/members/> (2 February 2015)).
6. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) presents the list by year and by the member states participating in peacekeeping operations (see United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Troop and police contributors’, available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml> (10 November 2015)).

7. United Nations, 'MINUSTAH Facts and Figures', available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml> (5 November 2015).
8. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of times each South American state was elected by the General Assembly to make up the Security Council as non-permanent members: Argentina (9); Bolivia (2); Brazil (10); Chile (5); Colombia (7); Ecuador (3); Guiana (2); Paraguay (1); Peru (4); Uruguay (2); and Venezuela (5). (United Nations Security Council, 'Countries Elected Members of the Security Council', available at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp> (11 November 2015)).
9. The Ninth International Conference of American States, meeting in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948, with the participation of 21 states, adopted the Charter of the Organization of American States, the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá), and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. See OAS, 'Our History', available at http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp (25 February 2015).
10. Article 1 – The American States establish by this Charter the international organization that they have developed to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence. Within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency. [. . .].
 Article 2 – The Organization of American States, in order to put into practice the principles on which it is founded and to fulfil its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, proclaims the following essential purposes:
 - a) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
 - b) To promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention;
 - c) To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the member states;
 - d) To provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression [. . .] (see OAS 1948).
11. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 'Confidence-Building Measures' in *Glossary*, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, available at <http://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/> (16 April 2016).
12. The IADB is the world's oldest military and regional defense organization. It was officially established on 30 March 1942, by a resolution of the Third Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. Initially the focus of his work was the development of themes and studies aimed at 'preparing member states to defend the continent and to

- recommend measures to this end'. After the Cold War, both the OAS and the IADB began to seek new vocations and roles to be played in this new scenario. As part of this recovery process and according to the AG/RES. 1 (XXXII-E/06), the IADB officially become an entity of the OAS, established as provided in the last paragraph of Article 53 of the OAS Charter ('Representação do Brasil na Junta Interamericana de Defesa', available at <http://www.rbjid.com/juntainteramericana.asp> (13 February 2015)).
13. Brazil's GDP (2013) was worth US\$ 2,245,673,032,353.8. The added GDP (2013) of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela was worth US\$ 2,124,216,594,274.4 (The World Bank, 'GDP', available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> (12 February 2015)).
 14. Presidência da República do Brasil, 'Decreto N° 7.667, de 11 de janeiro de 2012', available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2012/Decreto/D7667.htm (25 February 2015).
 15. See the ICJ's Press Release 2014/2, 27 January 2014, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/137/17928.pdf> (13 February 2015).
 16. 'The Security Council, [...] Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2 April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina, Determining that there exist a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), 1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities; 2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falklands Islands (Islas Malvinas) [...] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 502 (1982), available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/502> (26 February 2015).
 17. OAS XX Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Resolution I, 28 April 1982, available at <http://www.oas.org/consejo/MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/minutes.asp> (22 December 2015).
 18. OAS General Assembly, Declarations and Resolutions, available at <http://www.oas.org/consejo/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/Resoluciones-Declaraciones.asp> (8 November 2015).
 19. Embajada de La República Argentina en La República Federal de Alemania, South American Nations community President's Summit, Presidential Declaration on the Malvinas Islands, available at <http://calem.mrecic.gov.ar/de/node/4780> (26 February 2015).
 20. Author's translation from Spanish. For the original version, see Ministério das Relações Exteriores de Brasil, 'VI Reunião Ordinária do Conselho de Chefes de Estado e de Governo da UNASUL – Lima, Peru, 30 de novembro de 2012 – Documentos Aprovados', available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3234:vi-reuniao-ordinaria-do-conselho-de-chefes-de-estado-e-de-governo-da-una-sul-lima-peru-30-de-novembro-de-2012-documentos-aprovados&catid=42&lang=pt-BR&Itemid=280 (10 November 2015).

21. Author's translation from Spanish. See *Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia* (2009), Artículo 267, available at <http://www.presidencia.gob.bo/documentos/publicaciones/constitucion.pdf> (27 February 2015).
22. OAS General Assembly, 'AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79), Access by Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean', Declarations and Resolutions. Proceedings, Volume 1. Certified Texts of the Resolutions, 55, available at <http://www.oas.org/consejo/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/Resoluciones-Declaraciones.asp> (23 February 2015).
23. OAS General Assembly, Declarations and Resolutions, available at <http://www.oas.org/consejo/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/Resoluciones-Declaraciones.asp> (8 November 2015).
24. OAS Permanent Council, 'CP/RES. 930 (1632/08)', available at <http://www.oas.org/consejo/resolutions/res930.asp> (28 February 2015).

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PART III

Power Shifts and Security Priorities

The Zone of Violent Peace

David R. Mares

INTRODUCTION

The diplomacy of cooperation in intra-Latin American relations continues to coexist with that of militarized coercion, just as in the past. The historical and contemporary record has been read selectively, however, by scholars and diplomats, with the result that empirical richness has been lost. More importantly, we have also misunderstood security outcomes, and are surprised when Colombian forces attack across the border in Ecuador, Costa Rica denounces Nicaraguan troops taking control of disputed territory or Venezuelan troops blow up barges in territory internationally recognized as Guyanese. My argument is not that these are everyday occurrences, or even the dominant manner in which Latin American states interact with each other. My point is that these militarized behaviours have not been eliminated from the region and are actually incentivized by the way in which diplomats and scholars approach the security issues facing the region.

This chapter has three sections and a conclusion. I first briefly review why international conflict scholars study the militarization of interstate disputes and demonstrate that any claim to peaceful relations among a group of states needs to consider the empirical record. The section ends with an examination of the region's history of wars after World War II and militarized

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interstate disputes (MIDs) between Latin American states in the first decade of the twenty-first century (the Correlates of War (COW) MID data base ends in 2010), and compares that record with that of states in other regions to demonstrate that Latin America is not especially peaceful, that South America is not more peaceful than the rest of Latin America, and that within South America the Southern Cone/Brazil is not more peaceful than the Andean Ridge/Venezuela. A second section reprises my argument from *Violent Peace* (Mares 2001) to demonstrate how its causal logic can explain the occurrence of MIDs among Latin American states even today. In the third section I examine why the contemporary situation in Latin America does not dissuade militarization but continues to encourage it, particularly via a ‘moral hazard’ mechanism. The conclusion appeals to scholars studying Latin American security to engage the empirical record and respect the causal logic of the international relations models they seek to use.

GETTING THE EMPIRICAL RECORD RIGHT

Analysts studying international conflict within a traditional security perspective focus on two types of events: war and the militarization of a dispute short of war. These are not the only ways one could approach the topic of conflict. For example, one could focus on the life-threatening impact of economic sanctions imposed by one nation against another. But when Latin American scholars and diplomats make claims about Latin America’s ‘peaceful’ relations, they are at the very least including the traditional security focus on interstate armed conflict.

The claim that Latin America, or South America or its Southern Cone, is an especially peaceful region in the world or on its way to becoming a ‘zone of positive peace’, ‘stable peace’ or a ‘security community’ (Kacowicz 1998, 2000; Hurrell 1998; Battaglini 2012; Oelsner 2016) is, however, empirically incorrect. Latin America is not an outlier in having fewer wars than other regions (using the standard definition of at least 1,000 battlefield-related deaths in a 12-month period – cf. COW 2015; Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Worldwide, there were only 38 wars in the 61-year period from 1946 to 2007, as indicated in the latest COW database. Latin America has been the scene of three of those wars (El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, Argentina and Great Britain in 1982, and Ecuador and Peru in 1995), with two of those occurring in South America, only one in Central America and none in the Latin American Caribbean. The numbers of wars in Latin America is greater than in Western Europe or the North Atlantic, the same as in East Asia and

minimally bigger than in Europe as a whole or Sub-Saharan Africa with four each; even the Indian subcontinent has only experienced five wars in this period. Interstate war occurs mainly in the Middle East and now Central Asia.

Some Latin Americanist security analysts claim that the Falklands/Malvinas War should not be considered in a discussion of peace in Latin America because it involved a non-Latin American country, Great Britain. Though the fact that Argentina began the war raises some problems for an argument about a peaceful Latin America, let's see what happens to the comparative record if we exclude participants from outside a self-defined 'region' or 'community'. Western Europe is certainly a distinct subset of 'Europe', there is a North Atlantic community (i.e. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO), and North America is both a geographic and self-defined region; none of these three regions had any wars amongst their members. The three wars in Northeast Asia (Korea 1950–1953, Offshore Islands 1954 and Taiwan Straits 1958) would be excluded, leaving this region with no wars as well. In Southeast Asia three wars in which the US was the key player on one side would be eliminated from the data, leaving the region with three wars and significantly closer to the Latin American experience with two (one could also note that Southeast Asia's last war was in 1987, while Latin America's was more recent in 1995). The war in Angola could also be eliminated from the Sub-Saharan Africa count because the apartheid government in South Africa and the Cuban troops were not part of the African community; this adjustment also leaves the Sub-Saharan African region with only three wars. The point of these various comparisons is that however one counts the occurrence of war within a region, Latin America does not stand out as especially peaceful. The region's reduced incident of war over its historical existence actually parallels 'a general decline in the use of interstate war as a political instrument after World War II' (Thies 2016).

But why be concerned with the use of military force at levels below war? Battaglino (2012) argues that states can display or threaten to use force with no intention to fight. The study of military force short of war is an important theoretical and empirical topic, however, because the occurrence of war is not predictable, but rather probabilistic and ultimately the inherent presence of uncertainty means that one cannot predict which crises will evolve to war (Gartzke 1999). Eliminating the use of force in relations among states within a grouping is thus the only way to ensure that war does not erupt in that particular group. This is the idea behind the notion of a 'security community' (Adler and Barnett 1998;

Tuscisny 2007; Oelsner 2016), and why some analysts do not equate the lack of ‘war’ with peace, and see recurrent militarized conflict as an absence of peace (Mares 2001; Quackenbush and Venteicher 2008).

An MID refers to ‘cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state’. The COW project produces a list of MIDs in which the use of military force is broken down into five ‘Hostility Levels’: 1 = no use; 2 = threat; 3 = display; 4 = use with less than 1,000 battlefield-related deaths; 5 = war (MID 2015; Jones et al. 1996: 168).¹

The decision to use military force in some fashion is a policy choice. As such, it has a rationale and logic, whether that is framed in terms of presidential, bureaucratic or state interests. MIDs are not random events; they are intended to have an impact, though they are not generally intended to be a prelude to war.² All such incidents have the potential to escalate into war, but there is no pattern to the evolution of a MID. More than 1 in 10 (13 per cent) MIDs begin with a threat to use force, 38 per cent initiate with a display of force and 49 per cent erupt with outright use of force. The response to a MID does not vary by the hostility of the initial action: 47 per cent of threats are responded to with threats, 59 per cent of displays result in reciprocal displays and 43 per cent of the time use of force provokes a similar response (Jones et al. 1996: 193).

The most recent MID database only goes up to 2010, so our analysis here is limited by the systematically collected data; a number of MIDs in Latin America have occurred since 2010, but they have not been systematically collected and we cannot compare them with the as yet uncollected record of MIDs outside the region. Since the point here is to demonstrate that militarization remains a concern, not that its occurrence has increased or decreased in the past five years, the illustrations are appropriate. The militarized disputes that took place in Latin America from 2000 to 2010 are listed in Table 7, alongside the corresponding level of military hostility.

According to the COW researchers, there were 24 MIDs in the Latin American region from 2000 to 2010; only three of these were with non-Latin American states (Russia-Argentina; US-Venezuela twice).³ My research indicates that the COW researchers missed an additional seven, all of which were between Latin American countries, and they have been added to Table 7. Latin America was thus a party to 31 MIDs in the region during the first decade of the twenty-first century, of which 28 (90 per cent) were between Latin American countries.

Table 7 Militarized interstate disputes in Latin America, 2000–2010

<i>Dyad</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Hostility Level</i>	<i>Explanation</i>
Listed in COW			
Colombia-Venezuela	2000	4	
US-Venezuela	2000	3	
Guyana-Suriname	2000	3	
Guyana-Suriname	2000	3	
Belize-Guatemala	2000	4	
Nicaragua-Honduras	2000	4	
Nicaragua-Honduras	2001	3	
Nicaragua-Colombia	2001	4	
Nicaragua-Honduras	2001	3	
Argentina-Russia	2002	4	
Brazil-Peru	2003	4	
Venezuela-Colombia	2003	4	
Dominican Rep-Haiti	2004	3	
Ecuador-Colombia	2005	3	
Venezuela-Colombia	2006	4	
Colombia-Ecuador	2006	3	
Colombia-Ecuador	2007	4	
Venezuela-Colombia	2008	3	
Colombia-Ecuador	2008	3	
Colombia-Venezuela	2009	3	
Ecuador-Colombia	2009	3	
Costa Rica-Nicaragua	2010	3	
Colombia-Venezuela	2010	3	
US-Venezuela	2010	3	
Missed by COW			
Costa Rica-Nicaragua	2005	2	In dispute over river navigation rights, Nicaraguan troop build-up on river; Nicaragua army commander visited posts to see if they needed reinforcement; and coincident with his visit, the Army paraded tanks and troops in Managua.
Venezuela-Guyana	2007	4	Venezuelan military blows up gold mining dredges in area it claims but is recognized internationally as Guyanese; Guyana government denounces attack.

(continued)

Table 7 (continued)

<i>Dyad</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Hostility Level</i>	<i>Explanation</i>
Colombia-Nicaragua	2007	2	In response to dispute with Nicaragua over sovereignty of San Andres, Colombia sent 1200 troops to march on Colombian Independence Day.
Colombia-Nicaragua	2008	2	Colombia sent naval patrols to San Andres; Nicaraguan President says he'll complain to UN of harassment of fishermen.
Brazil-Paraguay	2008	2	Paraguay complains to OAS that Brazilian military manoeuvres on the border are meant to intimidate it on bilateral issues.
Belize-Guatemala	2009	2	Guatemala official protest concerning Belizean construction of border posts and patrols.
Nicaragua-Colombia	2010	3	President Ortega warns Colombia that Nicaragua may respond militarily if Colombia authorizes oil concessions in disputed waters.

Source: Author's elaboration

How does the empirical record of Latin American MIDs compare with other regions during this decade? In Western Europe (including Scandinavia) there were no MIDs at all, nor were there any in North America (Canada, US and Mexico). In the North Atlantic region, there were only three MIDs (Canada-Portugal and Canada-Denmark twice). These examples suffice to show that Latin America was not the most peaceful world region.

Since MIDs occur in Latin America at rates higher than in some other regions, it behoves us to understand the process of militarization and why it continues to be considered a legitimate tool in intra-Latin American relations. Not all interstate disputes militarize; in fact most of the time, in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, not just in Latin America, interstate relations are not militarized. So we need to know why state leaders sometimes choose to militarize a disagreement.

Since the use of military force is instrumental, we need to be aware of the issues around which tensions can develop to the level that military

posturing is considered an appropriate option. That means considering not only the traditional issues concerning national boundaries, ideological competition and natural resources, but also new ones revolving around trans-border flows of people (illegal migrants, guerrillas, criminals, and so on) and goods (illegal drugs, weapons, and so on) (Grabendorff 1994; Mares 2012a). In addition, the decision to militarize almost always has popular support once it has been taken, so we need to understand why governments would consider it in their interests to do so, and why citizens would view such actions as legitimate. Finally, we should consider the range of options for defusing militarized conflict when it arises and why in Latin America the options most used actually contribute to the perception that militarizing a dispute provides foreign and domestic policy advantages.

THE LOGIC OF MILITARIZED THREATS

A number of scholars have developed multiple classifications to account for the repeated use of military force short of war in a region (reviewed in Tuscisny 2007; Battaglini 2012). But these efforts do not attempt to explain why states would use low levels of military force. Explaining why a government would militarize a dispute means understanding the logic of militarization and the distribution of its costs and benefits. We need to know, not assume, how the costs of conflict are evaluated by citizens and government, as well as how the costs of acceding to the demands of a foreign government are perceived. I developed a model of militarized bargaining that builds on work demonstrating that leaders use foreign policy to provide collective and private goods to their domestic constituencies (Mares 2001; also see Crescenzi 2003). In terms of whether to militarize an interstate dispute, the key question for the leaders is whether the use of military force will benefit their constituencies at a cost that they are willing to pay and whether they can survive their displeasure if the costs are high. In this section I briefly define and discuss each of the causal variables.⁴

In my argument, the willingness of constituencies to pay costs varies with the value that they attach to the good in question. Their ability to constrain the leader varies with the institutional structure of accountability. The costs of using military force are influenced by the political-military strategy for the use of force, the strategic balance with the rival nation and the characteristics of the military force used. A leader may choose to use force only when the

costs produced by the combination of political-military strategy chosen (S) + the strategic balance (SB) + the characteristics of the force to be used (CF) are equal to or lower than the costs acceptable to the leader's constituency (CC) minus the slippage in accountability produced by the domestic means of selecting leaders (A). Force will not always be used when these conditions are met, but force will not be used in their absence.

$$\begin{array}{ll} S + SB + CF \leq CC - A & \text{may lead to the decision to use force} \\ S + SB + CF > CC - A & \text{no force will be used} \end{array}$$

The utility of a political-military *strategy* is evaluated in terms of its contribution to the policy maker's ability to advance his constituencies' interests. Only after ascertaining its potential usefulness does it make sense for policy makers to weigh the costs and benefits of using force. Advancing those interests can occur in different ways, depending upon the state of the relationship between the contending parties. These alternatives can be usefully summarized in five political-military strategies:

- keep the issue alive
- affect bilateral negotiations
- defend the status quo
- attract the support of third parties
- impose a solution

The *strategic balance* is defined by the resources that are relevant to those strategies and helps us understand the bargaining situation between the actors. While others have made this point using variations in military strategy, risk assessments and time frames (George and Smoke 1974; Alexandroff and Rosecrance 1977; Paul 2004), I add diplomatic and economic factors to the range of relevant resources. Because of incomplete and private information, however, the strategic balance is never entirely clear to either party.

Two *characteristics of the force to be used* also affect the costs of using force: mobilization requirements and force alternatives. The attributes of the domestic mobilization process affect the time domestic and international opposition needs to organize, the personal disruption experienced by the relevant publics and the impact on the economy. The use of a small number of troops drawn from a standing military force produces

the lowest mobilization costs. The alternative ways of using force also affect costs, with naval interceptions of fishing vessels in disputed waters among the least costly, and penetrating territory with an army being the costliest.

Constituents are defined narrowly as those whose support is required for a leader to remain in office; it is their cost calculations that matter. In a democracy, voters in general are not constituents; rather, it is those voters who voted for the policy maker (Clifton and Bickers 1992) as well as those voters whose support might be necessary for re-election or to counter anti-government demonstrations.

The sensitivity of the leadership to its constituency's cost evaluations is determined by the institutional structure of *leadership accountability*, which includes selection intervals and the leadership's ability to perpetuate itself in office via selection of colleagues. The literature clearly demonstrates that the institutional rules governing who votes and when, as well as how votes are counted, vary across democracies and make a significant difference in who wins and policy outcomes (Lijphart 1984; Cox 1997).

INCENTIVES FOR MILITARIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

The variables determining the use of force in Latin America are influenced by domestic and international factors. The *political military strategies* for using force have not changed recently – Latin Americans do not seek military conquest of their rivals. But weak revisionist states still want to keep the issues they dispute with more powerful neighbours alive (e.g. Bolivia vis-à-vis Chile, Argentina vis-à-vis Great Britain), and seek the support of third parties. Status quo states want to dissuade the revisionists (e.g. Colombia vis-à-vis Nicaragua, Chile vis-à-vis Bolivia). Consequently, there continues to be a number of ways in which militarizing a dispute could be beneficial to a government.

The *strategic balance* is affected by Latin America's security architecture, which is unique among developing countries in its extent and breadth, since it is composed of a wide array of international (e.g. International Court of Justice), regional, sub-regional and even bilateral institutions; in addition, they address both international and domestic threats. The strategic balance

has become increasingly ambiguous because of the proliferation of new regional institutions (UNASUR, CELAC, ALBA) that could weigh in on a dyadic dispute. The development of new regional institutions further raises the possibility of ‘shopping’ for an institution that would be more favourable to one’s position in a dispute. Perhaps more importantly, the specifically Latin American institutions prioritize the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, and thus are weakly institutionalized and tend to adopt ad hoc procedures (Mares 2011; Serbin 2010; Serbin and Serbin Pont 2016).

The priority given to national sovereignty and non-intervention has two negative impacts. First, there is no coherent regional vision of security (as in Western Europe), and thus each state defines threats to security as its current government sees fit. Second, the decision to militarize a dispute is regarded as a sovereign decision – if a government perceives a need to militarize, that is its prerogative. Rather than insist on a norm of no first use of military force in a dispute among neighbours, the security architecture is designed to become active after a government has decided that militarization is a good idea. This unwillingness of regional organizations to punish states that militarize a dispute generates two incentives for militarization, one stimulating a search for quick gains and the other producing a ‘moral hazard’ for risky behavior.⁵

The opportunities for short-term gain occur since the institutions take time to build a consensus for becoming involved and seek to get information from all the disputing parties. Nicaragua’s dispatch of troops into disputed territory with Costa Rica was immediately denounced by Costa Rica, which asked for help. But SICA would not become involved and Nicaragua vetoed Organization of American States (OAS) mediation; by the time the dispute was referred to the International Court of Justice, Nicaragua was entrenched in the area and Costa Rica had to agree to arbitrate an issue it believed settled. Nicaragua did not fear Costa Rica’s ability to impose punishment, given that Costa Rica does not have an army, but it also realized that the issue could not be revived unless Nicaragua could make short-term gains that would force Costa Rica to ask for international arbitration (Ercolani 2012).

The ‘moral hazard’ incentive for militarization arises because regional institutions respond to militarized conflict by seeking to lower the level of tensions through dialogue and negotiations. When the initiator of the use of force contests the status quo but is bilaterally weak, such a call for dialogue can create ‘moral hazard’ in the region’s security architecture. In the

previous section I have demonstrated that ‘moral hazard’ possibilities may encourage hard-line positions, even violence, by weaker parties in the dispute in the hope that an interested hemispheric community might increase pressure on a rival to settle (Mares 2012b, c). Although the hemisphere rejoices that Ecuador and Peru have settled their dispute, we should not ignore the fact that it took a small war in 1995 and the threat of a large one in 1998 to help convince the parties to settle. By guaranteeing that conquest will not be recognized and that escalation into a costly and long war will be unlikely, the OAS and the Four Guarantor countries of the prior peace treaty between Ecuador and Peru helped convince Ecuador to engage in the adventurous behaviour that developed into the short war of 1995. Ecuador achieved a settlement that had eluded the country for 50 years, but militarizing disputes and a short war were fundamental to this Ecuadorian diplomatic victory (Mares 1996/1997; Mares and Palmer 2012).

Even more powerful countries that nevertheless do not want war with a neighbour could be induced to risky behaviour by the way in which regional security institutions function. Colombia, involved in a decades-long civil war, certainly did not favour a war with its weaker neighbour Ecuador in 2008. But when an opportunity arose to attack FARC leader Raúl Reyes at his camp in Ecuador, Colombian forces crossed the border. Although the March 2008 Colombian incursion into Ecuador generated a flurry of Latin American diplomacy that defused the subsequent crisis, Colombia achieved its goal and faced no sanctions for its blatant attack on Ecuadorian soil. Because low-level militarization provides benefits to the initiator at low risk, we can conclude that ironically regional security institutions actually promote this risky behaviour.

The ambiguity in the strategic balance is also affected by uncertainty regarding the response of the two major states in the region, the US and Brazil. US capabilities and its credibility to influence the strategic balance through military, economic or diplomatic means have diminished. This decline in US potential to affect a strategic balance in Latin America stems from (i) its military overextension around the world; (ii) well-documented behaviours that call into question its commitment to democracy and human rights; and (iii) its inability to respond effectively to the diplomatic challenges posed by a number of Latin American governments who perceived that the commodity boom of the past decade created unprecedented opportunities for pushing the US out of Latin American affairs.

On the Latin American side, Brazil is perceived by many to constitute the key player for at least South American security because it articulates a vision of the region as pacific and supports institutions which claim to seek peaceful resolution of conflicts. But Brazil itself has not proven immune to using its military power to influence relations with neighbours; witness the complaint at the OAS by the then Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo that Brazilian military manoeuvres on its border during moments of stressful renegotiation of the treaty revising the distribution of electricity produced by the bilateral Itaipú Hydroelectric Complex were intended to pressure Paraguay on its demands (Zibechei 2009). In addition, the institutions supported by Brazil reflect the priority of national sovereignty (Trinkunas 2013).

The *characteristics of force* to be used have also changed – they are getting more sophisticated and offense-capable, which can lead to perceptions that quick military successes may be more likely now without requiring long-lasting military conflicts that require significant mobilizations of human and economic resources. The modernization of Latin American militaries was stymied in the 1980s and 1990s due to economic crises and a backlash against the military when democracy was restored (Franko 1994; Bloomberg 2008). Many militaries are being re-outfitted now that growth seems stable and their threat to democracy tamed and expenditures are not out of line with the size of national economies, particularly since the institutions were starved of resources for so long. But in this increasingly uncertain regional context, military modernization can also fuel uncertainty and suspicion. Venezuela spent US\$4 billion on fighter jets, attack helicopters and 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles and ammunition (Walter 2008). In addition, Venezuela's current military assistance to Bolivia is non-transparent and confusing to the latter's neighbours; Paraguay reacted by spending more and increasing its own troops on its Bolivian border (Martins 2011; ABC 2011).

Although two of the three variables that determine the costs of a military action have become more favourable to the use of force, we still need to consider the domestic political constraints on leaders who contemplate militarizing disputes. Perhaps the most important variables in the current situation are those incorporating the constituency's *willingness to absorb the costs of militarized disputes* and the *leader's accountability* to that constituency.

A constituency's *willingness to absorb the costs of militarized disputes* reflects both its view of what is at stake and the legitimacy of the use of

force. The legacy of the human rights violations of military governments in the 1970s and 1980s had de-legitimized the very concept of using military force to resolve conflict. Citizens throughout the region viewed the costs associated with using the military to defend the state as exorbitantly high. But rather than the demilitarization of security issues sought by anti-military groups who called for a focus on national security as citizen security, democratic governments have turned to the military for support in implementing a broad array of public policies ranging from fighting crime to national control over natural resources in a number of countries. In addition, Colombia's military offensive against the guerrillas under President Álvaro Uribe was popular and its successes led significant segments of society to reject broad negotiations in the current peace process (Illingworth 2015).

This use of military force to address broadly defined domestic security challenges generates costs to civil and human rights but is popularly supported in a number of Latin American democracies (Gagne 2015). The consequence is that military force regains its legitimacy as a means of resolving conflict. And because these states are democracies, their leaders' *accountability* to the citizens is high and provides incentives to defend those constituencies including by the use of military force if necessary. For example, eight days after the Colombian incursion into Ecuador and after Latin American nations had censored the effort, 83 per cent of Colombians approved of the 'cross-border incursion into Ecuador to eliminate Raúl Reyes' (Angus Reid Global Monitor 2008).

Popular support for military operations is particularly concerning when domestic instability polarizes politics at home, a nationalistic populism characterizes the government's ideology and the country has revisionist views about disputes with neighbouring countries. These three conditions come together particularly in Venezuela, which in 2015 engaged in new MIDs over territorial boundaries with Colombia and Guyana (Ishmael 2015; Tovar 2015).

The context within which the variables influencing militarization decisions operate has also changed in the contemporary period in ways that stimulate cross-border competition and insecurities. A number of states are experiencing increasingly destabilized domestic settings as the commodity boom comes crashing down, corruption scandals erupt and state subsidies that sustained inefficient industries, firms and services disappear. There has been an explosion of violence stimulated by organized crime and urban gangs in many countries, which in turn creates a climate of fear

among those living in the crossfire. Central governments and indigenous groups have clashed violently over the question of who controls the natural resources whose current and future exploitation could fuel economic growth. Empowered and frustrated citizens have taken to the streets, demanding rapid and dramatic resolution of grievances. In the past decade, the military often stepped aside when initial attempts to control or disperse angry crowds produced violence (e.g. Bolivia 2003) or simply refused presidential orders to act (e.g. Argentina 2001, Ecuador 2005) (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010); currently (2015), observers fear what might happen in Venezuela.

Responding to the domestic challenges and citizen demands, state power has increased as governments gain authority via constitutional reforms, legislative retreat and administrative fiat to diminish institutional constraints on their power in order to pursue perceived solutions. These leaders also promote the norm that it is appropriate to use increasing levels of state power to address threats that have defied resolution by ‘normal’ means. The potential for carrying these lessons learned at the domestic level to relations with other countries must be considered as we look ahead.

CONCLUSION: WHY MILITARIZATION MATTERS

The empirical record of militarization of disputes provides the rude shock that no sub-region of Latin America is well-embarked on the establishment of a ‘zone of peace’ (Malamud Rikles 2010). Illustrations of cooperative behaviour do not demonstrate that states expect only peaceful resolution of disagreements with each other (Wiegand and Powell 2011). Instead, the regional security environment has little transparency, limited common understanding of threats and competing strategic views, and continues to accept the use of low levels of military force in interstate bargaining.

Several options for improving regional security management exist, and all deserve consideration. I will focus here on the most far-reaching possibility that could set the region on the road to a security community.⁶ All options should be considered in terms of their ability to influence the determinants of the decision to militarize in line with the argument presented here, such that $S + SB + CF > CC - A$. The goal is to make militarization of a dispute generate a negative impact on the initiator’s interests, and thus render ineffectual its use as a tool for international relations.

The most promising path to significantly reduce militarization is to affect the region’s response to the strategy of use of military force in

disputes thereby undermining the utility of a strategy of militarization. If the Latin American community were to develop a norm that makes the use of force illegitimate not just to conquer territory, but also to affect interstate relations, any strategy for the use of force within Latin America would undermine the initiator's behaviour in the views of the community. Latin America already has a norm precluding use of force to conquer territory. A norm against the use of force to affect interstate relations would resolve the moral hazard issue. Such a norm would make first use of military force unacceptable under any conditions. Without this foundation, disagreements over politics would undermine the consensus, since political allies of a party would rationalize the circumstances in which the recourse to force by their ally was pre-emptive or preventive of the rival's 'certain' use of force.

The community must act against the initiator when the target cannot, in order to insure that no benefit accrues to the initiator. For example, in the Isla Calero dispute, Nicaragua militarized that issue knowing that Costa Rica (a status quo state) had no force on the ground that could prevent Nicaraguan troops from taking control of the area for the time necessary to alter the status quo. The regional community (in the form of the OAS) only asked Nicaragua to desist, but did not demand immediate withdrawal under the threat of being sanctioned by the community. Hence, the military and diplomatic balance effectively encouraged Nicaragua to initiate militarization.

Latin America has not demonstrated that it has embarked on a path towards a security community nor can scholarship defend a claim that it has provided a model of peaceful change for other regions to emulate. Military action by one state against another in Latin America is not 'unthinkable', even among statesmen and societies in the Southern Cone, the sub-region most often viewed as well on its way to a security community (Oelsner 2016) or zone of positive peace (Battaglini 2012). In 2007, Uruguayan President Tabaré Vazquez consulted with his military chiefs and US President George W. Bush concerning a possible Argentine military action over the disputed pulp paper mill on the Uruguayan side of the Rio de la Plata (MercoPress 2011). In 2007, the number of Chileans who believed that Argentina could attack Chile was more than half (53 per cent), and 7.6 per cent higher than in 1991 (46.1 per cent) (Varas et al. 2008: 67). Paraguay's complaint regarding military coercion by Brazil rounds out the evidence that some statesmen and even some societies are not yet convinced that violence is becoming inconceivable even in the Southern Cone of Latin America.

So why do scholars continue to discuss regional peace and ignore regional violence? The general international relations literature provides plenty of reason to be sceptical of an emerging security community anywhere in Latin America, and the empirical record continues to support that scepticism.⁷ Latin America is not immune to the factors that influence international relations elsewhere around the world. Scholars have the obligation to follow the logic of the argument they choose to use, and if they modify it, they must justify the modification and show its logical strength. Scholars must also test their preferred argument against the empirical record.

Mansfield and Snyder (1995) argued that during difficult democratic transitions political leaders were especially prone to engage in the use of aggressive nationalist rhetoric and military force. Mitchell and Prins (1999) demonstrated that even among democracies, only consolidated and stable democracies are statistically unlikely to avoid MIDs over territorial issues. Since their study defined these peaceful democracies by their score of 10 in the Polity database, and every other state scoring 6–9 as ‘in transition’, Latin America is a problematic region – only three states score 10s in the twenty-first century (Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile since 2006) and three states are not even classified as democracies (Cuba, Venezuela and Ecuador) (Polity IV 2015).

The most powerful theories of interstate peace rest upon the externalization of domestic processes that bring citizens together in values for the pacific settlement of disagreements and the use of the market to allocate resources and distribute the costs and benefits of growth (Maoz and Russett 1993; Doyle 1997).⁸ But Latin America does not have these characteristics – it is the most violent region in the world domestically, many countries have very polarized political processes and government continues to play a major role in the domestic economy in most countries. Why Latin American citizens would have a preference for peaceful negotiation with neighbouring countries but internally exhibit high rates of criminal and political violence is difficult to understand, not theoretically explained and not demonstrated by any analyses of empirical processes (Väyrynen 2000; Oelsner 2016). A similar critique can be made regarding the pacifying effects of market-led economic integration with neighbouring countries when a region is characterized by countries that promote state-owned companies and provide subsidies to safeguard non-competitive economic activities at home. For example, Tuscisny (2007: 438–439) found that South American citizens were not more trustful of each other than were citizens of more war-prone regions, and that Argentines, Uruguayans and Brazilians were ‘overwhelmingly’ opposed to

economic liberalism. The weak nature of Latin American security institutions render them unlike the institutions that are argued to contribute to peace. Scholars in the field must rise to the challenge of integrating relevant lessons from international relations theory with the empirical record of interstate violence in Latin America.

NOTES

1. Militarized incidents between states do not include accidental cross-border crossings by military that are not protested by the country whose territory has been violated, nor military violence against criminals/illegal migrants who cross into countries and are attacked by the forces there, unless that home country protests.
2. Comparing the interstate wars and MID databases clearly indicates that very few MIDs worldwide lead to war.
3. Information on the specific incidents that were coded as militarized is found in Militarized Interstate Incident Data, Version 4.0, which can be downloaded from the same page as the MID dataset (see MID 2015).
4. A fuller discussion can be found in my book (Mares 2001).
5. A moral hazard results when a party is endowed with an ‘insurance policy’ that diminishes the risks of a particular activity to a point at which the party perceives such risks to be low enough to engage in the activity; insurance providers seek to minimize moral hazard by excluding such activities from coverage or charging a premium that raises the cost to the insured to a point that dissuades such behaviour.
6. For a full discussion of the options, see Mares 2012b, c).
7. My updating of the MID database to 2015 is not yet complete but has occurrences between Nicaragua-Costa Rica, Nicaragua-Colombia, Venezuela-Colombia, Venezuela-Guyana, Dominican Republic-Haiti, and Chile-Peru.
8. Battaglino (2012) argues that democracies that trade with each other and develop regional institutions are the root of South America’s ‘hybrid peace’ in the north and ‘positive peace’ in the south. But, as the Polity IV data demonstrate, many South American democracies do not fulfil the requirements for the democratic peace argument that he references. In terms of trade, the willingness of Venezuela to significantly disrupt the trade, of Bolivia to not sell gas to Chile, and of Argentina to renounce its contracts to supply gas to Chile all indicate that it is not credible to believe that a disruption of trade is a major deterrent to the possibility of militarized conflict. Nor does he address the significant weaknesses of regional institutions that limit their ability to perform the functions expected in the arguments postulating the peace-enhancing attributes of security institutions.

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Defense Management in South America: Bureaucracy and Diplomacy

Rut Diamint

INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy and military force are indispensable tools for all governments.¹ In democratic political systems, the use of military force is generally a last resort in response to external threats and therefore tends to be an instrument of foreign policy. Authoritarian regimes are more prone to rely on military force as a means of governing at home, in addition to furthering their foreign policy goals. The diplomacy of Latin American military governments was for a long time permeated by the threat (real or perceived) of military force, which did not make for easy relations with neighbouring countries. Despite the fact that the armed forces primarily engaged in the persecution of domestic political opponents, their conflict hypotheses focused on neighbouring countries. New democratic governments put an end to this as regional and bilateral cooperation mechanisms and organizations gained precedence. Nonetheless, in many countries defense ministries remained isolated from and even in competition with ministries of foreign affairs.

Cooperation in defense policy does not tend to sit easily with foreign policy. It has, however, acquired significance within the context of regional agreements. On 23 May 2008 the Union of South American

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Nations (UNASUR)² was formed, entering into full effect in March 2011. On 11 December 2008, the South American Defense Council was created. Both entities could be considered a consolidation of pre-existing cooperation initiatives. UNASUR is the first South American agreement that creates a specific mechanism for dialogue on defense. It is meant to be similar to the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy, which has allowed greater transparency and cooperation in defense. For their part, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) declared its region to be a zone of peace, and the Andean Community (CAN) established arrangements for the non-violent management of conflicts. However, all of those organizations' efficiency is impaired by the fact that their member states continue to have a range of unresolved domestic issues in the sphere of defense.

In this chapter I analyse the difficulties within the field of cooperation in defense policy. First I examine defense management, illustrating what I call defense neglect, both in research and political practice. The latter is manifest in the defense bureaucracy, which suffers from two key problems: a lack of professionalization, and the dominance of the military. Second, I look at the development of national and regional defense identity, exploring knowledge production and the formulation of concepts, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of existing proposals, on the other. The third section deals with the tensions and contradictions between foreign and defense policies and outlines the alternative concept of defense diplomacy and its potential effects for defense cooperation.

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

Defense Neglect

The process of democratization brought the dilemma of what role to assign to the armed forces (Lowenthal 1976; Linz and Stepan 1996: 3–15; Nunn 1995; Stepan 1988: 3–12). In Latin American countries, the armed forces have varying and often quite extensive levels of influence – not only on defense policy, but also on foreign affairs, policing, and social and economic matters. Yet, the numerous challenges facing the fledgling democratic governments relegated a reform of the defense sector to a very distant place. Newly elected democratic politicians had little to gain and in some cases much to lose from challenging the role of the military. There was also limited political capital to be earned in defense reform. In some countries

there were legal obstacles to any meaningful democratic oversight of the military and the governments lacked the legislative strength to achieve the constitutional reforms needed to overturn them.

In Latin America the literature tends to confine itself to civil-military relations rather than defense policy. This is understandable given the region's history of military coups and dictatorships. The armed forces have posed a threat to democracy. Yet, there is a large difference between civil-military relations and the specific aspect of defense policy. Literature on this subject is remarkably limited, and when Latin American academics write on defense, these studies are usually not based on sound theoretical concepts. However, even in developed countries comparative studies on defense and national security policy are relatively rare, as Murray and Viotti wrote in 1982 (see Murray and Viotti 1994: xvii). In their introduction, the authors seek to clarify the aim of their book: 'Our attempt is to develop (1) the conceptualization or paradigm that organizes knowledge in this field, and (2) the methodology to study it. What follows, then, is not theory, but, we hope, the prelude to it' (Murray and Viotti 1994: xviii). While they do not claim to have formulated a comprehensive theory of defense, after more than 15 years of using their framework they believe to 'have identified at least some of the important variables or factors that would likely be part of such a theory' (Murray and Viotti 1994: xix). Although Murray and Viotti (1994) in the third edition of their book acknowledge that interest in the subject has increased, a literature review shows that this still remains a fairly unexplored field in social science.

Colin Gray justifies the limited amount of research on the subject stating that (...) 'the Government departments, especially those responsible for the issue of defense, are not accustomed to opening up their archives for external investigations' (Gray 1974: 89). Isaiah Wilson and James Forest's book about comparative studies of defense posits that the field developed significantly after the incorporation of security studies (Wilson and Forest 2008). However, the only true development has occurred in the area of security policy where there is already a degree of theoretical and methodological input (Buzan and Hansen 2009; Baldwin 1997), but not in the specific field of defense policy. There is no academic consensus with regards to what the analysis of defense should include, and the existing proposals have not gained the legitimacy necessary to match other studies.

In Latin America defense is not generally regarded as public policy. There is virtually no epistemic community around defense and security studies (except perhaps in the case of Brazil). Another aspect of what could

be referred to as ‘defense neglect’ is the reduced role generally held by ministries of defense. As Martínez Nogueira (2004: 38) sustains:

Ministries of Defense have traditionally been separate from the rest of government administration. Despite their years of experience, they do not have the capacity to formulate comprehensive coherent policies nor to allocate resources to maximize performance. This has a negative impact on planning, recruitment and operational issues for the military.³

Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2007) hold that the best decision that Latin American democracies could take would be to consider defense policy in an integral way linking it to other policy areas and looking at it in cost-benefit terms. However, they argue that Latin American civilian governments have neglected defense policy and that this apparent lack of interest is explained by three different factors, historical, rational, and structural.

According to the authors, Latin American governments don’t generally possess long-term defense policies. Few countries in the region experienced interstate conflict, which would have prompted civilian leaders to pay attention to defense policy. Instead the armed forces are still predominantly perceived as a threat to the governments in post-transition Latin America, and in some cases have in fact participated in their overthrow. Civilian control has not been conceived as a long term institution-building exercise designed to better manage defense forces, but rather as a series of short-term, stop-gap measures designed to forestall military takeovers (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007). Although Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas believe that defense will play a larger role in the future (due in part to threats such as drug trade), as well as attract the interest of legislators and citizens, both authors state that ‘Defense is an essential public good in most states, but is not perceived by the public in Latin America as a pressing national priority’ (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007: 86). As it is not an issue that voters are particularly interested in, it is rational for most politicians to ignore it. Moreover, they explain that politicians can largely neglect the issue of defense because the region is on the periphery of international affairs, and consequently governments rarely face the security threats that affect other areas of the world.

However, the changes in the international scenario and the relative loss of centrality of the great powers have given way to other states playing a pivotal role in world affairs. The supposed peripheral position of Latin America in international affairs highlighted by Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas

does not combine well nowadays with the important international role played by Brazil, and which Venezuela had attempted to play. Some countries are developing very competitive military technologies, while others negotiate in order to acquire technologies that they are unable to develop domestically. We can see evidence of this in Venezuela, Chile and Peru. Although we cannot claim there is an arms race, defense spending has increased in Latin America in the last decade (Diamint 2011), as the region seeks to participate in international affairs. In short, although I agree with Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas' argument that defense is not perceived as an essential good in Latin America, the absence of a clear democratic defense policy constitutes a cost for democratic stability and is not a reasonable choice.

This review of defense neglect by academia and political practice shows that the study of defense policy is an intellectual and practical challenge. The defense neglect on the part of civilian governments is also visible in defense bureaucracy, the issue that we now turn to. There are very few academic studies on the decision-making process in the field of Latin American defense, and in practice, defense bureaucracy is hampered by a lack of professionalization and a high extent of militarization.

Bureaucracy of Defense

Bureaucracies are necessary due to the complexity of the numerous issues that a country faces, as well as the need to follow up on policies when transitioning from one government to the next. South American nations cannot count on personnel, nor a structure that would allow for the development of an institutionalized state defense policy that is also long term and consensual.

Professionalization vs Politicization

Academia has tended to steer clear of defense studies not least because secrecy surrounding decision-making in the field of defense makes it difficult to analyse. Graham Allison's book *Essence of Decision Making: Explaining. The Cuban Missile Crisis* (1971) analyses three models (the rational actor, organizational process and governmental politics) to explain how governments work. The rational actor model is based on the premise that the government assumes the role of unitary decision maker. The second model describes governmental decisions not as the product of rational choices, but as the natural outcomes of standard

bureaucratic operating procedures. There are many decision makers with the same goals, but who are imperfectly rational. The third model has many players who focus on multiple problems. Policy outcomes are the result of compromise, coalition, competition, and lack of information among government officials but decisions are still rational. If negotiation fails, it is because some negotiators did not share their point of view widely enough, or their view lacked credibility (Lebow 1983: 457).

For this decision-making model to work, it is necessary to rely on a team of professionals who can respond efficiently to the formulation of public policies (Dillon 1988). Yet, South American defense ministries have by and large been very far from professional. In the mid-twentieth century they were but a minor office within the armed forces. During periods of democratic transition, they were staffed with members of the governing party, given the contention that it was important to take over functions that had originally been in the hands of the military. As democratization took hold, more civilians took over and the number of functions assigned to the ministries of defense increased. All of these advances are positive and necessary, but there has been no attempt to establish a professional defense bureaucracy, in stark contrast with the strict training granted to the diplomatic corps.

Advisors working in ministries of defense are not generally trained in the discipline either. Theoretically, advisors are required to generate knowledge and thereby aid decision-making. They also help to generate consensus between players with different agendas (politicians and servicemen). In general, there are two types of advisors. The first are close to the minister and probably have a long-standing relationship with the head of the ministry. This type of advisor tends to stay in post for the duration of the tenure of the minister who appointed them. The second type is technocrats possessing knowledge and information. This type should keep their positions regardless so as to ensure institutional memory. Unfortunately this does not usually occur so there is limited professionalism in the ministries of defense in South America. Ministers tend to ignore the benefits of professionalism and a stable institutionalized bureaucracy. It is common that there are no technocrats, and that all advisers are substituted with a ministerial change. Hermann and Hermann (1989: 365–9) warned of the complications created by multiple actors (or the frequent change of actors) in decision-making processes. A higher level of professionalization of the defense bureaucracy would hence lower the incidence of individual agendas during the creation and implementation of a policy.

In a 1972 article, Stephen Krasner expressed a certain distrust of multiple decision-making processes. Krasner considered that allowing bureaucrats to hold important decision-making roles is deceiving, as it overshadows the role of the president. He also warned against this perceived danger because it weakened democratic policy; and at the same time was an attractive incentive for leaders to blame their mistakes on lower-ranking officials (Krasner 1972: 160). In South America, the problem is not a bureaucracy that is too strong and sidelines the president, but one that is too weak. In the last few years, several South American governments have developed a form of hyper-presidentialism, which also had its effects on the state bureaucracy. For example, when bureaucrats are blamed and reproved, this occurs mostly because they demonstrate signs of autonomy and diverge from the view of the presidency.

Militarization

In South America, many issues in defense policy are still controlled by the armed forces. Table 8 illustrates the distribution of responsibilities within the ministries of defense and shows which entity is in charge of policy planning and execution. Based on the organizational charts of the ministries of defense, we can explore the extent of civilian control. Four policy dimensions have been chosen: higher education, planning, operations and human rights. Other categories that represent the attitude of defense ministries in conducting policy could have been selected; however, we have opted to use the model designed by Alfred Stepan (1988: 93–102), which is widely recognized as an instrument for evaluating civilian control and a valid analytical tool for understanding the inner workings of the system of defense.⁴ The education of the military can fall under the jurisdiction of civil authorities or the armed forces. If the ministry of defense is in charge, we consider this to be an indicator of the concentration of power under civilian authorities. Something similar occurs when it comes to planning. The item of operations is generally absent from the ministry's activities, remaining a manifestation of military autonomy. However, accepting that military manoeuvres and operations need to be coordinated and approved by civil authorities, civilian ministerial coordination is also an indicator of real ministerial capacity. Lastly, the category of human rights was selected due to its position as a point of tension between elected authorities and the armed forces in all countries of the region. The question of human rights (and how to deal with human rights

Table 8 Extent of civilian control of defense ministries' policies*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Planning</i>	<i>Operations</i>	<i>Human Rights</i>
Argentina	School of National Defense	Secretariat of Strategic Planning and Military Policy	General Directorate of Logistics	Service of the National Defense of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
	University Institute of the Armed Forces	General Directorate of Planning and Strategy		
	Institute of Scientific and Technical Research for Defense	General Planning Directorate General Logistics	General Directorate of Logistics	Department and Intercultural Human Rights in the Armed Forces
Bolivia		**	**	
	War College Institute Pardiá Calógeras			
Brazil	Program to support education and scientific and technological research in national defense (Pro-Defesa)			
	Program to support education and scientific and technological research in strategic matters of national interest (Pro-Strategy)			
Chile	School of Cyber Defense Technology Development Division	Plans and Policy Division Project Evaluation Division		
	Directorate for Science and Technology	Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning	Directorate of Logistics	Directorate of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Operational Strategic Directorate for the Defense of Freedom
Colombia	Directorate of Strategic Planning			

Ecuador	<p>Directorate of Planning Directorate of Analysis and Forecast for Defense Directorate Planning and Projects Directorate Defense Policy Directorate General of Policy and Strategy</p>	<p>Directorate of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law</p>
Paraguay	<p>Paraguay Institute of Strategic Studies Directorate of Science and Technology Center for Research and Technological Development for National Defense</p>	<p>Directorate of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law</p>
Peru	<p>Directorate for Management Policy and Strategy of National Security and Defense Planning Department for Defense Doctrine Directorate Directorate of National Defense Policy Office of Planning and Budget General Directorate of Evaluation and Strategic Monitoring</p>	<p>Directorate of Plans and Operational Logistics Defense Logistics Division Directorate of Legal, Notary Affairs and Human Rights</p>
Uruguay		
Venezuela		

*All secretariats and directorates are civilian offices of the ministries of defense.

**Head of Strategic Affairs, Chief of Joint Operations and Chief of Logistics from Brazil depend on the Joint Chief of Staff and not on the ministry.

Source: Compiled by the author from RESDAL Atlas of Defense (Donadio and Tibiletti 2014)

violations committed by military regimes) was central to the process of democratization, and has been a traditional indicator of civilian control.

This framework enables us to draw some conclusions. Firstly, the operative level (i.e. military planning in the narrow sense) remains in the hands of the armed forces. With the exception of Paraguay, where planning and operations are included in ministerial policy, in all other cases they are a domain of the armed forces. Only the question of logistics, a partial aspect of operative decisions, is managed by the ministries. Secondly, not all ministries address the issue of human rights (e.g. Brazil, Chile, Peru), or they group it with other issues (Uruguay). This reflects the fact that in these cases attempts at resolving issues related to an authoritarian past have been slow or unsuccessful. In other cases, military prerogatives seem to impose themselves, highlighting the limitations of said ministries.

Third, not all ministries have a training school, nor do the branches of the armed forces. Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela do not possess a specific educational center subordinate to the ministry. In the case of Chile and Colombia, they have an educational directorate within the ministry, but no institution for education. On the one hand, this explains why the ministry did not assume the same educational functions held by the armed forces. On the other hand, it indicates that there is no formal system of preparation for the ministries' civilian bureaucrats, which is a fundamental requirement for endowing defense ministries with real leadership and management power.

Certain peculiarities warrant attention. According to the Atlas of Defense published by RESDAL, Bolivia and Paraguay rank the following at the same level: the Ministry of Defense, the head of the armed forces and the Joint Chiefs of the armed forces. A similar situation pertains in Chile, where the Ministry of Defense has the same level of power as the Joint Commanders. In Ecuador, the head of the armed forces reports directly to the President, and does not depend on the Ministry of Defense. In Venezuela, the Strategic Operational Command is on the same level of hierarchy as the Ministry of Popular Power for Defense and General Command of the National Bolivarian Militia (Donadio and Tibiletti 2014: 24–6). This data confirms some lack of civil and political control. It also departs from the more traditional criteria surrounding democratic civilian control of the armed forces by equating the role of the minister with that of the armed forces. Furthermore, if we add to this information the identification of people assigned in each post, it is remarkable that many of these positions are in fact in the hands of the military (see [Table 9](#)).

Table 9 Number of military personnel in positions of power within defense ministries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Minister/Vice-ministers</i>		<i>Secretaries/Sub-secretaries</i>		<i>Directors</i>	
	<i>Military</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Military</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Military</i>	<i>Total</i>
Argentina	–	1	–	12	–	56
Bolivia	1	3	–	–	7	60
Brazil	–	1	1	8	22	28
Chile	–	4	–	N/I	N/I	N/I
Colombia	1	4	–	2	2	27
Ecuador	–	2	–	10	N/I*	24
Paraguay	2	3	2	5	9	46
Peru	–	3	–	1	N/I	38
Uruguay	–	1	–	1	–	15
Venezuela	4	4	N/A	1	14	20

N/A Not applicable

N/I No information

*Not specified whether directors are military officials

Source: Compiled by the author from organizational charts from the websites of the defense ministries (as of 2015)

In Paraguay, out of 46 Directorates, 9 are occupied by military personnel. In 2 out of the 5 secretariats, military personnel are in charge, and both vice ministers are military officers. Thus Paraguay's defense ministry employs a significant number of military personnel. Venezuela has both a Minister and Vice Ministers who are members of the military. Regarding the 20 directorate offices depending on the Minister of Defense, only 6 are under the control of civilians. The Ministry of Popular Power for Defense, as the ministry of defense is called, has 225 posts held by military personnel and a large number of officers working in education and military matters. This is the largest amount of ministry militarization in South America. While Ecuador offers very detailed information about the Defense Ministry's personnel (e.g. out of 24 directorates, 11 are in the hands of women), it is not stated whether or not this staff includes individuals belonging to the armed forces. In the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, there are no military officials in high-ranking ministerial positions.

This evidence is of critical importance for the aim of organizing a civilian defense bureaucracy. The institutionalization of defense policies requires a specialized officialdom, autonomous of military preferences.

Anyhow, as we will show below, the production of knowledge in this field, necessary for the identification of security threats or the formulation of a (regional) defense identity, is moving very slowly towards a democratization of the area of defense.

DEFENSE IDENTITY

As it is affirmed in the Constitutive Treaty of the UNASUR (*Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas*), the organization's objective is to consolidate South America as a peaceful zone – a base for democratic stability and integral development of communities, as well as a contributor to global peace.⁵ Another positive initiative was the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR (19 March 2014) centring on a Commitment to Democracy, and stipulating sanctions and suspension of rights for countries that suspend democracy.⁶

However, the countries of the region have different priorities in the field of security and defense. The internal war in Colombia differs from the concept of asymmetrical war in Venezuela. The use of force in Peru is different from that of Paraguay. The participation of the armed forces in matters of public security or development in Ecuador or Brazil differs from the role assigned in the legislation of Argentine defense policy (where they are meant to repel external aggression). Indeed there are still old bilateral tensions in the region, especially those of Chile with Bolivia and Peru, and those of Venezuela around the Essequibo area.

UNASUR has not reached an agreement on a common threat perception. As stated in a declaration by the CDS, one of the objectives of the agreement is to create a common defense identity. During the UNASUR debates, it was made explicit that the experience of the OAS Special Conference on Security of Mexico (2003) was not to be repeated, since the concept of multidimensional security elaborated there was so broad that it was barely functional and furthermore resulted in the securitization of the development agenda. The UNASUR concept of a common defense identity is meant to be precise and not a derivative of the multidimensional agenda that was affirmed in the OAS (Nolte and Wehner 2012: 5–6). However, this does not make it automatically operational.

Since its inception, the CDS has elaborated and signed three Plans of Action. Some of their proposals are general, such as identifying risk factors and threats that could affect regional and world peace. Other aspects are

more concrete, such as the creation of a mechanism that contributes to the specification of joint positions within the region's multilateral forums on defense matters. These aspects could become operational, but have not evolved beyond being more than a sentence in the declaration. In the 2012 Work Plan, a three-pronged research program is proposed: 1. Defense policy, risks and threats to regional security; 2. Institutions of national systems of defense; 3. Strategic planning. Yet, it is unclear if there ever was a concrete product derived from the proposal.⁷ The 2014 plan incorporated the topic of *Institutionalization of Defense in South America*.⁸ Again, no further information was available on this proposal.

The publication of the *South American Registry of Aggregated Defense Expenditure 2006–2010* is a measure of transparency and confidence building. However it does not present comparable data, as each government provides data without disintegrating items, which would allow for a true comparison. The standard methodology proposed for the measurement of defense expenditure has not been incorporated by several of the participating members.

Such criticism of this new organization could appear premature. However, the early stages of a multilateral organization's existence tend to be the most dynamic since the organization enjoys the spotlight on the international scene. Some commentators have pointed to the live televised UNASUR debate in Bariloche in 2009 as a much stronger sign of progress in democratic cooperation than has been the case with other multilateral fora (Carrión 2013: 16) (Kerssfield 2012: 79–80). Others, however, are less positive and claim that the meeting did nothing to change national policy (Nolte and Wehner 2012: 8; Triviño Salazar 2009: 2–3; Jácome 2010: 32). In fact, it is hard to assess these initiatives since they have not led to concrete action so far.

In sum, CDS has made progress: there is a political will to shape an own, South American concept of defense. But this runs the danger to collide with domestic tensions and limited national resources for the creation of a defense policy.

In an attempt to overcome the various misconceptions the Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED) was established. It has produced three public documents that have yet to be adopted by the national ministries of defense and handed down to their own armed forces. Despite the fact that the center could be considered an Argentinian initiative to act as a counterweight to Brazil, it certainly responds to a joint willingness to generate proper thinking on defense. Once again however, we see that many of the

Table 10 National delegates at the Center for Strategic Defense Studies

<i>Country</i>	<i>Delegate 1</i>	<i>Delegate 2</i>
Argentina	Civilian	Civilian
Bolivia	(N/I)	N/I
Brazil	Colonel	Civilian
Chile	Civilian	-
Colombia	N/I	N/I
Ecuador	N/I	N/I
Guyana	N/I	N/I
Paraguay	Colonel	-
Peru	Colonel	Captain
Suriname	Lieutenant Colonel	-
Uruguay	Colonel	Civilian
Venezuela	General	-

N/I No information

Source: Author's elaboration

experts involved in the Center are in fact military personnel, and not civilian officials from the ministries, as is illustrated in [Table 10](#).

Like the ministries of defense that have not yet developed professional career paths for their officials, there are few resources for defense studies in universities. A few initiatives do exist; for instance, Chile's Ministry of Defense finances a specialization in defense through the *Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile*.⁹ However, due to a lack of professors, the institute of the armed forces (*Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos* – ANEPE) took on the responsibility for this course, with diplomas granted by Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰ Again, as can be seen in [Table 11](#), the national institutions that support the CEED are to a large extent military, rather than civilian.

Of all the countries mentioned, Ecuador is the only one currently developing an education and training program on defense based on civilian guidelines, including the production of publications and research. Brazil has done much to develop its defense policy and has a singular role in doing so in the region. This is possibly because it is more important on the global stage which has compelled it to adopt policies involving the use of force, the creation of a political community and other epistemic developments in the field of defense. In the past several years, Brazil has organized a broad movement surrounding defense studies, including contributions from universities, grants, theses, publications and technological advancements

Table 11 National counterparts to the Center for Strategic Defense Studies*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Educational Center</i>	<i>Type</i>
Bolivia	General Directorate for Defense Policy and Cooperation for Integral Development (PODECODI)	Civilian**
Brazil	Center for Strategic Studies, Graduate School of War (ESG)	Military
Chile	National Academy for Political and Strategic Studies (ANEPE)	Military
Ecuador	Center for Strategic Defense Studies of the Ministry of National Defense	Civilian
Paraguay	Institute of Higher Strategic Studies (IAEE)	Civilian***
Peru	Center for Higher National Studies (CAEN)	Military
Suriname	Department of Defense Strategic Planning and Training	Military
Uruguay	Center for Higher National Studies (CALEN)	Civilian

*These centers are designated by ministries of defense to work as a counterpart of CEED

**Located in the ministry, but does not count on a proper institute

***All professors are part of the military

Source: Author's elaboration

(Saint-Pierre 2009; Franko 2014). All of this information is meticulously recorded in the National Strategy of Defense published in Brazil in 2008.

DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Competition vs Complementarity: Foreign and Defense Ministries

In recent years the characteristics of the international system have been much debated. On the ever-changing global stage, we face a complex multi-polar environment with several regional actors and protagonists contributing to the construction of a new political geography, economy, and security. It is logical for a state facing such uncertainty and adversity to exploit all its resources in order to insert itself into the global sphere. Nevertheless, what we perceive within the region is not necessarily an expression of that need.

On the regional level, coordination among countries is unsatisfactory and their negotiating teams respond to old diplomatic standards. The development of innovative measures that should come along with new forms of multilateralism have been very limited indeed. In the domestic sphere, communication between agencies is even more fraught with difficulty. Traditionally, foreign and defense policies have been regarded as separate and distant issues. While diplomacy was viewed as an issue of the

state, defense would generally fall within the realm of autonomous military domain. In Latin America, a number of examples clearly illustrate the disagreements between defense and diplomacy. Exemplary events include the mutual recrimination in Argentina surrounding the decision that a school ship belonging to the Argentine army should make a stop in Ghana, where it was held due to the demand for payment of international fiduciary funds. Both the defense and foreign affairs ministries blamed each other for the problem (Diamint 2015). Similar differences provoked a crisis in Ecuador's cabinet. The accusations against non-commissioned Peruvian naval officers (for having sold confidential information to the Chilean army) led to mutual accusations among the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, as well as the Presidency of Peru. As a result, the President of Peru, Ollanta Humala, sacked the Minister of Foreign Relations (Diamint 2015).

Ramírez Chaparro (2012: 219) identifies similar problems with respect to Colombia's participation in the United Nations Security Council in 2011–2012: 'Based on the interviews carried out for this study, we can infer that the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Defense do not share any sort of system of communication or consultation in which the country's position within the Security Council can be openly discussed'.

If defense policy is considered as the armed variant of foreign policy, then it is necessary to elaborate this concept in accordance with the objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The defense sector evaluates the international context in terms of its effects on the power of the state on the international stage or the threats it presents to the national way of life. Obviously, any proposal to react is in line with the actual capacity that the state can allocate to its defense. For example, when a country is considered at risk but does not have the resources necessary to protect itself militarily, it needs to resort to diplomatic efforts to see off the danger.

Without doubt, foreign policy and defense policy constitute a dynamic and inseparable duo. They also share a common challenge. In both we see the occurrence of the Janus effect,¹¹ as identified by Huntington (1961: 1) for defense policies:

The most distinctive, the most fascinating, and the most troublesome aspect of military policy is its Janus-like quality. Indeed, military policy not only faces in two directions, it exists in two worlds. One is international politics, the world of the balance of power, wars and alliances, the subtle and the

brutal uses of force and diplomacy to influence the behavior of other states. The principal currency of this world is actual or potential military strength: battalions, weapons, and warships. The other world is domestic politics, the world of interest groups, political parties, social classes, with their conflicting interests and goals. The currency here is the resources of society: men, money, and material. Any major decision in military policy influences and is influenced by both worlds.

This ‘Janus-like quality’ has also been highlighted by other authors such as John Baylis, who states that defense is an issue of borders since it exists within two worlds, the internal and the international (Baylis 1977: 15). Michael Clarke refers to the same idea: ‘It is necessary to note that, although the defense is an external action, the military question remains always an internal problem, a concern depends on the national political and regional or global security’ (Clarke 1991: 81). Looking at US foreign policy, Philip Williams adds that ‘many decisions are taken at lower ranks of Bureaucracy as a matter of routine, others need to be made at highest political level; some are subject to intense public and private pressure, others still are adopted in relatively careless ways when it comes to foreign policies’ (Williams 1988: 53). This double nature, that is, the coexistence of a facet of involvement in internal power struggles and the external aspect of positioning the country internationally, should not pose a natural obstacle to the attempt to reconcile defense with foreign policy. Differences ought to be resolved for the general good; nevertheless, tensions between the defense and foreign ministries are commonplace.

Diplomacy of Defense

Diplomatic and defense elites do not always belong to the same world, nor do they necessarily share similar visions with regard to the role of the nation, the most beneficial alliances, or the role to be played in international agencies. Brazil has had an adequate bond between both, solidified by the *Escola de Guerra* and *Itamaraty*. In Peru, to a lesser extent, both elites also coincided (Mauceri 2001: 56–7). In other cases there were divergences between the political and military elite. We see examples of this in Chile (Agüero 2002: 40–1) and Colombia (Vargas Velázquez 2011: 122). We also see the submission of political elites to military power, as is the case of Paraguay (Yore 2002).

Diplomacy usually represents a vision of the civilian elite, including their commercial and financial interests. Diplomacy seeks different ways to achieve national interests and goals. Traditionally, the focus was on hard power resources and tools like cultural diplomacy were less important. Recently, however, diplomatic initiatives have been closely associated with the growth of 'soft power'. Joseph Nye coined the term and notion of 'soft power' by incorporating new dimensions in the characterization of state power. According to Nye, soft power is 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced' (Nye 2004: 14). This doesn't imply that the use of force is excluded; rather, it is added to other capabilities in order to determine the rank of a state within the international system.

One example is the international promotion of the rule of law as an attribute of good governance, which, along with the third wave of democratization was interpreted as a clear sign of soft power (Pamment 2014: 52–3; Bélanger 1999: 678–9; Leonard 2009). In the European Union, for instance, there is extensive reference made to its smart power, civil power, normative power, and social cohesion. Cultural diplomacy also includes exchanges in culture, science, and economy in the hope of promoting a country's interests (Soares Arrosa 2008: 58). All of these orientations form what we tend to call 'cultural diplomacy', 'public diplomacy', 'people's diplomacy' or 'international cultural policy'.

Recently, the concept of soft power has also been picked up in the military sphere, and cultural diplomacy has been joined by the notion of defense diplomacy. This concept may appear antiquated, referencing old habits of military-to-military cooperation that have dominated Latin American foreign relations since the 1940s. Those models were centered on the exchange of officials, combined missions, courtesy visits and so on. Nevertheless, as Gregory Winger (2014: 12) keenly observes, since the end of the Cold War, a different perspective has begun to develop: 'At the heart of each instance of defense diplomacy has been an effort by one country to mold the strategic thinking and institutions of another in a manner that was amenable to the practitioner'. Out of a sense of international altruism, military cooperation serves a strategic purpose. Winger adds: 'Defense diplomacy is thus not cooperation for its own sake, but actually the method of bringing the strategic thinking of one country (the recipient) into harmony with another (the practitioner)'. Referring to

Martin Edmonds (1986), he further describes defense diplomacy as ‘the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their trained experience and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad’ (Winger 2014: 5).

Defense diplomacy uses the military as a source of soft power, in a design decided by the ministry of defense. From this perspective, defense diplomacy should never collide with foreign policy. The notion of defense diplomacy is intended as an alternative way to understand defense objectives. The theory of influence is aimed at affecting perceptions, reputations, attitudes, ideas and beliefs, and not necessarily the distribution of material resources (Pamment 2014: 56). Seeing defense diplomacy in these terms reveals a new field of collaboration with traditional diplomacy. It is just one more tool for strengthening the ties between neighbouring countries. As a result of the movement towards soft power in the areas of both state diplomacy and military cooperation, the agendas of both actors, diplomats and defense officials, should draw nearer to each other.

Brazil dabbled in the expansion of its soft power. The Cultural Agency of Itamaraty has been responsible for the diffusion of Brazilian culture abroad. Since the mid-1980s it has promoted the origination of centers and programs to spread the Portuguese language, cinema and national television,¹² as well as the creation of workshops focusing on the countries that are of great interest in Brazilian politics. A similar development towards soft power is detectable in the military sphere. Daniel Zirker posits that recent definitions of defense in Brazil show a wide convergence with the ideas proposed by the foreign ministry. He states: ‘The [Brazilian] Security Strategy document of 2000 proclaimed a “five-pronged strategy” with the first four parts pledging that the DoD would remain engaged in the hemisphere . . . support efforts to ensure democratic control of defense and law enforcement institutions . . . support efforts to strengthen effectiveness, legitimacy, and transparency of regional and sub-regional security structures and regimes . . . [and] support cooperative approaches to the peaceful resolution of border disputes and response to transnational threats and humanitarian crises’ (Zirker 2008: 15). The military command of Brazil within the MINUSTAH in Haiti is one expression of this soft power. Simultaneously, when it comes to matters of defense, Brazil continues to handle issues of defense with notions of hard power. This is illustrated by the government’s interest in increasing armament sales, as well as trying to equip UNASUR members with its defense industry. These goals are outlined in the National Strategy of Defense (Brazil 2008: 52–4).

Chile has developed effective diplomacy by consolidating its role in various multilateral systems. However, its armed forces have been reluctant to accept the cooperative vision, still manifesting a level of distrust towards neighbouring countries. Venezuela on the other hand has not embarked on the use of soft power, but rather oil diplomacy as a means of earning a place on the global scene. Could this perhaps be interpreted as yet another form of soft power? It seems not. Rather than coaxing and complementing, the logic that prevails in Venezuela's actions is that of subordination and nurturing dependence. Colombia relies on a 'military and constabulary diplomacy' in relation to meetings between the defense minister and his or her international counterparts (Ramírez Chaparro 2012: 217). However this is not openly denominated defense diplomacy. This proves that the ministry is not in fact the articulator of foreign relations.

The development of a stronger notion of defense diplomacy could surpass shortfalls in the formulation of a national defense policy. However, were it to transform into a space of rivalry with the foreign ministry, its effects would be insignificant. Moreover, in the face of such a vacuum of coordination, the armed forces could reach a higher level of autonomy.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, the region of South America is currently undergoing a transformation to a different stage of multilateralism, as is evidenced by greater cooperation and regional compatibility of policies. The defense agenda has been incorporated as a way to build confidence and disarm conflict. However, defense diplomacy and foreign policy are still far apart. The professionalization of defense administration is still very rudimentary. Both on the domestic and on the regional level, institutions in charge of administration and knowledge production in defense are strongly militarized. On the regional level, the project of formulating a common defense identity is attractive, yet the advances disappoint. UNASUR's importance cannot be denied, however there was high expectation and minimal harmonization.

Given that Latin American nations are seeking to become more important players on the world stage, foreign relations will increase in importance. Foreign affairs are set to become a more central component of government management. The creation of a professional and institutionalized defense

policy that also counts on a trained and competent civilian bureaucracy is vital in order to reach a point of ideal complementarity between the defense and foreign ministries. Hence governments will need to ensure that suitable candidates fill the positions in both ministries.

NOTES

1. Countries that do not have armed forces rely on other powers in order to defend territorial integrity.
2. UNASUR is an international institution comprised of the 12 countries of the South American region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Its organs include 12 Councils (Culture, Electoral, Social Development, Global Drug Issues, Economy and Finance, Education, Planning and Infrastructure, Health, Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Action Against Transnational Organized Crime, Defense) as well as the Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED), created by the South American Defense Council (CDS), the South American Institute of Government in Health (ISAGS) and the outlines of a South American Energetic Strategy.
3. All translations from Spanish to English are by the author.
4. Out of the categories used by Stepan to define the prerogatives of the armed forces as an institution within the domestic realm, the dimensions with the greatest relationship with the workings of the ministries were selected.
5. See Treaty here: http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/tratado_constitutivo.htm. This decision is supported by prior accords such as the Ushuaia Declaration from MERCOSUR (24 July 1998); MERCOSUR's Political Declaration with Bolivia and Chile as a Zone of Peace, free of weapons of mass destruction; the Lima Commitment – Andean Charter for Peace and Security of the *Comunidad Andina de Naciones* (CAN); The *Declaration of Guayaquil* regarding the South American Zone of Peace and Cooperation, signed during the second meeting of South American presidents on the 26 and 27 of July 2002. Finally, the Declaration of San Francisco de Quito on 12 July 2004 on the Establishment and Development of the Andean Zone of Peace as free of weapons of mass destruction, and guaranteeing no use of threat or force between states and other aspects.
6. See also Third Ordinary Meeting of the Council of Heads of State and Government of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Presidential Declaration of Quito, Ecuador, 10 August 2009, point 7: http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/10-8-09Dec_quito.htm.

7. http://www.ceedcds.org.ar/Espanol/09-Downloads/INFORME_CONCEPTOS_SEG_DEF.pdf. The information bulletins of the CEED are press notes regarding the activities of the Center. They contain no conceptual or content developments.
8. Point 16 of Paramaribo Declaration, Council of Heads of State and Government of UNASUR, 30 August 2013.
9. In Brazil there are at least two civilian courses of Strategic Studies (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Universidade Federal Fluminense), and military courses at Instituto Pandiá Calógeras, Universidade da Força Aérea – UNIFA.
10. Something similar occurred in Argentina, where under the management of Minister Nilda Garré a Defense specialization was created at the *Universidad Tres de Febrero*. However, since this institution did not possess the specialized human resources in the field, it had to rely on the School of Defense (*Escuela de Defensa*).
11. When Saturn was cast out of Mount Olympus by his son, Jupiter, he took shelter in the domains of Janus, who took him in and associated him with his kingdom. As an expression of gratitude, the god endowed him with a curious ability: seeing clearly both past and future, simultaneously, and this being able to act wisely in every circumstance. Janus is the archetype of reflexive attitude, represented by two heads and a horizon in the distance where both sun and moon appear.
12. Cultural Department of Itamaraty: <http://redebrasilcultural.itamaraty.gov.br>.

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Counterterrorism Policies in Brazil: A Securitization Syndrome?

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INTRODUCTION

This study deals with the prospects and limits of excessive consideration of some topics as ‘security issues’. To do this, we employ the framework of analysis offered by the Copenhagen School and mainly designed for the field of security studies. The concept of securitization is the key to understand the issues in this chapter, as well as the constellation of threats that the methodological division of security in sectors deals with. We reinforce this argument by applying securitization theory to a case study in the South American contemporary security context: the construction of the concept of terrorism in Brazil.

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We seek to analyse the Brazilian anti-terrorism agenda since 2011 – and some of its previous elements – evaluating its commitment with the United Nations (UN) counterterrorism framework. We contend that the political understanding regarding terrorism is contextually determined, yet when the concept is absorbed and made instrumental by political discourse, there is the possibility of its use as a means of legitimation for extreme measures in national and international politics. In doing so, we aim at dispelling some myths, highlight discursive constructions and illustrate the politically potentially harmful uses of security.

This chapter will proceed as follows. The next section will review the theoretical framework used to address our research problem, focusing primarily on the Copenhagen School and its securitization theory. Then, we will present a discussion on the phenomenon of terrorism in the global political context with particular attention to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), started in 2001, and its possible repercussions in other countries' security agendas. The third section evaluates Brazilian counterterrorism policies, using as sources historical literature and especially legal documents. The concluding section presents our most significant findings and discusses some implications.

WHAT DOES SECURITY MEAN? FROM CLASSICAL TO CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES

What is security? There is an analytical bias regarding the concept of security in international politics. To clarify it, its meaning must be understood etymologically: the word makes sense, indicates and determines the characteristics of a thing/subject. Grasping what the term 'security' means will be of particular use to understand the research agenda that emerged in security studies with the aftermath of the Cold War.

Critical security studies have three lines of research named in honour of the places where they were first created:

- (a) Aberystwyth or Welsh School, which has a marked influence of Marxist critical theory. Among the emblematic theorists of this school are Richard Wyn Jones and Ken Booth.
- (b) School of Paris, more related to sociological approaches and based on the studies of Pierre Bourdieu, whose central authors are Didier Bigo and Jeff Huysmans.
- (c) Copenhagen School, which had more projection in critical security studies than Aberystwyth and Paris. The term 'school' should not be

understood literally, but as label for a group of researchers who were working with similar theoretical interests during the 1990s and were under the institutional shelter of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). According to Guzzini and Jung (2004), COPRI developed based on a small number of researchers and a meagre institutional structure. Founded in 1985, it achieved stability since 1988 under the coordination of its first official director, Hakan Wiberg. The institute made a compelling critique of the status quo of security studies, particularly its focus on rational choice and deterrence theories. Peace research claimed that the Cold War was partly a result of the very mindset of scholarly observers and politicians alike: by assuming a permanent state of war, they were compelled to produce it in the first place (Guzzini and Jung 2004).

The issue of security can be thought of before and after the decline of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity. Realism and peace studies guided the central security debates. Realism focuses on state actors and the possibility of war among them. Barry Buzan (1991) points out the result of this well-known line of thinking: the power struggle between actors leads to a cycle of competition to maximize or maintain their relative position concerning power in the international scenario. Concepts such as anarchy and security dilemma are the backbone of realist thought: 'Realists tended to see security as a derivative of power: an actor with enough power to reach a dominating position would acquire security as a result' (Buzan 1991: 2).

The second approach of traditional security studies is peace studies. It is characterized by a strong idealist tone since it assumes that the resolution of security problems is possible by the settlement of conflicts in a peaceful way. By definition, it implies the possibility of the end of wars between nation states: 'Idealists tended to see security as a consequence of peace: a lasting peace would provide security for all' (Buzan 1991: 2).

The concept of anarchy helps illustrate the biggest concern of traditional security studies. Security in its various senses (both realist and idealist) means, ultimately, to reduce or eliminate any possible threat. Thus, the assumption that the international system is anarchic implies as a logical consequence that the units of the system do not consent to exist under the rule of a central government. In this environment the threats can come from any of the actors and a state depends solely on its own capabilities to deal with such situations.

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) developed the vision of ‘new security studies’. The concept of security is crucial in criticizing the traditional and military-oriented view, usually associated with realism (Buzan et al. 1998: 21):

The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them [...] traditionally, by saying ‘security’, a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.

Two important categories that are present in that study are the ‘existential threat’ and ‘emergency measures’. These two concepts involve the contexts and circumstances of the threats, as well as the definition of what it means for a particular actor. The traditional approaches portray security based on a one-dimensional and materialistic logic and do not consider the possibilities of analysis of security in a ‘different look’. In the words of Barry Buzan (1991: 23):

(a) States are the principal referent object of security [...]. This explains the dominating policy concern with ‘national’ security. (b) Although states are the principal objects of security, the dynamics of national security are highly relational and interdependent between states. Domestic insecurities may or may not dominate the national security agenda [...]. (c) [...] Among other things, this means that under anarchy, security can only be relative, never absolute.

According to Buzan and his colleagues, security is relational. Thus, it relates to different objects, actors, and constellations. One of the central features of the concept of security, as specified by the Copenhagen School, is to designate, signify and indicate: ‘Security as a concept clearly requires a referent object’ (Buzan 1991: 26).

Buzan’s analysis of security is compartmentalized into sectors – military, political, societal, economic and environmental. In the third chapter of his study *People, States and Fear*, Buzan (1991) explores the core elements of the threat to each sector to analyse the concept of national security. Themes like economic, environmental or societal security did not play a major role in security analysis in traditional realist perspective, as Guzzini and Jung (2004: 1) mention:

This conceptual widening has led to an erosion of the walls that previously divided strategic studies and peace research. To some extent, the two fields

have merged to become security studies, which covers a range from more traditional approaches to so-called ‘critical security studies’.

The political process of securitization also plays an important part in the Copenhagen School’s framework. It is an inherently political process and cannot be understood in isolation. If securitization belongs to the realm of politics and political discourse, the action of designating an issue as non-politicized, politicized and then securitized shows the path by which an actor or issue emerges as major theme on the security agenda of any state, as [Figure 3](#) shows.

However, the model of analysis offered by the Copenhagen School has some weaknesses that raise the following questions: (a) How to measure the securitization process, if it is a process and political discourse? (b) How to define the thresholds from one stage to another? (c) Can this framework of analysis address systemic-based research questions?

Thus, if the concept of securitization is meant to analyse how an actor or issue becomes the object of attention by another actor, the proposed methods, in turn, seek to explain how the actors and issues are embedded in political discourse of security. Thus, the sectors discussed by Buzan and his coauthors (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998) – military, economic, political, environmental and societal – indicate a path for research, but not an end in themselves.

The Copenhagen School builds a comprehensive and useful framework to think about how security performs a key role in the post-Cold War setting of international politics. The theoretical and methodological challenge proposed by the Copenhagen School falls within the scope of more critical theories in International Relations (IR). Several of its fundamental aspects also entail meta-theory. It seeks to be a critique of traditional theories in the field of IR theory, especially realism.

Yet, it is also important to highlight the weight that the concept of security has in political practice. According to Der Derian (1993: 94):

Non-politicized ↔ Politicized ↔ Securitized

Fig. 3 Process of securitization

Source: Authors’ elaboration

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of ‘security’. In its name peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature – as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name weapons of mass destruction have been developed which transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in IR, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted.

TERRORISM IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL CONTEXT: THE MACROSECURITIZATION OF THE GWOT

When addressing the definitional problem of terrorism, it is necessary to identify the roots of some misconceptions and lack of comprehension. Several authors have worked on this issue, and no consensus exists about a formal and widely valid definition of terrorism. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (2005) found more than 109 scholarly definitions of terrorism. They also see a significant shift in the use of the concept. Before the nineteenth century, the state was the most important actor employing terrorism, meaning that terror was a policy of states used to maintain the oppression of their citizens. State terrorism as we know it in modern times was first employed in Imperial Russia. The political objective of the expulsion of the Jews and the murder of Central Asian Turks at that time was the maintenance of the political unity of the empire.

However, during the nineteenth century, terrorist attacks also became a tool of non-state actors. In the twentieth century, terrorist acts used as means to political claims were widespread and employed by both state and non-state actors (Schmid and Jongman 2005). David Rapoport (2002) defines modern terrorism in four waves. The first wave, dated between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, had as key players the European anarchist movement. For example, Russian revolutionaries in the early twentieth century transitioned from the usual spreading of political pamphlets, ideas and rallies to violent action (Rapoport 2002: 4):

Narodnaya Volya (‘The People’s Will’), the first terrorist group in the first wave, inherited a world where traditional revolutionaries seemed obsolete or irrelevant. No longer could pamphlets, books, meetings, demonstrations produce mass uprisings, and even revolutionaries described themselves as ‘idle word spillers’! A ‘new form of communication’ was needed, one that would be

heard and command respect. Terror filled that need; no one could ignore it, and repeated acts of terror would generate the polarization necessary for revolution.

The second wave took place after the First World War with the emergence of nationalist and anti-colonial movements. The actions saw a change of focus; they were more targeted towards representatives of the state, and guerrillas were the preferred tactic to challenge state power in pursuit of a clearly defined political objective. According to Rapoport (2002), major energies went into guerrilla-like (hit-and-run) actions against troops, attacks that went beyond the rules of war, however, because weapons were concealed and the assailants had no identifying insignia. Some groups (e.g. Irgun and IRA) made efforts to give warnings to limit civilian casualties.

Rapoport identifies a third wave which had its origins in a New Left that emerged in the context of the Vietnam War. This third wave was characterized not only by anti-colonial stances but also by its opposition to the Western intervention model and questioning of the Western liberal democratic model. These actions of resistance echoed in South America in the mid-1960s (Rapoport 2002: 7):

In Latin America, revolutionary groups repeated a pattern visible in the first wave; they abandoned the countryside and came to the city where they would be noticed. Carlos Marighella, a major figure on the Latin American scene, produced *The Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*, a handbook of tactics comparable to Nechaev's *Revolutionary Catechism* in the first wave.

The fourth wave resulted from the emergence of the jihadist movements. The hot spots in the initial stages of that modality of terrorism were in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Yet, the concept of international terrorism and the scope of the actions in this wave are unprecedented. For the first time terrorist groups extend their activities to more than one geographical location. Terrorism now is a global phenomenon.

Twentieth-century terrorism after World War II could also be summarized according to the tactics that were used in each attack: the 1960s were the time of bombings, the 1970s were the time of airplane hijackings, and the 1980s and 1990s were the time of both. On 11 September 2001, however, something new happened in New York City when two commercial airplanes were used as missiles against two of the most famous buildings of the city, and another plane was deliberately crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, DC.

What did these attacks demonstrate to the world? Several answers to this question are possible, but we would like to stress that the primary objective of the terrorists was not only to spread fear among the American public, but also to demonstrate that world's most powerful military power was vulnerable to attack from 'unexpected weapons'. Pandora's Box was opened on that morning, and counterterrorism became the most pressing issue on the international security agenda.

The extreme violence used by al-Qaeda in the 9/11 attacks mobilized the entire international community to question how such attacks were possible. The answer to that question can be analysed if we understand what took place that morning. The terrorism of global reach differs sharply from previous terrorist attacks and other forms of violent struggle.

When we take into account the political environment, we have to regard the non-linear relationship imposed by multiple scenarios, which means that we are analysing different states, each one with its interests, regional and global status, population and so on. The definitional problem of terrorism arises as one of the central issues in political science because the essence of this research question does not lie with the most familiar aspects of terrorism, like violence, tactics and objectives, but with a broad understanding of the political sphere.

Terrorism is also related to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue, as the technological capability to produce them does not exclusively belong to the great powers anymore, but has also been achieved by small and weak states as well as by non-state actors. This increases the difficulty of reaching a broad agreement about the definition of terrorism. It is necessary, then, to account for different political environments and the possibility of unpredictable scenarios.

The very process of defining terrorism after the 9/11 attacks can be characterized as troublesome because it started to embrace too many different types of violence that populated the imagination of the entire international community – biological, chemical, nuclear terrorism, to name a few. Since the possibilities of terrorism were boundless, the concept became as broad as possible. In that sense, what the US government called Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) could be considered as a part of a process of macrosecuritization of a security issue on the global agenda. According to Buzan and Weaver (2009: 257), macrosecuritization can be understood as a securitization process on a larger scale, in which the level of aggregation is higher than the nation state:

Macrosecuritizations are defined by the same rules that apply to other securitizations: identification of an existential threat to a valued referent object and the call for exceptional measures. The key difference is that they are on a larger scale than the mainstream collectivities at the middle level (states, nations) and seek to package together securitizations from that level into a 'higher' and larger order.

They present a more inclusive logic and seek more decisively to convince the general public of the need to protect themselves from a threat. Examples are the GWOT, the Cold War, or global warming. One requisite for processes of macrosecuritization is the availability of universalist ideologies. Buzan and Waever (2009) categorize four types of universalism, which function as a cohesive and inclusive element to occupy a privileged position in the global security agenda. 'Inclusive universalism' refers to beliefs on how to optimize the human condition (whether by religious means or not – e.g. Liberalism, Marxism, Christianity, Islam). They are universalist in the sense that they apply to all humankind. In turn, those ideological beliefs that claim superior rights and status for one group over the rest of humankind are called 'exclusive universalism'. Examples include European imperial doctrines and Nazism. 'Existing order universalisms' are political claims about threats to one or more of the institutions of international society, which are universalist in the sense that they refer to the global level international social structure. 'Physical threat universalisms' have as referent object the physical future of the humanity, with potential damage on a global scale due to terrorism, nuclear weapons, infectious diseases or global warming (Buzan and Waever 2009: 260–1).

To Bigo (2006), the post-9/11 international security environment is marked by the upsurge of electronic surveillance of individuals and the use of security rhetoric to legitimize practices of exception. It is a period which reinforces a permanent state of exception or emergency, strengthening the discourse that the insecurity is the central feature of the global environment. The author argues that the attack of 11 September 2001 in the United States – as well as its interpretation as an event that changed the recent history – must be understood along with other international terrorist attacks in the 2000s. One of the solutions that spread was the use of technology to prevent terrorist attacks, with the worrying downside of an increase of surveillance through technology, which could also be interpreted as mechanism harmful to fundamental rights of privacy and human dignity (Bigo 2006: 49).

Bigo (2006: 63) insists that studies should focus on the riskiest consequence of GWOT (besides torture and pre-emptive war), namely the ongoing process of normalization which allows these emergency measures to be widely perceived as solutions to tackle security issues in the post-9/11 context:

[...] to focus on governmental antiterrorist policies alone, on Guantanamo Bay and torture in Iraq or elsewhere, without seeing the relationship to the daily treatment of foreigners at the borders and the suspicion concerning any deviant behaviour, is misleading. We need to insist on this normalization of emergency as a technique of government by unease, and on the success of the differentiation between a normalized population which is pleased to be monitored “against danger” and an ‘alienation’ of some groups of people considered as dangerous “others”. The surveillance and monitoring of the movement of each individual is growing, but effective controls and coercive restrictions of freedom are concentrated on specific targets. These targets are constructed as “invisible and powerful enemies in networks” and the narratives concerning these threats predate September 11 and even the end of bipolarity [...]

By applying the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization, we can notice that terrorism is presented as an existential and perennial threat to the whole international system— according to the government of United States. Figure 4 uses the Google n-gram tool to account for the mentions of the word ‘terrorism’ from 1800 to 2008 in millions of books in English that were digitalized by that company. It evidences that there was an impressive spike in the number of mentions to that term in the post-9/11 period. Terrorism has entered social imaginations, government policies and people’s books.

COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES IN THE SOUTH AMERICAN POLITICAL CONTEXT: THE BRAZILIAN CASE

When analysing the concept of terrorism and its frequent use in the international political environment, it is necessary to emphasize that its importance has risen considerably. One could thus say that terrorism has gone through a process of securitization. This process is particularly intense in the South American hemisphere, where it manifested itself as a policy influence over the security agendas of the countries. At the same time, the absence of a precise definition of terrorism makes room for the




Fig. 4 Mentions of the word ‘terrorism’ in books published in English, 1800–2008
Source: Authors’ elaboration using Google Books N-gram viewer, available at: <https://books.google.com/ngrams> (retrieved on 8 February 2016)

flexible use of this political concept, allowing the states to give it the meaning that is best suited to their political interests.

Terrorism has had a unique character in South American politics, especially during 1960s and 1970s. During this period, both state and non-state actors used this form of political action. Historically, terrorism in South America was mainly state terrorism. Some caution is warranted when thinking about terrorism in the region as a political phenomenon, especially after 1959, the year of the Cuban Revolution. At that time, the international political context was dominated by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, it was uncomfortable for the US government to have a communist country in its sphere of influence. The reaction to this communist presence was a systematic support of right-wing military regimes in the Americas. In this context, resistance groups against the military regimes emerged. Examples include MR-8 and ALN in Brazil; the Montoneros in Argentina; the Tupamaros in Uruguay;

the MIR in Chile; and the FARC and ELN in Colombia. These groups were regarded as terrorists by the respective governments, while they might have been called insurgents or guerrillas abroad.

In Brazil, the securitization of terrorism occurred in a complex manner. This is especially true if one takes into consideration Brazilian history and the ambiguity with which the term 'terrorism' was used in policy and law. During the period of the military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1964 to 1985, 'terrorists' were members of left-wing armed groups who opposed the government. The government carried out major armed campaigns against 'terrorist' groups, since it considered that they should be dealt with legal exceptionality, even though they were formed by Brazilian citizens. In this sense, the military labelled national groups opposing the regime as potentially destructive elements of society, an 'existential threat'. Actions against these groups were characterized by disregard of fundamental human rights. The existence of those 'enemies of the motherland' constituted a state of exception in which the military confronted the opposition by means of torture, unlawful killings, and disappearances. The discursive annexation of 'terrorist groups' thus authorized state agents to operate through extremely coercive measures.

This genealogy is essential to understand why the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 points out that the country 'condemns terrorism', without actually defining it. The new civilian government wanted to make it clear that the discourse of a terrorist threat would not be tolerated, and it tried to distance itself from the human rights violations committed during the dictatorship. Another aspect that contributes to the Brazilian difficulty of fighting terrorism lies in the fact that many people in the Brazilian elite (politicians, journalists and so on) were arrested on terrorism charges during the dictatorship and are very careful in referring to this term to frame any violent behaviour.

The Brazilian ambiguous position during a considerable amount of time served the interests of the country. After the 11 September 2001 attacks, legislative panic swept many countries, and under the guidance of the United States, criminal laws were toughened to give strong responses to terrorism. As a result of this process, even countries that had never been targeted adopted draconian laws against terrorism. The post-9/11 context in Brazil is unique for three specific reasons: (a) Brazil's increased projection in the international system, (b) the macrosecuritization of terrorism as a global threat and (c) the consolidation of Brazilian democracy and the lack of legitimacy of an anti-terror framework that was created during the authoritarian regime. By all indications, Brazil faced a very complex problem to try to respond to international demands for an anti-terrorist framework. The country needed to

update its policy, legal and strategic perspectives to handle the situation of being a potential target for major terrorist attacks. Celso Lafer (2003) provides an overview of the Brazilian status in the midst of the rapid adjustments that the securitization process of terrorism as a global threat required in the post-9/11 context. In this period, Brazil quickly adopted a set of international standards. It somehow bandwagoned the global process of securitization of terrorism in a mimetic way. It must be pointed out that the country did so without having a profound domestic debate that would allow an adaptation of the international norms to Brazilian domestic and foreign policy goals and interests. Regarding domestic policy, Brazil at first resisted the pressures to adopt new anti-terrorist legislation and did not succumb to the trend of using terrorism as a justification to restrict individual rights. Later on, however, the country changed its position.

Immediately after 9/11, Brasilia managed to express its rejection of the attacks against civilians, while at the same time it kept its distance from the US-sponsored GWOT. Washington repeatedly asked Brazil for support to deal with suspected Islamist groups in the triple border region of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, the focal point in South America when it comes to terrorism. Besides illicit activities, the biggest issue there is that the area is home to a growing Muslim population of about 30,000 – about 10 per cent of the local population –, mostly of Syrian and Lebanese origin. This caught the attention of US security policy after 9/11. The Bush administration argued that members of the Lebanese Hezbollah group operated in that area without control. In this sense, we agree with Villa (2014) when he analyses the South American impact of the macrosecuritization process carried out by US foreign policy. Yet, the refusal of the Brazilian government to label such groups as terrorists demonstrated that the country was not entangled in the US sphere of influence.

At the same time, article 4, paragraph VIII of the 1988 Federal Constitution names the condemnation of terrorism as one of the principles governing Brazil's international relations, and Brazil has a significant participation in international counterterrorism instruments. The need to absorb international counterterrorism legislation is undisputed. On 19 February 2001, Brazil adopted via decree UN Security Council Resolution 1333 of the year 2000.¹ The country moved firmly in the fight against money laundering, corruption and criminal organizations. While Brazil repudiates international terrorism, it has an extremely cautious stance on the use of military force to fight it. The country stresses the need to negotiate and deal with the economic and social causes of terror by peaceful means.

The Brazilian Constitution does not offer a definition of the political phenomenon of terrorism, and the development of specific domestic legislation on the issue of terrorism has always been irregular or unclear. Brazilian law had some anti-terrorist content. The chief example is the National Security Law 7.170/83, still adopted under a military president, which allows for sanctions against terrorist acts. Initially, no changes were made in reaction to 9/11 and Brazil refrained from creating a legal framework to deepen counterterrorism.

Things changed since 2001. This, however, was not attributable to a transformation of the regional security environment in Latin America, but had its roots in the country's substantial economic growth. Brazil benefited from rising commodity prices and China's economic growth, taking advantage of the financial windfall to try to drum up symbolic capital in the international arena. It is mainly due to these developments that the country started to host a series of major events, including the Environmental Conference Rio + 20 (2012), the Soccer World Cup (2014) and the Summer Olympics (2016). As Brazil started to be considered a rising power both in academic analysis and in the international news media, the country's rise materialized in these choices.

The intention to internationalize the country by hosting international delegations with an increasing frequency clashed with a lack of operational capabilities to deal with the threats that such events eventually lead to. The absence of historical terrorist threats in the country meant that the military and national security agencies did not possess expertise or structure to deal with terrorist acts. Also, as mentioned before, the very speech act of naming 'terror' a threat made some sectors of the society recall the criminal actions of the military dictatorship, which increased the political cost of changes in security policy with regards to terrorism. Two events exemplify the problem of denominating situations of violent upheaval. In 2006 a criminal organization called PCC in São Paulo undertook attacks that ended up killing 86 people; and in 2010 attacks by the Red Command gang in Rio de Janeiro were also regarded as 'terrorist' by parts of the public opinion. The institutional response, however, has always been not to treat those events as terrorism, but as common crime.

The security forces' response to the Brazilian protests in June 2013 was particularly violent.² During these events, young people in several cities resorted to the strategy of closing off large avenues as acts of social contestation. Images of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro using excessive violence against protesters quickly spread on the internet, which

encouraged certain segments of the protesters also to operate violently. The manifestations were accompanied by a media battle, with the front pages of newspapers filled with pictures of protesters attacking banks and buses. Conservative politicians and the press began to employ the word 'terror' to describe those actions.

Meanwhile, some international bureaucratic structures that had gained strength during the Bush era continued to exercise power over countries to try to deepen the anti-terrorist agenda. One of these structures is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, also known by the French acronym GAFI). That group, created to improve international cooperation in combating money laundering, gained super powers in 2001 to be also responsible for financial measures to combat terrorism. The FATF makes a number of recommendations and publishes a blacklist of countries that do not implement them. Being on the blacklist can seriously affect the credit of a country. During the Lula government, FATF bureaucrats tried to pressure Brazil to create specific legislation to criminalize terrorism.

The combination of external pressures for an anti-terrorist framework for the mega-events and conservative forces' discourse against the protests ultimately made the country update its anti-terrorism law. In this process which one can define as a securitization bandwagon, Brazil started to accelerate the development of its legal framework on anti-terrorism through Presidential Decree 7606 of 17 November 2011. This piece of legislation expressed the Brazilian commitment to fight terrorism and to implement Resolution 1989 of the UN Security Council, adopted in 2011.³ The process became more narrowly focused on domestic security threats after the June 2013 protests. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, then Senator Crivella proposed bill 728/2011, which sought to increase security by limiting access to areas around the stadiums for the Confederations Cup and World Cup matches to those individuals who had tickets. This bill was not approved, among other things because of the vagueness of the concepts used.

On the national level, the law project 2016/2015 was a first attempt to establish a definition of the crime of terrorism in the country. It is highly controversial and was subject to numerous modifications. In its original version it characterized terrorism as follows (Brazilian National Congress 2016):

Terrorist organizations are those whose preparatory and executory acts occur for ideological and political reasons, for reasons of xenophobia,

discrimination or prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity, religion or gender, and whose purpose is to cause terror, endanger people, property, public safety or public peace, or coerce authorities to do or not to do something.

The text that was finally approved by the parliament eliminated ideological and political reasons among the motivations, as well as the goal of coercing authorities. There was also a lot of controversy about what would be considered acts of terrorism, especially since the law project listed a number of tactics frequently employed by social protesters, such as sabotaging or seizing control of the means of communication or transport, ports, airports, railway or bus stations, hospitals, and places that carry out public services. The contested nature and fragility of the concepts used is also manifest in the exclusionary clause foreseen in the third paragraph of draft bill 2016/2015, which stated that certain types of political activity could not be classified as terrorism. This brings to light the problem of vagueness in the definition of terrorism.

Additionally, experts pointed out that all offenses listed in the anti-terrorist law project were already covered in the Brazilian penal code, for example by Bill 12.850/2013, which defines criminal organizations. Thus, draft bill 2016/2015 clearly responded to the urge to tackle 'international terrorism'. At the same time, it leaves sufficient definitional gaps that open the possibility of its application to domestic groups and social protest. The comparison of draft bill 2016/2015 and Bill 12.850 indicates the attempt of a more pronounced inflection towards securitizing the issue of international terrorism domestically.⁴

There is an excess of emergency discourse in this context. The speech act of pointing to protesters as terrorists ultimately authorizes a series of emergency measures. For instance, columnists in *Folha de São Paulo*, the largest newspaper in the country, pointed out in January 2016 that an anti-terrorist law would have prevented violent protests for free public transportation, as people who protested would have been considered 'terrorists' (Kataguirí 2016). By understanding the process of securitization as the displacement of a broad political process into a political agenda dominated by security discourse, one can consider that Brazil is adhering to the macrosecuritization process described by Buzan and Waever (2009), but poorly adapting it to the domestic context.

In the combat of terrorism, however, it is necessary to pose the question about the limits. The Brazilian state has to set a legal framework

without resorting to legal and political emergency measures. This 'state of emergency' environment is a risk which Brazil incurs without having a profound debate about the issue of terrorism, in particular about two complicated issues. The first relates to the possible problems of adopting a legal framework largely based on international law. The second issue is that the vagueness of concepts in the laws adopted might create a grey area in which social protest – which is entirely reasonable in a democracy – could be framed as terrorism.

The recent process of securitization of international terrorism raised a broad range of issues with regards to its implementation by domestic legislation. In the case of Brazil, it can be seen that this process moved the adoption of anti-terrorist legislation onto the Brazilian security agenda. It remains to be seen whether it will leave further marks, in particular regarding the future application of the recently created legal framework.

CONCLUSION

What conclusions can we draw from this study? Dealing with security means addressing a complex environment in which the variables interact intensely. The contemporary security debate cannot be understood by looking at terrorism only as global security issue, but it is necessary to observe domestic implications of international securitization processes.

In a certain way, security in the twenty-first century is a broader phenomenon with a decisive impact on the political agenda of states. In the South American case, one can see a divergence of interpretations regarding several security issues, among them the issue of terrorism. Terrorism is perceived as a global threat by many countries, but it is noteworthy that this interpretation is not so common for South American governments.

The analysis through the securitization theory provided by the Copenhagen School allows us to visualize the social construction of threats. It is necessary, however, to discuss the form under which we can define the degree of politicization of an issue and the level of securitization in a Brazilian political context. The normative framework, at first, was established to deal with possible external terrorist threats, but it might end up being transmuted into a coercive tool to handle domestic social movements. The ability to label groups that oppose the status quo as terrorists allows governments to suspend rights that are intrinsic to democratic citizenship.

The contemporary discussion on combating terrorism in Brazil is the result of two sets of factors. The external factors are a product of Brazil's need to deal with potential threats on its territory during international mega-events. In this perspective, the anti-terrorism law is a response to demands from international agencies such as the FATF to act against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Brazil had to create instruments to deal with international financial transactions that might provide aid to terrorist groups; otherwise it ran the danger of suffering sanctions.

On the domestic side, there was a lack of endogenous models for counterterrorist policy. Brazil has never been the target of international terrorist groups, which led the country to ultimately import foreign views, notably those of the United States. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Arab community in Brazil, especially after the recent influx of Syrian refugees, starts facing some harassment. Additionally, unexpected protests mobilized conservative forces' discourse against the protesters, labelling them as potential terrorists. This entailed a securitizing discourse aimed at justifying security practices within the country. The possible return to the use of anti-terrorism measures against Brazilian citizens is remarkable.

Thus, the emergency measures created by the US government to handle the 'Axis of Evil' and the GWOT ultimately had their repercussions and were adapted to the Brazilian context. The consequences of that process could dangerously lead to the framing of domestic social movements as 'enemies of the nation', either in public debate or by (sectors of) the Brazilian state agencies, and to the violation of human rights. A debate like this can open discussions with unpredictable consequences, which can undermine the basic guarantees within the country, if it is not carried out in a solid, careful and democratic manner. The Copenhagen School's framework helps us to understand the normative component embedded in security. The creation of extra-legal mechanisms, labelled as emergency measures driven by a 'national security' discourse, should be avoided as it implies a practical reduction of the 'normal' sphere of politics.

NOTES

1. The UN Security Council Resolution 1333 from the year 2000 was, among other penalties, aimed at blocking the resources of Osama bin Laden.

2. Even the UN Human Rights Council expressed concern about the Brazilian security forces' turn towards more repressive practices. On 10 June 2015, an addendum to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (UN Human Rights Council 2015) referred to the episodes of political violence: 'The Special Rapporteur remains disturbed by allegations of excessive use of force by the police against peaceful protestors in a series of assemblies and at the allegations of mass arrests of individuals aimed at intimidating critics and discouraging participation in public demonstrations'.
3. This Resolution reaffirms an extensive set of earlier counterterrorism resolutions: 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 (2006), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009) and 1988 (2011).
4. Draft bill 2015/2016 was adopted as Bill 13,260/2016 on 16 March 2016 (available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2016/Lei/L13260.htm).

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Desecuritizing the ‘War on Drugs’

Carolina Cepeda Másmela and Arlene B. Tickner

INTRODUCTION

After 30 years a consensus is growing among numerous governmental and social sectors in the Western Hemisphere that the so-called ‘war on drugs’ has failed (Bagley and Rosen 2015). And yet, the transformation of existing counternarcotics policies has proven a remarkably slow and difficult task. In this chapter, we make use of Colombian-US bilateral relations as a window to trace the evolution of the US-designed ‘war on drugs’. In addition to highlighting the role of securitization in the development of counternarcotics activities in Colombia, one of Washington’s main laboratories, we discuss the process through which the shortcomings of this policy – highlighted by a considerable body of empirical evidence and lessons learned from around the globe – have created opportunities to engage in desecuritization and to design alternative strategies.

In the first section we explore the principles and assumptions that have sustained the ‘war on drugs’. Although these have been analysed ad nauseam in numerous other works (see, e.g. Bagley and Tokatlian 1992;

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Tokatlian 1995; and most recently, Rosen 2014), it is vital to review them in order to understand the approach developed by the United States to the illicit drugs problem as well as its securitization. The second section explores the evolution of Colombian-US relations from the Andrés Pastrana administration (1998–2002) onwards, with the important caveat that the bilateral relationship has been ‘narcotized’ since the 1980s. In addition to providing an overall assessment of the anti-drug strategies of both countries, we also explore their ‘unexpected’ consequences. While it is difficult to separate the analysis of the ‘war on drugs’ from other objectives of bilateral cooperation, such as state-strengthening and counterinsurgency, the fact that narcotics occupied such a key role in the multi-year and multi-billion dollar Plan Colombia merits special attention. In the third section we conceptualize the idea of desecuritizing the ‘war on drugs’ by way of a general review of the Copenhagen school’s securitization theory, followed by an analysis of current political discourses and policy decisions that suggest that counternarcotics efforts are gradually shifting from a security framework to a political and public health-based lens. Finally, we identify the challenges that drug policy reform currently faces in Colombia and Latin America more generally.

THE WAR ON DRUGS: PRINCIPLES AND ASSUMPTIONS

The interpretation of illicit drugs as a ‘danger’ and a ‘threat’ has a long political and social history in the United States. In 1971, President Richard Nixon declared that they constituted ‘public enemy number one’ against which it was necessary to wage a ‘war’ – a claim that was radicalized during the administration of Ronald Reagan. However, since the early twentieth century, US policy has been based on two distinct but complementary assumptions: drugs are morally wrong and they represent a security threat.

Among the features that have determined American ‘exceptionalism’, moralistic attitudes derived largely from the Protestant work ethic play a prominent role in the national and international politics of the United States (Lipset 1997; Schuck and Wilson 2008). The religious origin of US attitudes towards issues such as narcotics, sexuality, crime, and punishment largely explains the nature of the public debate on drugs (Kennedy 2007). In addition to its representation as an ‘evil’ against which the United States has a moral duty to act, drug consumption has been understood historically as a depraved behaviour that is outside the limits of

'normal' society (Bewley-Taylor 2001: 6). Therefore, the issue of illicit drugs and the policies that have been developed to combat them have been based on the assumption that this problem has its origins outside the United States, in producer countries, and inside the country, among undesirable social groups, typically racial and ethnic minorities (Campbell 1992: 169–89). The fact that drugs are interpreted as a universal evil that threatens moral purity also exerts a restraining influence on public debate, namely, the rejection and disavowal of those analyses that are framed in different terms.

US drug policy has also relied on the identification of illicit drugs as a threat to security. The concept of securitization emphasizes the importance of discourse employed by states and other power-bearing agents to justify decisions and action (Wæver 1995). Through the use of speech-acts, state actors create specific readings of public issues that are not the product of objective assessments but of a set of historical, political, social, and cultural factors (Lipschutz 1995). In the case of security, when a specific problem is declared to be a threat, representatives of the state invoke the need for emergency measures and the right to use any strategy needed to combat it, including the use of force. Consequently, securitization enables the state to monopolize the handling of certain issues and to remove them from the public sphere, where they are normally subject to democratic debate and to the consideration of distinct policy alternatives. Given that there are no 'objective' threats, the main focus of securitization is not the identification and classification of different security problems, but how specific issues are labelled security threats and to what effect.

Taken together, the religiosity that accompanies the understanding of illicit drugs and their securitization explains the longevity of the 'war on drugs'. What is commonly known as the punitive or prohibitionist paradigm provides a specific interpretation of illegal drugs – 'they are bad and have to be ended'; the source of the problem – 'drugs are very cheap and easy to get'; and possible solutions – 'punishment, coercion, and prohibition' (Bertram et al. 1996). In so doing, the paradigm sets the limits of political debate on the subject and the feasibility (or impossibility) of specific policies. Conventionally, strategies have made use of a combination of interdiction, eradication, combating drug-trafficking organizations in producer countries, and criminalization and imprisonment within the United States to address the problem of demand, with a reduced emphasis on treatment and education. 'If the war against supply seeks to discourage consumption by increasing the economic cost of drug use, the war against

consumers seeks to increase the risk associated with consumption by imposing punitive measures' (Bertram et al. 1996: 4).

When issues are defined successfully as security threats, elites can circumvent ordinary rules of the political game with greater ease, public debate tends to stop and citizens are more likely to accept state decisions without much questioning. Equally important, securitization is often adverse to democracy, given that it bypasses key mechanisms and institutions of the democratic process, leading in many instances to militarization. Contrary to this reading, one of the arguments in favour of securitization employed by decision-makers is that such an approach allows for the 'efficient' management of problems framed as security issues as it provides a very specific menu of political and technical tools that would be difficult to employ outside of this framing (Wæver 1995).

COLOMBIA-UNITED STATES: THE DRUG RELATIONSHIP

Illicit drugs have been at the center of Colombian-US relations during the past three decades, largely due to the expansion of drug-trafficking organizations in Colombia in the 1980s, and growing concern in the United States with narcotics and associated crime and violence (Crandall 2002). Indeed, the Andean Initiative, introduced by George H.W. Bush in 1989 towards the end of the Cold War, granted Colombia a 'special' place on the US foreign policy agenda, and Colombia's own 'war on drugs' has relied heavily on US support and strategies ever since. However, the role of drugs in the bilateral relationship underwent a major transformation after the Ernesto Samper (1994–1998) administration, mostly due to the mutation of the political economy of drug trafficking in the country and its growing synergy with the armed conflict (see Tokatlian 2000; Tickner 2007).

When Samper took office in 1994, the division of labour for the cocaine trade was such that Peru and Bolivia produced most of the raw material (coca paste) and the Colombian cartels processed and exported it. This production structure changed in the mid-1990s due to the migration of coca crops to Colombia, largely as a result of successful eradication and interdiction campaigns in Peru and Bolivia, and the breakdown of the air bridge between these countries and Colombia. Accordingly, coca production in Colombia increased by about 50 per cent between 1996 and 1998 (GAO 2008), making it the largest producer of coca in the world. In addition, more than half was in Putumayo, a department controlled by the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. On the other hand, the dismantling of the Cali and Medellín cartels during the first half of the 1990s created a power vacuum that was filled not only by the mini-cartels but also by illegal armed actors, particularly the paramilitaries and the FARC. In both cases, participation in various links in the chain of production provided a crucial source of income that enabled their territorial expansion.

This context created the 'perfect storm' for broadening and deepening the existing security approach to coca cultivation, cocaine production, and, ultimately, counterinsurgency, during the Andrés Pastrana administration. Despite the Colombian president's efforts to distance himself from the US interpretation of the drug problem, mainly because it was deemed counterproductive for putting a negotiated end to the Colombian armed conflict, the success or failure of his peace efforts hinged largely on US support. Since Washington's interest in Colombia remained stuck on the 'war on drugs' (Arnson and Tickner 2010), Plan Colombia (PC) placed illegal drugs at the center of a general strategy for overcoming the country's internal crisis, including economic recovery, reform of the justice system, development, and human rights.¹ Given concerns with the expansion of illicit crops in Southern Colombia, one of the FARC's historical strongholds, PC became overdetermined by its military component. Indeed, 80 per cent of the first package of US aid – the largest source of external funding for PC, amounting to US\$ 1.6 million in 2000 and 2001 – was earmarked for the army and, to a lesser extent, the police and provided for the supply of helicopters, training of counternarcotics battalions, and military support for eradication and interdiction activities.

The argument made by the Pastrana government in the 'Plan for Peace, Prosperity and the Strengthening of the State' was that illicit drugs constituted a threat to national security because they fuelled the armed conflict, and that the Colombian state was too weak to face the problem by itself. State weakness was associated with a lack of monopoly over the national territory and the use of force, preventing, among others, the effective implementation of anti-drug policies by the national police in areas controlled by the guerrillas and where coca was cultivated.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and subsequent shifts in US foreign policy had a direct impact upon the bilateral relationship. Namely, the 'global war on terrorism' constituted a new securitization strategy that linked a set of external threats within a single analytical framework, including illegal trafficking of drugs and weapons, weapons

of mass destruction, and even state weakness (Tickner and Cepeda 2011). The nexus between terrorism and drugs, symbolized by a new concept –‘narco-terrorism’ – made it possible to tie together the securitization of these two issues (Buzan 2006).

In Colombia the ‘terrorization’ of counternarcotics policy had significant implications. The ending of the Caguán peace process with the FARC in February 2002 led to this group’s identification as a terrorist actor,² while the fusing of the armed conflict with counterterrorism stretched the thematic content of bilateral relations between Colombia and the United States. While prior to 9/11 US interests revolved largely around drug production and trafficking, afterwards the bilateral relationship also focused on the strengthening of the coercive apparatus of the Colombian state and on counterinsurgency.

The Colombian government was largely behind the idea that the Colombian conflict was the greatest terrorist threat in the Western Hemisphere, with an eye to placing the country on the post-9/11 map of US priorities (Moreno 2002). An almost immediate effect of this change in language was the lifting of restrictions associated with the use of US military aid received through PC. In March 2002, President George W. Bush asked Congress for authorization to use military aid in the fight against terrorism, which erased the tenuous distinction between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency.

This trend continued and deepened after the election of Álvaro Uribe in May 2002. From day one, Uribe set out to redefine national security policy and focused primarily on the war against illegal armed groups and drug trafficking. Despite the marked differences between the Pastrana and Uribe governments—especially the emphasis of the first on peace and the claim by the second that there was no armed conflict in Colombia – Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy was grounded in a similar interpretation of the Colombian crisis as formulated by Pastrana and reflected in PC. Namely, the weakness of the Colombian state was viewed as creating permissive conditions for the growth of armed groups and drug trafficking, and the reinforcement of state control over the national territory was deemed an essential condition for ensuring the rule of law and strengthening democracy.³

While Pastrana had viewed illicit drugs as a means to ensure Washington’s help in strengthening the state and thus creating conditions for peace, for Uribe, the ‘war against narco-terrorism’ became one of the main goals of his government, both within and outside the country.⁴ This was a different

interpretation of the Colombian crisis and the role played by drug trafficking, expressed repeatedly by President Uribe. Colombia still suffers from violence because of illicit drugs. Thus, if there were no drugs, there would be no terrorism. Vigorous implementation of zero tolerance against all manifestations of the drug problem including consumption, were the main result of this change of focus.

A number of assessments of PC provide invaluable information on the 'war on drugs' and its role in Colombian-US relations (GAO 2008; Acevedo et al. 2008; Mejía and Restrepo 2008; DeShazo et al. 2009; Isacson and Poe 2009; Thoumi 2009; Felbab-Brown et al. 2009).⁵ While the United States' main goal was to minimize the amount of cocaine coming into the country by affecting its purity and price in order to reduce consumption (which is also discouraged by punitive policies), Colombia sought to reduce production to lessen the sources of financing of illegal armed groups. Given that the nature of drug trafficking makes it difficult to collect accurate data on prices, profits, and levels of purity and that the two entities that collect statistics on drugs – the government of the United States and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) – use different methodologies and measurement tools, we refer where possible to the data reported by both sources (GAO 2008; Acevedo et al. 2008; Isacson and Poe 2009).

Colombia

Colombia, particularly during the Uribe years (2002–2010), implemented a hard-line strategy towards cocaine production that included the reduction of coca leaf crops, the dismantling of laboratories, the seizure of coca paste, cocaine and chemical precursors, and extradition of individuals involved in drug trafficking. However, as noted above, Uribe's interest in accommodating and cooperating with US security forces in counter-insurgency activities was equal or greater. While PC helped to improve certain facets of internal security in Colombia, the general consensus is that its achievements in reducing cultivation and production of cocaine fell sorely short of proposed goals, underscoring a less efficient performance of securitized policies than would be expected.

Between 1999 and 2013, there was an overall decline in coca cultivation in Colombia, although there is disagreement between the US State Department and UNODC reports as to the size of this reduction (see Thoumi 2009; Mejía and Posada 2010). According to the State Department, the number of

cultivated hectares in 2012 (78,000) was significantly smaller than in 1999 (122,500), the year prior to the implementation of PC. In contrast, UNODC statistics suggest that between 1999 and 2013, coca crops were cut by more than half, from 160,100 to 48,189 hectares. Regardless of this statistical discrepancy (Thoumi 2009; Mejía and Posada 2010), both sources point to a pendulum trend of ups and downs in coca crops, the increases being more pronounced for the State Department. The data also indicate that cocaine seizures increased steadily between 1999 (29,419 tonnes) and 2009 (199,768 tonnes) in Colombia, suffering a slight decline in 2006 (130,917 tonnes). However they declined to 122,669 tonnes in 2014 with a significant drop in 2011, with only 84,025 tonnes seized, according to the Narcotics Division of Colombia's national police. Additionally, data from UNODC identifies an important increase in coca crops growing from 48,000 ha in 2013 to 69,132 ha in 2014.

For both the State Department and UNODC, there is no correlation between the rates of reduction in illicit crops and the exponential increase in eradication efforts beginning in 2000. Crops have shrunk at a much slower rate than forced (and manual) eradication would indicate, while there are also periods during which illicit crops grew despite substantial increases in eradication. This suggests not only a high capacity for adaptation by coca cultivators and the illicit drug industry in general, but also the limited effectiveness of forced eradication as the main strategy to combat drugs. Since 2005, aerial fumigation of illicit crops has been supplemented with manual eradication, which grew steadily to a peak level in 2008, when 96,003 of 229,498 hectares of coca were eradicated manually. This manual eradication peak coincided with the first reduction in the total crop area reported by the United States since 2003, which led to the belief that this was a more effective strategy than aerial fumigation. However, according to the Narcotics Division of Colombia's national police, manual eradication between 2012 and 2014 dropped dramatically, not only because it is a more costly and slower method, but also because cuts in the assistance provided by the United States have mainly affected eradication efforts (Rosen 2014).

Although the number of hectares of coca planted in Colombia has decreased, this has only translated into a sustainable reduction of potential cocaine production since 2008. However, there is neither a direct nor a constant relationship between the decrease in coca crops and production potential. According to the US government, although between 1998 and 2012 illicit crops declined by 36 per cent, potential cocaine production fell

by 63 per cent. In contrast, UNODC claims that the reduction in crops was greater than decrease in potential cocaine production, 70 and 51 per cent, respectively. The asymmetrical relationship between the reduction of crops and potential cocaine production suggests that technological innovations in the drug industry allow the production of more cocaine with less coca leaf.

Extradition has been another cornerstone of drug policy in Colombia. According to Colombia's Drug Observatory, of the 1,420 Colombian citizens – including several paramilitary leaders – extradited to the United States from 1997 to July 2015, 971 are attributable to the Uribe government. This suggests that extradition stopped being an exceptional practice and became instead an everyday deterrent that played a central role in the policy of zero tolerance. While this strategy immediately removes certain bosses and mid-level leaders from business, the places they occupy in the chain of production are filled quickly as the conditions that make drug trafficking possible are not altered.⁶ Similarly, the extradition of paramilitary leaders has had a negative impact on processes of truth and justice.

The United States

In the United States, cocaine consumption behaviour also fails to follow the predictions of the punitive paradigm. The main US objective in the 'war on drugs' has been to prevent the entrance of large quantities of cocaine into the country through strategies such as interdiction and eradication that are intended to alter the drug's availability, price, and purity (NDIC 2008). Between 2002 and 2006 prices decreased or stayed the same, while the purity of cocaine increased, counter to desired results.⁷ Even with increased availability on US streets of lower-priced cocaine until 2006, there was not significant increase in overall consumption suggesting that there is no direct relationship between availability and the demand for or consumption of cocaine.

However, between 2007 and 2012, this trend reversed. According to data from the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), purity decreased from 62 per cent in 2012 to 44 per cent, while there was an increase in the price per gram from US\$136.58 to US\$185.67. On the other hand, in 2007 a significant shortage of cocaine in 36 major US markets, that include cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Minneapolis, and Michigan, among others, had no visible impact on prices (which should have

increased), purity (which should have decreased), or retail distribution (NDIC 2008). This suggests that blocking the entry of cocaine, by either the increase in seizures or decreases in production, has no direct or immediate effect on purity or prices.⁸ Even so, the data for 2007 and 2008 lent itself to the mistaken belief that a slight increase in price and a decrease in purity were evidence of the success of interdiction and eradication policies. Furthermore, it was possible to observe less purity and an increase in prices between 2007 (US\$ 58) and 2012 (US\$ 84)⁹ that could be reflected in a slight decrease in consumption of cocaine in 2014 according to National Survey on Drug Use and Health findings. Various US groups question this supposed victory, arguing that such fluctuations constitute moments of cyclic rearrangement of the structure of drug trafficking, which after being hit, quickly adapts, reorganizes, and provides continuity to business (Walsh 2009: 2). In fact, National Survey on Drug Use and Health findings suggest that cocaine use has remained relatively stable since 2005.

The problem of consumption has been handled through prevention and treatment programs, but primarily through the persecution and imprisonment of distributors, dealers, and consumers. The punitive component, which implies treating consumers as security threats, has been problematic for several reasons, including the strictness of punishment, high levels of incarceration, increased financial costs for the prison system, and racial bias (ICG 2008b; Bewley-Taylor et al. 2009). To compare the amount invested in education and prevention and the spending on incarceration for drug-related crimes, in 2006 US\$ 12.3 million were spent for the maintenance of prisoners incarcerated for drug-related crimes, while only US\$ 4.6 million were spent on education in 2008 (ICG 2008b: 8).

Collateral Effects

Overall assessments of the impact of the ‘war on drugs’ on the bilateral relationship agree that the greatest achievements of PC were not the reduction of coca crops and cocaine production in Colombia or of US consumption, but increased security, the weakening of illegal armed groups, the modernization of justice, and the reduction of poppy cultivation in relation to that of coca as well as its production potential (Acevedo et al. 2008; Felbab-Brown et al. 2009; DeShazo et al. 2009). Besides failing to effectively combat drugs, such policies have been extremely expensive (Gaviria and Mejía 2011). Mejía and Restrepo (2008), for example, identify a deficient relationship between the resources invested in PC by the

governments of Colombia and the United States and its results in terms of crop reduction, potential production, and the price of cocaine.

The fight against drugs in Colombia has also negatively impacted coca crops and cocaine production in Peru, where there have been increases since 2008 as a result of the 'balloon' effect¹⁰; however, growth in Peru is not as high as reductions in Colombia. In the Andean region as a whole, coca crops have suffered reductions between 2008 and 2013, with an increase in 2014 as a consequence of the surge in growth in Colombia.¹¹ Other identified 'collateral damage' relates to the environment, human rights and democracy, and violence. The environmental, economic, political, and social effects of eradication by fumigation include damage to vegetation, human health, animals, and water quality,¹² loss or reduction of legal crops, population displacement in fumigated areas, and intensification of armed conflict (Sicard et al. 2005; Codhes 2004; Mejía and Camacho 2014). The militarization of anti-drug policy has also had a harmful effect on human rights and democracy (Youngers and Rosin 2005; ICG 2008a; Rosen 2014; Restrepo 2015). Even in the security realm, where consensus on the positive impact of PC is greater, the correlation between US cooperation and improvement of public safety in Colombia is unclear (Isacson and Poe 2009; USAID 2009; Tickner and Morales 2015).

DESECURITIZATION

Existing empirical evidence and critical assessments of the 'war on drugs', both in Colombia and the United States, and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere and beyond, have underwritten a growing consensus on the failures of current policies that has created opportunities to formulate alternative strategies. The desecuritization of anti-drug policies is a key facet of this process. According to several authors (Huysmans 1998, 2006; Aradau 2004; Wæver 1995), much of the literature that addresses securitization and its implications has fairly little to say about desecuritization, the other side of the coin in critical security debates. Desecuritizing an issue involves moving it back into 'normal' politics, removing it from the exclusive domain of security actors and of undemocratic policies, and opening space for public debate and accountability practices (Wæver 1995).

This process is desirable for two reasons: on the one hand, there are ethical-political motives for opposing the exceptionalism and antidemocratic implications of securitizing moves; and on the other, desecuritization may be a more effective strategy than securitization for dealing with problems such

as illicit drugs (Aradau 2004), given the negative performance of current policies. However, it is not clear how to determine whether desecuritizing an issue is feasible or preferable, which is why Ole Wæver (1995: 46) argues that the question about security must be ‘what is particular to security, in contrast to non-security, modes of dealing with particular issues’ that makes it better than other approaches or frames. In keeping with the author’s argument, state representatives commonly frame social and political issues as security threats because security appears as a synonym of ‘good’ and ‘desirable’, even though adequate reflection and discussion of the pros and cons of addressing problems through this particular lens rarely take place.

In this sense, to desecuritize different issues and fields also ‘implies the search for an alternative way to order the political inside’ (Huysmans 1998) that deepens the debate, moving it beyond the terrain of the speech act and the security framing to the terrain of political order, that is, to the domains of public discussion and democratic debate. Desecuritization thus means not only *not* to talk in terms of security but also to look for alternatives (Aradau 2004) to address issues such as illegal drugs, immigration, environment, poverty, and so on, within society itself. Notwithstanding growing acknowledgment in the literature of the potential benefits of desecuritization, specific guidance on how to desecuritize given issues is scarce. Claudia Aradau (2004) argues that a political approach should prevail over a securitized one not only for reasons of efficiency and efficacy, but also for ethical-political ones, since desecuritization could be understood in terms of unleashing issues to democratic turf. In turn, Ole Wæver (1995) claims that the best way to treat specific problems (such as drugs) is to avoid securitization altogether, given that once an issue has been securitized there are no clear or easy steps to follow to remove them from this domain.

Jeff Huysmans (2006) proposes two different approaches to desecuritization: an objectivist one that presumes that security has an objective and external meaning that makes threats either real or illusory, leading to statistical and empirical efforts to ‘prove’ that many problems are not security issues at all; and a constructivist and deconstructivist reading that challenges the assumption that security has a given and objective meaning and therefore tries to understand how the process of securitization works in order to proceed with the opposite process. In other words:

While objectivist approaches focus on measuring the scope and seriousness of a threat and/or on hierarchizing given insecurities on moral or ethical grounds, its deconstructivist challengers focus on how this measuring is

embedded within social, cultural, and political processes and frameworks that represent or construct phenomena into threats. (Huysmans 2006: 4)

Given that 'security' and 'insecurity' are social constructs, desecuritization does not take place in a vacuum, but is rather constrained within political and social structures that limit and create opportunities to engage in such a process (Wæver 1995). As we have argued above, the problem of illegal drugs has been framed as a security issue that only a few government agencies have authorization to address, leading to a lack of democracy and public discussion on this issue. The securitization of drugs prevents more open debate, among others, by establishing a false dichotomy between policy alternatives such as legalization versus prohibition or suppression versus permissiveness.

Interestingly, Latin America and the world seem to be reaching a turning point characterized by growing criticism of the 'war on drugs'. Bruce Bagley and Jonathan D. Rosen (2015) claim that there is a growing consensus about the need to devise suitable alternatives to current prohibitionist and repressive strategies, especially in the United States; this is not only a call for change per se but also entails a series of concrete actions and measures such as decriminalization of drug possession, legalization of trade and consumption of some soft drugs. It is thus possible to argue that both ethical-political claims and efficiency-related arguments are fuelling a process of desecuritization of the 'war on drugs'. On the one hand, a different approach to illicit drugs is warranted on the basis of problems that the current policies have created in relation to human rights, public health, environmental damage, racial bias, alternative development, and cultural practices. On the other hand, cost-benefit analyses of anti-drug policies such as aerial eradication, incarceration, interdiction, and militarization in some countries, in contrast with less prohibitionist strategies, suggest that securitization is not the most efficient strategy (Mejía and Restrepo 2008).

Empirical evidence and ethical-political arguments have penetrated both the political sphere and public opinion or common sense (Hopf 2013), creating an enabling environment to promote political change. A security lens is becoming less useful to frame the problem of illegal drugs given growing acceptance of different approaches to deal with consumption and production such as harm reduction, decriminalization and alternative development. The desecuritization process is observable in changes in speech, political decisions and policy practices that are currently taking

place in distinct countries and regions around the world. Given Latin America's and in particular, Colombia's key role in the 'war on drugs', as well as the relative decline of US influence in the hemisphere, the political space open to the region and to this specific country to contribute to the global desecuritization debate is noteworthy.

Desecuritizing Anti-Drug Policy in the Americas

Because the 'war on drugs' in the Western Hemisphere has been led largely by the United States, changes in US attitudes towards anti-drug policy in tandem with decreasing power create key opportunities for political opening. Increasingly, US actions, decisions, and speech acts related to narcotics provide undeniable signs of desecuritization. Between 2012 and 2014, 4 states (Colorado, Washington, Alaska, and Oregon) and the District of Columbia legalized consumption and commercialization of marijuana, and 22 states have also legalized marijuana for medical purposes, and in another 5 the possession for personal use has been decriminalized. The Obama administration too has modified drug policy at the federal level. One of the most significant changes was the White House's decision to abandon George W. Bush's policy of prosecuting marijuana users in states where medical use is legal or consumption has been decriminalized. At the international level, President Obama has also shown greater willingness to learn from the mistakes of those policies implemented in places such Colombia and Afghanistan, and to seek out different strategies (Felbab-Brown 2010).

Such trends can also be traced to other countries in Latin America in terms of consumption and production. For instance, in 2013 Uruguay became the first country in the world to introduce legislation that grants the state control over the production, trade, and consumption of marijuana in order to legalize it completely; in 2014 Jamaica decriminalized marijuana possession and legalized its production and consumption for religious reasons; and Mexico made an important turn in October 2015 when the Supreme Court of Justice approved a request to allow cultivation and consumption of marijuana in the case of a specific association of four people, using the individual freedom argument.

Moreover, former presidents from Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil – César Gaviria, Ernesto Zedillo, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso – lead the Global Commission on Drug Policy that has denounced the failures of the 'war on drugs' and sought out different approaches to deal with

consumption, production and trafficking, and distinct problems associated with them, from public health and human rights perspectives (Global Commission on Drug Policy 2014). Nevertheless, a recent report by the Collective of Studies of Drugs and Law (CEDD) also underscores the resilience of securitized strategies. The fact that the prison population associated with minor drug offenses has grown more and considerably faster in recent years than that associated to other kinds of crime in countries such Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, and Mexico, points to the continued use of incarceration as a counternarcotics strategy (Corda 2015).

The targeting of production, one of the major strategies in the 'war on drugs', mostly affects small coca cultivators (Ledebur 2005). In this sense, Bolivia is increasingly viewed as a pioneer in implementing an alternative policy of coca production distinct from eradication. Since his inauguration in 2006, ex coca growers' leader Evo Morales has adopted key changes in the country's counternarcotics policy. The Morales government has maintained a strong commitment to combating cocaine production, while adopting a different approach to coca leaf cultivation, given both its cultural importance for Andean communities and its widespread consumption among the general population. In this sense, the slogan 'cocaine-zero but without coca-zero' underscores a deep transformation that contrasts with previous Bolivian strategies and with current approaches to coca cultivation in Colombia and Peru.

This does not mean that the Morales administration is not controlling coca crops. On the contrary, the government allows the cultivation of coca in limited quantities, one *cato*¹³ per family, and collects all related information through data from census and satellite imagery. The community also plays a key role since coca grower unions oversee and guarantee this commitment (Farthing and Ledebur 2015). The strategy is grounded in six pillars implemented since 2006 with European Union aid, that transcend simple restrictions on coca cultivation and cocaine production, and that underscore how the security approach can be replaced. These include land titling for coca grower families; biometrical registration of coca growers; registration of crops with the state Economic and Social Development Unit; creation of a database to monitor coca cultivation and legal sales; integrated development projects to diversify crops; and community empowerment to facilitate self-policing (Grisaffi and Ledebur 2014).

The strategy has been recognized by international actors such as the Organization of American States (OAS), which highlights its achievements

in terms of coca production control and alternative development promotion (OAS 2013). Farthing and Ledebour (2015: 58) summarize the policy's positive effects in terms of the implementation of a non-violent approach to coca cultivation, empowerment of citizens in the organization and control of coca production and commercialization, improvement of state–farmer relations, and development of alternative crops different from coca leaf. This change in Bolivian strategy illustrates that it is possible to desecuritize anti-drug strategies by designing and implementing a citizen-centered policy instead of an exclusionary and militarized one. Doing so has entailed both the decriminalization of coca leaf, given its cultural and social role, and recognition that it is not possible to control the size of coca crops without the involvement of coca-growing communities and the creation of opportunities for them to experiment with alternative products.

Colombian Trends

Since 2012, Colombian policymakers too have been gesturing slowly towards desecuritization by acknowledging the shortcomings of existing strategies and arguing for the need to adopt a different paradigm based upon the empirical evidence (largely an objectivist approach). In this sense, both the discourse and the actions of the Santos government might be understood as an indication of change in the way that anti-drug policy is formulated, designed and implemented. In November 2011, in an interview with *The Guardian*, President Santos became the first acting leader in the world to speak out publicly on the need for a new approach to illicit drugs and consumption, even stating he would support legalization of drugs like marijuana and cocaine if that will guarantee a more efficient solution of the problems of consumption and criminal organizations. However, he countered that he would not 'go it alone', calling instead for a coordinated debate and cooperative actions among different actors of the international community.¹⁴

Subsequently, official Colombian discourse as evidenced in different international forums such as the United Nations has constituted one of the main signs of such shifts. On 25 September 2014, President Santos delivered a speech to the UN General Assembly in which he detailed Colombia's long history of dealing with armed conflicts and called for the need to overcome the war. The Colombian leader stressed the importance of addressing the drug problem more effectively, and highlighted three of the points agreed upon with the FARC in the course of the peace

negotiations that began in Havana, Cuba in September 2012: dismantling drug mafia structures, promoting a national program of crop substitution and alternative development, and addressing the problem of consumption from a public health perspective.¹⁵

These agreements are rooted in the negative effects of the 'war on drugs' in Colombia which, according to Santos, justify the promotion of a different approach. With that goal in mind, different countries from the hemisphere have also been working within the OAS in order to develop a resolution to promote a common reformist position at the April 2016 Special Session of the UN General Assembly on the World Drug Problem. In this vein, Colombian Minister of Justice Yesid Reyes delivered a speech at the High-Level Thematic Debate on the Process Toward the 2016 Special Session on 7 May 2015, in which the Colombian government called for the need to review the current regime on illegal drugs, given its ineffectiveness in improving human health and welfare, and in reducing cocaine production and consumption definitively. Reyes identified important lessons that Colombia and the world should learn from the lost 'war on drugs', such as the limits of repression as a tool against illegal economies, the need to adopt a public health framework in treating consumption, the importance of adopting territorial approaches in formulating anti-drug policies, and the need to evaluate them not only from the perspective of the goals accomplished, but also with a view to unforeseen consequences and adverse effects.¹⁶

These two examples illustrate how the Colombian government has modified its positions within the international sphere towards the issue of illicit drugs. However, discursive shifts have also been accompanied by reformist policy debates and decisions within Colombia. In May 2015, the Advisory Commission on Drug Policy, created by President Santos, delivered its recommendations to the Colombian public. In the area of consumption and production, the Commission highlighted the need to incorporate issues such as human rights, decriminalization of the weakest links in the drug-trafficking chain, and the prevalence of human protection over the dismantling of illicit drug trafficking. In terms of production, it emphasized the importance of developing alternative strategies that involve the community, while also suggesting that forced eradication with glyphosate be suspended, given strong evidence of its lack of efficiency and its collateral health effects (Mejía and Camacho 2014).

In light of this report, the Colombian government proposed a new approach that placed human and citizenship rights at the center of its drug

policy, underscoring a substantial shift with regards to existing strategies, discourses and readings of the drug problem.¹⁷ Subsequently, the government began taking steps to implement the new approach, including medical marijuana regulation legislation and a draft Presidential decree that aims to regulate the cultivation, production and commercialization of marijuana for medical purposes. In this same direction, in May 2015 the National Drug Council decided to suspend aerial fumigation with glyphosate as of October of the same year.

These changes in discourse and political practice are linked not only to growing empirical evidence on the shortcomings of the drug war, and the loosening of Washington's stance on this issue, but also to peace talks with the FARC in Havana. The Integral National Program for Illegal Crop Substitution is one tangible result of the negotiations. Its main objectives include the encouragement of voluntary crop substitution by coca cultivating communities, community participation in local public policies related to coca, and the promotion of sustainable development programs that respect the ecosystem.¹⁸ This program implies recognition by the Colombian government and the FARC that the previous approach to coca crop eradication has failed, not only because it has not achieved its main goals, but also due to collateral effects related to the marginalization of coca communities.

Extradition has been an equally sensitive issue, given FARC fears of mass extradition based upon the Uribe government's previous move to send 14 paramilitary leaders to the United States in 2008. However, on this count too, President Santos has deescalated official discourse, emphasizing that demobilized guerrillas will not be extradited. Tellingly, the Obama government has publicly recognized that extradition constitutes a sovereign decision of the Colombians.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we reviewed the securitization of illicit drugs in Colombian-US relations, and argued that there is growing consensus about the failure of the 'war on drugs' and its harmful consequences. We showed that this critical juncture has translated into opportunities to change current policies and to engage in a more open and ultimately, political discussion. Four general conclusions can be derived from our analysis.

First, and in keeping with the literature on securitization, it is crucial that the debate on desecuritization be promoted by and among scholars in order to create a different frame to inform more democratic discussions about the best lenses to approach illicit drugs consumption and drug trafficking. Presenting objective empirical data that illustrates the shortcomings of the 'war on drugs', although important, is insufficient if it is not accompanied by a strong commitment to political opening and public debate.

Second, Colombia provides an important 'test case' that highlights the centrality of the domestic context for processes of desecuritization. The link that exists between the armed conflict and drug trafficking has not only opened space within the peace negotiations with the FARC for addressing this issue, but has also influenced Colombian positions and actions towards those international forums in which future drug policies will ultimately be crafted and hopefully desecuritized.

Third, global trends towards a desecuritized approach create opportunities to promote a broader and more democratic debate, and also provide important lessons for countries such as Colombia. The particular case of Bolivia shows how coca cultivation is controlled by coca grower communities that are important state allies instead of antagonists in cocaine production control. The value of local communities for any anti-drug efforts cannot be overstated, and their participation during both the implementation of control policies and the designing stage, including incorporation of their main demands and needs, is crucial.

Finally, notwithstanding current positive trends, a more complete assessment of remaining obstacles to the process of desecuritization is called for. These include bureaucratic inertia, public opinion stuck in securitized approaches, the rigidity of judicial systems and the continued use of incarceration, and public pressure to 'do something' due to criminal behaviour and citizen insecurity related to the drug traffic.

NOTES

1. Colombia, Office of the President, 'Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity and the Strengthening of the State', Bogotá 1999.
2. Although the FARC as well as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) were classified as terrorist organizations before 20 February 2002, until the day that peace talks with the guerrillas ended, Colombian officials were careful to avoid using the term in public references to these armed groups.

3. Colombia, Office of the President and Ministry of National Defense, 'Defense Policy and Democratic Security', 2003, 12, <http://www.mindefensa.gov.co>.
4. Álvaro Uribe's speech before the UN General Assembly, 24 September 2008.
5. Statistics on illicit drugs are also published annually and may be consulted in the following reports: US Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*; UNODC, *Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey*; and UNODC, *World Drug Report*.
6. Overuse of this instrument was challenged in 2009 by the Colombian Supreme Court, which rejected several requests for extradition based on the argument that crimes against humanity superseded drug trafficking.
7. Between 1997 and 2007, similarly, the price of heroin fell by 30 per cent.
8. In contrast, the fact that since 2004 there has been an increase in consumption in Europe can explain the periods of scarcity in the US market.
9. Prices per gram in amounts ranging from 10 to 50 g.
10. Coca crops have also been scattered and fragmented as a result of the balloon effect. Between 1999 and 2008, they increased from 12 departments to 24 in Colombia.
11. Data from UNODC shows that Bolivia and Peru keep a decreasing tendency in 2014.
12. It is worth noting that the environmental effects of cocaine production are similarly negative.
13. 1 cato is equivalent to 1.600 square meters.
14. See 'Juan Manuel Santos: It's Time to Think Again about the War on Drugs', *The Guardian*, 12 November 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/13/colombia-juan-santos-war-on-drugs>.
15. See complete speech at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48850#.VeKlo_1_Oko.
16. See complete speech at: <https://www.minjusticia.gov.co/Portals/0/Discurso%20Ministro%20de%20Justicia%20en%20Viena.pdf>.
17. For specific details about the strategy, see: <http://www.minjusticia.gov.co/Noticias/TabId/157/ArtMID/1271/ArticleID/862/Comisi%C3%B3n-Asesora-de-Pol%C3%ADtica-de-Drogas-entrega-informe-al-Gobierno-Nacional.aspx>.
18. See complete agreement at: <http://territoriosporlapaz.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AcuerdoPunto4.pdf>.

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Mexico and Its Role in North America's Security: Between Terrorism and Organized Crime

Raúl Benítez Manaut

INTRODUCTION

In the face of the new challenges of the twenty-first century, security cooperation between countries has largely focused on fighting terrorism. However, in Latin America – and in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean in particular – organized crime is regarded the much more dangerous security threat. North American security efforts hence focus on the fight against organized crime. These efforts have had an impact on the orientation of Mexican foreign policy. This chapter analyses the development of interdependence between the United States and Mexico in the wider context of North American regional cooperation. It also addresses geopolitical factors that influence the status quo in North American security and includes a discussion of the main security challenges in Central America and the Caribbean.

The first section discusses the historical security relationship of the United States, Mexico, and Canada and considers key elements for building shared security among the three countries. In this context, the international and domestic security contexts are of special relevance (Roett 1989). The following sections examine terrorism and organized crime in the region,

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and the impact of these factors on US and Mexican foreign policy as well as on the regional security agenda. In Mexico, defense and security policies have been guided by nationalist ideology as well as principles of non-intervention and absolute state sovereignty. Following the Cold War, Canada, the US, and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993. NAFTA transformed Mexico's trade relations with foreign nations and ushered Mexico into a new era of foreign policy with its northern neighbours. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 reinforced the strategic regional relationship overall, but significantly altered regional security concerns. Shortly after the attacks, the United States signed border partnership agreements with Canada and Mexico (2001 and 2002, respectively). Subsequently, new national policies were implemented to promote intensive cooperation in defense, security, intelligence, police, and border matters. Mexico and the United States signed the Mérida Initiative (2007–2008) to enhance anti-narcotics cooperation.

The United States is a difficult neighbour for Canada and Mexico. Yet, despite a number of obstacles to effective security cooperation, the three nations have engaged in generally stable and intensive cooperation over the past couple of decades.

This chapter concludes with an assessment of shared emerging security challenges. Overall, this analysis focuses primarily on issues of border security, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

THE PATH TO SHARED SECURITY

The US-Mexican relationship has had numerous ups and downs. The close relationship of the early twentieth century shifted as the Diaz dictatorship fell apart in 1910–1911 and gave way to the Mexican Revolution. Through Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson's activism, the United States initially supported the Diaz regime's heir, Victoriano Huerta. Nevertheless, President Woodrow Wilson ultimately recognized Venustiano Carranza's 'Constitutionalist' revolutionary faction. In the context of the ongoing Mexican Revolution, these actions as well as the invasion of the Port of Veracruz in 1914 were viewed as an instance of US imperialism (Quirk 1962; Link 1960: 99–104). By 1917, Mexico's emergent central government had gained control of much of the nation and began efforts for diplomatic recognition by the United States. In the Bucareli treaty of 1923, the US recognized the Mexican regime (US-Mexican Commission 1925).

Canada, as a former British colony, has always maintained a close relationship with the UK. However, as the United States became more powerful, Canada strengthened its links with its neighbour. The two have formed a strategic alliance and special relationship reinforced by the world wars. During the Cold War, security treaties to contain communism rarely had Canada's support even though the United States established such treaties with the majority of Latin American countries. Yet, Canada and the US signed a number of agreements such as the noteworthy 1957 North American Air Defense Agreement (NORAD). The agreement aimed to create a system of protection against a possible nuclear missile transpolar attack from the Soviet Union (Thompson and Randall 1994: 184). Canada also supported a Cold War-era effort towards US-Mexican cooperation on air defense, however (Cornett 1965). After the Cold War, Canada has adopted a multilateral foreign policy in which support of and participation in UN peacekeeping operations has been vital (Nossal 1989). In addition, Canada and the US are part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Clarkson and Mildemberger 2011: 120).

While Canada and the US are active within multilateral and international security systems like NATO, Mexico is not. Nonetheless, Mexico was a founding member of the Organization of American States (OAS), a hemispheric forum in which US leadership has been consistent (Aguayo and Bagley 1990). Canada only joined the OAS in 1990. With that decision, Canada assumed a 'dual identity' in security matters: both Atlantic and Inter-American (McKenna 1995: 131).

After the free trade agreement between Canada and the United States in 1988 and NAFTA, which included Mexico, in 1993, the new North America, based on economic and commercial cooperation, began to be built. Given its commercial nature, NAFTA did not explicitly incorporate regional security measures. Nonetheless, because of the shared global and multilateral security policy of Canada and the US, it was only 'natural' that Canada acknowledge the need to become more involved in regional security matters by establishing closer ties to Latin America overall via the OAS and to Mexico through NAFTA (Klepak 1993).

In the years following the creation of NAFTA, there have been a number of conflict cycles and disagreements on world geopolitics as well as periods of appeasement between the US and Mexico. [Table 12](#) summarizes the most important episodes in the last 100 years of the Mexico-US relationship.

Several authors argue that geography creates 'destiny' in security matters; it is difficult to avoid creating security agreements between countries that

Table 12 Cyclical periods of conflict and rapprochement in Mexican-US relations, 1914–2015

<i>Year</i>	<i>Description</i>
1914	US military intervention in Veracruz
1915	President Woodrow Wilson supports Venustiano Carranza's Constitutionalist faction
1917	New Constitution strengthens Mexican central government
1923–1937	Bucareli Treaties signed: US recognizes Mexican government and the two develop a pragmatic bilateral relationship
1938–1940	First wave of Mexican nationalism: oil expropriation
1942–1945	Mexican declaration of support for Allies in World War II: strategic and military rapprochement. Immigration agreements
1946–1970	US strategic support for Mexico's industrialization. Some degree of Mexican 'diplomatic autonomy' in response to US Communism Containment Doctrine in cases such as the Guatemalan crisis (1954) and the Cuban Revolution (1959–1964)
1970–1982	Second wave of Mexican nationalism and Third World diplomacy
1980–1990	Gradual rapprochement between Mexico and the US Mexican diplomatic autonomy in response to the Central American crisis. Mexico opposes the Reagan Doctrine and its notions of the containment of communism (1980s)
1990–1993	Negotiation of the tri-national commercial alliance based on NAFTA
1994	Canada begins to build strategic ties with Mexico (Bugailiskis and Rozental 2012)
2001–2002	North American nations expand from commercial to strategic ties in order to combat Islamic fundamentalist terrorism
2001–2002	'Smart Borders' agreements signed (US-Canada 2001; US-Mexico 2002)
2005	Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) signed
2007–2015	The 'war on organized crime' in Mexico begins. Mexico-US relationship strengthened via the Merida Initiative

Source: Author's elaboration

share borders (Wilson and Biette 2014: 41). Given the changing conditions of the international system in the twenty-first century, security cooperation systems have largely focused on fighting terrorism. Nonetheless, in Latin America and in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean in particular, organized crime has emerged as the number one security threat (Garzón and Olson 2013). Therefore, in hemispheric relations, security efforts in the northern sub-region are concentrated on fighting organized crime. These efforts have changed the parameters of autonomy in Mexican foreign policy (González and Pellicer 2013).

TERRORISM AND US SECURITY REFORM

After 9/11, rising international tensions affected Mexico directly, primarily because of its geographical proximity to the United States. In this context, Mexico, along with the majority of the world's nations, felt obligated to respond to US security demands. US strategy in response to 9/11 focused on: (a) Homeland Security and (b) pre-emptive action in international politics. From the perspective of the US, threats have expanded after the 2001 terrorist attacks. According to the commander of the Northern Command, non-state actors have become increasingly dangerous (Gortney 2015: 4–5):

Enduring threats to the nation emanate from traditional state actors, as well as rogue states, extremist organizations, homegrown violent extremists, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). And with Cyber-attacks on the rise, clearly a multitude of threats present an ever-present danger to our nation. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said many times, the homeland is increasingly vulnerable.

New security policies in the US began with congressional approval of the *Patriot Act* in October 2001 (US Congress 2001). To achieve US domestic security goals, the collaboration of Mexico and Canada was vital. In the North American sub-region, the need for a security and defense cooperation pact – a type of NAFTA *plus* (in the same vein as previous agreements such as the Canada-US 1957 North American Aerospace Command – NORAD) – had been discussed since NAFTA's implementation in 1994. However, the Mexican government and public had opposed strategic links to the United States that might endanger Mexican national sovereignty and thus, had refused to pursue closer security ties as a part of the development of greater commercial ties (Andreas 2003b).

The attacks on US territory created a new form of hyperrealist geopolitical thinking. The first expression of this thinking was the US search for mechanisms to tighten its borders with Canada and Mexico (Andreas 2003a). Given the widespread confusion in the United States after the terrorist attacks, some speculated that the Islamic terrorists had entered the US via Canada or Mexico. As a result, the US signed border partnerships, or 'Smart Border' agreements, with Canada in December 2001 and with Mexico in March 2002. Canada allowed a large number of US commercial flights to land in Canadian airports. In addition, Mexico collaborated with the United States to secure the shared border, the most heavily crossed

border in the world (approximately 350 million people cross every year) (Peschard 2003). Mexico also focused its security endeavours on protecting vital strategic installations, primarily oil deposits in the Gulf of Mexico (i.e. the Sonda de Campeche), and created an air security system against terrorist attacks. Moreover, the Mexican Armed Forces implemented *Operación Centinela* (Operation Sentinel), incorporating 18,000 military service personnel (Table 13).

Thus, since the Smart Borders Treaties, there has been a change in Mexican nationalistic perception of Mexican border security (Andreas 2003b). There were no significant debates in Mexico about signing the Smart Border agreements with the United States. At the same time, Mexico strongly criticized US international policy and argued that the Bush administration's Preemptive Action doctrine violated international law. Mexico refused to support US efforts to involve the UN in the war on terror, and the disagreement became a major sticking point in the relationship between the neighbours (Bondy 2004).

In security issues, the Mexican government has divided its work with the US government among government ministries. Since 11 September 2001, the Mexican executive ministry in charge of domestic affairs (*Secretaría de Gobernación* – SEGOB), the Attorney General (*Procuraduría General de la República* – PGR), and the intelligence agencies have collaborated extensively with their US counterparts (CISEN 2009). At the same time, Mexico's Department of State (*Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores*) took the lead in opposing US strategy in Iraq (2002–2003). This stance, along with the Fox administration's displeasure with the 2002 creation of the US Northern Command, led to considerable tension between the two nations (Bondy 2004). In other words, Mexico's foreign policy continued within its traditional parameters of trenchant criticism of US foreign policy. At the same time, however, the Mexican government pursued pragmatic cooperation with the United States on border security. Thus, there has been a complicated relationship between Mexico and the US on security (synthesized in Table 14). Over the past decade and a half, the two countries have gradually built a complex institutional framework for cooperation, in security terminology, a 'complex interinstitutional interdependency'.

From 2001 to 2006, the United States pursued Mexican and Canadian support in the fight against terrorism. Consequently, during this period, the US saw drugs as a secondary national security concern and US intelligence agencies oriented their efforts to other matters. With little pressure from the US, Mexican organized crime experienced a period of 'relief', expansion, and

Table 13 Core aspects of the Mexico-US and Canada-US Smart Border Agreements*

<i>22 Commitments in the Mexico-US Agreement (March 2002)</i>	<i>30 Commitments in the Canada-US Agreement (December 2001)</i>
<p>Security and Infrastructure</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Long-term planning 2. Improvement of border bottlenecks 3. Infrastructure protection 4. Port entry point harmonization 5. Project exhibition 6. Cooperation at border checkpoints 7. Border project funding <p>Security and Human Transit</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Prior checks of traveller documentation 9. Advanced passenger information 10. Business travel due to NAFTA 11. Secure borders and deterrence of 'polleros' (undocumented immigrant smugglers) 12. Visa issuing policy consultations 13. Joint training 14. Shared databases 15. Inspection of people originating from a third country <p>Security and Traffic of Goods</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 16. Private-public sector cooperation 17. Electronic information exchange 18. Sea transportation security 19. Technological cooperation 20. Railway network security 21. Fraud prevention 22. Interception of contraband 	<p>Security and Infrastructure</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 20. Smart transportation systems 21. Protection of critical infrastructure 22. Air transportation security 23. Border integration and naval monitoring equipment 24. Joint coordination of norms application 25. Intelligence service integration 26. Digital print scans at migratory checkpoints 27. Movement of deportees 28. Anti-terrorism legislation 29. Freezing of terrorist assets 30. Joint training and drills <p>Security and Human Transit</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Biometric identifiers 2. Permanent residency IDs 3. Universal alternative inspection system 4. Processing of refugees 5. Control of refugees 6. Visa policy coordination 7. Prior inspection in air transportation 8. Advanced passenger information; passenger name registration 9. Joint units for passenger analysis 10. Ferry terminal monitoring 11. Compatible immigration databases 12. Immigration officials abroad 13. International cooperation <p>Security and Traffic of Goods</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 14. Harmonization of commercial processes 15. Inspections beyond border areas 16. Joint provision of services 17. Client data 18. Port container examination 19. Infrastructure improvement

*Numbering corresponds to the order of points listed in the agreements

Source: Based on Shirk (2003)

Table 14 The War on Terror and Mexico-US relations, 2001–2006

<i>US approach</i>	<i>Mexican reaction</i>
Homeland Security Agencies: Dept. of Homeland Security Dept. of Justice FBI, CIA, DEA, DIA Border state governments Purpose: secure borders Institutions: National Guard, Coast Guard, INS, Customs	Total support Secretaría de Gobernación PGR, SEDENA, SEMAR, PFP, INM, CISEN Border state governments Cooperation to secure borders Armed forces, Police, PFP
Pre-emptive Action Dept. of Defense Dept. of State	No support Mexico has no Armed Forces abroad Conflict with the Foreign Ministry at the UN
Hemispheric security Dept. of State, OAS Concurrence in support of the CICAD, CICTE conventions Strengthen TIAR and IADB	Partial agreement Foreign Ministry at the OAS: no conflict, no cooperation Joint work on conventions Redefinition of IADB-OAS relationship Questioning the TIAR
War on Drugs Full cooperation: Dept. of Justice Cooperation with Armed Forces Problem: trust	Cooperation Full cooperation PGR CENDRO, Armed Forces Problem: trust

Source: Author's elaboration

invigoration. Only in 2011, the Obama administration proposed a strategy to combat organized crime that highlights the need to continue the institutionalization of binational cooperation. The same document affirms the link between terrorist groups and organized crime (The White House 2011).

ORGANIZED CRIME: A NORTH AMERICAN CHALLENGE

Already in the mid-1980s, drug trafficking began to surface as a top priority on Mexico's security agenda. It took until the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, for the government to confront the problem directly (Andreas 2002). With democratization, the Mexican government has faced the problem of drug trafficking from a position of weakness.

Organized crime has infiltrated political institutions through corruption – via illegal campaign donations to major political parties and donations designed to influence public officials. Cases of corruption have also emerged in the police and armed forces.

Mexican drug cartels have become the leading criminal organizations in Latin America as a direct result of Colombia's successful war on drugs, a war that limited the power of the Medellín and Cali drug cartels (Valdés Castellanos 2013). While US aid to Colombia helped dismantle the powerful mafia there, Mexico suffered negative consequences. The arms traffic from the United States into Mexico has fuelled the rise of organized crime and provoked a multidimensional escalation of violence since 2007. The homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Mexico rose from 9 in 2006 to 23 in 2011 because of two factors: first, the Mexican government's declaration of a war on drugs; second, a war between cartels to dominate cocaine smuggling into the United States. Public safety, therefore, became one of the population's main concerns and organized crime grew at such a rate that it became a national security issue.

Mexico has signed most international community conventions and protocols against organized crime. One of the most important is the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, also known as the Palermo Convention, signed by Mexico in December 2000. This convention includes two additional protocols against immigrant trafficking and firearms trafficking. Signing protocols and conventions is very important at the international level. However, it is not enough. Agreements must impact the national justice system, police, military, as well as intelligence and internal security agencies. The problem lies in adapting national laws to international agreements and implementing such agreements. Despite the signed international conventions and the multiple national justice and police reforms, Mexican security agencies continue to disregard international protocols. A variety of factors, including previous national security practices, have thwarted government efforts to revamp national security structures (Borjón 2005).

Although the Mexican state underwent a process of modernization and democratization during the 1990s, security agencies and the judicial system were not substantially modified or structurally reformed. The partial reforms of 1996 and 1999 created the National Public Security System (*Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública*) and the Preventative Federal Police force (*Policía Federal Preventiva* – PFP), but police forces failed to develop an *ad hoc* model for the country's new conditions.

In the post-Cold War world, Mexico, pressured to take advantage of the new geopolitical context, began to redefine its foreign policy significantly. This also had an impact on relations with its northern neighbour. In four successive administrations, the Mexican government pushed for a free trade agreement, a financial stabilization plan, a migration treaty, and greater cooperation on drug trafficking. In each case, the Mexican government largely set the content of the bilateral agenda by forwarding proposals perceived to be in its national interest (Selee and Diaz-Cayeros 2013: 55).

Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office on 1 December 2006. From the beginning of his administration, he asserted that Mexico was experiencing an unprecedented organized crime assault. Under Calderón, for the first time, the Mexican government publicly acknowledged its inability to control the cartels with its own resources and asked for US help. This move represented a break with Mexico's twentieth century national sovereignty doctrine; unlike the majority of Latin American countries during the Cold War, Mexico fought against communism without significant aid from its northern neighbour. Whereas during the Cold War period the Mexican Armed forces received no significant military aid, Mexico is one of the principal recipients of US military aid in the hemisphere today (Bagley 2012: 3).

To confront transnational organized crime, Presidents Calderón and Bush signed the 2007 Mérida Initiative, a commitment to set up a security cooperation program. The program, officially announced on 22 October 2007, established joint responsibility to curtail drug and weapons trafficking. The agreement also aimed to professionalize Mexico's security and military structures. Four strategic objectives ('pillars') were formulated: (1) disruption of the capacity of organized crime to operate; (2) capacity-building to sustain and strengthen the rule of law; (3) modernization and strengthening of border security; (4) building of strong and resilient communities. As a result of the agreement, the US Congress approved a 1.4 billion dollar package (including funds for Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti). President Barack Obama approved the Mérida Initiative shortly after he began his first term (Seelke et al. 2010) (Table 15).

Despite the groundbreaking security agreement, Mexico's defense apparatus has not been substantially modified in order to create new institutions capable of managing military branches in Mexico's twenty-first century democracy. The armed forces have continued to function as they had

Table 15 Programs and actions of Mérida Initiative, 2007–2014*Programs and actions*

-
- Training of justice system staff members such as judges, police, lawyers; training for penitentiary systems; judicial exchanges and support for law schools.
 - Creation of special courses to enhance law enforcement professionalization and crime investigation capabilities, train staff in firearms tactics and use as well as strategic analysis, strengthen anti-crime and anti-kidnapping units.
 - Fostering of a closer relationship between government and civil society to encourage respect for human rights and strengthen social programs that protect vulnerable social groups (e.g. youth and crime victims).
 - Training of pilots and mechanics to collaborate in supporting security force air mobility; provision of CASA 235 airplanes to SEMAR in order to improve surveillance of Mexican waters.
 - Delivery of X-ray scanners and other non-intrusive devices to Mexico in order to improve checkpoint effectiveness.
 - Delivery of almost 300 trained drug dogs to Mexico as well as weapons and money to the Federal Police, the Office of the Attorney General and tax authorities.
 - Linking of communications satellites with law enforcement agencies by Mexico's Department of Communications and Transportation.
 - Creation of a transborder Mexico-US telecommunication system that allows security agencies on both sides of the border to exchange information on criminal activity and criminal investigation more easily.
 - Establishment by the Mexican government of an academy for high-level penitentiary management in Xalapa, Veracruz; academy is one of 14 correctional centers certified by the American Correctional Association as of September 2014.
-

Source: Based on State Department (2014)

under the civilian-military system established in the 1930s. That is, the armed forces have exercised a great deal of functional, financial and political autonomy and have only answered to the president. Given the weakness of the judicial system and domestic security agencies, the federal government has relied heavily on the military to fight organized crime since the signing of the Mérida Initiative. In 2009, President Calderón characterized the fight against drug cartels as a 'war' in which the participation of the armed forces was vital (Calderón 2009a: 20):

Organized crime seeks territorial control. This will be all-out war because there is no possibility of coexistence with the drug cartels. There is no turning back; it's either us or them. The key missing element at this stage is political will. It is not enough to express it, but we must really take action.

We must deeply rethink our crime strategy at all times. The strategy has two parts. In the short-run, we must reinforce state authority and jurisdiction through the mobilization of the police and armed forces. We cannot lose territory; there are states where [governmental] authority has been seriously undermined. Clearly, the massive military and police operations we have launched will not eliminate criminal activity, but they will strengthen the state's capacity to reestablish the rule of law within its territory.

According to President Calderón's definition of organized crime, for the first time in Mexican history, criminal organizations were competing for some of the State's most important prerogatives: territorial control and the monopoly on the use of violence. Calderón's declaration of 'war' reflected his effort to maintain state power in these arenas. As in any war, allies are important for victory. Thus, Calderón sought US aid in Mexico's drug war.

THE PARADIGM SHIFT: FROM MISTRUST TO COOPERATION

Regarding the challenge of drug trafficking, there is an increasing awareness that Mexican and US interests are interdependent. A long period of negotiations between Mexico and its northern neighbour culminated in Mexico's request for US assistance to combat drug trafficking. A bilateral security agenda was first discussed in the 1980s. Figures from the 1980s placed the numbers of Americans who had tried marijuana and cocaine at 62 and 22 million, respectively. Large quantities of these narcotics came from Mexico, almost all the marijuana and a third of the cocaine. In addition, the killing of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena in 1985 by a member of the Sinaloa cartel led to intense pressure on Mexican authorities to solve the case, and the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act included sanctions against Mexico. Thus, by 1990, the drug trade and its repercussions on Mexican-US relations had been firmly established on Mexico's national security agenda (Trevorton 1989: 277).

Cooperation between the US and Colombia against drug trafficking intensified in the 1990s. In 1999, the Plan Colombia institutionalized anti-drug measures for Colombia and the Caribbean (Isacson 2015:148). These measures as well as the end of the armed conflict in Central America facilitated the movement of large volumes of cocaine by ground into Mexico. In other words, Mexico's location as the main entry point for Colombian cocaine en route to the United States was a geographic catastrophe for the country. The

'partial' success of Plan Colombia expanded the power of Mexican cartels, which in the 1980s had only been intermediaries for the Andean cartels.

As a result, increased Mexican-US cooperation became a 'security necessity' (Payan 1997). The most advanced bilateral initiative was the 1996 creation of the High Level Contact Group for Drug Control. In 1998, the Group presented a comprehensive document that diagnosed the drug problem from a bilateral point of view (US Government and Mexican Government 1998). By the end of the twentieth century, the bilateral agenda had already become 'narcotized' (Fernández de Castro 2001: 137) even though commercial and political affairs were still given diplomatic priority at the time.

With the drug war, Mexico has transformed its previous paradigm of *action and cooperation with its northern neighbour* into one of preoccupation with state *survival*. The Mexican government realized that the confrontation with drug cartels was a fight for its very survival. In order to maintain governmental authority, the Calderón administration declared war on organized crime and secured US aid through the Mérida Initiative security agreement, announced in 2007 and signed into law in 2008 (some 10 years after the White House first proposed security cooperation). For Calderón, the origin of Mexico's drug problems lay in US drug consumption. The other factor 'made in the USA' has been the virtually unrestricted sale of firearms (justified by the Second Amendment of the US Constitution). In Calderón's own words, 'The first cause is the American drug consumer; add to that the weapons trade, which includes the trade in high caliber weapons' (Calderón 2009b). According to the UN, of the more than 115,000 firearms seized in Mexico between 2010 and 2013, almost all had come from the US (UNODC 2015: 9 and 66) (Table 16).

Table 16 Resources of Mérida Initiative, 2008–2014 (in US\$ millions)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
ESF	20	15	15	18	33.3	32.1	46.1	179.5
INCLE	263.5	406	365	117	248.5	195.1	148.1	1,743.2
FMF	116.5	299	5.3	8	NA	NA	NA	428.8
Total	400	720	385.3	143	281.8	227.2	194.2	2,351.5

Source: Based on Seelke and Finklea (2013: 8), updated by author

Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, FMF = Foreign Military Financing, NA = not applicable

The Army and Navy special operation forces spearhead the war on drugs. Each institution's intelligence units must be bolstered through their own efforts as well as through the feedback of international oversight entities. Furthermore, both institutions must modernize their equipment. Because of the high cost of equipment, the Mexican government has accepted US financial assistance. A significant part of the first Mérida Initiative aid instalment was used to shore up the Armed Forces' capabilities in 2008. The different military branches – Army, Air Force and Navy, procured new equipment (GAO 2009). Yet, as the Mérida Initiative did not stipulate any performance and impact indicators, it is difficult to highlight concrete results from the first stage of the Initiative. Furthermore, the Initiative established no mechanisms for supervision and monitoring of resource transfer and use. Therefore, it is impossible to precisely determine whether the resources transferred have met the objectives efficiently.

Outside the framework of the Mérida Initiative, two military pacts between the Mexican Navy and its US (and Canadian) counterparts stand out: the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), signed in September 2008, and the North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI), signed by Mexico, the United States and Canada in December 2008. The goal of the first was to improve the Mexican Navy's intelligence capabilities (Wikileaks 2008). The purpose of the second was to enhance 'interoperability' through joint naval exercises (Lee 2013). By the end of 2013, the three countries had participated in more than 30 naval exercises.

In 2010, Mexico and the United States initiated a new cycle of bilateral cooperation that placed greater emphasis on intelligence data exchange and social policy measures. A number of goals were set, such as to: (1) dismantle transnational crime organizations operating in both countries; (2) strengthen the public institutions responsible for combating organized crime; (3) develop the twenty-first century border to facilitate the legal flow of goods and people; and (4) strengthen social cohesion in communities on both sides of the border, through an emphasis on drug consumption prevention and reduction (E. Olson 2012: 45). Goals 3 and 4 represent new avenues of cooperation introduced into the Mérida Initiative by the Obama administration in an effort to move away from George W. Bush's militaristic approach to fighting organized crime.

Since the beginning of the Peña Nieto administration in December 2012, a transformation in the program of cooperation between Mexico and the United States has taken place. The current emphasis is on drug

consumption prevention and restructuring of the judicial system and police force. The new government has fewer aims in pillar 1 of the Mérida Initiative, which is more operational, focusing on the interdiction of drug production and trafficking, and more in pillar 2, which covers professionalization and training to strengthen key institutions. The current government has also focused on a program to promote a culture of respect for the rule of law (Pforzheimer 2013). By mid-2014, it was clear that the Peña Nieto administration's Mérida Initiative priorities were justice system modernization and social cohesion promotion programs (State Department 2014).

Mérida Initiative implementation has not been free of conflict. Three conflicts stand out. The first occurred when Wikileaks publicized documents in which a cable from the US Embassy criticized the Mexican Armed Forces. The Wikileaks cable quotes (US Embassy 2010):

Our ties with the military have never been closer in terms of not only equipment transfers and training, but also the kinds of intelligence exchanges that are essential to making inroads against organized crime. Incipient steps towards logistical interoperability with US forces are ongoing related to Haiti relief. SEDENA, for the first time and following SEMAR's lead, has asked for SOF training. We need to capitalize on these cracks in the door. Any retreat on engagement on our side will only reinforce SEDENA's instincts to revert to a closed and unaccountable institution.

The Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), in charge of army and air force, understood this document as a fundamental critique of its strategy in the war on drugs. Hence, SEDENA asked President Calderón to expel Ambassador Pascual; the Mexican Armed Forces threatened to 'freeze' the bilateral defense relationship. Hoping to pressure the White House to recall the Ambassador, Calderón's government cut off all communication with Pascual, and in March 2011, Pascual was withdrawn from Mexico.

The second incident was Operation Fast and Furious, a plan which created great friction between the two governments. This intelligence project tracked firearms sold in the United States to Mexican criminals. In January 2011, media reports revealed that the US had introduced guns into Mexico without alerting Mexican authorities and that Mexican criminals had bought nearly 2,000 assault weapons through the program. The arms sales created a serious bi-national crisis since Mexico considered the operation a violation of its sovereignty (G. Olson 2012: 61).

The third major incident was an attack on a US diplomatic caravan in the state of Morelos on 24 August 2012. This assault was only the most notorious of several acts of Mexican governmental corruption that have severely heightened tensions between the two governments. In the attack, Federal Police shot 152 times into a vehicle carrying two US diplomatic agents and a member of the Mexican Navy. This episode showed clear signs of corruption – collusion between the Federal Police and a Mexican drug cartel (CNN 2012).

NEGOTIATING WITH THE POWER OF BIG FATHER

The United States, the most powerful nation in the world, is a troublesome neighbour for Canada and Mexico and essentially a *Big Father* to them. For example, NAFTA negotiations took place among unequal parties. While Canada has a long history of pragmatic negotiations with the United States and its relationship with its neighbour is characterized primarily by stability, the bilateral US-Mexican relationship exhibits cyclical instability – periods of nationalism (in which Mexico, as the weaker partner, must demonstrate its ‘autonomy’) as well as periods of necessary cooperation (such as the US war on terror and the Mexican war on organized crime). Though Mexico also has a long experience of negotiating with the US, the Mexican government has most often pursued principles, especially the principle of preserving Mexican national sovereignty, in negotiations. Nevertheless, Mexico’s periodic ‘need’ to negotiate has opened *windows of opportunity*. Such a need was evident during the 1992–1993 NAFTA negotiations as well as in the 2007 Mérida Initiative and subsequent expansion of the security agenda. In other words, for Mexico, necessity takes priority over foreign policy principles, and national security takes precedence over political disagreements with the United States. In this way, necessity opens the door for cooperation (Clarkson 2008: 417). Interestingly, when the Peña Nieto administration took power in 2012, members of the administration brought with them a number of negotiating traditions inherited from the twentieth century. These include a long-standing tradition of quietly cooperating with the United States while publicly promoting a nationalist line of national autonomy.

The signing of NAFTA was a turning point that ushered Mexico into a new era of foreign policy with its northern neighbours. After 20 years, the Mexican public continues to support NAFTA (support for NAFTA can be seen as an overall indicator of a favourable public stance towards the US).

However, despite long-standing support for NAFTA, the percentage of Mexico's population in favour of the agreement has decreased over the years. When asked in a survey, 'There is a free trade agreement between Mexico, Canada, and the US. Are you in favor or against it?', in November 1993, 73 per cent were in favour and 12 per cent against it; in July 2000, 72 per cent were in favour while 13 per cent were against; in April 2006, 61 per cent were in favour and 24 per cent were against; in December 2013, 54 per cent were in favour while 26 per cent were against NAFTA (Excelsior 2014).

Regarding security, there is a consensus that US-Mexican cooperation in defense and security matters is unavoidable for a number of reasons: the shared border, the evolution of transnational threats, the unsuccessful attempts of each country to combat new challenges (such as terrorism and drug trafficking) independently, and growing mutual trust. Security cooperation between Mexico and the United States has historical precedents. Collaboration has increased significantly since the 1980s. The High Level Contact Group in 1997 propelled joint efforts forward, as did the later 2002 Smart Border treaties and the 2007 Mérida Initiative. The Mérida Initiative is the first agreement that deeply involves defense agencies in the bilateral relationship.

There is, however, a wide range of obstacles to effective cooperation between Mexico and the United States:

- (1) The incongruity of legal structures and the consequences thereof. For instance, the Second Amendment of the US Constitution, interpreted to give any citizen the right to own firearms, facilitates the arming of Mexican organized crime and thus exacerbates Mexico's security situation through the thriving legal weapons trade in the United States.
- (2) The asymmetry in institutional capacities. That is, Mexico's institutional weaknesses demonstrated by corruption and a lack of security squad professionalization: Mexico's institutional fragility in significant security agency sectors fosters inefficiency in the war on organized crime, a situation often described as a 'security trap' (Bailey 2014: 7). Mexico's difficulties have led several analysts to consider Mexican security strategy a failure (Kenny et al. 2012). Some analysts hold that the war on drugs is impossible to win with the strategy implemented since 2007 because of the level of criminal organization penetration into important social and economic structures (Watt and Zepeda 2012).
- (3) Political obstacles, in particular each country's nationalism, generate mutual mistrust. Therefore, interactions between the two nations constantly

oscillate between convergence and divergence (Kilroy et al. 2013: 193). In legislative terms, both countries' congresses are unwilling to collaborate on security matters. At times, US congress members hostile to Mexico have great influence, and they make (or block) legislation based on constituencies in border states like Arizona and Texas that deeply distrust Mexico. In Mexico, strong nationalist currents run through the three major political parties (PRI, PAN, and PRD). Some congressional representatives see any cooperation with the US government as a capitulation to US 'imperialist' interests. Additionally, Mexico's top defense institutions differ in their approaches to cooperation with their US counterparts. The Navy Secretariat (SEMAR) has worked to deepen its long-term relationship with US institutions through treaties such as NAMSII and GSOMIA, which have helped develop SEMAR's intelligence apparatus. On the contrary, SEDENA is more reluctant to pursue bilateral institutional cooperation. Therefore, SEDENA cooperates by way of the Mérida Initiative and other programs for military personnel training.

Though it will be difficult to reverse the agreements already in place without quickly worsening the security conditions in both nations, there must be public debate of joint security policy in both nations as their governments attempt to modify previous paradigms of cooperation. Government proponents of these agreements must secure legislative and civil society support. Ultimately, Mexico and the United States must work towards legislature-approved treaties based on political consensus and long-term projections instead of provisional, reversible executive actions.

Similar considerations apply to the relationship among all three countries (the United States, Mexico, and Canada). For example, Canada and the US are in the process of transforming their domestic policies towards the legalization of drug production and trade. In the case of the US, public policies are often competing on the federal and state levels. Some states have moved towards legalization and other states promise to follow suit. These new state policies cause many analysts to believe that the US war on drugs has failed (Thompson 2014: 73). Current Canadian security measures also merit mention here. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, newly elected in 2015, has announced changes to the previous government's policy of restricted access for Mexican citizens. Trudeau promised more liberal policies that will eventually eliminate the visa requirement for Mexican nationals entering Canada.

These examples illustrate how domestic policies and regional security are interlinked. The new security relationship between the three North American countries also raises questions for the future of security in other regions such as

Central America and beyond. It will be important to observe how the three North American nations work together to participate in larger peacekeeping missions for global security (Council on Foreign Relations 2014: 76).

CONCLUSIONS

Currently, the evolving dynamic of global terrorism is redefining North American defense and security. During and after the Arab Spring of 2011, a number of governments in North Africa and the Middle East fell to civil society and pro-Western movements. However, reactions to these movements in the form of reenergized jihadi terrorist movements also emerged. In the wake of the large-scale US troop withdrawal from Iraq, the terrorist group the Islamic State (ISIL) has taken military control of northern Iraq and expanded into Syria in a drive to construct a 'caliphate'.

With the Obama administration facing multiple global challenges, from the rise of ISIL to Russia's new expansionist policy, it is difficult to foresee the future path of Mexico-US relations. Currently, Latin America is rarely on the US security radar. In the case of Mexico, the United States primarily pays attention to the country's security crisis when that crisis affects the United States. In 2014, migration re-emerged as a highly controversial political issue. Attention to the migration of unaccompanied minors to the US fostered racist and isolationist discourse that in some cases called for closing the US-Mexican border. In this way, the political discourse confounded humanitarian with security issues.

Mexico faces the challenge to confront its domestic security issues with its own resources and find ways to overcome the sources of those challenges. Moreover, Mexico must remedy the institutional weaknesses that hamper government efforts to combat security problems (Payan et al. 2013).

The current Mexican administration has diversified its security relationship with the US by demilitarizing the war on drugs and focusing instead on violence prevention. The Peña Nieto government has released a document outlining the administration's national security policy of coordinating federal agencies (Seelke and Finklea 2016). To achieve new levels of coordination, the plan calls for the creation of the National Security System and the Intelligence System, both designed to boost collective action among institutions that have previously functioned in an uncoordinated, independent, and uncommunicative fashion (CSN 2014).

The Mexican government has also tried to create new institutions to confront organized crime. One such organization, the National Gendarmerie, is

designed to be the new, elite, highly professionalized seventh division of the Federal Police. Constituted in September 2014, this police division has 5,000 members and was created after a review of best practices of a number of international police forces such as the Italian, Spanish, French, Chilean, and Colombian.

Violence and delinquency prevention is another important part of the current administration's security program. This focus began in 2012 as an alternative to the Calderón administration's intensive militarization of the drug war. The violence prevention program attempts to attack the structural roots of delinquency by building fragile but resistant communities to counteract risk factors for criminal behaviour, primarily among youth (DOF 2014). Official statistics generated since 2012 signal the stabilization and then gradual decline of Mexico's homicide rate – from a rate of 23 per 100,000 in 2011 to a rate of 19 per 100,000 in 2013.

ISIL's November 2015 attacks in Paris have mobilized a broad military coalition of a number of European nations and the United States. Though Mexico lacks the military capacity to back the coalition, the far-reaching repercussions of the humanitarian crisis precipitated by violence in the Middle East have led many countries to accept refugees. The US has accepted almost 30,000, and Canada has promised to accept 25,000 in 2016. Certainly, the international community will pressure Mexico and Latin American nations to accept refugees and at the very least cooperate with international humanitarian policies. In these ways, ISIL's offensive is redefining global anti-terrorism policy, including North American policy.

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