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BUILDING TRUST IN LATIN AMERICA¹

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I maintain that, when Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (2008) clarified the difference between the security dilemma and the security paradox, thereby removing a misguided interpretation of the conditions of security and insecurity in the international system, they allowed for a reinterpretation of the specificity of the Latin American view of the role of violence and the place of threat in international relations. I, thus, contest the view that international relations in Latin America as in other global regions are determined by the ontology of the international system and suggest that managing uncertainty through international institutions has created an environment that is not suitable for the development of a security paradox, in spite of the continuing existence of a security dilemma. This situation has been the result of reformist mechanisms that generate a significant level of trust throughout the continent regarding the use of violence.

The term security dilemma was coined by John Herz in the 1950s and has become an icon of international securities studies.² The dilemma is a result of the need to make choices, in the absence of knowledge about the intentions and motives of others, as well as their capabilities, given the inherent ambiguity of weapons. This is what Booth and Wheeler call the dilemma of interpretation. The presence of weapons invites mistrust as they can be understood as either offensive or defensive. On the other hand, leaders need to decide how to respond when there is uncertainty about what the other is planning. This is what the authors call the dilemma of response.³

When the choice made is a reaction based on the logic of deterrence rather than the logic of reassurance a security paradox may be generated. In this case a spiral of mutual hostility may be produced, when

¹ This paper was written with the assistance of Mariana Abi-Saab.

² John Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, n. 2, 1950.

³ Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. New York, Palgrave, 2008, p. 4.

in fact neither party was planning offensive action. The authors stress that the security paradox is not a necessary result of the security dilemma pointing out the role of human agency. The absence of political authority in international politics above that of the sovereign state generates uncertainty and insecurity, but this is not the only game in town. The clarification of the distinction between the security dilemma and the security paradox transfers the debate on insecurity in the international system into the realm of politics. The choices made by political leaders, the norms and rules created in the process of political interaction, the discourse and agenda produced in the context of political debate acquire new relevance for our understanding of the role of violence in international politics. Insecurity, tension, the arms race and ultimately war result from these social and political processes in historical contexts, not from the inherent conditions of anarchy. International institutions play a crucial role not only by administrating the use of violence or changing the cost/benefit calculations of actors, but also by changing their identity and culture.

When actors are sensitive to the fears of others and to how they may provoke fear, the possibility of generating trust is opened. Booth and Wheeler define security dilemma sensibility as '...an actor's intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others'.⁴ The combination of this effort and the disposition to take some risk will produce trust and cooperation and diminish insecurity in the system.

The authors tackle the difficulty of accurate threat assessment and mention seven factors that degrade accurate threat assessment: the organizational culture of intelligence organizations, the specificity of strategic culture in each country, the effect of bureaucratic competition and domestic politics on decisions about weapons, deception at the strategic and tactical levels, the difficulties of information-gathering about military programs of other states and the politicization of intelligence. They stress that 'material facts of weapons never speak for themselves...'⁵ and also point out the strength of the argument for worst-case forecasting. This 'involves assuming that what another state can do, it may do, and one must take measures to repair against this possibility...'⁶ In this chapter I will discuss the relationship between arms control mechanisms and threat assessment. I put forward the argument that arms control mechanisms generate, in conjunction with other institutions, an environment in which the probability of the use of violence decreases significantly and thus the possibility that a security paradox develops is slimmer.

⁴ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

I should start by explaining what I mean by 'the Latin American view'. Obviously the view of international politics and of the role of violence in international politics varies significantly in the different countries of the region and among different social groups. Even if we look only at the governing elites in the region, the differences will be significant. Some countries have aspired or do aspire to be regional leaders or hegemons, some countries have had or do have grievances regarding national borders, and others are satisfied with the status quo. The emergence of three different foreign policy patterns towards the United States in the region has been a feature of the last ten years: a confrontational stance in Venezuela, Cuba and Ecuador; a moderated position in Brazil, Chile and Argentina, and alignment with the US in Colombia and Mexico. Nevertheless a minimum common denominator can be detected. This partial reality will be sought at the multilateral level in this chapter. Further research is required in order to verify the positions developed in each country. The factors mentioned before, which pose difficulties for threat assessment in each country, need to be researched. My contention is that the agreements, formal and informal, reached at the multilateral level, the institutions, norms and international culture present in the region are a reliable indication of what the Latin American views of international politics and the role of violence are. I shall look at the mechanisms that administer the use of violence which can be found in the region, i.e. the norms, practices and international culture in the sphere of security. More specifically, I shall investigate the arms control mechanisms significant to international relations in the region. Other conflict resolution and conflict management mechanisms are also pertinent to this discussion but will be treated as the context in which arms control mechanisms are developed.

ARMS CONTROL IN LATIN AMERICA

Arms control mechanisms can be categorized as operational or structural. The first focuses on providing assurances with regard to military activities and defense postures and the second refers to arrangements aimed at reducing or prohibiting the acquisition and deployment of specific kinds of armaments.⁷ On the other hand, arms control mechanisms can be regional, international or involve a smaller number of actors. They do not tackle the conflicts between various actors, but change the behaviour and perspectives of relevant actors and have a direct input on the use of violence in the international system.

⁷ C. Bertram, 'The Future of Arms Control', *Adelphi Paper* n. 146, 1978. International Institute of Strategic Studies. <http://www.iiss.org/>

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) form part of the operational arms control framework. They are developed in order to generate trust and predictability and may include diplomatic and cultural measures, as well as military contacts. Information exchange and verification mechanisms regarding military activities generate transparency decreasing the likelihood of the escalation of conflict. They may also in the long run contribute to the change in relations, the constitution of norms and the modification of identities. The term was first used in the 1950s, but became relevant in the 1970s when the Helsinki Final Act inaugurated a series of East-West confidence- and security-building measures.⁸ CBMs were an integral part of the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). They helped to ease inter-bloc tension in the 1970s and 1980s, and in 1989–91, to ensure a smooth transition to the post-Cold War reality. The East-West and European experience has been a reference for the toolbox of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in other parts of the world. As Zdzislaw Lachowski notes, 'Various attempts to utilize them in other politico-military contexts have yielded mixed results. In the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) region and Latin America, military CBMs have been agreed within packages of broader, loose confidence-enhancing steps, and the political and military authorities have endeavored to test more and more of them'.⁹

Arms control mechanisms in Latin America developed slowly until the 1990s, but the process has gathered pace since the end of the Cold War and the mechanisms put in place have proven to be sustainable. They survive well in an environment where the peaceful resolution of international conflict has been a strong regional norm. Conflict resolution mechanisms have been in place in the Western Hemisphere and Latin America in particular since the end of the 19th century, the OAS and ad hoc groups having taken part in mediation efforts since the II World War. Several documents and relevant meetings have incorporated the theme.¹⁰ It is noticeable that at times there is tension between the will to develop and introduce arms control mechanisms and the defence of state sovereignty

⁸ Michelle Maiese, 'Confidence-Building Measures', *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/confidence_building_measures/>.

⁹ Zdzislaw Lachowski, 'Confidence and Security Building Measures in the New Europe', *SIPRI Research Report*, n.18, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 187.

¹⁰ Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999.

and positions held by several groups and governments on the discriminative nature of international mechanisms.

Latin America countries and regional institutions are generally adapted to international mechanisms in existence today. Regional cooperation with international institutions for the implementation of international norms is well accepted. In international forums Latin American countries have in general been supporters of arms control and disarmament initiatives. The Conference on Disarmament has accepted nine Latin American countries¹¹.

The Ottawa Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction) was promoted in the region and OAS members committed to the removal of antipersonnel land mines from Central America and from the Peru Ecuador Border. In July 2005 Chile began demining its border with Bolivia.¹² Countries in the region have ratified the treaty as seen in Annex 7. The Inter-American Defense Board now holds a Humanitarian Demining Division at its headquarters, comprised of officers from the countries of the Hemisphere. The Board has been involved in demining projects in Central America, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Guatemala, Suriname and Honduras have been declared countries free of mines.¹³

Strong involvement can be found regarding the non-proliferation regimes, although the need to move towards disarmament is a constant theme both in national and multinational contexts. There is a wide consensus in the region against the presence of WMD. Adherence to arms control treaties and organizations is widespread (see annexes 1–5) and adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) is nearly universal. Since the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was announced in 1987, Argentina and Brazil among others have curbed their missile aspirations. In 1993 Argentina joined the MTCR and in 1995 Brazil did the same. In

¹¹ These are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. See [http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/2D415EE45C5FAE07C12571800055232B?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/2D415EE45C5FAE07C12571800055232B?OpenDocument) (Access on 01/03/2009).

¹² By 2012 Chile must destroy the 118,377 anti-personnel mines that it has declared along its borders. See The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005. *The Military Balance 2005–2006*, London, Routledge.

¹³ Land Mine Monitor, <http://www.icbl.org/lm/> (accessed on 10/01/2009).

fact, curbing the missile programmes of countries such as Argentina and Brazil, along with Egypt, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan, can be considered the most important achievement for the missile non-proliferation regime. The Latin American countries have also been strong supporters of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Argentina and Brazil having ratified in 1998. Moreover OAS member states host a large number of monitoring facilities that form the International Monitoring System.¹⁴

Yet one should not forget that the nature of the NPT has always generated opposition from certain sectors of Latin American societies—the perceived discriminatory nature of the regime and the need to move further towards disarmament are issues raised by nationalist parties, sectors of the military establishment and scientists. In line with this perspective Brazil and Mexico take part in the New Agenda Coalition¹⁵. Moreover additional protocols to national safeguards agreements with the IAEA, intended to give the agency additional powers to detect clandestine nuclear programmes in undeclared locations, were not signed by the most significant players Brazil and Argentina.¹⁶

Regional arms control mechanisms have been promoted in a consistent manner. The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the OAS Charter, but slowly entered the inter-American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Latin American countries have been at the forefront of this process. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacucho Declaration,¹⁷ affirming their support for the idea of arms control.

Regarding conventional weapons and CSBMs the peace process in Central America was an important turning point in the history of arms control in the region¹⁸. In January 1983 the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela met on Contadora Island, Panama, to initiate what was the principal multilateral mechanism in the early 1980s

¹⁴ CTBTO map, <http://www.ctbto.org/map/#ims> (accessed on 26/01/2009)

¹⁵ The New Agenda Coalition was created in 1998 as a reaction to the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament efforts in the aftermath of the Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty's indefinite extension and of India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests.

¹⁶ See 'Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols' International Atomic Energy Agency http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html (access on 01/03/2009).

¹⁷ Argentina, Chile Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Peru and Venezuela.

¹⁸ For the peace Process in Central America see Jack Child *The Central American Peace Process, 1983–1991: Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence* Lynne Rienner, 1992. Cynthia J Arnsion, ed. *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999.

in the search for peaceful resolution to the conflict in Central America. The 'Contadora process' produced its first tangible agreement in September 1983, when the four members of the Contadora Group and the five Central American governments issued a 'Document of Objectives,' which identified twenty-one political, security and social-economic goals to be negotiated. Several of the 21 goals addressed the control and reduction of weapons, troops, and foreign military advisers in the sub-region. In August 1987, the Central American Presidents agreed to implement a regional peace and democratization plan. Known as Esquipulas II, it established broad commitments regarding: 1) democratization, 2) cessation of internal hostilities, 3) amnesty, 4) ending aid to insurgents, 5) national reconciliation, and 6) negotiations on security, verification, control, and limitation of weapons. The agreement built on the 'Document of Objectives' put forward by the Contadora Group.

Following the completion of many of the political Esquipulas commitments, the five Central American countries of Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala reaffirmed their desire to begin negotiations in the areas of security, verification, control and arms reduction in accordance with the Esquipulas II agreements. At the first meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica on July 31, 1990, they agreed to a regular process to accomplish these stated goals: to assure armed forces are defensive and not offensive in nature; maintain a reasonable balance or a proportional and comprehensive equilibrium of weapons, equipment, and troops such that they do not constitute a threat to neighboring countries; and define a new model of security relations based on cooperation, communication and prevention.

The five countries also agreed to create a body (Central American Security Commission, CASC) to periodically meet to negotiate an appropriate arms control treaty and the 'Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America' was signed December 15, 1995 in San Pedro Sula, Honduras by the Presidents of Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama. The treaty seeks to strengthen democracy in the region; protect human rights; begin to eliminate narcotics and weapons trafficking; promote sustained development; and encourage a regional arms control arrangement that promotes transparency, confidence and long-term peace.

The increased use of CSBMs in the Central American conflict scenario and the incorporation of arms control mechanisms to the negotiating process, and the involvement of several South American nations in the Contadora and Esquipulas effort, produced a "contagion effect" under which CSBM concepts and techniques were transferred from the Central to the South American conflict scenarios as seen below.

Latin America produced in 1967 the first regional treaty that prohibits nuclear weapons in a populated area of the world, the Tlatelolco

Treaty,¹⁹ which was signed by all states of the region. The treaty, which can be regarded as an expression of regional creativity and independence, has become a model for the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, such as the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1986), South-East Asia (Treaty of Bangkok, 1995) and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996).²⁰ The treaty prohibits testing, use, manufacture, production, acquisition, receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of nuclear weapons. It also establishes negative guarantees. Additional Protocol II prohibits nuclear-weapon states from attacking any party to the treaty. The treaty establishes in Article 13 that states should negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of the agency's safeguards to their nuclear activities. The Tlatelolco Treaty created the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). In 1992 OPANAL approved amendments to Articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 that were designed to change the verification procedures of the treaty. One additional organization deals with issues related to nuclear non-proliferation: the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABAAC).

However other attempts to build on such initiatives in order to develop mechanisms targeting conventional weapons were less successful, as Mark Bromley and Catalina Perdomo remind us (2005). Responding to an invitation of the Mexican Government, 21 nations of Latin America and the Caribbean held informal meetings in Tlatelolco, Mexico City, on August 21–24, 1978 on limiting conventional weapons in the region. The Mexican Government attempted to carry the spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco into the field of conventional armaments but did not succeed.

The move towards the formation of a nuclear regime in Latin America took place during a period of great optimism regarding a post-Cold War nuclear order launched in Reykjavik in 1986. Nevertheless, after these golden years of nuclear rejection proved to be a 'false dawn', the situation in Latin America did not change.²¹ This reflects a growing normative consensus against nuclear weapons that developed during the 1980s partly as a result of the existing non-proliferation regime.

¹⁹ The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has been in force since April 1969 when 11 states had already ratified it.

²⁰ For this subject, see Tariq Rauf, *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Questions and Answers*, International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1997.

²¹ The term 'false dawn' is used by William Walker in his discussion of the nuclear order. See William Walker, 'Nuclear Order and Disorder', *International Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 4 (2000), pp. 703–724.

Nuclear capability was seen as a stumbling block on the way to economic modernization and technological advancement instead of a sign of global prestige by the political elite in both Brazil and Argentina.

In 1991 the Peruvian government launched a comprehensive initiative for Latin America, seeking the gradual adoption of a WMD-free zone, the prohibition of the purchase, transfer and manufacture of new generations of special conventional weapons systems, and the implementation of a set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).²² On 4 December 1991 the Cartagena Declaration on the Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was issued, supporting the prohibition of WMD in Latin America and the Caribbean and committing the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) to renounce the possession, production, development, use, testing and transfer of WMD. In 1991, two years before the CWC was signed, Brazil joined with Argentina and Chile in the Declaration of Mendoza. They pledged not to produce, buy, stock, use or transfer chemical or biological weapons. The parties also agreed to establish on a national basis appropriate inspection mechanisms. Four other South American nations, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay, signed the declaration later. The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) declared its geographic region and Bolivia and Chile free of WMD and a 'zone of peace' in July 1998 (the Declaration of MERCOSUR as a Zone of Peace, signed in Ushuaia, Argentina). On July 26–27, 2002, the Presidents of South America met in Guayaquil, Ecuador and declared South America a Zone of Peace and Cooperation.

The integration between global and regional mechanisms in Latin America is well established. The proliferation of WMD regimes in particular are treated as a theme dealt with on a global level and supported by the countries of the region. Article 21 of the Tlatelolco Treaty established that the General Conference of OPANAL should inform the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Council of the OAS when any state party to the treaty violates it and thus threatens the peace and security of the region. Other examples are two OAS resolutions passed in 1999: Inter-American Support for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, AG/RES. 1624 (XXIX-O/99); and Consolidation of the Regime Established in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), AG/RES. 1622 (XXIX-O/99).

²² *Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes*, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2000, p. 87.

The two agreements most relevant to the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are the inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), signed in 1997 and the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions approved by the OAS General Assembly in 1999 and entered into force in 2002. The Western Hemisphere was the first region to develop a legally binding treaty against the illegal trafficking of firearms in the framework of the OAS, with the adoption of CIFTA. It was also the first region to develop a system of procedures to implement a treaty of this nature, with the adoption of the *Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition* in 1998, under the coordination of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).

The MERCOSUR sub-region was the first to develop its own mechanism for firearms control following the *Southern Cone Presidential Declaration on Combating the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials*, signed in April 1998. The declaration is supported by the Cooperation and Reciprocal Assistance Plan for Regional Security which tackles different aspects of organized crime, including arms trafficking. On the basis of this Declaration, the interior ministers decided to develop a joint registration mechanism for firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials within the MERCOSUR Security Information System,

During the 1990s the development of CSBMs has been a feature of the Latin American security environment. The agreements include measures to limit misunderstandings caused by arms acquisitions and military maneuvers, the strengthening of the control on the flows of small arms and light weapons, military contacts, the increase transparency in defense policy, joint operations and constant debate on the conflicts that arise²³.

Most of the activity in this sphere has taken place on a hemispheric basis. The first Summit of the Americas which took place in Miami in 1994 endorsed the role of CSBMs as mechanisms that favor democracy and development. Since that historical meeting the OAS has organized and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security-building measures

²³ For this subject see Mark Bromley and Catalina Perdomo, 'CBMs in Latin America and the effect of arms acquisitions by Venezuela', Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, *Working Paper*, n. 41, 2005; David Mares, 'Confidence-and Security-Building Measures: Relevance and Efficiency', in Gordon Mace, Jean-Philippe Thérien, Paul Haslam, eds., *Governing the Americas*, Boulder CO, Lynne Rienner, 2007. For a list of CSBMs sponsored by the OAS see <http://www.oas.org/csh/english/csbmlist.asp>. (accessed on 01/11/2009).

designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernize their defense forces without triggering suspicions from neighbors or leading to an arms race. Transparency in defence spending has been promoted at the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security, a working group on transparency in conventional weapons acquisition having been established. The Inter-American Defense Board (IID) prepares an inventory of confidence- and security-building measures of a military nature based on information provided by the member states each year. The Meetings of specialists on confidence and security measures and the meetings of Ministers of Defence Americas (Williamsburg 1995, Bariloche 1996, Cartagena 1998, Manaus 2000, Santiago 2002, Quito 2004, Managua 2006) are the most important forums for the discussion of the subject.

In 1994 a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration²⁴ called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defense policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador²⁵ expanded this agenda dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalization of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defense expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina's Defense White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC's common standardized methodology for the measurement of defense expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures.

²⁴ OEA/Ser.K/XXIX.2 COSEGRE/doc. 18/95 rev. 3, November 8–10, 1995 Santiago, Chile.

²⁵ OEA/Ser.K/XXIX.2 COSEGRE.II/doc.7/98 rev. 3, February 25–27, 1998 San Salvador, El Salvador.

The 2003 Miami Conference, where civilian and military representatives from 31 OAS member states were present, issued two final outcome documents: the “Consensus of Miami–Declaration by the Experts on CSBMs: Recommendations to the Summit-mandated Special Conference on Security;” and the “Miami Group of Experts Illustrative List of CSBMs or Countries to Consider Adopting on a Bilateral, Sub-Regional, or Regional Level.” These documents provide a practical roadmap for resolving interstate border tensions, lowering pressure for arms spending, promoting democratic norms, and fostering a climate of trust, transparency, and cooperation²⁶.

The CSBM framework produced norms and incentives for a wide range of activities involving Latin American countries and armed forces, more specifically. Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, the United States and Uruguay have presented White Papers on Defense available on the OAS website²⁷ and the experience of Latin American countries in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay and Guatemala have been taking part in MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Force in Haiti), a peace operation created in 2004 by a UN Security Council Chapter VII resolution. Among the CSBMs reported and catalogued by the OAS I highlight the cooperative military operations which between 2005 and 2008 as seen in Annex 8 involved practically all countries in the western hemisphere.

Francisco Rojas Aravenas mentions the most recent decisions regarding the subject: the OAS General Assembly, held on June 3rd 2008 decided to entrust the Permanent Council to convoke the fourth meeting of the Forum on CSBMs in the last quarter of 2009 and VIII Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, held in Canada in 2008, had CSBMs as one of the core issues on its agenda.²⁸ In addition the initiative for the creation of the South American Defense Council has planned to boost CSBMs. The number of States in the region that submit information on a regular basis needs to be increased but significant progress has been made during the last ten years. In December 2007 the Inter-American Defense Board updated the inventory of CSBMs applied by countries in the Americas and in other regions of the world during 2006. The updating of the inventory represents a partial sample of CSBMs applied in the

²⁶ Permanent Council of the organization of American States, Committee on Hemispheric Security OEA/Ser.G CP/CSH-528/02 rev. 4 corr. 1 31 January 2003.

²⁷ OAS website <http://www.oas.org/csh/english/docwhitepapers.asp> (access on 12/07/2008).

²⁸ Francisco Rojas Aravenas, ‘Confidence and Security Building Measures: An Instrument for and Peace and Stability’ in *A Comparative Atlas in Defense in Latin America* RESDAL, 2008. <http://www.resdal.org/atlas/atlas-region-ingles.pdf>.

Hemisphere, because its tables contain data on CSBMs applied by 13 reporting countries, which is 48.14% of the member states of the Inter-American Defense Board and 38.23% of the member states of the OAS. In addition to the 13 member states that reported on application of CSBMs, the remaining 14 IADB member states are directly involved in the application of CSBMs. According to the board all member states are applying CSBMs. Over the last eight years, 61% of the OAS member states, that is 21 states, have at some point submitted a report on application of CSBMs. It is relevant to note that in comparison to 2005 there was an increase of 62.50% in the number of reporting countries²⁹.

The bilateral arrangements complement this trend. Two dyads – Argentina and Brazil and Argentina and Chile – that had in the past represented the logic of confrontation in the region have now turned to cooperative security mechanisms, CSBMs having become a relevant feature of relations between these states. The creation of the Argentine-Chilean joint brigade Cruz del Sur (Southern Cross) is a potent example of this trend. Joint operations and training between the armed forces of these countries, procedures for the exchange of information and periodic meetings of senior officers are part of the reality of bilateral relations and military diplomacy in particular.

THE SECURITY CONTEXT IN LATIN AMERICA

There were few violent conflicts between states in the Americas after the end of the nineteenth century, although territorial disputes were abundant.³⁰ The four major inter-American wars took place between the middle of the nineteenth century and the 1930s: the Mexican-American War of 1846; the War of the Triple Alliance between 1864 and 1870 (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay); the War of the Pacific between 1870 and 1883 (Chile and Bolivia); and the Chaco War in 1932 (Paraguay and Bolivia). During the second half of the twentieth century and particularly after the mid-1980s the region has been characterized by very few instances of inter-state wars. In 1969 war broke out over territorial and migration issues between El Salvador and Honduras; in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands; and in 1998 Peru and Ecuador finally settled their boundary dispute after a conflict that left nearly a thousand dead combatants in

²⁹ Inventory on Confidence and Security Measures OAS CP/CSH-275/00 <http://www.oas.org/csh/docs/cp06820e.pdf>

³⁰ Jorge Domínguez, 'The Future of Inter-American Relations', 1999. Working paper, Inter-American Dialogue; David Mares, *Violent Peace*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004; Olga Pellicer, *Regional Mechanisms and International Security in Latin America*, Tokyo, The United Nations University, 1998.

1995.³¹ The US was involved in several armed conflicts and military interventions,³² particularly in Central America.

During the last twenty years interstate relations in Latin America have been peaceful. Relations between Brazil and Argentina and between Argentina and Chile improved dramatically after the mid-1980s,³³ and in 1999 Chile and Peru settled their border dispute. The transition to democratic regimes, the rapprochement in the nuclear field and the development of CSBMs on a bilateral basis, the projects of regional integration in terms of the Southern Cone, Central America or South America, the increase in economic interdependence, better infrastructural integration, the settlement of border disputes generate an environment where the use of violence in inter-state relations was not expected. Furthermore the US has refrained from military intervention during the same period.

As seen in the data in annex 9 most countries in the region spend a low percentage of GDP on arms. Colombia and Chile are exceptions that stand out. Colombia is at war and the powerful position of the military establishment in Chile explains its special situation. Regarding Latin America, Brazil is the only country that features among the fifteen major spenders in arms procurements according to SIPRI, accounting for 1 percent of world spending.³⁴ South and Central America stand out as the regions that spend less in absolute terms than any other world region apart from Africa, as shown in the data provided by SIPRI for 2007:

Military Expenditure in billions of US Dollars for 2007

Africa	16.8
East Asia	152
Europe	319
Middle East	79.0
North America	562
South and Central America	36.0

³¹ Monica Herz and João Pontes Nogueira, *Ecuador vs. Peru: Peacemaking Amid Rivalry*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2002.

³² Between the mid-nineteenth century and 1989, the US invaded Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Haiti, México, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama and Puerto Rico.

³³ Brazil and Argentina solved their disputes over water rights and nuclear competition. Chile and Argentina signed in 1984 the Treaty of Peace and Friendship that put an end to the Beagle Channel feud.

³⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI 2007 Yearbook Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Stockholm, 2007, www.sipri.org

Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The most severe disputes short of war featured territorial or boundary causes: near-war between Argentina and Chile in 1978; tense relations between Chile, on the one hand, and Bolivia and Peru, on the other, in the late 1970s. The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile-Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana, between Guatemala and Belize, between Guiana and Suriname.³⁵ In 2006 Argentina went to the ICJ to protest, on environmental grounds, the construction of two pulp mills in Uruguay on the Uruguay River. The border between Colombia and Ecuador is a locus of tension, since organized illegal narcotics operations in Colombia penetrate across Ecuador and thousands of Colombians cross to escape the violence in their home country.³⁶ The Malvinas/Falklands islands are also a territory in dispute, although involving an extra-regional country: Great Britain.³⁷ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.³⁸

Currently drug trafficking and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike, and the social and economic problems that characterize the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term. Whereas traditional armed conflicts are not characteristic of the region, armed violence manifests itself in organized crime, urban crime, youth gangs, land ownership disputes. According to

³⁵ CIA The World Fact Book <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2070.html> (accessed on 01/12/2009).

³⁶ Colombian troops in hot pursuit of FARC guerrillas and areal eradication increase tension between the two countries. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 250,000 Colombians are now refugees in Ecuador as result of the war.

³⁷ Argentina, which claims the islands in its constitution and briefly occupied them by force in 1982 before losing a war with Great Britain, agreed in 1995 to no longer seek settlement by force.

³⁸ Colombia, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Chile and Haiti Correlates of War. <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (Accessed 11/02/2008).

the Managua Declaration³⁹ terrorism, drug trafficking, people trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, corruption and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air defense systems pose threats to regional security. These transnational and domestic problems could generate tension and conflict between states.

The 1980s were a period marked by decline in procurements of weapons and in the arms race that may arise as a result of this process, largely as a result of the economic downturn. By the early 1990s, military expenditures for Latin America as a whole represented only about 1.5% of the combined gross national products—the smallest proportion of any region in the world. The number of soldiers per thousand people fell from about 4.5 during the first half of the 1980s to about 3.5 during the first half of the 1990s.⁴⁰ This trend is slowly reversing, given the new economic situation in the region, the understanding that the armed forces of most countries urgently need modernization and the access to new suppliers such as Russia. Several countries have embarked on modernisation and/or reorganization processes. Argentina's army published a Plan for 2025 which includes an action plan to recover the countries capabilities. Brazil's has embarked on a procurement drive but it is yet not clear if the necessary funds will be available⁴¹. Venezuela is also engaged in an arms procurement process and increased its defence budget as a result of the advantages of high oil prices. Venezuela's new acquisitions from Russia in particular have generated significant debate in Latin America and the United States.⁴² Colombia increased its defence budget by 11% in 2007 and the government has proposed a plan to spend around US\$26bn on upgrading the countries military capabilities. In Chile the price in copper has permitted various procurement programmes. In Peru the government has stated that a modernisation program is necessary.

³⁹ *Managua Declaration*, Seventh Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas October 2006.

⁴⁰ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1991–1992*. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1994; Domínguez, 'The Future of Inter-American Relations'.

⁴¹ See The International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance*, 2008, pp. 56–57.

⁴² The procurements from Russia include a Mi-17 and Mi-26 helicopter fleet, 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 24 Sukhoi Su-30MKV multi-role fighters and over 50 Mi-17V transport and Mi-35M fire support helicopters. During 2007 two new major deals were signed with Russia five kilo class diesel-electric submarines and torpedoes. Brazil, France and Spain have to cancel deals with Venezuela because of pressure from the US. *Military Balance*, 2008, p. 60.

CONCLUSION

The brief description of the security environment in Latin America offered here allows us to conclude that the existence of boundary disputes, the presence of internal and transnational security problems that could generate conflict between states and the dispute for prestige, power and influence among states remain present, as well as an ongoing process of military capability enhancement. Moreover, today the region is divided regarding perspectives on domestic political organization and international insertion. This can be seen to set the conditions for the emergence of a security paradox. My argument is that the conditions for the development of a security paradox are not present largely because a culture of trust regarding the peaceful resolution of disputes has developed.

Trust, as Booth and Wheeler remind us, develops under conditions of uncertainty and 'never entirely escapes it'. But 'trust-as-predictability'⁴³ deriving from a certain measure of confidence can develop among states or other forms of collective political organization. In this case the tradition of peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts, the arms control treaties in place and the CSBMs framework have generated a significant degree of confidence that military force will not be used and it is thus possible to put forward the argument that a security paradox will not develop in the region.

The logic of reassurance is ingrained in the regional and international institutions present in the region. It will be necessary to investigate the interaction between states, particularly in the cases where some kind of dispute is present in order to assess how the regional actors will deal with the security dilemma generated by the situation depicted above. Nevertheless, if we consider the multilateral level of interaction specifically in the realm of arms control we can understand that the Latin American view of the use of violence in international relations is not conducive to the generation of a security paradox. The concern with regional military balance has not vanished and the purchase and deployment of weapons is watched with concern by political elites in other countries, particularly in the case of dyads involved in border disputes and where domestic conflict may be internationalized. Uncertainty is present. But the arms control mechanisms described earlier are both an expression of a view of the use of violence limited by political choices and the mechanisms that allow for relations based on a certain level and kind of trust. My contention is that this level of trust will close the doors to the development of regional or bilateral security paradoxes.

⁴³ Booth and Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p. 230. The authors contrast 'trust-as-predictability' and 'trust-as-bond' which derives from interpersonal bonding, p. 229.

Annex I

Data on the Participation of Latin American Countries in groups and organizations linked to Weapons of Mass Destruction regime

Latin American Countries	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) *	Nuclear Suppliers Group	Missile Technology Control Regime	Australia Group
Argentina	■	■	■	■
Brazil	■	■	■	
Chile	■			
Colombia	■			
Costa Rica	■			
Cuba	■			
Ecuador	■			
El Salvador	■			
Granada	■			
Guatemala	■			
Guyana	■			
Haiti	■			
Honduras	■			
Mexico	■			
Nicaragua	■			
Panama	■			
Paraguay	■			
Dominican Republic	■			
Suriname	■			
Uruguay	■			
Venezuela	■			

Source: www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/, www.mtcr.info/english/index.html, www.australiagroup.net (accessed on 11/01/2008)

Annex 2

Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention

	Signed	Ratified	Accession
Argentina	01/08/72	27/11/79	-
Bolivia	10/04/72	30/10/75	-
Brazil	10/04/72	27/02/73	-
Chile	10/04/72	22/04/80	-
Colombia	10/04/72	19/12/83	-
Costa Rica	10/04/72	17/12/73	-
Cuba	10/04/72	21/04/76	
Dominican Republic	10/04/72	23/02/73	-
Ecuador	14/06/72	21/03/75	-
El Salvador	10/04/72	31/12/91	-
Guatemala	09/05/72	19/09/73	-
Guyana	03/01/73	-	-
Haiti	10/04/72	-	-
Honduras	10/04/72	14/03/79	-
Mexico	10/04/72	08/04/74	-
Nicaragua	10/04/72	07/08/75	-
Panama	02/05/72	20/03/74	-
Paraguay	-	-	09/06/76
Peru	10/04/72	05/06/85	-
Suriname	-	-	06/01/93
Uruguay	-	-	06/04/81
Venezuela	10/04/72	18/10/78	-

Source: www.opbw.org (Accessed on 11/01/2008)

Annex 3

MONICA HERZ
Chemical Weapons Convention

	Signed	Ratified
Argentina	13/01/93	29/04/97-2/10/95
Bahamas	02/03/94	-
Bolivia	14/01/93	14/08/98
Brazil	13/01/93	03/13/96
Canada	13/01/93	26/09/95
Chile	14/01/93	12/07/96
Colombia	13/01/93	05/04/00
Costa Rica	14/01/93	31/05/96
Ecuador	14/01/93	06/09/95
El Salvador	14/01/93	30/10/95
Grenada	09/04/97	03/06/05
Guatemala	14/01/93	12/02/03
Guyana	06/10/93	12/09/97
Haiti	14/01/93	22/02/06
Honduras	13/01/93	29/08/05
Mexico	13/01/93	29/08/94
Nicaragua	09/03/93	05/11/99
Panama	16/06/93	07/10/98
Paraguay	14/01/93	01/12/94
Peru	14/01/93	20/07/95
Dominican Republic	13/01/93	-
Suriname	28/04/97	28/04/97
Uruguay	15/01/93	06/10/94
Venezuela	14/01/93	03/12/97

Source: <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcsig> (accessed on 11/02/2008)

Annex 4

Treaty on Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

	signed	Ratified	Accession /Succession
Argentina	-	-	10/02/95
Belize	-	-	09/08/85
Bolivia	01/07/68	26/05/70	-
Brazil	-	13/07/98	-
Canada	23/07/68	08/01/69	-
Chile	-	-	25/05/95
Colombia	01/07/68	08/04/86	-
Costa Rica	01/07/68	03/03/70	-
Ecuador	09/07/68	07/03/69	-
El Salvador	01/07/68	11/07/72	-
Granada	-	-	02/09/75
Guatemala	26/07/68	22/09/70	-
Guyana	-	-	19/10/93
Haiti	01/07/68	02/06/70	-
Honduras	01/07/68	16/05/73	-
Mexico	26/07/68	21/01/69	-
Nicaragua	01/07/68	06/03/73	-
Panama	01/07/68	13/01/77	-
Paraguay	01/07/68	04/02/70	-
Peru	01/07/68	03/03/70	-
Dominican Republic	01/07/68	24/07/71	-
Suriname	-	-	30/06/76
Uruguay	01/07/68	31/08/70	-
Venezuela	01/07/68	25/09/75	-

Source: http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/apmnpt.pdf (accessed on 11/02/2008)

Annex 5

Geneva Protocol

	Ratified	Accession	Succession
Argentina	-	12/05/69	-
Belize	-	-	-
Bolivia	-	13/08/85	-
Brazil	28/08/70	-	-
Chile	-	02/07/35	-
Colombia	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-
Ecuador	-	16/09/70	-
El Salvador	-	-	17/06/25
Granada	-	-	03/01/89
Guatemala	-	03/05/83	-
Guyana	-	-	-
Haiti	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-
Mexico	-	28/05/32	-
Nicaragua	05/10/90	-	-
Paraguay	-	22/10/33	-
Peru	-	13/08/85	-
Dominican Republic	-	08/12/70	-
Suriname	-	-	-
Uruguay	12/04/77	-	-
Venezuela	08/02/28	-	-

Source: <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4784.htm#states> (accessed on 11/02/2008)

Annex 6

Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

	ratified	Accession	Succession
Argentina	06/04/89	-	-
Belize	-	-	-
Bolivia	-	24/01/02	-
Brazil	17/10/85	-	-
Chile	-	27/04/94	-
Colombia	-	28/03/03	-
Costa Rica	-	02/05/03	-
Ecuador	17/01/96	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	-
Granada	-	09/01/02	-
Guatemala	23/04/85	-	-
Guyana	-	-	-
Haiti	-	-	09/04/80
Honduras	-	28/01/04	-
Mexico	-	04/04/88	-
Nicaragua	-	10/12/04	-
Panama	01/04/99	-	-
Paraguay	06/02/85	-	-
Peru	-	11/01/95	-
Dominican Republic	-	-	03/03/80
Suriname	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	24/10/03	-
Venezuela	-	-	-

Source: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_status.pdf

Annex 7

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Latin America Countries	Accession	Ratification
Argentina	4/12/97	14/09/99
Bolivia	03/12/97	09/06/98
Brazil	03/12/97	30/04/99
Chile	03/12/97	10/09/01
Colombia	03/12/97	06/09/00
Costa Rica	03/12/97	17/03/99
Dominican Republic	03/12/97	30/06/00
Ecuador	04/12/97	29/04/99
El Salvador	04/12/97	27/01/99
Guatemala	03/12/97	26/03/99
Guyana	04/12/97	05/08/03
Haiti	04/12/97	05/02/06
Honduras	03/12/97	24/09/98
Mexico	03/12/97	09/06/98
Nicaragua	04/12/97	30/11/98
Panama	04/12/97	07/10/98
Paraguay	03/12/97	13/11/98
Peru	03/12/97	17/06/98
Suriname	04/12/97	23/05/02
Uruguay	03/02/97	07/06/01
Venezuela	03/12/97	14/04/99

Source: w.icbl.org/treaty (accessed on 06/02/ 2008)

Annex 8

Military Training Operations (CSBM)

Year	Countries	Description
2008	Paraguay-Honduras	Multinational Exercise of armies "Iguana voladora 2008"
2008	Paraguay-Chile	Southern Exercise- Star 2008
2007	Chile-Argentina	Binational Exercise of armies "Aurora Austral", Unitas Atlántico, Team Work South, INALAF 2007.
2007	Chile-Peru	UNITAS-PACÍFICO Exercise, PANAMAX,
2007	Paraguay-Honduras	"Fuerza Comando 2007".
2007	Paraguay-Ecuador	"Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz Sur 2007"
2006	Paraguay-Argentina	Combined Exercise 'Hermandad 2006'
2006	Argentina-Chile	Solidaridad-Ejecución Exercise.
2006	Argentina-Brasil	TRANSOCEANIC Exercise
2006	Argentina-Chile	PASSEX COM LA ARCH Exercise, INTEGRACION, UNITAS 2006, INALAF, VIEKAREN, PANAMAX, Team Wok South, Araucaria V, Saar Andes 2006
2006	Argentina-Uruguay	UNITAS 2006, ATLASUR, ACRUX.
2006	Argentina-Venezuela	UNITAS 2006
2006	Latin American countries and The United States	OMP-Sur 06
2006	Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, United States	OMP-Norte 06
2006	Brazil-Uruguay	ATLAS-SUR
2006	Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay	PLATINA
2006	Brazil-Uruguay-Argentina	PRATA
2006	Brazil, Colombia, Peru	BRACOLPER
2006	Paraguay-Brazil	CESPRAM
2006	Brazil-Uruguay	DIPLOMEX, TRANSFEREX
2006	El Salvador-Guatemala	Common capacity building operation
2006	Chile-Peru	Opas PKO SUR 2006
2005	Argentina-Chile	Solidaridad
2005	Argentina-Brazil	ACRUX, FRATERO, 'MISIONES DE PAZ', SACI, DUENDE
2005	Argentina-Uruguay	ACRUX, CEIBO
2005	Argentina-Chile	VIEKAREN, BELL BUOY, INTEGRACION, ARAUCARIA IV, Operaciones combinadas, SIMUPAZ.
2005	Argentina-Dominican Republic	'Operaciones militares de Paz 2005'
2005	Latin American countries and The United States	OMP SUR 2005
2005	Argentina-Bolivia	Tcnl. JUANA UZURDUY
2005	Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile	HERMANDAD
2005	Andean countries	SAR ANDINO
2005	Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, France, Honduras	CARAIBE 2005
2005	Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala	'Iguana Voladora 2005'
2005	Chile-Peru	SEGIO

Source: <http://www.oas.org/csh/portuguese/fdacsrelat%C3%B3rios.asp#Aplicaciones>
(Accessed on 10/01/2009)

Annex 9

Military expenditure (%GDP) for 2006

Country	
Argentina	0.9
Bolivia	1.4
Brazil	1.5
Chile	3.6
Colombia	4.0
Dominican Republic	0.5
Ecuador	2.3
El Salvador	0.6
Guatemala	0.4
Honduras	0.6
Jamaica	0.7
Mexico	0.4
Nicaragua	0.7
Paraguay	0.8
Peru	1.3
Uruguay	1.3
Venezuela	1.2

Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4> (accessed on 10/01/2009)