IDENTITY, MIGRATION AND THE NEW SECURITY AGENDA IN EUROPE

Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan
Morten Kelstrup and
Pierre Lemaitre

Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe

Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe

Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre

with

David Carlton, Kristian Gerner, Torben Hansen, Martin O. Heisler, Zig Layton-Henry, B. A. Roberson, Håkan Wiberg

Pinter Publishers Ltd
London

Contents

Abbreviations

CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CNN	Cable News Network
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
DM	Deutschmark
EC	European Community
ECO	Islamic Economic Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMU	European Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (The Basque Country and Freedom)
EU	European Union
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HOS	Croatian Liberation Forces
HSF	Croatian Party of Rights
HVO	Croatian Defence Council
JNA	Yugoslav National Army
LCY	Yugoslav Communist Party
MP	Member of Parliament
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
TO	Territorial Forces
TREVI	Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence Internationale ('police' cooperation among the EC countries)

UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protective Forces
VMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Preface

This book was conceived in the summer of 1990. It grew out of the work done by the European Security Group at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen on an earlier book: *The European Security Order Recast* (1990). That book analysed the structural transformation in European security that occurred with the ending of the Cold War. One of its conclusions was that the traditional military and ideological security preoccupations of Europe would become much less important in the future. This book picks up a major implication of that thread, arguing that the idea of *societal security* is now the most effective tool for understanding the new security agenda in Europe. Taking this approach has required us to spend some time developing the concept of societal security, which does not always fit easily into the conventional state-centric mode of security analysis. Part I of the book is therefore devoted to presenting societal security as a lens through which to observe contemporary events in post-Cold War Europe. The rest of the book attempts to describe the landscape and the dynamics that come into view when this lens is used.

When we started work on this project we were using a largely abstract idea which we hypothesised would become more prominent in the real world as time moved on. The swiftness of events has caught up with us more quickly than we anticipated, and as work has progressed we have found ourselves surrounded by an ever more concrete reality of societal insecurity in play. From the Danish rejection of Maastricht, through the assaults on refugee hostels in Germany, to the carnage of ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia, societal insecurities have moved to the centre of the political stage. Despite the remaining ambiguities and uncertainties in the analytical concept, we therefore feel that it is important to open the debate on it as soon as possible.

The basic ideas for the book were developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre. Buzan took principle responsibility for drafting Chapters 1, 3 and 7. Wæver did the same for Chapter 2, which is the core of the theoretical section, and which is why, in addition to correcting past alphabetical injustices, his name comes first in the list of authors. He also co-

authored Chapter 4 with Kelstrup and took some responsibility for editing. Lemaitre organised, edited and in part wrote Chapter 6. Since the core team did not command the whole range of expertise necessary for the project, we recruited a variety of experts to fill in the gaps. All of these graciously consented to work within the framework laid out by the core team. David Carlton wrote Chapter 9. Zig Layton-Henry and Martin O. Heisler co-authored Chapter 8. Torben Hansen and Kristian Gerner each wrote chunks of Chapter 6, and B.A. Roberson provided extensive input and commentary into Chapter 7. At a very late stage it was decided to include a brief chapter on Yugoslavia as an intensive case of societal insecurity, and Håkan Wiberg agreed to try our lens of societal security on his extensive material and analysis of the Yugoslav conflict. Chapter 10 was assembled and drafted by Buzan on the basis of inputs from the project group and texts provided by Kelstrup and Wæver. Buzan took overall responsibility for coordinating and editing the project. Although most of the chapters have identifiable principal authors, all have received input from others engaged in the project over a series of drafts. This is not therefore simply a collection of papers. Rather, it coordinates the thinking of eleven authors within a single framework.

We would like to thank the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, and particularly its Director, Håkan Wiberg, for supporting the work. The Centre not only provided a friendly and stimulating place to develop ideas, but also funded the research and the authors' meetings necessary to pull the book together. Lene Hansen acted as research assistant to the group and compiled the references. Her contribution made our meetings more efficient and congenial, and our research less onerous. Many of her comments and ideas appear throughout the text. Thanks are due to the many people who provided helpful feedback to the project, particularly to Robin Cohen and Nils Petter Gleditsch, who took the trouble to make extensive written observations in the early stages, and to Czeslaw Mesjasz and Sverre Lodgaard, who made very useful comments on a draft of Chapter 2. Relatively late versions of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 benefited from the comments by participants and especially discussants at the annual meeting of American Political Science Association in Chicago and the Inaugural pan-European conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations in Heidelberg, both in September 1992; and chapter 6 from the participants in the conference 'An Emerging Profile of the Baltic States in the Baltic Sea Region Community' in Riga, November 1992.

B.B., M.K., P.L., O.W.
Copenhagen
December 1992

Chapter 1
Introduction: The changing security agenda in Europe
Barry Buzan

1.1. The new security agenda in Europe

Since the middle of the 1980s, Europe has been increasingly subject to the interplay of four enormous political forces: (1) the political stagnation and economic bankruptcy of the Soviet Union; (2) the revitalisation of Western European integration, initially under the banner of '1992', and latterly, and with much more trouble, under 'Maastricht'; (3) the widening acceptance that pluralism and markets were essential ingredients for any successful modern society; and (4) the releasing and/or revival of nationalism and xenophobia. These forces played major roles in bringing the Cold War to an end. Once free to operate without the constraint of superpower rivalry, they acquired much greater latitude and prominence. The sudden collapse of both Soviet power and the ideological challenge of communism to the West were particularly important in unleashing the revival of nationalism and xenophobia (Hassner, 1991, 142, 147; Heitmeyer, 1991). The interplay of these forces is extremely complex. What they have wrought so far constitutes a decisive termination of the post-1945 era, and there is still vast potential for further change in the movements still under way. This section argues that these developments are likely to put a heavy emphasis on society as the main focus of European security concerns during the 1990s and possibly beyond. The next section sketches out the main elements that will affect European security during the coming decade.

Events since 1989 point to a security agenda in Europe that is radically different from that of the past. For the large group of states that are either within, or closely associated with, the European Community, the military and ideological threats that dominated Europe's security agenda both before and after the Second World War have receded into the background. Even under the least benign scenarios sketched below, these threats seem unlikely to regain their former prominence. The present period can in some ways be compared with that during the 1920s, or more briefly during 1945–7, when post-war exhaustion plus a degree of euphoria created low expectations of war. Europe is not threatened by armed invasions from outside, or by 'civil'

wars amongst its own great powers, or by becoming caught up in a war between superpowers. It is not ideologically divided, and in economic terms Western and some of Central Europe are already too much of a single economy to fall easily into neomercantilist fragmentation and competition.

These developments undoubtedly represent progress of a profound sort. But this progress does not eliminate insecurity in Europe. Traditional fears of military revival still lie in the background, and savage subregional conflicts already disturb Europe's complacency. But more important than these left-overs from the old security agenda is the exposure, and in part creation, of a new focus for insecurity. This focus is not primarily on the state. It is not a concern about the military overthrow or political subversion of governments, though it does have threatening implications for the process of governance, both domestic and international. Nor is it in any conventional sense about defending disputed boundaries, or about power rivalries or security dilemmas between states, though all of these things are still important, sometimes centrally so in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The principal focus of the new insecurity is society rather than the state. In the extraordinary conjuncture created by the emergence of new political configurations in both halves of Europe, and the new relationship between Europe and its adjacent environments caused by the end of the Cold War, it is societies that have become exposed to the main causes of insecurity. As Hassner (1991, 152) puts it:

> if one distinguishes between three levels of relations in Europe, strategic interaction, economic interdependence and social interpenetration, the chances of nationalism and the dangers to peace are to be found less on the first level than on the second and third, and particularly in their interplay. The most difficult problem is the socio-cultural one, but the way economic interdependence is achieved can either exacerbate or alleviate it.

In both halves of Europe a radical redefinition of the relationship between state and society is under way. In the western half, the process of integration is constructing a new macro level above the old states. In the economic and political sectors, and in some important ways in terms of identity, a real European entity is emerging, albeit haltingly, above the level of the old nation-states. As it does so, many of the former shielding functions of state boundaries weaken or disappear, and the functions of the state in relation to society change in quite fundamental ways. One result is that societies are more exposed. Cultural peculiarities long defended by states now come under pressure from the homogenisation and standardisation required for a single market. The single market also opens the way for much easier movements of peoples from one area to another. What will be the effect of potentially large movements on societies long used to a fairly high degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity? Will perceptions of threat be greater in countries such as Britain, France and Spain, where the fusion of state and society is many centuries old, or in countries such as Germany, Italy and Norway, where it is much more recent? Again, Hassner's observation (1991, 151) is worth quoting. In Western Europe he sees:

the perception of a threat to national identity coming, on the one hand, from the cosmopolitanism and standardisation of mass culture and consumption (often seen as 'Americanisation') and, on the other hand, the influx of immigrants who, for racial or religious reasons are often seen as alien or hostile. Individual, social and national insecurity, the preoccupation with law and order, jobs and the nation are thus combined into one complex syndrome in which external threats and internal doubts are hard to disentangle.

Recent statements by leading French politicians about immigrant 'invasions', the resort to violence against immigrants, the use of Nazi symbols by young toughs in Germany and Britain, and British, German, Italian and French moves to tighten up the entry rights of asylum seekers, underline Hassner's point and illustrate some of the more problematic strategies for societal defence. They also point to the potential for backlash against the integration process should the old national identities find themselves under threat from its consequences. The integration process not only creates some migration pressures by allowing freer movement for EC citizens, it also places responsibility for defence against migration from outside away from national governments. As French Interior Minister Phillippe Marchand has noted: 'France's external border is more Germany's border with Poland and Italy's with Yugoslavia than the German–French or Italian–French borders' (*Guardian Weekly*, 10 November 1991, 15). Although the bulk of potential migration from the east and the south does not depend on the integration process in the EC, the nature of the responses to it will be very much conditioned by the development of the Community. If the EC is not seen to provide adequate defence, then the Community itself could become politically vulnerable to nationalist disaffection and charges that it was undermining national identities both by encouraging migration and by promoting the homogenising forces of Europeanisation. It is not going too far to say that societal security issues may play a key role in determining not just the pace and scope, but also the success or failure, of the European integration process.

The process of integration in Western Europe creates room for many new configurations of identity to emerge. Some of these are within states, as previously submerged minority nationalities such as Basques, Catalans and Scots find new freedom. Others cross state boundaries, as in the Alpe-Adriatic, Baltic and Danube, where transnational identities find space and legitimacy for themselves in the area between the state and European levels. These identities have to find their feet in a less constrained environment and to establish new relationships with the societies that previously suppressed or dominated them.

In Eastern Europe an entirely different reconstruction of state-society relations is under way, though one substantially influenced by the new status of a European identity. There the main problem is how to construct a relationship between society and state along nation-state lines, while at the same time seeking a whole new pattern of economic relations both within and between societies. For the East-Central European states and the Baltic countries this synthesis is not entirely new, and the main problem is to find

more acceptable forms of government. For most of the successor states of the Soviet Union, the experiment with a modern nation-state (as opposed to pre-modern states) is being tried for the first time. Few of the societies in Eastern Europe have much of a tradition of independent statehood or democracy. Egbert Jahn has rather politely described the prevailing political tradition of the region as 'social nationalism' (Jahn, 1989, 9–15). Most of those that were released from the Ottoman, Austrian, German and Russian empires had only short, fraught periods of independence before being recolonised first, briefly, by Nazi Germany and then for a longer period by the Soviet Union. Most of those released by the breakup of the inner Russian empire have little or no modern experience of statehood and none at all of liberal democracy. Nearly all of these societies therefore have very uncomfortable relations with state power and face serious problems about how to constitute themselves. Many of them also face difficult choices about how to respond to the integration process in the West. Most – even peoples as far away as the Georgians – are strongly attracted to a European identity, though what 'European' means under these circumstances is not always clear. For some, 'European' means little more than Western and is part of the reaction against the communist years. For others 'European' has a more specific sense of geography, history and culture, and a clear focus on the EC as the future embodiment of that identity. But having just recovered independence, few of these peoples have the desire to be submerged once again in a larger entity. Many of the successor states contain substantial minority nationalities, with all of the potential for internal and external political conflict that such discontinuities between boundaries and identities makes possible. Possible echoes of one element in Europe's troubles during the 1930s could be heard when the 1992 draft of Russia's military doctrine stated that infringement of the rights of Russians living outside Russia and of persons 'ethnically and culturally' identified with Russia in republics of the former Soviet Union are viewed as 'a serious source of conflict' (FitzGerald, 1992, 76).

The problems of reformulating state–society–economy relations are not made any easier by the disastrous legacy of the communist period. On the economic side, there is debt, pollution, obsolescence, overcentralisation and hostility to the roles and inequalities that accompany market relationships. On the sociopolitical side, there is an atomised public with few of the networks or traditions of civil society and an archaic party system, the institutional weakness of which makes it vulnerable to populism and personality politics (Schöpflin, 1991). As Hassner argues, these conditions create a real danger of a particularly vicious 'catch 22', because the weakness of civil society provides barren ground for the seeds of democracy and market relations, and the failure of democracy and the market to grow will cripple the prospects for development of civil society. (Hassner, 1991, 137).

The differences in the reconstruction of state–society–economy relations between Eastern and Western Europe constitute a new line, or zone, of division in the continent. This boundary is very different from the Cold War one, but it is at least initially similarly placed and in some ways just as deeply drawn. On the Western side, the existing nation-state structure is still integrating towards a more open construction in which individual societies will be

both less protected and less constrained by the state system. On the Eastern side, the project is to construct nation-states that are viable while being exposed to the post-imperial gales of marketisation and democratisation. The division raises questions about how the two halves of Europe will relate to each other in terms of societal insecurities. From East to West, the threat is one of political and/or economic chaos in the East triggering migration into the West. From West to East, the fear is perhaps best captured in the traditional threat that strong societies have always posed to weaker ones. History is full of examples of stronger societies penetrating, absorbing and even obliterating weaker ones. How will the newly independent societies of the East resist the natural cultural dominance of the richer, better organised and more potent societies of the West? The frequent mention of 'Latin Americanisation', with its implications of military governments, chronic inflation, mass impoverishment and pervasive domestic violence is almost in itself a threatening statement. It is a safe prediction that whatever happens, most of the Eastern societies will experience sharp divisions between nationalists intent on using independence to defend cultural identities, and Westernisers eager to attach their people to the emerging European core.

On both sides of this divide, and in the interplay between them, Europe is undergoing a sociopolitical revolution involving migration of peoples, the formation of new societal identities, and the forging of new political forms and frameworks. The issues raised by societal insecurity are not new to Europe: national identity and political rights have played a major role in its politics since at least the French Revolution, and ethnic hatreds and rivalries were a major issue in both World Wars.

Some of the patterns in the societal insecurities between Eastern and Western Europe recur in the relationship between the European Community and its southern periphery in the Middle East. From south to north there is a perceived risk of mass migration caused by overpopulation, underdevelopment, political violence and/or ecological degradation. From north to south the threats are those posed by strong and powerful societies to weaker ones: penetration, exploitation, domination. One big difference between this centre–periphery relationship and that between Western and Eastern Europe, is that the north–south relationship is not mediated by a shared European identity and is indeed exacerbated by the strong cultural divide between Islam and the West. The colonial experience of the Middle East perhaps has some echoes in the experience of Eastern Europe in creating a legacy of attractions and ties to the West on the one hand, and fears and resentments of it on the other. But whereas relations between Eastern and Western Europe fall within the framework of a single security complex, those between Europe and the Middle East cross the boundary between two traditionally distinct security complexes, with Turkey and the Mediterranean acting as the insulator between them. The question here is how much security concern, and of what kind, will cross this boundary in the future?

If it is societies that are the central focus of this new security problematique, then it is the issues of identity and migration that drive the underlying perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities. Societies are fundamentally about identity. They are about what enables a group of people to refer to them-

selves as 'we'. Except for societies that exist in total isolation (or are universal) they are also about what distinguishes 'us' from 'them'. The defining modes of 'we', 'us' and 'them' are all challenged by the formation of new identities, and the movement of people carrying different identities. The purpose of this book is to examine the agenda of societal insecurity that these issues raise in the new Europe.

1.2. Trends and possibilities in European security during the 1990s

The events of 1989–91 closed some paths and set much of the military and ideological framework within which twenty-first century Europe will evolve (Buzan *et al.*, 1990). There is no plausible path back to the post-war situation of Europe overlaid by two dominant rival superpowers.

The closure of the Cold War option opens the question of what form the European security complex will take. *A security complex is about the relative intensity of security relations: a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed apart from one another* (Buzan, 1991a, ch. 5). All the states in the system are to some extent enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence. But because insecurity is often associated with proximity, this interdependence is far from uniform. Anarchy plus geographical diversity yields a pattern of regionally based clusters, within which security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside such complexes, than it is between states inside the complex and those outside it. Security complexes reflect a real patterning of global politics and are more than just an analytical tool. One can argue about the correct interpretation of the dividing lines, but one cannot just use the term 'security complex' on any group of states. There is a European security complex but not a Nordic one, a Middle-Eastern complex, but not a Mediterranean one. Europe is in these terms a 'natural' security unit.

In our earlier book we argued that the traditional European security complex had been overlaid by the two superpowers after the Second World War. The political and military presence of the United States and the Soviet Union and the imposition of their rivalry effectively suppressed the indigenous dynamics of security relations among the European states and thereby obscured the European complex almost completely. With the breakup of overlay, we argued that two options seemed possible: (1) fragmentation, in which the indigenous security dynamics of the European balance of power reasserted themselves under new conditions; or (2) integration, in which the growth of the EC effectively transformed Europe into a single security entity, making it an actor in a wider global balance of power rather than a regional complex. We argued that integration seemed the more powerful trend, but that fragmentation could not be eliminated as a real possibility (Buzan *et al.*, 1990).

In some respects this judgment still stands, and we will use it to frame the discussion in this book. We are, however, increasingly conscious that the rise of societal insecurity could easily become a powerful force in favour of fragmentation: indeed that it may already have begun to change the balance

of expectation between the two scenarios. Events have also somewhat undermined the clarity of our strict 'either/or' distinction between fragmentation and integration scenarios. The original argument assumed that the Soviet Union would remain in being as an actor. We saw Europe primarily in 'Poland to Portugal' terms, and the question of *fragmentation* or *integration* was thus a quite clear-cut issue about the success or failure of EC integration. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has extended 'Europe' far to the east, adding to it (so far) anything up to fifteen new states, depending on whether or not the Central Asian and Caucasus states are counted as part of Europe (as implied by their membership in CSCE and NACC). In this wider Europe there is no real possibility of a comprehensive integration within the near future (say two decades). The EC could not possibly take in all of the new states and survive. This means that 'fragmentation' will be present in parts of Europe. If integration succeeds, it will therefore create a major actor with some state-like properties, located within a larger European complex within which significant (eastern) parts will remain fragmented. If fragmentation triumphs, then it will define the whole of the new Europe in terms of complex balance of power politics among a very large and mixed group of states.

It has to be noticed here, that integration and fragmentation are not just descriptive terms for phenomena (some fragmentation in Yugoslavia, some integration in Spain) – they are also technical terms (like 'anarchy' in neorealism) that refer to the structural direction of the continent, the generative and policy generated *logic* that shapes political developments. Thus, 'integration' and 'fragmentation' refer not only to developments in specific parts of the continent, but also to the basic logic that takes hold of the European security complex as such: does security fall into the patterns of region–internal balance of power (fragmentation) or does it take the form of one central core relating to other regions of the world and to its own periphery (integration). If the terms were taken only in the descriptive sense, it would be a trivial, tautological fact that we had both integration and fragmentation in Europe. When we are looking for the *basic dynamic*, it is far from trivial – and we would expect 'either/or'.

In the long run, the two scenarios are alternatives posing a stark choice: the ultimate outcome has to be one or the other. But for now we are confronted with a dialectic of integration and fragmentation, where each drives the other. Since each becomes a motive for the other, we get more of both, and it is impossible to determine any firm direction. Integration and fragmentation logics have entered a kind of loop where each swing to the one side generates its opposite. It is widely assumed that the only viable way to counter and contain fragmentation in Eastern Europe is to strengthen European integration. This in turn generates opposition and resistance among peoples (like Danes and Britons) in Western Europe, and this in turn leads to new initiatives for integration with a hard core, and so forth (Wæver forthcoming-c).

Theoretical as well as historical knowledge tells us that a security complex cannot rest where Europe is now. When exposed to the challenge of security, European integration will either unravel towards much less than now ('1992'-minus) or cohere into quite a lot more (Maastricht-plus). It cannot stabilise

where it is. This grey zone existence is comparable to the situation of the United States right after gaining independence. As rightly argued in *The Federalist Papers*, separate states would inevitably end up as rivals and not act in a unified sense towards extra-continental (i.e. European) powers. Naturally, you fear neighbours more than far-away powers, you compare yourself to *relevant* powers and do not want them to grow or gain more than you, in order that their relative power does not grow faster than yours. And so if left to themselves without the cold war shield, the European powers (which means first of all France and Germany) will end up thinking about each other in these power and security terms. If so, they will evaluate all kinds of cooperation in terms of relative power gains, and they will more and more often defect from cooperation in order not to strengthen the other. (Wæver forthcoming-c). There is a deep structural reason why this logic is much more likely to impose itself after the end of the cold war: now the European powers have relative power gains in Europe as potentially the most immediate security concern – and no overriding (East–West) structuration to overlay this logic. A power political analysis points to two (and only two) real options for Europe: fragmentation (return to internal power balancing) and integration (quasi-state formation). We take integration as the navigation mark for our enquiry and investigate the logics and tensions of this process especially at the identity level, not forgetting that fragmentation is an important part of the integration picture.

At the centre of the integration scenario stands the EC. The Community has already taken on some actor-qualities in the international system. Whether it wants to be or not, it is treated by others as the main pole of power in Europe. This external demand is now a main driving force pushing integration further, reinforcing the internal economic and political pressures of the 1992 project. The unexpectedly rapid and deep collapse of Soviet power leaves the EC by default as the core focus for order and stability in the whole region. It has been thrust into this role whilst still in the middle of its own difficult formative process. Though not a state, or anything close to a state, the EC is none the less increasingly required to have something like a common foreign policy at a time when its internal processes are still in part foreign policy for the individual member states. Among other things, this complex and fragile arrangement means that the further processes of integration and disintegration in the EC will be powerfully influenced by its successes and failures in collective foreign policy. Even without this intervening variable, the evolution of the EC would be uncertain. The addition of strong feedback effects increases the unknowns. Foreign policy pressures could enhance the Community's development or they could help to unravel it.

We do not know what the EC will become. It seems safe to say that it will not follow the Soviet Union into complete dissolution. It also seems safe to say that it will not quickly, if ever, actually become a state, however many state-like qualities it acquires. In between the extremes of disintegration and consolidation the possibilities are legion. The close outcomes in either direction of the Danish and French referendums on Maastricht indicate how fragile and indeterminate this whole process is. The EC is groping its way towards a

new form of national-international political relationship. Its progress is highly susceptible to influence from both random events and unanticipated feedback consequences from the process of integration itself. Although the process is extraordinarily powerful in both its motivating forces and its consequences, there is no guarantee of it either developing in any particular direction or resulting in any particular outcome.

It is no exaggeration to say that the fate of the EC will largely determine the future construction of security in Europe. To the extent that integration succeeds, a large section of the European security complex will be transformed into a single actor operating not only as the major node within the complex, but also as one of several major poles of power in the international system. For the member states, successful integration will steadily transform much of what is now their foreign policy into the quasi-domestic policy of intra-European politics. The depth of integration will determine whether or not the Community achieves actor quality, effectively ceasing to be an anarchic international subsystem within itself. The breadth of integration will define not only the scope of 'Europe' but also the nature of Europe's security environment. Whether the bulk of the ex-Soviet empire is eventually within or outside the EC will determine much about both the character of the EC and the nature of its external relations. If integration falters, or unravels, then the process of disintegration in Western Europe will combine with that in Eastern Europe to generate new internal patterns within the European security complex as a whole.

The logic of security and rivalry is much closer under the skin than widely assumed. For instance, a spread of competitive interventions into the Yugoslav conflict in the summer of 1991 was prevented by *expectations* in France and Germany that more was to be gained from preserving the momentum of EC integration – a momentum that was lost a year later with the 'Danish' crisis over ratification of Maastricht and the monetary turbulence of 1992. With renewed Europessimism, the relative weight of local gains (from narrowly defined national power calculations) versus the gains from continued integration might look different in the case of the next crisis, for example the much mooted widening of the conflict in the Balkans. Then a roll-back of EC integration would be a real possibility, and the logic of security rivalry would take over. What we are talking about here is a possible intrusion of the logic of security, of mutual suspicion and *power measured competition*, which can upset the integration game and lead back to an old and all too familiar one. This risk is real. It is so because the EC has to be reconsidered in light of the end of the Cold War. What is to be feared is not military conflicts in Western Europe, but that a security-driven relationship would mean a process of disintegration, of unravelling for the EC. It is not possible that the projects for monetary and political union could continue if France and Germany started watching each other with suspicion over sub-regional conflicts in the Balkans or between Russia and Ukraine. If they started to worry intensively about relative power gains and geopolitical positioning, even the single market could unravel, because it is unlikely that, for example, France would accept verdicts by the European Court if these went against strongly felt French concerns, and the competition about

relative power gains would lead France to stop accepting some of its part of implementing the single market.

Theoretically as well as historically, security logic either operates *within a region*, or the region constitutes itself as an actor in security relations *at the global level*. In the latter case, international security fears disappear from relations within the continent because it has become sufficiently centred and thereby stopped operating as a balance of power system internally.

The fragmentation scenario requires a major disruption of the integration process and a return to a situation in which the European states themselves are the primary security actors. This is of course not a single, unambiguous event: fragmentation could take many particular forms, these depending in part on what caused the integration process to collapse. Its most severe form would be the complete disintegration of the EC and a return to balance of power international relations. Milder forms would include a partial collapse of the EC or a breakdown of its internal cohesion. Fear of fragmentation is one of the main pillars of the integration process, and that fear is based on the disastrous outcome of two world wars. It is difficult, though not yet impossible (Mearsheimer, 1990), to imagine a return to the *military* balance of power Europe of pre-1945, in which the European powers jostled and fought militarily amongst themselves. Many factors weigh against such a return. Memories of the catastrophic costs of total war in Europe are still strong. NATO, CSCE and the EC provide a robust web of organisations that serve the goal of more orderly relations in Europe, and this institutional framework avoids the cost of having one power directly dominate the others. The scaling-up of markets and production has undermined capabilities for rival national military mobilisation even in the core capability of arms production. The spread of democracy has suppressed the will for war, and a situation has developed in which the states and peoples of Western Europe no longer expect or prepare to use force against each other. It is highly unlikely that all of this could be undone to such an extent that military rivalry returns in Western Europe. But even non-military security fears and power rivalry in Western Europe could lead to a self-propelling process of disintegration.

There are several quite conceivable scenarios for the emergence of a new European security complex. Given that the fragmented East is now inside an expanded Europe, most of these involve combinations of the integration and fragmentation scenarios. Part of the complexity in considering these options is the continuing controversy over what constitutes 'Europe': is Europe's eastern boundary Poland, or Ukraine, or Russia? In trying to think through scenarios, it helps to keep in mind that security complexes require a subsystem of independent states whose security relations are substantially interdependent. Both amity and enmity can underpin security interdependence, which means that a security complex can be constructed along a theoretical spectrum ranging from a security community (all amity), through a security regime (controlled enmity), to a conflict formation (all enmity) – (Wæver 1989a, 307–10; Buzan, 1991a, chap. 5). The maximum geographical scope for a European complex would be as it was in 1914, including Russia and Turkey.

As suggested above, it is just about possible to imagine a return to pre-1945 dynamics, set towards the conflict formation end of the spectrum, involving

balance of power manoeuvring among the major powers. This would require massive deterioration of the EC, NATO and CSCE. In such an all-European complex, Germany would once again be the centre of gravity. Somewhat more plausible under current conditions of low ideological and military tension, is an all-European complex set somewhere between a security regime and a security community. Here the integration project would have failed, but a substantial institutional framework would remain. States would conduct independent foreign policies, but expectations of the use of force among the major powers would be low, and Europe would remain densely networked. A variant of this is compatible with successful integration scenarios in which an EC actor constructs a security regime with the rest of eastern and southeastern Europe.

Also compatible with the integration scenario is a Europe of subcomplexes, in which (as in the Middle East) local nodes of particularly strong security interdependence developed within a more loosely constructed overarching complex. There are three plausible candidates for subcomplexes. One is Western European, stretching from Hungary, Poland, the Baltics and Finland in the east, to Portugal and Ireland in the west. This might be constituted as anything from a single EC actor (if deepening and some widening succeed), to a subcomplex located towards the security community end of the spectrum (if integration fails). The second is Eastern European, composed of Russia, Belorus, Ukraine, and perhaps Romania, the Caucasian republics and the Baltics. Relations within it will be more towards the middle (security regime), or possibly the conflict formation end of the spectrum. The difficult question of whether the central Asian republics will relate more to this formation, or more to the Middle East and Asia is discussed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7. The third subcomplex is in the Balkans, where old rivalries among Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Albania and the successor states of Yugoslavia are reasserting themselves with a vengeance. These could also draw in Hungary and Romania. This subcomplex seems likely to be located towards the conflict formation end of the spectrum. If the EC remains coherent, it will not be able to avoid engagement in the Balkans because of both Greece and Hungary. Links between the Eastern European and Balkan subcomplexes are also entirely possible because of traditional Bulgarian ties to Russia and the swing positions of Turkey and Romania. In this scenario, one key element would be the degree of engagement or disengagement of the Western subcomplex in the other two, which would in turn depend heavily on the fate of integration. It is not plausible to imagine the EC disengaged from the Balkans. But it is perhaps possible to imagine a fault line developing between the Eastern and Western subcomplexes that became deep enough to justify treating them as separate complexes in their own right and no longer part of a larger European whole.

Whether Europe's future is dominated by integration or fragmentation (or for a certain period some combination), European security will also be strongly affected by the post-Cold War construction of the international system as a whole. The structural shape of this 'new world order' is already clear in several important respects. Bipolarity is dead. The new pattern is a combination of several poles of power, a single dominant ideology and a

single dominant coalition. This combination defines a new international order that can usefully be seen as structured along centre–periphery lines (Buzan, 1991b; Galtung, 1971; Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992). The resurgence of the UN Security Council as a legitimising device for intervention suggests the potentiality of a more coherent centre coalition. At this stage, however, as shown by the incoherent response to the Yugoslav crisis, the organisational structure of global management is still confused. There is as yet no clear division of labour or authority among the numerous organisations in play. The core of the centre is formed by the coalition of advanced capitalist powers in North America, Europe and Asia. This formation dominates the global networks of trade, finance, production, transportation, information, culture and R&D. It forms a security community in military terms, and it shares an economic regime, though it retains intense economic competition amongst rival economic centres. Most of the remnants of the Soviet empire are trying to join or associate with it, by plugging themselves into as many parts of the network as they can. The end of the second world's challenge to the first destroyed much of the political space that the third world had enjoyed during the Cold War. Aid is no longer easily available for strategic reasons, but now is increasingly conditional on the much more demanding and invasive grounds of liberal rectitude in economic and domestic political policy.

There are good reasons for thinking that this arrangement will define the main lines of international relations for the 1990s and perhaps considerably beyond. Given the huge disparities between centre and periphery in terms of power, wealth, organisation and stability, the only immediate alternative to it is a collapse of the centre into blocs, where rivalry supersedes the centre–periphery alignment. The only force pushing in this direction is the competition for trade in conditions of surplus capacity and the pressure for protectionism that such conditions promote. To succeed in breaking up the centre, economic rivalry would have to overcome not only the deep financial, production and market interdependence of the main market economy powers, but also the widely shared understanding among them that a return to 1930s style rivalry among closed imperial blocs would be economically ruinous and militarily dangerous. Unlike the 1930s, there is no will for intra-capitalist military rivalry and a profound awareness that war would not serve anyone's interest. Public opinion is more sophisticated and would be much harder to mobilise in favour of militaristic policies than it was during the interwar years and earlier. There may well be some formation of regional economic blocs, but they will continue to be interpenetrated by strong networks – of trade, investment, corporate ownership – and joint research projects. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the capitalist powers appear to have transcended Lenin's prediction that they would inevitably fall into conflict with each other over the redivision of the global market.

Within this general picture, the EC is firmly within the core. The certainty and security of that position is, however, moderated by its location next to both the disintegrated Soviet empire and the volatile relations of the Middle East: the first hung precariously between centre and periphery, the second one of the most turbulent areas of the periphery. There are, in other words, major questions about the nature of the larger regional environment in which

the EC, whatever its configuration, will have to operate. It is not clear whether that environment will be benign or malevolent. It could be benign either because it is stable or because, though unstable, its disarray is largely internalised and does not affect the Community. It could be malign either because its instability has repercussions for the EC, or because it becomes directly hostile to it.

One way to look at the security environment of the EC is to ask how far the newly revived process of decolonisation will go in its neighbours to the east and south. During the last decade of the Cold War, it was generally thought that decolonisation was over except for some scattered islands and enclaves and a few awkward cases such as South Africa, Israel and Hong Kong. But the implosion of the Soviet Union and the civil wars in Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and Somalia have revealed a substantial potential for second and even third rounds of the process. The principle of self-determination still has the power to destroy weak territorial states whose populations perceive them as empires.

The second round affects the older generation of states: those in which a dominant ethnic group or class – a 'lateral ethnie' – attempted to weld together diverse ethnic groups into a single nation-state (Smith, 1991: 52–61). Britain, France, Spain and in a different way the United States are the founding examples. Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire failed to seek national integration. The Soviet Union did attempt it, and after a longer struggle, is following the other multi-ethnic empires into dissolution. Separatist rumblings among Scots, Basques, Catalans, Corsicans, Quebecois and other 'integrated' minority groups suggest that this issue may not be settled even in some of the most successful and long-standing states.

A possible third round awaits in the many products of decolonisation in Africa, the Middle East and Asia that gained political independence between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s. Most of these are lateral states in the making, and only a few of them have made much progress in fitting a new territorial nationalism onto their diverse ethnic populations. They remain weak as states, having relatively low levels of sociopolitical cohesion (Buzan, 1991a: 96–107). The impact of triumphant nationalism in the ex-Soviet empire can only fan the flames of ethnic self-determination in these states. Not only does it reassert the legitimacy of ethnic self-determination against an 'imperial' state, but also it brings into question the sanctity of existing state boundaries that has been such a strong feature of the decolonisation/Cold War era. Yugoslavia is one harbinger and raises also the question of what international standing substate boundaries have in disintegrating states. Although having a slightly longer and somewhat different history, Yugoslavia was in many ways similar to a lot of third world weak states in containing a diversity of ethnic groups within a fairly arbitrary territorial boundary. Since Yugoslavia played a leading role in the Nonaligned movement, its example will hardly go unnoticed. The prospect is of a third round of decolonisation, mostly in the periphery, in which the post-colonial states and/or their boundaries will be challenged by the forces of self-determination. Since the principle of sacrosanct boundaries has already cracked within the centre against this assault, why should it stand in the periphery? So far the weak territorial

states of the periphery have mostly held their ground against secessionism, but it is an open question whether they can continue to do so. The cases of Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Zaire, Sri Lanka, and in different ways Afghanistan, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine/Jordan and Iraq, all suggest that the territorial framework of the post-war decolonisation may be on the brink of significant disintegration in some areas.

The significance of rekindled decolonisation for European security is that its immediate environment to the east is in the throes of the second round, and its immediate environment to the south and southeast is vulnerable to the third. The option of an international environment that is benign because it is stable thus seems remote. Equally unlikely is an unstable environment that is benign because it is introverted. To the east, the disintegration of the Soviet Union is intimately linked to the process of European integration and cannot be isolated from it. To the south lies the Middle East, Europe's border with the third world, and Christendom's border with Islam. In many ways the manifest turbulence, instability and violence of the Middle East is inward looking. As we will see in Chapter 7, the Middle Eastern security complex has its own intense dynamics that are distinct from, and in principle therefore separable from, Europe. But it seems unlikely that security insulation between the two will or can be anything like complete. Europe will be under strong pressure to play a role in the Middle East, both in direct defence of its own economic and strategic interests and because there will be a demand for it to play the ordering role of a great power in its immediately adjacent peripheral region. Whether it plays this role as a coherent entity or, as traditionally, in the form of a turbulent security complex in its own right will make a big difference to its impact.

1.3. The structure of the book

Part I begins by exploring the concept of societal security in some depth. Chapter 2 establishes the logic and definitions of the concept, and Chapter 3 relates it to the more traditional ideas of state, national and international security. Part II applies the idea to the contemporary unfolding of events in Europe. Chapter 4 looks at the process of Europeanisation and its impact on national identities and political institutions in the European Community and eastern Europe. Chapter 5 deals with the Yugoslav crisis and war showing both how the concept of societal security can be a tool for understanding the processes of escalation leading an ethnic conflict all the way to war. Chapter 6 deals with the massive reorientation of state–society relations under way in the former Soviet Union. Chapter 7 explores the validity of fears about a much mooted societal cold war between the new Europe and the Middle East. Chapter 8 examines the impact of migration on European societal identity. Chapter 9 looks at the implications of societal insecurity for civil war, 'terrorism' and public order in Europe. Part III is a summary, reconsideration and attempt to begin thinking about strategies for societal security. Chapter 10 reviews societal security as a concept, looking at its advantages, problems and scope for development, and summarising both the main lines of threat to societal security and the range of possible responses to societal insecurity. It also attempts to think forward about the relationship between societal insecurity and the future of Europe.

PART I – SOCIETAL SECURITY

Chapter 2
Societal security: the concept
Ole Wæver

The purpose of this chapter is to define the concept of *societal security*. Since this has not previously been attempted, it is useful not only to present our chosen definition but also to discuss at some length various possible approaches to the problematique. Defining 'societal security' requires that one consider not only 'society' *and* 'security', but also 'society' *plus* 'security', societal security. The chapter starts out with a section discussing 'societal', 'social' and 'society' – what is this new referent object we intend to introduce into security studies? Can it be given any meaningful and coherent content – is there a way to cut through the maze set up by generations of sociologists and anthropologists? We do not intend to solve some or all of the problems they have raised as to possible meanings of 'society' in their studies, merely to pick out useful contributions and explain how 'society' can be given a clear meaning in the context of security studies. The second subsection moves to the other core concept, 'security'. Without rehearsing the total debate, it restates some of the basic options as to definitions of security and locates the present approach in this wider landscape. So a concept of 'societal security' is established, but also the general meaning of security is given a new twist. The third subsection contains a discussion of the most common source of societal identity: the ethno-national community, which stands out to some degree among collective 'societal' identities. Is this *the source* of society, or just one potential – albeit empirically dominant – source of identity? And what does the literature on nationalism and national identity usefully tell us for the present project?

2.1. The 'society' in 'societal security'

At its most basic, social identity is what enables the word 'we' to be used. A 'we' identity can vary across a wide spectrum in terms of the size of the group to which it applies, the intensity with which it is felt, and the reasons that create a sense of belonging together. The size of social groups ranges from small, comprising a mere handful of people (family, friends, sports teams), through community and national levels ('we Berliners', 'we Germans') count-ing many millions, to civilisational and religious identities ('we Europeans', 'we Muslims') numbering hundreds of millions. The intensity of the 'we'

identity can vary from the cool functionalism of a professional association and the passionate but ephemeral quality of youth cults, to the white heat of some gang, clan, national or religious identities where people are prepared to kill or die in its service. There is no particular linkage between the size and the intensity of societal identities and no uniformity of intensity within any given group. National and religious identities, especially when threatened, can generate high intensity among very large groups, but it is quite normal to find the strength of individual adherence within such communities ranging from mere acceptance of the common cause to extremists for whom the furtherance of the identity takes priority over all else.

A first definitional problem concerns 'society' as distinguished from just any social group. A first clue can be taken from Rousseau (1968 [1762], 58f; book I, chap. 5):

> There will always be a great difference between subduing a multitude and ruling a society. If one man successively enslaved many separate individuals, no matter how numerous, he and they would never bear the aspect of anything but a master and his slaves, not at all that of a people and their ruler; an aggregation perhaps, but certainly not an association, for they would neither have a common good nor be a body politic . . . Before considering the act by which a people submits to a king, we ought to scrutinize the act by which people become a people, for that act, being necessarily antecedent to the other, is the real foundation of society.

The main point here is that the members cannot have only some attributes in common (according to sociologists or kings), they have to have a feeling of together constituting an entity: a people, a nation, a community. This will most often be an implicit act and does not have to be a complete 'Social Contract', but there has to be a subjective dimension to the community, a feeling that 'we are x', and that this is of value to the individual.

This idea relates to Tönnies' classical distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* ('society' or 'association'). A *Gemeinschaft* is a 'natural', not necessarily consciously articulated, group of an organic character, whereas *Gesellschaft* is built on a more contract-like rational conception of utility among the members (Tönnies, 1887; Lukes, 1973: 143f). 'Society' cannot be reduced to a purely rational calculating dimension, since it also has a social and moral structure which causes these calculations by the individuals, and which reproduces itself from generation to generation. This is Durkheim's point about society having a 'reality of its own' not to be reduced to the individual level. Seeing society only as a rational contract involves a kind of 'methodological individualism', where society can be understood in rational choice terms with the individuals as the basic unit. This means that ultimately society is not more than the sum of its parts and not a meaningful referent object. Pure *Gesellschaft* conceptions necessarily imply an individualist ontology, whereas pure *Gemeinschaft* conceptions obviously correlate with the opposite, organic approach, probably to a degree which most mildly liberal persons would reject. This leads us towards the view, that 'society' is basically to be conceived of as both: necessarily to some degree more than the sum of its parts, and not reducible to individuals.

Giddens has noted that there are actually two distinctively different meanings of 'society' in sociology (1985: 163): 'One is the generalized connotation of "social association" or interaction: the other is the sense in which "a society" is a unity, having boundaries which mark it off from other, surrounding societies.' In general, Giddens tries to solve this problem by dismissing the relevance of the second dimension (since societies do not have clear boundaries), and thus reduces the subject to the first dimension. This timeless and placeless view of society cannot easily be used in a security analysis at the international level, and we cannot follow Giddens at this point. We are interested in societies as units operating in an international system. Some other sociologists have tried to argue that the only society is the global society (Luhmann, 1982, 1989, 1990: 618ff; Robertson, 1990). But we need a separate concept of society (and nation) to operate in parallel to but distinct from the state, and so we cannot accept that the concept of society is swallowed by general social structures, thus losing its unit character.

In their meaning as 'units', modern societies are, according to Giddens, most often nation states or modelled on the ideal of the nation state. The nation is to be discussed in section 2.3, but we need to address here one aspect that may be involved implicitly in our concept of 'society'. Weber provides a classic definition of 'nation'. His most direct definition is:

> In so far as there is at all a common object lying behind the obviously ambiguous term 'nation,' it is apparently located in the field of politics. One might well define the concept of nation in the following way: a nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own. [Gerth and Mills, 1958: p.176]

The close link between state and nation raises a number of questions, and points us towards an assumption that is probably often implicit in much thinking about nations and to some extent on societies more generally. As pointed out by Immanuel Wallerstein and others, society has been conceived of as 'the other' of the state (Featherstone, 1990: 3; Wallerstein, 1988; cf. also Dyson, 1980: 55ff); it is 'that which is not state'. Society is both an alternative place ('civil society') and the ultimate source of legitimacy for the state. This concept of 'society' was unknown to classical Greece. When human beings formed a collective unit, it was called a state. There was no idea of the state as different from the political citizens; and the contrast would be with the individuals as private persons and independent units, not as another collectivity, 'society' (Arendt, 1958). However, our modern concept of 'society' seems to have emerged exactly as this correlate to the state, albeit with different emphasis on the separation of state and society, as in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and on the connectedness of the two, in the Continental tradition (Dyson, 1980; Kissinger, 1957: 192–5).

This pairing presents us with a dilemma. The close link to the state could be an advantage, since we want to study the relationship of societal security and state security. But if we conceive of 'society' as a partner to the state, their

relationship gets locked into a single formation in which societal security is precluded from being an independent subject. If society means 'the (emotional) foundations of the state', then societal security relates only to threats against the foundations of the state, at best a useless repetition of the whole argument around state security. And if 'nation' is defined as a community that strives for statehood, we cannot include in the study the role of nations that settle for some other situation, which might (as argued below) be an increasingly relevant phenomenon in Europe.

We seem to be confronted with a dilemma. If we opt for the clearly existing units, we end up with 'the other side of the state'; and if not, we have a multitude of organized patterns of socialization, but no clear sense of 'society' as a thing in itself. To put it differently: how can one differentiate between the security of groups in society and the security of society as a whole? Our study will deal with both kinds of security, but mostly the second. First, we deal briefly with the security of groups in society and then return to the overall meaning of 'society'.

From the moral (or goal-oriented) point of view to the extent that we are interested in studying and finding processes that enhance the security of people then we must be concerned about all threats against security in society. Ultimately this points towards the study of individual security (cf. Lasswell, 1965 (1935); Berki, 1986; Buzan, 1991a; chaps 1–3; Bloom, 1990). This field is important for two reasons, first, because it is of substantive importance for those concerned, secondly, because threats to individual and small-group security can in the case of powerful actors trigger strong reactions with effects on other groups and potentially society at large or even other societies or states in the international system. For example, if French farmers feel that their life basis is threatened by the change of EC agricultural policy and if they react strongly against EC policy towards GATT and more open trade with the East, their insecurity can cause increased insecurity in Eastern Europe, decreased capacity of the EC to deal with this and increased tensions between the EC and the USA. The insecurity of social groups can percolate upwards to affect the stability and security of society as a whole, with consequences reaching into other societies. Thus, we must have an interest in security at all the lower levels. But for reasons similar to those given in the discussion of society as *Gemeinschaft* and/or *Gesellschaft* above, it is not advisable to define the sum of the security of these smaller social groups as societal security. Doing so would lead us down the track tried so often in 'critical' debates on '(national) security': towards an atomistic, aggregate view of security. The resultant focus on individual and global security simply misses out the essential dynamics of collective units (states, societies) constituting themselves as social and political realities by interacting in an international system.

There is nothing inevitable or permanent about defining security in state-centred terms: it has emerged historically and might change again. But one has to admit 'the extent to which the meaning of security is tied to historically specific forms of political community' (Walker, 1990: 5). Only to the extent that other forms of political community become thinkable does it make sense to think about security at other levels. The main process at the present is a

very open and contradictory articulation of the relationship between state (and other political structures) and nation (and other large-scale cultural communities), and therefore the main dynamic of security will play at the interface of state security and societal security (in the sense of the security of large-scale 'we' identities). Thus, in this study we will continually be aware of specific threats to social groups, but we want to construct our concept of societal security in a way distinct from this, as being at a wider level of collectivity which is itself a social fact. One merit of not defining societal security in terms of individual security is that it becomes possible to study the relationship between the two.

We are thus interested in large-scale social units. But how large? What characterizes 'society' as distinct from 'social groups'? A main criteria is 'interpretative community' what is the context in which principles of legitimacy and valuation circulate and within which the individual constructs an interpretation of events? What social context has – in the eyes of the individuals – the dignity of a 'site of judgment'? (Foucault, 1977, 18; Weber, C., 1992, 212). Furthermore, it should be stressed that in the case of 'society', the question is not what the individual belongs to (since we all belong to numerous social contexts), but what society belongs to the individual, what social identity is his or hers as a part of the individual identity, without which he or she would feel diminished if this social context disappeared.

The essential elements registered so far are (1) the duality of society as social structure(s) and as large-scale collective units of individuals, (2) the component of mutual orientation, of a sense of forming or being a society, and (3) a grounding in structures, institutions and practices. We thus end up with a definition of society partly following Giddens (1985: 164f): 'a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity'; or more poetically, 'a rich and complex moral reality' (Durkheim, quoted by Lukes, 1988: p. 504). Institutions should not be taken too literally (which would make society more or less equal to the nation state), but societies differ from other social groups in having a high degree of social inertia, a continuity often across generations and a strong infrastructure of norms, values and 'institutions' in the wider sense. A nation – a concept on which we shall concentrate in subsection 2.3 – is then a special case of society characterized by: (a) affiliation to a territory, (b) a combination of present-time community with a continuity across time, linking past members to current and future members, and (c) a feeling of being one of the units of which the global society consists, i.e. with a natural right to demand a nation state, even if this right is not necessarily exercised.

Our definition of society is not a very surprising – or particularly sharp – one, nor should it be. Our purpose is not to develop general theory in sociology. We need to clarify the concept only so that our further argument is clear, and to the extent that this definition consists of a common sense consensus covering marxists and functionalists, Giddens, Weber and Rousseau, this seems to us to be an advantage. For the present purpose it has been necessary to make clear, first, that neither society nor nation is inherently linked to state; secondly that there is a category 'society' which can be distinguished from other social groups and, thirdly that this society does

not connotate any kind of harmony or full agreement but will normally contain internal conflicts as well as a willingness to defend itself against outside threats (Aron, 1967: 234ff; Weber, 1972: 20–3).

Ethno-national communities are not automatically or necessarily the prime basis for society, but it is clear that 'national identity', when employed, is an extremely powerful mode of subjectivisation. People basically live with multiple identities and these do not necessarily have a clear or permanent hierarchy in relation to each other. But in specific situations, especially the closer one comes to war in either literal or metaphorical forms, the more there will be a hierarchy. In these conditions national identity is usually able to organize the other identities around itself. In more relaxed situations, other identities are certainly able to compete with the national one. Furthermore, it is not pre-determined which national identity will gain from the general power of nationalism. Many individuals have multiple, possibly contradictory options: Bavarian and German, Slovak and Czechoslovak, Scottish and British. As we will argue in section 2.3 (and Chapters 4, 5 and 6), national identity is so far the most important form of large-scale social and political identity.

The only rival to nationalism as a social identity comprehensive enough and robust enough to support governing machinery has been religion. Like nationalism, religion has the considerable political advantage of reproducing its 'we' identity across generations in a more or less automatic fashion. This enables both of these types of societal identity to provide deep and durable foundations for political constructions. Religion has a potential advantage over nationalism in its greater flexibility of recruitment. Conversion to religion is – with a few exceptions – unobstructed by the rigidities of ethnic and linguistic heritage, and so it provides, at least in theory, a more open framework for political construction. It can be done quite quickly when voluntary conversion may occur and offers the opportunity to weld together an otherwise diverse community. 'Conversion' to a different nationality may in some senses be impossible within a single generation. As the history of Jews, blacks, Chinese and many other immigrant minorities attests, there are also awkward questions about whether immigrants of a different race can ever become full members of the national group, even if they are born and fully socialised into the national culture and language, so long as others in the group continue to see them as foreign. But because of its need to bridge the secular and spiritual worlds, religion operates at a political disadvantage compared with nationalism. National identity is a historical artefact, and easily and directly related to the process of government. Religious identity is not fully focused in the everyday world, and its spiritual elements can easily contradict, or not support, the political necessities of temporal existence. Islam, for example, may help to weld together a culturally diverse state such as Pakistan, but only at the cost of creating a strong transnational sense of community, the *umma*, that weakens the exclusivity and legitimacy of the secular state. Christianity successfully created a sense of civilisational identity, but since the fall of Rome has failed to unite it politically.

The main units of analysis for societal security are thus politically significant ethno-national and religious identities. National or nation-like identities

range from rather small groups such as the Welsh and the Romany people, through major nations such as the French, Germans and Poles, to the larger but vaguer civilisational idea of Europeans. Religious identities often work on a larger scale (Christendom or Islam) but usually contain subdivisions power-ful enough to constitute politically significant distinct identities (Catholic or Protestant or Orthodox, Sunni or Shi'ia). Where religious and national identities reinforce each other they can create very strong identities (Catholic Poland, Jewish Israel, Shi'ite Persia, Orthodox Greece, Shinto Japan), and very strong patterns of fear, hostility and societal insecurity (Christian Armenians versus Islamic Azerbaijanis, Jewish Israelis versus Islamic Arabs, Orthodox Greeks versus Islamic Turks).

This focus on national and religious identities does not imply that other types of social group – ideological, sexual, environmental, occupational, political, sporting, class, hobbyist and suchlike – are not also important in the constitution of society. What it does point to is a key distinction between social groups and societies. All societies contain a myriad of social groups, each carrying its own identity. But a societal identity is one that is not only robust enough in construction, and comprehensive enough in its following, but also broad enough in the quality of identity it carries, to enable it to compete with the territorial state as a political organizing principle. A societal identity is able to reproduce itself independently of the state and even in opposition to the state's organisational principle. Ethno-national and reli-gious identities have acquired particular prominence compared to other social groups because of their historical association with the development of the modern state. That association is in part complementary, as when societal identities provide legitimacy for governments, and partly contradictory, as when societal divisions provide the basis for assaults on governmental legiti-macy and authority.

On this basis, we can conclude that in the contemporary international system, societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom. This definition makes it difficult to give any objective definition of when there is a threat to societal security. We can best understand it by studying the processes whereby a group comes to perceive its identity as threatened, when it starts to act in a security mode on this basis, and what behaviour this triggers. Societal security is about situ-ations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms.

2.2. Security debates: wide or narrow agendas?

Our starting point is that security is broadly about the pursuit of freedom from threat. In human experience, no unit, whether individual or group, can ever be wholly secure. Security is always relative. The degree of it increases to the extent that threats are of low intensity and vulnerabilities few, and decreases as threats become more intense and vulnerabilities are more nu-merous and potentially serious in consequence if challenged. Security is thus a

result of the interplay between the vulnerabilities of the unit and the threats that if faces.

As argued above, the security of societies is closely related to, but none the less distinct from, political security, which is about the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy. Only rarely are state and societal boundaries conterminous. The key to society is that set of ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, about the self conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. These identities are distinct from, though often entangled with, the explicitly political organizations concerned with government.

Societal security is not used in this book as a 'more human' concept of security negating state security. We do not follow those theorists whose search for an alternative to state security leads them to individual security (sometimes called global security), and thus arrive by this route at a concept of 'societal security' composed of aggregated individual securities. Whenever security is defined via individual security there is a high risk that the core of the classical security problematique which one is allegedly trying to redefine, not forget, will be missed. A new agenda may be set successfully only at the price of losing one's grip on something which is also very real: the specific type of interplay among human collectivities which follows the logic of security. This classical logic can neither be studied nor avoided by measuring how secure individuals are. Security in this sense is a collective phenomenon and the way these collectivities relate is a trait of the system (see Figure 2.1).

It has become fairly common to talk about various sectors (or the like) in the field of security. One suggestion is Barry Buzan's five sectors: military, political, economic, environmental and societal. Although we may for practical purposes continue to talk about five sectors, our work with societal security has led us to conclude that the situation is more complicated. In the original conception, the five sectors were all ultimately sectors of state security. The state can be threatened by many things other than military threats. The reason why the sectors do not disintegrate into separate realms but remain sectors of the security problem is exactly that the common denominator is the threats to and defence by the state. The relative intensity and urgency of the different sectors explains the priorities given to each by the state. Of course, all sectors – and some more than others – do involve individuals. Individuals may die from air pollution, or agricultural land be degraded, either can give the state concern. Military threats can also be extremely menacing to individuals, but the criteria a state uses to judge their relevance and security importance is ultimately the way threats challenge sovereignty and territorial control and how they can be countered (cf. Aron. 1966: 5ff and 72f; Boserup, 1987; Wæver, forthcoming-b). Various social groups – or finally individuals – will be central to any specific security situation, but the concept of security, even with the formulation in terms of five sectors, had the state (and sovereignty) as the core referent object in all five sectors. In this framework, societal security was about the way states could be undermined or destabilized by 'their' societies becoming threatened

International *dynamics*

National (state) level

Individual level *dynamics*

conceptual
focus:
state
sovereignty

Figure 2.1 Hourglass model of security

or weakened in terms of social cohesion and identity. The referent object was the state, society was just a sector, an arena, where the state might be threatened.

Our work in this book shows this formulation to be untenable. In general, it would mean that a number of 'societies', such as the Kurds or Palestinians, which do not have or do not fit existing states, could only enter the story as nuisances: the more they cohered, the less security there would be for the state(s) containing them. This creates an excessive concern with state stability and largely removes any common sense idea about 'the security of societies' in their own right. In particular, it does not fit the logic of the integration scenario in Europe. Substantial parts of Europe might be gradually changing in a direction where states become less dominant, and societies – not always directly searching for state expression – become more important as political actors.

To deal with these problems we propose a reconceptualisation of the security field. Instead of talking about five parallel sectors all held together by state security (Figure 2.1), we shall work with a duality of state security and societal security, the former having sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and the latter being held together by concerns about identity (see Figure 2.2). Both concern survival. Sovereignty is the name of the game of survival for a state – if it loses its sovereignty, it has not survived as a state (and therefore a state saying 'security', always implicitly says that some specific issue at which it points, could ultimately threaten its sovereignty). Survival for a society is a question of identity, because this is the way a society talks about existential

threats: if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as 'us'. Of course the rhetoric of security will often be employed in cases where survival, whether of sovereignty or identity, is not actually threatened, but where it is possible to legitimate political action by making reference to such a threat.

Figure 2.2 modified hourglass model

State security is the referent object in four sectors: political, military, economic and environmental. State security can be influenced by the security or insecurity of a society on which it is based, but this has to be seen as a two-step procedure different from state security in the four other sectors. The referent object of societal security is society. In the case of straight nation states, the difference will be small between the pure state definition and the new more complex one of state security via societal security. There will, however, be other cases where the difference is vital: when nation and state do not coincide, the security of a nation will often increase the insecurity of the state – or more precisely if the state has a homogenising 'national' programme (France), its security will by definition be in conflict with the societal security of 'national' projects of sub-communities inside the state (Corsica). The more Corsicans feel Corsican, the less success for the French project. In some other projects (Czechoslovakia), the state would be more secure if the minority nation (Slovaks) felt secure as to their national identity and national survival (societal security) within the federal state.

As with state security, societal security has to be understood first of all as the security of a social agent which has an independent reality and which is more than and different from the sum of its parts. Societal security is not the security of the individual parts, nor is it the sum of the security of the parts. If we were to approach it by way of aggregating individual preferences, we would never capture the nature of the collective unit security problems that

are constituted in the relationship of states and their environment and societies and their environment. Although the Danish 'no' to the European union vote in June 1992 was probably to some extent influenced by the insecurity of various groups in Danish society, we would not arrive at the dynamics of the referendum and its issues by aggregating the situation of the farmers, the unemployed, the intellectuals, etc. Only by understanding the way the social identity of 'Denmark' is constructed and the way it works for 'its' citizens, can one understand how this 'Denmark' – the nation, the society – struck back on the state (also called Denmark) which wanted to Europeanise the political structures. Societies are often made insecure because important groups within them feel insecure, and our studies will therefore often focus on the insecurity of specific groups. This, however, has to be kept conceptually separate from the security of a society, societal security. Societal security is not social security.

The issue of societal security is a novelty in the field of security studies, and on some essential points it goes against the established procedures and premises of the field. But we do not offer societal security as the new, alternative theory to replace all classical security and strategic studies. Our objective is to make sure that the new agenda is carefully inserted into existing security theory. We want to be as precise as possible as to what consequential revisions have to be made in security theory, and what can actually stay the same. Thus we have elaborated the redefinition of security at some length here and elsewhere (Wæver, forthcoming a and b).

Societal security is relevant in itself and not only as an element of state security, because communities (that do not have a state) are also significant political realities, and their reactions to threats against their identity will be politically significant. In addition, larger emerging communities of societal identity – all-European, EC-European or regional sub-European – have to be studied in these terms. In principle we therefore have to modify the idea of a security agenda of five sectors focused on the state as primary referant object. At the collective unit level (between individual and global), in fact there are two organising centres for the concept of security: state security and societal security. Both of these (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2) are influenced by 'individual' and 'international' levels. Society is not just a sector of state security, but a distinctive referent object alongside it.

2.3. Nation, nationalism and ethnicity

In security analysis, 'society' mostly comes out as 'nations' or other ethno-political communities modelling on the nation-idea – whether this be at the level of Europe, nation or national minorities. Nations and nationalism are exceedingly complex phenomena whose diversity is not yet adequately captured by theory. The fact that all nations are parallelled and treated as equals by the workings of the UN-system suggests that there ought to be a coherence to the phenomenon of nation, but this belies the essential uniqueness and historical contingency of various nations and nationalisms. However, since nations and nationalism are so central to the present study, we need to outline what we mean by nation, what the scientific literature on the subject can teach

us about nationalism, and the likely evolution of national identities in various situations. The aim is not to present an exhaustive discussion of all theories of national identity and nationalism, but an understanding of the mechanisms and the types of national identity is absolutely decisive for understanding the emerging relationship between 'Europe' and the countries in Europe. How can different constellations of cultural and political identity evolve at the national and the European level respectively? When does a nation feel threatened? What kinds of European identity are compatible with continuation of a national identity? When (if ever) can national identity be replaced by another identity? We now prepare the ground for answering these and similar questions. The first provocation is provided by Hobsbawm (1990: 14):

> The basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity. This is now well understood, but the opposite assumption, that national identification is somehow so natural, primary and permanent as to precede history, is so widely held that it may be useful to illustrate the modernity of the vocabulary itself.

He continues by showing how until the 1880s the term 'nation' often meant the inhabitants of a province, country or kingdom – and in earlier usage the group of e.g. students from a specific foreign country resident at a university (the French students at Bologna being 'the French nation', etc). Whereas the understanding among ordinary people is somehow a (softened) reflection of nationalist ideology – the nation as a constant handed down to us from times immemorial – the scientific literature has reached a fair degree of agreement on the essentially 'modern' (and thereby relatively recent and non-automatic) character of the nation. National sentiments, local loyalties and patriotism were not unknown to older times, but essential components of what we mean by the term 'nation' are modern. Older national sentiments had no major political importance, they were not the source of political authority or seen as the primary identity of people. Kings would often speak a different language to that used by their subjects – and no one found this strange (see, for example, Henrikson, 1991). The common identification, history and language of a 'people' was neither the source of political legitimacy nor the basis for rule. The source of authority in late medieval Europe was to varying degrees divine and dynastic, not national.

The French revolution was a turning point in the history of nationalism, and although the various fragments of the idea of the nation had all emerged before it, the very idea itself can in an important sense be said to have been born during the revolution. When the king was beheaded, the question of political legitimacy presented itself in a new way. The revolution was not about correcting a ruler, it was about a regime, a way of rule that had to find its ultimate authority somewhere else (Knudsen, 1989a). In the name of whom or what did the new political figures act? The answer was: the nation (cf. the name of the 'national assembly'). The 'nation' was not the same as 'everyone' – it was from the beginning a unitary construct, the other side of the state–nation fusion, the social contract fusing the citizens into a collective

matrix which was more than the sum of the individuals (cf. Rousseau, 1968 [1762]).

The first step towards the modern concept of nation consisted in defining it as an alternative source of political authority. Thereby the nation became extremely important politically (no longer a marginal, exotic matter separate from politics). This elevation raised the question: how precisely do we define who or what this nation is? Anne Knudsen has pointed out how the answer to this question related to the world view of enlightenment, where truth was natural, and the basic laws no longer followed the will of God (1991, 19ff). Thus philosophy (no longer theology) was to discern how society could be arranged according to human nature. The French Revolution was an attempt at this (cf. also Furet and Ozouf, 1989 [1988]). In the French 1789 Declaration on the rights of Man and Citizen, it is proclaimed that 'all Men are equal by nature'. The nation was to become the most powerful concept in the search for the natural societies that should legitimate power and delineate 'the people'. Although the territories of most European states were the somewhat arbitrary outcome of wars and monarchial intermarriages, suddenly there was a legitimized political authority with reference to those people who happened to live there and who had not been studied previously, since they were seen as rather uninteresting. Who they were did not really matter until the arrival of democracy and revolutionary principles of legitimacy (Knudsen, 1991). The nineteenth century produced an enormous interest in popular culture (*Volkslieder*, *Volksmärchen*, *Volkssagen*, *Volksgeist*). The national culture, the nature of the nation was not only studied, it was at the same time shaped by new national systems of education, national anthems, flags and all the other nineteenth-century paraphernalia.

The link to 'nature' – the national landscape – was not only a product of romanticism (to which we soon return). It was also a logical conclusion of the enlightenment and its search for the nature of everything, including – when it came to politics and society – the nature of the nation, the nature of the people. At this point the nation starts to be bestowed with those traits we know: it is natural, linked to the landscape, the past, and not least to a unique people with its specific customs, dances and stories, its songs and traditions. The nation is pictured as a larger family, as tied together and stretching back and forward into history, and making us all belong together whatever we politically might do or think.

> What transcendent values could keep a realm together? There had to be something . . . And early in the nineteenth century, national identities began to appear. First, as a literary phenomenon: the interest of romanticism [was kindled] for the inner, the hidden, the dark, that which appeared to be the *true* soul of the people. That the people had a soul and not only an ability to be taxed or – at most – some abstract political demands was a new and intoxicating invention. [Knudsen, 1989a: 6, our translation]

But – as other students of nationalism have done in the second half of the 1980s – pause for a moment and ask whether this can really be true. Although it is an important corrective to nationalist ideology to point out the modernity

of nationalism and the peculiar traits of national feelings in recent centuries, is it really true that the nation did not exist before?

This question has been posed as the debate between 'modernists' and 'primordialists', or the 'constructivists' and the 'perennialists'. A recent reaction has been to allow for the role of some pre-modern features, some communal feeling or shared history as the basis on which the nation could be articulated. E.J. Hobsbawm, a rigorous modernist, has recently allowed for the concept of 'proto-nations' (i.e. nations prior to nationalism, national sentiments before 1789). But the necessity of a pre-existing, pre-modern *ethnie* for the articulation of a modern project of nation and nationalism is more clearly emphasised in the work of Armstrong (1982) and Smith (1986, 1991). These 'ethnies' and historical myths and symbols are important, but it is also important to study how they are constantly being transformed, redefined, challenged and either strengthened or undermined. 'National identity' is thus a discursive construction, but yet it has to work on raw material – there has to be a reservoir of myths, stories, old battles and historic figures. This past is neither determining nor trivial for contemporary national movements and identifications. The discursive-articulative approach is an in-between position, avoiding the fundamentalism of 'objective national identity' as well as the voluntarism and instability of the 'invented traditions' approach. The discursively constructed investments of meaning in historical and ethnic fragments are inert but powerful social realities.

Ethnic or national communities do not exist to be discovered in the people's soul. They can be articulated on the basis of various historical, political and cultural fragments. There are many possible combinations (and some impossible ones): for example, the nineteenth-century questions of whether Lithuanians were just a special version of the Poles or whether there was such a thing as a Slovak, a Norwegian, etc. (Hroch, 1985; Milosz, 1975; Østerud, 1984: 55–9). The articulation perspective does not mean that the 'objectively ethnic' approach is irrelevant. Anthony D. Smith has presented a more ethnic approach to national identity in a series of books. In his view, ethnic identities are a precondition of national identity.

> The nation stands at the centre of one of the most popular and ubiquitous myths of modern times: that of nationalism. Central to this myth is the idea that nations exist from time immemorial, and that nationalists must reawaken them from a long slumber to take their place in a world of nations. The hold of the nation lies . . . partly in the promise of the nationalist salvation drama itself. But this power is often immeasurably increased by the living presence of traditions embodying memories, symbols, myths and values from much earlier epochs in the life of a population, community or area. So it is these pre-modern ethnic identities and traditions that we must first explore: [Smith, 1991: 19f]

An ethnic community exists when a core group holds some of the following attributes: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a special homeland, a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. Even these are not purely objective but only

matter when they are 'endowed with diacritical significance' (Smith, 1991: 23), i.e. when they are given significance in some symbolic system of meaning.

It is therefore necessary to study the dynamics of formation and transformation of ethnic communities as well as the processes determining when they become a nation, nation defined as '*a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members*' (Smith, 1991: 14) (But note that Smith seems to mix up nation and nation-state when he includes a common legal system.) Nations require ethnic elements, but only under certain conditions do ethnic elements get actively articulated as an ethnic community, and only under yet further specified conditions do they lead to the political expression in the form of a nation.

It is thus possible to operate across a spectrum between the unarticulated ethnie and modern nationalism: one can talk of 'dormant identities', of national identities potentially and even likely to emerge. Transformations – nations dying or being reborn – are rare, since the whole social infrastructure of nations (not least language) gives them a very high likelihood of continuing even when not expressed in states (for example, the Baltic peoples) and when embodied in nation-states the reproduction of a nation is even more secure. The point about degrees of national articulation is necessary in order to explain which nations became established. There is a Portugese but not a Tuscan nation, a Norwegian but not a Skåne nation; there is a Belorussian nation, but the Ur-prussian language and people died out. Some ethnic identities were either overpowered and integrated into other, larger identities (where they live on as 'regions' but in some cases – like Tuscany – with no serious pretensions of being a nation), or they were swallowed up in more ruthless ways by nations that eradicated them (the Ur-prussians). Who won was largely determined by power factors, but the articulation was limited also by the available patterns of identities because some articulations would have been much more difficult than others. An open question at the moment of writing could be Moldova: is the Moldavian identity so distinct after fifty years of separate existence as a Soviet Republic that re-unification with Romania has lost appeal, or is the Romanian identity the meaningful reference, and a project for state unity therefore the most powerful political project?

Smith's definition of a nation points our attention towards the elements of historical continuity. It stresses myth and memory. 'Of course, there is much more to the concept of "nation" than myths and memories. But they constitute a *sine qua non*: there can be no identity without memory (albeit selective), no collective purpose without myth, and identity and purpose of destiny are necessary elements of the very concept of a nation.' (Smith, 1986: 2) But the people of large-scale societies such as nations never actually meet (Gellner, 1983b: 165; Andersson, 1983: 15f). What kind of strange community can a nation be? Here we introduce Benedict Anderson's important insight that nations are *imagined political communities*; they are primarily symbolic realities. These, imagined, communities are very real – they set the horizon and give structure to the careers of the relevant intellectual groups.

'Imagined' should not be understood in the sense of 'artificial' or 'incorrect', as sometimes implied by Gellner or Hobsbawm.

One of the main advantages of stressing the imagined nature of the nation is that it is possible to see how it has emerged out of a cosmological change in the whole outlook on the world, and how it has replaced a religious way of imagining community. Anderson stresses how nationalism should be compared with religion rather than with other *isms* like conservativism, socialism or liberalism: it is not primarily a political, self-conscious programme, but a cultural system. We take Anderson's analysis as the approximate starting point for a brief resumé of the main factors in the emergence and historical transformation of nationalism.

1. We start with the point from Anderson about cosmology: nations are imagined political communities, symbolic realities that have developed with a particular concept of time. When the concept of time changed the previous dominant 'imagined community', the religious one, gave way to the nation. It was the emergence of mechanical, linear (or as Anderson prefers: 'homogenous, empty') time which made the nation a meaningful unit. In the medieval world all was one under God, and links could be made across time and space. Politically significant connections were vertical. In the modern conception we get the idea of simultaneity, where lots of people can be joined horizontally without being at the same place or being in any direct way related to each other. So one may imagine abstract socio-political spaces, territory becomes significant, and politics becomes increasingly a struggle taking place on a map (Hay, 1968: xxii f). What spaces then became relevant were decided partly by politically created patterns – the territory from which ambitious educated youth could aspire for a career at the centre. Also important was the advent of 'print capitalism' the widespread availability of the written vernacular language with its accompanying media of the novel and the newspaper, the two main forms of national unifier.

Another basic view is Gellner's more structuralist, materialist explanation linked to capitalism and industrialism. With the emergence of industrialism, a need arose for freely circulating individuals who did not think of themselves as bound to a specific narrow location or function in a social order. The need was for abstract individuals with abstract qualifications able to circulate. 'The borders of validity for exam papers make up the natural boundary for a political unit' (Gellner, 1978: 146). This change 'makes anonymous, internally fluid, and fairly undifferentiated, large-scale, and culturally homogeneous communities appear as the only legitimate repositories of political authority' (Gellner, 1983b: 169).

A society that lives by growth must pay a certain price. The price of growth is eternal innovation. Innovation in turn presupposes unceasing occupational mobility . . . The consequences of all this is the necessity of universal literacy and education, and a cultural homogeneity or at least continuity . . . So culture, which had once resembled the air men breathed, and of which they were seldom aware, suddenly becomes perceptible and significant. The wrong and alien culture becomes menacing. Culture like prose, becomes visible, and a source of pride and

pleasure to boot. The age of nationalism is born . . . So at the very time that men become fully and nervously aware of their culture and its vital relevance to their vital interests, they also lose much of the capacity to revere their society through the mystical symbolism of a religion. So there is both a push and a pull towards revering a shared culture *directly*, unmediated in its own terms: culture is *now clearly visible*, and access to it has become man's most precious asset. Yet, the religious symbols through which, if Durkheim is to be believed, it was worshipped, cease to be serviceable. So – let culture be worshipped directly in its own name. That is nationalism. [Gellner 1983b: 174–6]

Gellner contributed something important by directing our attention to this very basic move from structure to culture, from fixity to fluidity, from identity through location in societal structures to identification with the whole of the society in which one circulates (Gellner 1983b: 172–7). It is, however, doubtful to what extent he has explained nationalism, or even nationality/nationness. Theories like Gellner's explain first of all the structural conditions that made nationalism possible, but they do not explain very well how and why it took this particular form. Anderson's cosmological explanation gives a bit more of an explanation for the form this community was to take, but his theory probably underestimates the role of specific changes at the end of the eighteenth century.

2. At the next stage the political factor becomes decisive, and the explanation quoted above (from Anne Knudsen) of the role of the French revolution is crucial. The nation suddenly became high politics, the crucial principle of political organization, and this shaped the form and functions of imagined political communities. Furthermore, the political fact of the French nation being established along these lines spread very efficiently not only by force of ideas but also by force of weapons. The revolutionary and Napoleonic wars showed the superior power of national armies, and these armies transported the revolutionary ideas. The process of defence against the French also helped speed up the process of national identification in Germany and elsewhere. The logic of military technique also played a separate and often decisive role in furthering the revolutionary reorganisation of society – with national identification, conscription and national standardisation.

3. Anderson's work also addresses the role of politics for the further trajectory of nationalism after the revolution. The work of Anderson, Hobsbawm and many others is replete with shrewd insights into the way political purposes shaped the use of national ideas in various colonial and anti-colonial campaigns, and in programmes for setting up nation states under new and challenging conditions. An important insight from Anderson (1983: 14) is that nationalism has been proved to be a modular idea. He argues:

that the creation of these artefacts [nationality and 'nation-ness' as cultural artefacts] towards the end of the eighteenth century was the spontaneous distillation of a complex 'crossing' of discrete historical forces; but that once created, they became 'modular', capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-

consciousness, to a great variety of political terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations.

This implies that the idea itself has been able to spread to conditions very different from those in which it originated. One should not try to explain later situations through comparison with the conditions for nationalism in its original situation. It has become a remarkably flexible and powerful idea. At a more abstract level, it implies that there is a high element of coincidence (non-determined history) in the evolution of nationalism. At specific places and times, ideas and experiences evolved that proved to be modular in the sense that they could be transferred to different contexts, and actually by their existence changed the chain of events in other places. Because the ideas of nation, nationalism and the nation-state were already invented, later political events elsewhere took directions they would not otherwise have done.

4. Another cosmological change – romanticism and German idealism – is also extremely important for the history of nationalism. As pointed out by Isaiah Berlin, modern nationalism is deeply connected to this particular (romantic) way of thinking. 'European nationalism as a state of mind' includes: (1) the conviction that men belong to a particular human group, and that the way of life of the group differs from that of others; (2) that the pattern of life of a society is similar to that of a biological organism – and its needs are therefore supreme (3) 'that one of the most compelling reasons, perhaps the most compelling, for holding a particular belief, pursuing a particular policy, serving a particular end, living a particular life, is that these ends, beliefs, policies, lifes, are *ours*'; (4) faced by rival contenders for authority or loyalty one believes in the supremacy of its claims to the point of employing force if necessary (Berlin, 1982: 341–5).

This part of the story is decisive. Without this existential dimension one is hard placed to explain how people in Croatia today can shoot the neighbour they lived relatively happily with until 1991. Suddenly the collective stands above the individual, or rather, one assumes that one's own worth, destiny and meaning of life depends on the fate of the collective, the whole to which one belongs. The whole is more than the sum of the parts, and meaning ultimately rests with the collective, the culture which stretches through time, back to forefathers that died in other wars, and forward into the future. Of course people killed each other prior to romanticism, but largely out of very direct personal calculations or emotions, or because one was hired as soldier, or because of very instrumental, rational calculations about the utility of wars for aims related to specific gains and power struggles. With romanticism we get a much deeper link between the fate of the individual and the fate of the culture. This logic is waning in the West, but is still very powerful in the East, and probably not impossible to reawaken even in the West (at least Center-West, German-speaking and German-influenced areas like Scandinavia).

It is necessary to keep this existential dimension in mind. It is not of equal strength in all cases, but the nation most often holds the two dimensions: the collective, political construct and the function it fulfils in the individual life.

The latter makes the idea of the nation especially powerful, not least due to the influence of romanticism, the idea that we are all born into cultures and codes, which are barely accessible to outsiders and then only through a total exercise of emotional, aesthetic and intellectual sensitivity. This conception of the world has become common sense to almost everyone except the most ardent believers in eighteenth-century, French enlightenment ideals. It means that there is such a thing as culture, and in practice this means most often and most importantly national culture.

In sum, Anderson's theory is generally very convincing, but it contains a paradoxical pattern of weakness. In the first period (late eighteenth-century) it offers a convincing cosmological explanation in terms of change of world view (and a partly materialist one related to printing-press capitalism), but in the later periods it lists no major cosmological change and misses romanticism. As to political factors, we see the opposite pattern: while in the later periods the political instrumentation of nationalism is put at the forefront, political dynamics play a small part in the explanation of the original breakthrough. So we lack an explanation of why and how the nation suddenly became a central political category, and why the idea of the nation took the form it did. The political eighteenth-century explanation is found more clearly in the writings of Anne Knudsen and the cosmological nineteenth-century analysis in Isaiah Berlin's work. Finally, Gellner's analysis – though nowadays often criticised for its semi-materialist functionalism – contains some basic insights into the way a modern national society coheres in contrast to other types of complex societies.

	Eighteenth century (and prior)	Nineteenth century
Economical, structural	Gellner (+ Anderson's printing-press/capitalism)	
Political	Knudsen: French Revolution	**ANDERSON**, Hobsbawm
Cosmological	**ANDERSON**	Berlin: Romanticism

Figure 2.3 Explanations of nationalism

This discussion of the political eighteenth-century and the cosmological-philosophical nineteenth-century changes is important in order to grasp the full depth of the distinction between two types of nationalism: 'Western' and 'Eastern'. This classical distinction is vital for the present study and goes back to the work of Hans Kohn (1944). He contrasts the French and British model against the German and East European one, pointing to a difference between a union of citizens and a folk community, noting contrasts between them in terms of individualism versus collectivism, political reality versus an eternal search for the ideal Fatherland, and bourgeois support versus an aristocratic base. Western nationalism is born into existing state frameworks and therefore has a given population which (by definition) fits the territory. The model

therefore has the chance of concentrating on democratisation, on defining the relationship between citizen and state. Eastern nationalism has had to struggle for democracy and a state at the same time, and it has to base the people somewhere other than in the (non-existing) state.

Anthony Smith defines the classical 'Western', civic concept of the nation using four elements: (1) a specific spatial or territorial reference – the 'homeland' as repository of historic memories and associations; (2) the idea of *patria*, a community of laws and institutions with a single political will; including (3) a sense of legal equality among the members of the community, pointing towards the idea of 'citizenship'; and (4) a measure of common values and traditions among the population or at least its 'core' community (Smith, 1991: pp.9ff). The German/Eastern concept is marked by being born without the context of a political framework (the state). Without a given definition of the 'who', the need to establish the group as a reality in itself was much stronger. There had to be a pre-political reality to point to, a reference to a people that existed although it did not have a state, and the argument then ended up as one about culture, about ethnic identity.

Of special interest is how the two traditions can be seen at play in experiments with multi-nation states. For instance, the United States operates very clearly with a political definition of the nation: secular religion, flag and constitution as sacrosanct – and therefore no change of constitution (nor of the dollar bill). Ethnic origin is allegedly completely irrelevant. Other states attempt more ambitiously to define an overarching cultural identity, a synthesising ethnic project in order to homogenise in the way France, for instance, succeeded in doing. But most often the model has not involved a denial of existing 'national' identities, only an attempt to build a layered structure with at least two simultaneous identities for each citizen. We have witnessed various attempts at multiple identities: some conspicuous failures (Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Pakistan), some still hanging in the balance (India, Nigeria, Canada, South Africa), and some where an apparently stable layering of identities has been achieved (Switzerland, United States, possibly Britain). If the task of establishing multiple identities looks daunting, the consequences of not doing so can be seen in the domestic politics of states such as Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Sudan and Sri Lanka, where minorities struggle to preserve their identities against a homogenising state. It is important to think systematically about the factors determining when, where and why attempts to construct multiple identities did or did not work. Are there reasons to expect that the political union of the EC will work out better than the Soviet Union? Or is the decisive factor located at another level, that of progress, modernisation and time? Is it true that the relationship between culture, politics and identity has changed with Western Europe entering high modernity, late modernity, post modernity or whatever it should be called? Are there now different expectations as to whether the political organisation has to mirror the patterns of the social community directly?

For some peoples, the untapped resources of nationalism offered the opportunity of creating large political communities with high levels of sociopolitical cohesion. The pre-existence of geographically coherent groups of people sharing ethnic, linguistic and cultural attributes made nation-states

possible. One thinks of the French, the Poles, the Germans, the Japanese, the Chinese, the Thais, the Koreans, the Greeks, the Italians and others. But for many others, national identities clashed with existing political constructions, as in the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. Where state clashes with nation, the government must choose whether to suppress the dissident identities, or coopt them, or replace them with a newly constructed idea of nationality. Suppression risks civil war. Cooption risks a vulnerable and shaky federal political constitution. Replacement requires a sustained and sophisticated policy such as that by which millions of immigrants have been transformed into Americans, or by which Scots, English and Welsh people accept a collective identity as British.

The question of federations, how and why states merge (or not), is largely a geopolitical question. The pressure for unification often correlates with what neo-realist balance of power theory would expect (Waltz, 1979; Wæver, 1992a): states do not merge when they can remain separately in the first division of world politics (i.e. each is a Great Power). Witness the European powers who were resistant to calls for unification from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. But they do sometimes try when federation is the precondition of achieving Great Power status, and especially when some other state has taught them what it means not to have that. This is at least part of the explanation behind the unifications of Germany, the Soviet Union, in some sense the United States – and a possible EC unification. Others, of course, have been unified partly because of other peoples' geopolitics: for example, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia. In each case, there had to be both a power base for unification (Bismarck's Prussia making Germany; the allies making the new federations after the First World War, but also a sufficient degree of popular/political identification with the overarching project (Germanness, South Slav unity; Czechoslovak identity). However, these stories of origin do not explain very much of the further fate of these constructs: why do some succeed and others fall apart? This can hardly be explained by geopolitics – the laws of balance of power can tell us that some federations are meaningless (like a European one in the eighteenth century), but it cannot predict that states will always exploit options to become Great Powers (Waltz 1990b). Attempts can be made, but failures are largely caused by the internal tensions of the construct, which depend on the identitive make up of the state and the strategies adopted by the state-makers. This is the exciting background to the present attempt in Western Europe.

A final theme that may be distilled from the literature is a specific community's rise and fall and eventual return to a nation. How is an identity forgotten and/or reinvented? How can we trace the logic and dynamics of identities that are once formed but come to live a life with new challenges? Generally it is a peculiar feature of the literature on nations and nationalism that it is mainly concerned with the origins, the birth of the phenomenon, comparatively less with its unfolding, and very little with the dynamics working on any existing constellation of identities. It might well be that Anderson and maybe Gellner have the superior theories of the origins of nationalism, but the comparatively less clear theory of Smith (1991) probably has more to offer on the workings of an existing national community. What

determines when the identification with a nation is weakened, when an almost disappeared nation suddenly re-emerges? Other authors who have contributed significantly to this part of the theoretical corpus are Hroch (1985; 1990) and Østerud (1984; 1987).

Summing up this section we can show the structure by defining some key concepts and conceptual pairs:

Nation, nationalism – We have already quoted with approval the definition given by Smith (1991: 14) where a nation is 'defined as *a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members*'. But what is nationalism? In some versions, nationalism means 'extreme national identity', or 'when it is too much', or some similar idea that nationalism is the extremist, xenophobic, unpleasant form. This is not our usage of the term 'nationalism'. Excessive variants should be labelled 'extreme nationalism' or 'hypernationalism' (Mearsheimer, 1990), though the dividing line is necessarily arbitrary and political. It is more useful to reserve the term nationalism for political programmes referring primarily to the nation – it can be the programme for creating the nation, or it can be one for defending the nation when (allegedly) threatened, or it might be just a political programme mobilizing on the basis of reference to the nation. The distinction is between the nation as a social fact (although a discursively established one) and nationalism as political action. The general phenomenon of thinking in terms of nations (Anderson implicitly uses 'nationalism' to refer to this general phenomenon/movement) should (cf. Anderson) not be defined in itself as a political movement – it is more akin to religion, but as with religion it can be very important in politics. In a deeply religious society one would be ill advised to attempt political mobilisation without including a religious appeal. The same goes for societies where there is a resonance for a national appeal, in which various political programmes will easily turn nationalist, i.e. include a logic of arguing from the nation: that this is good because it is in the interest of the nation, or the way 'we do things', or some other appeal with the nation as source of motivation.

National vs, ethnic identity – This conceptual pair is used in several different ways (cf. Østergaard, 1991: 146): (1) national as one type of ethnic identity, i.e. a specification, a subcategory; (2) the opposite order, with ethnic as a specific type of national identity; (3) ethnic identity as the predecessor of a national identity (cf Smith); and (4) as a competitor, ethnic identities challenge existing national identities. The fourth is often heard these days: movements among minority people are labelled 'ethnic', they are expressions of 'ethnicity', while the dominant ideology tries to set up a nation-state and therefore it is the 'national' identity (Eriksen, 1991). This, however, seems a problematic concept for two reasons. One is that it somehow reinforces the ideology of existing nations by defining the existing order as of a qualitatively different character (nation) than that of the challenger, which basically strives for the same (often nationhood), but is labelled 'ethnic', which often functions as a pejorative (the East Europeans are very ethnic, while 'we' are not).

The second problem is logical, that the terminology seems arbitrary, since ethnicity becomes nationalism as soon as a movement gains independence.

We will stick to the third definition (which partly links up to the first): ethnic identity is a less demanding category, which does not necessarily involve the specific, modern expression of the nation (as defined above). Thus, it will often be the predecessor, and it might also be possible to find contemporary cases of ethnic identity which is not national, while all national identity will fulfil the criteria for ethnic identity (cf. Smith's definition of ethnic identity quoted above on p. 30). The combination 'ethno-national' is used to designate nations based on the reference to ethnic and cultural ('German') in contrast to purely civic ('French') roots.

We will use the dichotomy – problematic, as most dichotomies – of *political and cultural identity*. National identity always involves various mixes of the two components, where the relative distribution heavily influences the expression a national movement takes. The political side being the typical republican, civic, French tradition and the cultural being the German, ethnic, organic one. The same duality can however operate in the way other identities are shaped – notably a European identity. We thus arrive at Figure 2.4. We keep an open mind as to what type of identity will emerge and settle at what levels. This is a tool for studying the interplay between different identities: what happens if cultural and/or political identities emerge at several levels? What if one type of identity emerges at the European and the other at the national or even the (sub-)regional level? More on this in Chapter 4.

	Nation	Europe	Other
Cultural			
Political			

Figure 2.4 The two dimensions of national and similar identities

The sources of a societal identity are in theory almost infinitely open. Communities of identity can form on whatever foundation appears as useful, attractive or significant. This theoretical flexibility is limited by the fact that historically national identity has acquired particular prominence as the societal factor most central both to the process of government and to 'international' relations, in the world as we find it at the end of the twentieth

century. National identity comprises a package of linguistic, ethnic and cultural similarity which for more than two centuries has been seen as decisive for the construction of large-scale communities. Weber assumes that nations are always built on some objective basis but defined by the subjective dimension, whereby objective factors are made significant. The most common basis is language, but this cannot be the sole criteria, since there are important cases of nations without a common language (Switzerland), and cases where langauge does not lead to joining the logical community (Quebec, Alsace). (Cf. Weber, 1972 [1921]: 527–30; for a clear presentation of Weber's views on nationalism, see Beetham, 1985 [1974], 119–50.)

Empirically, it might be that language and culture are the main objects to which people make reference when they argue who 'we' are: why 'we' belong together. But it is logically a contingent factor that language has (for some 200 years) been seen as decisive for a large community, or that we think of the world as divided into a number of 'cultures', in each of which people share a certain code and therefore communicate and interact relatively smoothly, whereas between the cultures there are more or less definite (semiotic) walls. It must remain logically open that communities can be, or become, based on whatever people take to be the decisive basis for them. When this 'it' is threatened, 'our' identity is threatened, and 'societal security' comes into play. Thus, the basis of identification in any era is not to be defined *a priory*, but to be studied through history. The importance of nation defined as language and culture is a contingent fact of recent history, not an essential trait of societal security. The definitional move only consists of linking societal security to the identity of communities, and the specific pattern of reaction when some members of a community try to call it to action on the ground that its identity is threatened. Methodologically, this means that most of the specifications for societal security in this chapter are generally valid, but that the specification in relation to ethnic and national identity is mostly relevant to Europe.

For now it seems that the national mode of identification is still very strong. When threatened it takes priority and re-arranges all other identities accordingly. Why is it that national identity, particularly in a defence/security perspective, is so powerful, and therefore so important to security studies? In part it is because the nation stretches through time; it ties together past, present and future, and implies the possibility of feeling obligations towards the continued unhindered flow through time. The national identity is about a special way of being alike to a degree where time-crossing identification is particularly strongly felt. Gellner also makes the important point that nationalism makes culture self-reflective; to worship culture in its own name (1983b: 175f). No wonder then that threats to 'our identity' most easily trigger reactions when that identity is the self-reflective national identity.

Chapter 3
Societal security, state security and internationalisation
Barry Buzan

How does the idea of societal security as developed above relate to the more traditional ways of thinking about the state and security? This chapter will try to answer that question by exploring the interplay between societal security, on the one hand, and the four other sectors of security (military, political, economic and environmental), on the other. The purpose of the exercise is to unpack the concept of security in order to bring into clearer focus the particular role and significance of societal security. What is it that generates threats to societal security? To what extent do these threats develop within the societal sector, and to what extent are they generated from the other sectors? How do insecurities within the societal sector feed into the other sectors?

Trying to answer these questions automatically draws one's attention to the nature of state–society relations, and therefore to the construction of the state itself. As illustrated so vividly in the demise of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, multinational states are more likely to generate problems of societal insecurity than are nation-states. The fusion of nation and state usually contributes to the security of both, though it does not necessarily do so. In much of modern Polish history, a weak state has failed to defend its society effectively. In contemporary Somalia, a fragmented nation and a weak state both contribute to chaos. In recent German and Japanese history, the synergy between state and society led to aggressive policies that eventually threatened the continuity of both.

There can be no doubt that the broad set of processes usually referred to as 'internationalisation' has a major bearing on security relations between state and society. Internationalisation has many facets. At bottom, it is about the construction of transportation and communication facilities capable of sustaining high levels of interaction across the planet, and about the development of transnational and international organisations able to use those facilities: (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993 chap. 4). Unless actively stopped by governments, the media (especially radio, but increasingly also satellite and video cassette television) will penetrate deeply into societies everywhere on the planet: CNN has become a global network, and even the PLO has its own radio station.

Internationalisation is also partly about the way in which scientific and technological knowledge and method have created global communities of research and production. It includes the growth of a global market, with the consequent development of planetary scale networks for finance, production, trade and information, and the spread of world products, cultures and styles. On the individual level, it is about rising cosmopolitanism: more students studying abroad, more business people travelling and living abroad, more entertainers and artists seeking and finding global audiences, and more non-governmental organisations operating internationally. In concrete terms, internationalisation is expressed by such things as the planet-wide wearing of blue jeans; by the public mourning of Freddie Mercury's death in dozens of countries; by the international activities of Amnesty International; by the use of English as a world language; by the interdependence of financial markets in New York, London and Tokyo; and by widespread concern about changes in the planet's atmosphere.

Internationalisation has profound and potentially complex effects on the way state and society interact. From one perspective, internationalisation threatens both states and societies. It threatens the state with economic and political penetration that reduces the ability of governments to control their domestic environments. It threatens society with powerful inflows of language, style, culture and values that may weaken or overwhelm their indigenous counterparts, disrupt the ability of local cultures to reproduce themselves, and/or generate the distorting effects of xenophobia. In combination, these impacts can have both positive and negative effects on security. On the negative side, they may drive a wedge between state and society over whether to resist or welcome outside penetration: there are clear signs of this tension in Europe over moves towards greater European integration. On the positive side they may increase the resources and the legitimacy of governments, and they may provide societies with outside resources to help defend themselves against a threatening government. They are a source of stimulation and ideas that help states and societies to evolve and develop. By creating more openness, transparency and interdependence between states and societies, they may help to reduce tensions between states and societies both domestically and internationally. The pervasive effects of internationalisation provide an essential backdrop to any understanding of societal security.

3.1. Threats to societal security

The security of a society can be threatened by whatever puts its 'we' identity into jeopardy. Since societal identities are dynamic rather than static in character, not all sources of change will be seen as threats. Some change will be seen as part of the natural process by which identities adjust and evolve to meet alterations in historical circumstances. Social communities may well argue within themselves as to what constitutes a threat. Societies, like states, can be relatively open or relatively closed in terms of the range and intensity of interactions they choose to define as threats: (Buzan and Segal, 1992 chap. 1) Some people will take more conservative and others more liberal positions

on what change is acceptable, as for example over whether to give official recognition to the use of Spanish in the United States, or what level of immigration is desirable or sustainable. Those who see American identity in predominantly white Anglo-Saxon terms will feel more threatened by the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxon peoples than those who see American identity mostly in terms of the melting pot. With societal, as with other forms of security, what is perceived as a threat, and what can be objectively assessed as threatening, may be quite different. Real threats may not be accurately seen. Perceived threats may not be real, and yet still have real effects (see Buzan, 1991a: chap. 3). Exactly when and why such threats become a political issue will vary according to the conditions of individual societies.

A societal identity can be threatened in ways ranging from the suppression of its expression to interference with its ability to reproduce. In concrete terms, such measures include forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of education or worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community. The reproduction of a society can be threatened by sustained application of repressive measures against the expression of the identity. If the institutions that reproduce language and culture are forbidden to operate, then identity cannot be transmitted effectively from one generation to the next. Reproduction can also be disrupted by changing the balance of the population in a given area. Extreme nationalists might see any form of foreign presence as a threat to the pure existence and reproduction of a national identity. This view was most clearly manifested in Nazi racial ideology. Even if some immigration is allowed or welcomed, there may come a point where simple numbers begin to change the identity, and therefore the social and political life, of the population within a given locality. Some governments use internal migration as a specific means of submerging local identities: the Soviet Union in Stalin's time, China in Tibet, Pakistan in Baluchistan, Israel in the West Bank. But there is no simple proportional formula for calculating when immigration becomes a threat. Some societies are more effective at absorbing immigrants into their own culture than others (this has been Chinese policy towards successful invaders for many millennia). Societies also vary in their tolerance for multiculturalism, which is the alternative strategy to absorption. In theory, though less so in practice, a society need never feel threatened by immigrants if its own identity is sufficiently adaptable and attractive to adjust to changes in its composition.

It should not, however, be forgotten that threats can strengthen the identities at which they are aimed. Attempts to suppress an identity may work, but equally they may reinforce the intensity with which the group coheres. Both Palestinian and Jewish identities have become more intense in response to threats, and it does not seem an exaggeration to say that the strong societal identities of the European nation-states were to a large extent forged on the anvil of rivalry and conflict with neighbours. Evaluating what is, and what is not, a threat, to whom, in what way and over what time-scale can be a tricky business.

Within the societal sector itself, the main threats to security come from competing identities and migration (both inward and outward). These threats

may overlap if the competing identity is largely carried by migrants, as in the Russification of Kazakhstan and Latvia. But competing identities can also work in their own right, as when states promote overarching identities on an array of pre-existing ethno-nationalities as in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Nigeria and India. Societal threats will be explored in the rest of this section. Threats to societal security coming from other sectors, and threats to those sectors arising from societal instabilities, will be taken up in the remaining subsections of this chapter.

Threats from competing identities arise when identities are mutually exclusive: one cannot be (or at least it is rather difficult to be) simultaneously both a Christian and a Muslim, or both a Greek and a Turk. Not all societal identities are necessarily competitive, so this source of threat needs to be treated with care. It is possible to be both German and European, or both English and British or Ukrainian and Canadian without the two identities necessarily threatening each other. The threat from competing identities can be tricky to identify. When identities are mutually exclusive (Pole or Lithuanian, French or German), then threat occurs only if the societies compete for territory, or if the overbearing influence of the one disrupts the reproduction of the other. In theory, 'self-limiting nationalisms' (Herz, 1968: 82) should be able to coexist without threatening each other, but in practice they often fall into rivalry. Identities that are not mutually exclusive should also in theory be able to coexist at different levels: British should not threaten Scottish, Nigerian should not threaten Ibo, Canadian should not threaten Quebecois. In practice, however threats may be perceived if the wider identity is seen as dominating, or if it is seen as a front for the influence of a rival exclusive identity. To the extent that Soviet was seen as Russian, or British as English, the compatibility of the identities on separate levels was undermined.

At lower levels of intensity, even the interplay of ideas and communication can produce politically significant societal and cultural threats. One example of this is the strong mutual reaction of Islamic and Christian communities to each other (on which more in chapter 7). Islamic fundamentalists are sensitive to the penetration of Western ideas, practices and fashions into their own culture. Likewise, Europeans are often sensitive to Islamic immigrants, whose strong, visible and alien culture can be seen as a defiance of integration, and therefore as a kind of invasion. The ease with which such hostilities can be ignited is demonstrated by the furore over *The Satanic Verses*, including murder threats and staged book-burnings.

Another example concerns matters of language, religion and local cultural tradition all of which play their part in societal identity, and which may be perceived as needing to be defended or protected against seductive or overbearing cultural imports. If the local culture is weak or small or closed, even the unintended side-effects of casual contact could prove disruptive and politically charged. Even so strong a nation as the French fear the impact of American fast-food on their culinary heritage and the erosion of their language by the incorporation of English words. Economic and technological developments may well carry such threats, not only undermining one identity but giving support to a competing one. Europeans and Japanese complaining

about Americanisation, or Third World people complaining about Western-isation, are in effect voicing concern about the impact of internationalising economic and technological developments on their societal identities.

The threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative num-bers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society. Perceptions of what numbers are critical will vary widely. This threat works on the societal level when the incoming population is of a different cultural or ethnic stock from those already resident. It is amplified when migrants seek to maintain their identity rather than adapting to that prevailing in their adopted country. There is obviously a spectrum of possibilities here. Immigrants may allow themselves to be absorbed completely, as many of those going to the Americas have done. Or they may seek a halfway house (many Jewish communities, the Chinese in Thailand), maintaining their own cultural com-munity in private while broadly adapting to the prevailing public norms of the host society. At the other extreme, immigrants may encapsulate themselves (or in some cases be encapsulated) within a cultural ghetto, maintaining their own identity and restricting interchange with the local community to specific purposes. This last strategy may be played either from a position of strength (Europeans in Asia and Africa during the colonial era) or from a position of weakness (some Asians in Britain, some Arabs in France, some Hispanics in the United States). Attempts at cultural survival may fail as successive generations are increasingly acculturated by the majority society.

In a long historical view, nearly all nations are the product of cosmopolitan blending and occupy their current positions as a result of earlier migrations. Most of the current states in the Western hemisphere owe much of their form and society to quite recent, and in many cases still continuing, immigration. But immigration can be seen as a threat as well as a boon. In the long run, it has the potential to reshape what 'nation' stands for, and thus to redefine the idea of the state. Even a generally welcoming country such as the United States passed laws restricting Asian immigration in the late nineteenth century (and the Japanese now get their own back by comparing America's polyglot character unfavourably with their own remarkable homogeneity). Racism, as immigrants everywhere have discovered, is a widespread and politically potent sentiment. Ethnic and cultural parochialism is almost everywhere a stronger political force than cosmopolitanism.

Up to a point, outcries about immigrants of different colour or culture can be dismissed as extremist bigotry. The fear of being swamped by foreigners is, however, easy to mobilise on the political agenda as a security issue, not least because it has happened so often in history. Scenarios vary from the obliter-ation of the Tasmanians and Hottentots, through suppression of the Indian nations in the Americas, to the steady northward drive of Hispanics into the United States. Ironically, cultural and ethnic swamping operates most fiercely *within* multi-nation states, often with government backing. As with compet-ing identities, governments can be the agents of threat to their own peoples as well as of defence.

International migration is in theory controllable by state enforcement of immigration regulations, but in practice few states are willing to pay the cost of sealing their borders against all determined entrants. The potential for

further human movement is large, and the incentives are mounting as huge gaps open up in the quality of life available in different states. The line between political refugees and economic migrants is already a problem between Eastern and Western Europe, between Latin American and the United States, and between Vietnam and much of East Asia. The Japanese fear an explosion of Chinese boat people if the decay of communism should take China down the same road as the Soviet Union. India has already experienced huge inflows of Bengalis because of civil war and may do so again if even rather modest rises in sea level begin to flood Bangladesh. The Americans have not been willing to take the extensive measures that would be required to stop the flow of Hispanics. The underlying pressures for migration look set to make this issue an increasing part of the security agenda, especially for the wealthier states and their societies. The differential between rich, economically dynamic areas with low birth-rates and poor, economically stagnant ones with high birth-rates is creating enormous pressures for move- ment. As hope fades for any quick closure of the development gap, more and more people in poor, misgoverned, stagnant and/or repressive states will have strong incentives to seek a better life in the developed states.

To the extent that tensions over migration, identity and territory occur between societies, we might by analogy with international politics talk about a 'societal security dilemma'. This would imply that societies can experience processes in which perceptions of 'the others' develop into mutually reinforc- ing 'enemy-pictures' leading to the same kind of negative dialectics as with the security dilemma between states. Societal security dilemmas might explain why some processes of social conflict seem to acquire a dynamic of their own. While initial conflicts might be explained with diverging interests, from a certain threshold the processes can evolve with a self-sustained internal dynamic, which might end up being very destructive. Sometimes inter-state and inter-societal security dilemmas might coincide, as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but societal security dilemmas can also operate largely detached from state relations, as in the civil wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Georgia, Sri Lanka and elsewhere. The analogy implies that we can look for confidence- building measures, which might modify or neutralise the societal security dilemma. Fundamentally, though, the situation at the sub-state level is differ- ent from the situation in the international system, because we generally have at least some state authority and not a complete anarchy at the sub-state level.

3.2. Societal security and the military sector

It is almost always true that if a state is threatened militarily from outside its borders, then so is the society within it. Exceptions to this rule occur when some significant societal element of the invaded state does not see the action as threatening. This can occur in several ways. One is cases in which the external threat is aimed at liberating an 'oppressed' minority within the target state (Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland in the late 1930s). A second is cases in which external military threats are aimed at removing tyrannical governments whose actions threaten their own societies (Tanzania's invasion of Uganda, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and more arguably the United

States' invasion of Panama). A third exception is cases in which invaders are liberating societies from imperial occupation, as in the allied expulsions of Germany and Japan during the Second World War. In all of these cases there is room for argument about the definition of threat. Apart from such exceptions, the state generally provides military protection from outsiders to the society or societies within it. When such protection fails, the results can be catastrophic, as they were for Poland, China and the Soviet Union during the Second World War when racist occupiers wreaked havoc on their societies. To the extent that the state is a machinery for protecting the society that it contains, then external military threats threaten the independence, territorial control, and perhaps existence of society. External armed forces are usually the agents of other states, and can be seen as instruments of what is more fundamentally a threat that is political in origin. In this form, the link between societal and military security is fairly straightforward.

More subtle is the link between societal security and the domestic side of military policy: in other words the relationship between a society and the military establishment of its own state. The most obvious instance of domestic military threat to society is when the armed forces act to suppress all or part of society, either on their own behalf (military governments in Argentina and Chile), or on behalf of a political party (Iraq under Saddam Hussein, most revolutionary regimes). Armed forces may conduct extensive massacres and suppressions of 'their own' populations (Iraq, Syria, Burma, Cambodia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Yugoslavia). This is especially so when they represent one ethnic group against others within the state and when they serve revolutionary regimes.

Less direct military threats to society can arise from various aspects of military policy. Conscription, for example, can serve as a modernising process by which the state seeks to homogenise its citizens at the expense of more traditional identities and lifestyles. This idea was born in the French Revolution, and played a significant role in continental Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Military service became a mechanism for eroding subnational identities by instilling in successive younger generations a common sense of national identity, purpose and experience. This was also clearly the policy in the Shah's Iran and in Mao's China. From a different perspective, some might argue that conscription threatens society by injecting into it a pervasive and corrupting militarisation. Conscription may put considerable portions of the population at risk, as witness the slaughtered generations of 1914–18 in Europe, or the 1980s in Iran and Iraq. An oversized military can also be a threat to society by seizing resources necessary for the reproduction of society. This was the case in the Soviet Union in the late Brezhnev period when the upkeep of the huge military apparatus is part of the explanation for the draining of funds from education, investment, culture and medical care. The most extreme form of this type of threat is illustrated by the strategy of nuclear deterrence (specifically mutually assured destruction), which makes the entire society hostage to a threat of nuclear obliteration. Consciousness of this risk and lack of confidence in the ability of governments to manage it responsibly helped to fuel massive peace movements in Europe during the 1970s and 80s.

If one turns the perspective around, it becomes easy to see how societies that are at odds with the states that contain them pose problems for the military establishment. At one extreme, a disaffected society faces the military with a domestic target, forcing it to divide its resources between internal and external threats. Pakistan illustrates this dilemma well, especially during 1971, when civil war triggered international war. So too does China during the 1930s, when civil war weakened the country's ability to resist the Japanese. In the case of civil war, the armed forces fragment into an internal anarchy, facilitating, and even inviting, external military intervention, as in Lebanon after 1976. Long-term preoccupation with domestic threats not only corrupts and politicises the armed forces, but can also skew their training and attitude in ways that ill-suit them for external conflict. The generally dismal performance of the Argentine army during the 1982 war with Britain is a case in point. When there is no clear differentiation between the functions of the army and those of the police, then the military is compromised in relation to external threats.

At the other extreme, this logic threatens the ability of the military to reproduce itself adequately to meet external threats. If significant sections of the population are excluded from recruitment because of doubts about their loyalty, then the mobilisation base of the state's armed strength is weakened. Such doubts reflect societal insecurities within the state. They may result from ethnic divisions, as in former Soviet concerns about recruits from central Asia, South African concerns about blacks, and Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish concerns about Kurds. They may also result from a general disaffection between government and society, such as that which underlay doubts about the reliability of Eastern European armed forces during the Cold War. Insecure societies may also constrain strategic options for defence policy. If societies are at odds with the states that contain them, then mass participation strategies of territorial defence become dangerous to implement. As the Yugoslav case illustrates all too vividly, arming and training a dissident population to meet external threats is an invitation to civil war when the sources of societal insecurity are within the state itself.

3.3. Societal security and the political sector

The classical functions of government are to provide security for the state against both external threats and internal challenges to the legitimate order, and to provide a framework of law and order for domestic society. To the extent that governments are representative of their people, there should therefore be considerable complementarity between government and societal security. But governments are not always, or even usually, representative, and they may threaten societies both within and outside their jurisdiction. Because of the links between politics and society, external threats to society can be difficult to disentangle from threats to governments. In relations between states, significant external threats on the societal level amount to attacks on national identity and thus easily fall within the political realm. Threats to society are often part of a larger package of military and political threats such as that faced by Israel from the Arabs and that posed by Nazi

Germany to much of Europe. Arab threats to the Israeli state include serious threats to Jewish society, just as Nazi threats to the Polish and Soviet states included threats to Polish and Russian society.

As in the military sector, however, there is also a very significant domestic component in political threats to societal security. If societal security is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and ethnic identity and custom, then threats to these values come much more frequently from the governing apparatus within the state than from foreign governments. The state-nation process is often directly aimed at suppressing, or at least homogenising, sub-state societal identities, as countless examples attest. The Bulgarians suppress Turkish identity just as the Turks suppress Armenians and Kurds. The Baltic nationalities fear Russification, the Tibetans Sinification. Iraq massacres and relocates Kurds. Indonesia encourages Javanese migration into less heavily populated islands. Many countries have conducted or allowed pogroms against Jews or other alien minorities. Delicate ethnic balances, as in Fiji, Malaysia and Sri Lanka, can lead to systematic political discrimination and civil war. Where governments take ethnic sides (Serbs vs. Croats, Sinhalese vs. Tamils, whites vs. blacks) or promote either a homogenising state-national identity (Russification, Sinification) or an anti-ethnic state-ideological one (communist, Islamic), they frequently become the main agents of threat to existing societies from competing identities. Brutal governments may simply kill, relocate or expel peoples of unwanted identity. This is not a new phenomenon: classical Greek and Roman society rested on the exploitation of a slave class.

Internal threats to society are symptomatic of weak states in which societal identities and governmental legitimacy work against each other. It is one of the awful contradictions of national security logic that the suppression of sub-national societal identities can be thought to contribute, in the long run, to the creation of stronger and more viable state-nations. Governments trying to create national identities to fit their boundaries can easily find themselves at war with indigenous identities resisting their own submergence.

Up to a point it is of course legitimate for governments to 'suppress' their societies in the course of normal policing. It is a function of the state not only to provide protection against external threats, but also to protect citizens from each other by making and enforcing laws. Government therefore does constrain society, and only a small minority of anarchist persuasion think that society would function effectively without some governmental control. When there are effective political mechanisms for linking society to government, this control should broadly reflect social consensus on an acceptable degree of self-limitation. Even democratic states may of course find that the mainstream consensus alienates minority groups. Where democratic mechanisms function only imperfectly, or in relation only to part of society, then government can become a threat to societal security. Indeed, because of the intimacy and extent of the relationship between society and government, government easily becomes the main source of threat to society.

Democratic constitutions can be seen as a way of solving tensions between

on the one hand different ethnic and national communities, and on the other between the state itself and either individuals or communities. It can be argued that the democracy is a state form which ideally serves the purpose of providing societal security. At least in principle it is against the character of a democratic state to suppress an ethno-national society. At the same time – still reasoning within an ideal concept of a democratic state form – the democratic state ensures (or should ensure) societal security without having to use open violence. Democracy can thus ideally be seen as a set of strategies to create both security from possible domestic societal threats (in securing government by law, public order, non-violence, non-discrimination, peaceful conflict resolution, adequate police-protection etc.) and security from the threat of the state (constitutional government, separation of powers, human rights, minority protection, participation and possibilities of changing government).

This view of democratic state forms does not imply that democratic states always are able to provide societal security in practice. Many conflicts in Western democracies (such as in Northern Ireland, with the Basques in Spain, the riots in Los Angeles, or the attacks on asylum seekers in Germany) illustrate that this is not the case. Low voting rates in some long-established democracies suggest widespread alienation between state and society. Further, the relationship between democracy and nationalism is complex, with nations in some sense as the historical framework for democracy, but on the other hand with democratisation often leading to or at least opening up for extreme nationalisms (Keane, 1992). Whether a democratic state is able to solve the problems of societal insecurity depends on both the concrete state form, its roots in the relevant societies and its strategies, and on the culture of the societies in question. As the many failures of transplanted democracy attest, it is questionable whether a democratic state can exist without a 'democratic culture'.

In addition to direct threats from the political to the societal sectors, there are also indirect threats arising from the consequences of government policies elsewhere. The discussion in section 3.2 about the threat of societal obliteration as a possible cost of nuclear deterrence points to foreign policy as a key area for this type of indirect threat. When governments either pursue aggressive policies abroad, or else adopt stances that appear seriously threatening to other states, it is society that takes many of the consequences. Obvious examples are Germany and Japan in the 1940s. These two societies first paid the cost of mobilisation, though it has to be admitted that by no means everyone saw this as a cost. Next they paid the more tangible costs of total war and total defeat: massive casualties, starvation, impoverishment, de-industrialisation and huge destruction of property. Finally, they paid the costs of occupation: years of foreign control over government and society, and (much more in the German than the Japanese case) rape, looting, loss of territory, dislocation of population, humiliation and reparations. Iran and Iraq in their different ways provide more contemporary examples of the same phenomena, as do Israel and Syria. Democracy may also sometimes put both state and society at risk in the international arena. Ikenberry and Hall (1989: 95–100) argue in the well-known tradition from de Tocqueville that liberal

democracies find it difficult to conduct well-judged foreign policies, tending to swing between extremes of indifference and over-engagement.

Reversing the perspective again, it is also possible to see how insecurity on the societal level interacts with the political sector. The two key points here are easily stated. If the source of societal insecurity is external to the state, then the probability is that the sociopolitical cohesion of the state – the interweaving, mutual support and mutual legitimation of society and governing institutions – will be strengthened. Society will look to the governing apparatus to defend it, and the government will look to society for support against a common threat. But if the source of societal insecurity is within the state, then sociopolitical cohesion will almost certainly be weakened, making the state weak as a state (Buzan, 1991a: chap. 2). As argued above, the government is the most likely source of domestic threat to society. Weak states are by definition plagued by their inability to establish a stable political legitimacy. Either government is at odds with all or part of society (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa), or less commonly, it is trying to hold the ring between parts of society that are seriously at odds with each other (Canada, India). Such states are vulnerable, *inter alia*, to penetration and intervention from outside, and to violence and secessionism within. Their weakness as states (ie. their political weakness, not necessarily their weakness as powers) may drive them towards aggressive foreign policies, in an attempt to offset domestic instability by raising the level of perceived threat from outside. Relations between India and Pakistan have much of this quality, and it has been argued that even the Cold War can in part be explained by the needs of ruling elites to use external threats as a means of facilitating domestic cohesion (Kaldor, 1990: 22–6).

3.4. Societal security and the economic sector

The relationship between societal security and the economic sector is exceptionally complex. At the time of writing (1992), it is perhaps worth keeping in mind the case of the successor states to the Soviet Union in thinking about this relationship. In the space available here, we can do no more than sketch the main points that bear on the security problematique. In this discussion, we will assume that the economic framework is defined by a capitalist world economy and that the problem for the state is how to relate to this economy. It also helps to be aware that the idea of economic security under market conditions is loaded with severe contradictions (Buzan, 1991a: chap. 6) Not the least of these is that under capitalism, actors *must* experience continuous and quite high levels of insecurity: unless they do, markets cannot deliver efficiency and the whole rationale and dynamic of the system is undermined. Similarly, under capitalism societies must be prepared to make continuous and often rapid adjustments in order to adapt themselves to changes in the scale, technology, competition and resource requirements characteristic of an ever-changing global market. It could be argued that the adaptation requirements, and the homogenising and cosmopolitanising effects, of capitalism automatically threaten any static or traditional idea of culture. With these caveats in mind, the threats to societal security from the economic sector can

broadly be cast into three categories: those that arise from the efficient working of capitalism, and those that arise from the inefficient working of capitalism and those that arise from the global structure of capitalism.

The threat to society from the efficient working of capitalism arises from the tension between the distinctive qualities of societal identity and tradition on the one hand, and the homogenising, atomising and class-generating qualities of capitalism on the other. Societal identities are marked by their differences from each other (language, culture, sense of history), and by the sense of community that they create within and among their own membership. National societies are bastions of self-referencing communal identities, in which differences from others are as important as internal similarities in constructing and maintaining identity. Global capitalism is a direct assault on many of these qualities. As a global system, it works to undermine national cultural distinctiveness in several ways. It generates global products (cars, televisions, Coca Cola, Dallas), attitudes (consumerism, materialism, individualism), and styles (blue jeans, English language, heavy metal rock) that erode the distinctiveness (and in some cases the viability) of national cultures. It reinforces this with ever higher intensities of interaction across a broad spectrum: exchange of goods, movement of individuals, multiple channels of communication, and mass linkage of information and transportation networks. To the extent that the reproduction of national identities requires limits to interaction, and the predominance of local products and networks, global capitalism threatens the process by its own counter-process of relentless homogenisation and adaptation. Participation in global capitalism forces states and societies to open themselves to massive and continuous pressures both for change (new technologies, new conditions of competition, new patterns of socio-economic organisation), and for conformity ('fair trading practices', 'level playing fields', 'equal access to markets' . . .). Capitalism and internationalisation are virtually synonymous.

In the discussion of the relationship between modern capitalist society and societal security we meet very contradictory interpretations, which might be seen as generalisations of existing, but contradictory trends. On the one hand we have the interpretation that the modern capitalist society doesn't fulfil the processes of socialisation to the same degree as earlier societies. One effect of the erosion of common norms is that socialisation of youth and of marginal groups such as immigrants, isn't successful. This means that a large part of society comes to consist of diffuse minorities. These minorities are weakly placed within society, easily experiencing insecurity, and easily reacting in violation of the norms of the society in the form of crime, vandalism, rudeness, alienation and social disorder. There are many manifestations of such reactions: active forms are house-occupations, demonstrations, terrorism; passive forms are lack of will (and ability) to live a normal life, dropping out from education and employment, homelessness, welfare dependence. City riots like those in Los Angeles and British cities or attacks on asylum seekers in Germany and Sweden can be seen in this light. Clearly, the democratic state has difficulties in reacting to these problems in a democratic way, and might react in an authoritarian way, thus leading to surveillance,

control and the use of force, with all the dangers that these imply for a democratic and liberal society (Hirsch, 1980).

On the other hand, we have the interpretation that the modern capitalist society through its high productivity and high level of consumption provides the citizens with a new identity as consumers, which is strong enough at least in part to substitute for traditional forms of national identities. From the debate on German identity we have the interpretation that economic satisfaction might substitute for a problematic historical identity, and its reinforcement by the view that it was the East Germans' wish for Deutschmarks, more than national identity, that paved the way for German unity. One of the problems in relation to this 'ideology of consumerism', which follows capitalism and is constantly supported by it, is that it presupposes a functioning capitalist system, and might lead to identity-problems if and when the promises of the consumer society are not kept. Thus, this ideology seems stronger in growth-periods than in crises. Another aspect is that the modern capitalism and its consumer ideology have provoked reactions in the form of new social movements which counteract the growth ideology of capitalism. This is especially true for the ecological movement. Thus modern capitalism is followed by new ideologies, which are more international than national, and of new international, ideological cleavages, for example in relation to the attitudes towards continued economic growth. These tendencies might interact with the problems of weak socialisation and integration, contributing to the very diffuse ideological culture in modern capitalist societies.

The relationship between society and capitalism has some paradoxical qualities. The two can easily work against each other in a mutually destructive pattern. Just as the pursuit of capitalism can erode society, so the maintenance of society can erode capitalism. One way for this to happen is for the state to intervene in the economy as a way of insulating its society from the (sometimes harsh) effects of adaptation and competition. As Mayall argues, truly liberal economies require a very narrow conception of security – that is relatively few types of societal and economic interaction can be classified as threats. But the spread of government functions into social and economic areas provides an endless supply of wider security commitments whose logic can be used to undermine liberal economic practice (Mayall, 1984: 317). The logic that liberal systems require a narrow conception of security rests on the inescapable insecurities of market-based relations. The counter logic stems from government commitments to welfare ('social security'), and more broadly to the management of the economy in order to optimise welfare, economic security and national identity for the electorate as a whole. The *dirgiste* style of French governments, and the battle of France and its farmers against the Uruguay round of the GATT deal is a good example. This line of reasoning links the more ambitious notions of individual and corporate security to the state level. If 'social security' broadly conceived means maintaining jobs, high incomes and traditional industries and patterns of employment, then welfare logic becomes a rationale for protecting the economy from the pressures of international market competition. In an environment in which economic threats have the highest profile for many citizens, this

conflation of social and national security logic can be electorally persuasive, leading to protectionist (economic *nationalist*) policies that effectively begin to raise barriers between the national and the global economy.

One logical end to this process is socialism/communism in which the state completely absorbs economy and society into the governing apparatus, de-linking it as much as possible from the global economy. A variant on it is the nationalist rejection of the global market as a threat to culture, as exemplified by policies in Iran (post 1979), China, Burma and to a lesser extent India. Much of the anti-Western ferment in the Third World, perhaps most conspicuously illustrated by the group of Islamic states, is based on this tension between the desire for the power and the material fruits of capitalism on the one hand, and the fear that the price to be paid for this is the opening of one's society and culture to decadent and destructive alien values and behaviours. Again, the importance of internationalisation to societal security is manifest.

But there is also an important sense in which capitalism and society work together. It has been argued (Gellner, 1983a) that one of the reasons for the creation of nationalism in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was precisely to contain the socially divisive and politically disruptive consequences of emerging industrial capitalism so forcefully pointed out by Marx. Capitalism divided society into antagonistic classes whose conflict was defined by their relationship to the means of production. Unless some countervailing, unifying force could be found, the turbulent energies of capitalism threatened to self-destruct, or at least to bring the march towards steadily greater economies of scale to a grinding halt. The answer was nationalism, which allowed class divisions to be contained with the greater whole of a fictively historic 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983). From this point of view, capitalism is fundamentally dependent on the maintenance of strong societal identities: without them it is vulnerable to self-destruction by its own class forces. To the extent that this remains true, neither capitalism nor society can be allowed to overwhelm the other. They are forced to exist in a state of tension, with governments trying to hold the ring in order to keep the whole game going. One recent statement of this balancing act is John Ruggie's work on 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1982).

When capitalism isn't working efficiently, holding the ring becomes more difficult, and the dynamics of threat between economy and society change. In periods of recession or depression, governments have fewer resources with which to uphold social harmony. Falling levels of welfare highlight inequalities of wealth and income and can create powerful political pressures for anti-capitalist redistribution of resources. Increased trade competition and global conditions of surplus capacity create pressures for protectionism. The rising cost, or large-scale collapse, of credit can impoverish both individuals and firms whose activities depended on flows of capital, creating demands for government intervention. These dynamics, and their effects, are traditionally illustrated by the case of the 1930s, in which economic crisis led to sociopolitical reactions which not only deepened the crisis, but also pushed towards aggressive foreign policies (the association of wealth with control of territory) and global war (Buzan, 1984).

A structural perspective gives yet another view of the relationship between

societal security and the economic sector. In this view, the global capitalist economy gives rise to a centre–periphery structure (Galtung, 1971). In the centre lie the powerful industrial economies that shape and control the international political economy. They dominate finance, trade, production, and technological innovation, and they set the political norms and rules for international society. Because of their commanding position, the states associated with these economies control sufficient resources to stabilise their internal class structures and to support client elites in the periphery. The periphery is occupied by weak economies primarily orientated to providing the centre with raw materials and low technology manufactures (that is, those in which profit margins are lowest and competition most fierce). According to this theory, the structure of global capitalism systematically disadvantages the states and societies in the periphery. As Calleo and Rowland put it: 'The elaborate economic interdependence of free-trade imperialism is obviously not without its political implications. It often promotes . . . political units lacking political or economic viability except as tributaries of the imperial power' (Calleo and Rowland, 1973: 11). Societies in the periphery will be unable to form strong states, unable to develop and relentlessly exposed to the more destructive qualities of capitalism. Although somewhat overstated, this is a powerful model. For our present purposes, it points to the fact that a substantial proportion of societies embedded in the global economy operate at a structural disadvantage. For these it might be argued that the whole economic system is a threat to societal security. Think, *in extremis*, of the Indian tribes in Brazil whose culture and life is being driven out of existence by the advance of 'development'.

3.5. Societal security and the environmental sector

Threats to societal security from the environmental sector arise when collective identities have important ties to a particular landscape which is itself threatened. By 'landscape' we mean not only the physical appearance of a territory, but also its climate, ecology and resource-base. The ties between social identity and landscape are strongest when a culture is highly adapted to a way of life that is strongly conditioned by that landscape. Arctic peoples (Inuit, Lapp) and rain-forest tribes are the most striking examples. In such cases, certain types of threat to the landscape (clearing of forests, blocking of reindeer migration paths by pipelines) can threaten the existence of the culture and sometimes of the people themselves. Threats of less than extinction can also be significant, and plentiful examples can be found in the history of North American Indians. Many Indian cultures were strongly tied to landscape. They developed a close relationship with the particular natural resources of their area, and their religions were cast in the form a landscape-based spirit world. Measures such as confinement of tribes to reservations (sometimes not their original lands) and massacre of key resources (buffalo, seal, whale), severely reduced the ability of these cultures to reproduce themselves.

This kind of close linkage between landscape and culture is typical of non-urban, preindustrial peoples. Urbanisation and industrialisation both create

'artificial' environments, and in so doing tend to detach cultures from their natural roots. But even in advanced industrial societies, significant connections to the landscape remain. The English look to their countryside, the Welsh to their valleys, the Finns and the Germans to their forests, the Indians and Egyptians to their rivers, and so forth. The term 'homeland' expresses the territorial and environmental element that inhabits most national identities. When the landscape is seen, as for example in several parts of the ex-Soviet Union, as essential to people's identity, environmental problems can become politically explosive because they are interpreted as problems of societal security. When the Russian rivers or farmland, or the Lithuanian coast line, or the Estonian hills were threatened by ecological destruction, this was seen as a threat against the indigenous people, against the 'national character': and therefore people reacted against the forces responsible, i.e. Moscow. It is no accident that the green movement not only has a strong globalist streak, but also a strong local, parochial one.

Threats to landscapes come in many forms, and cultures differ markedly in their attitudes towards them. Frontier cultures, currently exemplified by Brazil, care little for their landscapes except in terms of what can be extracted from them in the short term. More settled peoples, and those closely adapted to particular environments, are likely to be more sensitive. Landscapes can be threatened by pollution, by climate change (which may be a consequence of pollution), by changes in land use (forest to farming, farming to housing or industry, grazing to forestry, wetland to dry, dry land to lakes, etc.), or by changes in the weight of population resident in a given area. On marginal lands, overuse of resources may speed the onset of desertification. Although sensitivity to environmental threats varies from one culture to another, all will feel insecure in the face of catastrophic changes such as massive flooding. One has only to think through the effects of a renewed ice age (or more fashionably, of global warming) to see how dependent the whole pattern of human habitation, economy and politics is on a fairly narrow band of environmental norms.

Kristian Gerner has shown in several cases how threats agains an environment (or historical monuments) can trigger movements for independence. It may well be that such movements would have emerged anyway – they are not specifically about environmental–cultural–societal security. But it is interesting to notice the route this development actually took in many places. Since the reaction came (at first) not as the *demand* for something new (independent statehood), but as a *defence* of something threatened by environmental and cultural destruction, this implies the prior existence of something which had to be defended against a new threat – something which was *societal* but not necessarily related to a *state* structure. Several nationalities in what was then the Soviet Union began to show their national identity in the late 1980s not least in the environmental context: the national culture and identity was seen as threatened; and the threat was designated as both the communist system and – especially – the Russian power holders who by their ruthless policies showed at best their neglect of other peoples' national treasures, and at worst a conscious policy of extinction. Thus, the claim was not always raised at first in the political terminology of independence or sovereignty, but

as a concern for national identity – for instance expressed through nature. The demand came from society (Gerner, 1989: 188 223–77).

The reverse relationship between society and environmental security is complex and largely beyond the scope of this study. Some (mostly pre-urban, pre-industrial) societies live in equilibrium with their environments, changing little, and leaving the processes of nature largely undisturbed. Others take a much more predatory view, seeking to distance themselves from the natural condition and to exploit and conquer nature for their own enrichment. As human civilisation advances, it becomes ever harder to keep track of what 'natural' might mean. There is hardly anything natural (in the sense of original) about the English landscape despite its role in the national myth. Nature is increasingly becoming an artefact and as such society's perception of the relation between itself and nature is important. The dangers inherent in not taking into consideration this relationship are evident in the former Soviet Union where the destruction of nature is threatening the reproduction of society (Feshbach and Friendly, 1992).

3.6. Conclusion: societal security and state security

This discussion makes it clear that societal security is an integral and important component of state security. There are many ways in which societal security and state security can be at odds with each other and, when they are, the basic construction of the state is weakened. Unless society is secure within the state, the whole package of the state (here seen as government apparatus + society + territory) will be unstable. States in which society and government are at odds are weak as states and operate at a considerable security disadvantage in the international system. They will be more vulnerable to penetration by outside actors, less able to mobilise their own power and less able to offer stable partnerships for collaborative enterprises. Reducing contradictions between the state and societal security is thus a precondition for successful 'national' security policy.

Societal security is not just a potential obstruction to state security but can also provide a central part of the national security agenda. This positive linkage is clearest in relation to external threats which specifically target societies: Arabs versus Jews and, during the Cold War, communism versus liberal democracy. Where there is a reasonable level of identity between state and society, then part of the government's job is to defend societal security. One branch of this task leads to the traditional national security agenda of military preparedness to defend (or sometimes expand) territorial boundaries, and to protect civil society from depredations by armed raiders. Another branch leads to economic policy and the perennial tension between liberal and mercantilist attitudes towards trade, production and finance. And yet another leads to societally specific areas such as immigration control, education policy, and support (or not) for culturally and linguistically specific activities thought central to the reproduction of identity and community (the arts).

But the question of policies for societal security is more complicated than just how it relates to state security. What happens when societies cannot look

to the state for protection, either because the state is antagonistic, or because it has lost ground to a higher-level entity (as is happening in the European Community), or because the state cannot insulate society from the pressures of internationalisation?

PART II – SOCIETAL INSECURITY IN THE NEW EUROPE

Chapter 4
Europe and its nations: political and cultural identities
Ole Wæver and Morten Kelstrup

This chapter identifies the relevance of the concept of societal security in the analysis of present and future security problems in Europe. Its main focus is the relationship between developments at the political level and societal security in Europe. In particular, we trace the problems which arise for ethno-national (or other important) communities because of developments at the political level, or arise at the political level because of developments with regard to societal security.

Important themes in this chapter are related to the concept of the nation – understood as a combination of cultural and political identity. We are particularly concerned with the processes that might lead to a stronger and more comprehensive sense of European political community, a process of Europeanisation. Do such processes pose threats to existing political and cultural (especially national) identities in Europe? What are the possible consequences of such threats, in the form of new societal insecurity? And what are the responses to such threats? In relation to such responses, we specifically discuss the evolution of political institutions, for example, problems in forming institutions at a level beyond the nation-state.

We also want to look at the link between Europeanisation and societal security. Europeanisation can be seen as a possible threat to societal security, but further Europeanisation can also be a response to societal insecurity. As argued in Chapter 2, there is a distinction between ethnic and political identity. Political identity is mainly seen as 'sense of political community', of sharing a political project, while ethnic identity is a cultural, organic sentiment of being a larger family and ultimately deriving one's own identity and meaning of life from the community. Each type of identity can operate at different levels. This means that 'national' identity can include both the ethnic or cultural-bound and the state-bound aspects. Europe can similarly be constructed more or less in tune with one or the other.

This chapter deals first with the different meanings of the concept of Europeanisation. As indicated above, we imply by Europeanisation – if nothing else is stated – the development of a 'sense of community' (probably,

but not necessarily related to political institutions at the European level). Next, the analysis concentrates on the effects which the process of Europeanisation is having on existing patterns of national identity. It contrasts the current processes whereby the nation-state is being strengthened in the West and weakened in the East. After this, the chapter discusses the effects of the processes of Europeanisation on the development of the political institutions. It concludes, following the argument in Chapter 3, by looking at the overall linkage between societal and political security in Europe. The conclusion is especially concerned with the relationship between institutional and normative European integration and their combined relationship to societal security. It clears the way for the discussion in subsequent chapters on the more specific threats related to migration and terrorism.

4.1. Europeanisation

4.1.1. The meanings of Europeanisation

The term 'Europeanisation' has no fixed meaning. It has been used in many different ways, for instance to designate: (1) the development of a European pillar in NATO; (2) the development of Europe or Western Europe as an independent 'third force'; and (3) the growing importance of all-European cooperation (Meyer, 1989). Generally, the word is often used more neutrally, to designate (4) the expectation that there will be more security made in Europe, in other words that Europe will be more self-reliant (in one or the other way) or in technical terms: that superpower overlay is lifted, which implies the possibility of the re-emergence of a European security complex (cf. Buzan et al., 1990). Some might want to talk of Europeanisation as (5) the formation of a state-like European Union, connecting that process to the process of European integration. Yet, Europeanisation can also be understood as (6) the development at the individual level in Europe of people seeing themselves as Europeans.

These different ways of using the concept do create analytical problems, and some specification of meaning is necessary. The three first usages were characteristic of competing positions in the security landscape of the early and mid-1980s (Meyer, 1989). The fourth meaning was highly relevant in the late 1980s where the process of lifting overlay (and the question whether overlay would be lifted) were at the centre of political controversy (Buzan et al., 1990), but since the lifting is a reality now, it is to be treated more as a condition, a premise and not as the most interesting meaning of Europeanisation. The fifth meaning is better labelled European integration. Definition number six is the one we are going to use: 'Europeanisation' as *the development of a sense of being European* (the development of a European identity and/or a sense of European political community). Choosing this meaning does not indicate that the other meanings are uninteresting. On the contrary, it is important to relate the definition used here to some of the other processes which have been characterised as Europeanisation, but which will here be labelled differently.

As argued elsewhere (Buzan et al., 1990; Wæver, 1992a) and in Chapter 1,

the European Security Group analyse current European developments on the basis of the integration scenario as the likely and so far dominant trend for the European security complex, while fragmentation is also seen as a very real and politically relevant scenario. In the integration scenario, the institutional process of integration in the EC (or EU, European Union) is a very decisive (though not the only) component. We are therefore especially interested in investigating whether stronger integration in the EC will have effects on the large-scale political identities held by individual and social agents in the area. Does Europeanisation imply that one identity (ethno-national) is replaced by another (ethno-European) or does it lead to some kind of redistribution or re-allocation of collective identities between European, national and regional? (cf. Joenniemi and Wæver, 1992; Wind, 1992; Wæver, 1992a)

4.1.2. The re-appearance of 'Europe'

The overall framework for the present discussion is Barry Buzan's concept of security complexes (Buzan, 1991a: chap. 5; Buzan and Wæver, 1992) – and the ensuing concept of a European security complex (Buzan et al., 1990) which had been overlaid during the Cold War period (cf. chapter 1). The overlay was lifted gradually, especially for Western Europe, in the post-war period. The development of economic and political integration in Western Europe can be seen as part of such a development (Buzan, et al., 1990: chap 6). Yet the early and mid-1980s were marked by intensified attempts at overlay, and in another way by the omens of a future lifting of overlay. Thus, in the early 1980s we had discussions of 'Europeanisation of security' seen as attempts to form a security policy less dependent on the United States. 'Europeanisation' became a widespread slogan (and an object of study in strategic studies). 'Europeanisation' did not point to a specific development but rather a question, an opening, an expectation, a hole (Wæver, 1989a; Wæver, 1989b: 283–7). There was a vague but widespread expectation that we would get more security 'made in Europe' and less direct derivation from the superpower relationship, but exactly how (European pillar in NATO, neutralism and disarmament, a third way, or by liberating Eastern Europe) was far from evident. Yet, at the end of the 1980s there was a dramatic shift in the inner logic of a seemingly continuous trend towards a more independent European line in security. From 1980 to 1987 Europeanisation was largely a response to external pressure, to threats like unpredictable American policy and Russian attempts to lure Germany eastward.

Europeanisation was at that time a label for compensatory moves in relation to the increased pressures of the so-called second Cold War. From the 1987 summit meeting in Reykjavik, and definitely from the Rhodes Declaration of the EPC in 1988 and from the revolutionary year of 1989, the Western European states took on a much more serious task of not only correcting unpleasant elements of the policies of the superpowers, but taking over the job of carrying and structuring, guiding and leading a new Europe. After that, Europeanisation was no longer a policy inside a basically stable, non-Europe based, global order; it became a process on which Europe itself rested.

In parallel, the process of European integration regained speed after 1985 (with the Single European Act, programme '1992' and later the process leading to the Treaty of Maastricht for a European Union). From the mid-1980s hope and expectations were once again increasingly attached to the European Community.

All through the 1980s 'Europe' gained in symbolic significance. Well before renewed *détente* and Gorbachev, the reference point in security debates had started to change. From the early 1980s, the pure East–West framework gave way to a debate in terms of 'Europe'. 'Europe' became the codeword, a word that all agreed to refer to. Russians, French, Germans, everybody acted in the name of Europe, for Europe. But just beneath the surface one could see that the commentators were not talking about the same Europe. These 'Europes' had different boundaries to West as well as East, different organising principles and different 'European' values (Jahn *et al.*, 1987; Wæver, 1989a, 1989b, 1990a). As a political space 'Europe' increasingly opened up, and the political struggle of competing Europes became more and more central.

From 1989–90 we can regard the superpower overlay as lifted. In the 1990s (starting on 9 November 1989), European development could no longer be regarded as a reactive phenomenon. It took on the character of construction, of forming a new order supposed to rest in itself. This construction has so far mainly happened along the lines of integration, but with fragmentation as an ever present, historically founded competitor. Among the mechanisms that could lead from the track of integration to that of fragmentation, one of the more important is a conflict over societal security in a key European state. If the process of Europeanisation is registered as threatening national identity in France or Germany, this will be the most basic process that can undercut integration. It seems a safe bet that politics will continue to be cast in terms of 'Europe', even though the specific form remains open. The overall policy agenda will be seen as a problem of 'Europe' whether the trend turns towards integration or fragmentation.

4.1.3. European identity and the European idea

The increasing Europeanisation and politicisation of Europe raises the questions 'What is Europe?' and 'What is the European idea?' To what extent can one see a historical continuity in plans for constructing European unity? Is there a kind of slow, even retarded, nation building? How do we now rate the chances of success for this ancient project? Or was the 'European idea' something else – in reality (as in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) more like a 'family of nations' and an international society (Smith, 1992; Bull and Watson, 1984) – which may still continue? What does 'European identity' mean? Is it similar to, or an alternative to, or a repetition of, national identity? Politically, the question is in what sense there might be, or might develop, a European identity on which European integration could be based.

Much has been said and written about what it might mean to be European, what is the historical and semantic import of European identity (see for

example, Curcio, 1958; Gollwitzer, 1964 [1957], Morin, 1987; den Boer *et al.*, 1993). The history of the European idea shows that it has appeared in various periods of history in a relatively clear form, then disappeared for long stretches, then reappeared with partly new meanings and with twists and turns giving it yet new content. The Dutch historian Pim den Boer (den Bier *et al.*, 1993) has argued that a real concept of Europe, a distinct self-reflective idea of a Europe with a history and meaning, emerged with the French Revolution, i.e. not until the late eighteenth century.

> The term 'Europe' came to be used in [a] much more conscious manner. It had had a familiar ring for centuries . . . and now came to be endowed with historical interpretations and political ideas. The idea of Europe became more significant, but there was no question of a general climate of opinion. Various groupings had their own idea of what Europe had been and ought to be.

The concept of Europe is not some eternal core idea or a seed which we find far back in history and whose development we then trace through the ages. Rather it is the story of several conceptual fragments that have become linked at various points to the idea of Europe and which are then articulated and re-articulated through the following periods. The five main fragments in the dominant discourses on Europe were: the role of Europe as a geographical concept, the concept of liberty, Europe as Christendom, the balance of power and European civilisation.

These thoughts indicate that there is a rich reservoir of ideas linked to Europe, but that there is no stable core, no given European identity. The 'European idea' will remain a fascinating and frustrating enterprise. There is much in it – but no final answer.

In the current political situation, however, it is attractive to attempt to give a more specific content to the idea of a European identity. The 1980s and early 1990s were marked by the dual move of EC integration and the collapse of the Soviet empire. Both are widely seen as some kind of victory for the idea of Europe: the states in the Western part of the continent are contemplating handing over sovereignty to a European supranational political construction, and the states in the Eastern part are returning to Europe. In this context arguments based on the 'European idea' are politically powerful.

This whole discussion of European identity is closely related to the 'cultural dimension' of the EC. It is often argued that the cultural sphere is lagging behind the economic and political ones. Jean Monnet's statement that if he should start it all over again, he would start in culture and education is often quoted (for instance by Schlesinger, 1991: 141). And we are also reminded of Robert Schumann's statement that 'before Europe develops into a military alliance or an economic community it has to be a cultural community' (1951; quoted by Lindeborg, 1990: 28). Sometimes these arguments come from progressive (Green or humanist) voices who stress that there has to be a better balance between the soft, human side and the hard, economic, political and maybe military side. There has to be more culture in the EC. At other times they come from worried Eurocrats who fear that there are limits to how far one can push integration in the political and economic spheres unless

people feel sufficiently European. 'Who falls in love with an Inner Market?', asked Jacques Delors (quoted in Lindeborg, 1990: 30).

In this debate it is assumed that political order ultimately rests on popular loyalty and affection (as in the nation-state). Sometimes it is further argued that loyalty is a question of identity, identity is a question of culture, and culture is created by disseminating symbols and propaganda. Thus, some strands of the EC machinery work from this perspective with everything from balloons for the children with the EC symbol on, and putting the EC flag up in every possible place, to the EC passport and possible joint Olympic teams.

It has been questioned (Schlesinger, 1991: 139) whether it is realistic to think so instrumentally about culture and identity:

> Unity is the goal, and information . . . is *the* means to achieving it. Unity at a European level is said to be an outcome of an act of will dependent upon a prior condition: a 'European identity'. But this in turn is dependent upon something else: 'information'. Information (culture) is therefore held to act as a homogenizer or articulator of the will: it is a thoroughly idealist and voluntarist perception of the construction of the desired order, and a rather improbable explanation.

It can be claimed that this flags-and-balloons strategy is a sign of weakness. It was high on the agenda when integration was stalling, and the EC machinery in desperation tried both to standardise maximally whatever it could get its hands on and disseminate its message in all possible ways. Apparently the actual process and magnitude of the task taught the Eurocrats that they actually cannot take over everything and they have very consciously to send back many tasks to national and regional levels to avoid being overwhelmed. Steps in this direction are the replacement of harmonisation in technical fields is to some extent by mutual recognition of standards among the participating states, and that cultural policy is now more interested in working with the national identities than against them. The proclamations about culture (for instance in the Maastricht Treaty) now stress much more than previously the task of preserving national and regional variation.

In contemplating whether it will be possible to construct 'Europe' on some political or cultural identity it might be wise to listen to the warning of Anthony D. Smith (1992: 73–4):

> There is the deeper question of popular myths and symbols, and historical memories and traditions. Here we are placed firmly back in the pre-modern part of each national state [from where it draws its energy and images and where Europe has no similar well]. There is no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice Day, no European ceremony for the fallen in battle, no European shrine of kings or saints. When it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification, there is no European equivalent of national or religious community. Any research into the question of forging, or even discovering, a possible European identity cannot afford to overlook these central issues.

After noting that there is also a lack of historical, political mythology which does not point to imperial myths and/or raise some parts of Europe above the others, Smith continues:

Is it possible for the new Europe to arise without 'myth' and 'memory'? Have we not seen that these are indispensable elements in the construction of any durable and resonant collective cultural identity?

Here lies the new Europe's true dilemma: a choice between unacceptable historical myths and memories on the one hand, and on the other a patchwork, memoryless scientific 'culture' held together solely by the political will and economic interest that are so often subject to change. In between, there lies the hope of discovering that 'family of cultures' . . . through which over several generations some loose, over-arching political identity and community might gradually be forged.

Smith speaks of 'the political will and economic interest that are so often subject to change'. But are the myths and symbols as inflexible as he suggests? Remembering that the nations themselves wrote and rewrote history too, is it impossible that history appears in a different light in later generations? Or maybe that history and myths becomes less relevant to politics? We might instead argue as Jürgen Habermas (1992: 12) does:

Our task is less to reassure ourselves of our common origins in the European Middle Ages than to develop a new political self-confidence commensurate with the role of Europe in the world of the twenty-first century.

The reason for this is, that:

Unlike the American variant, a European constitutional patriotism would have to grow out of different interpretations of the same universalist rights and constitutional principles which are marked by the context of different national histories.

Habermas concludes that the European project will not succeed if it is attempted in the format of the nineteenth-century nation-state. A European nation-state is an illusion and a self-defeating project. There is no necessary link between European history and culture on the one hand and European politics on the other. European integration is not happening because it is natural and necessary: it will only happen if sufficient political energy is invested in the project (cf. Wind, 1992). There is a contest over European identity between romantic, historicist constructions and more political conceptions (see Figures 2.4 and 4.5).

4.2. Europeanisation and other identities

Questions relating to European identity are developing very differently in the Western and Eastern parts of Europe. In the Western part the main development is the way the process of Europeanization and identity-formation relates to the EC and how this effects national identity. There is a link both to the political developments in the EC (European Union, popular support, etc), and more broadly to developments in the attitudes of the people towards Europe and the nation. Is it true that the EC does not generate much community-like support and the support seems to be utilitarian rather than affective? (cf. Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; *Eurobarometer*, 1992 and

1993). What decides whether such a weak political community can survive future crises? Can European integration take another form, maybe establishing a more stable relationship with the national identities?

In the Eastern part of Europe, the issues are more classical: to what extent does nationalism set the stage for post-communist politics? How is the new nationalism related to the process of Westernisation? Is nationalism a transitory phenomenon or a lasting legacy? How will this influence the Europe-orientation of these states, and how in turn will Europeanisation possibly influence national identities there. Seen from the national perspective will 'Europe' be a stabiliser, a threat or both?

4.2.1. The future of national identity in (a Europeanising) Western Europe

In relation to Western Europe we should be aware of the complex nature of the European transformation, which takes the form of an illogical mix of three processes (Wæver, 1990a, 1992a):

- classical interstate cooperation especially in the field of security, and in relation to the two (in security terms) semi-European states, the United States and Russia, in NATO and especially in the CSCE;
- the creation of a superstate, the EC, which takes on a number of state-like traits without ever becoming a nation-state or even a normal sovereign territorial state;
- the emergence of 'sub-state' and 'around-state' structures, especially involving German *Länder* and other regions, business and similar networks.

The common denominator for this mixture is the tendency towards dissolution of the modern state system as we have known it in Europe since the end of the Middle Ages. What happens now is that political authority gets dispersed on more and more levels, which undermines the exclusive, sovereign, territorial state. During the modern period it has been possible to denote the state as the primary level, from which sub-national as well as international developments (including international co-operation) were clearly derived and delegated. Now, in the new Europe, this becomes increasingly blurred: is the EC a sovereign state *in status nascendi*? Or is the sovereign actor after all the (nation) states? Or is this question no longer answerable? Is regionalism within Europe – the emergence of transborder regions (Joenniemi and Wæver, 1992) – still something controlled by the states, or is it fundamentally an independent process in its own right?

The new structures can be seen as 'neo-medieval' in the sense that overlapping authority is returning (Bull, 1977b: 254f, 264ff, 285f, 291ff; Wæver 1990b, 1991b). The medieval metaphor has the advantage of directing our attention at the change in the organising principle of the sovereign, territorial state (not the nation-state which is only half as old). The national idea is obviously not dying out (nor is politics as such giving way to 'interdependence' or technocratic 'administration' as often implied in ideas of 'end of the nation-state'), but what is modified is the organisation of political space. For some four centuries it has been organised through the principle of territorially defined units with exclusive rights inside and a special kind of relations outside: international relations, foreign policy, without any superior auth-

ority. In the EC now there is no longer any one level which is clearly the most important to refer to. There is a set of overlapping authorities, and thereby even those nations most closely approaching the ideal type of the nation-state, lose the option of always referring to 'their' state. The close link between state and nation is broken.

In a historical perspective the state–nation relationship is approaching an unprecedented situation. The nation, which was born into an interstate system based on the sovereign territorial state (already two or three hundred years old at the time; Mayall, 1990), will potentially continue into a post-sovereignty situation. If this happens, the post-modern political system will not be totally like the middle-ages in which the political concept of nation did not exist. The understanding of this complex evolution is often obscured by the use of the term 'nation-state' as designating both the emergence of the national idea and the twice as old territorial state (i.e. the principle of territoriality, sovereignty and exclusivity). This conflation means that the specific nature and importance of the territorial state concept (which is the basic organising principle behind the system) is overlooked, which obscures an understanding of the importance of a possible change at the level of the territorial state. Announcements of the demise of the nation-state are often refuted by pointing to the continuing importance of nationalism/the nation idea. But this misses the point, since the major change is happening at the level of the state, while the nation as such continues (Wæver 1991b).

	Pre-sixteenth century	Sixteenth to eighteenth century	Nineteenth and twentieth centuries	Twenty-first century ?
Territorial state	-	+	+	-
Nation	-	-	+	+

Figure 4.1 State and nation through the ages

In this perspective EC integration is not the creation of a new nation-state (concentrating power, authority and identity). Rather it is a dissemination of power. Much is taken to Brussels, but without attaining a new synthesis. Cultural identity largely remains at the national level, even with a tendency to move down towards micro-national 'regional' identity. The coupling state–nation is weakened without a new synthesis being achieved at the European level. No sovereign Euro-state is created, nor will we have sovereign member states. In such a perspective the nations do not disappear. Maybe they are not even weakened – but the territorial state with its prin-

ciple of sovereignty is. Left behind we find, nations with less state, cultures with less shell.

Such a development has important consequences for the security agenda. It implies increasing importance for societal security, i.e. situations where (significant groups in) society feel their identity threatened and try to defend themselves. In the previous (pre-integration/'modern') situation when a nation/culture felt threatened (by immigration, foreign products, international co-operation), it could call on 'it's' state to close the borders to immigrants, pursue a protectionist economic policy or withdraw from international co-operation. This seems no longer to be true. Border control and several forms of economic policy have already moved towards the EC level.

If people generally accept this development, how do cultures defend themselves? With culture! If you feel, your identity is threatened by internationalisation or Europeanisation, you have to strengthen the expression of existing identities. Culture has in this sense become security policy.

If the reader will excuse a few parochial examples, it can be illustrated why we focus on the sphere of culture. In Denmark we have in the last years had many TV-programmes and seminars on 'Danishness' and the like. This has not necessarily been linked to the anti-EC agenda of recreating a tight state–nation correspondence, but on the contrary often presented as a correlate to an acceptance of EC integration. In the Danish EC debate the future and form of a Danish (non-state) nation is an issue, and the cultural community has been first to approach these new themes – almost explicitly in terms of 'cultural security policy'.

In such threats both objective and subjective elements are at play. Cultural identity is not necessarily threatened simply because it is interpreted as being threatened. We do not want to contribute to the impression that for instance Danishness is being threatened by immigration and/or EC integration. Neither is it a given result that we should reach for nationalistic defence when cultures are experienced as threatened. Simplistically, one can say, a sound, relaxed national identity is the best guarantee against nationalism, against reactions of fear and defence.

Today, in Western Europe we experience a process of challenged cultural identities and new articulation of national identities. Yet, at the same time we experience an alternative process of de-nationalisation, where another ideology takes over: a combination of utilitarianism, consumerism and formal democracy. There certainly is a flexibility in some quarters towards adapting (or even forgetting) their national identities in relation to Europe. There are tendencies towards a general downgrading of the craving for fixed and secure identities.

Actually the new process of articulation of national identity and the continued process of de-nationalisation are parts of a key controversy in several European countries. It is not yet clear whether in the long run we will see integration or fragmentation. Under integration, an institutionalisation and differentiation of these different kinds of identity would develop. Non-state, national identities would struggle for survival within an acceptance of the EC system (that is, stay basically non-state oriented) and let the political structures evolve in a more and more European manner, while culture became the

essence and main task/expression of the nation. Under fragmentation the national reactions will escalate and nations therefore reclaim control over politics, that is a re-nationalisation of the state and a de-Europeanisation of politics.

Important questions regarding the future development in Europe are: (a) will national identification generally subside? And if not, (b) which of two possible directions will developments in cultural identity take: (b–l) that national identity revives in the form of non-state, cultural self-defence, which might support Europeanisation of political structures, that is the evolution of a European political identity while cultural identity remains national; or (b–2) that it will be revived in the form of classical nation-state thinking and classical concerns for state sovereignty, national autonomy and self-expression at the cultural and political level? The process of the nations retreating into cultural self-cultivation (*Kulturnation* without *Staatnation*) while the European process builds state-like superstructures is on the agenda as a novel, challenging pattern.

With the process of European integration – and culturalisation of the nations – we see a marked emergence of societal security as separate from state security. The state is concerned about and defends against certain threats (to sovereignty). And society – the nation – defends its (perceived) identity in another security field. However, this dualism is not symmetrical. The societal side can choose to call upon the state and collapse itself back into the old constellation cf. Fig 4.2). Thus, the integration scenario relates to a perspective whereby state security and societal security are increasingly differentiated as separate fields, with separate referent objects; and if society continues to take care of its security in its way, this process might continue. But if security concerns on the societal side escalate to a level where the state is called back in, this will signal a potential retreat from integration and back to a more clear-cut nation-state modelling of Europe. Thus, returning to a theme from Chapter 2, we have not elevated state and society to an equal – though to a separate – status as referent objects of security. The long-term importance of societal security in Europe is contingent on the process of integration – but integration is also dependent on the separate security strategies of society.

Figure 4.2 Security strategies of state and society

4.2.2. The future of national identity in a Europeanising East Central Europe – and the combined developments in Eastern and Western Europe

In the East the main trend is the re-creation of the tie between state and nation. The ideal that every nation (people) should have its own state, and that the borders of the state should correspond to those of the nation, is strongly held in Eastern Europe. This leads to a re-emergence of the nation-state, but also creates a multitude of classical type conflicts: over borders, over the historical right to territories, over minorities leaving bigger states and possibly 're-uniting' with a motherland (for example, Hungarians in Romania, Moldova's possible reunification with Romania).

Through the early period of the national idea, Eastern Europe was dominated by multinational empires (Austrian, Russian, Ottoman), and the areas from Bulgaria to the Czech lands had only sporadic experience of independent statehood. Poland was the exception, but not always a happy one. The southern (mainly Balkan) part was 'liberated' as the Ottoman empire crumbled and states were formed, not only according to nation-state logic but simultaneously as a crucial part of Great Power politics during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Major parts of East Central Europe became independent states through the Versailles treaty after the First World War. In this period the principle of national self-determination was the official guiding axiom, but this was not easy to apply in mixed areas such as these (and with Great Power politics also in play).

East Central Europe became strongly influenced by the romantic (Herderian) version of nationalism: the ethnic '*Volk*' version, in contrast to the civic, republican type. Thus, 'the people' was conceived of in a way which allowed it to function as a silent preserve for resistance against the 'foreign', communist regime of the post-war period. Liberation from Soviet communism therefore appears at the same time as a return to Europe and a victory and rebirth for the nation.

It is possible to make both calls – European arguments and national arguments – in the current political context. Probably the national arguments will always be the more powerful emotionally whereas the European arguments at least in the first post-wall years have a more rational appeal: the only chance for success lies with close alliance with the West, including living up to the West European 'standards of civilization' (minority rights, non-autocratic democracy, true pluralism etc.). It is not unlikely that the European factor will lose its force in the East as the ability (and/or will) of the West to deliver instant relief is proved to be limited, while the national argument will remain important. Thus, the prospect is that the conflicts related to re-nationalisation in the East will grow.

We are now ready to draw an overall pattern of main developments in Europe. In the West, state and nation are de-coupling. If the integration scenario holds, much of the power of the state moves to the EC level. Thereby the nations are left open to new threats, notably with a new kind of vulnerability, which creates a new kind of security problem.

In the East, in contrast, we see a tightening link between state and nation.

This leads to conflicts of the classical type, emerging from constellations in which state and nation do not fit, and for instance one nation's state makes claims on territory controlled by another state. The various nation–state pairs get into conflict with each other (whereas the nationalist reactions in the West appear when nation and state are decoupled). These tendencies are illustrated in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3 State-nation constellations in Eastern and Western Europe

These conflicts in the East become more pressing, more dangerous, not least in the light of the changing geopolitics following the re-birth of Russia. One way to avoid their pulling the whole continent into new–old power balancing and alliance policy, is often seen to be a strengthening of integration in Western Europe. But integration could well increase the new problems in the West. More 'state' is pulled away from the nations, and now at a speed that is not generated from within Western Europe, but increasingly due to external logic generated by the Eastern situation. This leads to new societal insecurity in the West with new risks of defensive reactions. The circle has been closed. Old style nationalism (in the East) accelerates new style nationalism (in the West). From the West to the East (the arrows in Figure 4.4 illustrate this) various kinds of stabilising impacts of Western Europe on Eastern Europe: from the indirect power and discipline of economic rewards giving incentives to behave in fields like, for instance, minority rights (Keohane, 1990; Wæver, 1993), to direct intervention in conflicts as well as the general stabilising effect of the EC as a core, example and bulwark against balance of power dynamics. This process spills back towards disintegrative effects in the West which then merge with the arrow coming from East to West: the national idea, the national category in thinking about politics. In a sense there is a race on between the logics of 'East eats West' and 'West eats East'.

Figure 4.4 The interaction of nationalisms. East and West

It is therefore necessary to confront the central question: what really drives these national(ist) (re)actions in the East, and what factors might influence the future evolution of national identity and European orientations in the area?

Today we know a least five things about nationalism:

(1) The force and future importance of nationalism is repeatedly underestimated (Berlin. 1982, 1978).

(2) Nationalism hits most often and most strongly in phases of modernisation, industrialisation, and Westernisation – i.e. when a significant social group or all of society is detached from their roots and become alienated by a processes of modernisation.

(3) Hurt pride and humiliation contribute to the development of nationalism.

(4) The idea about the existence deep in the national soul of a profound meaning and a golden future accelerate the development of nationalism, that is the ability to think along lines which make the national values supreme and the uniting point.

(5) Nationalism is a kind of module. It has developed as an idea and as a movement through a number of phases. But each new aspirant to nationalism can pick up the idea in its most developed form, without having to live through the historical experience of earlier phases. Thus a kind of acceleration effect is created. New nationalisms do not have to return to the French Revolution and have all the experiences themselves, but have a chance of entering at the point to which Germans, Americans, East Central Europeans and Third World people have taken the concept.

These factors point in the direction of nationalism being a likely option for East Central Europe. Probably a key factor will be the degree of hurt pride and humiliation. Issues like these are central since nationalism is after all a very existential matter – the incredible force of nationalism is impossible to understand if one does not see how it has a central role in each individual, gives an answer to the meaning of each individual human being (cf Chapter 2). One should therefore be particularly sensitive to the mechanisms in society in East Central Europe which create personal needs on which nationalism naturally feeds.

Jiřina Šiklová has put forward an interesting explanation of 'Nationalism in East and Central Europe' (1991:10): 'the loss of the value of the secondary or acquired status'. The problem is that all acquired status is bound up with the system, the past, with guilt. In the general lack of orientation, the game of attributing guilt, of finding 'those who are guilty', becomes a central exercise.

> The citizens of East and Central Europe got the opportunity to change, to declare their allegiance to their convictions, to say who they really are. Enthusiastically, they step forward in front of the microphone, write, want to say who they really are and to declare their belief. What can they, however, say about themselves without shame? Normally, they would declare their job, their education, the qualifications, the size of their savings, their possessions – i.e. their acquired or secondary status. And at the moment when they want to pronounce this, their voices get stuck and they turn mute. They realise that all signs of their secondary, acquired social status were and are related to the fallen regime.

Searching for a form of group consciousness which does not threaten themselves: 'Nationalism can be one such idea. It is indifferent as to class and interests, unites the population and does not remind of the recent past'. Without shame people can only turn to their primary or born social status, i.e. to gender, age, race and nationality 'because there one does not at all meet the question "And how and from where did you achieve this?" When I say, I am Slovak, Czech, Pole, Hungarian, German that does not only imply that I define myself, at the same time this connects me with the other people, who have the same fate.'

The achievement of a new, own (secondary) social status is decisive in avoiding escalating nationalism. In this way the economic factor is very important, but its operations have to be filtered through a psychological filter in order to understand how, when and why it operates. Pride and shame are central concepts. Nationalism will often outcompete other political programmes. While alternative (class, societal) visions might offer a more realistic outlook for improvement in the future, they lack the ability to offer immediate pride (and shield against shame).

Though economic improvements are crucial, the traditional liberal argument about overcoming nationalism through modernisation has to be modified in at least three ways. First, it is not the economic factor directly that creates nationalism but the psychological factors which have to be understood. Secondly, despite the arguments about the irrational nature of nationalism it is still possible that the mechanisms will get started again at some level

of economic development. This is so not least because of the unsettling effects of modernization and the relative nature of status, and thereby the constant possibility of humiliation. Thirdly, there is a difference between trying to prevent the eruption of nationalist logic by economic pre-emption and handling a conflict that is already started and run according to nationalist logic. In the latter case, as we can see in Yugoslavia, the most blatant economic irrationality does not prevent continued fighting and increasing stereotyping. Nationalism is both collective and very personal, existential.

We are here dealing with the competition between nationalism (or 'tribalism' [Dahrendorf, 1990]) and Westernisation. The most important question is how the development in the West will interact with the development in the East, and how the processes of Europeanisation will affect the individual and collective aspects of societal security, respectively. On the one hand, European integration and Europeanisation can supply many of the desired features: materially (economically), an alternative and longed for value ('Europe'), institutions and stability which might sometimes take the burden from the political systems being established. On the other hand, Europeanisation can easily be seen as part of a bigger development process which becomes increasingly intolerable. Economically reform can easily disrupt before it delivers the goods. The process of modernisation, industrialisation and Westernisation can lead to significant social groups (or almost all of society) being torn from their roots and becoming alienated blaming foreigners who put demands but do not help.

4.2.3. European and national identity – a new mixture

In this phase of European history a new question regarding European identity arises on the political agenda: with most of Western Europe on the way towards a European Union, what kind of identity does this new construct generate/demand – and how will it relate to national identity? Will the EC create a European identity, taking the form of the nation-state – a national and European identity – and thereby crush the old, national identities? Or is the development of European integration not a question of identity at all?

We suggest that European integration is a matter of identity, but that European integration does not necessarily demand close integration of peoples, shared culture or homogeneity. It is first of all a political body that is needed, a political Europe. It is not only the formation of political institutions, but also a normative, political integration. What is needed is a development of political identity. But a new European, political identity should not and cannot substitute for national identity. It can, though, create new political meaning and support for political institutions, which are neither nation-states nor a new European superstate.

According to such a perspective, the future relationship between European and national identity develops like this:
- At the European level, a political identity is generated. Foreign and security policy becomes the focus of a 'republican' construction of a state subject (a 'nation' in French). To this belong 'citizens', a people who

choose at the level of politics to identify with the values of this state subject, who are patriotic in terms of politics – but who do not necessarily feel that they are in any organic sense one big family. It can be rather hollow, as long as the shell is hard.

- The national level (together with, in some places, the regional one) remains the focus for cultural identity, for community. The ('German' type) nation remains at the national level – but in its original Herderian form, where the nation is so important, that expression in a state becomes unnecessary.

	Europe	Nation
Political	1) *	2)
Cultural	3)	4) *

Figure 4.5 Distribution of identities

The logic of this is not just that people should have multiple political identities (cf. Buzan *et al.*, 1990: 56f and 220f). Rather it is suggested that people should/could have two clearly defined core identities, each attaining a considerable weight in the area where it counts. People will of course have several identities (professional, gender, local, . . .), as they always have had. But just as these identities could previously under specific conditions (war) be organized around one core identity, nationality, there are in this emerging process two primary focal points. This duality makes this vision much more realistic than the general post-modern multiplication of identities which will be unstable for most individuals (which intellectuals tend to forget, and thereby make this post-modern vision an example of an enlightenment belief in detached, self-assured individuals).

Anthony D. Smith has rightly argued, that in practice the two concepts – 'French' and 'German' – are not separate, but actually both at play when most people talk of nations (that is why we can actually get along using this single word for two phenomena, that seem to be almost unrelated: state/territory and a linguistically united '*Volk*'). But possibly, the two can again move in separate directions, which we can only talk clearly about by disentangling the two meanings of nations, calling them for instance civic state-nation (France) and organic people-nation (Germany).

In this perspective our political-cultural future could possibly consist of a dualism, with Europe as the civic state-nation and our old nation-states as organic people-nations. Identity and politics would be delinked and political identity partly refocused. Possibly, the culture-nation would also become de-territorialized. People would feel affection for a certain land and heritage, but the 'people' as an entity would not be linked to a clearly delineated territory. A consequence of such a development would be that the debates on cultural or societal security would increasingly focus on multiculturalism, respect for difference versus universal standards, respect for cultural autonomy versus respect for the values a society and political order cannot compromise on, i.e. the border line between culture and politics.

4.3. Identity and the development of political institutions in Europe

4.3.1. Identity and the dynamics of political institutions

As stated earlier, society can be understood as 'a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity'. This definition – in which the use of the term institutions should not be taken in a narrow sense – implies that it is of special interest to look at the relationship between cultural and political identities and the development of political institutions. It is of importance what role changing political institutions might have for the formation of cultural and political identities, and vice versa. European integration implies the formation of new interstate or suprastate institutions. We must ask how the Euro-aspect of the institutional development will be seen in regard to the state-aspect, and what importance the development of new Euro-institutions will have for cultural and political identities in Europe? And what importance do the cultural and political identities in Europe have for the formation of Euro-institutions?

The institutional aspect of European development refers not only to the international organizations in Europe but also includes the system of states. The main organizational form of the European institutional system has for centuries been the state system and its international society.

4.3.2 The European Community as a project for institutional change

One of the main developments in Europe since the last war has been the development of the European Community. Without attempting to write the history of this grand European project, we might reflect on the reasons that have made this project the focus of European development. While the development of the EC was relatively stagnant up to the end of the 1970s, it gained a new dynamism in the mid-1980s, especially after the 1985 summit in Milan and the plans for a realisation of the Single European Act in the years thereafter. After the breakups in Eastern Europe in 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the uniting of Germany, the EC process accelerated. The common initiative of Germany and France in 1990 showed that the problems related to a new balance of power in Europe after the unity of Germany did not – as was widely feared – block European integration but rather acceler-

ated the integration process, resulting in new moves for the creation of an economic and political union. The governmental conferences in 1990–91 and the Maastricht Agreement can be seen as the – so far – latest result of this accelerated dynamism. Even with crises in the post-Maastricht process we can in the coming years expect many new negotiations and agreements which will attempt to continue the ongoing expansion of the EC into a European Union.

The reasons for the revitalisation of the EC in the mid-1980s were partly the growing economic competition between Europe, the United States and Japan, and partly the tendencies in Europe for more relative independence within the American overlay. Also the new leadership of the EC Commission, with President Jacques Delors as leading figure, played an important role. Generally, the integration process was a continuation of the well-known (neofunctionalist) strategy of furthering integration through gra-dualistic steps within functionally specific areas. According to the (early) neofunctionalist theory such integration within specific sectors would lead to spill-over into new, functionally specific areas. Thus, a main assumption was – at least in the perspective of the Commission – that the European Single Act would open for the Single Market, and that this again would lead to further pressure for monetary integration, and so forth.

Common action by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand in spring 1990 created the initiative for new governmental conferences on economic and monetary union and on political union. Common pressure from Germany and France led these conferences to the result that we find in the Maastricht Agreement of February 1992. This development, together with other forces such as the importance which states outside the EC attribute to it, has given the EC a central role in the present institutional development in Europe.

What are the effects of this process in regard to cultural and political identity? Recent development in the EC have led to important changes in its character. In its early years the project of European integration, which was included in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community and later of the EEC and the Euratom, was mainly a project for economic integration. The project also had political and security motivations, but in its content it mainly covered the creation of a common market and of external trade policies. More recently, the EC is becoming a multidimensional phenomenon. It is at the same time a project for economic integration, for political integration and for integration of Europe in other socio-cultural dimensions. Thus the EC has gradually developed into a project for institutio-nal change in Europe. It has become a political-institutional project which affects the position and functions of the participating states. More and more it affects questions related to political and cultural identities.

Until the crisis in 1992 for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty it seemed (maybe not totally correctly, but not totally incorrectly either) that the core actors in the EC (the major states and the Commission) were pushing ahead in as many fields and as far as possible. But this had changed somewhat by the summer of 1992. The EC experienced severe problems of credibility. While the expansive EC project had earlier been blocked by state actions (as for instance by de Gaulle's policy in the 1960s), the process now seemed blocked – or maybe only delayed – because of lack of public support.

The lesson of 1992 from the Danish 'no' and the French 'almost no' seemed to clarify priorities. Issues such as cultural policy, education and some elements of the social system are very sensitive for the nations and should therefore be left at the nation-state level. A community threatened with the spectre of fragmentation has to give priority to the structure carrying elements of the union project, i.e. even more EMU and security integration, plus probably common policy for asylum seekers and migration (Wæver, forthcoming-c). This is a way of explaining how subsidiarity has become a major problem for the EC. Subsidiarity is probably unrealistic as a strict legal formula for running the EC. But if there is one lesson learned after the various national crises about the European Union it should be: leave culture to the nations. And among the central, continental powers (France and Germany) it is equally clear that the more fragmentation threatens, the more the hard fields of EMU and security have to take on more speed.

In this perspective one outcome of the crises in 1992 could be that differentiations and priorities within the project become clearer (both as to issues and countries). The EC project might develop more clear ideas of what and who are central, and what and who are peripheral to integration. It is not beyond doubt that this lesson will be learned. Another possibility is that major actors (the major states and the Commission) might continue to follow old strategies, insensitive to the new kind of problems for the EC project.

In 1992 the Maastricht Agreement was the latest, important expansion of the political integration in Europe. It was important, not because it introduced major political reform, but rather because it included very many small steps in the direction of political integration and confirmed the long-term goals for the formation of a steadily stronger European Union. Thus, the agreement included, *inter alia*, gradualistic steps towards a common foreign policy (introducing weak majority voting in this area), giving a few further powers to the parliament, introduction of a common European citizenship, introduction of formal police cooperation and common regulations on migration. It also included a plan for the formation of an economic and monetary union and prospects for formation of a defence dimension of the community. In 1992 it was still uncertain, whether and how the Maastricht Agreement would be implemented. But with this agreement the development of the EC did go further than before into developing Euro-institutions, and implementing changes which could affect political and cultural identities in Europe.

Even before the Maastricht Agreement the EC had developed an institutional system with a dual character, comprising at the same time a state-system, in which the member states are the decisive actors, and a system with the EC institutions – the European Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court – as the decision centre (Kelstrup, 1992a). In the state component, the balance of power is the dominant logic. In the EC component, the central institutions attempt to expand their powers incrementally in accordance with the logic of neofunctionalistic integration theory. The present accelerated dynamic of the EC can, as indirectly indicated above, be explained as a combination of the two. The gradualistic logic of the EC, which was revitalised from the mid-1980s, was reinforced by state

actions after 1989, mainly by the special situation that the interests of the reuniting Germany and France both supported further integration (Moravcsik, 1991; Wæver, 1990a; Kelstrup, 1990 and 1992a). This conjuncture, in which internal institutional interests are supported by major state interests, is unusual and contrasts to the situation of the EC in the 1970s.

The EC's institutional system is also challenged by external dynamics. One of the difficulties in interpreting the dynamics of the EC system is to estimate correctly whether the external dynamics will further integration or fragmentation in the EC system. One interpretation could be that the external influences support integration. Thus one might claim that all institutions in the EC – including the European Council (i.e. representatives of the states) – have increasingly become Euro-institutions. In such an interpretation, the European Community as a political and economic actor has gained sufficient *eigendynamik* and external recognition and has confronted external as well as internal challenges to such a degree that the formation of the 'Euro-actor' is reinforced. Global competition has forced a 'Euro-logic' on decision makers, thereby reducing the difference between Commission, Council of Ministers, European Council and Parliament. The result has been that they all think and act increasingly on a European level (which has become rational policy as Europe becomes economically and politically real in the global system). As 'Europe' has emerged as an actor, the classical interpretation of the role of different institutions has lost its validity (Wæver, forthcoming-c).

Alternatively, it might be argued that the EC and the EC member states in their interactions within the international political system have developed different interests, which have promoted fragmentation within the EC. For instance, the different interests in specific issues, from responses to Serbia, GATT negotiations and differences related to interest rates, have led to internal disagreements and fragmentation. In a post-Cold War context, the threat of fragmentation basically looms much larger than previously (Mearsheimer, 1990).

The EC's institutional system has developed into a very complex network of organizations with many different dimensions. One of the most important dimensions is socio-cultural, which is related to questions concerning the formation of cultural and political identities. Work had been done at the beginning of the 1970s on the definition of a European identity (Copenhagen Declaration, 1973). Further, there has been much work and discussion of this in relation to the Doodge Commission, about the concept of 'Europe of the citizen'. But in spite of these efforts – and of the flag-and-balloon strategy mentioned above – it is difficult to estimate the strength of the socio-cultural dimension of the EC. One aspect of this is how much the EC affects the social and cultural life of EC citizens. Another aspect is how much support people in Europe give to the EC, and how much they identify themselves with the common European goals and/or with the new institutions. It is difficult to reach valid conclusions on the degree of identitive support for the EC. One cannot just look at opinion polls, which describe attitudes towards the EC on any given day. The decisive questions in regard to identity arise when and if there are conflicts between different identities. It is in times of crisis that people show their identitive priorities. Opinion polls taken during calm

periods are not very valid and even in a crisis identity responses will vary according to the type and source of the threat.

It seems to be a fair judgement that the EC has developed so much that the EC system now affects the question of cultural and political identities in its participating states. At the same time it seems correct to assume that there have not yet been any decisive changes towards forming a new EC European identity, which overrides the national identities. Much is written on the question of a common European identity and much is done in forming such an identity. But no shift towards a dominant new European identity connected to the new EC European institutions has taken place. The crises in relation to the ratification of the Maastricht Agreement confirm this.

During the prolonged 1992–3 crises it was often noticed how elites and the general public reacted differently: the elites were usually willing to hand over sovereignty in rather large doses, whereas the general public where much more sceptical. Politicians and Eurocrats made numerous statements to the effect that 'We have moved too fast', 'We are too far ahead of the people' and 'We have not explained well enough why Maastricht is necessary'. All implying that all would take the same view if allowed to know and think like the elite. However, our analysis has pointed to a deeper causation exposing the rhetoric of 'too fast and too far ahead' as superficial and arrogant. There is a split between state logic and societal logic, with the elites more closely linked to the state and the public to society.

If the EC succeeds in realising the institutional project along the lines laid down in the Maastricht Agreement, we shall see an expanded and important EC which will have a new influence on identity formation in Europe. On the other hand, such an institutional development is not at all certain and maybe not even likely. It still is a very fragile project that could fail for many different reasons. One could be that the major state interests change. Another could be that support for common EC institutions is insufficiently developed. If the EC is unsuccessful in its institutional project, it is likely that the formation of a stronger common European identity will fail as well. The institutional and identitive aspects of the EC-integration project are closely interconnected. It is therefore necessary to look more closely at the interconnectedness between the institutional development and the question of public support for the new European institutions.

In the relationship between the institutional and identitive aspect of the EC integration two problems seems to be of major importance: the problem of representation and the problem of efficiency. The answer to these problems will most likely decide whether the long-term development of the EC will generate sufficient support from the states and from the population in the EC. We might assume that support for the political system of the EC depends partly on the possibilities which the system gives for representation, and partly on the outcomes or effects of the system. Or put the other way around, there are two major causes for possible public dissatisfaction with the EC system: unequal or insufficient representation in the system; and the possibility that the EC system proves to be too inefficient to provide solutions to problems. If either unrepresentativeness or inefficiency is too great, we might expect a growing support for the states rather than for the EC.

The classic debate about democracy vs. efficiency is thus at the centre in understanding the EC system. One could be tempted to conclude that the only possibility for a viable EC system is that it simultaneously develops as a democratic and an efficient system. Such a view of the EC would point to the solution of development towards a state-like entity, which could take over the functions of the states. But this is too narrow and, not least due to the mechanisms of societal insecurity, would be a self-defeating strategy.

The EC and democracy. The debate on democracy in relation to the EC is normally formulated as the problem of the EC's democratic deficit, focusing on the relative lack of democratic legitimacy within the EC decision-making process. Often the debate is concentrated on the wish for more powers for the European Parliament. The normal argument is: economic processes have become European and therefore uncontrollable by the national parliament, decisions then move to the European level but in non-accountable forms, for instance as powers to the Commission and the Council. The normal answer is a repetition of an old understanding of democratic control: more powers to the European Parliament.

Our view is that this debate on the democratic deficit suffers from an intellectual deficit. Seeing the problem of lack of democracy in the EC as a lack of powers for the European Parliament is too narrow an interpretation. One central issue is that the processes of internationalisation (Chapter 3) which have outrun the capabilities of national parliaments will also outrun the European Parliament. It is not likely that giving more powers to the European Parliament will re-establish parliamentary control of global economic and social processes. Who really believes this? It might sound logical to attempt to re-establish a classic structure of democracy at the European level. But we basically do not believe that the kind of correspondence between the people's will and the development of societies can be (re-)created as it was in the classical image of democracy. The loss of control of local parliaments is caused by internationalisation and informatisation (Møller, 1990), and it is not to be easily re-established simply by giving more powers to Parliament at another level.

At a more principled level we argue that with the relative decline of the nation-state (which as we have claimed above is more appropriately understood as the decay of the territorial state), it should not be very surprising to find a crisis of democracy. After all, democracy was born together with the modern nation-state. Representational democracy on the basis of the principle of one person one vote, naturally goes together with a vision of society which is not cut up into segments (guilds or cultures) but views the members of the societies as all being of the same kind, equal and citizens. If all inhabitants in France are Frenchmen before they are anything else, it is also easy to see why politics can take the form of representational democracy.

What are the solutions to these problems? Certainly, the solution must be sought in further work on the difficult questions relating to democracy and internationalisation. We have to rethink what it is we are asking democracy to supply us with, and then try to form a political order which supplies this, taking the internationalisation into account and allowing for institutionalisation both at state, interstate and suprastate levels. This is not equal to

adopting a unified whole called representational democracy in Europe. It is much more an opening for a more creative, institutional thinking, which does not become so occupied with efficiency or with simplistic, integration ideologies as to forget the fundamental functions and goals which were included in older democratic thinking.

Democracy has many meanings and consists of many elements. One important element of democracy is a guarantee of rights as involved in the basic idea of contract between people and state: the state supplies order as well as guarantees the basic civil and political rights for people, and people give support (and if necessary their life) for the republic. Another element is the 'last instance' check on power: that in the classical, Western, pluralist sense of democracy there should be a chance to replace one power elite with another and thereby a control against abuse of power by those entrusted with it – power can be called back. A third element of democracy is representation (the idea that each individual is present in the political sphere, not necessarily in his or her own person, but represented by someone who may be regarded as 'me' in some important dimension). A further element of democracy is participation in that the person in question is taking an active part in politics (by voting, in interest groups and possibly as a party member).

The two first mentioned elements of democracy can be relatively easily lifted to the European level. Representation will first of all be national. Participation might in some instances be easiest at the local and regional level (including the larger but newly emerging 'trans-regions' like the Baltic Sea Region). Since the emerging sub-regions or trans-regions in Europe typically take the form of non-state networks, of decentralised patterns of activities and not primarily state-to-state co-operation, this might be combined with possibilities of participation at this level (Wæver, 1991a; Wæver and Joenniemi, 1992; Joenniemi and Wæver, 1992). Here individual action makes a difference, because the region (as network) only exists as a result of decentralised, spontaneous action. In this perspective increasing democracy in the EC also involves increasing differentiation where the different levels take on different democracy-relevant functions, while none of the levels do very well across the board. If we ask for democracy as a fixed package with all the elements, we will inevitably be disappointed. But on the other hand this should be no reason for resignation and giving up democratic ideals. On the contrary, an extensive debate on democracy is overdue. West European societies will have to ask themselves: what was/is it we have been valuing in democracy? They will demand most of these values, but perhaps take them more separately as values, not as a single package of democracy to be contained in the one sacred Parliament.

How are democratic elements to be combined with internationalisation and the institutional development of European integration. Democracy as the package we have received from the eighteenth century cannot be sustained in the unified, integrated way we tend to think about it. If we continue to think of democracy as such a package, we will keep trying to square the European/ national circle: make Europe a nation-state or the nation-states Europe.

The deeper logical dilemma of all this is that the words 'democracy' and 'international relations' do not go well together. They are seldom combined,

and when they are, the effect is often confusing (as argued convincingly by Walker, 1991a). Democracy has worked domestically through the nation-state, and also internationally the nation-state has been the only meaningful vehicle for democratic control. International cooperation is construed as inter-state cooperation and thereby democratic to the extent that the partici-pating states are democratically controlled. In relation to the EC this leaves ultimately only two meaningful – but extreme – ways of democratising: either the EC is (and remains) an inter-state structure, and democracy is ultimately guaranteed through the democracies of the member states, or the EC is moving towards a federal state structure, and it has to establish its own democratic structures – as a state. But what if the EC is and will remain some kind of in-between creature? This can only be addressed by opening a wide discussion on what 'democracy' might mean in a transnational political space; in a non-sovereignty structured 'neo-medieval' space (Walker, 1991a, 1991b; Connolly, 1991; Sakamoto, 1991; Held, 1991).

In a more down to earth way it can be noticed that the present institutional system of the EC (or a Maastricht version of it) is, as mentioned, only partly democratic. This means that European integration for some peoples in the community, especially those living under (what is perceived to be) relatively well-developed democratic conditions, implies a process of de-democratization. This is the case when relatively democratic states lose power to a less democratic European system. On the other hand, the present conditions for some peoples in Europe are such that a weakening of the state and the development of common European institutions will mean further democratisation. Thus it depends on your point of departure whether you will regard the process of European integration as a process of democratisation. To some degree this might explain different attitudes to European integration in different European states. For instance, in Southern European states (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) the EC has been closely linked to the projects of democratising these states. In Northern European states, the EC project has been perceived more as a political project which might threaten already established political practices, for instance democratic norms or the welfare state.

The EC and efficiency. Another problem in the development of the EC relates to the efficiency of the emerging, European institutional system. Much criticism of the EC for lack of efficiency has already been launched, exposing especially the bureaucracy of the EC and the lack of ability to act. A common response to this criticism has been that the efficiency of the EC system has to be compared with the lack of efficiency of the state system, especially in regard to some problem areas like security, environment and macro-economy. Another response has been that it is exactly because of the difficul-ties in the present institutional system of the EC that more powers have to be transferred to Brussels. Thus, deficiencies in the present decision-making system are often used as legitimation of further transfer of powers to the central decision-making system. It is in accordance with this that we must expect new rounds of negotiation on new reforms of the system, beyond the Maastricht Agreement, attempting to transfer even more powers to the common institutional system. Thus, we can for instance

expect attempts to establish more areas where decision by majority voting is possible.

These arguments for an institutional expansion of the common EC institutions might seem persuasive, but they run the risk of taking too narrow a perspective. It is not necessarily true that the EC – or a reformed EC – can or will become more efficient. This is especially not true if the system is so undemocratic that it cannot generate public support. Thus, the need for more efficiency at the European level is not necessarily fulfilled through a transfer of further powers to the central institutions.

In this debate on efficiency the possible enlargement of the EC plays an important role. The EC already has problems with efficiency now, but it will have greater practical problems if it develops into a community of seventeen or twenty without major simplifications in the decision-making procedures. Then institutional reforms must be on the agenda.

The EC shares a dilemma with other political systems: if it is too inefficient, its results will not satisfy the system's participants. Then support for the system may be withdrawn and it is likely that the participants will turn to other relevant decision-systems, most notably the states. This will weaken the EC system and give it even fewer possibilities for effective problem solving. The obverse of this is that institutional reform to provide for more efficiency could very easily mean less representation and thus cause unease with regard to the democratic aspect of the EC, resulting in less support for the system. How much support for the EC system depends on its performance? Given the relatively low degree of identitive support for the EC system, one might expect the answer to be that the existing support is mostly utilitarian, depending heavily on the performance.

The question of efficiency within European integration is not necessarily directly connected to the question of how much formal power it is possible to delegate to the central decision-making system, or how this might be improved through institutional reform. It might be more efficient to have a decentralised system which in its effect gives substance to the principle of subsidiary: the principle that decisions should be taken at the lowest level possible.

The conclusion to these reflections on democracy and efficiency in regard to the EC is that they indicate that there are many dilemmas for European integration. The way in which the dilemmas are solved will be very important for the viability of the EC system. It should be kept in mind that other forces than those relating the citizens directly to the EC system are of decisive importance for the fate of the system. The policies of the states (and possible shifts in state interests) and the external relations of the EC might (as described in Chapter 1) have decisive influence. We also hesitate to postulate that systems which are not efficient and/or undemocratic cannot survive. The communist systems survived quite a long time.

4.3.3. Changes in state form, economy and society

Changing forms of democracy, new state–nation relationships and mysterious meanings of European integration, all these can be seen as reflections of the

emergence of a new kind of political structure, which we have called neo-medieval (or post-modern). These, however, have to be explained as well, and some readers may prefer another way of presenting some of the changing ramifications to the exotic idea of new Middle Ages.

What is possibly changing globally, and not least in Europe, is the form and function of the state. In the terminology of Bob Jessop, this could be summed up as a triple change: from the Keynesian welfare state to the Schumpeterian workfare state; a three-way 'hollowing out' of national states; and a transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. These three can be condensed into the statement 'that a "hollowed-out" Schumpeterian work-fare state provides the best possible political shell for post-Fordism' (Jessop, 1992: 1). The Keynesian welfare state promoted full employment in a relatively closed national economy (primarily through demand-side management) and generalized norms of mass consumption through welfare rights and new forms of collective consumption. The Schumpeterian workfare state, in contrast, strives 'to promote product, process, organizational, and market innovation and enhance the structural competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply side intervention; and to subordinate social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness' (Jessop, 1992: 2).

This change reflects a change in the world economy. 'Money, technology, information and goods are flowing across national borders with unprecedented rapidity and ease. The cost of transporting things and communicating ideas is plummeting. Capital controls in most industrialized countries are being removed; trade barriers, reduced. Even items that governments wish to prevent from getting in (drugs, illegal immigrants) or out (secret weapons) do so anyway' (Reich, 1992:6f). National economies are not closed and growth dynamics are not autocentric.

Changes in the global economy involve not least the rise of new core technologies. Mastering these new technologies will be decisive for growth and structural competitiveness, but since they are incredibly knowledge- and capital-intensive, 'their development demands extensive collaboration among diverse interests (firms, higher education, public and private research laboratories, venture capital, public finance, etc.) . . . States have a key role here in promoting innovative capacities, technical competence, and technology transfer' (Jessop 1992:5). Innovation and structural competitiveness become the key words for the 'self-conception' of the state, and this is – together with the internal crisis of the Keynesian welfare state – a key factor behind the changes towards a new state form linked to post-Fordist accumulation. The workings of the global economy and the relative success of states that have adopted innovation-oriented 'Schumpeterian' strategies present challenges to all states, and state strategies therefore have to be seen against a background of completely changed rules of the game.

The state self-consciously reflects in terms of promoting innovation and flexibility – with a consciousness of the many societal factors relevant to innovation and 'dynamisation'. Here we find one of the central causes of the 'hollowing out' of the national state. Jessop (1992:3) argues:

This does not mean that the national state loses all importance: far from it. Indeed it remains crucial as an institutional site and discursive framework for political struggles; and it even keeps much of its sovereignty – albeit primarily as a juridical fiction reproduced through mutual recognition in the international political community. At the same time its capacities to project power even within its own national borders are becoming ever more limited due to a complex triple displacement of power upward, downward, and, to some extent, outward.

In handling the new state task of securing the optimal insertion in the global economy and managing the domestic repercussions of global restructuring, state agencies have to be restructured and reorientated. Thereby the 'hollowing out' of the nation-state often gets a regional dimension. In developing new pro-active roles, the states need to make alliance strategies among states on different regional scales (cf. Campanella, 1991; Jessop, 1992: 7; Joenniemi and Wæver, 1992). The state has to foster the competitiveness of regions in the global economy in order to create flexibility and dynamism, and this involves also a certain rebirth of the state at the regional and local level, just when it is in some senses weakened at the national level. At the same time the EC struggles with the same tasks (structural competitiveness, innovation and high-tech development), but does not become a new integrated, sovereign state. The net result is that 'stateness' does not necessarily decrease – but it fragments. As we noticed in section 4.2. about West European 'societies without a shell' and above in relation to the vanishing focus for democracy:

> The 'state' in Western Europe is tending to disappear as a power-centralizing institution, one to which responsibility for policy can be ascribed and which exercises 'public' mediation (in both senses of the term) between social interests and forces. We might also express this by saying that we have entered a phase of new-style 'privatization' of the state, but in the guise of a multiplication and superimposition of public institutions . . . The upshot that we see all around us . . . is what might be called the reign of statism without a true state. [Balibar, 1991:16, 17]

This complex process can probably be seen as the deeper cause of many of the instances of societal insecurity (at the same time as it defines the framework in which we have to think about strategies and institutional responses for the creation of societal security). Seeing the state disintegrate is not exactly comforting to all groups.

Not only the national state, but also the national economy disappears:

> What is the role of a nation within the emerging global economy, in which borders are ceasing to exist? . . . Rather than increase the profitability of corporations flying its flag, or enlarge the worldwide holdings of its citizens, a nation's economic role is to improve its citizen's standard of living by enhancing the value of what they contribute to the world economy. [Reich, 1992: 301]

'So who is "us"? The answer lies in the only aspect of a national economy that is relatively immobile internationally: the American work force, the American people' (Reich, 1992, 8). The main problem is that some segments of society ('the symbolic analysts') do well and gain from internationalisation,

favour cosmopolitan strategies and detest nationalism, while other and larger groups in society are losing out and tend to favour strategies closer to economic nationalism. 'The underlying question concerns the future of American *society* as distinct from the American economy, and the fate of the majority of Americans who are losing out in global competition' (Reich, 1992: 9). Ultimately, the unit that becomes decisive is a (potential) 'society' which has only cultural bonds to keep it together. The effect of Reich's analysis is to delink (national) society and (national) economy – as we pointed above to a delinking of national society and the state.

The general picture that emerges involves three central and interrelated developments. Economies become open and global. State structures fragment and become multi-layered, non-focused 'stateness' at many levels. And culturally defined society that was previously seen as reflections of, or hinging on, state and/or economy becomes a unit in its own right, which has to act, confronts new challenges of potential fragmentation and can experience developments that appear as existential threats, i.e. societal security problems. These problems will increase not just because of particular developments (like migration or terrorism) but owing to structural transformations (political and economic) that make societies increasingly vulnerable. They will not find their answers by linking up to the state or the economy, but by interposing themselves in complex networks of 'states' at many levels and in a border-transgressing and highly competitive global economy.

4.4. The dynamics of European integration and societal security

What are the consequences of the dynamics of European integration for societal security in Europe and vice-versa? It should first be clear that the total European institutional development is not only connected to the EC, but also comprises other institutions functional for Europe's future, particularly the CSCE and NATO. After the end of the Cold War Europe has a multiorganisational framework, which we must expect to continue. Within this framework our main expectations are that the EC will have a leading role as the engine of further European integration, and that it will develop a stronger actor-capability and play an increasingly important role on the European scene. This implies that the EC will be an important part of a greater, multiorganisational institutional system in Europe in which some kind of division of labour will develop among the CSCE, NATO, the EC and the WEU (or, as it is often called these days, interlocking institutions'). We already see tendencies towards this cooperation between the different institutions, although with much uncertainty – and some competition – in relation to the division of tasks.

If we assume a development in this direction, what will be the consequences for societal security in Europe? European institutional development will have important effects on different societies, and the effect will depend on the character of the overall development. Some possibilities are:
(1) The weakening of the state will most probably continue. This implies that the societies which have their own state (uni-nation states, in which there are no major ethnic minorities, such as Denmark) will experience a

relative weakening of their independence. This does not imply that they will lose action-possibilities or influence. They definitely will not, if the EC continues to favour small state-nations by unequal representation. But they will lose some autonomy and maybe – if they feel very democratic – experience a certain degree of de-democratisation.

(2) The weakening of the state will give better possibilities for self-expression and possibly also for self-government to nations which have so far been dominated by other nations within the legal framework of the nation-state (the Basques, the Scots etc.). This might be seen as a danger for the nations which have been dominant within the nation-states until now. It is uncertain whether such changes will be so serious as to create important societal insecurity.

(3) The establishment of stronger common European institutions will probably strengthen the tendency to develop Europeanisation, and a new sense of belonging to a common European political community. Whether this new political identity will in fact become more important depends much on the degree of democracy in the new institutional system and on its performance efficiency. Such a process of Europeanisation presupposes a learning process through the actual common action of the institutions in question. Failures in such common action might well create an important backlash, leading some groups or nations to develop anti-EC attitudes.

Figure 4.6 Am emerging landscape with mulitple security actors

All in all further European integration implies threats to the identity of some ethno-national societies. One threat is that societies, which have so far been privileged within the nation states, might see their privileged situation deteriorating. They might then react against European integration, also using their states for this purpose. So integration might well provoke reaction

against integration – and thus be the triggering cause for turning towards fragmentation.

For this reason it is decisive that the identity formation that will have to accompany the emergence of new political structures for Europe does not take a form which is in itself a frontal attack on national identity. The attempt to develop an ethno-national style identity at the European level will probably be too much of a challenge for the nations, and cause strong reactions. This gives a specific twist to the concept of subsidiarity. The real political issue is not about finding a way of measuring what issues ought rationally to be settled at what level (ultimately classical functionalism: form follows function). It is about giving the nation that which is the nation's (that is culture, identity and those issues relevant thereto: education, a social welfare system, a cultural policy in the narrow sense); and giving the EC what is its own (economic and monetary policy security structures, the single market and possibly immigration policies). The other side of this coin is that the nations go along playing this game, that they accept the change to being more cultural and less political and economic entities. The nations will have to learn to accept a separation from 'stateness' since 'stateness' will get distributed between regional, national and European levels, and instead they will increasingly have to see themselves as cultural communities reproducing primarily through cultural means.

European security – and stability in Europe – will hinge on a much higher number and much more diverse set of units each individually trying to secure their own future, and each with the option of blowing the whistle for dramatic counteraction if they find the development unacceptable (cf. Figure 4.6). More units get hold of the security instrument, although the threat by the societies to some extent is related to the option (cf. Figure 4.2) of calling the state back to a close state–nation link and thereby blocking European integration. This overall constellation with several referent objects and 'voices' in the security field should be seen in contrast to the situation where the state was the only referent object – and the only subject – of security action (Figure 4.7).

Figure 4.7 The classical security universe

These thoughts suggest that if societal insecurity is to be diminished or avoided, the overall European construction should be dualistic in the sense that (1) it should be established as a system, which has both important democratic aspects and a high degree of efficiency, and (2) at the same time it should create a multicultural entity, which should give room for the self-expression and partial self-regulation of a multiplicity of national and other communities. Further, it is important that the common institutional system has adequate powers to deal with special problems (i.e. local conflicts, special endangered areas or groups) when they arise.

The discussion in this chapter has suggested that developing an overarching European identity seems necessary in order to back up institutions required to stabilise the new Europe. This identity should not develop as an ethno-cultural identity but stress the political side as much as possible. The new identity landscape should be seen not as a competition for the new sovereignty but as a complex pattern of different kinds of politics and identities (regional, national and European). Finally, there is a demand for society and collective identity and therefore it is not satisfactory if the elite just claim that 'we all have many identities' – there are some enduring concerns that have to be satisfied in a new European political configuration. We are generally moving towards a system of institutionalisation and integration at the European level, which, while it does not go all the way towards making EC state structures, does not on the other hand rely solely on the states but on the general stability of a network of institutions and arrangements. Thereby it depends on the stability of the participating social units, the societies.

Chapter 5
Societal security and the explosion of Yugoslavia
Håkan Wiberg

The complexity of the Yugoslav crises consists in the multiplicity of sources of conflict behaviour (economic, cultural, political, constitutional, international) and the spider-web character of the conflict pattern: interconnected triangular relations with shifting coalitions, each change affecting the entire pattern. Academic specialisation, journalistic criteria of newsworthiness, political mobilisation, propaganda battles and plain ignorance interact to misrepresent this pattern as bilateral one-issue conflicts. Solid analysis will take years (for pre-1991 analyses see Banac, 1984; Pawlowitch, 1988; Schierup, 1990; an early presentation of recent problems and possible solutions is Henricson-Cullberg *et al.*, 1991); the main point of this chapter is to present just enough of the complexity to show how problems of state security and societal security interact with each other.

5.1. Nations and political units

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia in 1929), created in 1918 from Serbia and Montenegro (with recent acquisitions from Turkey) and parts of Austria-Hungary, was as multinational as the Habsburg empire. Its territorial history is very complex: today's Croatia has fourteen regions with different histories in recent centuries.

The kingdom specifically did not attempt to identify administrative parts ethnically. Each *banovina* was named after a major river; some boundaries differed from historical or ethnic ones. The 1939 *sporazumen* defined a specific Croatia, expanded and proclaimed as an independent state in 1941, when Yugoslavia was divided between Italy, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. After 1945 Yugoslavia had six republics, dividing Serbia into what we will call Nuclear Serbia and the autonomous provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija (previously 'Old Serbia'; now 'Kosova' to Albanians, 'Kosovo' to Serbs). Its main peoples are crudely described below.

The distribution of the population in 1991 appears in Table 5.2. Nationality was self-stated. 'Others' included other stated nationalities, not 'No stated

Figure 5.1 Map of former Yugoslavia

Table 5.1. The main peoples of Yugoslavia

	Distinct language?	Dominant religion	State tradition?
Serbs	Yes (or No)	Orthodox	Medieval, 1815–1918
Croats	Yes (or No)	Catholic	Medieval, 1941–45
Moslems	No	Islam	No (or borrowed)
Slovenes	Yes	Catholic	No
Montenegrins	No	Orthodox	Yes, until 1918
Macedonians	Yes (or No)	Orthodox	No (or borrowed)
Albanians	Yes	Islam	No

nationality', 'unknown' or identities stated in regional terms. Smaller groups than 10,000 are omitted here. The largest 'Others' group consisted of 341,000 Hungarians in Vojvodina. Unknown but sizable demographic changes since 1991 mean that this table must be treated as an approximation only.

5.2. Causal components: a checklist

The 1991 crises had a long prehistory and a variety of causes. The relative weight of the different factors will take many years to assess properly; the major ones are listed below.

5.2.1. Economy

Yugoslavia was in economic crisis for a couple of decades (see Schierup, 1990), manifested in *decreasing and eventually acceleratingly negative economic growth* after economic reforms in 1965 abolished the elements of central planning which had previously supplemented the self-management system. After 1965 high levels of emigration to offset transitory unemployment and bring hard currency remittances had severe domestic effects. Petro-dollars borrowed in 1975–81 were squandered on consumption rather than productive investment, catching Yugoslavia in a debt trap as the dollar and real interest rates soared.

Accelerating inflation and unemployment – and several aborted panaceas – halved average real income in the 1980s. People neglected their urban jobs for family farms and market operations to make ends meet, and the national economy suffered. It would have been surprising if political radicalism had *not* emerged; the issue was *what kind* of radicalism would be predominant: left-wing, right-wing, populism, nationalism or a combination?

A second element concerned the *redistribution of income*. Notwithstanding attempts at interregional equalization, the income per capita ratio between Slovenia and Kosovo grew from three in 1947 to five in 1965 and eight in 1989. Transfers were sharply reduced after 1965, but all parties complained: Slovenia and Croatia about spending too much on the poor and inefficient south; Serbia about being a contributor rather than the receiver it should be according to statistics; the others about receiving too little and about falling

Table 5.2 Distribution of peoples in political units

	Slovenes '000	Croats '000	Serbs '000	Moslems '000	Montenegrins '000	Macedonians '000	Albanians '000	Yugoslavs '000	Others '000	Total '000
Slovenia	1,718	54	47	27				12	17	1,963
Croatia	24	3,708	581	48	10		14	105	78	4,760
Nuclear Serbia		27	5,082	174	75	31	76	146	130	5,824
Vojvodina		74	1,151		44	17		169	511	2,013
Kosovo			195	57	20		1,608		53	1,955
Bosnia-Herzegovina		756	1,369	1,906	14			240	12	4,367
Montenegro			57	90	380		41	26		615
Macedonia			44	40		1,314	427	14	161	2,034

Source: 1991 Census.

behind more developed parts. Serbia was also accused of siphoning off some of the aid on its way. Here, and in other issues, *everybody* felt cheated.

A third element was *economic disintegration*: trade between the republics fell, trade went increasingly within a republic or into international trade; local economies became more inward-looking and/or more linked to powerful centres in southern Germany and northern Italy.

5.2.2. Constitutional conflicts

Yugoslavia always suffered from constitutional conflicts. The Serbs wanted a centralized state emulating most of Europe and the pre-war Serbian constitution; Slovenes and Croats preferred a looser confederation. The Serbs initially prevailed, especially after the 1929 monarchist coup; the issue remained catastrophically divisive, as demonstrated in the war years. In the post-1945 federation the republics had some autonomy, continuously increased in repeated constitutional compromises. The 'Yugoslav road to socialism' after the rupture with Stalin in 1948 included a political innovation reducing the power of the central government and the republics: *samoupravljanje* (self-management) on municipal and enterprise level. Whatever its intentions, that system was never as self-managed as in political rhetoric; the 1965 reforms accelerated its degeneration into a protectionist system of local patrons (party, technocrats) and clients, using borrowed money for wage increases. The 1974 constitutional compromise further increased the autonomy of republics and even more of Vojvodina and Kosovo. This loose federation of eight units with very different economies proved unable to settle economic problems by political decisions: constitutional complexities gave each unit a veto against change.

The Yugoslav version of Leninism entailed constitutionally categorising peoples into *nations, national minorities* (or *nationalities*) and *ethnic groups*. Nations were peoples with primary existence in Yugoslavia: Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians; after 1974 also Moslems. People whose majority was in another state (Hungarians, Albanians, Turks, Italians, etc.) were national minorities with no claim to having republics.

5.2.3. Latent ethno-national contradictions

Peaceful coexistence lasted successfully for a long time (except in Kosovo); yet several underlying historical traumas defined latent conflicts. Residing in long-standing popular sentiments, they contributed to constitutional compromises; they were occasionally exacerbated by political manipulation. Expressions of them were local (Kosovo) or quickly suppressed (Croatia, 1971); after the mid-1980s, they spiralled between political leaderships, eventually trapping the politicians.

Three traumas are particularly important. We describe them without assessing factual accuracy; a trauma is defined by the historical memories of a nation, not by professional historiographers.

The trauma between *Serbs and Croats* is recent. When Serbs and Croats from the Ottoman and Habsburg empires fought, it was as soldiers, not as

peoples. A widespread Croatian view is as follows. The basic cause lies in the Serbs dominating Yugoslavia after 1918. The royal family, Karadžordžević, was theirs; the Orthodox Church was favoured; Serbs completely dominated the military and police. Croatian protests were repressed, even by political assassinations, especially under the Serbian royal dictatorship after 1929. In 1941, the Croats finally recovered their own state after centuries of foreign overlords, but German and Italian tutelage brought to power Ante Pavelić, who massacred Jews, gypsies, Croatian democrats and Serbs. Croats constituted the bulk of Tito's partisans, suffering vast casualities fighting the Ustaša regime. Civilian Croats were massacred by Serbian ultranationalists, *ćetniki*; Tito's bolsheviks exterminated Croatian troops and civilians returned by the Allies. The post-war communist regime was anti-Croatian and Croatian national sentiment was oppressed by censorship, imprisonment and party purges.

To many Serbs, Croatian sabotage of the post-1918 constitution made it collapse in 1929. Croatian terrorists, Ustaše, engaged in political assassinations, such as King Alexander in 1934. After Hitler's attack, Pavelić got his Greater Croatia (including Bosnia-Herzegovina). His 'final solution' for two million Serbs there was 'kill one third, convert one third, expel one third'; Ustaša slaughtered several hundred thousand Serbs in concentration camps and local massacres. During and after the war, the Serbian *ćetniki* were persecuted and massacred by communists under the Croat Tito. The communist regime was anti-Serbian and Serbian national sentiment was oppressed by censorship and imprisonment; constitutional changes gave Vojvodina and Kosovo influence in Serbia, but Serbia none in them.

The second trauma is between *Serbs and Moslems*, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandžak Novipazar. Through many Serbian eyes, Moslems were willingly used against them by Turks, Austrians and Ustaše. Moslem eyes see racist Serbian behaviour, including expulsions to Turkey, culminating in genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina by *ćetniki*.

The third trauma is between *Serbs and Albanians*. Albanians see a ruthless Serbian occupation since 1878 of increasing Albanian areas, then a Serbian colonization of Kosovo and racist attempts at Serbianisation and expulsion of Albanians to Turkey. Serbian massacres of Albanians occurred during the Second World War, repeatedly recurring later. A widespread Serbian version remembers Turks expelling Serbs from their historical heartland, implanting Moslemized Albanians there. During the Second World War, Albanian fascists, Balli Kombetar, collaborated with the occupiers against the Serbs, expelling many from Kosovo. Tito rewarded Albanian riots by installing in 1974 a corrupt Albanian government which discriminated against Serbs; many were killed or threatened, fleeing north for safety.

Most of these perceptions, originating in family traditions or political propaganda, have *some* historical background, sometimes much; they disagree on *how many* were killed, *to what extent* different peoples took part, and whether events were *typical or exceptional*. All groups see themselves as historical victims of brutal oppression, even genocide. After 1945, these feelings were suppressed in the name of national reconciliation (Brotherhood and Unity); but they did not disappear and were passed on, for example, by

oral family traditions. What one group sees as a genuine historical grievance is often dismissed by others as mythical or monstrously exaggerated; this exacerbates the traumatic relations, adding the extra trauma of *not being heard*.

5.3. The recent background: the 1980s

All these factors are known as having contributed to war; several were present to an extreme degree. Any choice of watershed events must be arbitrary; where points of no return can be located, they signify triggers rather than basic causes. In the last decade, the 1981 uprising in Kosovo is the first such event. Kosovo Albanians repeated their 1968 demand for a republic of their own inside Yugoslavia. The Serbian leadership refused, contradicted by no other republic. Some Serbian arguments were in terms of *identity*: Kosovo was the historical cradle of the medieval Serbian empire, encompassing Kosovo Polye and Serb cultural monuments, such as medieval churches and monasteries. Other arguments relied on worst-case calculations concerning *security*. Republics, but not autonomous provinces, could constitutionally secede (all republics agreeing); an Albanian republic might declare independence, then join Albania. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had created great nervousness in Belgrade, conjuring up a scenario of tensions between Yugoslavia and a Soviet Union cooperating with Bulgaria and Albania: a nightmare for *all* Yugoslav security planners. The clinching constitutional argument was that only nations qualified for republics.

5.3.1. Spiralling nationalism

Demonstrations for a Kosovar republic were ruthlessly suppressed, several hundred Albanians were killed and several thousand imprisoned. Economic crisis provided a breeding ground for nationalism; Albanian nationalism was further strengthened by being oppressed. The aftermath also revitalised Serbian nationalism. Serbian journalists undermined the long-standing taboo on nationalism, covering or freely inventing Kosovo Serb complaints about Albanian persecution, thus intentionally or unwittingly paving the ground for the Serbian Communist party to establish a nationalist platform when Milošević took over in 1986 (and became President of Serbia in 1987). Simultaneously, a working group prepared a draft memorandum to the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. It was never officially presented; copies or excerpts were leaked, creating widespread rumours. Its main points appear to have been: (1) preserve and democratise Yugoslavia with equal rights for all peoples; (2) if Yugoslavia disintegrated, Serbs should live together, hence administrative boundaries must be revised; (3) proposals for revisions and implementation were presented.

The effects of this memorandum exemplify the complex dialectics. To Serbs it would appear innocuous, just stating the obvious in terms of identity and security. If it was intended to dissuade secessions, it was extremely counterproductive: other peoples ignored (1), seeing (2) and (3) as immediate plans. Fears of Serbian nationalism and Yugoslav centralism increased when

Serbia limited provincial autonomy in 1988 (later abolishing it) and sup-pressed protests in Kosovo, while Serbian mass demonstrations in Vojvodina created a more Serbian government there. Open Croatian nationalism re-appeared; Slovenia turned secessionist for the first time, revising its consti-tution in 1989 to authorise a declaration of independence.

5.3.2. The road to dissolution

Gorbachev contributed to the dissolution by ending the Cold War which defined the same national security *raison d'être* of Yugoslavia as that provided by pre-war fascist neighbours. This weakened a main Slovenian reason (the other being the Yugoslav market) for remaining in Yugoslavia. The fall of East European regimes contributed to multi-party elections in all republics in 1990, first in Slovenia and Croatia, last in Serbia and Montenegro. Given the cumulation of factors mentioned above, elections came at the worst possible moment. Ardent nationalists won everywhere, irrespective of party colours; the runners-up included even more extreme nationalists, giving the winners little leeway for compromises. They engaged in various demonstrations of sovereignty, accelerating the conflict spiral: attacks on remaining pan-Yugoslav institutions increased Serbian fears and actions inspired by these fears.

Three such institutions were left: the constitution, the Communist Party (LCY) and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The party had long been disintegrating, parties of different republics seeing themselves primarily as representing their republics. The Party Congress in January 1990 was discon-tinued by a Slovenian walkout; the Slovenian and Croatian parties left LCY in February.

Croatia and Slovenia set up national guards in 1990, seen as unconstitutio-nal by the Yugoslav government; the JNA secretly tried in spring 1990 to bring all weapons of the territorial defence forces into central depots. This succeeded in Croatia; it was discovered and halted in Slovenia (Bebler, 1992).

The constitution was also attacked. Slovenia and Croatia demanded changes making them *de facto* independent states as well as drastic cuts in the federal budget, in practice primarily that of the JNA. Serbia and Montenegro blocked constitutional changes, suspecting them of aiming at the total dis-memberment of Yugoslavia; abolishing provincial autonomy improved their blocking power by giving them four seats out of eight in the Presidency. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were caught in the middle, having made declarations of ill-defined sovereignty but objecting to secessions, presenting federative-confederative alternatives until the last moment in June 1991.

There is a basic dialectic in the process. To many Serbs, Yugoslavia was never pro-Serbian and increasingly threatened Serbian interests, but it pro-vided two basic guarantees. Serb identity was protected by the fact that all Serbs lived in the same state; and the physical security of Serbs, hence of the Serbian people, was protected in Yugoslavia (though with some shortcom-ings). The more these Yugoslav guarantees were deflated (by secessions or further confederalisation), the stronger became the pressure on the govern-ments in Serbia and Montenegro to provide their own guarantees. *The*

Yugoslavia project and the Greater Serbia project were thus complementary to each other. (By the same logic, Little Serbias in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina then became complementary to Greater Serbia.) This dialectic has another aspect: the more the Serbs insisted on living together if Yugoslavia disintegrated, the more the northern republics wanted to secede; the more secessions, the more Serbian the remaining Yugoslavia became, spurring further secessions. Slovenia and Croatia *having seceded*, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina moved from mediation to secession.

The development in Croatia provides some illustrations. The Croatian parliament elected in April 1990 immediately introduced various forms of discrimination against non-Croats, mostly felt by Serbs redefined from being a constituent nation in Yugoslavia to a minority in Croatia. The normative Croatian version of Serbo-Croat with Latin alphabet became the exclusive official language. People were requested to give loyalty oaths. Serb policemen in Serb majority areas (and elsewhere) were fired and replaced by ethnic Croats. Some symbols resembled those of Pavelić's Croatia, from the checkerboard flag to the cut of uniforms. The Serb areas in Krajina, apparently encouraged by the Socialist Party of Milošević, then created their own administration and police, declaring that if Croatia would leave Yugoslavia, they would leave Croatia. When this led to clashes, JNA units interposed themselves between the parties, ostensively as neutral, *de facto* protecting Serb independence. As Serbs in other parts of Croatia suffered from this and even more Pavelić symbolism appeared, the spiral continued.

5.4. Endgame and war

Yugoslavia had three major powder kegs: the first was the conflict between Croatian and Slovenian separatism and the (initial) desire of other republics to preserve Yugoslavia. It was highly inflammable: the complex and grey-zoned boundary between Serbs and Croats differed widely from the Serbia/Croatia boundary. In the second powder keg, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs would never accept making it an *independent and unitary* state, the initial goal of Croat and Moslem leaderships. The third powder keg is the Serb-Albanian-Macedonian complex with possible extensions to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. The deepening political crisis spurred the EC attempt to mediate, offering generous development aid if the parties agreed; they did not. Croatia and Slovenia met Serbian intransigence with *faits accomplis* on 25 June 1991; their unilateral and therefore unconstitutional declarations of independence led to war.

5.4.1 The northern powder keg

Developments demonstrated that Slovenia and Croatia differed greatly: the EC-brokered Brioni agreement on 7 July 1991 included a ceasefire and monitored JNA withdrawal from Slovenia, but created no durable settlement in Croatia. There was also a complex endgame between Croatia and Slovenia, neither wanting to secede alone while having different interests as to timing; Slovenia won. If its strategy can be reconstructed from actions, it was to rely

on Slovenian resources only; to be well armed and prepared; to force Croatia's timing by announcing that Slovenia really would proclaim independence on 25 June; and to demonstrate Slovenian defence capability, hoping to give Ljubljana and Belgrade common interests in excluding Slovenia from the Serb–Croat conflict, thus saving Slovenia the all-out defensive war it was also prepared for. This strategy was perfectly calculated and capably executed.

Given the brittle balance, Slovenia's success exacerbated all other problems: domestic political pressures forced Croatia's government to exceed its resources (vastly overanticipating Western help) in trying to retain the Serb majority areas (Krajina, etc.) that had declared for leaving Croatia if it left Yugoslavia. In both cases only military occupation could keep the smaller unit in the larger. The resulting war was therefore about the secession itself and about boundaries between Serb areas and Croatia, also giving Croatia an interest in its spreading to Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere.

The original core problem remains in essence the same today. President Tudjman, like the monkey in the fable, could not extract the Croatian hand from the Yugoslav bottle without dropping the Krajina nut and could not drop it without risking his political life to more extreme forces; President Milošević could not widen the bottle without similarly risking his political life.

When Croatia and Slovenia revived their declarations of independence (frozen since Brioni) on 8 October, the withdrawal of JNA forces from Slovenia was completed in October. In Croatia, it predictably escalated the wars: major confrontational war around the Serb republics in Krajina and East Slavonia and in southern Dalmatia (Dubrovnik), JNA and Serb militias facing Croatia's national guard and Croat militias; siege wars (Croatian forces surrounding JNA bases); guerilla wars behind the fronts; and mutual terrorisation of civilian populations by the worst Serb and Croat militias. The fronts moving further into mixed or predominantly Croatian areas, the EC became increasingly anti-Serbian. Another escalation followed the EC decision in mid-December on possible recognitions after 15 January 1992 and the unilateral German recognition on 23 December. The UN representative Cyrus Vance then arranged a ceasefire in early January 1992, durable since then notwithstanding frequent skirmishes and Croatia's offensive in January 1993. It included a complex package of monitoring, demilitarisation, etc., permitting different interpretations by different parties selling it at home. UNPROFOR plays an important role monitoring front lines; Tudjman's demand for their withdrawal in March 1993 would reopen the war. The Serb republics have merged to the Serb Republic Krajina, which has agreed with the Serb Republic Bosnia-Herzegovina that UN withdrawal will make them merge.

5.4.2. The central powder keg: Bosnia-Herzegovina

Invited by the EC, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina applied for recognition of their independence. On 13 January 1992, the Badinter commission recommended recognising Slovenia and Macedonia, but not Croatia; nor Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the commission, probably out of ignorance, called for a referendum. This was held on 1 March in Croat- and Moslem-dominated areas (a Serb referendum had already proclaimed *them* indepen-

dent), a new declaration of independence following: the EC position had forced the cautiously balancing Moslem leadership to join the Croats, ignoring very strong Serb warnings. After minor skirmishes, the EC decision on 6 April 1992 to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina made inevitable an all-out and increasingly Lebanese war: three peoples, seven political leaderships, nineteen armed forces (according to Miloš Vašić of *Vreme*). In addition, every Yugoslav schoolchild knew 6 April as the anniversary of Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia in 1941; Serbs would therefore read the date as an extremely threatening signal rather than just ascribing it to ignorance and incompetence.

President Alija Izetbegović claims to represent the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina; that claim is at least nominally recognized in a minor part of its territory. His government might be seen as representing the Moslem–Croat majority, some 60 per cent of the population, given the ambiguity of Croatian positions. What is controlled by this majority, however, is mainly controlled by Croatian forces taking no orders from Sarajevo; and where the Croat and Moslem leaderships have common goals, they are primarily anti-Serbian. Present Serb and Croat leaderships have common interests against Moslem ambitions for a unitary state. It therefore appears more analytically useful to see Izetbegović as representing the Moslems only; forces at his disposal include predominantly Moslem parts of the government forces (TO), plus local Moslem militias reinforced by international *mujahedeen*. The actor interests we can ascribe to Moslems include Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent unitary state where Moslems are safe from Serbs and Croats. This defines a conflict with the two other major actors.

The Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina under President Radovan Karadžić can be ascribed the goal of its independent existence, within as wide – and as purely Serbian – a territory as possible. It will not rejoin any unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, but possibly a sufficiently cantonized version if that proves necessary and joining Yugoslavia impossible. The Serb leadership will attempt to force the leaderships of Serbia and Yugoslavia to support it (to avoid coups or civil wars in Serbia and Montenegro). Local Serbs, who were in the great majority in the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, shifted flags and took over most arms and armament factories when the JNA withdrew. Local Serb militias, and paramilitary groups hailing Belgrade fascists like Šešelj and Arkan, both cooperate and compete with Serb Republic forces; pitched battles have been fought.

The Croat Republic (or Community) of Herceg-Bosna under President Mate Boban differs from the Serb Republic by its political ambiguity and double role as independent entity and nominally loyal part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its present goals parallel those of the Serb leadership: preferably joining Croatia, with independence (more threatened by a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina than by the Serbs) in as large and purely Croatian(ized) canton(s) as possible as fallback position. Its official armed forces are HVO, primarily cooperating and competing with HOS (loyal to fascist leader Dobroslav Paraga in Zagreb); pitched battles have been fought. Izetbegović was forced to recognise both as legitimate. Parts of TO are dominated by Croats; there are also local Croat militias.

Serb and Croat leaderships in Bosnia-Herzegovina have contradicting

interests, especially about division of territory in minor areas where they are main competitors, and common interests in blocking a unitary state by cantonisation. President Karadžić hailed the proclamation of the Croat Republic Herceg-Bosna in May 1992 as a reasonable exercise of Croatian national self-determination, asking President Izetbegović to state Moslem claims and join negotiations on territorial division. A Western invasion would be necessary to end Serb independence, but would equally end Croat independence. Both leaderships know that sheer demography will shortly give the Moslems a majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The radical cantonisation that is the only acceptable solution to Serbs and Croats must be seen as threatening by the Moslem leadership. Geography and demography would locate the Moslem cantons in the northwest, around Sarajevo and in the southeast; they become isolated enclaves if Serb and Croat cantons vote themselves home – if the Moslems cannot conquer corridors through central Bosnia by cutting Serbian areas off from each other.

The Serb and Croat leaderships might go further, making their areas completely independent states, presumably later to join Yugoslavia and Croatia; or nominally preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state with one Serb and one Croat canton, observing decorum by constitutionally guaranteeing full religious freedom to Moslems. They have met in Graz and elsewhere to discuss principles for division, reportedly agreeing on 65 per cent to the Serbs and 36 per cent to the Croats; Milošević and Tudjman have also discussed 'swapping lands' (see various issues of *YUGOFAX*). The Moslem leadership therefore seeks an external military protector; the alliance with Croatia is too ambiguous. The major Western invasion indispensable for its maximal ambition (forcing the Serb and Croat republics to join a unitary state) is unlikely, unless Serbs (or Croats) make extremely provocative moves. Turkey is rhetorically willing, but pragmatically cautious; since Turkish military intervention probably means war with Greece, NATO has strong motives to discourage it.

5.4.3. *The southern powder keg*

The southern triangle consists of Serbs, Albanians and Macedonians. The Albanian majority in Kosovo proclaimed the independent *Republic of Kosova* in 1990 (recognised by Albania only) and has elected a multi-party parliament appointing a government under President Ibrahim Rugova. Kosovo remains under JNA control; the police force is virtually exclusively Serb; attempts at keeping Kosovo Serbian include firing most of the Albanian labour force, arrests, sequestration, etc. The Albanian strategy of non-violent resistance includes running a set of institutions (schools, hospitals etc.) parallel to those controlled by Serbia.

Internal conflicts in Macedonia are primarily between Albanians and Macedonians; the Serb minority is small, the JNA has withdrawn entirely and Yugoslavia has no territorial claims. The present coalition of reform communists behind President Kiro Gligorov and Albanian parties keeps the largest and irredentist party, VMRO, out of government. The Albanian referendum (10–11 January 1992) gave 90 per cent for independence; there have been clashes between Albanians and Macedonians.

Armed struggle in this triangle would probably repeat the pattern of shifting coalitions in the northern and central triangles; it carries a greater risk of internationalisation, with Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey as immediate candidates.

5.5. Identity and security

The complex web of conflicts described above concerns state (or quasi-state) *security* as well as societal security: (national) *identity*. Most bilateral conflicts contain both elements, with varying emphasis.

The external security problems of Yugoslavia stemmed from its strategic location; solutions included non-alignment and strong but defensive forces: 1 per cent of the population in the JNA, some 10 per cent quickly mobilisable in territorial forces (Roberts, 1976). Internal security problems primarily concerned *the idea of the state*. Yugoslavia was not questioned internationally; its identity included co-foundership of the Non-Aligned Movement and 'Yugoslav socialism'. The problem was mainly internal. Creating a Yugoslav identity overshadowing ethno-national identities had failed: only a small and decreasing percentage defined themselves as Yugoslavs in censuses (see Table 5.2). Yugoslavism having close links with Marxism-Leninism, it could hardly survive political secularisation as a unifying ideology. The alternative solution was to avoid competition between identities by successive decentralisation in constitutional compromises.

The end of the Cold War redefined traditional security problems. The JNA had been part of the solution; some republics now saw it as the problem, calling for drastic cuts while creating national guards. This attacked one of the few remaining symbols of Yugoslav identity: Yugoslavist ideology harmonised with vested JNA interests and with government interests in counteracting secessionism. The republics defined their own security problems even before proclaiming independence.

Slovenia had few identity problems, having clear territorial identity, virtual coincidence of territory and people and an unchallenged language and culture of its own. Threats of increased Yugoslav centralism, perhaps even Yugoslavisation, are now defeated. It remains to find the place in the West the Slovenes claim and to become ecclesiastically independent of Zagreb. Once Slovenia turned secessionist, security problems included Yugoslav occupation and entanglement into the Serb–Croat war; they have now largely been solved.

In Croatia, problems were much more complex. The JNA defined an external security problem, local Serb militias an internal; they cooperated closely. They were also severe identity problems. The battle for distinctiveness of Croatian language, culture and religion had been fought for a long time, by systematic attempts to make the Croatian language maximally distinct from Serbian (a two-front war, with various dialects in Croatia as the other front), and by catholicising Croatia. In 1990, these attempts accelerated, constituting grave identity threats to the Serbs and thereby contributing to making them a security threat.

Another vicious circle originates in Croatian identity being so closely linked

to *state* identity. This played a significant role in resistance to the Habsburg empire and to the Serbian domination in inter-war Yugoslavia. In 1990, however, the only independent Croation state predecessor in many centuries was that of Ante Pavelić. Many Croats would distinguish between its good side (independent Croatia) and its bad side (Ustaša), taking it for granted that symbols taken over or copied from it stood for the good side only; a minority, like Paraga's HSP party, saw the Ustaša state as something to be proud of altogether. To many Serbs all symbols and behaviour that resembled *that* Croatia were equally deadly threats to Serb security and identity; the mutual spiral of threats was again reinforced.

This sanctity of the state also ruled out the territorial compromises necessary to get a Croatian state that was also ethnically Croatian; in addition, Knin in Krajina is the same cradle symbol to Croats as Kosovo to Serbs. EC support for making state boundaries out of administrative ones then made compromise impossible for President Tudjman.

Problems were even more complex for Serbs and Serbia. In state security terms, Serbia is primarily threatened by the fragmentation of Yugoslavia making it small, landlocked and surrounded by hostile neighbours. Serbian identity is as tied to *nation* as the Croatian is tied to *state*, and the Serbian nation inhabits a much wider territory than Serbia. Dividing Yugoslavia along administrative rather than ethnic boundaries hence defines a strong threat to Serbian identity; this makes local Serbs a security problem to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they are many. Given history, recent and more distant, the secessions of these two republics would be seen by Serbs there as identity threats *and* – by many of them – as deadly threats to the security of the Serb communities there; hence the Serb secessions from the secessions. This convolution of problems is also seen in Kosovo, the largest part of Serbia where Serbs are a minority; the problem is seen by Serbs in both security and identity terms. This makes the Serbs a formidable threat to the Albanians, in security terms (oppression) and in identity terms: competing claims of being autochtonous and renewed attempts at Serbianisation of Kosovo.

Moslem problems include both security and identity to an extreme degree. Armed forces of Bosnian Serbs (and Croats) define the security problem: occupation, expulsion and massacres, with minority status in chauvinist Serb and Croat states as a worst case. Identity is also highly problematic. It cannot be anchored in language, there being little relation between religion and dialect; Moslems are a minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, albeit the largest; there were no Moslems in the medieval Bosnian kingdom; Bosnia-Herzegovina Moslems have long been secularised rather than zealots. One solution, in former Yugoslavia, was having 'Moslem' recognised as a *national* identity, on a par with Serb or Croat; but Yugoslavia is no more. Another solution is to be a state-carrying nation in independent Bosnia-Herzegovina together with Serbs and Croats – who will only have that on terms Moslems see as threatening their security. Two other solutions now seem to emerge: revitalisation of religion as centre of identity and identification as Bosnians. They are likely to create problems with Serbs and Croats: both will fear the creation of an Islamic state once suggested by Izetbegović, neither will let the

Moslems monopolise being Bosnians – or relinquish their Serb and Croat identities in favour of a Bosnian one.

The problems of Macedonia and the Macedonians also include both security and identity terms. The security problem lies in being small and unarmed and risking to face, in case of armed conflict, a choice between pox and cholera: joining Albanians and Bulgarians, who, if victorious, might divide Macedonia between them along the 1941 line; or joining Greeks and Serbs, who, if victorious, might want no independent state between them.

The identity problem can be succinctly described by recalling that Macedonia is surrounded by Bulgaria, recognising a Macedonian state but no Macedonian people; Yugoslavia, recognising a Macedonian people, but following the EC non-recognition of a Macedonian state; Greece, recognising neither as long as the name Macedonia is used; and the Albanians, only recognising a Macedonian state that is *not* (exclusively) that of the Macedonian people they recognise.

To the extent identity is anchored in language, Bulgaria is the main threat: it regards Macedonian as a Bulgarian dialect (having no special status in Bulgaria itself). To the extent it is anchored in religion, the Serbs are the main threat: the Macedonian church got a separate identity a generation ago, but still under the Serb patriarchate in Niš; the Serb, Bulgarian and Greek churches informed the Russian church that they would not attend its millennium in 1987 if the Macedonian church was invited on a par with them. To the extent it is anchored in statehood, the Albanian minority will not accept Macedonians defining themselves as *the* state-carrying people. When it is defined by territory and history, the Greeks object strongly to the biggest party, VMRO, showing maps where 38 per cent of 'Greater Macedonia' is present Macedonia, 51 per cent northern Greece and 11 per cent western Bulgaria; and to Macedonia having heraldically incorporated the star of Alexander the Great from Greek territory. Behind these issues, there is also the (consensual) Greek nightmare of Turkish/Moslem encirclement.

5.6. Conflicts, context and conclusion

The spider web of conflicts is thus even more complex than first indicated: security problems of political units define security dilemmas; there are several 'identity dilemmas'; security and identity problems interact, usually negatively.

To see how local conflict dynamics was affected by external feedback, we chose the EC as example. Its perception of the conflict complex accelerated its transition from mediator to conflict party in late 1991, with dramatic local effects. For reasons discussed elsewhere (Wiberg, 1992), German perceptions were as predictable as their predominance in defining the EC position.

That predominance merely reinforced one effect of EC intergovernmentality: being an organisation of states, not of peoples. Conflicts were therefore perceived as being between Serbia and Croatia, rather than Serbs and Croats. Those in Bosnia-Herzegovina were similarly reduced to a bilateral

Serbia/Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict; this perceptual transformation is also likely if the southern powder keg explodes. *Recognition of states* therefore became a central issue; the German tradition of making this a political weapon, not a matter of fact, prevailed.

When political and national boundaries differ, the interpretation of *national self-determination* becomes problematic, as seen in Yugoslavia's question to the Badinter commission in October 1991: 'Who can be the subject of the right to self-determination from the standpoint of international public law – a nation or a federal unit; is the right to self-determination a subjective collective right or the right of a territory?' (Zametica, 1992: 63). The EC answer reflected its state emphasis, inventing the principle that secessions should follow administrative rather than ethno-national boundaries. Primary victims are two million Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 750,000 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina; it also dooms two million Albanians to remain in Yugoslavia and Macedonia.

International law distinguishes 'nations', entitled to national self-determination, from 'national minorities' merely entitled to minority protection. German *Rechtstaatlichkeit* was embodied in criteria for recognition, especially human rights and minority protection. They attempted to make it irrelevant that political and national boundaries differed.

The attempt failed: Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina saw it as a threat to societal security, losing their nation status and being reduced to *minorities*. This contradicted the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution, but was precisely what Croatia had intended by its 1990 constitution. The EC position therefore deepened the conflicts, being inevitably seen as threatening Serb identity – and security: local Serbs had little faith in assurances extracted from Croatia, not seeing the EC as taking its own conditions seriously. Germany's statement on 23 December 1991 that Croatia fulfilled the conditions about minority protection and human rights made Serbs conclude that it believed more in Croatia's government than in Serb corpses and refugees.

Hubris and state-over-nation emphasis made the EC overestimate what its formulas could solve and underestimate what the Serbs feared, especially those *outside* Serbia, as well as how deep it must dig in the *Realpolitik* toolbox to extract concessions. Serb concessions consist in *state* behaviour: withdrawing the JNA, Yugoslav renunciations of territorial claims, calls to Serbs in Croatia to accept a 'special status' there. EC awards are seen as threatening the Serb *nation*. All parties expecting their enforcement, they first engendered Croat illusion politics and Serb paranoia politics, then Moslem illusion politics, Serb paranoia politics and Croat *Realpolitik*. This has ominous implications for the remaining powder keg.

Any durable solution to the Balkan conflict web must take societal security into account. Pure 'state security' solutions along EC lines can be temporarily imposed by force. They would leave some five million people in states where they feel their very identity threatened, and the very presence of that force would make that worse, while its withdrawal would mean the end of the solution. Pure 'societal security' solutions have no better prospects: using ethno-national boundaries to define states in former Yugoslavia would make Croatia and Serbia both losers and winners and Macedonia a loser, while

Albanians and Moslems would get states they did not have before. Yet unless considerable exchanges of population were made, neither Serbs, nor Moslems would get coherent states; territorial and demographic components of identity would clash in Kosovo and Krajina. If any solutions can be found, they must be based on recognising that there are some incompatibilities between state security and societal security and trying to limit these incompatibilities by means of trade-offs rather than worsening them by letting one kind of security dominate entirely.

Chapter 6
The crisis of societal security in the former Soviet Union
Pierre Lemaitre, Kristian Gerner and Torben Hansen

In December 1991, almost exactly sixty-nine years after its foundation, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist. Its process of decay and disintegration has been described and analysed continuously and need not be outlined here. The demise of the Soviet Union meant the collapse of central identity markers and of factors of cohesion. Both the scope and the range of political power changed as the superpower was replaced by successor states. The economic situation also changed radically. Social relations entered a state of flux. A high degree of insecurity began to define the individual's perceptions of politics, economy and societal conditions. In 1992 there emerged a situation where almost everybody felt insecure about the future.

6.1. Identity and social system

In the EC the potential for societal insecurity is brought about by the attempts at establishing elements of supranational structures and nations; a process which is evolving within the larger framework of a capitalist-democratic system. The newly born states of the imploded Soviet Union are facing the task of establishing a new social system, including new state structures that can fit the emerging national identities. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a revolutionary event in the sense that the elite gaining power had a political programme which, if implemented, would imply a revolution in the social system. However, it was not a revolution like the French Revolution in 1789, in which a new social system and a new elite and new identities had matured in the womb of the old polity. Consequently, for the post-communist states the questions concerning what kind of social system would supersede the defunct communist system and what kind of identities would emerge was put on the agenda. The battle over the social system was accompanied by a battle over national identity, and it is at the interface between these two battlefields that the biggest source of societal insecurity lies.

After the collapse of communism four macro-historical processes have

been unfolding all of which affect the prospects for societal security in the new states.

(1) The further disintegration of the communist state structures and of the Soviet empire. As the communist system in practice as well as theoretically has proven to be unreformable (Kornai, 1986), a dismantling of communism as a social system is a *sine qua non* for the establishment of a viable social system and a functioning relationship between social system and society. However, given the division of labour in the Soviet Union, and the fact that cooperation was operating in some vital sectors like energy, foodstuffs and semi-finished products, the way in which the centralised Communist system is dismantled is important for future developments in the newly created states.

(2) Establishment of new social systems including new state structures. Three social systems have been competing for the role of successor to the communist system. In most of the new states a capitalist-democratic social system is the proclaimed goal, but some form of a Slavic model, be it a communist or some other authoritarian one, is also promoted actively. In Azerbaijan and the new Central Asian states there is a surging preoccupation with Islam evoking an interest in some brand of an Islamic state.

(3) Corresponding to the restructuring of the domestic polity, new international relations have been established. Not only have relations to the West multiplied at many levels, but also those to the Middle East and East Asia.

(4) Identity formation has been evolving related to pre-Soviet, Soviet, ethnic, state and international dimensions.

To a certain degree the four processes have their own dynamics. The big question in relation to potential insecurity is whether the four processes evolve in such a way as to make it possible for a social system to function. Or will the Communist experience be repeated in the sense that the various social processes interact dysfunctionally by pulling the social system and society in different directions, finally resulting in a collapse of the social system (Hankiss, 1990).

This chapter starts out with an analysis of past developments in Ukraine. Compared to Russia, this state has stronger European roots, and during the struggle for independence there was a good fit between going back to society's European identity roots and the demands for independence. However, for this state too, future developments are uncertain. As soon as independence had been achieved, the difficulties of transforming an ex-communist system came to the fore – a transformation which was made all the more complicated by Ukraine's vulnerability to developments in Russia. In Russia the implosion of the communist state has reopened the century-old struggle between Westernizers and Slavophiles. Should Russia be reconstructed using the West as a model or according to some Slavic model? This was not only a question of social system, but also a question of identity. Compared to Russia and Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and the five Central Asian republics can be seen as the periphery of the former Soviet Union. These newly independent states also have two other common characteristics, both shared

with the Balkans: an incredible medley of ethnic groups and vast arsenals of collective memories of past struggles for survival. These features make the post-independence dynamics between social system and society in these states especially explosive. The last section in the chapter discusses the implications of probable developments in the former Soviet Union for West European security.

6.2. Ukraine

Present Russia, Belarus and Ukraine all have their origins in the early mediaeval Kievan state. Internal strife and outside conquest by the Mongols and by Poland and Lithuania made this state disintegrate in the thirteenth century. After the demise of Mongol rule in the late fifteenth century, Moscow emerged as the major successor state to *Kievskaya Rus'*. The Russian ruler called himself 'tsar' (emperor), and Moscow gained a patriarchate in 1589. However, what is known today as Belarus and the Ukraine belonged to Poland–Lithuania until the mid-seventeenth century. The western part of Ukraine belonged to this state until its dissolution in the late eighteenth century, when it was incorporated into Austria under the name of Galicia. In 1918–39, Galicia was part of Poland. Only in 1939 were Galicia and western Belorussia conquered by the Soviet Union and united with the Soviet republics Ukraine and Belorussia.

Ukrainian nationalism is based upon the notion of Russia as the significant other. One may speak of an ambiguous relationship. Ukraine and Russia both trace their origins to Kievan *Rus'*. However, for Ukrainian nationalists the Russians are impostors and pretenders only, in reality stemming from Finnish tribes on the Volga. Russian nationalists tend not to recognise Ukrainians as a nation at all but regard them as 'polonised' – corrupted – Russians or 'little Russians'. Things are further complicated by the fact that the two nations have a large common cultural heritage and that many individuals in Ukraine do not find the distinction very important. Intermarriage has been common and Ukrainians and Russians have often been brothers-in-arms in fighting for the Soviet empire.

In Ukraine, ethnic mobilisation against Moscow and the Soviet state gained momentum relatively late, long after similar processes had taken off in the Baltic and Transcaucasian areas. A significant threat in developments in Ukraine was that the national political mobilisation became both ethnic and territorial. The political actors in Ukraine stressed a double sense of identity, tied not only to ethnic Ukrainians but also to what was perceived as the historical lands of Ukraine. Because the latter identity was derived from a certain understanding of the past, history and mythology played important roles in the political development in Ukraine. Political mobilisation started in the western districts, i.e. in those parts of the mediaeval Kievan principality that had belonged to Poland–Lithuania, Austria and Poland from the fourteenth century until 1939. Although the majority of the population had remained orthodox, a substantial share in western Ukraine had been members of the uniate church. It was created in 1596 by the Polish authorities. Over the centuries, the uniate or Ukrainian Catholic Church merged with

Ukrainian nationalism and became an ethnic marker. Through this Catholic connection, a Central European identity and a sense of belonging to Europe were stressed. Ukrainian nationalist ideology was developed mainly by intellectuals in Austrian Ukraine in the nineteenth century, although it developed in the Russian part as well as a reaction against increased Russification of the 'Little Russians'. The striving for national independence found its political expression in the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian republic in 1918, consisting of both the Habsburgian and the Russian parts. However, the independent Ukrainian state was short-lived; by 1921 the Bolsheviks were in firm control. Like the other Soviet republics, the Ukraine suffered a drastic transformation in order to conform to the Communist scheme (Gerner, 1989, 1990).

The Ukrainian state is multiethnic. Of its population of 52 million in 1991, roughly 37.5 million were ethnic Ukrainians, about 12 million Russians, about half a million each Belorusians and Jews and about a quarter of a million each Poles and Hungarians. There were smaller numbers of a host of other nationalities. It turned out that most of the peoples had a strong sense of identification with the Ukrainian historical territory and therefore also with the Ukrainian state, as was demonstrated in the referendum on sovereignty on 1 December 1991 with its overwhelming majority for the independence alternative. This outcome was undoubtedly partly influenced by the policy of the Ukrainian popular front 'Rukh' which, from its inauguration in September 1989, had pursued a line of mutual understanding, respect and equal rights for the national minorities. The remarkable thing about Rukh was its conscious and apparently rather successful attempt to fight ingrained xenophobic sentiments, especially with regard to Jews and Poles. Politically most important, however, was that the Ukrainian nationalists succeeded in winning over ethnic Russians for the cause of Ukrainian independence. In sum, the Ukrainian story of 1989–91 was one of a rather successful creation of territorial nationalism in a multiethnic population.

The national political mobilisation in Ukraine had much to do with fears and senses of insecurity. People felt threatened by the way the Soviet system worked. Once the Soviet structure began to crumble, an overwhelming majority of the population saw the solution to their insecurity problems in the creation of a sovereign state, where they would be, in some sense, masters of their own fate. The breakdown of the Soviet system was a necessary condition for the idea to take root that secession from the Soviet Union was possible. However, the triggering causes of political nationalism were both territorial and ethnic.

The territorial trigger was the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power station in 1986 and its aftermath. It did not lead to immediate political mobilisation, but it gradually alerted the population, regardless of ethnic origin, to react against the perils of living in a Soviet Union ruled from Moscow. The Soviet authorities did rather little to inform the population about the consequences for their health and well-being. The Ukrainian physician Yuryi Shcherbak at last took an initiative to investigate the consequences. In December 1987 he founded an environmental movement, called 'The Green World'. The discussion on the environment coalesced with

demands for rehabilitation of the Ukrainian language, history and culture. The ethnic trigger was pulled. The whole country and the Ukrainian people were described and perceived by intellectuals as physically and mentally damaged by the Soviet system. It seems that the broad layers of the population accepted this picture. They voted in support of secession both in the referendum in March 1991 and in the presidential election in December.

Once concern for the environment merged with cultural or ethnic questions, western Ukraine and its capital L'viv (Lvov) became the centre for the independence movement. Because of its history, Russian and Soviet influence was weaker here than in the east and south. The popular front Rukh emerged in L'viv in the spring of 1989. It soon gained a foothold in central and eastern Ukraine and it actually held its first congress in the capital Kyjiv (Kiev) in September. The movement gained mass support, and the Communist party was forced to accept the national mobilisation and to change both leading personnel and policies. The 'sovereignists' defeated the 'imperialists' in the party. Many party functionaries simply changed sides.

The misguided attempted *coup* by Gorbachev's government on 19 August accelerated the movement towards independence in Ukraine. The Supreme Soviet declared Ukraine a sovereign state on 24 August. The referendum on 1 December was followed by a declaration that made the sovereignty operative on 4 December. On 8 December followed the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States which also included Russia and Belorus. On 21 December eight more former Soviet republics joined the new Commonwealth. Gorbachev abdicated and the Soviet Union was dissolved. Political developments in the Ukraine had been decisive for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The change of status from 'younger brother' to 'equal' was crucial for Ukrainian nationalists. From now on, their sense of identity and of existential security was predicated upon the undoing of the Russian empire, the Soviet Union.

The ex-Communist Leonid Kravchuk, who was elected president of the Ukraine on 1 December with more than 60 per cent of the votes, became Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, numbering 1,400,000 men. Ukraine had more than 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads and a lot of tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. However, the Supreme Soviet declared its intention to destroy all nuclear weapons and to make Ukraine a nuclear free state. It had earlier been decided to reduce the army to 420,000 men. The rationale behind this figure was to reach parity with other large European states, like France. A further argument was that Ukraine has long borders to guard. Moreover, its military planners are products of Soviet military thinking, with its emphasis on numbers (Mihalisko, 1991a: 19–22; 1991b: 15–19).

However, the ecological situation and the state of the old industrial structure and of the infrastructure in general in Ukraine continued to deteriorate amidst all political euphoria. The Chernobyl nuclear power plant was scheduled to be closed, and Ukraine was likely to experience a shortage of energy in the near future (Marples, 1991: 14–16). Ukraine's economy was part of the Soviet economy and is therefore closely connected to the Russian economy. However, to establish close ties to the West is vital, because it is only through

learning about democracy at all levels, through influx of capital, technology and know-how from developed capitalist countries that the social system can be reconstructed. However, this presupposes that the Ukrainians themselves will embark on a revolution of the social system, which has hardly begun; in this respect Ukraine faces a task of the same titanic magnitude as Russia. Only if Ukraine succeeds in this precarious endeavour, can the societal security gains from independence be consolidated.

6.3. Russia

In 1991, from a Russian point of view, history was rolled back to before the time of Peter the Great. The Soviet Union had been the heir to the Russian empire. The old empire's core had been the Muscovite state. In the mid-seventeenth century, Moscow had conquered the major parts of Belarus and Ukraine from Poland–Lithuania. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Peter I had taken the Baltic provinces from Sweden. At the end of same century, Catherine II acquired the Crimea and the Black Sea coast from Turkey. In the beginning and in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russian tsars incorporated Finland, Transcaucasia and Central Asia into the empire. After the demise of the tsarist state, the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Belorussia and Bessarabia were lost, but these areas were taken back by Stalin in 1939–40. The post-war boundaries of the Soviet Union were recognised *de facto* by all other powers in the Helsinki agreement in 1975.

In 1991, a huge part of the old territories was lost. In one stroke, the Russians were deprived of two important bases for their sense of national identity: the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. The latter was not only dissolved but also largely dismissed as a monstrosity, whereas the former was rejected by all non-Russian nations. All literate people in Europe, the Russians included, had been taught for generations that a Russian Great Power, from 1922 called the Soviet Union, was natural. Now this notion was invalidated. The revolutions in 1905 and 1917, and the Civil War in 1918–20 had been premonitions of the things to come in 1991, but as the Soviet Union resettled in the moulds of old Russia, history seemed to retain its natural course. Because it did not affect their own sense of identity, non-Russians inside and outside the Soviet Union were mentally and emotionally capable of accepting the new order of things. It was much more difficult for the Russians. They had to accommodate to geopolitical facts dating from before Peter the Great.

In 1991, Russia could not help but be economically, politically and militarily affected by a number of bonds with the other post-Soviet and ex-Warsaw pact states. Apart from the problems of creating a viable political and economic system and of identifying ways to safeguard the Russian state and the Russian nation, the Russians found themselves in a severe economic and social crisis. Malnutrition and diseases weakened the people physically, and societal life was characterised by disorder, as the planned economy disappeared without any orderly system replacing it. The geopolitical situation of the Russian federation, its vast area, its population of more than 150 million and its huge military resources, all make it a Great Power. However, in terms

of economic performance, social structure, general health of the population, legal provisions for economic activities and, last but not least, political system, in 1991 Russia must be considered to be an underdeveloped country in need of modernisation.

When the Soviet Union was dissolving and when the Russians had to search for a post-Soviet sense of identity and social system, the old Westernizers-Slavophiles dichotomy, gained new significance. Should the country become a democratic, capitalist *Rechtsstaat*, multiethnic and economically integrated with the neighbouring states, or should Russia try to develop a specific Slavic, Christian orthodox and egalitarian state? Would it be possible to establish a social system which could integrate elements of both civilisational forces? The Western way would de-emphasise the significance of political boundaries and of the ethnic question. The Slavophile approach would alienate Russia from its neighbours and intensify ethnic conflicts in those states where the Russians had become national minorities. There were some 20 million of other nationalities within the boundaries of the Russian federation, and an estimated 25 million ethnic Russians in the other post-Soviet states. The problem was to enhance the security of both the Russian multinational state and of the Russian people in the neighbouring states. The solutions were radically different, as seen from a Westernizing or from a Slavophile perspective.

In the spring of 1992, three young researchers from the USA and Canada Institute, Aleksei Bogatyrov, Mikhail Kozhokin and Konstatin Pleshakov, published an article under the title 'The National Interest in Russian Politics', which belongs at the Westernizing end of the thinking on national security. For several reasons,[1] the article may be considered to be representative of the intellectual environment of the Russian president Boris Yeltsin. According to Bogatyrov *et al.*, (1992: 35):

> In our view, the basic interest of the Russian Federation is to safeguard guaranteed conditions for a free and secure life for all citizens above all in their capacity as individuals but also with regard to group, social and other qualities. To recognise the priority of the individual rights of each person, which has been proclaimed by the Russian leadership, brings us close to the West.

In this context, the question of national rights of the Russian minorities in the neighbouring states acquires special significance. According to the authors (Bogatyrov *et al.*, 1992: 37):

> The rights of the Russian minorities are regarded as an instance of human rights. In this case, it is the right and duty of the Russian Federation to draw the attention of the governments of the neighbouring states to facts of discrimination against the Russian minority and to turn to authoritative international organisations and demand expert investigations on the spot.

According to Bogatyrov *et al.*, the Russian national interest is to protect Russian culture and the well-being of the individual, what they call Russianness and statehood. Priority must be given to statehood, because of the multitude of nationalities in the Russian Federation. Russia must remain

a multinational state. The individuals in this state have a dual identity, ethnic (Russian, Tatar, German, Jewish, Korean etc.) and state. To solve territorial questions and to transform the military sector are the two main actual concerns for Russian foreign policy. In principle, present state boundaries should not be changed. However, every nation has the right to decide its own fate (Bogatyrov *et al.*, 1992: 42). In other words, the three scholars understand the right to national self-determination in ethnic terms.

Bogatyrov *et al.* argue that Russia should use its nuclear arms potential as a peace-keeping menace, furthering global balance. Moreover, Russia should modernise and diminish its non-nuclear defence and create mobile task forces, capable of swift reaction. The country must be able, in case of need, to evacuate and house Russian minorities in the neighbouring states (Bogatyrov *et al.*, 1992: 43–4).

It might be even more relevant to pay attention to the views of the chairman of the old Soviet national cultural fund set up by Gorbachev, the grand old man of Russian cultural life, Academician Dmitrii Likhachev. In an article with the telling title 'Lifting the Barriers', he expressed the concerns of the moderate Slavophiles. Likhachev remarked that Russian bones were spread over the northern hemisphere from the Carpathians to California. The Russians had liberated the Romanians, the Bulgarians and the Serbs from the Turkish yoke, had let the Finns and the Baltic peoples retain their native languages and had given these peoples their grammars. Russia had emptied its rivers and destroyed its best soil in order to give water to the brethren in the south (a strange reference to the river diversions that never were). The so-called independent states would never be able to free themselves from Russia and Russia would never be able to free herself from them. Their cultures were imbued with Russian contributions and Russia's culture had been inspired by theirs:

> Should we establish boundary posts when the most valuable thing we know – the culture of every people and of the whole of mankind – does not recognise any borders. Let there be . . . boundaries . . . and all necessary attributes of statehood. But do preserve the unified network of communications, the system of relations, and, hopefully, one currency and all which is necessary for the existence of a single cultural sphere. All this does not contradict the concept of sovereignty. [Likhachev, 1992]

The tenor of Likhachev's thesis is that the Russians have carried the burden of empire and magnanimously given other peoples culture and security. His views must be considered to be indicative of a central train of thought among Russians. Though basically a Slavophile, Likhachev has supported Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's attempts at Westernizing Russia's social system. David Remnick (1992: 46–7) has stressed the significance of Likhachev's views:

> The importance of Likhachev's position at a time when the ideology of communism has collapsed and a virulent nationalism periodically threatens to fill the vacuum cannot be overestimated. Like Sakharov's call for an end to Communist Party dominance in 1989, Likhachev's attacks on Great Russian nationalism, on anti-

Semitism and theocracy, come at an absolutely critical time. Likhachev's plea to preserve a heritage that had been so ignored and abused has helped to spark wide discussion in recent months of Russian character, ideals, and nationalism. As a scholar and moralist, he has played a critical role in helping Russia to discover its cultural identity and its place in Europe.

The anti-Western Slavophile point of view has not only been put forward by a number of small political parties. It also has support in such powerful institutions as the military-industrial complex, comprising the military, industries under the ministry of defence and military research institutions. After having been shattered by the August 1991 attempted *coup*, by the summer of 1992 this power centre was again asserting itself (Pedersen, 1992; Foye, 1992; Lough, 1992). According to the view in these circles, Russia faces a major military threat from the former republics and Russia should act with much more firmness in relation to them. Writing in the Russian nationalist paper *Pravda* in early 1992, the Russian vice president Aleksandr Rutskoi, a former Major-General and 'hero' from Afghanistan, asserted: 'The historical consciousness of Russians does not permit anyone mechanically to bring the borders of Russia in line with [the borders of] the Russian Federation (Solchanyk, 1992: 14). It was clear from his previous standpoint that Rutskoi did not have in mind a diminution of Russia. According to Roman Solchanyk, a Radio Free Europe analyst, there are no illusions in Kiev that Rutskoi's idea of Russia includes the major part, if not all, of Ukraine (Solchanyk, 1992: 14). Furthermore, it certainly boded ill that the draft of Russia's military doctrine in 1992 stated that infringement of the rights of Russians living outside Russia and of persons 'ethnically and culturally' identified with Russia in republics of the former Soviet Union is viewed as 'a serious source of conflict' (FitzGerald, 1992: 76). There are many examples from Caucasus and Central Asia that the Russian military is taking on the role of defender of 'ethnic and cultural' Russians with – and in some cases without – the consent of the Russian government. In summer 1992 the Russian foreign minister accused the military leadership of fanning conflict in Moldova and Transcaucasia. He asked, 'Why is the military deciding the most important issues?' (Lough, 1992). Furthermore, according to the military, a threat from NATO cannot be excluded either. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact has left the military with an acute sense of Russia's vulnerability due to loss of a strategically important defence glacier.

Marxism, the third main intellectual current prevailing in Russian thought during the last century, is also still alive. According to an opinion poll conducted on 23 February 1992, answering the question, 'Would you agree or not to Communists regaining power in Russia?' 6 per cent said 'Yes', 16 per cent answered 'Yes, if our problems will be solved' and 15 per cent said that they didn't care (*Moscow News*, No. 9, 1992: 2). A noticeable development is the joining of forces between former Communists and Slavophiles in common fronts against Westernization.

In relation to identity, maybe the most important thing in 1991–2 was that there was an openness, or indeed confusion, among the Russian public about what it meant to be Russian, which could make several future developments

possible. The plethora of viewpoints was not only scattered among different groups in society, but also in the minds of the individual Russians. A British sociologist, Theodore Shanin, has diagnosed the situation of the Russian society using Emile Durkheim's term 'anomie' as 'a society in crisis because of the breakdown of moral codes which cement it together'. This is a very painful condition, maybe more painful than the material deprivations also being experienced by most Russians in this period. According to Shanin (1990: 7), the Russians

> . . . do not seem to know what to expect in a month's time. They want to run, but don't know where to go. They fear, but don't know precisely what they should be afraid of. This is a sign of something more profound than fear of an imminent danger.

The Russian's mental universe was chaotic in the sense that none of the tendencies had a strong pull. The new ideologies were weakly founded. As regards capitalism and democracy, although there was an openness and an interest in the public, there was very little knowledge of what a capitalist-democratic system stands for. For this reason, and due to the fact that fighting to get basic necessities takes a vast amount of time, an active public participation in the transformation was not to be expected. And if the situation deteriorates further, it might become so painful that familiar patterns of thought become determining for action.

6.3.1. Ukraine and Russia

A few years ago, Ukraine and Russia were parts of the same state. Their security interests coincided. Today, these states have to protect their national security against each other. Russia has pretensions to be the main inheritor of the Soviet Union. It has succeeded in so far as it has been allowed to take Russia's place in the United Nations, including the permanent seat in the Security Council. Ukraine challenges Russia regarding the question of the heritage from *Kievskaya Rus'*. The struggle between the two has been waged primarily by diplomatic and rhetorical means. The bones of contention range from the question of the degree of commitment to the CIS, over the question of national armies and partition of the Black Sea navy, to the status of the Crimea.

The way the Soviet Union broke up made Ukraine and Russia follow different tracks regarding the definition of the national interest. The Ukrainian leaders chose to stress the importance of retention of the Soviet internal boundaries as the borders of the new state. This led the Ukrainian parliament to declare that the Crimea, which Ukraine received from Russia in 1954 (on the tercentenary of the 'reunion' of Russia and Ukraine in 1654) as a part of the post-Soviet state. The Russian parliament cast doubt upon the legal validity of the 1954 transfer.

In Ukraine, the collective rights of national minorities were hailed with the obvious aims of enhancing Ukrainian territorial state identity among the people and of posing as a good guy in the eyes of the rich Western powers. In

Russia, on the other hand, there are strong political forces that stress their right to safeguard the interests of all ethnic Russians in all the successor states. Measured against the existing state borders, Ukraine's concept of national security thus was inner-directed and basically defensive, Russia's definition might become outer-directed and potentially expansionist.

A point of convergence between the security perceptions of the two East Slavic nations may be found in the policies of the Ukrainian leaders and in the views of the Russian Likhachev. It is the argument that state boundaries should have their significance reduced. The agreement signed by Ukraine with Hungary in early June 1991 on mutual collective rights for the respective minorities, was intended to become a precedent for relations with the other neighbouring states (Reisch, 1991: 14–17). Ukraine is using relations with Hungary as an example. Its policy is to argue that international security and thus the security of the individuals in the area would benefit from making state boundaries transparent. The implication is that this view should be embraced by the leaders in Ukraine's other neighbouring states Russia, Poland, Moldova and Romania. This strategy is usually supported by the nation-bigger-than-the-state countries like Germany and Hungary (Wæver, 1990a; Gerner, 1992b), who want to link up to their 'lost brethren' beyond national borders without engendering inter-state conflicts. Often the state with the foreign minorities (Poland, Romania) is less enthusiastic about the arrangement, seeing it as potentially a first move towards (and not an alternative to) raising territorial demands, as it was in the inter-war experience. However, the Ukrainian example is interesting as a case where the host nation for minorities uses this strategy in order to pre-empt conflict. Ukraine uses the eager collaboration of Hungary in establishing a principle that could help to defuse or channel one of the main conflicts with Russia: that over the Russian minority in Ukraine. The future elaboration of legislation about citizenship and minority rights together with the mutual relations of states dealing with these issues will be a major cause of division among the ex-Soviet states. A comprehensive solution must be worked out if serious interethnic and international conflicts are to be prevented.

6.4. Caucasia and Central Asia

With the disintegration of the Soviet empire approximately 40 million Muslims found themselves in six separate states: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. The rest of an estimated (by 1990) total of 57 million ex-Soviet Muslims live in the Russian federation concentrated on the Volga and in Russian-dominated Northern Caucasia. Formally these populations are rated as belonging to the religion of Islam, but in the 1930s and in the Khrushchev years Moscow worked hard to oppress religion (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990: 144). When the empire collapsed Soviet Muslims had only a 'hazy and rudimentary understanding of the Islamic faith' (Rupert, 1992: 180). Therefore, when talking about Muslims it should be noted that what the term stands for in relation to inhabitants of the ex-Soviet Union is uncertain and probably changing rapidly. Georgia's and Armenia's strong Christian traditions give these two republics some distinct

national identities. However, Northern Caucasia, the three independent republics in Transcaucasia and the subcontinent of Central Asia are alike in possessing a great diversity of ethnic groups and long memories of past conflicts and injustice. For centuries great powers interfered in these areas, and nomadic tribes from the steppes repeatedly conquered the settled cultures. Kings and generals exterminated or deported the population of whole cities or provinces; other people migrated because of climatic changes or were evicted by nomads to survive only in isolated pockets in the hills. Before the time of Russian expansion the European notions of state and nation were unknown. People belonged to different communities, based on economic and/or religious functions. City-dwellers – craftsmen and shopkeepers of the bazaar – and peasants were unarmed subjects of a prince. Nomads and peasants of the less accessible hills usually carried arms and enjoyed a freedom which they defended fiercely.

When the Russian army carried colonialism into Caucasia – in the beginning of the nineteenth century – and Central Asia – in the 1860s and 1870s – scores of different linguistic and religious communities were exposed, first, to a new type of economic exploitation and, second, to the polarizing effects of nationalism. The tsarist bureaucracy imposed a hitherto unknown uniformity on taxation and legislation but generally refrained from interference in cultural and religious matters. Nationalist ideas only emerged at the end of tsarism, and when the old order collapsed independent governments were set up in Transcaucasia and Central Asia and 'everybody was cutting everybody else's throat' – as a British diplomat aptly described the turmoil in 1919.

When a new order was established by the victorious Red Army in 1920–1, Northern Caucasia, Transcaucasia and Central Asia were reabsorbed into a colonialist system and subjected to the security overlay established in Eurasia by the Soviet empire. Between 1922 and 1939 the economic and administrative structures (see figure 6.1) were entirely shaped by the Stalinist programme of confiscation, collectivisation and industrialisation. On the level of culture the Communist party attempted to annihilate every trace of the Islamic–Persian tradition, to cut every connection to the wider Muslim Umma (the global community of believers) and to prepare the non-Russians for the achievement of a new 'internationalist' nationality encompassing the totality of the Soviet population. Stalin's nationality politics was applied. A nationality was primarily defined in terms of language and it equated an administrative structure and a territory. Behind the borders of allotted territories certain recognised non-Russian nations, the titular nationalities – an expression coined by Western researchers – were instructed to 'sink roots' and develop those parts of their own cultures which did not contradict the communist project. By combining these elements of indigenous culture with larger and larger doses of pure communist culture, the acknowledged nations of the Soviet Union would over time be drawn together and finally a new communist culture would emerge (Rywkin, 1982; Saroyan, 1988; Suny, 1990).

This state of affairs was an innovation. Before the Russian conquest and under tsarism the Muslims of Caucasia and Central Asia were conscious of belonging to the Umma in a wider sense – vis-à-vis non-believers – and to their local community (a village, a tribe or a district of a city) in a narrower

Figure 6.1 Caucasia and Central Asia

sense. The issue of language was not important. No clear linguistic borders existed. The same person might use one vernacular communicating with relatives or neighbours and a totally different one with people in the next valley. The educated classes – small elites in these agrarian societies – used Persian and Arabic as written languages. The integration into the Soviet Union and the creation of the republics as proto-nations completely crushed this pattern, and Stalin's politics inevitably implied countless arbitrary solutions. The rule that to each local state apparatus belonged one nationality placed scores of non-titular ethnies in a predicament. In certain cases a minority community obtained recognition as a semi-nationality entitled to a semi-autonomous republic or an administrative sub-unit on a lower level. This was the case of the Karakalpaks, speaking a Central Turkic dialect closely related to Kazakh. They were not included in the Kazakh Soviet republic, however, but handed over to Uzbekistan (Uzbek belongs to the East Turkic branch). The Armenians in Nagorny Karabagh met the same fate when Moscow decided to incorporate their home land as an autonomous region into Azerbaijan. Many more ethnic groups did not even receive this inferior position but vanished from public records and were thus exposed to complete assimilation. This happened particularly in Azerbaijan where Kurds, Tats, Armenians outside Nagorny Karabagh and other non-Turkic ethnies were branded 'non-natives', although their ancestors had lived on the land long before the arrival of the Turkic nomads in the twelfth century (Saroyan, 1990: 15–18). But all over Caucasia, in the Volga area, on the Crimea and in Central Asia this hierarchic structure – 'first rate' titular nationalities with a political and cultural hegemony over 'second rate' and non-recognised minorities – was firmly established.

At least since the Brezhnevite 'period of stagnation' material grievance added to the tensions in the republics. The Caucasian and the Central Asian republics can be considered the periphery of Russia and Ukraine, the two core republics of the Soviet Union. Like the former West European colonies, the southern Soviet republics had their economy transformed to suit the demands of the core. Uzbekistan was made the cotton producer of the Union; this was extremely wasteful as cotton-growing in Uzbekistan demands huge investment in irrigation schemes, it triggered widespread ecological disasters and the product was of poor quality. When the Soviet Union's economy began to deteriorate rapidly, uneconomic monocultures as in Uzbekistan was the first to be hit. The economic crisis, in turn, affected relations between the oppressed and titular nationalities. Thus Karakalpak claims for secession from Uzbekistan were reinforced by the appalling ecological conditions of the Aral Sea and its shores where the habitat of this ethnos has been destroyed by the overexploitation of the water in the river Amu Darya and by toxic wastes from cotton production. A parallel problem developed in Nagorny Karabagh, as the government in Baku neglected this non-Turkic enclave in terms of industry, infrastructure, educational facilities and cultural activity (Walker, C. 1991). Interethnic conflicts therefore exploded with Gorbachev's decision to launch *glasnost'*. This was particularly clear in the case of the Armenians who felt encouraged to demand a reconsideration of their claim that the Karabagh enclave should be detached from Azerbaijan and join Armenia.

A common feature for the area is a political culture which is difficult to square with the idea of democracy. Among intellectuals there are Westernizers, but they are few. During the Gorbachev period the ruling elites in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia were hostile to *glasnost* and *perestroika* which were seen as another way of reimposing the Kremlin's control. In Uzbekistan the leadership blocked TV transmissions from Moscow and banned newspapers and books printed in 'licentious' Russia. The development of opposition movements and a free press was not allowed. The system of authority remained closed to public scrutiny, and society continued to function along the lines of the Brezhnevite time of stagnation – i.e. according to personal contacts and loyalty to a closed group 'whether based on locale of origin, common educational or career background, or general ethnic communal attachment' (Gleason, 1991: 619). Thus while Islam as a religious force had been all but eradicated under Soviet rule, older traditions of government sanctioned by the conservative Muslim clergy in the period before the Russian conquest were carried on by the new elites developed by Moscow in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Both systems – the traditional Islamic and the Stalinist – were based on the notion of a closed society and the rejection of inalienable rights, including the citizens' right to manage state affairs (Badie, 1986: 47; White, 1979: 84–190). Increasingly, the inflexible political system in these states came under pressure from a rapidly changing society.

Since 1988 violent conflicts created a general atmosphere of fear and hatred: Armenians and Azerbaijanis started the war in the Karabagh, and in 1989 Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks and Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Ferghana valley were violently pitted against each other. Other groups were also involved in interethnic strife (Carrère d'Encausse, 1990). The road to independence was marked by rapidly growing malign nationalism.

6.5. Prospects for societal security in the former Soviet Union and the effects on Europe

The development of the new ex-Soviet states after independence gives some clue both to likely future developments and their implications for Western Europe. The prospects are discussed under the assumption of a continuation of Western policies and level of commitment as of 1991–2.

6.5.1. Russia

In the spring of 1992 President Yeltsin began a radical process of Westernization. Though met with increasing opposition, the Westernizers managed to hold the ring during the first year, but only by postponing the difficult part of the transformation. Large-scale privatisation, easy access for foreign firms to buy shares in Russian companies and closure of unprofitable firms are still in store. According to the Economics Minister, Andrei Nechayev, unemployment is expected to rise from 250,000 in 1992 to about 5 million in 1993, 5.5 per cent of the work-force; according to other estimates, the real jobless figure may be twice the official one (*International Herald*

Tribune, 16 September 1992: 11). Eventually the Yeltsin government might succeed, but the prospects seem dim. By the time this book is published, the reform process might *de facto* have come to an end. Even if this is the case, it is important to be aware of the process leading to the collapse, because this will have a strong influence on future developments either way.

There seems to be a high probability that the reform process will fail because of interplay between economic, political and ideological chaos, mounting public disorder and a surging Russian nationalism. The opening up of Russia to capitalism has triggered a nationalist revival; this revival has been furthered because the opening has been accompanied by the emigration of intellectuals and illegal export of objects of art (Gerner, 1992a). There are several factors at hand likely to give a further boost to the mounting Russian anti-Western nationalism. One is hurt pride, which is likely to be increasingly in play. The Russians have not come to terms with the loss of the empire and they will daily be reminded of the loss by news about Russians being mal-treated (whether or not true) and streams of Russian refugees from the former Soviet republics as well as other regions demanding independence. In 1989, 25 million ethnic Russians lived outside Russia, and as a whole this group has stronger Russian nationalist sentiments than Russians inside the Russian state. Migration of Russians to Russia is therefore likely to affect the balance between Westernizers and Slavophiles.

A mounting anti-Western Russian nationalism will result in the economic transformation losing momentum and coherence, the result being a half way house economy having elements of both systems' and a further deterioration of the economic situation. This is likely to aggravate the political and ideological chaos and increase public disorder. According to an opinion poll, even by November 1992 47 per cent of the Russian population found the situation 'unbearable' (*Moscow News*, No. 45, 1992: 2). Economic, political and ideological chaos and increasing public disorder are factors likely to boost a nationalist revival (Dencik, 1991).

The emerging nationalist revival is increasingly getting a distinct anti-Western slant (*Moscow News*, No. 29, 1992: 6–7). The reaction to Western-ization of an ever larger segment of the Russian society has been to stress communist–Slavophile virtues such as social solidarity and the need for a strong hand ruling. As time passes the memory of the malfunctioning of the communist system fades and as the economic, political and ideological chaos mounts it becomes increasingly plausible to present the crisis of Russia as the result of Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's attempts to Westernize: all the more so since Yeltsin's declaration of Russia's independence actually triggered the demise of the Soviet Union. The likelihood of such a scenario increases as it is consistent with the aspirations of strong interest groups such as the military-industrial complex.

It seems as if Russia is on a route comparable to the one in Germany after the First World War under the Weimar Republic, where interplay between hurt pride, economic and political chaos and a mounting public disorder undermined a weakly founded democracy.

If a Russian anti-Western nationalist revival gains momentum a negative dialectic between the West and Russia is likely to develop (see Figure 2 in

Chapter 4). A Russian nationalist revival will imply greater room for ma-
noeuvre for interest groups with Russian-nationalist inclinations such as the
military-industrial complex. Often the military-industrial complex has been
pursuing policies at odds with a Westernizing Russian government, as was the
case under Gorbachev with the military's independent policy in relation to the
Baltic states, and under Yeltsin's government where the military has con-
tinued to develop and test chemical weapons despite Russia's commitment
not to do so (*Moscow News*, No. 39, 1992: 9; and No. 44 1992: 1, 4). Such
developments will affront the West and increasingly make Westernization
impossible, as Russia's demands for Western assistance and know-how will
not be met. At some point, it seems likely that the stage will be set for an anti-
Western Russian nationalist government to assume power.

For a short while the establishment of order by an authoritarian
communist-Slavophile government might revive the economy. (For which
reason some in the West might even favour this solution.) However, it is not
likely to last long, as this would essentially be a return to the social system
which was functioning extremely inefficiently even under much more favour-
able conditions than now. Such a government is therefore unlikely to be able
to fulfil the aspirations even of the ethnic Russian population, and it will be at
odds with the Westernizers and the 17 per cent (1989) of the population who
are non-ethnic Russians. The economy is likely to deteriorate further under
the pressure of an overgrown state sector, massive public funding of private
industries, hyperinflation and mounting social tensions. A new round of
growing tensions between the social system and society seems likely. This
might at some point set the stage for a further division of Russia into smaller
states.

In sum, a functioning relationship between the state-social system and
society does not seem to be likely for many years. The prospect for the ex-
Soviet Union seems to be Latin Americanisation, characterised by military
governments or governments where the military-industrial complex is domi-
nant, chronic inflation, mass impoverishment and pervasive domestic vio-
lence. One specific Russian feature would be the size of the military-industrial
complex. Even amidst economic and political collapse, a large part of the
military is likely to be able to continue partly due to its ability to create some
order around itself, partly because the military has its own system of supply
and will be able to get hard currency through arms sales. Another specific
feature would be a large stock of highly educated scientists seeking untraditio-
nal ways of making a living. The result will be a high degree of individual
insecurity but probably also social anomie, a loss of sense of direction, and
thereby generally societal insecurity with large parts of society defining
themselves in anti-Western terms.

6.5.2. *Ukraine*

Smooth progress towards Europeanisation soon came to an end once inde-
pendence was achieved. At that point it was no longer possible to point to an
external cause, i.e. Ukraine's integration in the Soviet Union, as the main
reason for Ukraine's *malaise*. The disintegration of the COMECON system

hit Ukraine very hard, especially the diminished supply of energy from Russia and the fact that Ukraine had to pay for deliveries in hard currency. Furthermore, having obtained independence, Ukraine had to give attention to changing its own social system. Those with vested interests in keeping important elements of the old system gained support, as did the communist-Slavic layers in society calling on the state to take care of firms and individuals. Cleavages along ethnic lines have begun to develop; at the time of independence, only about a third of the officers based in Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians, the rest mainly ethnic Russians (Foye, 1992: 58). President Kravchuk won most of the Russian officers over by assuring them that they would not be discriminated against if they accepted Ukrainian citizenship. However, the Ukrainian Army Officers Union has conducted a successful campaign to shift the composition of the officer corps in favour of ethnic Ukrainians. And as regards nuclear-free and neutral status, the official position now is that Ukraine will give up its nuclear weapons only if the West provides Ukraine with security guarantees. Unofficially, quite a few Ukrainian experts on security state the view that Ukraine should remain a nuclear power, because only a nuclear power is taken seriously in international politics (Foye, 1992; Lodgaard, 1992).

At present several political projects are competing for the post-communist social system, all claiming to be the saviour of the Ukrainian nation. None of them seems, however, to be able to muster enough support to carry the transformation through to a viable social system. After independence, the president, the ex-Brezhnevite, Kravchuk, pursued a reform course the reality of which was authoritarian and communist in that it kept key elements of the old system while trying to integrate elements of the Western model. This half way-house solution has increasingly put the Ukrainian economy into the red and put Kravchuk under pressure. Unfortunately there is no strong democratic movement which can take over. So the tension between society and state is likely to continue for some time. Like the Russians, the Ukrainians' self-perception is far removed from reality; the Ukrainians like to compare themselves to the French. However, considering the fact that for more than seventy years the Ukrainian nation has been interwoven with a communist state, in many aspects a more appropriate comparison would be a large Third World state. Given this discrepancy and the fact that government policy will have to deal with the harsh realities, it will be difficult to get widespread public approval for any policy. The final outcome of the interaction between state and society is very much dependent on factors at present unknown. What will be the reaction of the Ukrainian population if there is mounting hostility between Russia and Ukraine? Will it push Ukrainian society as a whole towards opting for a Western identity and a thorough transformation of the social system? Or will the ethnic Russians side with their fellow kinsmen in Russia? What will the reaction of the West be if there is increasing tension between Ukraine and Russia?

6.5.3. Caucasia and Central Asia

The independence of the states in the area triggered a further escalation of the armed conflict. Having been the frequent historical battleground for fighting between various civilisations, there is a copious stock of myths among the various ethnic groups about the need to fight for survival. Since ecological disasters, rapidly increasing populations, inflexible political structures and economic decay plague these new states, a further strengthening of malign nationalism seems at hand. The civil war in Afghanistan has spread to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These circumstances, plus the fact that these weak states are surrounded by states with very different interests (see Chapter 7), makes it likely that for most or maybe all of these new states a functioning relationship between social system and society is unlikely to emerge. They are likely to be characterised by high levels of both state and societal insecurity for a very long time to come. This will also affect the surrounding states, especially Russia, by increasing the number of Russian migrants, smuggling of drugs and arms. The Russian army will have no difficulty in making itself useful as the guardian of Russian interests.

6.5.4. Likely implications for Europe

If the Yeltsin reform process is successful, the specific features of the new state will be an overgrown military-industrial complex and a weakly founded democracy. This makes it likely to be a difficult partner in European politics, but poses much smaller problems than would emerge if the reform process were to fail.

The East Central European states would be among the first to experience the effects of a breakdown of Westernization in Russia. At present production of energy in Russia is rapidly dwindling and is only likely to increase if Westernization continues. As the transformation of East Central European states is extremely uncertain, a further economic downturn in Russia is likely to have a domino effect on several of the states in East Central Europe. Most of these states are still heavily dependent on supplies, especially energy, from the former Soviet Union and they will be adversely affected by increasing numbers of immigrants, criminal and semi-criminal activities, the availability of arms and drugs, and the spill-over from ecological disasters in the former Soviet Union. Even Hungary might be a victim if an economic collapse of Russia comes on top of the adverse effects of a continued war in former-Yugoslavia.

The EC will no doubt try to fence off the negative consequences of such developments. This will, however, be very difficult given the character of the threats and the fact that the border is long and has many weak intermediate states. Therefore, it seems likely that Western Europe will be affected too, accelerating several adverse tendencies which are already visible now.

Implications for public order. In Russia reported crime was up 18 per cent in 1991 and is expected to reach 30 to 35 per cent in 1992 (*International Herald Tribune*, 31 August 1992: 1). The production and use of drugs is rapidly increasing (*Moscow News*, No. 43, 1992: 13; and No. 46, 1992: 16). In West

European states there is a rapid increase in the reported crime committed by Russians and East Europeans ranging from the smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol and refugees to nuclear material and more traditional Mafia-style crime such as prostitution, robbery and murder. In 1992 the German police investigated more than a hundred cases of smuggling of nuclear material from ex-COMECON countries, up from twenty-nine in 1991 (*International Herald Tribune*, 30 November 1992: 1). If an economic, political and ideological collapse were to occur, it seems beyond doubt that there would be a major boost to the whole range of criminal activity by Russians and Central Europeans.

The economic consequences would first of all affect Germany, the EC state with by far the largest investments and trade with Russia and Central Europe. However, the rest of the EC will be affected too, both directly and indirectly through the effects that a weakening of Germany's economy would have on the rest of Europe, and in terms of increased outlays on policing and refugees.

Political implications. The diminished economic weight of Germany and the growing threat from outside could be factors which would make EC integration easier and this might contribute to raising the funds necessary to help the transformation in the East. However, this will take a long time and it presupposes that the political agenda in the EC is not dominated by the interests of the extreme right. According to a Western prognosis, barring economic catastrophes and wars, Western Europe might have to deal with about 13 million immigrants from the East over the next decade; about 4 million from East Central Europe and 6 million from the ex-Soviet republics plus 3 million ethnic Germans going to Germany (*The Economist*, 28 November 1992: 79). As avoiding economic catastrophes and armed conflict seems likely to be just a pious hope if there is a collapse in the East, these figures might be far too low. And if, added to immigrants coming from other parts of the world and maybe refugees from a continued war in former Yugoslavia, the stage is set for a major boost to the extreme right wing in Western Europe, then the malign nationalism in the East could feed into the West triggering malign Western nationalism. Oil producers like Iran would get increased influence in states like Ukraine and Armenia as an alternative source of energy.

Environmental implications. There will be no money for coping with the ecological disaster left over from the communist system (Feshback and Friendly, 1992) and the ecocide in the former communist states is likely to continue, though perhaps decreasingly due to the economic slow-down. By December 1992 one reactor at Chernobyl was operating and another was about to be started up again, despite the fact that the plant is considered highly unsafe. But acute lack of electric power has overruled security concerns. One of the major – but so far much underestimated – sources of environmental damage, the military-industrial complex, is likely to continue its pollution of the environment.

Military implications. Having grown up with 'correlation of forces' as a key concept (Lider, 1986; Vigor, 1975), the Russian military is unlikely to go to war with the West without extreme provocation. But there will be many indirect conflicts, e.g. the Russian military may assist third parties confronting

the West, such as the Serbs. Furthermore, the international market will continue to be flooded with cheap, sophisticated weapons and sensitive know-how, one of the few areas where Russian products are competitive (Zagorski, 1992). Yet another arms exporter will be added, which – like China – is willing to disregard international agreements on restrictions of arms sales. Ukraine and Slovakia might also enter this business on a large scale.

Societal security. Overall, the combined effects of a breakdown of Westernization in Russia is likely to be a considerable threat to societal security in Western Europe. It is probable that West European self-identification will be strengthened if the Russians and some of the Central Europeans again assume their old role as a negative reference point. But it seems likely that the destabilising effects of a collapse will be dominant. The threat posed to societal security in Western Europe is not only due to a major increase in the number of immigrants, but also in terms of draining the EC of resources needed to deal with the construction of a viable political order in Western Europe where both nations and a Europe-wide structure gain stability and legitimacy. A collapse in the former Soviet Union is a threat to societal security in the same way as German unification was a threat to societal security in Germany, because of the cost in resources and increasing tensions between various groups in society. Dealing with new conflicts and challenges from the East is also likely to lead to political tensions within the EC, as – for instance – France, Britain and Germany react differently.

The analysis above presumes a continuation of Western policies and a similar level of commitment as in the first year of Yeltsin's government. These external conditions make the transformation of Russia as difficult and politically hazardous as the reshaping of Germany after the First World War. It might be possible to avoid a collapse in the East if the West launches a large-scale Marshall Plan encompassing the former Soviet Union and East Central Europe. (Lemaitre, 1993; Cassen, 1992). This would give the former communist states a better chance to transform their social system in the same way as Germany after the Second World War. But so far there has not been much interest in the West and, as time passes, it will become increasingly difficult to implement it.

In Part I of this book, threats to societal security were analysed from five sectors: military, political, economic, environmental and societal. The analysis of societal security in relation to the former Soviet Union points to the importance of the functioning of the social system as a whole for the prospects for societal security.

Note

1 Information on the status of the article in Russia, given in a letter from Mikhail Kozhokin to Kristian Gerner, December 1991.

Chapter 7
Europe and the Middle East: drifting towards societal cold war?
Barry Buzan and B.A. Roberson

This chapter examines the security relationship between Europe and the Middle East. Its purpose is to compare European perceptions of threat from the Middle East, and more broadly from Islam, with the realities, and to link these perceptions into societal insecurity in Europe. It is less concerned with threats from Europe to the Middle East because these lie beyond the scope of this book. By the term 'Middle East' we refer to the Arab world plus Iran, Israel and Ethiopia: the area of the Middle Eastern security complex (Buzan, 1991a: chap. 5). Turkey is exclusively neither Middle Eastern nor European, and currently sits as an insulator between these two civilisational areas.

The chapter starts by examining European perceptions of threat from the Middle East. It then sets these into the historical context of relations between the two regions, arguing that the Cold War substantially restricted and distorted a longstanding interplay between them. The chapter ends with an assessment of actual or likely security threats emanating from the Middle East to Europe. The argument is that most European threat perceptions about the Middle East and Islam are exaggerated; but that there are some real, or at least politically usable, grounds for concern about societal security.

7.1. Perceptions of threat

There is an active and growing perception in Europe of a threat from the Middle East. Alarmist statements appear regularly in the media, and the issue is firmly planted in national and European Community political agendas. The headline 'Europe braced for migrant invasion' (*The European*, May 10–12, 1991) reports a European Commission study focusing on the migration implications of the population explosion in the high birthrate countries bordering the southern Mediterranean. This is accompanied by stories of tens of thousands of Third World migrants being turned back from Europe's borders and hurried moves by European Community member states to strengthen immigration controls. The *International Herald Tribune* (30 December 1991) reports 500,000 people per year applying for status as political refugees, raising

questions not only about humanitarian policies and welfare resources, but also about 'how countries that have never thought of themselves as ethnic melting pots can preserve their national identities'. Liberal policies towards political refugees are under sustained pressure in most EC countries. This is especially so in Germany where exceptionally generous provisions have led to a much larger inflow than elsewhere, with the resulting social crisis becoming so grave that the foreign minister argued that immigration was threatening German democracy (*The Economist*, 19 September 1992: 52). The suspicion that many would-be asylum seekers are economic migrants is amplified by the knowledge that the pool of such migrants potentially contains several billion people. In combination with the end of ideological confrontation, this is creating a strong demand to apply much more stringent criteria, and much less generous administrative procedures, to applicants for political asylum. In relation to the Middle East, *The Economist* (1 June 1991) notes: 'Exploding populations plus stagnant economies will force more and more North Africans to get to Europe by fair means or foul', and 'the Arab countries of the Mediterranean seaboard will have 100m more mouths than they can feed by the year 2000'. *Le Monde* reports on the illegal transportation of Africans across the Straits of Gibraltar, noting that about four hundred people have already perished attempting to get into Europe by this route (Bole-Richard, 1992: 14).

The news stories that come out of the Middle East mostly feature threatening images: Islamic fanatics preaching hatred of the West (Iran, Lebanon); terrorists displaying contempt for human rights and civilised values (Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Israel/Palestine); brutal dictators flushed with oil money, hungry for weapons, often eager to acquire the chemical and nuclear technologies for mass destruction, and showing no hesitation about resort to violence both domestically and internationally (Iraq, Libya, Iran under the Shah, Syria); anti-democratic feudal elites awash with cash, ruling small populations and balancing hypocritically between Western decadence and Islamic self-righteousness (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates); and Muslim masses and leaders keen to establish Islamic states some of whose laws and practices affront secular Western standards of civilisation (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, Libya). These stories play to a European audience possessing a historically impressive and currently active record of racism and xenophobia (Heitmeyer, 1991; Hassner, 1991) The backdrop to them is Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the vast transfers of cash that the oil trade has poured into what would otherwise be an unremarkable collection of Third World countries.

As well as portraying the Middle East as an alien, hostile and backward place, these images focus attention on the substantial immigrant communities from the Middle East already established in Europe. Immigration issues empower right-wing movements in France (against Arabs) and in Germany (against Turks and others). In Britain, the public burning of books and support for the call to kill Salman Rushdie appear to link local Islamic extremists with those in Iran, giving the impression that the immigrant community is a cultural fifth column doing the bidding of foreign anti-Western forces. (In the Balkans and the Central Asian republics, there are of

course very old established Islamic communities, most of them Turkic, but some, most notably in Albania and Bosnia, stemming from local European populations converted during the period of Ottoman rule.)

Responses to the problem of immigration control in the form of greatly increased cooperation and information exchanges on policing, visa controls and asylum policies are already under way in the negotiations among the parties to the Schengen Agreement (concerning the abolition of border controls among some EC members). In addition, there is TREVI, one of the working parties set up by the EPC to deal with internal security matters that are outside EC jurisdiction. One of the four TREVI working groups is trying to coordinate police activities after borders are opened. Uncertainty over the future of the deepening process following the crisis over Maastricht raises questions over where responsibility for immigration control will be located. The Maastricht Treaty itself includes fairly comprehensive provisions on legal cooperation and internal matters, and looks towards greater cooperation on asylum policy, external border control, immigration, and legal and police cooperation, (on Schengen and TREVI, see Chapter 8, pp. 163–4).

Given that Europe is vastly more powerful and better integrated than the Middle East, the idea that the Middle East poses a threat to Europe seems at best highly exaggerated. When viewed through the lens of societal security, however, a potentially more plausible vision of threat comes into focus. As the media reports cited above suggest, the potential migration of large numbers of ethnically and culturally different peoples into Europe generates fears that are easy to mobilise using the language of security (Wæver, forthcoming).

A combination of contemporary and historical conditions may conspire to make Europe receptive to a perception of threat from the Middle East. As Edward Mortimer argues there are deeply-rooted folk memories in Europe about the long and bloody battle between Christianity and Islam as rival and mutually exclusive civilisations (1991: 10–13) Whether real as memories or not, this history can be revived as a political resource by anti-immigrant interests. In parts of the Balkans these memories are politically active, though as the tragedy in Yugoslavia suggests, no more so than the even longer-standing tensions between Catholic and Orthodox Christians. Fear of Islam can easily be connected to the continued adjacency of Europe and the Turkic and Arab peoples who remain its primary carriers, and such fears are amplified by rising concern about tensions between the developed West and the poor Third World. They can be made to resonate with the revival of Islamic extremism, which itself links easily to fears about existing immigrant communities and potential 'invasions' of alien migrants. Political sensitivity to migration can be amplified by appeal both to naked racism and to concern over high long-term levels of unemployment in Europe. Some Islamic extremists happily play into this game because the attention it focuses on them flatters their significance with their own audiences.

Against this view it can be argued that folk myths about the struggle with Islam are only strong in the Iberian, Eastern European and Balkan countries that bore the brunt of Arab and Ottoman invasions; that migrant workers (as opposed to immigrants) are a beneficial and largely controllable phenomenon

(see Chapter 8); and that the construction of Islam as a threat does not serve anything like the same set of domestic political interests that coalesced against communism after the Second World War. All of these points have weight, yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Europe is nevertheless in many ways politically receptive to the construction of an Islamic threat on the societal level. Pragmatically, there is the fact that right-wing parties and media in several countries have found the issue a valuable resource, usually to play a nationalist game, as in France and Germany.

More symbolically, Mortimer (1991: 10–13; 1992: 35) points to Europe's need for an alien threat to replace the role of communism in supporting its social and political identity. This perspective raises deep and difficult questions about the extent to which political communities need (or at least want) external threats in order to maintain their internal coherence. For these purposes the symbolic value of threats may be more important than their concrete reality. Europe has been living with the communist threat for a long time, and its sudden removal unquestionably leaves a political vacuum. It is conceivable that the European process can continue without the stimulus of an external threat. But it is also conceivable that the absence of a threat will become a problem for the integration process, removing an important element of motivation and cohesion that it requires, and strengthening the impulse towards fragmentation. In this case, invoking a kind of societal cold war between Europe and Islam could be attractive to some as a way of attempting to restore cohesion and reinforce an emergent European-level socio-political identity. The crisis over weak public support for Maastricht could increase the attractiveness of this strategy.

There are other candidates for this role of useful threatener, but all of them have severe limitations as unifying symbols for Europe. One is the prospect of instability in the former Soviet empire. But so long as the question of Europe's eastern boundary remains open, Russia and others cannot be treated as a major threat without splitting the EC. The open casting of Germany as a threat is more likely to wreck the European project than to support it, a fact that anti-Europeans such as Mrs Thatcher try to exploit. Appeal to the threat of American-Japanese economic competition could serve, but would threaten the immensely valuable and hard-won cohesion of the OECD states and the GATT regime. Compared with the alternatives, the Islamic threat has fewer drawbacks even if it is less real.

Smith (1992: 62–76) points to the Islamic option with his argument that the European project lacks a coherent myth of collective identity, that its own history does not offer any easy remedy and that the integration project is fundamentally flawed and fragile without the presence of a 'durable and resonant collective cultural identity'. He concludes by pointing to the danger that this problem will be solved by resort to a 'reactive' identity against the Third World, involving economic exclusion, cultural differentiation and possibly cultural and racial exclusion.

Looked at from the societal perspective, then, the idea of a security threat to Europe from the Middle East is certainly real enough to be exaggerated into political significance. But how objectively real is this threat? Are the security interactions between Europe and the Middle East strong enough to

suggest the formation of a new security complex embracing both of them? Can a security complex be constructed in the societal sector? Or do security relations in Europe and the Middle East constitute essentially distinct formations, each defined much more by what goes on within itself, than by interaction between them?

7.2. The Middle East and Europe: connections and disconnections

To answer these questions, it helps to take a long view. In historical terms there is much that links the two areas. For nearly a thousand years between Alexander the Great's empire and the fall of Rome, much of what we now call Europe and the Middle East were part of a single political system dominated by a Hellenistic culture. For nearly another thousand years, from the beginning of the eighth century to the end of the seventeenth, Christian Europe and the Islamic world were locked into a bitter military struggle: as late as 1683, Ottoman armies laid siege to Vienna. But by the nineteenth century, stagnating Ottoman power allowed increasing European penetration into the Middle East, and from the turn of the century, oil became an important factor in European interests in the area, particularly in the Gulf. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, meant the dismemberment of its Arab components into League of Nations' mandates and protectorates. This semi-colonial period, though brief, shattered any hope of Arab or Islamic unity by laying the foundations for a mosaic of separate states in the region.

Despite the long history of interlinkage, what emerged after the European withdrawal from the Middle East was two quite distinct security complexes. The European complex, having exhausted itself in two world wars, succumbed to overlay by the United States and the Soviet Union (see Buzan *et al.*, 1990: Chap. 3). Simultaneous with the rise of superpower influence, indigenous forces within the Middle East striving to expel remaining 'imperial' footholds resulted in a steady decline in the European presence in the region. Britain remained the dominant external power in the region up until 1956, but the increasing penetration of American oil companies and influence (especially after the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953), the humiliation of Britain and France by the United States at Suez, and the expulsion of France from Algeria in 1962, greatly weakened Europe's position in the region. British influence in the Gulf remained substantial until its unilateral withdrawal for economic reasons in the early 1970s. Intervention in the Middle East thereafter became increasingly the province of the United States and the Soviet Union, though their presence was nothing like as dominating as it was in Europe, and certainly did not overlay the region's intense indigenous security dynamics. Between 1956 and 1991, the Europeans' strategic role in the area was largely as allies of the United States, usually supporting its basic goals, but often critical on methods. American hegemony protected European interests in oil, and did not prevent a lucrative trade in arms.

Except for these oil and arms ties with Europe, plus some residual cultural and political links, the post-independence Middle East quickly formed its own

security complex. The Arab League founded in 1944–5 quickly grew to encompass nearly twenty-one states stretching from the Atlantic coast of North Africa to the Arabian Sea. Within this grouping, shared Arab identity and Islamic religion provided a politico-cultural forum within which intense, inward-looking regional security dynamics soon developed. Pan-Arab nationalism and Islam created transnational political linkages across the whole complex providing an endless source of justifications for interventions, alliances, rivalries and wars.

With so many members and so many cross-cutting issues and interests, the volatile internal security dynamics of the Middle Eastern complex quickly acquired Byzantine complexity. The battle of virtually all the Arabs against Israel provided a central focus for the whole complex from a very early date and generated a series of short but intense wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1978, 1982). Other sub-complexes also formed within the region, also usually focused on the non-Arab states embedded in the region (Israel, Iran, Ethiopia). In the Gulf, a triangular rivalry among Iran (Islamic but not Arab), Saudi Arabia and Iraq developed soon after the British announcement of the intention to withdraw from the region in the late 1960s, with Syria and Egypt as peripheral players. This sub-complex almost rivalled the Arab–Israeli one in significance, and generated the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s, and the major intervention in 1990–1 to oust Iraq from Kuwait. In the Horn of Africa, a messy sub-complex of civil and international wars focused on Sudan, Ethiopia (non-Islamic) and Somalia. In the Maghreb, a less intense sub-complex was defined by rivalries amongst Morocco, Algeria and Libya, and incorporating Tunisia. This did not generate any major wars, though it did fuel a long succession struggle in the former Spanish Sahara. These sub-complexes had distinct local dynamics of their own, but all were caught up in, and penetrated by, the larger Arab and Islamic dynamics that made the Middle East a distinct regional security complex in its own right. Allies for one purpose might be enemies for another, and the domestic instabilities of most of the new states amplified their sensitivity to international relations. As in any security complex, the patterns of amity and enmity *within* the region dominated security relations and concerns.

The dynamics of the Cold War overlay in Europe and those of decolonisation and independence in the Middle East tended to turn the two regions in on themselves, reducing their political and strategic, though not economic, interaction with each other. The strategic detachment of Europe and the Middle East was also helped by the role of Turkey which became an insulator between the two regions. Cut off from other Turkic nations by the Soviet Union, and drawn into NATO because of its strategic vulnerability to Soviet power, Turkey was largely absorbed into the European complex. Being Islamic, but not Arab, being firmly committed to a secular state, being the former imperial power in the Middle East, and having no desire to tie itself to the conflict and backwardness of its neighbours to the south and east, Turkey had plenty of reasons to stand aloof from the Middle East. Like Russia, Turkey brings into sharp political focus the question of where Europe's eastern border should be located. This continues a very long period of

ambivalence between Europe and the Ottoman Empire in which the latter was part of the European system for balance of power purposes, but not part of European international society (Gong, 1984: 106–19; Watson, 1992: 177, 188, 217–18, 259).

In the period between decolonisation and the end of the Cold War, the Middle East thus consolidated itself as a distinct and largely self-contained security complex. The post-Ottoman legacy of fragmentation into separate states took its particular form from the workings of European imperialism, though in some aspects it also reflected pre-Ottoman patterns of political organisation (notably Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, Morocco, though neither Iran nor Ethiopia were part of the Ottoman Empire). When added to a host of political and religious rivalries within the region, fragmentation ensured that independence would bring intense and sustained regional conflict. Some of this conflict drew in competitive Cold War interventions by the superpowers, but the strength of the regional dynamics was illustrated by the Iran–Iraq war, which was almost wholly independent from Cold War influence. For better or for worse, by the late twentieth century, the modern Middle East had established itself largely independently from the military and political security concerns of Europe, though oil and the arms trade provided a powerful security linkage in the economic sector.

7.3. The ending of the Cold War and its consequences

Events since the late 1980s have begun to reshape perceptions and relations across the Mediterranean. The ending of the Cold War and the subsequent implosion of Soviet power have affected regional and inter-regional relations almost everywhere, and those between Europe and the Middle East are no exception. The freeing of Transcaucasia and Central Asia added six new states to the Islamic world, and created a new zone of eight states lying between Russia on the one side, and Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and China on the other. The new pattern of security relations in these two areas is not yet clear, but the withdrawal of Soviet power has set the new stage, whatever the play may turn out to be.

As argued in Chapter 6, the three small Transcaucasian states, possibly joined by some breakaway tribal republics, may form a miniature buffer complex, separating Russia from the Middle East. The violent inter-state and intra-state conflicts in this region have already drawn in Turkey and Iran as competing sources of influence and support, and Russia still has an interest despite its own internal disarray. Teheran made a sustained but unsuccessful effort to obtain a cease-fire in the Armenian–Azerbaijani war, and Turkey has found itself divided on the question of intervention. In spite of the cordial relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and an old and bitter hatred between Armenians and Turks, Ankara has remained almost neutral and appealed to the international community to stop the war. When leaders of the opposition 'Motherland' party demanded intervention in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan Prime Minister Demirel warned that this might prove counterproductive: 'We are not indifferent to the sufferings of the Azerbaijanis . . . but one step too many by Turkey would put the whole world

behind Armenia' (Fuller, 1992). Armenian military success later caused Ankara to lend covert military support to the Azerbaijanis (*Newsweek*, 20 July 1992). Demirel is aware of the danger that open Turkish engagement could spread the fighting into Turkey's own troubled Kurdish regions, and has no desire to jeopardise the country's prospects of closer integration with the EC. Thus although the security dynamics unfolding in Transcaucasia are quite vicious, they seem likely to remain largely contained within the region.

In Central Asia, Turkey, Iran and Russia are also the main players. This new region has barely found its feet, and most of its states are preoccupied with internal problems. There is as yet insufficient independent security dynamic in the region to call this a security complex, and Russian penetration is still strong, especially in Kazakhstan. Iran has conducted a general religious campaign, tried to establish economic and logistic links and has attempted to secure political alliances in the Central Asian republics (especially after the fall of the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan). The Islamic economic community (ECO) was revitalised and enlarged with the post-Soviet Central Asian republics and Turkmenistan was offered treaties for gas delivery and the construction of rail facilities through Iranian territory.

In competing for influence in these two new regions Iran and Turkey have been hampered both by their weak economies and by the complex patterns of religious, linguistic and ethnic identities. Turkey has the model of a successful transition from a centrally planned to a free market economy, and when the new states of Central Asia and Transcaucasia began linking up with international political and economic networks Turkey was their favoured contact. The loose grouping of 'Black Sea' states that met in June 1992 included the three Transcaucasian states as well as Turkey and Russia, but not Iran. By maintaining strict secularisation Turkey is more likely to inspire the Muslim republics in which only small groups have felt attracted to the Khomeini revolution. After decades of Soviet conformity the populations of Central Asia and Transcaucasia want Western-style consumer goods and TV transmissions from Turkey. Turkish officials have stressed the ties of language and cultural traditions with Azerbaijan and the more distant 'cousins' in Central Asia. But connections with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan will probably be based less on feelings of Turkic solidarity (Slav or Arab solidarity was never strong either) or security considerations, and more on trade and investment. Since Turkey lacks capital, this opportunity reinforces its desire for closer linkage with the EC.

Within the Middle East itself, the retreat of Soviet power deprived several states, most notably Syria, of a major external ally and turned off the superpower competition that had helped to amplify arms racing and rivalry in the region. Up to the end of 1991, it seemed at first to leave the United States in a commanding position as the dominant external power in the region. This impression was much inflated by the war against Iraq, which demonstrated American capability and will to enforce its views in the region. The United States seemed to be tied into the Middle East both by its concern for the world oil market, and by its commitment to Israel. While Soviet power was one threat to the supply of cheap oil, there were enough threats from within the region to sustain security concerns. The durability of the US commitment

to Israel depends on the nature of its basic interest. If it was primarily as a strategic foothold, then the disappearance of the Soviet Union will alter the commitment. If it is based on some more high-minded precept like supporting democracy, freedom or the Jewish people, then the disappearance of the Soviet Union won't change much. Israel was always threatened by Arab, not Soviet, power.

But by 1992 permanent major reductions in US forces in Europe and Asia were under way. Large contraction of US military forces was being planned, with resulting uncertainties about the future of the country's capability to project massive conventional force overseas at short notice. Without the spur of the communist threat and with the rising urgency of domestic economic and social problems, there emerged a possibility that the United States would begin to move towards a more normal Great Power role in the international system, taking the lead only if it was both followed and militarily and financially supported. So long as no serious military threat arose from the ashes of the Soviet Union, the winding down of American commitment to, and forces in, Europe seemed likely to continue, raising a small but growing question mark over its ability to intervene in the Middle East with the same ease as previously. But the US interest in oil, reinforced both by a lax domestic energy policy and by the intervention against Iraq, remained a declared strategic concern. This interest seemed durable, despite the fact that the Middle East is further away from the United States than it is from Europe or Japan, and that both of them are more dependent on its oil than is the United States. So long as the United States perceives itself in global terms and treats oil as a strategic issue, then distance is not a factor and it will retain a force structure enabling it to fight wars at long range.

For the European Community, the question looming on the horizon was what role it would play in the Middle East now that it was free from the pressures of the Cold War? The answer to this question depended not only on developments in the Middle East, and the durability and focus of American engagement there, but also on the nature of Europe itself. If integration triumphed, then the EC would become a single powerful actor in relation to the Middle East. But if fragmentation held sway, then the way would be open for messier and more competitive relations between the European powers and the states of the Middle East. In terms of security complex theory, the future seemed to point to a relationship between higher and lower level complexes (see Buzan, 1991a: chap. 5). Either way, the outcome would be not unlike the relationship between the United States and Latin America, or China and Southeast Asia, where a Great Power (or powers) sits adjacent to a peripheral regional complex.

Under any plausible scenario, Europe's engagement with the Middle East is likely to return to historically more normal levels, requiring a political engagement more proportional to the economic one. Europe remains dependent on oil from the Middle East. Continued American presence will for some time yet save Europe from having to take the lead on either oil security questions or the vexed question of Israel. On the basis of past behaviour, a shift towards more European and less American influence in the region would probably work to the disadvantage of Israel, which has had no strong backers

among the leading European powers since France changed sides in 1967. The European powers have no strategic interest in Israel, are not pressured by a strong domestic Jewish lobby, and have traditions and trade interests that favour good relations with the Arab world. It is interesting to note that the emigration of Jews from the ex-Soviet Union to Israel, by exacerbating the problem of Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, could be playing a significant role in the Arab–Israeli struggle.

But Europe will have to do more than continue as America's willing subaltern in the region. Propinquity puts the Middle East generally, and North Africa in particular, firmly within Europe's sphere, and Europeans will have to decide to what extent, and in what way, they wish to become responsible for maintaining order in the region (Mortimer, 1992: 35–46). In some ways, European involvement in the Gulf patrols during the Iran–Iraq war, and even more so in the military action against Iraq, foreshadows these questions of future responsibility. Although easy to see as confirming American primacy in the Middle East, these events may in retrospect come to look more like the beginnings of a larger European role. Many shadows of the past remain and are taking on new life. It was Britain, France and to a lesser extent Italy that took the main roles in the Lebanon and in the second Gulf War, just as they had the main roles in the Middle East before decolonisation. And it is Germany that now has the main connection to Turkey, just as it did towards the end of the nineteenth century, and also with Iran. Whether the Middle East could help to develop European integration by presenting it with a common foreign policy problem, or whether the still fragile institutions of European political cooperation might break down from overload, is an open question. As the disarray over Yugoslavia and the crisis over Maastricht show, there is still a long way to go in the development of an effective European foreign policy.

7.4. Myths and realities of threats from the Middle East to Europe

This global overview brings us back to the opening question of reality versus myth in European security perceptions of the Middle East. The main question is how perceptions of threat in Europe line up with actual threats from south to north across the boundary between the two complexes. We will examine this question in terms of the five sectors of security: military, political, economic, environmental and societal.

In the *military sector*, security complex theory suggests that both perceptions and realities of threat should be low, especially in the direction of the less powerful (lower level complex) to the more powerful (higher level) one. Broadly speaking, this remains the case, though there is doubtless some atavistic fear of Islam in Europe, and Saddam Hussein has done much to reinforce the image of an aggressive, expansionist Arab potential. Although there are some substantially equipped military powers in the Middle East, they are fully preoccupied with threats from other Middle Eastern states. The second Gulf War demonstrated the chronic political fragmentation of the region and the intensity of its local rivalries, both of which serve to protect Europe from military threats. Only a united Arab or Islamic force could pose

a serious military challenge to Europe, and there is no prospect of such a development within the foreseeable future. The poor performance of Arab armies both against tiny Israel and each other, not to mention Saddam Hussein's hollow threat of 'the mother of all battles' also points to serious limitations on what even a unified Islamic force could do to threaten Europe. Even nuclear proliferation within the Middle East, which is a distinct though by no means certain possibility in the medium term, does not pose serious threats to Europe. The spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would greatly intensify the fears and rivalries within the region. Its principal effect would be to reinforce the inward-focused security dynamic of the Middle Eastern complex, possibly even extending the complex into South Asia. Parts of Europe might come within range of Middle Eastern nuclear arsenals, just as the Soviet Union came within range of Israeli delivery systems. A nuclear-ised Middle East would be strongly placed to resist external military inter-vention, but it would have little reason to threaten Europe and no hope of achieving meaningful military superiority.

But while the direct military threat to Europe is low, Europe could well be threatened by the outcomes of military conflicts within the Middle East. Here the two Gulf Wars are instructive, hinged as they were on fears that one state might get control over the bulk of the region's oil resources. Few of the region's state boundaries have deep roots. Its impressive historical tradition of five millennia is wholly dominated by the waxing and waning of large conglomerate empires created and held together by military power (Mann, 1986: chaps 3, 5, 6, 8). Another military bid for hegemony over oil would be a serious threat to Europe. The United States might continue to take the lead on this issue, but if it withdrew, then Europe would be confronted with the hard choice between mounting its own intervention, or taking a more Japanese view that whoever holds the oil will still need to sell it. It is worth noting, however, that Japan is investing in a massive expansion of civil nuclear power, hoping to use the controversial fast breeder technology to increase the nuclear share of electricity generation in its economy from 25 to 45 per cent (*Guardian Weekly*, 19 April 1992; *The Economist*, 18 April 1992). The evolution of European relations with Russia, which also controls large oil and gas resources, could profoundly affect which way this question was answered.

Likewise in the *political sector*, whatever atavistic fears of direct aggression may exist in Europe are not supported by the contemporary facts. A resur-gent Islam may be viewed by some Europeans as a threat to Western political values and institutions. To sustain this perception there is the tempting parallel to be drawn of Islam as the new torchbearer for anti-Westernism to replace the defeated communist challenge. But this parallel is inapt. Unlike communism, Islam poses no military threat, and its approach to economics is broadly compatible with capitalism. Only the ideological threat even begins to be comparable, and three powerful facts bear against even this.

The first is that there is no will to mount a crusade against the West. The main problem for Islam is to find a way to modernise itself so that it can maintain its integrity and independence against the overwhelming power and influence of the West. The second is that Islam (like Christianity) is so divided

within itself as to be incapable of sustaining a united crusade against the West even if one was wanted. As an individualist religion, encouraging a direct relationship between believers and Allah, Islam is exceptionally prone to fragmentation. It is divided between Sunni and Shi'a factions, and these in turn are divided into many contending theological sub-groups. The coherent relationship between Islam and state power that would be necessary for a political threat also does not exist. Islamic forces and existing state establishments are often opposed to each other, sometimes violently, as most conspicuously in Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Tunisia and increasingly Egypt. Consequently, many Middle Eastern governments are threatened by so-called Islamic fundamentalism, which can in part be seen as a reaction against the failure of nationalist reform movements to achieve modernisation. Even where the state embraces religion, as in Saudi Arabia, the opposition is Islamic (in this case 'fundamentalist'). When Islamic movements do achieve state power, as in Iran, like all revolutionary movements they quickly find themselves bound by the necessities of running a state. Such unity as Islam does provide is cut through by ethnic and political divisions.

The third reason against the plausibility of a political threat to Europe from Islam is that, unlike communism, Islam has almost no power to penetrate Western societies. Communism offered a political ideology that was for a time potentially attractive to large sections of the population within the West. It also offered a demonstrated development model that remained a plausible alternative to capitalism for several decades. Islam has neither of these qualities. Amongst the indigenous populations in the West it has little following and little appeal. It is mostly seen as an anachronistic alien religion, associated with extremism, violence and underdevelopment, and it is more likely to be viewed with contempt than with interest. It is widely (if not always correctly) perceived as being in necessary opposition to such Western values as individualism and human rights. Its more extreme practices, such as mutilation under Sharia law, and the treatment of women as inferior not only reap a sustained bad press, but also underline its culturally alien quality. More broadly, religion itself has a declining appeal in Europe. In sum, Islam has neither the will, the coherence nor the appeal to pose an ideological threat to Europe from within.

In terms of economic ideology, Islam is sufficiently close to Western practice that the question of its posing an alternative, as communism sought to do, scarcely arises as a serious issue. Islamic states may be searching for an Islamic route to development at one level, but they appear to be dealing with their own economies and in their trading relations on fairly pragmatic grounds. They try to have a stable currency, maintain fiscal balances, encourage the private sector, and promote savings and investment. As regards the market economy, Islam is no alien to business. It was founded in a merchant and trading society by a merchant and trader. The Islamic party FIS in Algeria, for example, is reported by *The Economist* (11 January 1992), as being 'an economically liberal party, strongly supported by small businessmen and in favour of private enterprise'. Islamic banking may reject interest, but it is not averse to investment on the basis of shared risk and profit (*The Economist*, 10 April 1992).

In the *economic sector*, the only plausible threat to Europe from the Middle East concerns oil: either attempts to form a suppliers' cartel, or to seize monopoly control, or interruptions to supply because of conflicts in the region. These threats are given reality by past experience. Although currently at a low ebb, they could rise to prominence again once alternative supplies of oil become scarce, or if a new would-be hegemon arises. Such a re-emergence will remain plausible so long as the region continues to enjoy a dominant position in the supply of energy. But this position is itself under threat by developments of new sources of supply, or of new energy technologies (nuclear, solar), or of a switch to other sources of chemical energy (natural gas, methane, hydrogen). As in the military and political sectors, the fragmentation and fractiousness of the Middle East serves Europe's security. Most Middle Eastern suppliers are highly dependent on sales of oil for their own economic welfare and cannot afford sustained disruption of the market. Saudi Arabia could in theory lead a revival of the oil weapon if it became hostile to Europe, but its own position, both domestically and regionally, is so insecure that such a challenge seems highly unlikely, especially after the Iraqi attack on Kuwait. In addition, although the position of Middle Eastern suppliers in the world market remains strong, the potential availability in the medium term of supplies from the successor states to the Soviet Union will weaken any threat to Europe in this sector.

In the *environmental sector*, there is little direct interaction between the two regions. Massive events such as large-scale nuclear war in either would, of course, affect the other, but the prospect of such events is remote. The two regions do not share direct land boundaries or river systems, and are not connected by significant problems of air pollution. The Mediterranean Sea is their main shared environment and is certainly not short of pollution problems. But given the weakness of the circulation system within the Mediterranean, pollution tends to remain localised to its source. Each country pollutes its own coast without much direct effect on countries on the other side. Environmental threats may emerge across the Mediterranean, but they are not yet a significant security issue and show some signs of being a developing area of cooperation. Indirect environmental effects are more plausible. War, water shortage, pollution and overpopulation could all trigger emigration, which brings us to the societal sector.

It is only in the *societal sector* that any real short-term basis for European threat perceptions about the Middle East can be found. As already discussed under political threats above, there is no overarching threat to identity in Europe from Islam itself. If anything the alien quality of Islam serves to reinforce the sense of European distinctiveness (though inasmuch as it acts as a foil for European identity Islam of course reproduces itself as a threat in European eyes). But in relation to both migration and public order, it is, up to a point, possible to justify perceptions of threat as having real substance.

The American experience, although unique because of America's history as a nation of immigrants, illustrates many of the mechanisms that generate this threat:

– unpromising economic prospects for the masses in the poorer society;

- the juxtaposition of a wealthy, low-birthrate society and a poor, high-birthrate one;
- a demand for low-cost labour in the wealthier society;
- politically repressive governments in the poorer society; and
- the presence of an already established migrant community from the poorer society within the wealthier one.

All of these conditions are present between Europe and the Middle East, though it might be argued that the demand for low-cost labour is shrinking in post-industrial economies. A further pressure for migration arises from the prospect of water shortages in the Middle East. This could plausibly be caused both by excess demand on existing resources and by the possibility of a sustained drought arising from the natural cycles of the Sahara desert (shifting northwards instead of southwards). At the very least these factors point to rising stress within the Middle Eastern security complex. The possibility that such stress could trigger large movements of people cannot be ignored. Concern about the impact of any such flow is heightened by the degree of cultural difference between the populations. Compared with the Hispanic migration into the United States, a Middle Eastern one into Europe would be more alien in terms of language, religion and ethnicity.

This threat is not so much one of a great wave as of a steadily rising tide. There is obviously no threat that European populations will be displaced *en masse*, as might conceivably be done by the Arabs to Israel (and is perhaps being done by the Israelis to the Palestinians). As demonstrated by their defensive response to refugee pressure from the Yugoslav crisis, most European states have both the will and the legal, moral, administrative, and if need be coercive, capability to control the flow of legal migration and to prevent illegal mass immigration. But they cannot prevent all illegal immigration, and they can be expected to propagandise optimistically about the effectiveness of the measures they do take. Because immigration control is difficult, especially where resident communities already exist, part of the fear is that the action necessary to minimise it will erode civil liberties and liberal self-perceptions within European society itself (see Chapter 8).

In the short term, the threat from migrants would seem to come in two principal forms: (1) in terms of a distorting impact on European domestic politics favouring the extreme right and generally raising the importance of racial and cultural matters in politics at both national and European level; and (2) in terms of large impacts on specific local communities in which immigrants do seem to 'swamp' a given area or even city. Broadly speaking, right-wing parties defend nationalist views of social and political order. When migration becomes a problem, they seize upon it because they see it as having a deleterious effect on the kind of society they envisage. Working-class people are usually more affected by large migrations because the incoming people are more likely to move into their neighbourhoods and threaten their employment or wage levels. Relatively few migrants move into middle class neighbourhoods, and professionals do not so easily threaten each other's income or job security. Working-class immigrants often have customs, mannerisms and lifestyles which are not only different but difficult for the indigenous population to accept. Where migrants are discriminated against and

deprived of social security and employment, crime can become an outlet for entrepreneurial talent. This aggravates the relationship between migrant communities, the native poor and those on the periphery of these communities. The right wing, and especially the extreme right, naturally seeks to exploit these social difficulties and can use them to tap the wellsprings of racism and xenophobia that lie beneath the surface of even quite liberal societies. This aspect of the societal threat to Europe from the Middle East works not so much directly, except for some local communities, but mostly indirectly, in terms of the political consequences that a sustained concern about immigration pressure will have on Europe's domestic political life. And the Middle East, of course, is not its only source.

The public order question is partly linked to migration (see Chapter 9). Inasmuch as further migration raises communal tensions, public order problems follow naturally. This is a question partly of numbers, partly of class, partly of cultural difference and whether migrants assimilate or ghettoise, partly of location and degrees of concentration, and partly of how much economic opportunity is available and whether the incomers are permanent immigrants or temporary migrant workers. But there is also the issue of terrorism within Europe as a spillover from Middle Eastern turmoil. This threat is a familiar one, and the question is whether it is likely to increase or subside in significance during the coming decade. Ironically, this threat arises from the political fragmentation of the Middle East, which in most other respects broadly serves European security. It should also be noted that even before the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Middle East was not the only, or even the major, source of terrorism in Europe.

The nature of this societal threat makes it difficult to comprehend in the conventional terms of relations between security complexes, which emphasise military and political threats and vulnerabilities. Unless the migration threat becomes so large as to require major civil and military defensive measures, it does not disturb the general characterisation of Europe and the Middle East as separate security complexes. Only if it reached the level of an inter-societal cold war would this conclusion have to be reconsidered. In that case it is likely that military and political relations would already have deteriorated sufficiently to require a redefinition of the boundaries and threat dynamics that define the pattern of security complexes.

7.5. Conclusions

We conclude that by almost any objective measure, military, ideological and energy supply threats to Europe from the Middle East are low. Indeed, if this analysis had been conducted in reverse, looking at threats from Europe to the Middle East, the threat profile would be distinctly more dramatic. There is, however, a potentially real threat in the societal sector arising from migration. This threat is not yet objectively large, but the fact that European societies are so sensitive to it means that it is already politically important. It seems safe to say that if the objective threat grew, the political significance of societal insecurity in Europe would rise at least in proportion, and possibly with a multiplier. Because Europe is so responsive in this sector, it may also

be the case that the political significance of the migration threat could grow within Europe even if the objective threat remained at present levels. The feeling of being 'invaded' by foreigners is already a powerful political resource in several countries. Although this is mostly tapped by minority right-wing parties at the moment, it could become more mainstream if political elites tried to co-opt it as part of a strategy to save a foundering integration project.

Although this outcome is by no means inevitable, the groundwork for it is already under way. By stoking the furnaces of societal insecurity the media and some political leaders continue to lay down the socio-political foundations necessary to support a societal cold war between Europe and the Middle East. In some localities and in some countries there is already a significant and organised political constituency for this rhetoric, and it is therefore likely to remain part of the European political landscape. The use of domestic political racism is constrained by the horrendous memories of its consequences before and during the Second World War. But a pan-European xenophobia directed against the Third World in general and the immediate Middle Eastern periphery in particular, might become attractive to some European elites. This attraction would rise if the integration project was endangered by intra-European fractiousness, itself a looming possibility given the turbulence surrounding Maastricht. Its feasibility would also be helped by moves towards a more closed international economy based on regional trading blocs, a prospect that hangs in the balance pending the success or failure of the long-running GATT negotiations. Under these circumstances the construction of an external threat to offset internal centrifugal forces would become more acceptable.

Several factors stand against such a development. First is the moral distastefulness of such a policy in a liberal society, but by itself this might not prevent it if other conditions were strongly in favour. Second are the economic and particularly oil links with the region that would make enmity with it costly. Third is the interest in avoiding spillover from peripheral regional disorders into Europe. If there was a societal cold war between Europe and the Middle East, it would reduce European influence there and strengthen the hand of anti-Western forces throughout the region.

If EC integration stays on course, then this 'societal cold war' scenario will not arise. The same is true if fragmentation triumphs, for then policy would return to the state level, and Europe and the Middle East would interact as two sets of states in adjacent security complexes. Xenophobic policies might gain ground in some states, but there would be no European-level policy as such. It is only while the question of whether integration or fragmentation will dominate remains unanswered that reasons might be found for inflating the objectively small threats from the Middle East into a force that might be politically useful for European integration. Even in this interim ground, there are reasons for thinking that such a stratagem would fail in the face of the moral and economic forces arrayed against it. But that does not guarantee that it will not be tried. By heightening and legitimising people's concerns about immigration, the steady background drumbeat of media and political sensationalism on the question continue to lay the foundation for it. Since we

are arguing in this book that societal insecurities are a main threat to the integration scenario and that the period of indeterminacy between integration and fragmentation clearly may be prolonged, there is clearly cause for concern.

Chapter 8
Migration and the links between social and societal security
Martin O. Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry

Just as weather moves from areas of high pressure to low, so too transnational migration flows from areas of high political, social or economic insecurity to what migrants tend to perceive as areas of lower insecurity. Both processes entail change and are likely to be accompanied by turbulence. This chapter treats the ramifications of changes inherent in large-scale transnational migration to Western and Central Europe since the end of the Second World War. Our focal concern is with actual and potential consequences of the presence of large numbers of immigrants on the societal security of the countries of residence. Following a brief presentation of the history and current specifics of immigration since the late 1950s in the first section, we consider the nature and meaning of security in the receiving states. To grasp how and why the presence of newcomers might be perceived as a challenge or a threat to the host societies, it is necessary first to understand how conceptions of society have been transformed in the past few generations into the social, economic and political values and institutions that publics prize and elites strive to defend. The second section provides a brief overview of the substance and forms of the communities constituted by the welfare democracies that now characterise most European host societies, the political processes by which they were created, and the significance attached to membership in such societies by their citizens. We suggest that such membership has come to constitute an exclusive identity that, under specifiable social, economic and political conditions, may come to be seen as threatened.

The sources of threat to the host society's values and political styles associated with the immigrant presence and the possibility, however vague or remote, of further immigration in the future are considered in the third section. These are related to another source of putative threat to the autonomy if not the integrity of Western and Central European societies – the increasing unification of Europe and the blurring of prevailing, if diffuse, notions of 'sovereignty'. The European Community (EC) is also a progressively more important factor in the interplay of immigrants and host societies. These considerations are treated in the penultimate section of the chapter.

Finally, we look briefly at some of the consequences of the massive transnational migrations of the last three decades on the evolution of European international relations. We suggest that such migration has begun to redirect the external relations of both sending and receiving countries; it is creating new or newly structured relationships that will increasingly shape Europe's goals and behaviour in international relations.

8.1. Contemporary migration to Western Europe

International migration, that is the large-scale movement and settlement of people from one country to another, is a phenomenon as old as human history. Among other things, it played a major role in the rise and fall of classical Greek and Roman civilisation, and in the expansion of European imperialism. Many states, most notably those in the Western hemisphere and Australia, have built up their populations from migrants, and the fate of the native peoples there provide an extreme case of loss of cultural and political control to an incoming alien population. Ever since the emergence of modern territorial states with their delineation of borders formally designated the extent of state authority and the domain of citizenship, migration has posed governments the long-term challenge of managing cultural and political change. Some of the consequences of failing to deal adequately with the effects of migration can be seen in the tense domestic politics of places such as Fiji, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and South Africa.

Migration has become one of the major global issues during the second half of the twentieth century, this time in the context of an international economy and division of labour that is global in the extent and depth of its penetration. This rise in concern is not only because the scale of current transnational migration is so substantial, but also because it challenges the ability of states to control their borders, traditionally regarded as a fundamental attribute of sovereignty. It is not so much a question of whether states can physically close their borders. As the former communist states demonstrated, most of them could do so. The political issue is more about the financial, social, moral and international relations costs of doing so. The Mexican–US border is a case in point, where the social, economic and political costs of anything approaching total closure are unacceptably high, and the current attempt is to address the problem by incorporating Mexico into the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and stimulating its development (*The Economist*, 12 December 1992: 21–3). The right to determine who shall enter the territory of the state, to reside, to work and in the long term to decide the composition of the future population and culture are all being profoundly affected by international migration. This is associated with the increasing integration of the world economy, accelerating international contacts between business men, politicians and publics, and the growing importance of the international tourist industry. All these combine to make international migration much more difficult for states to control.

The increasing integration of the world economy has major consequences for international migration as the international division of labour provides high incentives for people from marginalised economies to seek work, secur-

ity and better opportunities in the developed world. International migration is thus a collective phenomenon which arises as part of the social relations between the less developed and more developed parts of the global economy. Post-war migration between the less developed and more developed countries has resulted in the establishment of large Third World communities in advanced industrial countries, and these 'bridgeheads' are continually being augmented by the process of chain migration which involves the continuing recruitment of new migrants as families are reunited, wives and husbands are chosen and friends are encouraged to migrate. Continuing international contacts will inevitably result in further migration and will be further provoked by the multifarious sources of individual insecurity such as economic failure, internal or international wars, persecution, climatic catastrophe and famine in the societies of emigration.

Western Europe, in particular the countries of the European Community and the European Free Trade Area became one of the migration magnets of the post-war world. After the Second World War, with the assistance of the Marshall Plan and workers recruited from the European periphery, former colonies and other parts of the Third World, Western Europe re-established itself as one of the most advanced and productive centres of the world economy. Mass migration to Western Europe has involved over 30 million people (Power, 1979), and perhaps many more, who came as workers or dependants or refugees. Some have returned to their countries of origin but more have stayed and in fact have settled, often without intending to become permanent residents. It is important to bear in mind that neither immigration nor what are commonly termed racial distinctions are entirely new to Western European societies. In many British cities, such as Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield and Bradford, substantial and stable minorities of African, Afro-Caribbean and Asian (including Chinese) populations have been present since the nineteenth century (Fryer, 1984). A minority of immigrants have become naturalised citizens of their new countries of work and residence but there are over 15 million people who are legally resident foreign citizens in Western European states and several more million who are undocumented aliens. The official figures are presented in Table 8.1.

The post-war migration to Western Europe is still continuing despite the relatively strict immigration controls imposed by most Western European governments in the mid-1970s (Hammar, 1985). A relatively recent phenomenon is the rapid rise in asylum applications to European countries in the 1980s and 1990s. This rise is from a relatively low base but asylum applications have become major political issues in many European countries including Austria, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Table 8.2 gives an indication of asylum applications to selected European countries from 1987 to 1991.

The collapse of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe has opened up a huge area, historically part of Central Europe's hinterland, for more intensive investment, business and trade. The collapse of the 'iron curtain' has also paved the way for the resumption of large-scale migration from East to West, which has, of course, occurred from time immemorial. Many studies (Sassen, 1988) have shown the strong links between investment, trade and migration

Table 8.1 Foreign (non-citizen) population of selected European countries, 1990 ('000s)

	Foreign population	% Total population
Austria	413.4	5.3
Belgium	904.5	9.1
Denmark	160.0	3.1
Finland	26.3	0.5
France	3,607.6	6.4
Germany	5,241.8	8.2
Italy	781.1	1.4
Netherlands	692.4	4.6
Norway	143.3	3.4
Sweden	483.7	5.6
Switzerland	1,100.3	16.3
United Kingdom	1,875.0	3.3

Source: Continuous Reporting System on Migration, Trends in International Migration, OECD, Paris, 1992.

Table 8.2 Asylum seekers and refugees applying to selected European countries, 1987–91 ('000s)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Austria	11.4	15.8	21.9	22.8	27.3
Belgium	6.0	4.5	8.1	13.0	15.2
Denmark	2.7	4.7	4.6	5.3	4.6
France	27.6	34.3	61.4	54.7	50.0
Germany	57.4	103.1	121.3	193.1	256.1
Netherlands	13.5	7.5	13.9	21.2	21.6
Norway	8.6	6.6	4.4	4.0	3.0
Sweden	18.1	19.6	30.0	29.4	26.5
Switzerland	10.9	16.7	24.4	35.8	41.6
United Kingdom	5.2	5.7	16.5	30.0	57.7

Source: Continuous Reporting System on Migration, Trends in International Migration, OECD, Paris, 1992.

and the increasing mobility of capital in the world economy is associated with increasing labour mobility. Migration from East to West has resumed and could become a tidal wave if economic collapse and ethnic rivalry were to lead to large-scale conflict in such areas as Ukraine, Moldavia, Poland and Russia itself. The conflict in the former Yugoslav states and the crises in Albania, Romania and Bulgaria have already caused a substantial exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries. At the time of writing there remained every possibility that this outflow would continue or escalate, with Bosnian Muslims being forced to leave their traditional areas of settlement, and Albanians possibly next in line. East-to-West migration is, however, likely to be limited

by factors already in evidence such as Western efforts to improve the economic and political circumstances of potential migrants *in situ* (Shevtsova, 1992; Callovi, 1992).

Economic, demographic and social conditions on the European periphery, especially in North Africa, Egypt and Turkey will mean that pressure for large-scale migration will be enormous. Even unemployment and a marginal existence in Western Europe will be viewed as preferable to conditions of economic and personal insecurity and helplessness that are increasingly evident in many parts of the Third World. Recent migrations of Maghrebians and other Africans to Italy, Spain and Portugal illustrate the pressure. In the next three decades, it has been estimated by the European Commission, that 95 per cent of the population increase around the Mediterranean will come from countries on the southern and eastern shores and only 5 per cent from European countries to the north. Moreover post-war migration has already resulted in substantial communities of Turks, as well as of Maghrebians and other Third World people, being established in Europe, which means that chain migration will assist the flow.

Before turning our attention to the challenges posed by international migration to Western European countries and in particular to the European Community, it must be emphasised that migration will continue to have some advantages for Western Europe. If economic growth, the welfare state and high living standards in general are to be maintained, then some migration must continue. Immigrants and, in particular, the descendants of recent immigrants are major sources of recruits to European labour markets, but the latter's hopes of upward social mobility are often disappointed due to lack of qualifications and discrimination. They are often confined to jobs in the traditional sectors of immigrant employment: the menial, low paid and more dangerous jobs. New immigrants also find employment in these sectors. The huge concentration of industrial infrastructure and investment in Western Europe makes continuing migration the most effective means of exploiting these resources. Transferring them via investment and reallocation to areas of labour surplus would be both an expensive and high-risk strategy for Western European capital. It would have no immediate effect on stopping migration, and in the short to medium term would increase it as more people would acquire skills and money that would enable them to migrate more easily. Only in the long term would capital investment revive a weak Third World economy to such an extent that population growth could be reduced and enough jobs created to reduce emigration. Migration would thus continue in spite of efforts to restrict it.

Two additional factors also emphasise the continuing importance of immigrants. Firstly, demographic trends in Western Europe, in particular the rapidly aging profile of European populations, indicate that immigration may be required to provide the goods and services demanded by relatively old but wealthy European populations. Secondly, contributions from migrant workers are a valuable source of income sustaining the financial viability of the welfare states in such countries as Germany, France and Britain. As immigrant populations are relatively young and healthy, attributes encouraged by immigration legislation as well as the greater mobility of the young,

they contribute more in taxes and other contributions to the welfare state than they receive. It has been estimated by its Federal Government that in 1991 foreigners paid DM 54 billion in taxes and created 25,000 new jobs for the German economy. They received DM 16 billion in benefits. In practice their entitlements to welfare and social security payments may be restricted by their immigrant status and foreign citizenship. These distinctions between members and non-members of the welfare state are increased as European governments struggle to restrict their expenditure against ever increasing demands upon it (Freeman, 1986).

The contribution that immigration and immigrants make to host societies and economies tends to be denigrated by politicians and the mass media due to fear of the consequences of large-scale and uncontrolled immigration but also because immigrants and foreigners are unpopular and can easily be cast as scapegoats. Those people whose standard of living is insecurely based on fragile or temporary jobs or people losing out in the competition for other scarce resources may be attracted by attacks on people they regard as illegitimate competitors because they are newcomers or foreign citizens (Husbands, 1988).

8.2. The contexts and objects of societal security

The onset of large-scale immigration to Western and Central Europe in the 1950s and 1960s coincided with the late stages in a fundamental transformation of receiving countries' societies, polities and economies. Most had become comprehensive welfare states, based on universal criteria of inclusion for their citizens. These developments crystallised into particular structures and styles of politics that relied for their legitimacy on broad participation, corporate representation and bargaining or compromise aimed at satisfying outcomes among major segments of society (Heisler, with Kvavik, 1974), and on trust over time. The memories of actual or mythical collective pasts – the march towards the common membership connoted by the society of the welfare state – encompass the struggles entailed in its creation and the norms used to justify it. Over the generations it took to construct such societies, there was an accretion of collective memories or myths by which the welfare state became part of the national identity.

The gradual extension of political, social and economic entitlements was built up over a period of fifty to a hundred years (depending on the country). This process created broader, substantively deeper, more textured forms of citizenship than had existed before or than is currently found in most other countries. Such economic and political rights as labour organisation and collective bargaining, universal suffrage, constitutionally assured civil liberties, access to publicly provided education, redistributive taxation schemes, income support for families far below the median, comprehensive health care or insurance for all or virtually all and subsidised shelter for people whose income did not suffice to obtain decent housing on the market were based on the proposition that greater participation, fairness and levelling of life chances lead to a collective social good. Consciously or not, people in what became Europe's welfare democracies had entered into new social contracts

and had empowered the state to implement them. Although some citizens – most notably those distinguishable by their physical appearance, such as people of African, Afro-Caribbean and Asian descent in Britain and of North African origin in France – were less comprehensively and effectively integrated than those of the 'core populations', by the middle of the twentieth century few or no normative or legal justifications remained for keeping them apart.

Alongside this transformation there was a concurrent set of related, equally profound, changes in the bases of the Western European state's claim on its citizens and in the latters' relationships with each other. The consolidation of welfare states coincided with the pronounced decline in their independent capabilities to meet perceived threats to security, viewed in traditional military terms. The payment of taxes; obedience to laws and connections with each other ceased to rest on the protection from outside threats offered by the state. Such protection from real or imaginary external threats had served, for from two to four centuries, as the principal justification for the building and maintenance of the state's institutions, the assertion of its authority and its monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force internally (Herz, 1957; Tilly et al., 1975). With the concurrent arrival of the welfare state and security dependence, the state's claims came to rest increasingly on the social and economic security and the participatory political process it made available to its citizens (Heisler, 1986a; Benjamin, Heisler and Peters, 1988).

In most continental Western European democracies these transformations were mostly in place when large-scale migration began in the early 1960s; and substantial progress in this direction had been made in the United Kingdom as well. Gunnar Myrdal (1960) noted that the result of these developments, which he summed up as the democratic welfare state, did not follow from a coherent master plan, but rather grew incrementally by the accretion of more specific and less ambitious programmes and policies and ad hoc responses to political exigencies.

Ten or fifteen years after the end of the Second World War, most indigenous ethnic and religious minorities had been included in these political communities (Heisler, 1990; Heisler and Heisler, 1991). But the large waves of post-war immigrants were not. Whether they entered as invited (contract) foreign workers or by exercising options to immigrate grounded in former colonial relationships, citizens of the host societies generally deemed them to fall outside the core communities established in the course of the construction of the welfare state (Heisler and Heisler, 1991). They were not seen either as participants in the building of the social market states of the countries they entered or as descendants from those who had participated. This is an important justification for their exclusion from many of the prerogatives of citizenship, including the right to vote in national elections, which is seen as perhaps the most important token of admission to membership.

This new basis for the social contract among citizens and between them and the state was premised on continued economic expansion, growing public expenditures and increasing individual opportunities. Immigrants, especially those recruited as foreign workers to fill jobs for which there were insufficient numbers of native workers, or which the natives deemed too unpleasant or

unrewarding to accept, contributed substantially to such expansion and to opportunities for upward mobility for native workers. But, when economic growth faltered in the mid-1970s, all Western European countries stopped recruiting foreign workers. That did not stop immigration, however, since the agreements under which foreign workers had been admitted provided for family reunification. In addition asylum-seekers and others with special rights of access continued to come in substantial numbers. The resident foreign populations in Western Europe doubled in the fifteen years following the cessation of the recruitment of foreign labour.

In analysing this issue, there is a non-trivial problem entailed in determining who are immigrants. The case of *Ubersiedler, Aussiedler* and former citizens of the former GDR is the most significant case in point. Under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, they are entitled to claim German citizenship, notwithstanding that they were not socialised into the post-Second World War West German polity, that they did not participate in the construction of either Germany's democracy or its economic miracle, and that in many important respects – including often lack of knowledge of the language and vast cultural distance, in the case of *Aussiedler* – are more alien to the society than are foreign workers who have lived in the FRG for decades and especially their children, who were in many cases born there. As regards identitive distance, nominally German entrants – including the thousands who move each month from the territory of the former GDR to the western *Länder* – are very much like immigrants, and many West Germans react to them as such.

The generalised economic downturn of the mid-1970s in the industrialised countries of Western Europe put the welfare state under stress by simultaneously increasing demands on its fiscal resources and decreasing its income. Governments were faced with the politically unpalatable choice of either cutting expenditures for programmes and policies, or increasing taxes substantially, or both (Rose and Peters, 1978). Western welfare states had no experience with managing a 'politics of less': distributing shortages and cuts or diminishing disposable incomes. In virtually all such countries, political elites used a rhetoric of retrenchment to rein in the 'revolution of rising entitlements' on the crest of which they had governed for a generation or more (cf. Bell, 1976). In the United Kingdom and the United States, where the welfare state was much less extensive, institutionalised or deeply ingrained in the political ethos, new governments undertook frontal, ideological attacks on social programmes and expenditures. But in the more mature welfare states of continental Western Europe, the politics of less became endemic. Publics had to become inured to less government expenditure (or at least lower rates of increase in such expenditures); less disposable income (through higher taxes or falling behind inflation); less optimistic prospects for advancement, for the future of younger people, and for the children of those who had reached adulthood in the quarter century of sustained growth in the post-war period. Political elites faced unaccustomed and discomfiting tasks of reducing their electorates' expectations. These conditions formed a part of the context within which occurred the initial realisation of the presence of large numbers of semi-settled foreigners (Heisler and Heisler, 1986; Heisler,

1986b) and to the need to come to grips with demands stemming from their presence. They account in part for the defensive reactions that accompanied that realisation.

Another set of dislocating factors coincided with the recognition that foreign workers, their dependants, asylum-seekers and other immigrants had entered and become part of the populations of Western and Central European societies. Multifarious social changes, many apparent before massive immigration but often unnoticed until later, have undermined assumptions about the current and future quality of life. Higher rates of crime against property and the person, renewed social conflicts, long-term unemployment, housing shortages and greater unpredictability in social relations have occurred in most industrialised societies in the West. Such changes have been accompanied by increased perceptions of inadequately coping public institutions. Schools, health care, the courts, prisons, political and other institutions have come under persistent and increasingly vocal criticism from the publics they serve.

One of the new aspects of immigration that contributes greatly to societal insecurity is the perception of citizens that their state and society have become much more open to foreigners of all sorts, and that they no longer have the firmly bounded quality that formerly seemed to be the case. Partly this stems from the semi-settled position of many foreign workers, their children and dependants – their disinclination to integrate fully or to seek citizenship in the host society, even where that is a relatively readily available option (Rogers, 1986). There is also the widespread sense that there are many 'outsiders' present in some tentative, irregular or illegal status (not to mention the numbers of transient tourists, students and business people who pass through legitimately but none the less change the day-to-day face of society). Leaving aside the appreciable, but by its nature not measurable, problem of illegal or undocumented aliens, there are large and growing numbers of foreigners who entered in quest of asylum. Recent estimates by Ministries of the Interior in France and Germany suggest that, although less than 10 per cent of applications for asylum are approved, more than two out of every three who enter on that basis stay. The examination of applications tends to be a protracted process; applicants are often left in an indeterminate status while their claims and appeals are pending; and, most important as regards both numbers and consequences, a majority of those eventually denied asylum remain in the country with or without permission.

Regardless of the basis of their presence or their legal status, increasing numbers of visibly distinctive people contribute to the insecurities occasioned by social change. The cumulative impact is at once real and diffuse (cf. Dahrendorf, 1985; Inglehart, 1990). As we suggested earlier, people readily perceived as outsiders are not necessarily immigrants in any meaningful sense of that term. They may include citizens descended from generations of native-born citizens, as is the case in Britain, and also for increasing numbers of people in France, Germany, the Netherlands and other Western European countries. They are, none the less, often classed with immigrants or foreign workers. This is particularly the case in France, where citizens sharing some physical and descent-related traits with immigrants are not only nominally

classified as immigrants by 'real' French people but often also adopt that classification themselves (Heisler 1992).

In addition to their cultural, linguistic and religious differences, most immigrants and citizens perceived as immigrants are also set apart from what are essentially middle-class societies by their working-class status. They are noticeable in public spaces; their children are a marked presence in schools; and their differences tend to reinforce a sense of attenuated cultural and cognitive coherence that characterises life in late twentieth-century urban societies: and that would likely be essentially similar without immigrant populations. These perceptions tend to be reinforced by the clustering of physically and culturally distinctive populations in particular neighbourhoods, schools and occupations. Such clustering reflects a mixture of isolation imposed by the dominant majorities through discrimination and self-imposed isolation. The proportion of these two elements in the mixture leading to isolation can only be determined through specific empirical studies, and even then it is likely to be difficult or impossible to establish with precision.

Their distinguishing traits have made immigrants ready scapegoats for economically-driven social changes in the receiving countries that are difficult to absorb and often dislocating. It is hard to demonstrate empirically whether immigrants contribute to the public financial strains of welfare states, the diminished efficacy of public institutions, or increased crime and disorder, but the belief that they do can none the less take hold in the host society and can be exploited by political opportunists. The reasoning supporting such beliefs is clearly of a *post hoc ergo proctor hoc* sort. Economic stringency caused by recession, social changes perceived to be uncomfortable, institutional over-load and other sources of difficulty occurred or were widely remarked after the advent of large-scale immigration; therefore these problems, which can be seen as threats to social security, are readily attributed to the immigrant presence and thereby elevated into problems of societal security.

The economic, social and institutional changes experienced by Western welfare democracies in the past fifteen-to-twenty years have been accompanied by changes in the policies and political styles developed in the course of the establishment of such polities. Policy making in all of them is less consensual than it was until the mid-1970s. The 'social contracts' between capital and labour have been largely abrogated. Consociational and corporatist political styles have been largely displaced by new polarisation between class, sectoral and regional interests. Satisficing policy outcomes are progressively more likely to be rejected by adversarial, even confrontational, engagements in conventional party and parliamentary politics as well as in non-traditional channels of participation. In the political climate that has been in increasing evidence in most receiving countries during the 1980s and 1990s, the immigrant presence is both a rallying point and a short-hand surrogate for what is anyway an increasingly polarised national politics. While there is no necessary, and certainly no proportional, relationship between the new politics of confrontation that has accompanied economic travails and dislocating social changes and the numbers or types of foreigners present, the latter have none the less engendered partisan reactions that, in several countries, threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the political order. For example, each of

the three Scandinavian countries has spawned either anti-immigrant parties or movements within established parties that premise social and economic ills on the immigrant presence, despite the comparatively small number of foreigners in their midst. In contrast, some of the Western European countries with very large foreign populations, such as Luxembourg, have shown substantially less politicised reaction.

This connection between political reactions to the immigrant presence and the maintenance of legitimate governance represents a multifarious and almost entirely unstudied challenge to European societies. The overwhelming focus and tenor of scholarly writing and political activity related to that presence reflects concerns with the conditions, fate, integration and reception of immigrants. It does not treat in substance or depth such prospects as the diminution of electoral support for mainstream parties often occasioned by issues related to immigration; the movement of mainstream parties towards anti-immigrant or xenophobic policies, in order to minimise defections to the latter; or the perceived costs (real or imagined) in public budgets, competitive positions in the labour market and education, and other factors associated with policies and laws directed towards overcoming the structural disadvantages of minorities.

W.I. Thomas's well-known theorem clearly holds here: 'public definitions of a situation become a part of that situation'. Whether the association of conditions of life and the policies of mainstream or 'establishment' political actors and styles with the immigrant presence is real or illusory, it is the regime that is held accountable. By regime we mean not only mainstream political actors but also the institutions, principles and rules by which they govern and the norms they use to justify their actions. If one of the cornerstones of societal security in Western democracies has been the stability of institutions and principles of legitimacy by which they are governed, then the political and institutional concomitants of the social *malaise* associated with the presence of unintegrated foreigners in large numbers may erode that stability.

8.3. International migration and perceptions of society

Post-war migration has thus confronted the advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe with a number of challenges that concern their national identity and societal integrity. Firstly, post-war migration has transformed Western European states into multi-cultural and multi-national societies. Although most European states have always had national minorities, some of which have been and even now are irredentist (e.g. Irish, Basques, Corsicans): see Hechter, 1975; and Chapter 9 below), most European states have considered themselves to be relatively homogeneous nation-states whose members felt a common membership of the national community due to such binding factors as shared history, ethnic identity, language, culture and political experience. This relative cultural and ethnic homogeneity has been transformed by post-war migration into cultural and ethnic heterogeneity. Moreover, this heterogeneity is likely to increase due to continuing migration and the growth of the immigrant and immigrant-descended populations

whose youthfulness and higher replacement rates will lead to their expansion as a proportion of West European populations.

Table 8.1 gives an indication of the size of the foreign population in selected West European states but it conceals its ethnic and national diversity. In Switzerland most migrant workers have been and are European, mainly Italian and Spanish, but this is not the case in other West European countries. In Germany, for example, the first post-war migrants were Germans fleeing before the Soviet armies all over Eastern Europe. These refugees were followed by Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Russia (Esser and Korte, 1985). After the German economic miracle began in the 1950s a huge migration of East Germans from the German Democratic Republic was followed by a migration of 'guestworkers' from Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece. The ending of East German emigration in 1961 when the building of the Berlin Wall caused the major escape route to be closed, resulted in large-scale recruitment from Turkey and Turks quickly became the largest group of foreign migrant workers in the Federal Republic. In 1989 there were 1.6 million Turks, 606,000 Yugoslavs, 521,000 Italians and 295,000 Greeks resident in Germany.

In France post-war immigration has consisted of a mixture of colonial and post-colonial migrants, many of whom had French citizenship, and foreign workers usually from neighbouring countries but also from the Third World. In 1989 by far the largest group of foreign workers came from Portugal followed by Algerians, Moroccans, Italians, Spaniards and Tunisians.

Table 8.3 Foreign workers and foreign population in France ('000s), 1989–90

Country	Foreign workers, 1990	Total foreign population, 1990
Portugal	425.9	645.6
Algeria	251.6	619.9
Morocco	171.7	584.7
Italy	108.9	253.7
Spain	96.6	216.0
Tunisia	74.9	207.5
Turkey	54.6	201.5
Other	369.3	878.7
Total	1,553.5	3,607.6

Source: Continuous Reporting System on Migration, Trends in International Migration, OECD, Paris, 1992.

However, as mentioned earlier, statistics relating to the foreign population conceal the size and diversity of the immigrant population. In the case of France this is because many immigrants had French citizenship because they migrated for example from Algeria when it was considered to be part of metropolitan France, or because they came from French overseas *départments* such as Martinique or Guadeloupe. Many migrant workers coming to France had a special status as they were recruited under bilateral arrangements. This was particularly the case for North and West Africans. However

most of these special arrangements were ended between 1975 and 1977.

In the Netherlands the heterogeneity of the immigrant population is also apparent. The largest groups of foreigners are the Turks (203,500) and Moroccans (160,000), but there are large numbers of relatively skilled personnel from other European Community countries (168,000) and also people from the former Dutch colonies in Indonesia, Surinam and the Dutch Antilles. Some of these, particularly Dutch-Indonesians, seem to be well integrated into Dutch society but many others are not, as is the case with the South Moluccans. In Sweden, like Switzerland, the largest groups of foreigners are European from neighbouring Scandinavian countries; Finland (120,00), Norway (38,000) and Denmark (29,000). There are also significant numbers of former Yugoslavs (41,000), Iranians, (39,000) Turks, (26,000) Chileans (20,000) and Poles (16,000).

Migration to Britain has been significantly different from that to other European countries to the extent that foreign workers without citizenship formed a very small proportion of post-war immigrants to Britain. Most migrant workers coming to Britain were either Irish who were treated as British, whether or not they came from the Republic of Ireland or Northern Ireland, or were from British Commonwealth or Colonial territories. Also post-war migration to Britain occurred relatively early and now a majority of people belonging to the minority ethnic communities established by post-war immigrants to Britain are native-born British citizens. An indication of the diversity of the non-European minority ethnic communities in Britain can be seen from Table 8.4.

The ethnic and cultural diversity of post-war immigration means that past experience of intra-European migration may not be a useful guide to the ability of European states to adjust to and integrate these latest groups of migrants. In the past it was assumed that immigrants would adapt to, and be assimilated into, the population of the host society. They would be accepted and integrated at least by the second generation. This process of assimilation was 'one-sided' in the sense that immigrants had to adjust to, and accept, the language, customs and values of the host society. Sometimes this process was forced as occurred with the Polish migrants to the Ruhr in the nineteenth century who were pressured to become assimilated Germans by a variety of restrictions on the practice of their culture and language (Dohse, 1981). In Britain, in contrast, assimilation was assumed to be an inevitable process. Writers like Daniel Defoe, for example, had commented on the rapidity by which foreigners transformed themselves into 'True Born Englishmen' (Defoe, 1899). English anthropologists attempting to explain the processes of integration have suggested a multi-stage process involving initial conflict and adjustment leading to accommodation followed by integration and finally to assimilation (Patterson, 1965).

However, there is considerable doubt whether this straightforward process of accommodation, integration and assimilation will, or ought to, be followed by post-war immigrants and their descendants. Firstly, as occurred with previous migrations, there is considerable popular resistance to accepting many of the new migrants as equal members and citizens of the receiving societies. This is partly because some of them are seen as culturally more

Table 8.4 Population by ethnic group, Great Britain, 1985–7 ('000s)

	1986	1987	1988	Average 1986–8
White	51,204	51,573	51,632	51,476
All ethnic minority groups	2,559	2,484	2,687	2,566
West Indian or Guyanese	526	489	465	495
African	98	116	122	112
Indian	784	761	814	787
Pakistani	413	392	479	428
Bangladeshi	117	116	91	108
Chinese	113	126	136	125
Arab	73	79	66	73
Mixed	269	263	328	287
Other	164	141	184	163
Not stated –	607	467	343	472
All groups	54,370	54,524	54,662	54,519

Source: John Haskey, 'The Ethnic Monority Populations of Great Britain: Estimates by Ethnic Group and Country of Birth', *Population Trends*, 60, Summer 1990, OPCS London, HMSO, 1990.

distant than past or present communities of European immigrants. Secondly, racism and processes of racial exclusion mitigate against the acceptance and integration of some groups of immigrants. Thirdly, many people in Western liberal democracies view the process of assimilation as illiberal and undemocratic and there is much support for positive and conscious adjustments to be made by the host society to welcome and accept some of the immigrants' values and culture. This can be seen in campaigns in favour of multi-cultural and mother-tongue education. Moreover, some immigrant groups are exercising their political power to defend their rights to maintain their cultural difference, for example, in freedom of worship and in obtaining state grants to educate their children in schools of their own culture and faith. Another complicating factor is that in the 1980s and 1990s West European politicians have been concerned to reduce public expenditure and limit the burden on the public exchequer. This may intensify resentment against foreigners and immigrant minorities if they are seen as receiving additional benefits.

Finally, there is the whole process of European integration and the creation of a European citizenship and identity. This creates a novel situation both for immigrants to the European Community and for member host societies. An immigrant may find it easier to adopt and accept a cosmopolitan European identity than the narrower, more restrictive identity of a Frenchman, German or Englishman. Will a future European citizenship be independent from the local national identities of member states or will it only be available to those who already have the nationality of a member state?

Doubts about the ability, particularly of non-Europeans, to be accepted and assimilated have been voiced in a number of countries, especially in

Britain and France. This has been put forward most forcibly in Britain by Conservative politicians and adherents such as John Casey who, for example, has argued that: 'There is no way of understanding British and English history that does not take seriously the sentiments of patriotism that go with a continuity of institutions, shared experience, language, customs and kinship . . . the moral life finds its fulfilment in an actual historic human community and, above all, in a nation state.' He argues that immigrant groups do not have these shared experiences and loyalties and are therefore most unlikely to identify with the traditions and loyalties of the host nations (Casey, 1982). The clearest exponent of this view was Enoch Powell, who in one of his speeches concluded that 'the West Indian or Indian does not, by being born in England, become an Englishman. In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth, in fact he is a West Indian or Asian still' (Powell, 1968). Norman Tebbit's recent attempt to create a 'cricket test' of loyalty, namely 'which side do they cheer for', shows that contemporary politicians are willing to question the loyalty and willingness of immigrant groups to identify with their new host society.

Similar concerns have been raised in France where such politicians as Jacques Chirac and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing have voiced doubts about the ability of France to assimilate, in particular, its large North African population. Undoubtedly this is partly a response to the threat posed to the mainstream right by Jean-Marie Le Pen and the Front National but it is also a concern about continuing immigration from North Africa.

8.4. Conclusion: the European Community, societal security and migration

Immigration can present threats to security in the receiving countries, albeit generally not directly of a military kind. The capacity of social, economic, political and administrative institutions to integrate large numbers of immigrants, and the resistance of some immigrant communities to assimilation, affects the stability of society and therefore the ability of receiving states' governments to govern. Over time, it may affect the legitimacy of their regimes and the self-conception of the nation. Such challenges are particularly likely to be acute in the presence of long-term economic problems, ineffectual government, deep political polarisation or rapid social change. Less common security concerns to receiving states arising from migration are military problems that may arise from: (a) irredentist activities by immigrants hoping to effect political change in their countries of origin, (b) conflicts imported by immigrants leading to violence in the host country, (c) terrorist activity, or (d) attempts to reduce immigration or refugee flows by preemptive military intervention in the sending countries.

There are also security-related dimensions of migration for the less developed sending countries as well as the receiving countries. Emigration often serves as a political, social and economic safety valve. Once emigration becomes substantial and emigrants are established in the countries of destination, large-scale return, especially if it is sudden, may present a security threat to the countries of origin, as the ability of political and economic institutions to integrate them might not be adequate. The loss of remittances caused by

large-scale return might also have adverse economic consequences. Examples here include the case of Nigeria's mass expulsion of Ghanaians and Uganda's mass expulsion of Asians.

Transnational migration is thus an important nexus for international relations. Over time, sending and receiving countries can create dyadic migration regimes covering rules, legislation, employment contracts, repatriation of money and people, the management of repatriated capital in the countries of origin, increased trade and tourist flows. These and myriad other dimensions of these dyadic relationships can structure expectations in both sending and receiving states regarding their international relations and in some cases have done so. At best, those expectations, coupled with the mainly unidirectional exchange of populations, can create *de facto* security communities between pairs of sending and receiving states. Migration regimes and security communities can create international ties of attention, political and economic interest and cultural interpenetration. They can progressively influence state behaviour, particularly the behaviour of European receiving countries, and they also enter into the European Community's as well as individual states' security problematiques. At worst the population mixtures resulting from migration can create tension, hostility and even war if they cause domestic and international politics to become negatively entangled. The possibilities here are illustrated, *inter alia*, by Europe's history of irredentist clashes, by the tensions between Russia and its new neighbour states over ethnic Russian minorities and by recent tensions between Bulgaria and Turkey. The European Community may also inherit this negative side if it moves towards a common foreign policy.

The engagement of the EC can already be seen if we examine the impetus towards free movement of workers in relation to tensions within the European Community and the efforts to harmonise community policy towards economic migrants and refugees. In June 1985 a major step was taken towards free movement when Germany, France and the Benelux countries signed the Schengen Agreement on the removal of controls at their common borders. This was initially expected to be implemented by 1 January 1990, but at the time of writing is still being postponed. The European Commission regarded this initiative as the forerunner to the abolition of the Community's internal borders and anticipated that the Schengen Agreement would highlight and help resolve the technical problems associated with free movement of people within an international area (Callovi, 1992). The accession of Italy, Spain and Portugal to Schengen has strengthened the likelihood that it will provide the model for the whole Community. The Schengen arrangements inevitably involve a high degree of police cooperation among the member states and coordination of policies to control non-citizens. Thus foreigners who enter a Schengen country will usually require a visa, will have to show they have sufficient means to support themselves and will normally only be admitted for three months. If they move from one Schengen country to another they will have to register with the authorities within three days. People defined as undesirable by one state will be excluded from all and entrants who fail to comply with their conditions of stay will be excluded from the whole area. Airlines and shipping companies who carry aliens with

inadequate or false documents will be fined. The Schengen accords are backed up by a computerised intelligence and information system (the Schengen Information System), which is to be based in Strasbourg. This will provide data on people to be refused entry such as asylum seekers who have already had their applications refused, illegal immigrants, criminals and suspected terrorists (Bunyan, 1991).

There are two other Community organisations that are also discussing the problems of harmonising immigration and refugee policy. These are the TREVI group and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration. The TREVI group was set up in 1976 as a meeting of Interior or Justice Ministers to consider ways Community countries could work together to combat terrorism. (TREVI itself is an acronym for 'Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence Internationale'.) The Group has gradually expanded its remit to cover international crime, drug trafficking and the policing and security aspects of free movement.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration was established in October 1986 under the British Presidency. It is composed, like TREVI, of interior ministers and was initially concerned with the dramatic rise in asylum applications. In April 1987 it agreed to a common policy on asylum applications and to penalties on airlines and shipping companies bringing inadequately documented asylum-seekers to European Community countries (Layton-Henry, 1992).

The growing importance of immigration due to developments in Eastern Europe and concern about continuing pressure from North Africa led the European Council of Ministers of 8–9 December 1991 to request 'that an inventory of national positions on immigration be established to provide a basis for discussion of the matter within the Council'. The Council request was divided into two areas: (i) questions relating to the entry and movement of citizens from third countries, and (ii) the integration of non-Community nationals who have been admitted into the territories of member states. The Commission had already asked a group of experts to analyse the entry policies of member states, practices with regard to residence for immigrants, the reuniting of families, access to employment, education, housing, social benefits, civic and social rights, relations between immigrants and official bodies and facilities for repatriation (Commission of the European Communities, 1990). The report was greatly concerned with demographic pressure from North Africa in particular but felt that the relaxing of immigration controls and increased immigration was not the solution. In the long term, it argued, economic investment in the sending countries and population control measures would be the most likely solution.

To some extent a dyadic migration regime already exists between the European Community and the North African states and also with Turkey. The colonial ties between France and Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and the historic ties between Germany and Turkey have been reinforced by large-scale migration. Geographical proximity, bilateral agreements, remittances, Turkey's membership of NATO, and chain migration have reinforced the relationship. The applications of Morocco and Turkey to join the Community are logical outcomes of these increasingly close relationships. The reluctance

of the Community to consider these applications is partly due to concern to ratify and implement the Maastricht Treaty, enlargement within Europe, and the political, cultural and economic barriers to membership within Morocco and Turkey, but also to the recession and the rise of racial violence and political parties opposing immigration within the Community. There is evident tension between, on the one hand, the institutional capacity of both the Western European states and the EC to handle all of these issues, and on the other the increasing societal pressures both inside and outside the Community concerning the processes of migration.

The countries of Western Europe are in a state of historic transformation. The Maastricht Treaty with its emphasis on European Union and the creation of a European citizenship has raised fears that the national identities and sovereignties of member states will be eroded. Members of the European Community are giving up sovereignty in such areas as control over their economies, labour markets and the composition of their populations. The move towards free movement of workers and persons is a crucial part of this transformation and it is hard to accept the extra economic competition this will involve in a period of high unemployment and recession. The opposition to this transformation is, to some extent, being displaced at the popular level on immigrants and asylum seekers who are seen as additional and unacceptable sources of competition for jobs, housing and welfare benefits. The increasing displacement of Muslim populations in Western Europe, the fears of Islamic fundamentalism (see Chapter 7), and reduced confidence in some European countries that Muslims can be easily accommodated and integrated have been exploited, for example, by Jean-Marie Le Pen and the Front National in France. The rise of racial violence in Germany and apparent consolidation of support for the Front National in France have already pushed mainstream politicians and parties in both countries to adopt tougher policies on immigration issues.

In terms of societal security in Europe, we can thus conclude that migration stands alongside, and is in some ways part of, the identity issue discussed in Chapter 4. Over time, migration has influenced and will continue to influence, not only conceptions of society, but also the way in which states and societies relate to each other, both positively and negatively, and nationally and internationally. Given the particular character of the Western European welfare state, migration ties together social and societal security in a way that causes economic recession to exacerbate societal insecurity. The inherent tendency of migration to polarise society is reinforced in pluralist states, whether more or less strongly depending on different national circumstances, by political actors in host societies engaged in defending immigrants' rights or supporting anti-immigrant parties or activities. The forces unleashed can both disrupt public order and transform the political process. It is important not to overlook the fact that these issues are not wholly new. Societal and political relations both within and between sending and receiving states have already been appreciably conditioned by the large-scale international migration that Europe has experienced since the Second World War. To some extent, the domestic and international politics of societal security reflect the established facts of earlier migration. It is not just a question of a single dominant

national culture responding to a first wave of immigrants. Responses to the current and future migration pressures now looming on Europe's horizon will thus be conditioned by the changes in ideas, values and expectations about society that already reflect a blend of the 'dominant national cultures' and the established immigrant presence.

Chapter 9
Civil war, 'terrorism' and public order in Europe
David Carlton

9.1. The definitional problem

We are concerned in this chapter with politically-related violent threats to societal security in the new Europe that fall outside the category of unambiguous warfare waged by sovereign states. The extent of the violence under review ranges from low-intensity conflicts among sovereign states and all-out civil wars at the top of the scale to public order disturbances at the bottom. In between these extremes seem to lie protracted 'terrorist' campaigns, *coups-d'état* and one-off assassinations.

The reader should appreciate that these terms will be used without any great precision. For scholars, statesmen and international lawyers have in practice failed to agree on watertight definitions of most of these various manifestations of violence.[1] And the pejorative term 'terrorism' in particular is used here with some reluctance and usually in quotes. We shall normally use the term to describe significant levels of violence perpetrated by politically-motivated sub-state actors who may or may not be to some degree sponsored by, but who will not normally be directly controlled by, sovereign states. We propose, however, to exclude from systematic consideration what is sometimes called 'state terror', that is morally-contentious violent acts carried out by governments within their own frontiers against their own citizens in any circumstances not generally recognised as a civil war. This somewhat arbitrary exclusion has been adopted in order to assist clear analysis. It is not intended to imply that the use of violence by sovereign states within their own jurisdiction is necessarily more (or less) justified in ethical terms than violence used by sub-state actors or by states promoting low-intensity violence across frontiers.

Another analytical decision is that violence in pursuit of national independence or frontier revision will initially be considered in isolation from all other examples of politically-motivated violence. Our justification for adopting this course lies simply in our belief that for the foreseeable future, at least in Europe, the large majority of violent deeds leading to loss of life will be

related to 'national self-determination' issues and hence merit separate treatment. It is to this aspect that we shall now turn.

9.2. National independence or frontier revision struggles

Without doubt the most important development in the recent past in Europe has been the stupendous transformation in the East – the almost total collapse of communism, the re-emergence after more than half a century of genuinely independent sovereign states throughout East-Central Europe, German unification and the implosion of the Soviet Union into, thus far, a further fifteen sovereign states. But developments in the West may also have seminal implications: the Single Market of 1992 is already achieved and the Maastricht Treaty holds out the promise, if not yet the certainty, of the early emergence of a fully-integrated European superstate in the Western end of Europe. Indeed, some foresee that such a superstate will eventually extend as far as the Urals or even beyond. In the near term, however, the process of integration seems likely to be relatively limited in scope and confined to the existing twelve members of the EC with the addition of various EFTA members and, at a later date, possibly a select minority from among the former members of the Warsaw Pact, namely Hungary, the Czech Lands, and conceivably Poland and Slovakia. In considering the relatively short-term impact of these various actual or prospective developments on those prospects for societal security with which we are in this chapter especially concerned, it is accordingly appropriate to review the two halves of Europe separately.

In the case of Western Europe – which we deem not to include any former member of the Warsaw Pact except for the territory of the former German Democratic Republic – recent developments seem likely to have few dramatic implications for sub-state violence at least with respect to struggles for national independence or frontier revision. The only high-profile insurgencies concern Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. In both cases the 'troubles' long predate the recent transformation of the European scene: in the former case there has been intermittent armed resistance to the partition settlement from its origins in 1921–2 and the present intense phase can be dated back to 1969 (Bell, 1983; and Bell, 1987); in the latter case an armed struggle for a separate Basque state has been waged continuously, especially against the Spanish government but also spasmodically against the French government, for the last three decades (Sullivan, 1988) and romantics can, of course, go back into the mists of history in the effort to prove some kind of continuity of resistance.

It seems unlikely that in these relatively remote parts of Europe anything will change rapidly despite the awareness of upheavals in the wider European arena. In Northern Ireland, for example, the removal of the Berlin Wall did not inspire imitation: parts of Belfast and Londonderry/Derry continue to remain physically divided for the mutual protection of the two antagonistic communities. The location of 'sovereignty' has been shared over the years since 1922, in varying proportions, between London and Belfast. Now the Irish Republic, as a result of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, is held by some to

have been given an ambiguous toehold of 'sovereignty' also. And Brussels is gradually assuming greater powers and responsibilities, in theory and in practice, over the daily lives of the people in the province. But only the renunciation of primary responsibility for societal security by London, in whatever form it should take, is likely to cause any early amendment in the level of casualties. For without the British Army to hold the ring, sectarian killings would be likely greatly to exceed the present average annual death toll of around one hundred – at least in the years immediately after withdrawal. If formal power passed to Dublin, for example, it surely cannot be doubted that violent resistance by Protestant paramilitaries would ensue and that the armed forces and police of the Irish Republic would be, at least initially, at a great disadvantage in comparison with those they replaced. Much the same would be true if instead the EC aspired to take over. And even an independent Ulster – inevitably under Protestant domination – would no doubt push many more members of the 'Nationalist'/Roman Catholic community into the arms of an even more embittered Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).

Thus any early major change in Northern Ireland – and it is most unlikely to be a change towards greater tranquillity – will be precipitated by a decision in London to review the desirability of maintaining the United Kingdom in its present form. Ironically, it is neither from Brussels nor Dublin that the catalyst for such a review is likely to come but rather from Edinburgh. If, as now seems likely, there should develop an insistence on the part of Scots on devolution or complete independence – and the latter may quickly flow in practice from the former – there could be a backlash south of the border in favour of an 'England First' movement. Continuing to provide economic subsidy to and shedding blood on behalf of Northern Ireland might then be called seriously into question, particularly in dispiriting circumstances where a Union shrunken through the loss of Scotland might be asked to surrender its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and to play a less prominent role in the EC.

If, then, Scotland should set off a chain reaction that would lead to increasing chaos in Northern Ireland, what part could fairly be attributed to the seminal developments occurring in Europe? Some would probably point to the fact that the Scottish Nationalists' recent revival in popularity has coincided with their use of the fashionable slogan that their aim is 'independence within the EC', thereby neatly bypassing London but appealing to the two-tier set of loyalties referred to in an earlier chapter (see discussion in Chapter 2). Others may contend that Scottish nationalism has been influenced by the emergence of a plethora of new European states in the collapsing Soviet and Yugoslav federations. And several of these new states – Latvia (2.7m), Lithuania (3.7m), Estonia (1.6m), Slovenia (1.9m) and Croatia (4.7m) – have populations significantly smaller than that of Scotland (5m) (and incidentally the same size as or not much bigger than Northern Ireland (1.6m) – hitherto often considered simply incapable of sustaining an independent existence on demographic grounds alone). Moreover, demands for Scottish devolution and independence are not new. They also appeared to flourish in the 1970s before fading after the technically negative outcome of

the referendum of 1979.[2] In the general election of October 1974, for example, the Scottish Nationalists obtained 30 per cent of the Scottish vote which was 9.5 per cent more than they obtained in April 1992. So any supposed connection between recent developments in Europe and any Scottish-inspired intensification of the Ulster crisis arising out of the possible unravelling of the United Kingdom will be hard to prove.

Another possible linkage concerns both Northern Ireland and the Basque country (or Euskadi as separatists describe it). This is the supply of arms for 'terrorist' purposes. The countries of the former Warsaw Pact were indeed involved in stirring up trouble for their ideological adversaries and were not averse to supplying arms, if possible in return for hard currency, to a great variety of sub-state groups throughout the world. The new Czechoslovak government, for example, has revealed that their Communist predecessors supplied the PIRA with the explosive Semtex, whose presence is relatively difficult to detect. But neither the PIRA nor Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) were ever more than marginally dependent on the Warsaw Pact countries for arms supplies or funding. Both have significant bases in the wider community and can, if necessary, raise funds without outside help. And ironically, in the case of the PIRA more such outside help in the 1980s came from sympathisers in the United States than from Warsaw Pact countries – though even Noraid's contribution was relatively modest even at the height of its influence in the early 1980s (Adams, 1988: chap.6).

Equally marginal in its impact may be the indirect consequences of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, namely the increasing isolation of various Islamic 'crazy states' under pressure from the 'new world order'. It is certainly true that Libya and other possible imitators have recently sought to distance themselves from West European sub-state groups. But at the height of the Cold War Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's impudent rhetoric was probably more trying to Western governments than the limited amount of arms he was actually able to deliver to those he so vociferously supported. Certainly it is difficult to believe that even the PIRA, of which Gaddafi was apparently especially fond, will be significantly affected by this particular fallout from the termination of the Cold War.

It is also possible that ETA and the PIRA will be adversely affected by the increasing cooperation among European law-and-order enforcement authorities. The new regimes in Eastern Europe will, however, play relatively little part on this front because they are too geographically remote to be arenas for much transnational activity by West European 'terrorists', though they may be able to supply London and Madrid with some interesting names from the records of their communist predecessors. More significant may be the tendency towards pooling anti-terrorist efforts in the EC. But it must be acknowledged that the principal vehicle – the so-called TREVI system inaugurated in 1975–6 – has a history that long predates Maastricht: EC ministers and officials concerned with combating 'terrorism' already consult and meet regularly behind closed doors. Also said by some to be important are the meetings initiated at Schengen to review the implications of the abolition of frontier controls in much of Western Europe (Bolten, 1991; and Swart, 1991).

On the one hand, it is undeniable that increased cooperation against every

kind of transnational criminality will result. But the increase in unhampered mobility that is inevitable may serve to undermine the efforts of the law-enforcers. It is perhaps worth adding that the emergence of EC collective efforts in the law-enforcement field may lead to interested parties placing excessive emphasis on the extent of the 'terrorist threat' to the whole EC. For, with budget allocations at stake, there may be a temptation to take advantage of a few spectacular incidents that attract disproportionate media coverage. It should not be forgotten that even in Northern Ireland and the Basque country road accident fatalities still greatly exceed those caused by insurgents – and the carnage on the roads can also be reduced by increasing resources committed to policing and other preventive measures. Whether any of this will make much net difference to ETA and the PIRA may, however, be doubted. In any case the PIRA, in particular, will have to live for some time at least with British unwillingness to forgo all border checks on transport arriving from the rest of the EC or even end limitations on movement between Northern Ireland and the mainland United Kingdom.

Apart from Northern Ireland and the Basque country there are in Western Europe various other regions where nationalist movements are active and hence where actual or potential societal violence requires the attention of governments. Among such national movements are those involving Corsicans, Catalans, Bretons, Welsh, Tyrolians and, as mentioned, Scots. And the state of Belgium, in particular, could divide along ethnic lines. (*The Economist*, 31 October 1992: 46): In general, however, there would appear to be a low probability in the conditions of relative economic affluence which have become normal throughout the EC, that few, if any, of these cases will develop into major insurgencies, though the relationship between economic affluence and the absence of large-scale violence is impossible to prove. Indeed sceptics might draw parallels with Norman Angell's confident but mistaken contention before 1914 to the effect that major war among the European Great Powers had been rendered unlikely by economic well-being and mutual dependence (Angell, 1912). Yet the fact is that Switzerland experiences little or no 'terrorism'. And many experts on Northern Ireland believe that mass unemployment and widespread poverty go far in explaining at least the intensity of the violence that has prevailed since 1969 (Sluka, 1989; and MacDonald, 1986). But in any event the collapse of communism in the East seems wholly irrelevant. And even the integration process in the EC may be of only marginal relevance.

Perhaps the most interesting case concerns the Scots, to whom reference has already been made in the context of Northern Ireland. In the aftermath of the British general election of 1992 it could be that disaffection from the Union will grow dramatically and that unconstitutional or even violent actions could ensue – though modern Scotland does not have a violent tradition in political matters. The fact is that 75 per cent of Scots voted for candidates favouring devolution or outright independence. But the Conservative government at Westminster, with only 25 per cent of the Scottish vote, supports neither. On the other hand, Prime Minister John Major has said that, while opposed to devolution, he would reluctantly concede outright independence if a majority of Scots were seen to favour it. On the face of it, this should

mean the issue can be resolved by peaceful means. For if a majority of Scottish MPs at Westminster vote for independence a referendum would presumably be held and, if the result was positive, independence would ensue. But the divergence between Scottish MPs favouring devolution and those favouring independence may prevent this simple course being followed – with the result that a deadlock could be caused with grave implications for societal security.

Already some MPs have spoken of the Conservatives at Westminster having no authority to govern Scotland and a few have even called for civil disobedience. What remains to be seen, however, is whether in the particular case of Scotland these developments have had or will have as much to do with the wider European context as might be true of some independence movements located nearer to the heart of Europe. (In this connection it may be significant that in the French referendum on Maastricht Brittany voted in favour in contrast to Corsica which, like Scotland, is more remote from the 'centre' (*The Economist*, 16 September 1992). But of course many factors other than national identity were doubtless involved in determining the results.)

So far as Western Europe as a whole is concerned, then, it is difficult to draw any very dramatic conclusions relating to the future of nationalist-inspired sub-state violence. Each case has to be examined in its own relatively narrow context. If there is any overarching consideration that may shape developments, it may be not so much the formal moves towards integration but rather the economic circumstances that prevail during the period when the process of integration is taking place. Avoiding a world slump may be of greater importance than creating a common currency. At best it might be argued that the existence of the EC framework eases the politics of devolution or even secession by making the split less absolute and less intense than would otherwise be the case. To that extent the EC helps to keep such processes more political and less violent than might otherwise be the case.

This conveniently brings us to Eastern Europe and the CIS. For here in quite different economic conditions we can expect to see a massive increase in violence inspired by self-determination. For many, if not most, people in this vast region, living standards have fallen. Yet expectations were that they would rise with the collapse of the Communist regimes. In such dispiriting circumstances it is not surprising that long-suppressed nationalist and irredentist aspirations have come to dominate the political scene.

The prospects for continuing violence can scarcely be exaggerated. But statesmen, lawyers and other analysts may be increasingly baffled when it comes to deciding what to call particular manifestations of such violence. Is most of it likely to be traditional sub-state violence (or 'terrorism')? Or are we mainly facing full-blown civil wars or even wars (declared or not, low-intensity or high-intensity) between sovereign states? The present or former existence of four federated sovereign states lies at the heart of the potential for confusion: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the newly-sovereign Russian Federation. For much of the new wave of violence related to self-determination in the East is connected to their evolving fate.

We may begin with the Soviet Union. This was formally dissolved by the

mutual consent of the membership at the end of 1991 and hence other states have been largely spared the dilemma of deciding whether or not to recognise breakaway entities – though the ambiguous status of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia caused embarrassment to President George Bush and other Western leaders during the last years in power of President Mikhail Gorbachev. At the end of 1991, however, it appeared to many that the dissolution of the Soviet Union had after all been accomplished with surprisingly little bloodshed or lasting ill-will. And the agreement of at least the majority of the former states of the Soviet Union – including all the populous ones – to form the CIS was seen as a hopeful sign that nationalist aspirations had thereby been largely met. True, the long-running Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh was never out of the news. And everyone was aware that vast numbers of ethnic Russians were now living in states outside the Russian Federation. But the hope was that the CIS, under the apparently united leadership of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan, would be able to contain most manifestations of tension.

During 1992, however, the prospects greatly worsened. For the leading four states of the CIS have begun to quarrel over issues of fundamental importance. Many of the headlines have focused on the dispute about whether to centralise control and ownership of various types of nuclear weapons, about the future of the Red Army and about the fate of the Black Sea fleet. But in the long run the most ominous portent may turn out to have been the Russians' willingness to raise the issue of the permanence of frontiers. They have done so in the most dramatic fashion with respect to the Crimea – transferred to Ukraine in 1954. For example, in January 1992 the Russian Supreme Soviet voted to re-examine the constitutionality of this transfer. This threat to re-open the issue was probably motivated by a short-term desire to bring pressure to bear on Kiev concerning the Black Sea fleet's future. But once rehabilitated the frontier issue may prove difficult to bury, for millions of Ukraine citizens living in the Crimea may have been encouraged to take matters into their own hands in demanding boundary revision. Similarly, Moscow may come to regret sending armed assistance to the people of the Russian-speaking parts of Moldova even if in the short term this may have prevented a merger with Romania, which a majority of inhabitants of Moldova as a whole probably desire. For the result may be a splintering of Moldova into two different 'states' which may or may not prove acceptable to the rest of the CIS or the wider international community.

By calling into question the sanctity of the frontiers of the fifteen successor states to the Soviet Union, the Russians may in short have unleashed forces they cannot control. And it is precisely the Russians above all who may in the long run have most to lose. For they still preside over what is even officially called a Federation. If Moldova or Ukraine are to be encouraged to break up how much greater is the scope for internal collapse within the vast territory stretching from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean? Already Tatarstan, Chechen-Ingush and Siberia have seen the emergence of separatist demands – with Moscow no longer being able to claim a record of consistent support for the territorial integrity of the successor states of the Soviet Union. We may thus

see something similar to well-known dolls on sale in Moscow – open one and inside is another and then yet another . . .

A further depressing development during 1992 was the conflict within Georgia. The outside world has been at a loss to understand why a president, chosen decisively in 1991 in free elections, should have been ousted by force. And international lawyers would doubtless find it difficult to judge whether the original and subsequent violence should be described as 'terrorism' or 'civil war'. If 'terrorism' is the correct term, it is a further tricky point as to whether President Gamsakurdia was the victim of 'terrorism' or whether he became a perpetrator of it when he sought to recover his lost position. The emergence of a new regime under Eduard Shevardnadze may possibly inaugurate a brighter era for Georgia itself except for Abkhazia. But the precedents created do not augur well for societal stability in any of the states of the former Soviet Union – not least for those on the southern flank, which can evidently expect no serious support from Moscow, Kiev or Minsk. This whole area may become embroiled in a tussle for influence among Turkey, Iran, China and even the new regime in Afghanistan. The violent events in Tajikistan in 1992 appeared to have ominous implications.

All in all, the former Soviet Union appears to face a bleak future in the matter of violence inspired by self-determination. The main doubt is whether we shall see it confirmed at the level of so-called 'terrorism' or whether it will mainly find expression as 'civil war' or even interstate conflicts.

Yugoslavia presents an even more depressing picture – though obviously the implications on worst-case scenarios are likely to be less dramatic than those that may arise in the case of the former Soviet Union with its vast population, formidable nuclear arsenal and massive army, which is in a certain sense now an army without a country. This aspect apart, the principal distinction between Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union lies in the fact that the hitherto internationally-recognised federation has not been dissolved by mutual consent. This has had a number of implications. First, the international community was deeply divided for a time about the case for recognising the breakaway states of Slovenia and Croatia and, later, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Secondly, the process has been piecemeal. At the time of writing it is incomplete – with Belgrade still in control of Macedonia (or Skopje as the Greeks insist it be called), Montenegro and Kossovo as well as Serbia. Finally, and most significantly, the borders of the three newly-emerged states have not even initially been recognised by all concerned. In particular, the authorities in Belgrade argue that the eastern frontiers of Croatia need to be redrawn to take account of the predominance of Serbs in many areas. And it is equally obvious that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where religious affiliation is almost as powerful a divisive factor as nationalism, is acceptable to almost nobody, least of all in Belgrade. There has been talk of 'cantonisation' as a possible 'solution' but just borders of 'cantons' seem almost impossible to imagine. For the three main groupings (Muslim Bosnians form 45 per cent; Orthodox Serbs form 32 per cent; and Roman Catholic Croats form 17 per cent) have 'intermingled and inter-married so much that trying to separate them is like trying to unscramble an egg' (*Sunday Times*, 19 April 1992).

There is, however, one satisfactory aspect about Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina: they appear to have no claims on non-Yugoslav territory and hence do not in practice present any central challenge to the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which involved near-universal assent to the proposition that existing frontiers in Europe should not be changed by force. It may be another matter, however, if the Macedonian part of Yugoslavia achieves independence. For a Macedonia based on language and ethnicity may be held by some to pose a threat to the integrity of Greece and maybe also Bulgaria. Another international complication could arise in the event that the Albanians in Albania should seek a merger with the ethnic Albanians in Kossovo or vice versa.

All in all, the situation in what was Yugoslavia has exemplified the negative consequences that have flowed from the end of the Cold War or what John Lewis Gaddis has called 'The Long Peace' (Gaddis, 1987). Already more than 10,000 casualties have occurred as a result of the release of nationalist or religious passions hitherto held in check by fear of Soviet intervention. (It would take more than half a century for a similar toll to emerge in Northern Ireland on present projections.) Nor can there be much hope that the levels of violence in the former Yugoslavia will diminish in the foreseeable future despite the best peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations, the EC and the so-far inconspicuous CSCE. But again, as with the CIS, we do not know whether 'terrorism', 'civil war', low-intensity or even high-intensity interstate warfare will be the most appropriate descriptive term.

Czechoslovakia is another federation whose fate was sealed by the collapse of the disciplines provided by the Warsaw Pact. So far, however, the tension between Prague and Bratislava has taken an almost wholly non-violent form. Whether this will last remains to be seen. But few now believe that the emergence of a wholly independent Slovakia can be avoided. With luck two sovereign states may peacefully emerge, achieve universal recognition, and have prospects, like Slovenia, for a more-or-less tranquil future. There may, however, be serious problems in relations between an independent Slovakia and Hungary, whose borders are certain to be held to be unsatisfactory by extremist forces in Budapest on account of territory largely occupied by Hungarians ceded to Czechoslovakia after the First World War (*The Economist*, 31 October 1992: 44–5).

Hungary may indeed eventually provide an example of a state willing to exploit irredentist aspirations without the excuse that it is part of a collapsed federation. Or rather in its case such an excuse, so far as it exists, is not particularly recent. For Hungary's grievances spring from the collapse of federal Austria–Hungary at the end of the First World War. The Treaty of Trianon was, of course, imposed on Hungary by the victors and has ever since led to protests from many Hungarian-speaking people living outside the new state's frontiers. This is above all the case in the Transylvanian region of Romania. Hungary is, needless to say, a signatory of the Helsinki Accords and so far has not sought to any serious extent to renege on its obligations under their terms. But would this good behaviour endure if these Accords were to be widely disregarded by other, larger powers, or if the dissolution of Czechoslovakia were thought to nullify the terms of the Treaty of Trianon?

Romania is clearly another power whose attitude to the Helsinki standards might be said to be ambivalent. It is clearly delighted to see them remain in force so far as Transylvania is concerned. But the loss during the Second World War to the Soviet Union of what is now Moldova still rankles. As long as Moscow takes an interest in the matter, Bucharest will have to proceed with care. But, if the Russian Federation itself implodes, an opportunity may arise to encourage a movement favouring reunification – even though the Russian-speaking minority in Moldova may strenuously resist to the point of use of violence.

The analysis in this section has so far focused largely on governments and on the extent to which they may or may not promote violent irredentist movements and accept or resist changes in frontiers. But we should not overlook the fact that in any case governments, even when they are in broad agreement, may be in some circumstances – as in Northern Ireland or the Basque country – powerless to prevent the development of major sub-state insurgencies. All that can be said at this stage is that the conditions for the emergence of similar long-running insurgencies in the East look, to say the least, far from negligible.

What, if anything, can the wider international community do to try to minimise the scope for nationalist-inspired violence in the East? Essentially it can offer mediation, some peacekeeping forces, and, to a limited extent, financial aid. The difficulty with offering mediation is that it is rarely welcomed by all the parties to a dispute and can indeed sometimes be depicted, fairly or not, as a form of disguised intervention for self-serving ends. For example, Boris Yeltsin has won few plaudits in either Armenia or Azerbaijan. Again, few in Belgrade were favourably impressed by Germany's insistence on recognising Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states and most considered it to be effectively tearing up its obligations under the Helsinki Accords according to which Federal Yugoslavia (and not its constituent parts) was universally recognised as a sovereign state with borders which would not be altered by force. As for peacekeeping forces, the risk is that any significant level of casualties will lead to hasty withdrawal such as has occurred on more than one occasion in the post-war history of the Middle East. And, of course, the sheer scale of the problems faced in the former Yugoslavia in particular may make truly effective peacekeeping a pipedream from the outset.

Maybe it is only with money that the watching advanced world can realistically hope to provide much concrete assistance in the East. There can, of course, be little prospect that aid could be on such a generous scale as to rapidly fulfil the aroused expectations of higher living standards for the population as a whole. But more limited sums could surely be made available to assist the resettlement of people living in zones of greatest tension. Unfortunately, such an approach may lack appeal because the transfer of populations in the past has usually been forcibly carried out in the most brutal fashion in the aftermath of revolution or war. For example, in the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin in particular was uninhibited in forcibly transferring vast numbers in an attempt to increase loyalty to the Soviet state and to the Marxist-Leninist ideology at the expense of national identity – and that particular example has, of course, now returned to haunt Stalin's various

successors in a strikingly ironic fashion. Nevertheless there are cases where such transfers were quite successful in terminating long-standing minority problems in the long term: for example, those made at the end of the Second World War, especially the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia and the replacement of Germans by Poles in the region around Wrozlaw (formerly Breslau). Incidentally, if these methods had been used in 1919 maybe Hitler's even less welcome technique – that of seeking revision of frontiers as exemplified in one fashion at the Munich Conference in 1938 and in another fashion by invasion of the disputed Polish Corridor in 1939 – would never have gained the widespread support that made him a national hero and rendered it difficult for doubting generals to resist his more extravagant expansionist moves in 1940–1.

Could forcible transfers of populations be attempted in today's Eastern Europe and the CIS? The answer is probably negative in that we are fortunately not living in quite such fraught conditions as those that applied in 1945. And, in the absence of such conditions on a wide canvas Western leaders will surely hesitate to endorse a solution that appears intolerably inhumane. (President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, for example, went so far as to apologise to Germany for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans in 1945!) But perhaps if bloodshed continues to increase, financial incentives offered by the EC or the United States could serve to induce voluntary movements from the most chaotic areas. For example, plans for 'cantonisation' of Bosnia-Herzegovina might just prove workable if large sums were available to provide an attractive scheme for rehousing those willing to move. Similarly, the ethnic mix in the Baltic States might return to a pre-Stalin character with the minimum of suffering if suitable inducements could be provided by the affluent West.

It is for consideration whether such voluntary population transfers would constitute a more fruitful approach than relying primarily on possibly rather Utopian attempts at promoting mutual conciliation or at least mutual protection among ethnic groups; or, alternatively, whether emphasis should be placed on diplomatic pressure on certain states to change frontiers whatever the implications that might have for the integrity of the Helsinki system. Clearly conciliation leading to more-or-less stable multi-ethnic states (of which the United States itself is a foremost example) would be almost everyone's first preference in the West provided circumstances were even moderately promising. But the record of such efforts in the inter-war period do not suggest that this will be the pattern in the East in general and in the Balkans in particular. *Faute de mieux*, then, we may often, in the most extreme cases, have to choose between favouring frontier revision or population transfers. Our tentative conclusion is that consciously unleashing forces that might lead to the redrawing of the entire map of Eastern Europe might indeed prove in practice to be the least constructive course given the strength of support behind the Helsinki assumptions. But before too long Helsinki may in any event be ancient history and the map may have become wholly unrecognisable whether the West likes it or not.

9.3. 'Terrorism' or public order disturbances not related to nationality or frontier problems

If issues related to self-determination are sure to be the dominant concerns in the years ahead, and certainly the ones causing the largest number of casualties, there is likely to be little or no actual diminution of manifestations of violence deriving from other causes. But in this section of our analysis it does not appear that any sharp distinction can be made concerning the prospects for the territories covered by the former Warsaw Pact and NATO and hence an all-European approach seems appropriate.

As stated, we are not here concerned with those seeking to change frontiers or create independent states. But this does not mean that ethnic, linguistic and religious loyalties are irrelevant to this part of the analysis. For groups drawn together by such loyalties may become involved in violence for other reasons. First, they may be an alienated minority group residing within a country but with no claim to forge a new state within it or to change its frontiers. For example, persons of North African origin or antecedents living in the suburbs of French cities can have no realistic expectation that the geographical limits of French sovereignty will ever be altered. But many such persons certainly have grievances, real or imagined, concerning such matters as parity of esteem or reward, housing and access to employment. The fact that in some cases they may have been born in France and be full citizens may seem to them to make no difference to their sense of persecution on ethnic religious grounds. All the indications are in fact that in the particular case of France at least such alienation is growing and is finding expression in public order offences. And France is, of course, not the only affluent country in Europe that has a potential problem of this kind, though from country to country there are considerable variations in percentages of immigrants who are full citizens, permanent residents and temporary guest workers and who are 'legals' and 'illegals'.

Secondly, there may be minority groups in various European states who, while having no serious grievance at their treatment by the authorities or even by society as a whole, are nevertheless provoked into initiating violence or retaliating against violence by the activities of possibly small indigenous groups eager to persecute or expel them. Some of these indigenous groups use opportunities presented by elections to spread their message; others engage in crude street violence reminiscent of the Nazis in Weimar Germany. Both France and Germany have recently seen examples of these kinds of clashes, which may increase throughout the affluent part of Europe if further large-scale immigration takes place – whether from Eastern Europe or the Islamic world.

Thirdly, we may see more examples of immigrants arriving suddenly and without permission in large numbers in response to political or economic breakdown at home. The clearest case of this kind recently was the mass emigration of Albanians to the eastern coast of Italy. The decision to refuse the would-be immigrants admission caused severe public order problems for the authorities, particularly in Brindisi. There would, of course, have been added and wider risks to societal stability if there had been a significant

community of Albanians already established in Italy but in the particular case this was not so. Sudden migrant flows of this kind may materialise almost anywhere in the future. Some may come from North Africa, though transportation difficulties may militate somewhat against this. Others may move from one European country to another. Presumably for the most part they will be heading in a westerly direction. But it should not be assumed that wealthy EC states will be the sole destinations. Czechoslovakia, for example, fears a flood of migrants from its even less well-off neighbours in the CIS. Governments in this kind of situation may face public order problems whatever their response: would-be immigrants and their sympathisers might resist if repatriation were the broad approach; domestic xenophobes might take to the streets if a broad policy of leniency were adopted. Italy has already been cited as an example of the former; whereas Germany has seen something of this latter danger, particularly in the former German Democratic Republic, where Polish economic migrants were permitted to arrive in considerable numbers in 1991. Clearly the extent of this particular threat to public order in the long run largely depends on whether the governments concerned can evolve a collectively-agreed policy for preventing sudden, uncontrolled flows of immigrants. But this is easier said than done and may involve unpleasantly repressive restrictions on the movement of citizens of states which have recently adopted Western-style democratic constitutions.

Finally, ethnically-distinct groups may engage in violence on behalf of an external sponsoring state. Normally in the past this has not involved large-scale public order disturbances but assassinations of selected individuals or, exceptionally, planting bombs on Western airlines. For example, Libya even boasted in the early 1980s of its determination to pursue emigrants who had fled from the Tripoli regime to West European countries. And the present Bulgarian government has stated that its Communist predecessor acted similarly in the streets of Paris and London, though without proclaiming it. The end of the Cold War probably means that this kind of threat to societal security in Western Europe at least will sharply diminish. Clearly none of the new regimes in Eastern Europe, if they survive, will imitate their Communist predecessors and not only because political exile is now a thing of the past.

But even the unreformed anti-Western regimes in the Third World may also have to mend their ways. For countries like Libya can no longer count on exploiting the former ideological split between East and West. For example, at the height of the Cold War there would have been no concerted UN pressure on Libya of the kind that it has experienced over the Lockerbie affair. And all the indications are that the UN Security Council is so far only flexing its muscles in comparison with what it may eventually do if similar outrages occur in future. Moreover, not only a relatively weak state, such as Libya, may be effectively put in the dock, but Syria and Iran may also suffer the same fate if their conduct should be sufficiently provocative. This may come to apply also to blatantly violent acts which are perpetrated not only in Europe itself but against European (and North American) citizens, embassies, airliners and businesses anywhere in the world.

We must now review the prospects for some other 'terrorist' activities and violations of public order that are essentially unrelated to ethnicity and

statehood. First, we must consider the so-called 'single issue' fanatics. They include those who campaign violently on behalf of animal rights; those who oppose nuclear power; and those who become obsessed with any one of the various 'green' issues. There seems little reason to suppose that recent developments in Europe should make much difference one way or the other to these groups or individuals and hence one might expect the 1990s to resemble the 1980s from this point of view. But maybe the virtual collapse of Marxism-Leninism as a focus of ideological appeal has a certain relevance in that some young idealists, thus rendered 'homeless', may be drawn into extremist behaviour on behalf of broadly 'green' rather than broadly 'class' causes such as the Baader-Meinhof group favoured. Similarly, waves of student violence of the kind seen particularly in 1968 may not recur in the 1990s – at least not with any neo-Marxist underpinning. Indeed, students throughout Europe seem at present to be quiescent and generally uninterested in ideologies. But history may not have quite ended where student protest is concerned. What could reawaken the sleeping campus giants? Possibly the catalyst could be widening recognition of the remarkably divergent quality of the provision for higher education in a variety of European countries. This is not of course only an East–West contrast. For, even within the EC conditions vary greatly – with one of the poorer countries, Great Britain, making better provision, though for smaller numbers, than is the case with some of its wealthier neighbours.

Next we should mention violence related to trade disputes, typified in Great Britain in the mid-1980s by the public-order disturbances associated with the coalfields and the Wapping printing plant. There appears at present to be little prospect of Europe-wide disturbances of this kind as trade-union membership and power is generally in decline. But where traditional industries face rapid decline, problems may arise. And this may be in the face of opposition from official trade-union leadership. Eastern Europe will be more prone to this than Western Europe. In short, the erratic behaviour of the Romanian miners may find some imitators.

More prevalent in a period of relatively high unemployment may be violent protests by socially-deprived groups denied the chance ever to join highly-organised work-forces. Eastern Europe, where dislocation and disappointed expectations are likely to be widespread, seems particularly vulnerable. So too does the former German Democratic Republic if no economic miracle materialises. But even in the rest of the EC there may be growing protests by victims of what may be increasingly evident examples of uneven economic development. The 1992 Single Market may tend to accentuate the decline of population centres around the periphery of the EC, for example northern England (where riots occurred in 1991); parts of the Irish Republic; Calabria and Sicily; and remoter parts of Spain.

Finally, some attention needs to be given to leisure-related public-order problems. Football crowds, for example, have become increasingly troublesome throughout Western Europe during the 1980s, leading on occasion to fatalities. Will these problems increase in the 1990s? Will Eastern Europe experience the same phenomenon? Will other sports be affected? Again, holiday beaches and bars may increasingly be plagued with drink-related 'tribal' violence, particularly if ever larger numbers of industrial workers are

able to take advantage of cheaper air travel. Paradoxically, then, some of these problems will be exacerbated not by increasing poverty but by the increasing availability of leisure and rising living standards if these should become widespread features of the Europe of the 1990s.

9.4. Conclusion

Most 'terrorist' or public order incidents in the 1990s, as in the 1980s, may be episodic and unconnected so far as Europe as a whole is concerned. In Western Europe even the particularly acute areas of tension, Northern Ireland and the Basque country, seem likely to experience no very dramatic increase in violence and hence everyday life for most people will remain more-or-less normal. In short, road accident fatalities will continue greatly to exceed those caused by ETA and the PIRA.

It is probably only in Eastern Europe and the CIS that there appears to be a potential for a really dramatic escalation in the number of 'terrorist' incidents. But here we may be dealing with something that will be widely perceived to be akin to 'civil war' or 'anarchy' than to traditional problems of 'terrorism' and 'public order'.

Could such acute manifestations of crisis, if they intensify, even trigger international warfare? The answer so far as various small states is concerned is probably 'yes'. In short, a new era of Balkan Wars may be at hand. At present, however, there appears to be little likelihood that major powers, let alone states possessed of nuclear weapons, would easily allow themselves to be drawn into such warfare, particularly on opposing sides. On the other hand, nobody actually foresaw that the First World War would result from a 'terrorist' throwing a bomb in the remote Balkan town of Sarajevo.

Notes

(1) There is now a considerable literature on so-called 'terrorism' but much of it is purely descriptive or aimed at a popular market. In comparison with 'international relations' theoretical analysis is strikingly underdeveloped. Hence many works are marred by promiscuous and contradictory uses of the term 'terrorism' and there exists no serious general theory covering causation, prevention and termination of the various aspects of the phenomenon. Preliminary moves in this general direction may, however, be found in the works of Paul Wilkinson, especially his *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (1986). See also the thoughtful contribution of Conor Gearty, *Terror* (1991) – essentially a lawyer's perspective.

(2) In March 1979 a referendum in favour of devolution was carried by a slim majority but as James Callaghan, the then Labour prime minister, explained in his memoirs, 'this counted as a defeat as the Devolution Act had provided (against the Government's will) that 40 per cent of the total electorate must vote in favour, so with those who abstained added in, the total fell below the required figure' (Callaghan, 1987: 558).

PART III – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 10
Societal security and European security

This chapter reviews and comments upon our attempt to apply the analytical tool of societal security to the contemporary problems of European security. Section 10.1 reviews societal security as a concept, looking at its advantages, problems and scope for development. Section 10.2 explores possible strategies for dealing with societal insecurity on levels ranging from individual to European. Section 10.3 considers the relationship between societal security and the dynamics of the integration and fragmentation scenarios for Europe

10.1. Societal security as an analytical tool

One central purpose of the preceding chapters has been to contribute to the discussion about broadening security analysis beyond the traditional state-centric and largely military agenda. Our method has been to develop the concept of *societal security* in the context of the new security problems emerging in Europe since the ending of the Cold War. We are aware that the particularities of our European case study have skewed our presentation of the general concept. The purpose, however, was not just to write a book about the theory, but also to try to develop some insight into the novel and urgent security problems that are now unfolding in Europe.

Societal security, like other concepts in social science, can be seen as a kind of analytical lens, able to give an insight into familiar problems from a new perspective. Like all lenses it gives a partial view, making some things clearer and pushing others into the background. In this case, what is made clear is the importance of society as an independent variable in European security logic, and consequently the significance of identity, Europeanisation and migration as security issues. Although in some cases societies are closely linked to states, they are entities with independent influence in security matters. Their identities, the possible range of threats to them, and their possibilities for defensive action are thus part of the wider security problematique. In part societal security overlaps with the traditional concerns of state security, but in part it needs to be considered in its own right. The lens of societal security

emphasises that there are many circumstances in which the security of the state and the security of society do not line up and may well be opposed.

This lens offers particular advantages in examining contemporary Europe because the processes of integration in Western Europe and disintegration in post-communist Europe both bring society close to the centre of mainstream security dynamics. As demonstrated in Chapter 4 the process of integration pushes the societal security agenda into central focus. In turn, the societal security lens reveals problems in the dynamics of identity and integration that have not been adequately taken into account by integration theory. Chapters 5 and 6 show how the process of disintegration also puts societal security issues on centre stage, and indeed how the functioning of the social system as a whole is crucial to the security of both state and society. Given that structural realist theory is particularly sensitive to questions of political integration and disintegration (in terms of anarchy versus hierarchy as deep structure), analysis in terms of societal security fits comfortably into the structural realist approach that we used in our 1990 study.

The advantages of using societal security as an analytical tool can be summarised as follows:

(a) It gives a powerful insight into the security problems of Europe since the ending of the Cold War, enabling one to bring the issues of identity and migration into the broadening theoretical framework of the debate about security. It allows analysis of EC integration and Soviet disintegration to be combined with thinking about Europe's relations with its Islamic periphery, and thus to address systematically a neglected part of the policy agenda. Etienne Balibar has argued that racism and opposition to migrants are actually expressions of the crisis of the state, which is 'tending to disappear as a power-centralizing institution' (Balibar, 1991: 16f). This view is closely linked to the question of Europe.

(b) It identifies a crucial weakness in the logic of integration policy: namely that reactions against integration in the sphere of identity can easily become strong enough to halt, and possibly reverse, even a well-established process of integration. State sovereignty is thus not the only hurdle to be overcome in achieving integration; societal insecurity has also to be successfully addressed. Indeed, the current gap between political elites and mass opinion in many Western European states suggests that the societal hurdle may pose a greater difficulty for integration than the state one.

(c) Societal security offers an important extension of security theory. The elaboration of a concept of societal security has made clear that there is another social and collective focus in security analysis additional to the state, yet also standing in between the unrealistic extremes of individual and global referents for security. Security studies have traditionally been concerned about relationships amongst collectivities, and we have shown that one can remain within this tradition and yet include completely new dynamics and insights through the elevation of society to the status of a referent object beside the state.

Looking further ahead, societal security might well come to relate to recent discussions on the post-modern (vs. modern and pre-modern) state, which

could become a significant feature in the analysis of international relations (Coker, 1992; Cooper, 1992). The post-modern state is one in which society plays a dominant role in politics, and the state, heavily constrained by law and openness, is more its ringholder and servant than its master. Modern states represent the nineteenth-century project, in which government dominates society and economy, and the nation-state synthesis easily breeds social Darwinistic international relations. Pre-modern 'states' are those that have the institutional form of modern states, but in which governmental penetration of society is weak and contested, and in which pre-state social and political formations are still powerful elements. The contemporary international system is composed of a mixture of these three types, but the centre of power in the system is dominated by (mostly Western) post-modern states. Societal security is in many ways a natural concept for this type of heavily open and pluralist state, which is one reason why we have found it useful for examining the current situation in Europe.

There are also some problems and disadvantages in using societal security. The main ones that have come to our attention during the present work are:

(a) Society is an ambiguous referent object for security, particularly in terms of 'voice': how does a society speak? In order to cope with the needs of an international relations problematique, we have necessarily gone against sociological orthodoxy by treating society as a unit of analysis rather than as a process. We have made some progress in pinning down this unit in terms of ethno-national and/or religious identity groups, and in many, though not all cases, this helps to distinguish society from the state. There is, however, no doubt that society is a less coherent unit of analysis than the state, as illustrated by the difficult question: 'Who speaks for society if not the state?' The problem is one of many possible voices claiming to speak for society and the uncertain or contested legitimacy of these claims. Anyone can speak on behalf of society, claiming that a security problem has appeared. When should this be taken seriously? Does Le Pen speak for the French nation (and, if so, how is this nation defined)? Do fascist vigilantes 'speak' for their nation when they desecrate Jewish cemeteries or attack immigrants? Do liberal intellectuals, when they advocate human rights, compassion for refugees and multiculturalism? What is the interaction between the necessary 'voice' of society, and the 'ear' without which the voice gets no support? Societal security is less self-defining than state security, but not necessarily less real.

In thinking about this issue, it is important to avoid the image of an undifferentiated society. It is not society that is speaking but some institutions or actors in society. The normal situation is that the state speaks security in the name of society, i.e. with reference to a homogeneous, amorphous society that it allegedly represents, and the state has a clear focus and a voice. Then comes the theory of societal security and sounds as if it advocates that this homogeneous, amorphous society sometimes speaks on its own behalf. However, society is differentiated, full of hierarchies and institutions; some are better placed to speak on behalf of society than others. Society speaks through its institutions, but the state also exists as institutions in society. There is a 'unitary actor

problem' in the case of society more radical than the problem of states as unitary actors so often discussed in international relations. 'Society' never speaks, it is only there to be spoken for. And this is done all the time: a large part of politics is about speaking in the name of 'society' (Wæver, 1990c: 16, 19, 24, 28; Laclau, 1990: 89–92; Torfing, 1992: 14, 16–18) But there is a difference between this and speaking about 'security' in the name of society. We cannot predict who will voice the 'societal security' concerns, we can only see afterwards how much legitimacy an actor does have when trying to speak on behalf of society. Various actors do try this all the time. But they become consequential on a political scale only when society actively backs them up (as with neo-nazis in some cases in Germany), in contrast to situations where it doesn't (ultra-left groups performing terrorist acts in the name of a people that does not support them).

Only in rare situations like the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, do moments of self-evident representation of society by some – not elected but generally accepted – organ, like Civic Forum, occur. Much more common will be situations where the societal voice is controversial and only partly accepted. And in most cases the state will try to pre-empt other actors from taking on this function. Carl Schmitt claimed that the task of the state was to define enemy and friend, and if the state failed to do this, inevitably others would come forward and the state would loose its position and be replaced by the new power (1963 [1932], esp. 45–54) This, however, is not necessarily correct in the complex constellations that are evolving in Western Europe. There, as argued in Chapter 4, we might see the evolution of a division of labour or parting of the ways between state and society, where societal voices establish themselves as defenders of certain proclaimed identities, while the state goes on defending its sovereignty as a separate agenda.

(b) The concept of societal security can easily be taken as legitimising social violence and vigilanteeism outside the bounds of the government, and thereby undermining one of the foundations of public order. The idea that societies are a legitimate referent object for security opens the way for non-state actors to claim to speak or act for society. Examples of this include attacks in Germany, France, Britain, Spain and elsewhere against immigrant hostels, and on a larger scale in ex-Yugoslavia, where the breakdown of some government structures allows societal militias to take on their own deadly mission in pursuit of ethnic cleansing (Chapter 5). At the extreme, the concept offers potential for promoting primal anarchy, and the breakdown of government authority and security structures. Societal security cannot avoid the risk of legitimising non-state security policy. Accepting other voices speaking for society will always involve a de-legitimisation of the state that 'should' be the protector of society. It then becomes a problem that anyone can try to speak on behalf of society.

The closeness to fascist ideology is troubling: is it therefore inadvisable to raise this agenda of societal security? Isn't there a risk that the result is to legitimise xenophobic and nationalist reactions against foreigners or

against integration – 'We are just defending our societal security!'? This could be a risk, but it seems to us a risk we have to take. This danger has to be offset against the necessity to use the concept of societal security to try to understand what is actually happening: the social construction of societal insecurity. Our main interest is not whether this or that increases or decreases societal security, but what processes trigger the definition among specific groups of an issue as 'a threat to societal security'. And when issues become addressed as societal security matters, they take on a specific urgency and drama which in itself often leads to conflict escalation. Our approach would seem to be a necessary precondition for understanding either how to avoid issues being constructed as societal security in the first instance, or failing that of handling them moderately (as societal security) in the second instance. The dynamics of societal security – and the fear reactions involved – can be channelled better if understood than if ignored, and without understanding there can be no sound basis for security strategy.

(c) It is not easy to draw a clear boundary between 'societal' and 'social' security, not least because of serious ambiguities in the understanding of society itself. What is 'society' and how does it relate to individuals? How strong do shared identities have to be before we can speak of 'society', and how might one measure such things? Sociology has no clear answers and tends to reject the idea of society as a unit of analysis that is essential to our approach. The difficulties are formidable, though the security logic that societies can be actors or units (and targets or victims) is strongly supported by dozens of cases all across the world map. If the answer is reductionist – that society is the sum of the individuals that compose it – then it becomes exceedingly difficult to draw a line between social and societal security. If the answer is structural – that society is more than the sum of its parts – then it is possible to follow the path taken in this study and set collective criteria that distinguish societal from social security. As the discussion of the welfare state in Chapter 8 suggests, however, this does not wholly escape the problem of economy and welfare as intervening variables linking social and societal security. We are aware that we have only touched lightly on this problem and that much more remains to be said.

(d) Societal security, like other security concepts, carries the danger that it draws attention to security as if it is a good thing and consequently sets the achievement of security as a policy goal. Aside from the difficulties of ever achieving full security and the paradoxes of policies that generate more security problems than they solve, this approach masks the preferred option of de-securitisation. The long-run objective is not to achieve societal security, but to move the issues off the security agenda altogether, leaving them to be dealt with by the processes of civil society. If the language of societal security has still to be used, then the problem is not resolved. The ideal situation is not to be concerned about security, but to handle issues and disagreements normally as everyday politics, not as existentially threatening. In this regard societal security is no different from security generally.

As noted above, we are aware that our theoretical analysis has been shaped by the need to address the European case. We do not think that the utility of the concept is confined to Europe: it could also be useful in looking at other parts of the world, most obviously at weak states in the periphery of the international system. It applies therefore to development theory and state theory generally. In an important way the concept transcends the border between political theory and international relations theory. It is relevant for international relations theory where societies cross state boundaries, where migration is politically significant, and where domestic problems of societal insecurity spill over state boundaries.

In this book quite a lot of the specifications of societal security are particular to Europe. The relatively close identification of society with ethnonational communities is not universally valid, and especially in the United States one would have to rethink seriously what the basic societal units are (at a given time), and what the logic of this kind of social organisation is. Although it can be claimed that race, gender, religion, class and nation are all equivalent in their function of articulating ideas of conjunction and disjunction in political discourse, of categorising political space, it still does make a difference whether society is founded on the basis of one logic or the other. Thus, in the case of the United States one would be able to study societal security, but would probably have to take one step back, basing the analysis mainly on the more abstract elaborations in Chapters 2 and 3, and elaborating the logic of different kinds of societal units. In the case of Africa, one would probably find a third logic, where 'nations' play a prominent role, but where the historical foundations as well as the evolving state-forms are so different that the resulting interplay of state security and societal security will need a rather different theoretical elaboration before the conceptual apparatus can be applied. We would expect the lens of societal security to be useful in these and other cases, but we do not claim that the analysis of this book can be directly re-applied to other cases with different social and historical experiences without substantial further development and modification. The general problematique of societal security needs to be evaluated separately from the specific European forms investigated here.

We are also aware that there is quite a bit of unfinished business in unfolding the concept of societal security as it relates to the main body of security analysis. If we think of societies as units, do we therefore have to think in terms of societal security dilemmas between them as suggested in Chapter 3? Such an idea would require further investigation into the interplay of identities. Societal security dilemmas would have to occur within, between or through states. Thought would need to be given as to how these societal dynamics were mediated not only between and through states (in the anarchic dimension), but also as to whether and how the character of state and governmental organisation and ideology affects societal security (in the hierarchic dimension).

10.2. Societal insecurity: the question of strategy

What is the range of possible responses to societal insecurity raised by the discussion in the preceding chapters? We do not seek to develop any complete or coherent prescription here: such a task would require another book. Rather, the task is to clarify and concentrate, and to provide some commentary on the general problem of formulating strategies to meet problems of societal insecurity. Any security agenda requires consideration of strategy: if there is a security problem, then policy needs strategy if it is to be effective. With societal security, especially in the post-modern Western European environment, the first problem is strategy for whom and by whom? Societal security has a whole spectrum of possible actors and objects ranging from the individual, through society and the state, to the EC. In relation to our European case study, the question of actors is substantially influenced by which scenario dominates. Fragmentation emphasises the merging of society and state, and so pushes towards the state as the key policy actor, and minorities as the main issue. Integration separates state and society, and so pushes the locus of policy away from the state, towards society and towards the EC. Societal security also raises the same questions of strategy as other types of security. Is the strategy to be aimed at reducing vulnerabilities or at reducing threats? Is it to be offensive or defensive?

In relation to migration, for example, ladders of offensive and defensive escalation are already visible within the domestic forum of receiving societies. Responses to immigrants can move from the local to the national political level. Low on the offensive rungs are the kind of individual responses that result in shifting property prices and rearrangement of the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods. Defensive responses at this level include tolerance and promotion of multiculturalism. Towards the middle on the offensive side are more violent responses in which (usually right-wing) groups use violence and murder against immigrants, and attempt to establish the legitimacy of their claim to represent and defend the 'national interest'. The defensive counterpoint are mass anti-racist movements of the type that proved successful in Britain. If these have any success, the way is open for the formation of collective political movements to attempt to capture and hold ground in national politics. Movement up the offensive ladder is well advanced in France and Germany. Indeed, as we write the process in Germany seems to be reaching a point at the top of the middle rungs with both offensive and defensive mobilisations. In Spain the first stages of violence and murder being used against the rising numbers of immigrants seem to be under way (*The Economist*, 21 November 1992: 59). It should also be noted that even with these escalations, racial violence in Western Europe is still low compared with an apparently more fully multicultural society in the United States.

For threatened societies, one obvious line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure that the society reproduces itself effectively. The German idea of *Kulturnation* expresses this strategy, and the way in which a dispersed group like the Jews have maintained a strong culture while being embedded in other societies suggests some

of the methods that might be deployed: language and religious teaching, observance of special days and rituals, maintenance of cultural symbols and dress, and suchlike. In theory, this defensive approach could go in either of two directions: it can become exclusivist, requiring ethno-cultural purity and strict territorial identity, or it can be cosmopolitan and multicultural, accepting cultural mixture in economic, political and some cultural life, while nevertheless maintaining group identity.

When taken up by minority groups, the exclusivist route can lead to terrorism (the Basques, Northern Ireland), or secessionism and state-seeking (the former Soviet Union, Slovakia, Scotland). When taken up by a dominant group or state, this approach typically leads to a homogenising state seeking to impose a single 'national' identity on a diverse set of societal identities. This may take the form of vigilantes (Germany, France, Spain), or of imposing a dominant culture (Sinification, Russification, and suchlike), or a homogenising political ideology such as communism or some religion. The typical object of threat is a minority society trapped within a state that is antagonistic to its cultural survival: for example, Russians in many of the new CIS states, Muslims in Bosnia, Hungarians in Slovakia, Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, Armenians in Azerbaijan, and many more. The strategy ranges from suppression of cultural expression and education, through ghettoisation, forced migration or internal colonisation, to persecution, mass rape or conversion, ethnic cleansing and genocide.

The more cosmopolitan, multicultural route also has problems. Multiculturalism has not been a conspicuous success in many of the places in which it has been tried. Opening societal identity, as was done in Canada, Britain and the United States, has arguably deepened cultural and political divisions and weakened the social cohesion of the state. Canada may not survive as a state. Britain, France and Germany face unresolved tensions between a homogenising view of citizenship and a multicultural reality. The United States has deep ethnic divides and is beginning to lose the cohesion of a single shared language. The opposite strategy of using a mixture of coercion and propaganda to absorb a variety of cultures into an overarching new identity has failed even more spectacularly in the formerly communist world. As soon as coercive constraints were lifted, the Soviet and Yugoslav states quickly shattered along traditional ethno-national and religious lines, despite, in the Soviet case, seven decades of ruthless application of a homogenising strategy. There does not appear to be an easy answer.

In the United States and Germany this question is discussed as *multiculturalism* and in France as the question of *citizenship* and nationality, of pluralism and patriotism. The American dilemma is that according to the *zeitgeist* we now acknowledge that different communities are different, that they therefore have to study differently in universities, go to job interviews differently, etc. – if not it is cultural imperialism on behalf of the majority group. The problem is that this threatens to destroy any standards across groups, any ability to measure, compare or, in the end, communicate. The melting pot turns into ghettoisation and segregation: ultimately into private language (cf. Berman, 1992). In Germany, the theme is whether Germany is or should be multicultural, or whether this is an unacceptable negation of the nation-state

status that has just been re-established. In this debate it has been argued that there will soon be a United States of Europe, and then – of course – we will all be living in a multicultural society (Geissler, 1991): an interesting case of the Europe factor potentially softening a domestic conflict.

In France, there are deep problems relating to the Jacobin tradition (Safran, 1991; Wæver *et al.*, forthcoming) and the (in principle) very open definition of nationality facing waves of immigrants who are allegedly 'less close' than those France assimilated successfully in the past. One relatively widely accepted view is that the different groups should have a right to their own culture, without people developing exclusive communities; i.e. avoiding separate schools for each nationality and suchlike. The hardline Jacobin approach is to demand loyalty from everyone to the 'true' values in order to gain entrance (i.e. being open to newcomers but setting very strict criteria for admittance). The pluralist approach is to accept a right to be different (*droit à la différence*) including ethnic self-assertiveness. The compromise is to gamble on process, i.e. to be relatively open minded as to what is accepted within the institutions, for instance in the schools, and then to hope that assimilation actually works *de facto*. But even compromise raises a crucial question: what is the limit of that which is culture in relation to that which is part of the institutional set up of state and society? As in the French affair of the *foulards* – three North African girls wearing Muslim head covering – the question is whether this is culture, or whether it hits fundamental societal values about the individual, sexual equality, and the separation of church and state. The two sides are not easily separable. Culture includes different relationships among the sexes, different principles for children's behaviour, and many other issues that easily touch on law or basic codes for organising socio-political institutions.

At the very least, these difficult experiences point to a problem for the great integrative experiment now under way in the EC. The EC is both a voluntaristic union, and one being forged amongst states and nations remaining *in situ*, and therefore no direct lessons can be learned from either North America (forged from immigrants) or the coerced union of the communist world. But some strategy is necessary to deal with the potential for societal insecurity in the European integration process. One possibility is to make 'identity constellations' a central focus. What are stable and unstable combinations of societal identity? What European level identity will trigger panic in what nations? What kind of national identity threatens neighbours or minorities? In a strategic, action-oriented, perspective 'identity management' in Europe can become a key structuring issue for societal security, and since societal security is climbing the security agenda generally, this means that the overall direction of European security since the end of the Cold War might very well be decisively influenced by the issue of which of the possible patterns and constellations of collective identities in Europe actually crystallises. The distribution of different kinds of political and cultural identities at different (European, national and regional) levels will be a central factor in determining the viability of an integration process that seeks to leave behind the fixed and clear pivotal role of the modernist nation-state as the main identity carrier, and to replace it with a more open and multi-layered post-

modern identity. If Western Europe is to transcend its own invention of the nation-state (which it subsequently imposed on the rest of the planet), then it has to solve this problem. The question can be seen as one of redefining European civilisation in terms of a non-violent conflict culture that extends not only to relations between states, but also to relations between societies – *international* relations in the fullest sense.

The solution suggestion in Chapter 4 was that development of an overarching European identity is necessary in order to back up the institutions required to stabilise the new Europe. This identity should not develop as an ethno-cultural one, but stress the political community side as much as possible. The new identity landscape should be seen not as a competition between the new sovereignty and the old national identities and states, but as a complex pattern of different kinds of politics and identities on several different levels, including the European one. There has to be a sense of the whole as well as of the parts. The stability of this new Europe will not rest solely either on the old state or nation level, or on the new European institutions and identity, but rather on the network of institutions and arrangements among them. The units will have to be stable in themselves if the whole construction is to be stable.

One problem in pursuing identity management in this context is the homogenising impact of international capitalism on societies. Continuous pressure to adopt global fashions, styles, behaviours, languages, ways of thinking, patterns of consumption, economic organisation and suchlike corrodes local cultures by disrupting their generational reproduction. An internationalised market political economy requires states and societies to be relatively open, meaning that they must not treat the great bulk of economic and societal transactions as threats. Preferably, though not necessarily, they should also be militarily transparent and politically tolerant (that is, pluralist; see Buzan and Segal, 1992). Even in the quite closely matched societies within the EC, single market harmonisations have had substantial impacts on the link between products and practices on the one hand, and societal identities on the other, examples ranging from rules on beer, crisps and sausages to rules on abortion and human rights. These impacts have played an important role in making societal insecurity a threat to the process of integration in the EC.

Analysis of this emerging political order will have to focus *inter alia* on the self-perceived firmness of the societal units – do they feel threatened, by what or whom, and what will decide what direction their reactions take? This seems to be the key dynamic determining the direction Western European politics will take in the 1990s. Attempts to shape and organise this new order should perhaps downgrade its interest in 'architecture', overall logic and institutional consistency, and take seriously whether the micro-level becomes stable or will strike back. Previously one could largely ignore this level since the nations were generally controlled by the states, but this is no longer the case. Nations and societies emerge as units in their own right, units concerned about their security. Through the concept of societal security we end up at last actually studying 'national' security, which is probably the key to European security. Given the hazards of a European ethno-nationalism for the integration project, the kind of identity that an integrating Europe takes on must

be a political identity of Franco-American style civic republicanism. A Euro-ethno-nationalism would not only threaten the viability of integration, but also risk inflaming Europe's relations with the Middle East. The civic republican solution to Europe's identity problem might help to avoid the dangers of societal cold war between Europe and its southern periphery discussed in Chapter 7.

In terms of foreign policy strategies more generally, attempts at closure – whether economic or cultural – would seem to have limited prospects. Isolation from the international economy has very high costs, and would stand in contradiction to the triumph of liberalism in the Cold War. Participation in the global economy necessitates a substantial degree of openness to the movement of goods, ideas, information and people.

Within this context there is considerable scope for maintaining and extending intergovernmental arrangements between Europe and Third World states to manage migration. Sending and receiving countries share some objectives. The demand for cheap labour in industrial countries means that, as in the United States, there will always be substantial tolerance for immigrants even when the official policy is to exclude them. There is a spectrum of workable administrative solutions to some aspects of unwanted migration, ranging from internal defences, such as stiffer border controls and criteria for entry, to more forward defences in the form of buffer zones and or targeted aid, investment and development policies to create long-term incentives for people to stay in their own societies. Up to a point, the Japanese-style policy of capital export (versus labour import) may work as a strategy against migration, though it requires both serious attention to sustained adaptation of one's own society and economy. Development strategies probably have the short-term effect of increasing migration. In the long term, they face two difficulties: first, lack of any development model that is guaranteed effective; and, secondly, concerns that success will eventually breed rival powers. Receiving countries will nevertheless support it for at least three reasons: the need to be seen by their electorates to be doing something acceptable; avoiding the problem of raising civil liberties and human rights issues by taking repressive measures against migrants; and the possibility that aid will not so much reduce incentives to migrants, but give receiving governments leverage over sending ones to take more vigorous repressive measures themselves. Sending countries will seize it as a powerful justification for aid demands at a time when their other sources of political leverage have been weakened by the ending of the Cold War. All of these strategies are more difficult if the sending country has effectively collapsed, for example, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, Yugoslavia.

As argued in Chapter 6, pursuit of closure strategies would also exacerbate minority problems all through the former communist world. Openness, transparent borders and acceptance of human rights agreements have some chance of mitigating or preventing disputes among the successor states about minorities from one nation(-state) embedded in the territory of another (Russians in Kazakhstan, Hungarians in Romania, Armenians in Azerbaijan, and many more). But openness also has serious risks. If it is seen as derogating from newly acquired sovereignty, or interpreted as interventionism, it could lead to

backlash and worsening relations. There are no easy or safe solutions to the complex and unfriendly system of new international relations that results from the set of modernist (and some pre-modern) state-building projects in the former communist world.

This section has done no more than suggest some key areas where strategies for societal security will be needed, and to offer some initial thoughts about possible lines of action and their consequences. To the extent that the analysis offered here is valid, there will soon be a growing demand for strategic thinking in relation to societal security on issues ranging from migration and public order, through European integration, to questions of foreign policy towards (and intervention in) the turbulent regions to the east and south of the EC core.

10.3. Societal security and the dynamics of integration versus fragmentation

This book argues that post-Cold War developments in Europe can be understood using the idea of societal security. If society rather than the state is made the central focus of security analysis, then a new policy agenda and a new set of causal dynamics come clearly into view. This tactic does not remove the state from security analysis, but it does shift it off centre stage: it puts more of the 'national' back into 'national security'. In Europe, society is largely defined by ethno-national identity. In the Western half, the integration process threatens to undo the classical European political order of nation-states, leaving the nations exposed within a larger European political framework. With rising fears of migration and loss of local political control, this project has profoundly divided some European peoples from their political leaderships. Societal insecurity has been the mainspring of the crisis over Maastrich and has arguably replaced state sovereignty as the key to success or failure of European integration. In the Eastern half, national identity has rapidly become the driving force of post-Soviet political reorganisation, raising myriad problems of boundaries, minorities and organising ideologies to plague the relations of this vast new international subsystem. The interplay of societal insecurities in West and East will shape not only the fate of the integration project in the West, but also the prospects for political stability in the East and the future of Europe's relations with its Islamic periphery.

In sum, societal insecurity goes a long way towards explaining both the crisis of integration in the West and the crises of disintegration in the East. It is therefore playing a central role in shaping the balance between the fragmentation and integration scenarios on which our overall analysis rests. The danger is that it could become decisive in favour of fragmentation. In the ex-communist world it has already played a major role in the breakup of the Soviet Empire that has extended 'Europe' eastwards. In the West it has raised a major challenge to the next stages of the integration project, stalling the move towards European union at a point where demand pull from international society for a coherent European actor is rising strongly. Both the move to a wider Europe incorporating the modernist nation-state projects in the East and the weakening of support for integration within several of the core EC members tend to shift the balance in favour of fragmentation. Can it

be said that either integration or fragmentation is now dominant in Europe?

Integration has a powerful momentum which cannot easily be stopped or significantly wound back. This momentum is not so much resident in enthusiasm for European union in and of itself, which is a minority position, especially in northern Europe. Instead it resides in fear of the alternatives, and fear of the costs of unravelling what has already been achieved. Fear of fragmentation is very powerful, not just because of the concern about the revival of classical European security complex dynamics, but more because the diseconomies of scale of the European states as independent economic and political actors is well understood by all of them. All realise that anything like full fragmentation would reduce them to insignificance as international actors, threatening the security and stability they have enjoyed during the last four decades. There is some fear that Germany alone might be able to escape this logic, and any hint of German hegemony would create a strong push towards balance of power behaviour in Europe. For all, integration is strongly driven by cost-efficiency considerations relating to military and foreign policy capability, and to the organisation of research, production and markets. All are trapped in the openness already created, where the single market drives significant, but little appreciated, integration at police, customs, immigration and other administrative levels. Fear of fragmentation is rooted in consequences that spread from the local level in Europe to Europe's position in the international system. Within Western Europe the fear is of economic inefficiency and a resurgence of balance of power behaviour and concern with relative gains. Within the larger Europe, the fear is that fragmentation will weaken Europe's ability to handle the possible collapse of the attempt to establish a capitalist-democratic social system in Russia and other post-communist states. Some sort of EC/European union construction is the best hope both for preventing this collapse and for containing its consequences for the West if it does occur. On the global level, the fear is that fragmentation would both eliminate Europe from the top rank, where a new power rivalry among the United States, Japan and (possibly) Europe is unfolding in the techno-economic sphere, and expose it to domination, penetration and exploitation by the more coherent and dynamic centres of capitalist power.

But the forward momentum of integration has crashed into a wall of public disaffection and genuine resistance at the state and societal levels to the dissolution of existing state structures that would be the very obvious consequence of the next integrative steps. This disaffection varies a lot in style, form and intensity from country to country. Its most serious feature is the gap that has opened up between political leaderships, with most mainstream parties favouring Maastricht, and publics, who are much more divided on the matter. On such a major constitutional issue this gap is insupportable in pluralist democracies, not least because it creates prospects for political dissidents to appeal to the 'unrepresented' masses. Even if political elites succeed (as now seems likely) in getting the Maastricht Treaty ratified, the tension will not die away. Large struggles remain over implementation, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) project is in ruins, and the cost of achieving ratification has been to strengthen the availability of opt-outs to new members. Opt-outs increase the likelihood of a smaller, weaker

European core, and a looser construction of overlapping circles with differing degrees of integration on different issues (Wæver, forthcoming c).

Foreign policy issues also threaten integration by promoting the logic of relative gains which existing EC institutions are still too weak to contain. During 1991, the Yugoslav crisis demonstrated this clearly, with Germany, France and Britain pulling in different directions over questions of recognition and intervention. A collapse in the East might well repeat this process on a larger scale, adding to the existing crisis of integration. The immediate effects of such a collapse would be very unevenly distributed. In the short run Germany would be strongly affected, and Great Britain and France only slightly. It would be tempting for France and Britain to improve their short-term power position relative to Germany by allowing it to carry most of the burden.

Did the Danish and French referendums send a useful warning signal to elites, who may now steer a more careful course in relation to public anxieties? Note the recent headline appearing in the influential German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (6 October 1992). 'The EC will relieve the people of the fear of losing "national identity" '. Or is the nationalist genie out of the bottle in both East and West, permanently damaging the integration process, pushing it at best towards the British position of co-operation rather than union? The first understanding would see integration slowed down and made more complicated, but still essentially on course. Then the key question is how wide the EC becomes, and what relations it establishes with the states and peoples on its periphery. Successful integration implies a Europe of concentric circles, with European union as its core. The second understanding sees integration derailed, with the nation-states seizing more power back to themselves, the assumption of integration fading into the background, and the calculus of balance of power behaviour increasingly becoming dominant both within Western Europe, and in the policies of external powers such as Russia, Japan and the United States towards the Western European states. Then the key questions are about the dynamics of the new European security complex explored briefly in Chapter 1.

In the longer run, our view is that this choice has to be resolved in one direction or the other. As demonstrated, *inter alia*, by the crises over the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and by the rise of societal insecurities within the EC, the EC cannot hover forever in its present halfway house. The position between '1992' and Maastricht is inherently unstable. It contains too much integration for existing institutions to handle the consequences and too little to override the calculus of relative gains amongst the European powers in the rough and tumble of international politics, trade and finance.

At the moment the result of this collision is impasse: both going forward and going back are unacceptable. In the short and medium term (say the next ten years, unless a collapse of democracy in Russia forces a more rapid resolution of the choice on Western Europe) the political process of integration will become – indeed, is already – so complex and protracted that it can serve as a temporary substitute for a more decisive outcome. The stability of this situation depends on maintenance of the understanding that the direction is still towards integration even if there is no forward movement, or

some actual reverses of the ERM type. But if the understanding shifts towards an expectation of disintegration, then the impasse will no longer be sustainable.

The most likely outcome is that the impasse remains stable for several years. Within it there are all sorts of possibilities for variable speed and concentric circle versions of integration to emerge. This combination of complexity and impasse offers a framework for a political discourse that can continue for a time to fudge hard choices in the guise of considering technical problems of implementation, resolving complicated configurations of national interest and avoiding a domestic crisis for any of the members. The impasse might be seen as a new round of Euro-sclerosis during which the crisis is addressed, or merely works its way through over time, and prepares the foundations for a later burst of acceptable integration like the '1992' phase from 1986 to 1991 following the sclerosis of the 1970s.

If impasse becomes an interim scenario for the next decade, then societal security will be one of the main forces in play shaping the outcome. It will do so not only in the integration process in the EC, but also in the modernist nation-state projects in ex-communist Europe, whose outcome (first, but not only, in former Yugoslavia) will of course be one major pressure affecting the EC process itself. And anyone who thinks that this is just a European issue need look only at India, where the rise of militant Hindu 'nationalism' is opening up societal insecurity on a truly gigantic scale.

The danger inherent in accepting a period of Euro-sclerosis is, however, much greater than last time, since the forces of fragmentation are stronger after the Cold War, and there is a risk of falling further into internal rivalry than was imaginable within the framework of East–West overlay. It is still not yet sufficiently appreciated how much the ending of the Cold War has changed both the international position and significance of the EC project. The EC is no longer cocooned by the surrounding stability of superpower standoff. The risks of delaying the creation of a more coherent European foreign and security policy are formidable. Given the rapid emergence of a serious demand pull for European policy from the Balkans and from the former Soviet empire, delay increases the risk of destructive feedback into the still fragile integration process. It poses hard choices for the United States and the United Nations about the level and type of their engagement or intervention into these areas. The choices they make will shape relations for decades to come, and this means that Europe's present paralysis is not just a passing cost. It puts its fate substantially into the hand of others, and has consequences that will affect the development of Europe itself for many years into the future.

References

'A Survey of Defence in the 21st Century', *The Economist*, 5 September 1992.

Abadan-Unat, Nermin (1992), 'East–West Versus South–North Migration: Effects Upon the Recruitment Areas of the 1960s', *International Migration Review*, vol. 26:2, pp. 401–12.

Adams, James (1986), *The Financing of Terror*, Sevenoaks: New English Library.

Akiner, Shirin (1983), *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*, London: Kegan.

Alstadt, Audrey L. (1986), 'Azerbaijani Turks' Response to Russian Conquest', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. XIX:3/4, pp. 266–86.

Anderson, Benedict (1983), *Imagined Communities: The Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.

Angell, Norman (1912), *The Great Illusion: A Study of The Relation of Military Power to National Advantage*, London: Heinemann.

Arendt, Hannah (1958), *The Human Condition*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Armstrong, John Alexander (1982), *Nations before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Aron, Raymond (1973 [1966]), *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, New York: Anchor Press.

—— (1970 [1967]), *Main Currents in Sociological Thought, 2: Durkheim, Pareto, Weber*, London: Penguin.

Ashley, R. K. (1989), 'Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance', in E.-O. Czempiel and J. N. Rosenau (eds) *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, pp. 251–90.

—— (forthcoming), *Statecraft as Mancraft*.

Astourian, Stephan H. (1987), 'On the Rise of Azerbaijani National Identity and Armeno-Azerbaijani Relations', *Armenian Review*, vol. 40:3, pp. 33–45.

Badie, Bertrand (1986), *Les Deux États – pouvoir et société en Occident et en terre d'Islam*, Paris: Fayard.

Balibar, Étienne, (1991), 'Es Gibt Keinen Staat im Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today', *New Left Review*, no. 186, pp. 5–19.

Banac, Ivo (1984), *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Banks, Martin (1991), 'State Theory and the Post-Cold War World' in M. Banks and M. Shaw (eds) *State and Society in International Relations*, London: Harvester/ Wheatsheaf, pp. 1–18.

Bebler, Anton (1992), 'The Yugoslav Crisis and the "Yugoslav People's Army" ', *Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung*, no. 23.

Beetham, David (1985 [1974]), *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2nd edition.

Bell, Daniel (1976), *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, New York: Basic Books.

Bell, J. Bowyer (1983), *The Secret Army: The IRA 1916–1979*, Dublin: The Academy Press.

—— (1987), *The Gun in Politics: An Analysis of Irish Political Conflict, 1916–1986*, New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books.

Ben-Israel, Hevda (1992), 'Nationalism in Historical Perspective', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 45:2, pp. 367–98.

Benjamin, Roger, Martin O. Heisler and B. Guy Peters (1988), 'External Challenges, Domestic Masters: State and Policy in the International Environment', Paper prepared for presentation in the 14th World Congress of the International Political Science Association; Washington, DC, September 1988.

Berki, R. N. (1986), *Security and Society*, London: J. M. Dent & Sons.

Berlin, Isaiah (1982), *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*, London: Penguin.

—— (1978) 'Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power', *Partisan Review* 1978, reprinted in *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*, 1982.

—— (1991), *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Berman, Paul (ed.) (1992), *Debating P.C: The Controversy over Political Correctness on College Campuses*, New York: Laure.

Bloom, William (1990), *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bogatyrov, Aleksei, Mikhail Kozhokin and Konstantin Pleshakov (1992), 'Natsional'-nyi interes v rossiiskoi politike', *Svobodnaya Mysl'*, no. 5, pp. 34–44.

Bole-Richard, Michel (1992), 'Dire Strait to a promised land . . .', *Le Monde*, 24 October; reprinted in *Guardian Weekly*, 8 November, p. 14.

Bolten, José J. (1991), 'From Schengen to Dublin: The New Frontiers of Refugee Law', in H. Meifers *et al.* (eds) *Schengen: Internationalisation of Central Chapters of the Law on Aliens, Refugees, Security and Police*, Kluwer: W.E.J. Jyeank Willink.

Boserup, Anders (1986), Presentation on the concept of security at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen.

—— (1987), 'Staten, samfundet og krigen hos Clausewitz' in Carl von Clausewitz, *Om Krig, bind III: kommentarer og registre*, Copenhagen: Rhodos, pp. 911–30.

Boulton, Ralph (1992), 'CIS is Dissolved – Agreement in its Place', Reuter, 17 May; quoted in *Svenska Dagbladet*, 18 May.

Breton, Raymond (1990), *The Governance of Ethnic Communities*, New York: Greenwood Press.

Bugge, Peter (1993), 'The Inter-war Years', in Pim den Boer, Peter Bugge and Ole Waever, *History of the European Idea*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Bull, Hedley (1976), 'Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations: The Second Martin Wight Memorial Lecture', *British Journal of International Studies*, vol. 2:2, pp. 101–16.

—— (1977a), *The Anarchial Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Macmillan: London.

—— (1977b), 'Introduction: Martin Wight and the study of international relations', in Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977.

—— (1979), 'The State's Positive Role in World Affairs', *DÆDALUS*, vol. 108:4, pp.

111–24.

—— and Adam Watson (eds) (1984), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon.

Bunyan, T. (1991), 'Towards an Authoritarian European State', *Race and Class*, vol. 32:3, pp. 19–27.

Buzan, Barry (1984), 'Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case', *International Organization*, vol. 38:4, pp. 597–624.

—— (1991a [1983]), *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

—— (1991b), 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century', *International Affairs*, vol. 67:3, pp. 431–51.

—— (1992), 'Environment as a Security Issue', in Paul Painchaud (ed.), *Geopolitical Perspectives on Environmental Security*, Cahier du GERPE, no. 92–05, Université Laval, Quebec.

—— Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer and Ole Wæver (1990), *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Pinter.

—— Richard Little and Charles Jones (1993), *The Logic of Anarchy*, New York: Columbia University Press.

—— and Gerald Segal (1992), 'Introduction: Defining Reform as Openness', in Gerald Segal (ed.) *Openness and Foreign Policy Reform in Communist States*, London: Routledge, pp. 1–17.

—— and Ole Wæver (1992), 'Framing Nordic Security: European Scenarios for the 1990s and Beyond', in Jan Øberg (ed.), *Nordic Security in the 1990s: Options in the Changing Europe*, London: Pinter, pp. 85–104.

Callaghan, James (1987), *Time and Chance*, London: Collins.

Calleo, David P. and Benjamin M. Rowland (1973), *America and the World Political Economy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Callovi, Giuseppe (1992), 'Regulation of Immigration in 1993: Pieces of the European Community Jig-Saw Puzzle', *International Migration Review*, vol. 26:2, pp. 353–72.

Campanella, Miriam L. (1991), 'Proactive Policy-Making: The New Role of the State-Actor', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 26:4, pp. 480–99.

Carr, E. H. (1981 [1939]), *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919–1939*, London: Papermac.

Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène (1978), *L'Empire éclaté. La revolte des nations en URSS*, Paris: Flammarion.

—— (1990), *La Gloire des nations ou la fin de l'Empire soviétique*, Paris: Fayard.

Casey, J. (1982), 'One Nation: The Politics of Race', *Salisbury Review*, vol. 1:1, pp. 23–8.

Cassen, Bernard (1992), 'Un plan Marshall pour les pays de l'Est?', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February, p. 4.

Chay, Jongsuk (1990), *Culture and International Relations*, New York: Praeger.

Christophersen, Henning (1989), *Tanker om Danmark i det ny Europa*, Copenhagen: Børsens Forlag.

Clark, Ian (1989 [1980]), *The Hierarchy of States*, 2nd edn, Cambridge: BISA/ Cambridge University Press.

Coker, Christopher (1992), 'Post Modernity and the End of the Cold War: Has War Been Disinvented?', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 18:3, pp. 189–98.

Commission of the European Communities (1990), *Policies on Immigration and the Social Integration of Migrants in the European Community*, sec. (90) 1813, Brussels, 28 September.

Connolly, William E. (1988), *Political Theory and Modernity*, Oxford: Blackwell.

—— (1991), 'Democracy and Territoriality', *Millennium*, vol. 20:3, pp. 463–84.

Conquest, Robert (1986), *The Harvest of Sorrow*, London: Arrow Books.

Cooper, Robert (1992), 'A New World Order?', unpublished manuscript, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.

Curcio, C. (1958), *Europa, storia di un idea*, Florence.

Dahrendorf, Ralf (1985), *Law and Order*, Boulder: Westview Press.

—— (1990), 'Die Sache mit der Nation', *Merkur*, no. 500. vol. 44:10, pp. 823–34.

Defoe, D. (1899), 'True-born Englishman', in H. Morley (ed.), *The Earlier Life and Chief Earlier Works of Daniel Defoe*, London: George Routledge and Sons.

Delors, Jacques (1991), 'European Integration and Security', *Survival*, vol. 33:2, pp. 99–110.

den Boer, Pim and Peter Bugge and Ole Wæver (1993), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Dencik, Lars (1991), 'Social Conflict and Ethnicity – Some Conceptual Elaborations', in Helen Krag and Natalia Yukhneva (eds), *The Leningrad Minority Rights Conference – Papers*, Copenhagen: The Minority Rights Group Denmark, pp. 50–61.

Deudney, Daniel (1991), 'States and Republics in the Emergent Global Greater Synthesis', thinkpiece for the 'Wither the State? Security and the Nation-state' workshop at University of California, Santa Cruz, August.

Deutsch, Karl W. (1954), *Political Community at the International Level*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

—— et al. (1957), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dohse K. (1981), *Ausländische Arbeiter und bürgerlicher Staat, Genese und Funktion von staatlicher Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerrecht. Vom Kaiserrecht bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Königstein/Taunus: Verlag Anton Hain.

Dyson, Kenneth (1980), *The State-tradition in Western Europe*, Oxford: Martin Robertson.

'Eastern Europe . . . Central Europe . . . Europe' (1990), *DÆDALUS*, vol. 119:1.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (1991), 'Ethnicity versus Nationalism', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 28:3, pp. 263–78.

—— (1992), 'Linguistic Hegemony and Minority Resistance', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29:3, pp. 313–32.

Esser, H. and H. Korte (1985), 'Germany', in T. Hammar (1985), pp. 165–205.

Eurobarometer (1992), no. 37.

—— (1993), no. 38.

Featherstone, Mike (1990), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (also published as vol. 7:2–3 of *Theory, Culture and Society*), London: Sage.

Feshbach, Murray and Alfred Friendly, Jr. (1992), *Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature Under Siege*, London: Aurum Press.

FitzGerald, Mary C. (1992), 'Russia's New Military Doctrine', *Air Force Magazine*, September, vol. 75:9, pp. 76–78.

Foucault, Michel (1977), *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, New York.

—— (1978[1976]), *The History of Sexuality. An Introduction*, New York: Pantheon Books.

—— (1979), 'Governmentality', *Ideology and Consciousness*, vol. 6, pp. 5–21.

Foye, Stephen (1992), 'The Ukrainian Armed Forces: Prospects and Problems', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1:26, pp. 55–60.

Freedman, Lawrence and John Saunders (eds), (1991), *Population Change and European Security*, London: Brassey's.

Freeman, Gary P. (1979), *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: the French and British Experience 1945–75*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton

University Press.
—— (1986), 'Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 485, May, pp. 51–63.

Fryer, P. (1984), *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain*, London: Pluto Press.

Fuller, Elizabeth (1992), 'Nagorno-Karabakh: Can turkey Remain Neutral?', vol. 1: 14, *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3 April, pp. 36–38.

Furet, François and Mona Ozouf (1989), *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolutionary*, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap/Harvard (French original, 1988).

Gaddis, John Lewis (1987), *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Galtung, Johan (1971), 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 8:2, pp. 81–118.

Gardels, Nathan (1991), 'Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin', *New York Review of Books*, vol. XXXVIII: 19, 21 November 1991, pp. 19–23.

Gearty, Conor (1991), *Terror*, London: Faber.

Geissler, H. (1991), 'Wir Sind ein Einwanderungsland', in *Die Zeit*, no. 47, 15 November 1991, p. 7.

Gellner, Ernest (1978), 'Scale and Nation' in F. Barth (ed.), *Scale and Social Organization*, Oslo: Universitettsforlaget.

—— (1983a), *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

—— (1983b), 'Nationalism and the Two Forms of Cohesion in Complex Societies', in *Proceedings of the British Academy, London*, vol. LXVIII (1982), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 165–87.

—— (1992), 'Nationalism Reconsidered and E. H. Carr', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 18:4, pp. 286–93.

Gerner, Kristian (1989), *Svårt att vara ryss. På väg mot postsovjetismen*, Lund: Signum.

—— (1990), 'The Return of Belorussia and the Ukraine', *Wiener Slawistischer Almanach*, no. 25/26, pp. 145–59.

—— (1992a), 'Kulturen i Östeuropa: från plan till marknad?', *Nordisk Østforum*, vol. 6:4, pp. 29–40.

—— (1992b), 'Centraleuropa från Pax Sovietica till Pax Germanica', in Sven Tägil (ed.), *Europa – historiens återkomst*, Hedemora: Gidlunds Bokförlag, pp. 303–42.

—— and Stefan Hedlund (1992), *The Destruction of the Soviet Empire: The Role of the Baltic States*, London: Routledge.

Gerth, H. H. and C. Wright Mills (eds) (1958 [1946]), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford UP/Galaxy Books.

Giddens, Anthony (1984), *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

—— (1985), *The Nation State and Violence: Vol. II of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

—— (1989), *Sociology*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

—— (1990), *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

—— (1991), *Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gleason, Gregory (1991), 'Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia', *Soviet Studies*, vol. 43:4, pp. 613–26.

Goldgeier, James M., and Michael McFaul (1992), 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', *International Organization*, vol. 46:2, pp. 467–91.

Gollwitzer, Heinz (1964 [1957]), *Europabild und Europagedanke: Beiträge zur deuts-*

chen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, München: Beck.

Gong, Gerrit (1984), *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gresh, Alain (1992), 'Lendemains indécisif en Asie Centrale', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, January 1992, p. 6.

Gunder Hansen, Nils, and Frederik Stjernfelt (1992), 'Dansk sprog og kultur i det forenede Europe. Spekulationer omkring internationaliseringens konsekvenser', in Christen Sørensen (ed.), *Europa – Nation, Union: Efter Minsk og Maastricht*, Copenhagen: Fremad, pp. 225–48.

Habermas, Jürgen (1987), *Eine Art Schadenabwicklung – kleine politische Schriften VI*, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.

—— (1990) *Die nachholende Revolution – kleine politische Schriften VII*, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.

—— (1992), 'Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe', *Praxis International*, vol. 12:1, pp. 1–19.

Hammar, Tomas (1985), *European Immigration Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— (1990), *Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration*, Aldershot: Avebury.

Hankiss, Elemér (1990), *East European Alternatives*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Harbsmeier, Michael (1988), 'Europas Opdagelse' in Hans Boll-Johansen and Michael Harbsmeier (eds), *Europas opdagelse: Historien om en idé*, Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, pp. 82–114.

Hassner, Pierre (1991), 'Culture and Society', *The International Spectator*, vol. 26: 1, pp. 136–53.

Hay, Denys (1968 [1957]), *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*, 2nd edn, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Hechter, M. (1975), *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536–1966*, London: Routledge Kegan Paul.

Heisler, Barbara Schmitter and Martin O. Heisler (1986), 'Transnational Migration and the Modern Democratic State: Familiar Problems in New Form or a New Problem?', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 485, May 1986, pp. 12–22.

Heisler, Martin O. (1986a), 'Trapped Governments in Alliance: Security Dependence and Constraints on the Autonomy of the Modern Democratic State', paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association; Washington, DC, August 1986.

—— (1986b), 'Transnational Migration as a Small Window on the Diminished Autonomy of the Modern Democratic State', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 485, May 1986, pp. 153–66.

—— (1990), 'Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in the Modern West', in *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, edited by Joseph V. Montville; Lexington: Lexington Books, 1992, pp. 21–52.

—— (1992), 'Migration, International Relations and the New Europe: Theoretical Perspectives from Institutional Political Sociology', *International Migration Review*, vol. 26:2, pp. 596–622.

—— and Barbara Schmitter Heisler (1991), 'Citizenship – Old, New, and Changing: Inclusion, Exclusion, and Limbo for Ethnic Groups and Migrants in the Modern Democratic State', in Juergen Fijalkowski (ed.), *Dominant National Cultures and Ethnic Identities*, Berlin: Free University of Berlin, pp. 91–128.

—— with Robert B. Kvavik (1974), 'Patterns of European Politics: The "European Polity" Model', in Martin O. Heisler (ed.), *Politics in Europe: Structures and*

Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies, New York: David McKay, pp. 27–89.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (1991), 'Xenophobia: Modernisation's Curse', *European Affairs*, vol. 5:2, pp. 51–7.

Held, David (1991), 'Democracy and Globalization', *Alternatives*, vol. 16:2, pp. 201–8.

Henricson-Cullberg, Martha, Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Sören Sommelius and Jan Øberg (1991), *After Yugoslavia What?*, Lund: Transnational Foundation for Peace and Futures Research.

Henrikson, Alf (1991), 'Efter unionerna', in Svenolof Karlsson (ed.), *En okänd själ – på jakt efter det nordiska*, Eskildstuna: Nordic Council.

Hérodote – revue de géographie et de géopolitique, (1989), no. 54–55, 'Les marches de la Russie', pp. 149–270

Herz, John H. (1950), 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, vol. II:2, pp. 157–80.

—— (1957), 'Rise and Demise of the Territorial State', *World Politics*, vol. IX:4, pp. 473–93.

—— (1959), *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, New York: Columbia University Press.

—— (1964), 'The Relevance and Irrelevance of Appeasement', *Social Research*, vol. 31:3, pp. 296–320.

—— (1968), 'The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation State', *Polity*, vol. I:1, pp. 11–34; reprinted in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 76–89.

—— (1981), 'Political Realism Revisited' and 'Comment', in *International Studies Quaterly*, vol. 25:2, pp. 179–97 and pp. 237–42.

Hinsley, F. H. (1986 [1965]), *Sovereignty*, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hirsch, Joachim (1980), *Der Sicherheitsstaat. Das 'Model Deutschland', seine Krise und die neuen sozialen Bewegungen*, Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.

Hobbes, Thomas (1968 [1651]), *Leviathan*, Middlesex: Pelican Books.

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990), *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, myth, reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hroch, Miroslav (1985 [1969, 1971]), *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*, translated from German and Czech by Ben Fowkes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hroch, Miroslav (1990), 'Linguistic Program – Romanticism – Nationalism', paper presented at the conference of International Society for the Study of European Ideas, Leuven.

Hunter, Brian (ed.) (1991), *The Statesman's Yearbook 1991–92*, 128th edition, London: Macmillan.

Husbands, C. (1988), 'The Dynamics of Racial Exclusion and Expulsion: Racist Politics in Western Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 16:6, pp. 701–20.

Ikenberry, John and John Hall (1989), *The State*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald (1990), *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ionescu, Dan (1992), 'Romanian Concern over the Conflict in Moldova', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1:18, pp. 46–51.

Jahn, Egbert (1989), 'Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe', Frankfurt am Main, PRIF Research Report 1/1989E.

—— Pierre Lemaitre and Ole Wæver (1987), *European Security: Problems of Research on Non-Military Aspects*, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Papers of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research.

James, Alan (1990), 'The Meaning of Sovereignty', presentation at the annual conference of British International Studies Association, Newcastle in December.

Jessop, Bob (1992), 'Changing Forms and Functions of the State in an Era of Globalization and Regionalization', paper presented to EAPE Conference, Paris, 4–7 November.

Joenniemi, Perrti and Ole Wæver (1992), *Regionalization around the Baltic Rim – Background Report to the 2nd Parliamentary Conference on Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area*, Oslo 22nd-24th April 1992; Nordic Seminar and Working-group Reports no. 1992: 521; Stockholm: The Nordic Council.

Joly, Daniele and Robin Cohen (1989), *Reluctant Hosts: Europe and its Refugees*, Aldershot: Avebury.

Kaldor, Mary (1990), *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East–West Conflict*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Kaufmann, Otto K. (1989), 'Swiss Federalism', in Robert A. Goldwin, Art Kaufman and William A. Schambra (eds), *Forging Unity out of Diversity – The Approaches of Eight Nations*, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, pp. 206–38.

Keane, John (1992), 'Democracy's poisonous fruit', in: *The Times Literary Supplement*, 21 August 1992, pp. 10–12.

Keohane, Robert O. (1990), 'Le istituzioni internazionali del mondo nuovo', in *Relazioni Internazionali*, December 1990, pp. 3–17.

Kelstrup, Morten (1990), 'The Process of Europeanization: On the Theoretical Interpretation of Present Changes in the European Regional Political System', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 25:1, pp. 21–40.

—— (1992a), 'Societal Insecurity in the New Europe: National and International Responses to New Challenges', paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago, September 1992.

—— (ed.) (1992b), *European Integration and Denmark's Participation*, Copenhagen: Politiske Studier.

Kissinger, Henry (1977 [1957]), *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of Peace 1812–1822*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Knudsen, Anne (1989a), *Identiteter i Europa*, Copenhagen: Chr. Ejlers Forlag.

—— (1989b), *Korsika: En Ø i Historien*, København: Basilisk.

—— (1991), 'Mikronationalismens dannelseshistorie', in Anders Linde-Laursen and Jan Oluf Nilsson (eds), *Nationella identiteter i Norden – ett fullbordat projekt?*, Eskildstuna: Nordisk Råd, pp. 19–38.

—— (1992), 'From Political Culture to Culture as Politics' in Henrik Tvarnø (ed.) *Politisk Historie. Nordiske Studier i historisk metode*, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

Kohn, Hans (1944), *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, New York: Macmillan.

Kornai, János (1986), 'The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes and Reality', *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 24:4, pp. 1687–737.

Kratochwil, Friedrich (1986), 'Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System', *World Politics*, vol. 39:1, pp. 27–52.

—— (1989), *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge: BISA/

Cambridge University Press.

Kurth, James (1992), 'The Post-Modern State', *The National Interest*, no. 28, Summer, pp. 26–36.

Laclau, Ernesto (1990), *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London: Verso.

Lang, D. M. (1980), *Armenia – Cradle of Civilization*, London: Allen & Unwin.

Larrabee, Stephen E. (1992a), 'Instability and Change in the Balkans', *Survival*, vol. 34:2, pp. 31–49.

— (1992b), 'Down and Out in Warsaw and Budapest: East Europe and East–West Migration', *International Security*, vol. 16:4, pp. 5–33.

Lasswell, Harold (1965 [1935]), *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, New York: Free Press.

Layton-Henry, Zig (1992), *The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, 'Race' and 'Race' Relations in Postwar Britain*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Lemaitre, Pierre (1993), *Marshall Plan or Chaos*. Forthcoming.

Lengyel, László (1990), 'Europe through Hungarian eyes', *International Affairs*, vol. 66:2, pp. 291–8.

Libaridian, G. J. (ed.) (1988), *The Karabagh File: Documents and Facts on the Region of Mountainous Karabagh, 1918–1988*, Cambridge and Toronto: The Zoryan Institute.

Lider, Julian (1986), *Correlation of Forces: An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist Concepts*, Aldershot: Gower.

Likhachev, Dmitrii (1992), 'Poverkh bar'erov', *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 6 May, p. 6.

Lindberg, Leon N. and Stuart Scheingold (1970), *Europes Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.

Lindeborg, Lisbeth (1990), 'European Identity as a Cultural Objective' in Janerick Gidlund and Gunnar Törnquist (eds), *European Networks*, University of Umeå, CERUM, Centre for Regional Science, pp. 17–60.

Lodgaard, Sverre (1992), Interview by Pierre Lemaitre, 12 November.

Loescher, Gil (1992), *Refugee Movements and International Security*, Adelphi Paper no. 268, London: IISS.

Lough, John (1992), 'Russia's post-Commonwealth army packs a political punch', *International Herald Tribune*, 6 August 1992, p. 6.

Luhmann, Niklas (1982), 'The World Society as a Social System', in R. Felix Geyer and Johannes van der Zouwen (eds), *Dependence and Inequality: A Systems Approach to the Problems of Mexico and Other Developing Countries*, Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp. 295–306.

Luhmann, Niklas (1989), 'Staat und Staatsräson im Übergang von traditionaler Herrschaft zu moderner Politik' in *Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik: Studien zur Wissenssociologie der modernen Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, pp. 65–148.

Luhmann, Niklas (1990), *Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Lukes, Steven (1988 [1973]), *Émile Durkheim: His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study*, London: Penguin Books.

Lukie, Reneo (1992), 'Twilight on the Federation in East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 45:2, pp. 55–98.

MacDonald, Michael (1986), *Children of Wrath: Political Violence in Northern Ireland*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Manfrass, Klaus (1992), 'Europe: South–North or East–West Migration?', *International Migration Review*, vol. 26:2, pp. 388–400.

Mann, Michael (1986), *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A. D. 1760*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Manning, C. A. W. (1962), *The Nature of International Society*, London: LSE.

Marples, David (1991), 'Ukraine's Economic Prospects', *Report on the USSR*, vol. 3:40, pp. 14–16.

Mayall, James (1984), 'Reflections on the "new" economic nationalism', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 10:4, pp. 313–21.

—— (1990), *Nationalism and International Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mearsheimer, John J. (1990), 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', *International Security*, vol. 15:1, pp. 5–56.

Mellor, Roy E. H. (1989), *Nation, State and Territory: A Political Geography*, London: Routledge.

Meyer, Berthold (1989), 'Common Security Versus Western Security Cooperation? The Debate on European Security in the Federal Republic of Germany', in Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer (eds), *European Polyphony: Perspectives beyond East-West Confrontation*, London: Macmillan, pp. 168–85.

Mihalisko, Kathleen (1991a), 'Laying the Foundation of Armed Forces of Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, vol. 3:45, pp. 19–22.

Mihalisko, Kathleen (1991b), 'Defense and Security Planning in Ukraine', *Report on the USSR*, vol. 3:49, pp. 15–19.

Milosz, Czeslaw (1982 [1975]), 'Vilnius, Lithuania: An Ethnic Agglomerate', in George De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross (eds), *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuity and Change*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Møller, Jørgen Ørstrøm (1990), *Det internationale samfund*, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.

Moravcsik, A. (1991), 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interest and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', *International Organization*, vol. 45:1, pp. 19–56; also printed in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman (eds), *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change*, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 41–84.

Morin, Edgar (1987), *Penser l'Europe*, Paris: Gallimard.

Mortimer, Edward (1991), 'Christianity and Islam', *International Affairs*, vol. 67:1, pp. 2–14.

—— (1992), *European Security after the Cold War*, Adelphi Paper no. 271, London: IISS.

Motyl, Alexander J. (1992), 'The Modernity of Nationalism', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 45:2, pp. 307–24.

Mouffe, Chantal (1991), 'Pluralism and Modern Democracy: Around Carl Schmitt', *New Formations*, no. 14, Summer 1991, pp. 1–16.

—— (1992a), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*, London: Verso.

—— (1992b), 'Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community', in Mouffe (1992a), pp. 225–39.

Myrdal, Gunnar (1960), *Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International Implications*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Nahaylo, Bohdan (1992), 'Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1:18, pp. 29–45.

—— and Victor Swoboda (1990), *Soviet Disunion*, London: Macmillan.

Neumann, Iver B. (1992) 'Identity and Security', review essay in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29:2, pp. 221–6.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1888 [1972]), 'Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben' in *Werke* (four volumes edited by Karl Schlechta), Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1972, pp. 209–85.

Norton, Anne (1988), *Reflections on Political Identity*, Baltimore: John Hopkins

University Press.

Øberg, Jan (1983), *At Sikre Udvikling og Udvikle Sikkerhed*, Copenhagen: Vindrose.

O'Keeffe, David (1992), 'The Free Movement of Persons and the Single Market', *European Law Review*, vol. 17:1, pp. 3–19.

Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (1989), *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Columbia, South Carolina: South Carolina Press.

—— (1991), 'Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History', *Alternatives*, vol. 16:4, pp. 425–46.

Østergaard, Uffe (1991), 'National og etnisk identitet' in Hans Fink and Hans Hauge (eds), *Identiteter i forandring*, Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, pp. 144–83.

Østerud, Øyvind (1984), *Nasjonenes Selvbestemmelsesrett: Søkelys på en politisk doktrine*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

—— (1987), *Det moderne statssystem*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Pankhurst, Jerry G. and Michael P. Sacks (1980), *Contemporary Soviet Society*, New York: Praeger.

Patterson, S. (1965), *Dark Strangers*, London: Penguin Books.

Pawlowitch, Stevan K. (1988), *The Improbable Survivor*: *Yugoslavia and its Problems, 1918–1988*, London: Hurst.

Pearson, Raymond (1992), 'The Geopolitics of People Power: The Pursuit of the Nation-State in East-Central Europe, *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 45:2, pp. 499–518.

Pedersen, Klaus Carsten (1992), *Den russiske militærledelses politik* (The Russian military leadership's policy). Report to 'Den Sikkerhedspolitiske Studiegruppe', 9 June 1992 supplemented with interview by Pierre Lemaitre, 25 September.

Pedersen, Ole Karup (1970), *Udenrigsminister P. Munchs opfattelse of Danmarks stilling i international politik*, Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

Petrović, Ruža and Marina Blagojević (1992), *The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija*, Belgrade: The Serbian Academy of Arts and Science.

Poggi, Gianfranco (1990), *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Powell, E. (1968), text of a speech delivered to the annual conference of the Rotary Club of London, Eastborne, 16 November 1968, printed in B. Smithies and P. Fiddick (eds) (1969), *Enoch Powell on Immigration*, London: Sphere Books.

Power, J. (1979), *Migrant Workers in Western Europe and the United States*, Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Pooley, Colin G. and Ian D. Whyte (eds) (1991), *Migrants, Emigrants and Immigrants: A Social History of Migration*, London: Routledge.

Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa (1992), 'Chickens Coming Home to Roost: A Perspective on Soviet Ethnic Relations', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 45:2, pp. 519–48.

Reich, Robert B. (1991), 'What is a nation?', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 106:2, pp. 193–209.

Reich, Robert B. (1992 [1991]), *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism* (with a new afterword), New York: Vintage Books.

Reisch, Alfred A. (1991), 'Agreements Signed with Ukraine to Upgrade Bilateral Relations', *Report on Eastern Europe*, vol. 2:25, pp. 14–17.

Remnick, David (1992), 'Defending the Faith', *New York Review of Books*, vol. 39:9, May 14, pp. 46–7.

Renan, Ernst (1990 [1882]), 'What is a Nation?', in Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 8–22.

Ritter, Alan and Julia Conoway Bondanella (eds) (1988), *Rousseau's Political Writings*, New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 84–174.

Roberts, Adam (1976), *Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence*, New York: Praeger.

Robertson, Roland (1990), 'Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept', in Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (also published as vol. 7:2–3 of *Theory, Culture and Society*), London: Sage, pp. 15–30.

Rogers, Rosemarie (1986), 'The Transnational Nexus of Migration', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 485, May 1986, pp. 34–50.

Romero, Frederico (1990), 'Cross-Border Population Movements', in Wallace (1990b), pp. 171–91.

Rose, Richard and Guy Peters (1978), *Can Government Go Bankrupt?*, New York: Basic Books.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1968 [1762]), *The Social Contract* (translated by Maurice Cranston), Harmondsworth: Penguin.

—— (1988 [1755]), 'Discourse on Political Economy' (translated by Julia Conaway Bondanella), in Ritter and Bondanella (1988), pp. 58–83.

—— (1988 [1762]), 'On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right' (translated by Julia Conaway Bondanella), in Ritter and Bondanella (1988), pp. 84–174.

Ruggie, John G. (1982), 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', *International Organization*, vol. 36:2, pp. 379–415.

—— (1983), 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-realist Synthesis', *World Politics*, vol. 35:2, pp. 261–85.

—— (1989), 'International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time and Method', in Czempiel and Rosenau (eds), *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, pp. 21–36.

Rupert, James (1992), 'Dateline Tashkent: Post-Soviet Central Asia', *Foreign Policy*, no. 87, pp. 175–95.

'Russia and Ukraine: the new cold war', *The Economist* (1992), vol. 323: 7758, 9 May, p. 34.

Ryan, Stephen (1990), *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Rywkin, Michael (1963), *Russia in Central Asia*, London: Collier Books.

—— (1982), *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, New York: Sharpe.

—— (ed.) (1988), *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917*, London: Mansell.

Safran, William (1991), 'State, Nation, National Identity and Citizenship: France as a Test Case', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 12:3, pp. 219–38.

Sakamoto, Yoshikazu (1991), 'Introduction: The Global Context of Democratization', *Alternatives*, vol. 16:2, pp. 119–28.

Sandel, Michael J. (1992), 'The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', in Tracy B. Strong (ed.), *The Self and the Political Order*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 79–94.

Sarkisyanz, Emanuel (1961), *Geschichte der orientalischen Völker Russlands bis 1917*, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag.

Saroyan, Mark (1988), 'Beyond the Nation-State: Culture and Ethnic Politics in Soviet Transcaucasia', *Soviet Union/Union Soviétique*, vol. 15:2–3, pp. 219–244.

—— (1990), 'The "Karabagh Syndrome", and Azerbaijani Politics', *Problems of Communism*, vol. 39: September–October, pp. 14–29.

Sassen, S. (1988), *The Mobility of Labour and Capital: A Study in International*

Investments and Labour Flow, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schierup, Carl-Ulrik (1990), *Migration, Socialism and the International Division of Labour: The Yugoslav Case*, Aldershot: Avebury.

Schlesinger, Philip (1991), *Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities*, London: Sage.

Schmitt, Carl (1963 [1932]), *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Berlin: Duncher & Humblot.

—— (1990 [1922]), *Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränitet*, 5th edn, Berlin: Cuncker & Humblot.

Schöpflin, George (1991), 'Post-Communism: Constructing New Democracies in Central Europe', *International Affairs*, vol. 67:2, pp. 235–50.

Schröder, Hans-Henning (1992), 'Vereinigte Streitkräfte und nationale Armeen. Zum Wandel der sicherheitspolitischen Lage in der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staten', *Osteuropa*, vol. 42:8, pp. 669–79.

Schutter, J. J. E. (1991), 'Schengen: Its Meaning for the Free Movement of Persons in Europe', *Common Market Law Review*, vol. 28:3, pp. 549–70.

Serfaty, Simon (1992), *The Identity and Definition of Europe*, London: Pinter.

Serow, William J. (1990), *Handbook on International Migration*, New York: Greenwood Press.

Shanin, Theodore (1990), 'A Feverish Society', *Business in the USSR*, vol. 1:4, September 1990, pp. 71–3.

Shaw, Martin (1991), 'State Theory and the Post-Cold War World' in M. Banks and M. Shaw (eds), *State and Society in International Relations*, London: Harvester/ Wheatsheaf, pp. 1–18.

Shevtsova, Lilia (1992), 'Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow', *International Migration Review*, vol. 26:2, pp. 241–57.

Šiklová, Jiřina (1991), 'Nationalismus in Ost- und Mitteleuropa: Ersatz für den Werteverlust des sekundären sozialen Status', in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 September 1991, p. 10.

Skinner, Quentin (1992), 'On Justice, the Common Good and the Priority of Liberty', in Mouffe (1992a), pp. 211–24.

Sluka, Jeffrey A. (1989), *Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish: Support for the Ira and ÍNLA in a Northern Irish Ghetto*, Greenwich, Connecticut and London: JAI Press.

Smith, Anthony D. (1981), 'States and Homelands: The Social and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory', *Millennium*, vol. 10:3, pp. 187–202.

Smith, Anthony D. (1986), *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell.

—— (1991), *National Identity*, London: Penguin.

—— (1992), 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity', in *International Affairs*, vol. 68:1, pp. 77–102.

Snyder, Louis L. (1990), *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, London: St. James Press.

Solchanyk, Roman (1992), 'Ukraine and Russia: The Politics of Independence', *RFE/RL Report*, vol. 1:19, pp. 13–16.

Sörlin, Sverker (1990/1991), 'Signalement av Europa – en identitet i dialog med sig själv', *Nordrevy*, 1990/4 and 1991/1, pp. 19–35.

Strong, Tracy B. (1992), 'Introduction: The Self and the Political Order', in Tracy B. Strong (ed.), *The Self and the Political Order*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1–21.

Sullivan, J. L. (1988), *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890– 1986*, London: Routledge.

Suny, R. G. (ed.) (1983), *Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Slavic Publications.

—— (1990), 'The Revenge of the Past: Socialism and Ethnic Conflict in Transcaucasia', *New Left Review*, no. 184, December, pp. 5–34.

Swart, A. H. J. (1991), 'Police and Security in the Schengen Agreement and Schengen

Convention', in H. Meifers *et al.* (ed.), *Schengen: Internationalisation of Central Chapters of the Law on Aliens, Refugees, Security and Police*, Kluwer: W. E. J. Jyeank Willink.

Swietochowski, Tadeusz (1985), *Russian Azerbaijan 1905–1920*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tassin, Etienne (1992), 'Europe: A Political Community?', in Mouffe (1992a), pp. 169–92.

Ternon, Yves (1977), *Les Arméniens – histoire d'un génocide*, Paris: Edition du Seuil.

Tilly, Charles *et al.* (1975), *The Formation of the National States of Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tönnies, F. (1887), *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, Leipzig: Fues's Verlag.

Torfing, Jacob (1991), 'A Hegemony Approach to Capitalist Regulation' in René B. Bertramsen, Jens Peter Frølund Thomsen and Jacob Torfing, *State, Economy and Society*, London: Unwin Hyman, pp. 35–93.

—— (1992), *Mod et brud med objektivismen indenfor samfundsvidenskaberne?*, Working Paper no. 6/1992 from Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

Turner, Bryan (1992), 'Outline of a Theory of Citizenship' in Mouffe (1992a), pp. 33–62.

'Ukraine. Europe's new state', *The Economist* (1991), vol. 321:7736, 7 December, p. 36.

Vigor, P. H. (1975), *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality*, London: Routledge and Paul Kegan.

Vlabos, Michael (1991), 'Culture and Foreign Policy', *Foreign Policy*, no. 82, pp. 59–78.

Wæver, Ole (1989a), 'Conflicts of Vision: Visions of Conflict', in Wæver *et al.* (1989b), pp. 283–325.

—— (1989b), *Hele Europa: Projekter. Kontraster*, Copenhagen: SNU.

—— (1990a), 'Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian', *International Affairs*, vol. 66:3, pp. 477–99.

—— (1990b), 'Tysk Lebensraum på Listefødder', *Nordrevy*, vol. 1:3, pp. 16–25.

—— (1990c), 'Politics of Movement: A Contribution to Political Theory on and in Peace Movements', in Katsuya Kodama and Unto Vesa (eds), *Towards a Comparative Analysis of Peace Movements*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, pp. 15–43.

—— (1991a), 'Culture and Identity in the Baltic Sea Region', in Pertti Joenniemi (ed.), *Co-Operation in the Baltic Sea Region; Needs and Prospects*, Tampere Peace Research Institute Research Report, no. 42.

—— (1991b), 'Territory, Authority and Identity: The Late 20th Century Emergence of Neo-Medieval Political Structures in Europe', EUPRA paper.

—— (1992a), 'Sikkerhedspolitisk Stabilitet og National Identitet' in Christen Sørensen (ed.) *Europa – Nation, Union: Efter Minsk og Maastricht*, Copenhagen: Fremad, pp. 101–161.

—— (1992c), 'International Society: The Grammar of Dialogue among States?', paper prepared for the Workshop on 'The Nature of International Society Reconsidered', European Consortium for Political Research, University of Limerick, 30 March – 4 April 1992.

—— (1993), 'Europe Since 1945: Crisis to Renewal', in den Boer *et al.* (1993).

—— (forthcoming-a), 'Security, the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word (and the Transformation of a Continent)'.

—— (forthcoming-b), 'Securitization – Desecuritization', forthcoming in Ronnie Lipschutz and Beverly Crawford (eds) *Security and the Nation State*.

—— (forthcoming-c), 'The Europeanization of Europe', *Politica Internazionale*,

Rome.
——, Ulla Holm and Henrik Larsen (forthcoming), *The Struggle for 'Europe': French and German Concepts of State, Nation and European Union*.
—— and Pertti Joenniemi (1992), 'Region in the Making – A Blueprint for Baltic Sea Politics', in Christian Wellmann (ed.), *The Baltic Sea Region: Conflict or Cooperation? Region-making, Security, Disarmament and Conversion*, Kiel Peace Research Series, vol. 1; Münster/Hamburg: Lit-Verlag, pp. 13–60.
——, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer (eds) (1989), *European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East–West Confrontation*, London: Macmillan.
Walker, C. (1980), *Armenia – the Survival of a Nation*, London: Routledge.
—— (1991), *Armenia and Karabagh, the Struggle for Unity*, London: Minority Rights Group Publication.
Walker, R. B. J. (1988a), 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizon of Contemporary Political Practice', paper for Workshop on the Coming Global Civilization: What Kind of Sovereignty?, in Moscow, 10–16 October 1988 and published in Walker and Mendlovitz (eds), *Contending Sovereignities: Redefining Political Community*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990.
—— (1988b), 'World Order and the Reconstitution of Political Life', first draft-Department of Political Science, University of Victoria, Canada.
—— (1989), 'Ethics, Modernity and the Theory of International Relations', working paper, Princeton University.
—— (1990), 'Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics' in *Alternatives*, vol. XV:1, pp. 3–28.
—— (1991a), 'On the Spatiotemporal Conditions of Democratic Practice', *Alternatives*, vol. 16:2, pp. 243–62.
—— (1991b), 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', *Millennium*, vol. 20:3, pp. 445–62.
—— (forthcoming), *Inside/Outside*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallace, William (1990a), *The Transformation of Western Europe*, London: RIIA/Pinter.
—— (1990b), *The Dynamics of European Integration*, London: RIIA/Pinter.
—— (1990c), 'Sovereignty: As a Political Concept in Its Historical Setting', presentation at the annual conference of British International Studies Association, Newcastle in December.
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1988) 'Should We Unthink Nineteenth-Century Social Science?', in *International Social Science Journal*, no. 118, November 1988, pp. 525–31.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass.: Addison Wessley.
—— (1990a), 'Realist Thinking and Neorealist Theory', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 44:1, pp. 21–37; also printed in R. Rothstein (ed.), *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations*, Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 21–37.
—— (1990b), 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', paper presented at the conference of American Political Science Association in San Franciso, August.
Watson, Adam (1984), 'Russia and the European States System' in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds) (1984), pp. 61–74.
—— (1992), *The Evolution of International Society*, London: Routledge.
Watson, Michael (ed.) (1990), *Contemporary Minority Nationalism*, London: Routledge.
Weber, Cynthia (1992), 'Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the Sovereignty/Intervention Boundary', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 18:3, pp. 199–216.

Weber, Max (1972 [1921]), *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie*, 5th edn revised by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübringen: J. C. B. Mohr.

—— (1988 [1895–1919]), *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, 5th edn, edited by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübringen: J. C. B. Mohr. (Part of the seven-volume UTB-series, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*).

Wendt, Alexander (1992), 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, vol. 46:2, pp. 391–426.

White, Stephen (1979), *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, London: Macmillan.

'Who are we?', *Time* (8 July 1991), pp. 12–17.

Wiberg, Håkan (1992), *Divided States and Divided Nations as a Security Problem – the Case of Yugoslavia*, Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research; Working Paper 14/1992.

—— and Ole Wæver (1992), 'Norden in the Cold War Reality' in Jan Øberg (ed.), *Nordic Security in the 1990s: Options in the Changing Europe*, London: Pinter, pp. 13–34.

Widgren, Jonas (1990), 'International Migration and Regional Stability', *International Affairs*, vol. 66:4, pp. 749–66.

Wight, Martin (1977), *Systems of States*, Leicester: Leicester University Press.

—— (1968 [1979]), *Power Politics*, 2nd edn (of the 1979 posthumously published, revised and extended version of the essay from 1946), edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, London: Penguin Books.

Wilkinson, Paul (1986), *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, 2nd edn, London: Macmillan.

Wind, Marlene (1992) 'Eksisterer Europa? Reflektioner over forsvar, identitet og borgerdyd i et nyt Europa' ('Does Europe Exist? Reflections on defence, identity and civic virtue'), in Christen Sørensen (ed.), *Europa – Nation, Union: Efter Minsk og Maastricht*, Copenhagen: Fremad.

Zagorski, Andrei (1992), 'Post-Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Risks', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 23:3, pp. 27–39.

Zametica, John (1992), *The Yugoslav Conflict*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies; Adelphi Paper no. 270.

Zielonka, Jan (1992), *Security in Central Europe*, Adelphi Paper no. 272, London: IISS.

Zizek, Slavoj (1992), 'Eastern Europe's Republics of Gilead', in Mouffe (1992a), pp. 193–207.

Zubok, Vladislav (1992), 'Russia's New Foreign Policy', *World Policy Journal*, vol. IX:2, pp. 191–217.

Index

Note: Page numbers in **bold** type refer to **figures** and page numbers in *italic* refer to *tables*. EC is used as an abbreviation for European Community

This book argues that threats to ethno-national identity are replacing military concerns as the central focus of European insecurity. In Western Europe, societal insecurity has replaced state sovereignty as the key to success or failure of European integration, pushing concerns about identity and migration to the top of the political agenda, and profoundly dividing peoples from their leaderships. In the East, national identity has become the mainspring of post-Soviet political reorganisation, raising a host of boundary and minority problems. The interplay of these societal insecurities in West and East will determine both the political shape and stability of Europe for the next generation, as well as the future of Europe's relations with its Islamic periphery.

Contents

Ole Wæver and **Pierre Lemaitre** are Senior Research Fellows at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. **Barry Buzan** is Professor of International Studies at the University of Warwick.
Morten Kelstrup is Associate Professor at the Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. All are members of the European Security project group at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen, and were co-authors of *The European Security Order Recast* (1990) Pinter.