PART I
INTRODUCTION AND DESIGN

1
Legitimacy in Global Governance

Contemporary society has experienced major growth in both global governance and its contestation. Proliferating transboundary challenges have encouraged notable expansions of global policy, but the legitimacy of governing beyond the state also remains deeply in question. Think only of disputes around virulent health pandemics, stalled climate agreements, gridlocked trade negotiations, fragile arms control frameworks, and fragmented approaches to refugee crises, financial instabilities, and internet security.

Legitimacy—the belief that a governing power has the right to rule and exercises it appropriately—has considerable implications for global policy. Without the durable foundational support conferred by legitimacy, global governance institutions may struggle to obtain resources, attract participation, take decisions, obtain compliance, and generally advance with handling critical transboundary problems. It is therefore crucial to determine the levels of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance around the world, as well as to identify the forces that generate and shape these beliefs.

A particular headline issue around the legitimacy of global governance is the relationship between elites and citizens at large. Episodes such as Brexit, street protests against international economic institutions, and the rise of populist forces suggest a possible divergence in the views of global governance between political and societal leaders on the one hand and the general public on the other. A common argument purports that today's elites, as the main winners of globalization, are out of touch with ordinary citizens, who bear the brunt of its burdens. The alleged result is a significant political disjuncture, as well as a major obstacle to effective and democratic global cooperation.

These observations provoke a key research question: *To what extent, and why, do citizens and elites around the world regard global governance to have legitimacy?* This overarching question encompasses three sub-questions. First, what levels of legitimacy do citizens at large give to global governance institutions, and what explains those citizen beliefs? Second, what levels of legitimacy do elites accord to global governance, and what explains those elite beliefs? Third, how much do levels of citizen and elite legitimacy toward global governance diverge, and what explains any such elite–citizen gaps?

Solidly grounded knowledge of this issue is quite thin. Existing studies of legitimacy in global governance, while by now notable in number and quality, still have limited coverage of countries, issues, and institutions. We therefore have only a narrow picture of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Moreover, we have no systematic measure whatsoever of possible divides between leaders and publics on this matter. We also still have much to learn about the factors that drive citizen and elite legitimacy perceptions toward global governance. In particular, no previous research has systematically examined why the legitimacy beliefs of citizens and elites toward global governance might differ.

This book addresses these lacunae in knowledge. We aim to offer the first systematically theorized and empirically grounded cross-national comparative study of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Specifically, our study makes two core contributions.

Empirically, this book provides the most comprehensive comparative analysis thus far of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, building on two uniquely coordinated surveys executed in 2017–19, covering multiple countries and international organizations (IOs). While previous studies have mostly examined single countries/regions and single global governance institutions, our analysis covers five diverse countries—Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the United States (US)—and six global IOs in different policy fields— the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, our coordinated data allow us to offer the first comparative analysis of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs.

Theoretically, this book develops an individual-level approach to explaining legitimacy in global governance. While previous research has largely examined sources at organizational and societal levels, we focus on the circumstances of the individual. Specifically, we theorize how an individual's characteristics in respect of socioeconomic standing, political orientation, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust shape legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Our individual-level approach thereby advances the theoretical frontier on global governance legitimacy and complements other perspectives on its sources.

The central findings of our research are threefold. First, there is indeed a notable and general elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. While elites on average hold moderately high levels of legitimacy toward the studied IOs, the general public on average is decidedly more skeptical. This gap holds for all six IOs, four of the five countries, and all of six elite sectors. Second, individual-level differences in interests, values, identities, and trust dispositions provide significant drivers of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, as well as the gap between them. Most important are differences in the extent to which citizens and elites trust domestic political institutions, which systematically shape

how they assess the legitimacy of IOs. Third, both patterns and sources of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs vary across IOs and countries. These variations suggest that, alongside the individual drivers, organizational and societal contexts also condition attitudes toward global governance.

Beyond its conclusions on legitimacy in global governance, this book's findings have implications for three broader issues in research and politics. First, we show how the notoriously elusive concept of legitimacy can become empirically tractable through carefully designed survey research. Second, our findings shed light on future opportunities and constraints in international cooperation, suggesting that current levels of legitimacy point neither to a general crisis of global governance nor to a general readiness for its expansion. Finally, our observations fuel debates on whether global governance confronts a problem of democratic credibility, as the elites who have most access to and influence in global governance accord notably more legitimacy to IOs than the affected public at large.

The remainder of this opening chapter expands on each of these components of our book: the central research problem; the state of existing knowledge; our conceptual and theoretical approach; the study's research design; our main results; and the implications of these findings for research and politics. We finish this introductory chapter with a plan for the rest of the book.

Global Governance and the Problem of Legitimacy

As we write this book, humanity is immersed in the comprehensive global disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic. The virus itself has spread to every corner of the planet. Its repercussions for health, economy, culture, and politics encompass the globe. The development and distribution of vaccines is suffused with global-scale cooperation and competition. Long-term societal recovery from the pandemic, too, will have prominent global dynamics and consequences. Plainly, COVID-19 is a global problem that demands a substantial measure of global governance. Local, national, and regional measures are not enough.

Similar needs for global governance arise well beyond viruses. Indeed, most headline challenges of contemporary society have pronounced global qualities: climate change, migration flows, economic welfare, identity politics, financial crises, food and nutrition, peacebuilding, cybersecurity, cultural heritage, and more. Each of these issues has a planetary reach and may require a planetary response. Not surprisingly, related political mobilizations such as Amnesty International, the antinuclear campaign, Fridays for Future, the Global Right, the Internet Governance Forum, la Vía Campesina, and various religious alliances also extend worldwide. Like it or not, we live in a global world that elicits global politics.

How we govern global affairs is therefore crucial—and contested. For over a century, people have debated what kinds of ideas and institutions should order

global politics. After the First World War, the League of Nations vied with the Communist International to be the guiding path for global politics. The Second World War shifted the locus of struggle to liberal versus fascist designs of world order. The third quarter of the twentieth century saw clashes at the UN over decolonization and a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Around the turn of the millennium, a so-called "anti-globalization movement" filled the streets of major cities across the planet with protests against established global economic governance institutions. "Occupy" camps in over 80 countries followed in 2011–12. At the present time, liberals, populists, environmentalists, fundamentalists, and others compete for the soul of global politics.

At the heart of these debates lies the question of legitimacy. In a word, do people believe that global governance institutions have a right to rule and exercise that rule appropriately? For instance, how far do people perceive the UN, the WHO, or the World Bank to be legitimate? Moreover, what drives people to hold lower or higher levels of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance institutions? If people doubt global governance in its current forms, what kinds of changes might raise their legitimacy beliefs in the future?

These questions are crucial. Legitimacy is a core issue for politics. To the extent that legitimacy prevails, a governing arrangement (whether local, national, regional, or global) tends to have greater stability and power. When people find a governing institution legitimate, they are generally more ready to participate in its processes, contribute to its resources, follow its policies, etc. (Parsons 1960; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tyler 1990; Dahl and Lindblom 1992). Legitimacy means that people buy into the system, even if they might oppose a particular policy measure or a certain political leader. In global governance, for example, legitimacy can help an institution like the WTO to attract members, obtain funds, produce policies, achieve compliance with its rules, affect problems, and generally hold its own against potentially competing regulatory arrangements, such as unilateral protectionism or bilateral trade agreements.

In contrast, to the extent that legitimacy is lacking, a governing apparatus (on whatever geographical scale) tends to face greater volatility and dysfunction—or relies more heavily on stealth and coercion in order to retain power. When people question the legitimacy of a governing institution, they sooner opt out, break the rules, or even dismantle the regime. Illegitimacy beliefs have fueled many a revolution across the centuries and around the world (Bukovansky 2002; Giglioli 2017; Sultany 2017). In global politics, shortfalls of legitimacy at, say, the WHO could discourage participation, restrict funding, limit decision-making, hamper policy implementation, lead people to rival venues such as multi-stakeholder organizations, and possibly even close down the IO itself. We witnessed such difficulties with the Trump Administration's denunciations of the WHO during the COVID-19 pandemic.

To be sure, the relationship between legitimacy and global governance is complex. Legitimacy is not the only force that shapes how global institutions handle the major policy challenges of our day. Also in the mix are the capacities of the various organizations, political circumstances of the countries involved, conditions in the world economy, personalities of leading decision-makers, pressures of crisis situations, etc. Moreover, as a companion volume to this book shows, the consequences of legitimacy are not necessarily straightforward (Sommerer et al. 2022). For example, a global governance institution that enjoys high levels of legitimacy could become complacent as a result and actually perform less well. In contrast, a legitimacy crisis might actually spur a global institution to become more innovative and effective (Bes et al. 2019). Yet, within these intricate dynamics, legitimacy is always a key ingredient that shapes the amounts and types of global governance that do and do not transpire. It is therefore crucial to determine levels and patterns of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance around the world, as well as to identify the forces that generate and shape these perceptions.

As a next question, one may ask *whose* legitimacy beliefs toward global governance matter. Certainly important are the views of elites, since leaders in politics and society are the main makers and shapers of global policies. Elite engagement is key to the functioning and indeed the very existence of global governance institutions. Levels and drivers of elite legitimacy can affect participation in, resources for, and compliance with global governance (Bes et al. 2019; Uhlin and Verhaegen 2020). It is often also elites who spur delegitimation attempts vis-à-vis global governance, for example, from dissident governments, oppositional political parties, disaffected civil society associations, and critical journalists and academics.

It is also important to consider the legitimacy beliefs toward global governance of citizens at large. Whereas the general public was previously assumed to be mostly passive toward global governance, with "a-legitimacy" (Steffek 2007: 190), recent decades have witnessed considerable politicization of the question (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Zürn 2018). In particular, we have seen a backlash against international cooperation among many citizens (e.g., Colantone and Stanig 2019; Hobolt 2016; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Moreover, some normative theories argue that it is important for democracy that publics affected by global governance perceive these institutions to be legitimate (Held 1995; Gould 2004; Archibugi et al. 2012; Scholte 2014).

A question that follows from this elite–citizen distinction concerns possibly different assessments of global governance. How much legitimacy do elites accord to global governance arrangements as compared with citizens at large? In particular, is there a gap in legitimacy beliefs between leaders in politics and society on the one hand and the general population on the other?

Elite–citizen tensions are a recurrent theme in the long history of global governance. A hundred years ago, critics alleged that liberal elites were out of touch with proletarian masses over the League of Nations (Carr 1953; Petruccelli 2020).

After the horrors of the Second World War, a new generation of IOs enjoyed general popular support, with what Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) called a "permissive consensus." However, by the 1970s and 1980s, elite-supported structural adjustment policies from international financial institutions provoked popular resistance in many peripheral countries, as well as a debt crisis movement in the Global North (George 1988; Walton and Seddon 1994). In the 1990s and 2000s, large citizen demonstrations against "neoliberalism" became a regular feature at meetings of global economic institutions and the World Social Forum (O'Brien et al. 2000; Smith et al. 2015). With the 2010s, citizen critiques of IOs extended beyond economic institutions, as voters delivered Brexit in the UK and anti-globalist governments in Brazil, India, the Philippines, Russia, the US, and elsewhere (Hobolt 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Each scenario seems to place elites on one side and general citizens on the other.

If indeed an elite–citizen gap in legitimacy toward global governance exists, it could be highly problematic, both normatively and practically. Normatively, such a divide could present challenges for political representation and accountability, if we take the view that elites should reflect the opinions of, and answer to, citizens, yet pursue global governance based on beliefs that diverge from the overall citizenry. Practically, an elite–citizen legitimacy gap in global governance could render international cooperation more difficult to achieve, with negative consequences for the capacity to address problems such as climate change, financial instability, and transnational conflict. If citizens do not find global governance legitimate, then elites (who need to consider public opinion) could find it more difficult to agree on new global policies and institutions, thereby encouraging further gridlock around meeting global challenges.

Yet what is the actual situation? To what extent, and why, do citizens and elites around the world regard global governance to be legitimate? Do the two groups indeed hold different overall views of the legitimacy of global governance institutions? If so, what generates the gap? These are vital questions for academic inquiry and, potentially, political response.

State of the Art

While legitimacy historically has had a marginal place in the study of world politics, the past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a substantial body of research, partly in response to public contestation of regional and global governance. Research on the subject began to grow in the 1990s (Franck 1990; Held 1995; Niedermeyer and Sinnott 1995; Hurd 1999; Scharpf 1999). A fuller theorization of legitimacy and legitimation in world politics unfolded after the turn of the millennium (Clark 2005, 2007; Steffek 2003, 2004; Zürn 2004; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Clark and Reus-Smit 2007; Hurd 2007; Hurrelmann et al. 2007; Black

2008; Chapman 2009; Mayntz 2010; Nullmeier et al. 2010; Quack 2010; Bernstein 2011; Brassett and Tsingou 2011; Zaum 2013; Bexell 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Gronau and Schmidtke 2016; Sabrow 2017; Lenz and Viola 2017; Oates 2017; von Billerbeck 2017; Whalan 2017). Recent years have brought important synthesizing work, so that we are now well placed systematically to examine the meaning, sources, processes, and consequences of legitimacy in global governance (Tallberg et al. 2018; Zürn 2018; Tallberg and Zürn 2019; Dingwerth et al. 2019; Scholte 2019).

The Legitimacy in Global Governance (LegGov) research program, conducted in 2016–21 at Stockholm, Lund, and Gothenburg Universities, has taken one step toward a further integration of different theories and approaches to researching legitimacy. The present book is one of a set of three works that complete the LegGov endeavor. While this volume explores the patterns and sources of legitimacy in global governance, a second volume examines processes of legitimation and delegitimation in global governance (Bexell et al. 2022), and a third volume considers the consequences of legitimacy for global governance (Sommerer et al. 2022).

As regards the specific concern of the present book, existing scholarship indicates three alternative ontological starting points for studying sources of legitimacy in global governance: the individual, the organization, and the social structure (Tallberg et al. 2018: Chapters 3–5). The predominant approach to date has focused on sources at the organizational level. This perspective assumes that legitimacy beliefs arise from the features of governing organizations, such as their purposes, procedures, and performances (e.g., Scharpf 1999; Hurd 2007; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Lenz and Viola 2017; Anderson et al. 2019; Scholte and Tallberg 2018; Dellmuth et al. 2019; Bernauer et al. 2020; Verhaegen et al. 2021). A second approach, usually informed by constructivist or critical theory, has located the sources of legitimacy beliefs in characteristics of the wider social structure, such as cultural norms, economic systems, and political regimes (e.g., Bernstein 2011; Gill and Cutler 2014; Scholte 2018).

This book proceeds from a third ontological starting point from the individual level. This approach attributes legitimacy beliefs to characteristics and circumstances of the person holding them, such as interest calculations, political values, social identification, and institutional trust (e.g., Gabel 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Dellmuth 2018). In recent years, this approach has informed research on attitudes toward international issues in comparative politics (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2017; Rodrik 2018), international relations (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006), and studies of the European Union (EU) (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt and de Vries 2016).

Yet, thus far, the systematic study of individual sources of legitimacy beliefs has been hampered by poor availability of comparative data (Dellmuth 2018). With regard to public opinion, substantial literature addresses attitudes toward the EU,

typically using data from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey (for an overview, see Hobolt and de Vries 2016). More recently, a growing body of research has examined public opinion toward other IOs, including the UN, making use of data from the World Values Survey (WVS) or more specific surveys (Edwards 2009; Norris 2009; Johnson 2011; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Schlipphak 2015; Bearce and Joliff Scott 2019). However, data for these studies have tended to cover only a single IO, such as the EU or the UN, a single policy field, such as economy or security, and a single country or region.

Existing research is still more limited when it comes to elite attitudes toward global governance. Several general studies have theorized about elites in global politics (Van der Pijl 1998; Sklair 2001; Rothkopf 2008; Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2012; Philips 2018; De Wilde et al. 2019). Other works have considered how elites affect certain aspects of global governance processes (Cox and Jacobson 1973; Haas 1992; Scholte 2011; Binder and Heupel 2015; Goetz and Patz 2017; Tallberg et al. 2018; Dür et al. 2019; Schmidtke 2019). Further studies have mapped characteristics of elites worldwide (Gerring et al. 2019) or examined the attitudes of elites in a certain country or region toward a particular topic, such as globalization (Rosenau et al. 2006; Strijbis et al. 2019). A substantial body of literature has investigated elite views of regional governance through the EU (Hooghe 2002; Best et al. 2012; Sanders and Toka 2013; Persson et al. 2019; Goldberg et al. 2020; Cilento and Conti 2021; Tatham and Bauer 2021). However, we mostly lack systematic research on elite opinion toward IOs more generally (for exceptions, see Binder and Heupel 2015; Schmidtke 2019). No previous research has collected and analyzed large data on elite views of global governance, covering multiple countries, multiple sectors of society, and multiple IOs.

As for systematic comparisons of public and elite opinion on global governance, existing empirical work is extremely limited. One study has compared elite and citizen views of European integration (Hooghe 2003). Another investigation has compared elite and public opinion on international human rights law (Kim 2019). Finally, several studies have examined elite–citizen divides regarding US foreign policy (Page and Bouton 2007; Kertzer 2020). In each case, the coverage is limited to a single country, a single issue, or a single IO. Thus, earlier research offers no cross-country measurement of possible divides between elites and citizens on the legitimacy of global governance, and no previous empirical work has rigorously examined the forces that might generate cleavages on this issue between leaders and publics.

Our research for this book moves beyond these limitations in existing scholarship. We develop an individual-level approach to legitimacy that attributes variation in such beliefs to characteristics of citizens and elites. We examine our theoretical expectations through systematically coordinated data on public and elite opinion in multiple countries toward multiple IOs. Yet, before we expand on theory and research design, some conceptual pointers are in order.

Concepts

This book examines "citizen" and "elite" views of "legitimacy" toward "global governance." We understand our first key concept, "global governance," to refer to processes of societal regulation that operate on a planetary scale (Weiss and Wilkinson 2019). Global governance "institutions" are the bureaucratic organizations which formulate and administer policy measures that apply to actors and locations around the world. Global governance institutions have traditionally taken form mainly as IOs: that is, formal permanent treaty-based bodies with state members, such as the UN and the WTO (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Pevehouse et al. 2020). While IOs tend to be the most visible sites of global governance, nowadays one also sees other institutional forms, including transgovernmental networks, private global governance mechanisms, and global multi-stakeholder initiatives (Slaughter 2004; Büthe and Mattli 2011; Scholte 2020).

We operationalize the notion of "global governance" in this study by focusing on traditional IOs which, in many areas, function as core pillars of global governance and play frontline roles in addressing transborder problems. One need only think of the WHO and disease control, the IMF and financial crises, the UN in various conflict settings, and the WTO in trade politics. In addition, such IOs are relatively better known to citizens and elites around the world, making them more suitable for a study of legitimacy beliefs than less known forms of global governance.

Taking the various institutional forms together, global governance has grown considerably in volume and diversity in recent decades (Barnett et al. 2021). Across all policy fields, many consequential governance measures today emanate from institutions with a worldwide remit. That said, the size and resources of IOs and other global governance institutions remain modest overall, with far less budgets, staff, remits, policy measures, and sanctions than most states. Skeptics favor these modest proportions and, if anything, advocate a future contraction of global governance (Miller 2007), while proponents underscore regulatory deficits that require major expansions of global policy (Hale and Held 2017).

As for our second key concept, "legitimacy," we already indicated earlier its quality as a belief that a governing institution has the right to rule and exercises this right appropriately (Weber 1922; Suchman 1995). Legitimacy thereby entails stable, diffuse, foundational approval of a governing institution, as distinct from contingent support that depends on certain officeholders or particular policies (Easton 1975; Hetherington 1998).

Here it is important to distinguish between legitimacy as a perception of appropriate rule and other conditions that might be its causes or consequences. Hence, for example, perceptions of well-functioning democracy are a possible source of legitimacy but are not equivalent to legitimacy itself. After all, many situations arise where people believe in the rightful rule of non-democratic regimes (Weber 1922). Likewise, it is important to distinguish between legitimacy and its possible

results, such as participation in elections and compliance with rules. After all, a person can vote under compulsion and can follow instructions without believing in the rightfulness of the authority behind them. In short, legitimacy is an attitude or a belief and must not be confused with the circumstances that produce it or the situations that might flow from it.

In this book, it is also crucial to differentiate between normative and sociological legitimacy. Normative (or philosophical) legitimacy refers to the right to rule based on conformity to certain philosophically formulated values and principles, such as justice or fairness (Caney 2005; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Christiano 2010; Archibugi et al. 2012; Erman 2016). In this case, a theorist identifies generic criteria for evaluating the normative appropriateness of governance and then applies these standards to a concrete arrangement in order to judge whether it is morally worthy of legitimacy according to the specified principles. In contrast, sociological (or empirical) legitimacy refers to perceptions of rightful rule that are established in an observed empirical population (Reus-Smit 2007; Zürn 2018; Tallberg et al. 2018). In this case, a researcher develops a measure of legitimacy beliefs and examines the extent to which people in a given audience consider a governance arrangement to be legitimate.

This book undertakes a sociological-empirical analysis of the legitimacy perceptions held by citizens and elites in various concrete contexts around the world. Our primary aim is to understand whether, how, and why people have these legitimacy beliefs, not to evaluate whether the IOs we study should be judged as legitimate in view of certain normative theories about rightful rule. That said, we recognize that sociological and normative conceptions of legitimacy may be empirically related while still being analytically distinct (Keohane 2006; Bernstein 2011; Beetham 2013). The normative may shape the sociological if people's legitimacy beliefs toward a governing institution are shaped by the philosophical principles that circulate in a given historical context. Conversely, the sociological may shape the normative if the development of political philosophy is sensitive to broader trends in societal views and norms.

Our third key concept, "citizens," refers to the overall population in a country. Citizens are political subjects: i.e., persons with an age and wherewithal to have rights and responsibilities as members of a collective life, or a "public" (Dewey 1927). Hence, in this book, we speak interchangeably of "citizens" and "the general public." In modern political theory, citizenship is mostly associated with the territorial state, so that "citizenship" is equivalent to "nationality." In this book, we understand citizens to be the collective of people who are subject to and affected by global governance arrangements, irrespective of their nationality. In effect, this conception more or less covers all of contemporary humanity, since, for example, WTO rules impact the prices in shopping baskets around the world, and WHO (in)actions touch everyone exposed to global diseases. Bodies like the World Bank also have near-universal membership from countries all over the planet.

A fourth key concept in this book, "elites," refers to people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential (Mosca 1939; Mills 1956; Khan 2012). Most studies of elite opinion in world politics focus exclusively on political elites (e.g., Hooghe 2002; Binder and Heupel 2015; Persson et al. 2019); however, our study also encompasses wider societal elites, since both governmental and nongovernmental actors aspire to shape global governance. In this conception, "political" elites occupy the formal decision-making positions in governance. Political leaders include both the senior officials who operate the institutions of governance and the politicians who decide upon the policies that the bureaucracy elaborates and implements. Meanwhile, "societal" elites hold leadership positions outside of governance institutions. These players include senior academics, civil society organizers, business executives, and media commentators. Societal elites feed prominently into policy deliberations—and sometimes also participate more directly in governance processes.

Elites merit particular attention in the study of global governance. These leaders generally have the greatest access and inputs to the process. Elites are primary players in shaping opinions (Guisinger and Saunders 2017; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021), providing research (Haas 1992; Allan 2017), injecting or withholding funds (Goetz and Patz 2017, Dellmuth et al. 2021), lobbying for influence (Scholte 2011; Tallberg et al. 2018), and making and executing policies (Cox and Jacobson 1973; Hawkins et al. 2006). In short, no global governance can transpire without the engagement of elites, and these leaders heavily influence the particular directions that global governance takes.

To be sure, elites are also citizens. Political and societal leaders are part of the citizenry rather than a separate category. However, elites are but a small proportion of the general public, since most people are not policymakers, corporate executives, media influencers, civil society mobilizers, and academic experts. Thus, although citizen beliefs include elite beliefs, the vast majority of citizens are so-called "ordinary people," and measures of public opinion relate overwhelmingly to non-elites.

Theory: An Individual-Level Approach

In this book, we develop an individual-level approach to explaining citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. We start from the assumption that individual-level factors can explain social outcomes such as legitimacy. Consequently, we theorize why individuals with varying characteristics think differently about IO legitimacy, and attribute variation in citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs to differences in characteristics that matter for attitudes toward IOs. As described earlier, we distinguish this individual-level approach from organizational- and societal-level explanations, which locate the sources of legitimacy in the

features of governing institutions and in the wider social order, respectively (Tallberg et al. 2018: Chapters 3–5). At the same time, our selection of IOs and countries allows us to assess individual-level explanations in diverse organizational and societal contexts. Thus, in the interpretations of our results, we discuss the role that IO and country conditions may play in shaping explanatory patterns observed at the individual level.

Our individual-level approach has several advantages. First, it recognizes that legitimacy is a belief in the minds of individuals and varies between individuals, thus calling for an examination of the individual conditions that shape people's attitudes. Second, this approach provides significant distinctive insights, complementary to but also different from organizational and societal explanations. It adopts the individual as the basic building block, theorizes the individual characteristics that shape people's legitimacy beliefs, and explains variation among citizens, among elites, and between the two groups based on the distribution of individuals with these theorized characteristics. Third, this approach allows us to engage in a dialogue with scholarship in comparative politics, international relations, and EU studies about the types of individual-level features that matter for international attitudes (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2017).

Within this individual-level approach, we focus specifically on four lines of explanation, relating respectively to socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. We select these four angles, as each emphasizes one central dimension of an individual: their material standing, value orientation, social identification, and institutional trust. Bringing these complementary explanations together in one integrated framework also favors comprehensiveness, as we cover perhaps the most important ways that individuals differ from each other with implications for legitimacy beliefs. However, in order to account for the possibility that other individual-level characteristics might influence legitimacy beliefs as well, our empirical analysis also considers a number of alternative explanations.

To elaborate briefly on our framework, a first line of explanation considers the role of socioeconomic factors in shaping legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. This argument draws on research that emphasizes utilitarian calculation and people's position in the economy as central to the formation of opinions on global issues (Gabel 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Rodrik 2018). We build on this logic to suggest that the ways in which people are positioned to benefit materially from IOs can help to explain their legitimacy beliefs toward these organizations.

Thus, we would expect that citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward IOs vary depending on an individual's socioeconomic (dis)advantages. When citizens or elites are more well endowed in terms of socioeconomic resources such as

education and income, they are better positioned to benefit from globalization and more likely to regard IOs as legitimate. Similarly, attention to differences in socioeconomic status may help us explain any gaps in legitimacy beliefs between citizens and elites. If elites are more socioeconomically advantaged than citizens, and more often belong to the winners of globalization than citizens, such differences should translate into systematic differences between elite and citizen views of IO legitimacy.

Our second line of explanation looks at political values. Here we build on a literature which argues that attitudes toward global governance arise from ideological orientations (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Hooghe et al. 2019; de Wilde et al. 2019). On the one hand, we examine political values in relation to the classic left–right spectrum; on the other, we consider a more recent ideological axis in society and politics which captures issues that often fit poorly on the left–right continuum. This distinction juxtaposes green alternative liberal (GAL) values and traditional authoritarian nationalist (TAN) values. Extending earlier theorizing, we suggest that individuals who hold left-wing and GAL values are more likely to be supportive of international cooperation than individuals who hold right-wing and TAN values.

Based on this logic, we would expect that legitimacy beliefs among citizens and elites vary depending on whether individuals hold left-wing rather than right-wing values and/or GAL rather than TAN values. By the same token, this logic would attribute gaps in legitimacy beliefs between elites and citizens to systematically different political values in these groups. If elites are more prone to hold left-wing and GAL values compared to citizens, they are expected to find IOs more legitimate than citizens. The recent wave of right-wing and TAN populism around the world suggests that the contemporary general public may indeed be more susceptible to anti-globalist ideology.

Our third line of explanation focuses on geographical identification. It suggests that legitimacy beliefs toward IOs are a function of the geographical spheres to which individuals feel attached. This expectation draws on research concerning social identity in general, and political-geographical identification in particular, as a source of attitudes toward global issues (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Rosenau et al. 2006; Norris 2009; Verhaegen et al. 2018). Individuals with a more global identification are assumed to favor global governance more, because it links political authority with the global community to which they feel attached, whereas individuals who feel closer to their country tend to view IOs as a lower priority or even as a threat to national identity and autonomy.

In line with this logic, we would expect that citizens and elites hold stronger legitimacy beliefs toward global governance when they feel closer to the world and less close to their country. In a similar vein, this logic would explain elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs by pointing to systematically more global identification (and less national identification) among elites as compared to citizens at large.

Elites are more likely to gain global exposure than the average citizen, which may foster greater global identification, and people who already identify more with the global sphere are probably more likely to seek elite positions.

Our fourth line of explanation emphasizes political trust, in particular, linkages between trust in domestic and international governance institutions. Here we draw on a literature that shows strong correlations between levels of trust in domestic political institutions and IOs: the more that people perceive their national political system to be legitimate, the more they perceive IOs to be legitimate as well. Previous research attributes this link to a variety of mechanisms, including people's use of heuristics to form opinions about institutions they know less well and people's general trust predispositions (e.g., Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Harteveld et al. 2013; Voeten 2013; Persson et al. 2019; Schlipphak 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021).

Based on this logic, we would expect differences in domestic institutional trust to translate into corresponding differences in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. Citizens and elites who are more trusting of domestic political institutions are also more likely to find IOs legitimate. Extending this logic to the issue of elite–citizen gaps in legitimacy beliefs, we would expect such divides to derive from systematic differences between these two groups in terms of their respective trust in domestic political institutions. Because of their advantaged positions in politics and society, elites are more likely to have positive views of domestic governing institutions than citizens in general. Elites, after all, have more access to those institutions and greater possibilities to influence them.

Our framework conceives of these four lines of explanation as complementary. It is common in current debates in comparative politics, international relations, and EU studies to pit these accounts against each other, as if explanations around socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust are in competition. In contrast, we are open to the possibility that all four arguments contribute explanatory power and show the benefits of an individual-level approach to legitimacy beliefs.

Research Design: Coordinated Surveys

Our book offers the first large-scale empirical study of citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, covering multiple countries and multiple IOs. To obtain data in respect of the research questions and theories elaborated above, we undertook two coordinated international surveys between 2017 and 2019. We collected evidence regarding citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance by placing a set of questions in the 7th Wave of the WVS (WVS7). We gathered data for elite attitudes by conducting our own elite survey, in the context of the

LegGov program. Coordinating questions between the two surveys means that we ask identical questions to both citizens and elites and can thereby directly compare the results, in particular whether, how and why citizens and elites differ in their levels of legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis global governance.

In terms of IOs, the surveys examine citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward six organizations: the ICC, IMF, UN, World Bank, WHO, and WTO. Given our focus on IOs as pivotal players in global governance, we have selected these six IOs because they exhibit certain key similarities and differences. All are global IOs with worldwide membership, and all qualify as leading institutions within their respective policy domains. At the same time, these IOs vary in ways that may matter for legitimacy beliefs. Notably, three of them are involved in economic governance, broadly defined (IMF, World Bank, WTO), while another three are engaged in human security governance, broadly defined (ICC, UN, WHO). In addition, these IOs have diverse procedures and varying performances, which may influence how people perceive their legitimacy (Tallberg and Zürn 2019).

As for our country selection, we examine citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs toward these IOs in five countries: Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, and the US. Our original intention was also to cover South Africa, but unfortunately the WVS7 did not happen in this country as planned. As we have collected elite data in South Africa, we discuss patterns of elite legitimacy beliefs in this country in the descriptive analysis of elite legitimacy beliefs in Chapter 4. The selected countries offer diversity in multiple contextual conditions that may impact citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs, as well as differences between them. These societal-level factors include widely varying economic conditions, political regimes, geopolitical positions, and specific experiences of the six IOs in question. Within each country, the WVS7 polled a nationally representative sample of the citizen population, while the LegGov elite survey used quota sampling to examine the opinions of leaders in the spheres of business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, and research.

To capture perceptions of IO legitimacy, the two surveys measure respondents' "confidence" in the organizations. The confidence measure of legitimacy has two distinct advantages. First, it aligns well with our conceptualization of legitimacy as the belief that a governing institution has the right to rule and exercises it appropriately. "Confidence" taps into respondents' general faith in an institution, beyond short-term satisfaction with specific processes or outcomes. Second, the confidence measure allows us to link our study to a large body of literature on public opinion that uses this indicator of legitimacy. Confidence, along with trust, has emerged in political science research as a common way to measure legitimacy beliefs (e.g., Caldeira 1986; Newton and Norris 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2009; Bühlmann and Kunz 2011; Johnson 2011; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Dellmuth et al. 2019).

Other survey questions for our study relate to the respondents' socioeconomic situation, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. The surveys thereby provide us with the data necessary to examine the lines of explanation in our individual-level approach to legitimacy. Further survey items gather information on matters such as age, gender, and knowledge about global governance that serve as controls in our analyses. Our research methods are further elaborated in the next chapter.

Findings and Implications

The central findings of this book are threefold. First, our analyses reveal a significant and consistent elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. While elites overall hold moderately high levels of confidence toward the studied IOs, the general public on the whole has relatively lower assessments. On average, elites have substantially higher levels of confidence in IOs than citizens. This gap between elite and citizen views exists for all six IOs, for four of the five countries, and for all six elite sectors. Yet these elite–citizen differences in confidence are not unique for IOs: similar gaps prevail in attitudes toward national governments. This pattern indicates that both global and national politics experience a divide in the legitimacy that elites and citizens accord to governing institutions.

Second, we observe strong support for our individual-level approach to legitimacy beliefs. Across all of the analyses, we find substantial verification of our four theorized individual-level drivers of legitimacy beliefs: socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. These results indicate that the legitimacy beliefs toward IOs of both citizens and elites are shaped by the same array of individual-level factors. Moreover, the gap in elite–citizen legitimacy toward IOs can also be attributed to systematic differences in these four factors. In contrast, we do not find support for a range of other individual-level factors that are sometimes expected to shape legitimacy beliefs, including gender and knowledge about global governance.

Overall, domestic institutional trust enjoys the broadest explanatory power of the four individual-level explanations. Particularly among citizens, and often also among elites, trust in domestic political institutions is strongly related to confidence in IOs. In addition, differences between citizens and elites in their respective levels of trust in domestic political institutions provide the most consistent explanation of corresponding gaps in IO confidence.

Socioeconomic status, political values, and geographical identities also help to explain variation in IO confidence among citizens and elites. While these three accounts generally hold less systematic explanatory power than domestic institutional trust, they are all relevant in several country and IO contexts and

sometimes present the strongest explanations. These results suggest that our four individual-level drivers are complementary rather than competing in accounting for IO legitimacy beliefs.

Third, we find interesting variation in patterns and sources of legitimacy beliefs across IOs and countries, suggesting that organizational and societal contexts condition attitudes toward global governance alongside the individual factors. We observe such variation in terms of average confidence in specific IOs and countries, and with regard to the drivers of confidence levels in particular IOs and countries. Both citizens and elites differentiate between organizations when expressing their confidence in IOs. IOs engaged in human security governance (ICC, UN, WHO) tend to enjoy more confidence than IOs engaged in economic governance (IMF, World Bank, WTO). Among the six IOs, citizens as well as elites have the most confidence in the WHO and the least confidence in the IMF. Likewise, the confidence of citizens and elites in IOs varies across countries. Citizens in the Philippines and Germany generally have more confidence in IOs than citizens in Brazil, the US, and especially Russia. The pattern among elites is broadly similar to that among citizens, with the exception that elites in Brazil have the most confidence in IOs, and the Philippines drops to third place.

IO and country contexts also shape the explanatory power of our four individual-level sources of legitimacy beliefs. With respect to IOs, the distinction between human security and economic IOs again comes to the fore. Political values have explanatory power mainly in relation to the three economic IOs, likely because the policies of these organizations evoke people's ideological sentiments. Socioeconomic status and geographical identification, too, tend to matter most in relation to the economic IOs. In contrast, domestic institutional trust has explanatory power across all IOs.

Notable differences in explanatory power across our four logics also arise with respect to countries. Socioeconomic status is a particularly powerful explanation in the US. Political values are especially important in explaining IO legitimacy beliefs in Brazil and the US. Geographical identification is a particularly prominent explanation of IO legitimacy beliefs in Russia and the US. Domestic institutional trust matters in four of the five country contexts, with the exception of the US.

In sum, our analysis shows that citizens on average accord moderately low legitimacy to IOs, while elites on average hold moderately high legitimacy beliefs. This difference in perspective produces a notable elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. To explain this gap in legitimacy beliefs—as well as variation among citizens and among elites—all four of our posited individual-level drivers are relevant, albeit to different extents depending on the IO and the country in question.

These findings have several important ramifications for research and policy. Starting with a significant methodological implication, our study shows the rich possibilities for worldwide comparative survey research on legitimacy in global

governance. To be sure, surveys have limitations, for example, by applying uniform question formulations to culturally diverse circumstances and by generating rough quantitative measures that gloss over fine-grained qualitative details. Still, this book shows that global survey data offer great rewards in terms of directly comparable evidence that covers multiple countries and social sectors in relation to multiple IOs. While legitimacy perceptions are less readily observable than many conditions in world politics, surveys present a way of making these complex beliefs empirically tractable. Going forward, research would benefit from a broader survey coverage of countries and global governance institutions, as well as more extended time series.

Turning to theoretical implications, our findings speak against research that sets different explanations of legitimacy beliefs in contention with each other. In this vein, for example, international relations features a debate on whether economic or non-economic factors drive public opinion about international issues (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001a; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Rho and Tomz 2017). Relatedly, scholars in comparative politics debate the sources of contemporary anti-globalist populism, distinguishing between an economic and a cultural explanation (e.g., Mudde 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Gidron and Hall 2017; Rodrik 2018). In contrast, our study suggests that individual-level drivers related to socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust coexist and complement each other. Thus, the question for future research is not so much which explanation is most valid, but how several forces combine.

Another larger theoretical implication relates to levels of explanation. In this study, we have privileged explanations at the individual level and have discovered that the characteristics of individual citizens and elites significantly shape their legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Thus, it is not enough, as much literature to date has done, to examine only institutional-level drivers of legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, such as the purpose, procedures, and performance of the organizations (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Tallberg and Zürn 2019; Bernauer et al. 2020). Nor can we explain legitimacy in global governance exclusively in terms of societal-level factors, such as cultural norms, economic systems, and political regimes (e.g., Bernstein 2011; Gill and Cutler 2014; Scholte 2018). The individual level of explanation is (very) important. That said, the prevalence of variation in the significance of individual-level drivers between IOs and between countries suggests that institutional-level and societal-level factors also play a role in shaping legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Hence, the question for future research is perhaps not how individual, institutional, and societal forces compete for preeminence, but instead how they interrelate with each other.

Moving to political implications, our findings suggest neither a crisis for global governance nor a readiness for expansion. As we have shown, overall levels of legitimacy beliefs toward global governance are quite moderate. These levels do

not appear to indicate a profound legitimacy crisis for global governance, among either elites or the general public. Average confidence toward most IOs in most countries studied here is slightly higher than average confidence toward national governments. In addition, existing longitudinal assessments do not point to a secular decline in attitudes toward global governance (Tallberg 2021; Walter 2021; Dellmuth and Tallberg forthcoming). At the same time, these levels of legitimacy are far from a full political endorsement of IOs: in certain countries and in relation to certain IOs, citizen legitimacy beliefs are starkly low, and even elites are skeptical in some settings. Thus, while current levels of legitimacy might not present a crisis, they also provide little ground for the expansion of global governance, however much pandemics, ecological changes, technological innovations, and other world-scale challenges might seem to call for such enlargement.

A particular political challenge going forward concerns the consequences of the elite–citizen gap in IO legitimacy. As suggested by the portrayal of international cooperation as a two-level game (Putnam 1988), citizen skepticism can be a major obstacle to enhanced global collaboration. Unless the elites who negotiate international rules can count on citizen support, they will be more reluctant to formulate ambitious policy goals and less able to secure domestic ratification and compliance. In addition, citizen skepticism toward existing IOs also clarifies why populist politicians can find it profitable to use anti-globalist discourse. In particular, the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs offers a political resource for populist movements who charge that ruling circles are out of touch with "ordinary people."

Indeed, the elite–citizen gap in legitimacy beliefs toward global governance, so clearly depicted in this book, may present a challenge for political representation. We see that the elites who lead the global governing generally have substantially more positive assessments of IO legitimacy than the citizens who are governed. Just how troubling this situation is from a normative perspective depends on one's conception of political representation and how elites handle this disconnect in legitimacy beliefs. If we expect elites to represent the views of citizens, in line with notions of substantive representation (Pitkin 1967; Achen 1978), then this elite–citizen gap poses a potential problem. However, it only becomes a normative deficiency if elites do not recognize these differences and fail to adjust governing accordingly, but instead pursue their own visions of global governance regardless of divergent public opinion.

In this sense, the elite–citizen gap vis-à-vis legitimacy in global governance poses a conundrum for democratic accountability. In a working democracy, political and societal leaders obtain and retain their power by answering to the publics whom they (the elites) affect. Accountability entails that the holders of power are transparent toward, consultative of, and monitored by impacted citizens—and make due reparations when their actions cause the public harm. The difficulty is that accountability relations are generally underdeveloped in global politics (Ebrahim and Weisband 2007; Black 2008; Scholte 2011, 2014).

Democratic deficits arise when insufficient mechanisms are in place to ensure that those who hold power in global spheres engage with and respond to citizens at large. If elites regard global governance differently than citizens at large—and lack adequate accountability to the general public—then the resulting citizen frustrations can nourish political unrest, as witnessed in a succession of resistance movements over the past century.

In terms of political responses, our research underlines an urgency for change in global governance. Medium levels of legitimacy do not help—and sooner hinder—the generation of increased resources, decisions, and compliance that are required to make global governance more effective. A substantial general elite–citizen legitimacy gap can work against democratic global governance. Yet the multiplicity of individual-level forces behind legitimacy beliefs—not to mention their likely complex interconnections with institutional- and societal-level drivers—suggests that any formula for positive change is probably multifaceted and varying across contexts.

Plan of the Book

The remainder of this book is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 2, elaborating the research design, sets out how we empirically study legitimacy beliefs by surveying citizens and elites. In line with our individual-level approach, the chapter identifies and discusses different ways to measure legitimacy beliefs in the existing literature and opts for the indicator "confidence." The chapter then presents the selection of IOs and countries for the empirical investigation and provides background about how the chosen IOs and countries vary in ways that are potentially relevant for the formation of legitimacy beliefs. Informed by this selection, we then introduce the citizen data drawn from the WVS7 and the elite data based on the LegGov Elite Survey, and address questions of data quality and validity.

Chapter 3 is the first of six empirical chapters and focuses on citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Using data from the WVS7, it describes levels of, and variation in, citizen confidence toward our six focal IOs. Although mainly examining our five focal countries, for a broader comparison the chapter also considers evidence on confidence in IOs for a larger group of 45 countries in the WVS7. We first examine citizen legitimacy beliefs in the aggregate, covering all IOs and countries combined. Then we disaggregate the data in turn by IO, by country, by IO within each country, and by social groups of class, age, and gender.

Chapter 4 examines levels and patterns of elite legitimacy beliefs. It uses data from the LegGov Elite Survey on the same focal IOs and countries. Mirroring the descriptive analysis for citizens in Chapter 3, we start with elite legitimacy beliefs in

the aggregate, combining all IOs and countries, and then disaggregate the evidence by IO, by country, by IO within each country, and by elite sector. Since the LegGov survey covered a broader set of IOs than the WVS7, we are able to compare elite legitimacy beliefs toward our six core IOs with eight additional global governance institutions of various types. As mentioned earlier, this chapter also incorporates additional data on elite legitimacy beliefs in South Africa. In terms of elite sectors, the chapter compares the confidence levels toward IOs of business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, and research.

In Chapter 5, we build on the data from Chapters 3 and 4 to examine the size and patterns of the gap between elite and citizen legitimacy beliefs toward IOs. As in the other two descriptive chapters, we first examine the elite–citizen legitimacy gap in the aggregate, covering all IOs and countries combined. Then we disaggregate the figures to identify variation in the size of the gap by IO, by country, by IO within country, by elite sector, and by IO within each elite sector.

Chapter 6 provides a full elaboration of our individual-level theoretical approach, as well as the four explanations that focus respectively on socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust. For each explanatory logic, the chapter spells out expectations about citizen and elite legitimacy beliefs, as well as the gap in elite–citizen legitimacy. The final section of the chapter operationalizes each of the four logics in terms of a pair of indicators, which are then tested in the subsequent three empirical chapters. Whereas the first three empirical chapters describe levels and patterns of legitimacy beliefs among citizens, Chapters 7–9 turn to explaining this variation.

Chapter 7 examines the four individual-level explanations in relation to citizen data from the WVS7. The chapter begins by describing how the independent variables that operationalize these respective logics vary, and then presents the regression model that tests for significant associations. The explanatory analysis proceeds with a similar structure as the descriptive analysis: that is, we first examine the sources of citizen legitimacy beliefs in the aggregate (covering all IOs and countries). Then we disaggregate by IO, by country, and by IO within each country. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.

Chapter 8 examines possible individual-level explanations of elite legitimacy beliefs. Using LegGov survey data, the chapter first describes variation in the measures used to operationalize the four main logics of explanation, and then presents the regression analysis by going through the same steps as Chapter 7. In addition to testing whether and how socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust are related to confidence in IOs, the chapter also investigates how elites' professional characteristics (i.e., sector, issue focus, work orientation, and IO experience) are related to confidence in IOs. We conclude by discussing the main insights against the backdrop of the findings for citizens in Chapter 7.

Chapter 9 examines individual-level sources of the elite–citizen gap that was described in Chapter 5. How far do our four privileged logics (regarding socioeconomic status, political values, geographical identification, and domestic institutional trust) explain why elites on average consider IOs to be more legitimate than the overall population? Empirically, we employ a dyadic modeling strategy whereby each elite respondent from the LegGov Elite Survey is matched to each citizen respondent from the WVS7 in the country in question. The analysis then assesses whether differences between elites and citizens in these four sets of characteristics have a statistically significant relationship with elite–citizen differences in legitimacy beliefs toward IOs.

To conclude the book, Chapter 10 recapitulates the overall findings of our study and discusses their broader implications for research and policy. We particularly focus on lessons for the empirical study of legitimacy, for explanatory theories of legitimacy beliefs, for democracy in global governance, and for the future of international cooperation.