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Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Election

STEPHEN WHITE, MATTHEW WYMAN & SARAH OATES

VOTING IS STILL QUITE NEW IN RUSSIA.[1] Voting, that is, in the sense of choosing. Under the Soviet system there were frequent votes but no opportunity to choose, not just between candidates or parties but (in practice) whether to vote at all. It was the leadership, in a variation on Brecht's suggestion that the government 'elect a new people', that determined the composition of each new parliament, the proportion of deputies that should be replaced, and the constituencies in which they would themselves be nominated.[2] In 1987, in the first partial break with this practice, a small number of constituencies in local elections were allowed to nominate more candidates than seats available; and then in 1988, as 'democratisation' developed further, a new electoral law was adopted that allowed any number of candidates to be nominated, with the result determined by a vote that had to be cast in a polling booth and not openly affirmed as in the past. The outcome was described as 'political shock therapy' by the party's leading conservative, Egor Ligachev, as nearly 40 first secretaries and many more local officials were rejected by a newly enfranchised electorate.[3]

A Russian parliament was elected on the same partly competitive basis, in March 1990; and it was this parliament, a Congress of People's Deputies with a smaller working Supreme Soviet, that took Russia into the post-communist era. Tensions were always likely to develop between a parliament and a president that both enjoyed a mandate from the electorate; they were still more likely between a parliament that was overwhelmingly communist at the time of its election and a president who had resigned from the CPSU, banned it after the August coup and dissolved the state it had created. Those tensions, in the end, were resolved by another coup when El'tsin dissolved the parliament in September 1993 and then ordered the army to shell the White House in early October to suppress what he described as a 'parliamentary insurrection'; according to official sources, 145 lost their lives in the bloodiest street fighting since the October revolution.[4] The elections that took place the following December were accordingly on El'tsin's terms: his main opponents, Vice-President Rutskoi and parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, had been imprisoned, several parties were refused permission to participate, and two of the leading opposition newspapers, *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, were ordered to change their names and editors.

The outcome, in the event, was a surprise to pollsters as well as to the parties themselves.[5] Under the new constitution, which was put to the vote at the same time, there was a new upper house, the Council of the Federation, elected by the republics

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and regions; and a new lower house, the State Duma, with half of its 450 seats filled by individual constituencies and half by national party lists on a proportional basis. Russia's Choice, led by former acting prime minister Egor Gaidar, had the largest overall total of seats in the new Duma, but the competition among party lists was won by Vladimir Zhirinovsky's ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party, with the revived Communists in third place. 'We've woken up to a new state', lamented *Vechernyaya Moskva*; Gaidar himself resigned from the government shortly afterwards, acknowledging that reformers had suffered a 'bitter defeat'.[6] The new Duma, however, was an extraordinary one, elected for a limited period of two years; its successor, to be elected in 1995, would define the shape of parliamentary politics for a normal four-year term and perhaps for rather longer.

After an extended discussion the election law that governed the 1995 election was largely unchanged, leaving the controversial 50:50 balance between party list and individual constituency seats that had prevailed two years earlier.[7] But there had been substantial changes in the political environment, as market reforms gathered momentum and social differences widened. The official economy continued to contract, by 13% in 1994 and by a further 4% in 1995: a fall that took it below half the level of economic activity that had been recorded in the last years of communist rule.[8] A substantial proportion of Russians—perhaps a third—were living below the subsistence minimum.[9] There were fewer Russians in paid employment, with 8% officially out of work and a further 20% who were not receiving their wages on a regular basis.[10] But the rich were getting richer, in absolute as well as relative terms, and by 1995 the richest 10% were estimated to be earning 25 times as much as the poorest 10%.[11] Life expectancies were falling, to just 58 for men;[12] and levels of recorded crime were still increasing—the number of murders had doubled in just three years, with three members of the Duma itself among the victims.[13] Governments generally seek to generate a 'feel good' factor as they approach a new election; Russians were 'feeling bad', some very bad indeed, by the time they came to exercise their democratic rights in December 1995.[14]

The contenders

According to the Central Electoral Commission, 273 parties or other organisations had the right to nominate candidates to the new Duma, and there were indications that Russia might set the 'world record for the number of electoral associations per head of population'.[15] In the event, 69 parties or movements gave notice of their wish to compete for places in the new Duma, although some did no more than announce the launch of their campaign.[16] Under the election law (Article 39), parties—or more accurately 'electoral associations'—had to collect the signatures of at least 200 000 electors to secure nomination, not more than 7% of whom could be drawn from any one republic or region. In the individual constituencies candidates had to obtain the support of at least 1% of the local electorate (Article 41). The 225 single-member constituencies would be allocated to the candidates that secured the largest number of votes in each case (Art. 61); the other 225 seats would be distributed among the party lists on a proportional basis, provided each had secured at least 5% of the vote and (in both cases) that the level of turnout was at least 25% of the electorate (Art. 62).

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

FIGURE 1. ELLA PAMFILOVA, 'TO LIVE WORTHILY'



FIGURE 2. RUSSIA'S CHOICE (EGOR GAIDAR), 'EVERYONE TALKS ... HE ACTS'

In the end, 2627 individual candidates were nominated, 1055 of whom were independents;[17] and 43 parties and movements were registered, with a total of 5675 candidates on their lists[18] (the Central Electoral Commission claimed later that it had validated 933 000 nomination papers containing a total of 12 million signatures[19]). Very provisionally, the parties and alliances that were included on the ballot could be divided into four broad groups.[20]

There were (i) 11 *'democratic' or reformist groupings*, of which the most important in the outgoing Duma was 'Russia's Democratic Choice—United Democrats', led by Egor Gaidar and committed to the fullest possible transition to a private ownership economy. The bloc included Gaidar's own Russia's Democratic Choice Party, founded in June 1994, together with the Peasant Party of Russia led by Yurii Chernichenko and the Social Democratic Party, formed in 1995 and led by the 'father of *perestroika*', Alexander Yakovlev. Gaidar's party had emerged from Russia's Choice, the largest of the parliamentary fractions after the 1993 elections, but Gaidar himself had resigned shortly afterwards and Russia's Choice lost ground as some of its deputies gravitated towards the Chernomyrdin government, while others took up a more sharply critical position; so did Gaidar after the outbreak of the Chechen war, although this led to an open rift with President El'tsin when Gaidar announced in February 1995 that the party would not support him for a second term.[21] Russia's Democratic Choice adopted 'Freedom, property, legality' as its slogan; it favoured a reduction in the role of the state, support for small business, the privatisation of agriculture and a cut in military expenditure. The party list was headed by Gaidar, together with the former parliamentary ombudsman who had become internationally

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known for his condemnation of the Chechen war, Sergei Kovalev, and actress Lidiya Fedoseeva-Shukshina.

'Yabloko' (Apple), led by economist Grigorii Yavlinsky, shared a commitment to economic reform but on a more gradual basis, and it was sharply critical of the policies the El'tsin administration had been following with Gaidar's support since the start of 1992. Yabloko's list was headed by Yavlinsky, former US ambassador Vladimir Lukin and economist Tat'yana Yarygina; Yurii Boldyrev, one of the party's co-founders, had resigned as deputy chairman in opposition to what he considered to be Yavlinsky's authoritarian management of its parliamentary fraction but retained his membership. Their aim, Yavlinsky told *Izvestiya*, was to demonstrate that there was a 'democratic alternative to the current regime'; they were critical of the bombing of the White House in October 1993 and the increasingly corrupt nature of the ruling elite, and anxious to strengthen the place of parliament within the current Russian constitution.[22] Yabloko supported the free market, but not at the expense of those who were unable to defend their own interests, and they did not believe science, education, health and culture could simply be handed over to market forces. Their electoral programme placed considerable emphasis in addition upon public morality, the environment, and evolutionary rather than more rapid change.[23]

Among the other pro-reform movements, 'Forward, Russia!' was headed by former finance minister Boris Fedorov; founded in February 1995, it was particularly conspicuous for its firm defence of Russian unity, including the Chechen republic (what would the US government have done, Fedorov asked, if Texas had tried to leave the Union?). At the same time Forward, Russia took a sharply hostile position towards the President and prime minister and called for faster, more extensive privatisation and measures to curb the government bureaucracy.[24] Forward, Russia, in Fedorov's view, was at least potentially the equivalent of the US Republican Party, and Yabloko the equivalent of the Democrats; opponents made less flattering comparisons between Fedorov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky on the basis of their outspoken defence of Russian state interests and populist rhetoric.[25] Apart from Fedorov, Forward, Russia's national list was headed by businessman Alexander Vladislavlev, first vice-chairman of the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists; the name of the grouping itself was borrowed from Silvio Berlusconi's successful right-wing movement in Italy, 'Forza Italia'.

The 'Pamfilova-Gurov-Vladimir Lysenko' bloc, another pro-reform grouping, was formally an association of the Republican Party, headed by Lysenko and based originally on the liberal Democratic Platform in the CPSU, and the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, but in practice it was an alliance of the supporters of its three well known leaders. Ella Pamfilova, the most prominent, had been minister for social welfare in the Chernomyrdin government but had resigned in 1994; before that she had headed the commission on privileges in the USSR Supreme Soviet, earning a reputation as an advocate of social justice. The bloc's programme emphasised a 'comprehensive system of social guarantees', public order, a higher priority for health, education and culture, and military reform.[26] The Party of Beer-Lovers was also regarded as 'democratic' in orientation (its ranks were however threatened by a pro-vodka secession[27]); so too were the Social Democrats, headed by Vasilii Lipitsky and Gavriil Popov, and the Party of Workers' Self-Management, headed by the

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famous eye surgeon Svyatoslav Fedorov. As Fedorov put it in one of his campaign publications, it was 'shameful that the people whose eyesight I have restored see a country that has collapsed'.[28]

The (ii) *'pro-government centre'* was based around Our Home is Russia, founded in the spring of 1995 as a political movement that could sustain the Chernomyrdin government in the Duma elections and then provide the basis for a presidential campaign by Boris El'tsin in the summer of 1996. In practice, Our Home was the 'party of power': a coalition of the post-communist political and economic *nomenklatura*, with differing views but a common interest. It represented two constituencies above all: the energy complex, with which Premier Chernomyrdin had a close association, and the metallurgical complex, with which first vice-premier Oleg Soskovets was connected. Chernomyrdin's reputed wealth as a result of the privatisation of the gas industry attracted unfavourable publicity, and some dubbed the group 'Nash dom, Gazprom' after the name of the gas concern of which the premier had been chairman and which had made him, apparently, one of the richest men in the country.[29]

Our Home is Russia's list was headed by Chernomyrdin himself, together with film director Nikita Mikhalkov (formerly close to Alexander Rutskoi, his 'Burnt by the Sun' had won an Oscar in 1994) and General Lev Rokhlin, who had led the assault on Grozny but refused to accept a state prize for his achievement. Our Home stood for a 'broad centre', including a stronger state and support for domestic producers and investors. Its pre-election programme, adopted in August 1995, emphasised three priorities: the 'spiritual renewal of Russia', including the rights and freedoms of the individual; the 'integrity of the country', including public order; and the 'development of a market economy together with a greater degree of social protection'.[30] Our Home's most obvious advantage was the support it received from big business, together with its access to the machinery of government and to the mass media; it was able to spend liberally on campaign publicity, and to attract celebrities (like the German supermodel Claudia Schiffer) to its public events, although it was not clear that this would compensate for the middle-aged image of the prime minister (who had never before run for public office) and his ministerial colleagues. Their campaign slogan—'On a firm foundation of responsibility and experience'—emphasised this bureaucratic image.

Sergei Shakhrai's Party of Russian Unity and Concord (PRES) was another pro-governmental grouping, and one that had performed relatively well in the 1993 elections. Essentially a grouping of Shakhrai's supporters, it had originally formed part of Our Home is Russia but withdrew to campaign separately when it failed to secure enough prominent places in Our Home's national list (Shakhrai himself was offered the 7th or 8th place, but there were none for his colleagues). In 1993 PRES had won votes in peripheral and non-Russian areas, but his earlier supporters were dismayed by his firmly pro-government position in the Chechen conflict and the party was not expected to secure representation in the new Duma. Its list was headed by Shakhrai, Valerii Bykov (a biochemist who was responsible for the preservation of Lenin's mummy), and the Siberian politician Vladimir Ivankov, and its programme emphasised a new relationship between the federal government and the regions.[31] 'Cedar' represented environmentalists, but was close to government supervising

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

FIGURE 3. Viktor Chernomyrdin (Our Home is Russia), 'If Your Home is Dear to You'

agencies; its list was headed by party chairman Anatolii Panfilov and included Sergei Zalygin, editor of the literary journal *Novyi mir*. The Muslim movement 'Nur' was also close to government positions, influenced by a loyal church hierarchy.

'Women of Russia' had an ambiguous position; based on the Soviet-era Committee of Soviet Women and relatively successful with 8% of the party-list vote in the 1993 elections, it had come to reflect the views of the President and of its leader Ekaterina Lakhova, a doctor who came from the same part of Russia as El'tsin and who had organised a commission on women, the family and demography within his administration. It was, in this sense, the female half of the 'party of power'; yet it had also supported a move by the Communists and Agrarians to halt the process of privatisation. It was, *Izvestiya* explained, 'one of the most pragmatic' of the Duma parties, in that it 'more often than others voted for diametrically opposite proposals'.[32] And when it came to voting on the 'most bitterly contested questions of principle, they usually abstained or voted in a way that suited the government'.[33] Women of Russia had lost their unique claim to represent the female constituency with the inclusion of women in prominent positions in other blocs or indeed as leaders of blocs, like Pamfilova and Irina Khakamada of the pro-market grouping Common Cause; at the same time they had the good fortune to obtain first place on the ballot paper, a source of some advantage in all electoral systems. Their programme emphasised social issues, including protection for the family, a 'socially oriented market economy', and non-involvement in military conflicts, including Chechnya; as the programme pointed out, 'Without women there's no democracy!'.[34]

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FIGURE 4. 'TO THE WOMEN OF RUSSIA!'

Several other groups were in a similar position, offering critical support to the government while emphasising the need to protect the less advantaged. Ivan Rybkin's Bloc, headed by the Duma Speaker, had been formed in early 1995 as a putative left-centre counterpart to Our Home is Russia, but it failed to gather support and Rybkin was expelled from the leadership of his own Agrarian Party in September 1995 for being too pro-presidential. Its electoral programme promised a more gradual approach to privatisation, with profitable and strategic industries left in state hands, high levels of duty on the export of raw materials and protection for domestic producers.[35] The left centre was also represented by Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia—the Union of Labour, founded in September 1995 and headed by trade union leader Mikhail Shmakov, former vice-premier Vladimir Shcherbakov, and former co-chairman of the Civic Union Arkadii Vol'sky. The 'main element in our programme', they explained, was 'priority for national industry', particularly the military–industrial complex; for commentators it was virtually a 'second edition' of the Civic Union, under whose auspices Vol'sky had contested the Duma election two years earlier.[36] Another of the centrist groupings, 'Transformation of the Fatherland', placed more emphasis upon the reform of Russian federalism; it was headed by Sverdlovsk regional governor Eduard Rossel'.

A further group of parties occupied a (iii) *national-patriotic* position, including a new and apparently promising grouping, the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO). Its leaders were certainly representative of key constituencies: former chairman of the Security Council Yurii Skokov, who had close ties with the military–

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industrial complex; economist Sergei Glaz'ev, chairman of the Democratic Party and minister of foreign trade up to October 1993 when he resigned in protest over El'tsin's suspension of parliament; and the formidable figure of Alexander Lebed', the gravel-voiced general who had led the 14th army in the Dnestr region until a ceasefire was concluded and who was then dismissed when his outspoken views began to embarrass the ministry of defence. Some opinion polls in the autumn of 1995 suggested Lebed' was the most popular politician in the country;[37] newspaper commentaries credited him with the 'brain of Albert Einstein and the physique of Arnold Schwarzenegger'.[38] His autobiography, *Za derzhavu obidno*, was published in the autumn of 1995; it recalled his arduous military training, his service in Afghanistan and Moldova, and his commitment to the Orthodox church, the army and the Russian people—but not necessarily democracy.[39] KRO also drew upon the support of Lyudmila Vartazarova of the Socialist Workers' Party, former justice minister Yurii Kalmykov, and industrialist and deputy Konstantin Zatulin.

The Congress had been founded in March 1993 to represent Russians living outside the federation, gradually evolving into a moderate national-patriotic grouping. Its programme was egalitarian, but also eclectic. Its central elements were the gradual reconstitution of the USSR by peaceful means, defence of Russians abroad, a crackdown on crime, support for traditional Russian institutions such as the church and family, the restoration of Russia's great power status, and the formation of a 'highly effective and socially oriented market economy'.[40] KRO made clear that it was not a party that sought to represent the interests of a particular group but an 'above-party movement' whose members could support a variety of views. It was very critical of the government's economic programme and blamed El'tsin for the collapse of the USSR, the 'October events' of 1993, and the excesses of privatisation; but it had its own difficulties, partly because of the inconsistencies in its programme but also because of the unresolved ambitions of its leaders (Skokov, for instance, told journalists that Lebed' lacked 'education' and was unready even for the post of minister of defence, let alone the presidency[41]).

The other national-patriotic parties were 'Derzhava' (Great Power), headed by former vice-president Alexander Rutskoi, and Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats had been the sensational winner of the 1993 Duma party list election, but their parliamentary fraction had been unstable and Zhirinovsky had in practice shown some willingness to cooperate with the Chernomyrdin government, in particular through his support of the 1994 and 1995 budgets. The party's earlier appeal had also been undermined by the emergence of other radical nationalist groupings, including KRO and Sergei Baburin's Russian All-National Union, which joined forces with the left-wing coalition Power to the People in the December elections. The Liberal Democrats, as in 1993, were nationalist and anti-Western in their foreign policy, strongly in favour of the restoration of federal control in Chechnya, and pro-market but also protectionist in their domestic economic strategy.[42] They were well financed, had a national network of activists and enjoyed a high level of support within the armed forces;[43] but they owed most of all to their leader, a charismatic campaigner who successfully identified the problems of ordinary Russians and suggested simple but plausible remedies—such as reviving arms exports or shooting the leaders of organised crime.

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A more conventional range of parties occupied the (iv) *communist–agrarian left*, of which by far the most important was the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, founded in 1990 within the framework of the CPSU and led by Gennadii Zyuganov. It was a distinctive party in many ways: the only one with a mass membership of half a million or more; the one with the best network of local activists throughout the country; and virtually the only one that was more than a leadership fan club (unlike almost all other groupings, the rating of party leader Zyuganov lagged behind that of the party itself).[44] In 1991, the party explained in its election platform, there had been a 'state coup' led by the 'old *nomenklatura*'. The Communists called for a 'national-patriotic majority' in the new Duma which would restore a 'people's power' based on the soviets with guaranteed socioeconomic rights for working people, the renationalisation of 'strategic' sectors of the economy, and priority for domestic producers of all kinds. Internationally, they would seek to restore a single union state; and they set out priorities for the presidential election that would take place the following year, including the abolition of the presidency itself.[45] The party's list of candidates was headed by Zyuganov, Vladivostok procurator Svetlana Goryacheva and Kemerovo regional chairman Aman Tuleev; it also included former Supreme Soviet chairman Anatolii Luk'yanov, who had been arrested after the attempted coup in 1991.

The Communists' ally in rural areas was the Agrarian Party, founded in 1993, and representing state and collective farm rather than commercial agriculture. Its leader was Mikhail Lapshin, director of the 'Behests of Lenin' farm in the Moscow region; its other leading figures included Alexander Zaveryukha, who was vice-premier in the Chernomyrdin government, and Alexander Nazarchuk, who was minister of agriculture, as well as Vasilii Starodubtsev, who had been one of the conspirators in August 1991 and was the successful chairman of a collective farm in the Tula region. The Agrarians' election slogan was 'Fatherland, People's Power, Justice, Welfare'; but they stood, effectively, for state support of the agricultural sector, and this had been the main objective of their parliamentary faction in the outgoing parliament. The Agrarians also opposed land privatisation, arguing that it would lead to a fall in production and that speculators, rather than farmers themselves, would be the most likely beneficiaries.[46] There were two other left groupings, 'Power to the People!', led by former prime minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and Duma deputy Sergei Baburin, which sought to defend the living standards of ordinary people but without returning to a 'supercentralised planning and distribution system';[47] and the harder-line 'Communists-Labouring Russia-For the Soviet Union', a coalition of the Russian Communist Workers' Party and the Russian Party of Communists, who were committed to the restoration of soviet power and of the USSR and socialism more generally, and who were led by one of the most effective of the street orators, Viktor Anpilov.[48]

The campaign

Unlike in 1993, the rules that governed media coverage of the Duma elections in December 1995 were detailed and carefully considered. The most important single document was adopted by the Central Electoral Commission on 20 September 1995; it covered access to air time on radio and television as well as the publication of election material in the press, although in both cases it applied only to the state-

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supported sector. The regulations made clear that the media were to refrain from any form of bias in their news coverage, and set out rules for the conduct of debates and round tables. There were also detailed regulations for the provision of free air time to all registered political parties and candidates. Between 15 November and 15 December, the national television and radio channels had to provide one hour of free time every day to be shared by the 43 parties and associations that had been registered as contestants; arrangements for individual candidates were made by regional electoral commissions, allowing each candidate up to 20 minutes of radio or television time in the course of the campaign and free advertising in the local press. Parties and candidates could buy additional time on a commercial basis.[49]

There were related limits on campaign expenditure. The Central Electoral Commission instructed that all funds were to flow through special temporary accounts in the national savings bank. Political associations were allowed to spend up to 10.9 billion rubles (about $2.4 million) on their campaign, and individual candidates up to 437 million rubles ($95 000). As well as their own funds and the resources that were made available by the electoral commissions, candidates and party lists could make use of donations, but the scale and source of such donations were carefully regulated. Private individuals could donate no more than 874 000 rubles ($190) to a candidate's election fund or 1.3 million rubles ($284) to a party; firms or organisations could donate no more than 8.7 million rubles ($1900) to an individual candidate or 87.4 million rubles ($19 000) to a party; and parties themselves could make available no more than 65.6 million rubles ($14 300) to the campaign funds of their candidates in individual constituencies. There could be no contributions from foreigners, international organisations, stateless persons, Russian firms with more than 30% foreign ownership, local government bodies, the military, charitable or religious organisations; and an auditing service was established by the Central Electoral Commission that was responsible for monitoring all forms of income and expenditure.[50]

There were several further regulations: for instance, radio and television companies had to advertise their rates before the start of the campaign, and those rates had to be the same for all parties and candidates. Advertising, moreover, had to be easily identified and distinguished from editorial contributions. At the same time, journalists noted, there were no formal restrictions on expenditure on the collection of signatures in order to secure nomination in the first place—'the longest and most expensive part of the electoral campaign'. And there was little on the equalisation of opportunities between, for instance, Our Home is Russia, which could mobilise the entire government apparatus for its purpose, and its major opponents. The limits that appeared in the regulations, as commentators noted, were basically a 'declaration of good intentions', with no evidence that the authorities would be or had in the past been able to restrict, for instance, invitations to electors to attend sponsored receptions, or the use of foreign funds. The Central Electoral Commission itself acknowledged that the regulations did not extend to 'indirect' advertising, such as when a 'candidate appeared (for money or without payment) in a variety of ostensibly non-political programmes'.[51]

According to the European Institute of the Media, which monitored campaign coverage on behalf of the European Union, free time was allocated 'fairly and in

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TABLE 1
ADVERTISING AND FINANCE IN THE 1995 DUMA ELECTIONS

	Total TV advertising (hours/mins)	*Estimated cost ($000)*	*Campaign funds (mn rubles)*	*'Cost' of a seat (mn rubles)*
Our Home is Russia	7.21	1100–2200	4370	198
Ivan Rybkin Bloc	7.02	600–1200	3950	2146
Liberal Democratic Party	5.16	500–1000	4370	210
Congress of Russian Communities	2.29	400–800	4363	1136
My Fatherland	1.28	300–600	4230	4382
Russia's Democratic Choice	1.18	350–700	4293	561
Stable Russia	1.03	150–300	1610	–
Forward, Russia!	1.02	135–270	2156	757
Women of Russia	0.55	145–290	–	1269
Yabloko	0.53	250–500	4370	181
Party of Russian Unity and Concord	0.36	–	1834	1949
Beerlovers' Party	0.35	–	–	–
Cedar	0.32	–	–	–
Communist Party	349 seconds	–	930	9
Agrarian Party	90 seconds	–	100	41
Party of Workers' Self-Management	37 seconds	–	242	554

Source: Adapted from A. G. Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy. 1995. Elektoral'naya statistika* (Moscow, Ves' mir, 1996), pp. 57, 55, 68–69.

accordance with the regulations' in spite of a 'few minor complaints'. The rates charged for paid advertising were indeed uniform; and political advertisements were clearly distinguished from editorial opinion in the federal broadcast media. Indirect advertising in the newspapers and on some regional channels, however, was 'commonplace', and the volume of advertising that some of the parties were able to undertake on national radio and television was more than they had been allowed to spend on their entire campaign, suggesting that a part of their effort had been financed from sources other than the bank accounts that were maintained for this purpose. Our Home is Russia bought nearly a quarter of all political advertising, worth about $4 million at the advertised rate, and it was also the largest purchaser of television commercials (see Table 1). When this was added to the support of individual candidates, advertising in the press and in other ways, it had clearly spent much more than the permitted maximum. Our Home, in addition, bought nearly an hour of air time on the second national TV channel, which was more than the free time it had been allocated and a further violation of the law.[52]

By far the largest share of paid advertising was on television, with 195 separate commercials shown about 4800 times over the two months before the election, but for different periods of time on different channels and at different points in the day.[53] The longest and the most numerous commercials were sponsored by Our Home is Russia; the Communists, by contrast, used virtually no national television advertising, relying instead on their well established network of local activists. So did their rural ally, the Agrarian Party. Editorial coverage was also uneven, with Our Home is Russia taking 24.7% of the time that was devoted to the election on the five central television channels, followed by Russia's Democratic Choice with 12.8%. Both of them, in the

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view of independent analysts, were 'overexposed'; the same was true of radio coverage, which 'devoted a few minutes to the most important parties, yet gave generously to OHR and RDC'. The central press was less important as a vehicle for political advertising, but it had a disproportionate influence upon élite opinion and the political agenda; although 'quite pluralistic', there was little or simply negative coverage of Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats and a 'tendency to support the centrist and reform-oriented parties'.[54]

Newspapers, like their counterparts in the West, did not neglect the human aspect of the election. What, for instance, did the party leaders read? From whom did they take advice? And what did they drink? Gaidar, it emerged, took Andrei Sakharov as his role model. He took advice from his wife, but refused to say how he had proposed to her, he drove a Zhiguli, and had a maid; and his preferred drink was whiskey and soda. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, unsurprisingly, drank Zhirinovsky vodka; he had great respect for the prerevolutionary prime minister Stolypin and Charles de Gaulle; he had no car of his own, and no domestic assistance; he was a Moscow Spartak supporter; his favourite music was late Beethoven; and if he had a fault, it was (he thought) impulsiveness. Alexander Lebed', by contrast, had no political role model, no car of his own, no housemaid, and did not drink at all, but he had proposed to his wife 'like all normal people' and he could make an omelette, which was his favourite food. He liked Russian traditional music, travelled regularly on the underground (where he was most impressed by the 'large number of poor people'), and if he had a career outside politics it would be as a carpenter.[55] Boris Fedorov of Forward, Russia took Theodore Roosevelt and Margaret Thatcher as his models; he had proposed to his wife the day after they met, drank beer and thought his main shortcoming was that he was 'too clever'. Irina Khakamada of Common Cause also chose Mrs Thatcher, but preferred to drink 'a little gin and lots of tonic'.[56]

As well as advertising and meetings, the parties sought to get their message across by posters, flyers and leaflets. Russia's Democratic Choice featured a picture of their leader Egor Gaidar gazing thoughtfully into the middle distance above the slogan: 'Everyone talks. He acts' (see Figure 2). Another warned voters against a 'Bolshevik revenge' and urged them to 'make a sensible CHOICE'. Boris Fedorov's Forward, Russia distributed a jokey pamphlet, 'The achievements of the Chernomyrdin government in 1994–95', with its pages entirely blank; Communists-Labouring Russia-For the Soviet Union featured a muscular worker strangling a doubleheaded eagle, the symbol of the new regime. The most numerous and expensive posters were those of Our Home is Russia, many of them featuring the prime minister himself (Figure 3). Some, playing on the party's name, showed the premier with his hands steepled like a roof, others invoked the support of those who 'valued their home'. Others still showed the premier cosseting a well nourished rooster, whose early morning call was meant to remind voters of the party's slogan, 'Don't sleep through the future of Russia!'

Most of the parties, in fact, based their appeal on their leaders in the same way. The Congress of Russian Communities (Figure 5) featured Yurii Skokov and Alexander Lebed' in a warm handshake, above the slogan 'Join us' (they parted ways soon after the election). The Pamfilova–Gurov–Lysenko bloc made as much as it could of the popular and widely recognised Pamfilova calling on voters to 'Live

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FIGURE 5. CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN COMMUNITIES, 'JOIN US!'

worthily!' (Figure 1). Eye surgeon Svyatoslav Fedorov was pictured in front of his successful hospital; his television commercials and election flyers made the point 'You have eyes'. Where appeals were expressed in terms of policy, they were often vague or unrealistic. Alexander Rutskoi's Derzhava, for instance, promised to introduce public order 'once and for all', to secure a 'society of social justice' with everyone guaranteed an income at least twice the level of subsistence, and to restore Russia as a military power based on its own traditions and values rather than an 'alien way of life' imported from the West. Ivan Rybkin's Bloc made a series of more specific but even less realisable promises, including the payment of salaries without delay, 'sensible prices' for goods and services, free medical treatment, and guaranteed employment and pensions.[57]

On the nationalist right, Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats pitched their appeal almost exclusively in terms of the leader himself. Typically he was pictured against an image of the Russian parliament (Figure 6); sometimes the slogan was 'Vote for the LDPR', in other cases it was simply 'You'll do fine with me!' or more frequently, 'I'll get Russia up off its knees!' The party's printed leaflets attacked the 'corrupt "democratic" *nomenklatura*', promised to defend ordinary people against the mafia and rich 'new Russians', and assured Muscovites that public transport would run on time, that the streets would be clean, and that housing would be allocated to city residents rather than 'southern Mafiosi'. The Communists relied more heavily on their canvassers and local newspapers;[58] their national advertising was generally conventional, but it did feature a campaign ditty which began:

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

FIGURE 6. V. ZHIRINOVSKY, 'YOU WILL ALL BE FINE WITH ME!'

Khochesh' zhit' ty zanovo,
Vybirai Zyuganova,
Vybirav tsifru 25,
Budesh' schastliv ty opyat'
(If you want to live again, vote for Zyuganov; if you
Choose 25 [the CPRF list], you'll be happy again).

Given the enormous expanse of the country, the weak development of membership structures and winter conditions, the parties understandably put a great deal of effort into their television commercials. Russia's Democratic Choice showed a finger seeking out their number on the ballot paper and then making a 'sensible choice'. Our Home is Russia featured a campaign song, upbeat scenes of industry and schoolchildren, and the slogan 'Choose the future, vote for NDR'. Yavlinsky's Yabloko ('Apple') promised in a similar way that it would 'take Russia out of its crisis', but also made inventive use of its name. In one of its commercials, an apple falls off a tree and lands on the head of a figure resembling Isaac Newton; in another, a country lass tells her young man, who seems more interested in the apple he is eating, 'You love the apple more than me!' He replies, 'I vote for Apple, but it's you I love'. Generally, however, television, like the printed media, made most of the leaders themselves. Boris Gromov, a former general and 'a man you know', fronted the commercial that was put out by the national-patriotic group 'My Fatherland'; Boris Fedorov presented viewers with his entire family in some of his commercials and his campaign mascot, the hedgehog, in others. Some of the Ivan Rybkin Bloc commercials, similarly, showed family photos of the leader's earlier life; others featured two

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cows lamenting the decline of Russian life and agreeing that 'Ivan' was the leader who could provide 'fairness, order and peace' (the favourite commercials, overall, were those produced by Our Home is Russia, but Rybkin's cows aroused the strongest reactions: 9% in one survey judged them the best, but 19% thought they were the worst[59]).

The Liberal Democrats were more inventive still, featuring a new style of political commercial that was dubbed 'porno-politics'. The most characteristic example featured a scantily clad chanteuse in what appeared to be an expensive and smoky nightclub, pouting and undoing her bodice while the image of the party leader was projected onto a large screen behind her.[60] In other commercials, women from Natasha Volkonsky in *War and Peace* to a bored housewife promised to 'do anything' for him. In another of the party's public events, Zhirinovsky appeared on stage with a sequinned stripper who told him, 'Spank me, I want a man who will spank me'; the irrepressible party leader told his audience that voting was like making love.[61] With all its faults, this at least made an impression; so did the advertisement sponsored by KRO, which showed a hand reaching for an envelope being stopped by a voice warning ' "Comrade bureaucrats, don't take bribes!" ' followed by a uniformed Lebed' adding for good measure ' "I don't advise it!" '. Others made less effective use of their opportunities, such as the public service series produced for national television by Nikita Mikhalkov, a leading figure on the Our Home party list. One of them showed two men floating in space, one of them Mikhalkov himself. As Russia comes into sight beneath them one comments that the prettiest girls are to be found in Samara; the other disagrees. 'Russians', commented the *Financial Times*, 'are still waiting for the punch-line'.[62]

The television ads were not only shorter than the free time spots, which were typically about seven minutes on a given day for a particular party, but also much livelier. Many of the spots did no more than show the party leaders talking about their own groupings, and few managed to convey a clear sense of purpose. Despite efforts by television presenters to encourage a sense of debate, most parties refused to cooperate and stuck to their own styles, which were rarely informative or of interest even to their own supporters.[63] Television clips, according to our survey evidence, were more important for supporters of some parties than others. When asked what had been most effective in influencing their vote, 19% of Yabloko and 18% of Our Home is Russia voters said it had been campaign film clips (*roliki*, which can refer to commercials or free time promotion). However, fewer than 9% of Communist voters and fewer than 12% of Liberal Democrat voters took the same view. By contrast, more than 27% of Communist voters claimed to have made up their own minds rather than relying on television advertisements, appearances by party leaders on television, journalistic commentary, or other influences. About 20% of Our Home voters, 22% of Liberal Democrat voters and 19% of Yabloko voters claimed similarly that they had made up their own minds. In the same survey, fewer than 20% of Our Home voters reported that they had decided how to vote 'long before the campaign started', compared with almost 40% of Communist and Liberal Democrat voters. Clearly, Our Home, founded just a few months earlier, had to make up much more ground during the campaign itself.[64]

There were several set-piece debates along the lines of American presidential elections as the campaign reached its conclusion. In one of them Vladimir Zhirinovsky

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caused a minor sensation by throwing a glass of water at his opponent.[65] In another, Nikolai Ryzhkov took on Grigorii Yavlinsky; in another still, Zyuganov was pitted against Nikolai Mikhalkov of Our Home is Russia. The veteran actress, Elena Bystritskaya of 'Stable Russia', found her opponent engaging in a 'mild flirtation'.[66] The most confrontational encounter, on the eve of the poll, was between Egor Gaidar and a Communist deputy, Yurii Ivanov, who attacked him unsparingly for his subservience to Western interests. All campaigning was meant to come to an end on the eve of the poll, Saturday 16 December 1995, although the Central Electoral Commission continued to explain procedures and there was a certain amount of indirect publicity for the leading contenders. Chernomyrdin, in particular, was featured on central television attending an ice hockey match; Zyuganov was briefly covered on independent television attending a concert; and the same channel put out a pre-election edition of its animated puppet cartoon 'Kukly' (Dolls), which made fun of all the party leaders but also hinted at a Communist victory.

Russians, according to the survey evidence, had very mixed feelings about the exercise in which they were about to engage. Nine out of ten thought the results would be manipulated, and a majority (57%) thought they would have little or no effect on government policy.[67] At the same time a larger majority thought it was the duty of citizens in a democratic society to take part in elections (two-thirds agreed completely with this view), and a still larger majority said they were likely to vote themselves (about 70% in October 1995, up from 60% in April). If they did so, it was already clear that pro-government parties were unlikely to benefit. Three-quarters thought government policies were heading in the wrong direction; the same proportion described their standard of living as bad or very bad (56% said it had declined over the past year), and there was overwhelming dissatisfaction with the state of public order, the Chechen war and government policy towards the less advantaged (91, 90 and 88% respectively). Only 16% expressed confidence in Boris El'tsin, and even fewer (11%) in the Duma itself.[68] There was every reason, on the eve of the poll, for the President to issue an impassioned appeal to voters not to let the 'forces of the past return to power'.[69]

The results

In the event, the puppets got it right. The elections proved to be a success for parties of the left, especially the CPRF, which increased its vote share by 10% compared with 1993, winning twice as many votes as any other party or alliance and over a third of the seats in the new Duma. The other parties of the left failed to pass the 5% barrier and were accordingly denied representation in their own right, but thanks to local agreements of a kind which pro-government or reformist parties had in most constituencies been unable to conclude, the Agrarians and Power to the People won 20 and 9 single-member districts respectively. Communist deputies were deputed to each of them after the election to make up the minimum that was required to form a deputies' group in the new Duma. Against the predictions of most commentators, second place in the party list section went to Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats. Their 11% of the vote, however, was half the share they had achieved two years previously. This was variously blamed on Zhirinovsky's backing for the government at crucial

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TABLE 2
ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA, DECEMBER 1995

	PR Party List			*SMDs*		*Total seats*	
	% of vote	*number of seats*	*% of seats*	*number of seats*	*% of seats*	*number*	*%*
Communist Party	22.3	99	44.0	58	25.8	157	34.9
Liberal Democrats	11.2	50	22.2	1	0.4	51	11.3
Our Home is Russia	10.1	45	20.0	10	4.4	55	12.2
Yabloko	6.9	31	13.8	14	6.2	45	10.0
[5% threshold]							
Agrarians	3.8	–	–	20	8.9	20	4.4
Power to the People	1.6	–	–	9	4.0	9	2.0
Russia's Democratic Choice	3.9	–	–	9	4.0	9	2.9
Congress of Russian Communities	4.3	–	–	5	2.2	5	1.1
Women of Russia	4.6	–	–	3	1.3	3	0.7
Forward, Russia!	1.9	–	–	3	1.3	3	0.7
Ivan Rybkin Bloc	1.1	–	–	3	1.3	3	0.7
Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko Bloc	1.6	–	–	2	0.9	2	0.4
Communists-Working Russia-For the Soviet Union	4.5	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
Party of Workers' Self-Management	4.0	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
Trade Union and Industrialists	1.6	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc	1.0	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
My Fatherland	0.7	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
Common Cause	0.7	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
Transformation of the Fatherland	0.7	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
Party of Russian Unity and Concord	0.4	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
Party of Economic Freedom	0.1	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
89 Regions of Russia	0.1	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
Bloc of Independents	0.1	–	–	1	0.4	1	0.2
Other parties	8.9	–	–	0	–	0	–
Independents	–	–	–	77	34.2	77	17.1
Against all lists	2.8	–	–	–	–	–	–
Invalid vote	1.2	–	–	–	–	–	–

Source: Vestnik Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1996, 1, pp. 49–51 (party list vote) and 18–47 (deputies elected by single member districts).
Registered electorate: 107 496 558. Total vote: 69 204 819. Valid vote: 67 884 200.
Turnout (total vote as percentage of electorate): 64.4%.

points during the previous Duma, the fact that his novelty and anti-establishment credentials had worn off, and on the fact that, unlike in 1993, the LDPR faced competition for the nationalist vote from other parties, in particular KRO.

The elections also proved a moderate success for Yabloko, which consolidated its position as the main party within the 'democratic opposition' to the El'tsin administration. While it did not raise its share of the vote, higher turnout meant that the total number of Yabloko voters increased, and successful targeting also meant the capture of 14 single-member constituencies, five of them in St Petersburg, where it was the best placed of all the parties. The other party which was successful in surmounting the 5% barrier was Our Home is Russia, although it was rather less successful than the main pro-government force, Russia's Choice, had been in 1993. The 1993 poll had been held against the background of the forced dissolution of the previous parliament, and consequently many government opponents were sceptical about voting, since they assumed that the results would be falsified anyway. Pro-

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government voters, keen to be on the winning side, took part in greater numbers. Despite some concerns about the fairness of the vote, by 1995 there was a greater belief that anti-government voting might have an impact. Our Home's support fell accordingly, to about one voter in ten; and its expenditure in terms of the seats that it won was higher than that of Yabloko and very much more than that of the Communists, although less than that of most of the other parties (see Table 1).

Five parties narrowly failed to gain the 5% needed to win party list seats. These were the hardline Communists-Labouring Russia-For the Soviet Union, Russia's Democratic Choice, Women of Russia, Svyatoslav Fedorov's Party of Workers' Self-Management, and KRO. The success of the first of these demonstrated that a nostalgia for Stalinism had by no means died out in Russia, while the size of the vote for the latter two demonstrated that for Russian parties it was often as important to be led by a popular figure as to have managed to establish a mass membership and national organisation. Russia's Choice's relative failure (it was the largest party after 1993) was for the most part because it was no longer the establishment party and therefore did not have the resources of the state to assist its campaign effort; it was also a less united force than it had been before. Russia's Women, like Russia's Democratic Choice and the LDPR less successful than in 1993, suffered from the fact that there were now a number of other parties campaigning on similar themes, and (activists suggested) from a degree of complacency; they lost nearly half their vote. The Agrarians appeared to have lost ground in a similar way, in that other parties with a better national organisation were also campaigning for the retention of state-run agriculture.

What was the influence of the electoral system chosen? One can look at this in terms of fairness of representation, in terms of the coherence of the assembly which was formed as a result of the vote, and in terms of the development of the Russian party system. The party list section of the vote, as the main author of the electoral law, Viktor Sheinis of Yabloko, had intended, amplified the representation of the largest parties in parliament while denying representation to more marginal ones.[70] In this way it was hoped that incentives would be created for parties with compatible views to coalesce and that there would be fewer minor parties in the new parliament, which would give Russian voters a clearer choice of political alternatives at future elections. A competition between party lists in a single all-Russian constituency would also ensure that there was some attempt to address issues that were of concern to the whole of the country; and, thought Sheinis, it would strengthen the parties themselves. 'No proportional representation, no parties', he told journalists.[71]

With 43 parties competing, however, the outcome was that just over half the party list votes were cast for parties that exceeded the 5% threshold (the other 49.5% was 'wasted'); and the successful parties in turn secured about twice as many seats as their share of the popular vote would have given them. The single member district was still less effective as a mechanism for translating votes into seats: just under 30% of all votes cast went to the winning candidates. The Duma was thus more coherent in terms of parties than it might have been under other electoral rules, but at the cost of being highly unrepresentative. One intriguing outcome of the voting procedure adopted was that—against received political science wisdom—the overall outcome in the single member districts actually proved more proportional than that in the party lists.

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Various indices of disproportionality for voting systems exist, and there is no consensus as to which is the best. However, taking one relatively straightforward definition used in a recent study of Russian elections, the index of disproportionality for the party list section was 47% whereas for the single member districts it was just 21% (compared with a West European proportional representation average of 6% disproportionality).[72]

What was the social and demographic basis for voting in the 1995 election? Tables 3 and 4 show this in two different forms. Table 3 presents survey data from two polls conducted by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research on our behalf, one immediately before and the other immediately after the Duma elections.[73] It should be noted that the reported voting results are acceptably close to the actual results, demonstrating once again that those sceptical of Russian polling are wide of the mark in many of their criticisms. Table 4, by contrast, is compiled from actual votes, rather than survey data. It relates voting on the party list in each of the 225 single-member constituencies to the demographic characteristics of those districts, and therefore provides a portrait of the behaviour of different types of regions, rather than of individuals. The data show what are becoming familiar features of Russian electoral behaviour.[74] The CPRF was most strongly supported by the poor, older voters, those living in rural areas, and those with least formal education. It did better in more rural areas, and also in the electoral districts with the highest proportions of non-Russians. Table 4 also shows that the hardline Communists-Labouring Russia grouping did well in the same districts in which the CPRF secured a higher share of the vote; so did the Agrarian Party.

The profile of the typical LDPR voter was different in several important ways. He—and it was more than twice as likely to be he than she—was likely to be of working age, living in a rural area or smaller town, an industrial or agricultural worker or in the police or armed services, poorer than average, and with fewer years of formal education. Voters for KRO had a similar profile, suggesting that the two nationalist parties were indeed fishing for votes in the same pool. Both nationalist parties did significantly worse in areas with a higher proportion of non-Russians. Voters for Our Home, Russia's Democratic Choice and Yabloko were different again: they were more likely to be female, and they were younger, wealthier and better educated. The three parties each did better than average among entrepreneurs and businessmen, professionals, administrators and students. According to the VTsIOM data, Yavlinsky's party was the most popular choice among students and those with degrees, and Chernomyrdin's among those employed in state administration. Each of these three parties, in addition, did better in urban than in rural areas, but Our Home's best performance was in non-Russian regions, while Yabloko and RDC's greatest strength was in predominantly Russian electoral districts.

One key to understanding these voting patterns, we would argue, lies in the distinction between 'winners' and 'losers' in the particular circumstances of post-communist Russia. Voters who supported hard-line opposition parties were likely to be from more marginal sections of society: the poor, pensioners whose benefits had not been paid on time, workers owed substantial back wages, rural dwellers who, unlike many of their urban counterparts, had seen no visible signs of change for the better in the areas in which they lived, and those dependent upon the state more

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TABLE 3

TRENDS IN PARTY SUPPORT DURING CAMPAIGN (%)

% of total voters		*CPRF*		*Russia's Women*		*Yabloko*		*Russia's Choice*		*Our Home is Russia*		*KRO*		*LDPR*	
		1995 Party vote													
		Pre	*Post*	*Pre*	*Post*	*Pre*	*Post*	*Pre*	*Post*	*Pre*	*Post*	*Pre*	*Post*	*Pre*	*Post*
	All Russians	23	26	9	7	10	11	4	5	9	11	6	4	9	11
45	Men	24	26	2	4	9	10	4	4	8	10	9	5	13	16
55	Women	21	25	14	10	11	12	4	6	10	13	4	3	5	8
19	18–29 years	11	11	10	7	13	17	3	9	10	13	9	3	9	13
48	30–54 years	18	24	9	7	10	11	6	5	9	11	6	6	11	13
33	55 years and over	37	37	7	7	8	8	2	3	8	10	4	2	6	9
	Income: low quartile	27	28	15	8	4	8	2	3	8	9	4	3	11	14
	Middle quartiles	25	29	7	7	9	10	4	3	10	11	6	4	10	12
	High quartile	11	18	7	6	18	15	7	10	8	14	8	5	5	9
40	Big city	17	22	7	7	15	13	5	8	10	12	6	4	5	8
35	Small city	23	24	12	7	9	13	4	4	7	9	7	4	10	12
26	Rural	30	32	7	6	4	7	3	2	9	12	3	4	13	17
3	Independent entrepreneur	4	10	0	0	27	16	12	16	8	13	12	10	4	7
5	Manager, bureaucrat	15	19	2	5	23	18	8	8	8	18	2	5	8	11
15	Professional	13	14	9	9	16	16	8	11	10	12	5	6	6	4
3	Military, MVD, Procuracy	19	20	0	0	0	9	0	0	4	6	15	14	11	20
7	Routine white collar	16	13	5	6	10	17	4	1	11	15	14	5	6	8
26	Worker	19	29	12	5	6	9	3	2	10	10	6	5	15	21
4	Student, school student	14	5	12	7	21	23	5	12	12	12	7	0	0	5
32	Pensioner, housewife	37	38	8	8	8	7	2	4	8	11	3	2	6	8
6	Unemployed	20	22	9	13	3	10	3	2	6	8	6	2	12	13
17	Higher, incomplete higher education	19	17	4	4	15	21	9	15	11	13	4	4	4	3
45	Secondary education	18	21	9	8	10	11	4	4	9	13	8	5	9	11
37	Elementary education	32	36	10	6	8	8	2	2	8	9	3	3	10	16
	n =	268	299	103	80	118	130	46	58	106	131	69	48	105	135

Source: VTsIOM survey data, early December 1995 ($n = 1606$) and late December 1995 ($n = 1568$). Interviews were conducted in respondents' homes, and the results were weighted for age, education, rurality and gender.

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generally for their income and way of life. By contrast, both government and reformist parties did well among groups of higher social status: the wealthier, the more educated, workers in administration or management rather than industry or agriculture, and professionals of various kinds, as well as urban inhabitants, who were more likely to have experienced positive changes in their surroundings over the recent past. Our Home did particularly well among workers in state administration, Yabloko and Russia's Choice among the potential beneficiaries of reform (such as students) and among those who had benefited from recent policies.

There were differences of other kinds among voters, relating to their degree of commitment and their reasons for voting as they had done. The Communists were the most successful in retaining their earlier vote (see Table 5): more than two-thirds of those who had voted for the CPRF in 1995 recalled that they had done so in 1993, well ahead of those who had refused to vote on both occasions, and still further ahead of the Liberal Democrats, Yabloko (both of which kept just under half of their vote), and Russia's Women (just a third of whose 1995 voters had voted for them two years earlier). Communists had the 'hardest' support in another sense, that their voters were the most likely to report that they identified 'fully and unconditionally' with the party's programme and slogans. Some 43% did so entirely and 32% with reservations; no other party had the complete agreement of more than a quarter of its electorate, and among the pro-government parties there was a particularly low level of commitment. Lowest of all was Our Home is Russia, only 17% of whose voters fully and 37% with reservations were prepared to identify with its programme and slogans.[75] That programme, admittedly, was in effect its conduct of government since the previous elections; and as *Argumenty i fakty* remarked drily, the democrats had made so many mistakes you could 'only wonder the Communists won no more than 22.3% of the vote'.[76]

Respondents were also asked about the influences that had shaped their electoral choices (see Table 6). Overall, the strongest motivation to support a party was that it 'reflected the interests of people like me', and this was particularly true of the Communists and of Russia's Women. But for the other parties it was the quality of their leadership and not the interests they represented that was decisive: the clearest case was the Congress of Russian Communities, which also gained from its image as a party that was relatively free of scandal or corruption, and one that was a new force in political life. Our Home and the Liberal Democrats were seen as the 'strongest' parties, more so than the Communists (Russia's Women were the weakest). The Communists, on the other hand, gained support from their established national presence, and from 'neighbourhood' effects—choices that were influenced by the workplace or wider community. Again, it was a form of support that was more likely to accrue to a party that had a significant presence at the local level throughout the country.

A further factor underlying voting patterns is nationality, illustrated in Table 4. As can be seen, nationalist parties did significantly worse in predominantly non-Russian areas. It should also be noted that the Communists' apparent success in these districts is illusory: once income is controlled for, the effect disappears. The major party which did significantly better in non-Russian districts, all other factors being equal, was in fact Our Home is Russia. These data are unsurprising: the aggressive Russian

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TABLE 4
PARTY SUPPORT BY CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS

% of total voters		*CLR*	*CPRF*	*APR*	*Russia's Women*	*Yabloko*	*OHR*	*Russia's Choice*	*KRO*	*LDPR*
	All regions	4.5	22.3	3.8	4.6	6.9	10.1	3.9	4.3	11.2
9.7	Under 50% Russian	5.5	25.9	9.5	3.9	2.5	18.1	2.9	1.8	6.4
13.6	50–80%	5.0	21.2	4.4	5.7	5.0	10.4	3.0	4.2	12.4
76.7	Over 80%	4.3	22.0	3.0	4.5	7.8	9.1	4.1	4.6	11.6
24.5	Under 60% urban	6.1	27.0	8.2	4.3	3.0	9.6	1.6	2.8	13.4
26.6	60–74%	5.0	24.7	4.0	4.8	5.9	8.7	3.0	4.1	12.3
25.0	75–90%	4.2	21.1	2.1	5.3	7.1	9.5	3.3	5.2	11.7
23.9	Over 90%	2.8	16.1	0.1	4.0	11.9	13.0	7.7	5.1	7.0
	percentage with higher education:									
26.4	low quartile	6.0	26.6	7.6	4.7	3.3	8.2	1.8	3.0	13.3
22.9	high quartile	2.7	16.5	0.6	3.5	12.9	13.7	7.7	5.6	6.2

Source: Authors' data.

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TABLE 5
CONSISTENCY OF PARTY VOTE, 1993–95 (%)

Recalled 1993 vote	*1995 Party Vote*									
	CPRF	*Russia's Women*	*Yabloko*	*Russia's Democratic Choice*	*Our Home is Russia*	*KRO*	*LPDR*	*Other, against all*	*Did not vote, don't know*	*n*
CPRF	68	2	3	1	2	1	1	10	13	141
Agrarians	29	9	0	4	7	5	5	22	20	56
Russia's Women	5	34	11	4	11	5	5	21	7	44
Yabloko	5	3	43	5	11	8	0	14	10	89
Russia's Choice	11	4	8	19	12	3	6	26	15	143
LDPR	15	5	5	0	6	1	47	16	9	131
Other	21	2	7	5	15	7	4	22	17	85
Did not vote	8	4	6	2	6	3	6	15	49	544

Source: As Table 3 (post-election name only).

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TABLE 6

THE MOTIVATIONS OF PARTY VOTERS

QUESTION: WHY DID YOU VOTE FOR THIS PARTY OR BLOC? (MORE THAN ONE ANSWER ALLOWED)

	It reflects the interest of people like me	*I trust its leader(s)*	*It is strong enough to change things*	*Out of habit or I know this party, but have barely heard of the others*	*The majority of my peers supported it*	*It isn't so good, but the others are worse*	*To protest about what is going on in the country*	*These are people not involved in financial scandal or corruption*	*This is a new fresh political force*	*I like its name*
All	30	28	21	7	8	12	5	5	5	2
CPRF	43	12	28	15	12	7	7	2	0	0
Russia's Women	39	18	8	3	4	15	5	9	8	4
Yabloko	31	40	19	4	6	9	2	9	12	2
Russia's Democratic Choice	29	38	16	10	9	14	0	2	3	0
Our Home is Russia	18	28	31	5	9	18	1	0	2	2
KRO	15	48	19	6	8	13	8	19	13	2
Liberal Democrats	21	39	30	5	9	18	6	3	2	0

Other answers and don't knows not reported.
Source: As Table 5.

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nationalism of the Liberal Democrats and Communists, and their call to reconstitute the Soviet Union and to recentralise Russia, evidently put off voters in non-Russian areas, whereas the government policy of allowing a significant degree of autonomy to the regions evidently appealed in those places that had negotiated such a relationship. One intriguing aspect of Russian voting behaviour continues to be the influence of gender. Women, who according to the poll data made up 55% of the electorate in December 1995, continue to be significantly more reluctant to vote for the nationalist opposition and more likely to vote for the government or reformist parties. This remains true even after income, education and rurality have been taken into account. While no convincing explanation for this pattern has yet been offered, it seems likely that the continuing gender gap relates to a suspicion of some of the more violent and confrontational solutions to Russia's problems offered by (for example) the Liberal Democrats.

Some conclusions

How fair was the December 1995 Duma election? International observers, at least, were convinced that the wishes of the Russian people had been faithfully represented. There were 993 registered observers from 61 foreign countries, including a number of international organisations,[77] and they were distributed across the country; all polling stations were accessible to them, except a small number of mostly military prisons.[78] The European Parliament's delegation felt able to declare the results '100% free and democratic' the morning after polling day, more than two weeks before the results themselves were declared.[79] Voting, they found, had been 'conducted everywhere in a calm and orderly manner'; local electoral commissions were 'well organised'; and the election as a whole was 'up to international standards'.[80] The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly reported similarly that the election had been carried out in a 'free and fair manner';[81] the International Foundation for Electoral Systems thought the high level of turnout was in itself a 'most important indicator of the confidence of electors'; and the US government's Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe felt able to conclude that popular sovereignty had at last 'struck roots'.[82]

International observers also found a series of 'minor infringements',[83] and others were reported in the press. In some cases the ballot box could not be clearly seen by election officials; there was open voting, a result in part of the extremely large ballot paper that was needed to list all the parties; and the count was not always checked, for reasons that included the 'sheer physical exhaustion of some commission members'. But these were problems of a 'practical nature, and not evidence of fraudulent intent'.[84] In Perm', observers found evidence of 'family voting', and there was little supervision of mobile ballot boxes,[85]; in Ufa, two ballot boxes 'sprang leaks' and ballot papers spilled out on the floor.[86] The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also noted 'signs of fatigue', with observers from the political parties allowed to take part in the count. Some voters, apparently at their own request, had been advised for whom to vote by local officials; and many polling stations were overwhelmed by the numbers of voters that sought to make use of them.[87] In general, the picture was one of fairness but also of 'controlled confusion'.[88]

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Other observers were less complacent. Sobyanin and Sukhovol'sky, for instance, drew attention to the sharp fall in the proportion of ballots that were invalid (from 7.6 to 2.1%)—a 'strange increase in political literacy'.[89] For Sobyanin, at least, up to a fifth of the total vote had been misallocated.[90] There were related concerns about the collection of signatures—they had been available for purchase, at a price that increased as the election approached, and in the end substantial numbers of candidates ended up with fewer votes than the number of signatures they had collected in their support.[91] This was made easier by a directive by the Central Electoral Commission on 3 October, which allowed nominators to fill in everything except the signatures of the electors that were included in their lists. But how could election officials be expected to verify thousands of sheets of illegible handwriting?[92] There were additional concerns about the apparent disappearance of almost two million from the electorate.[93]

There was, in fact, some evidence that particular results had been falsified or at least inaccurately tallied. In five single-member constituencies there were 'technical mistakes' that required alterations in the final results, although no changes in the allocation of seats.[94] A much more serious departure from established procedures took place in the enormous Taimyr no. 219 electoral district. The winner, according to the official announcement, was the local deputy head of administration, Nikolai Piskun, with 131 votes more than his nearest opponent, Muscovite Elena Panina, who had drawn on the support of local teachers and doctors. But when the votes were counted, it was found that 144 lacked the stamp and signature of the local electoral commission, and that in one of the districts in the constituency there were 23 more ballot papers than had been distributed. When the invalid ballots were counted again, moreover, there was a difference of 1211 compared with the original count. Panina sought an investigation; but as the head of the Central Electoral Commission told his staff, there were irregularities of this kind in many constituencies. Who wanted to create a precedent?[95]

There were also improper inducements, and attempts to evade the controls on campaign spending. For instance, concerts were organised for apparently philanthropic purposes, but then used by the candidates who had sponsored them to distribute election literature. Some other candidates did not conceal their connections with the criminal world and local officials were often reluctant to apply the full force of the law against them (the Liberal Democrats had the largest number of candidates with a known record—12—but there were others in almost all the parties[96]). A particularly notable case in St Petersburg did reach the courts, in which a candidate had promised a bonus of 15 000 rubles and a delivery of groceries to elderly voters and had then arranged for them to vote ahead of time, hiring a fleet of buses to take them to the polling stations. In the end he received just 2% of the vote and the case was dropped.[97] In Pskov the official stamp of the electoral commission was stolen by an observer, who told police later he had only wanted to 'check the vigilance' of polling officials.[98] In another case, one of the regional lists of the party led by spiritualist Evgeniya Davitashvili was headed by an Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed'—the same name but not the same person as the KRO leader, in what was apparently a deliberate attempt to deceive.[99]

The electoral system itself came in for some criticism, in particular the legislation

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that had allowed so many parties and alliances to take part. The OSCE parliamentary delegation pointed to a number of the problems to which this gave rise, including the confusion that arose among voters making their choices and then marking a ballot paper that was so big it could not be spread out in the polling booth, and the burden that was placed upon the media in terms of the provision of free time.[100] There was another direct consequence, as we have seen: the large proportion of voters—just under half of the total—who voted for parties or alliances that fell below the 5% threshold and were accordingly denied any party list places. The Duma election of 1995 produced the highest level of disproportionality of this kind that has yet been recorded, with 49.5% of the party vote going to parties that were unrepresented, compared with just 13% in 1993. For the *Izvestiya* commentator Otto Latsis and for party leaders Ivan Rybkin and Irina Khakamada, there was a basis for challenging the results in the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the 'rights of millions of voters had been violated'. The combination of a Duma half of whose members were elected by party lists, together with a 5% threshold, Latsis complained, had 'turned a doubtful system into a completely absurd one'.[101]

There were several suggestions for a further modification of the electoral system that would avoid results of this kind in the future. For some, at least, there were arguments for raising the threshold: for instance, increasing the number of signatures that had to be obtained and the number of constituencies in which they had to be gathered.[102] Others argued that this would simply enrich the organisations that had come into existence to arrange campaigns for candidates who were able to afford their services, including the collection of signatures and, 'for the laziest', the writing of their election manifestos.[103] There was general agreement that a closer check should be kept on campaign expenditure, and that the efforts of local electoral commissions should be more adequately supported.[104] The Central Electoral Commission itself called for a new law on parties, and on the computerised voting system that had been piloted during the Duma election; there were also arguments for insisting that candidates run either in national lists or in constituencies (14% of all candidates had been nominated in both categories, which gave them a significantly better chance of election).[105]

What, finally, were the implications of the 1995 Duma elections? For oppositionists, at least, they had been a sort of referendum on the El'tsin government in which it had secured only 10% of the vote;[106] in their turn they represented a step towards a more broadly based government and a 'patriot president'.[107] El'tsin himself professed to regard the vote as 'no tragedy', and prime minister Chernomyrdin promised there would be no change in government policy as a result.[108] But there were indications from other parts of the presidential administration that there was a need for 'serious correctives' in policy, and perhaps some Communists in the government;[109] and indeed the elections were followed by the removal of some of the most openly pro-market ministers, including Anatolii Chubais and foreign minister Kozyrev, and their replacement by more pragmatically oriented centrists.[110] During 1996, after the presidential elections, a post as minister for the Commonwealth of Independent States was found for Aman-Gel'dy Tuleev, who had been one of the Communist candidates.

The new Duma's own composition changed after the election in ways that bore

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little relation to the 'will of the people' it was meant to have embodied. During the campaign itself 330 candidates withdrew from the federal lists for which they had been nominated, and 38 became 'independents' or changed their party affiliation.[111] The Duma that convened in January 1996 was in turn an imperfect reflection of the parties and individual candidates that had been successful in the election. Many of the leading figures on party lists decided not to take their seats, leading to accusations that they had simply 'rented' their names.[112] And only the Liberal Democratic fraction in the new Duma corresponded exactly to the number of seats that had been won by LDPR candidates in the election. One of the 'independents' joined the Yabloko fraction; 10 'independents' and one of the three elected under the auspices of Forward, Russia joined Our Home is Russia; six 'independents' joined the Communists, together with the single deputy elected for the Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia; while the Communists themselves delegated nine deputies to the Agrarians and six to People's Power, a newly established deputies' group that was made up of independents and representatives of seven different party lists. Only 12 of the 77 independents remained without a parliamentary affiliation; the other 13 unaffiliated deputies had originally been elected on one of the party lists.[113]

With such a loose association between voters, parties and the formation of government, the Duma election could scarcely provide for an organised choice of political alternatives: it was more a 'sort of referendum on El'tsin'[114] and still more so a dress rehearsal for the presidential elections that were scheduled for the summer of 1996. With such a highly presidential constitution, it was only through a change at the highest level that the broad lines of government policy could be changed; but the Duma elections allowed parties to be formed and tested, presidential hopefuls to gain some media exposure (and free air time if they made arrangements for a nomination), and tactical alliances to be formed on the basis of the decisions of voters rather than the preferences expressed in opinion polls. Two months after the Duma election, 31 presidential candidates had announced themselves;[115] it was they who would take forward the political momentum generated by what many saw as Russia's 'first "real" elections',[116] whose smooth conduct made it in turn more likely that the exercise of political power would continue to be regulated by a ballot box within a framework of law.

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[2] The Politburo, in the late Soviet period, approved the communiqué of the Central Electoral Commission before the elections had taken place (see *Izvestiya*, 13 July 1992, p. 3). Brecht had suggested in 'The Solution' that rather than dissolve the government after the uprising of 17 June

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1953 it would have been 'simpler ... if the government dissolved the people and elected another' (Alan Bold (ed.), *The Penguin Book of Socialist Verse* (Harmondsworth, Penguin), 1980, p. 240).

[3] Egor Ligachev, *Zagadka Gorbacheva* (Novosibirsk, Interbuk, 1992), p. 75. Gorbachev himself saw the 1989 elections as a 'major step in ... the further democratisation of society'. Others were less sanguine: Yurii Solov'ev, for instance, thought they had shown that a 'struggle for power' was in progress, and Anatolii Luk'yanov thought measures should be taken against Memorial and Pamyat', which were 'close to anti-Soviet organisations' (Politburo minutes, 28 March 1989, Chernyaev papers, Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow). For a full discussion see Stephen White, 'The Soviet elections of 1989: from acclamation to limited choice', *Coexistence*, 28, 4, December 1991, pp. 513–539.

[4] On the loss of life see *Izvestiya*, 28 December 1993, p. 1 (a further 878 were wounded). For a more detailed if somewhat 'presidentialist' account see N. L. Zheleznova *et al.*, (eds), *Moskva. Osen'-93. Khronika protivostoyaniya* (Moscow, Respublika, 1994).

[5] On the December 1993 elections see Stephen White, Richard Rose & Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, NJ, Chatham House, 1997), chapters 6 and 7. See also Richard Sakwa, 'The Russian elections of December 1993', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, 2, March 1995, pp. 195–227; Matthew Wyman *et al.*, 'Public opinion, parties and voters in the December 1993 Russian elections', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, 4, June 1995, pp. 591–614, and Peter Lentini (ed.) *Elections and Political Order in Russia* (Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995).

[6] *Vechernyaya Moskva*, 13 December 1993, p. 1; *Izvestiya*, 15 December 1993, p. 2.

[7] For the law see *O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1995); and on the process by which it was adopted, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 29 November 1995, pp. 1, 5. Legal aspects of the electoral law are considered more fully in S. A. Avak'yan, *Vybory '95 v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Rossii* (Moscow, Assistant, 1995) and A. E. Postnikov, *Izbiratel'noe pravo Rossii* (Moscow, Infra.M-Norma, 1996).

[8] *Voprosy statistiki*, 1996, 3, pp. 81–88.

[9] *Finansovye izvestiya*, 1995, 40, p. 1 (the standard of living of 80% had fallen, while the richest 10% earned—or at any rate received—a third of all money incomes).

[10] *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 29 February 1996, p. 3.

[11] *Izvestiya*, 31 May 1995, p. 9.

[12] *Izvestiya*, 2 February 1996, p. 2 (women could expect to live until 72); an even lower figure of 54 was reported in *Argumenty i fakty*, 1995, 30, p. 13.

[13] *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 11 April 1995, p. 1. The shooting of the third Duma deputy was reported in *Izvestiya*, 11 February 1995, p. 1.

[14] In November 1995, according to VTsIOM, 46.7% rated the material position of their family as 'bad' or 'very bad' (for about the same proportion it was 'average'); 57.1% thought the situation in Russia as a whole was 'tense' and a further 28.9% thought it was 'critical' or 'explosive'; and 15.6% expected the country's economic position to improve, but 52.9% thought it would worsen (*Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 1996, 1, pp. 57, 59).

[15] See A. G. Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy. 1995. Elektoral'naya statistika* (Moscow, Ves' mir, 1996), p. 11. The possibility of a 'world record' was suggested in *Segodnya*, 18 August 1995, p. 2.

[16] *Izvestiya*, 24 October 1995, p. 2. The Central Electoral Commission later reported that 111 of the 273 bodies or associations that were entitled to do so had exercised their right to nominate candidates; 51 presented lists of signatures in support of their registration (Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, p. 11).

[17] Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, p. 154.

[18] *Kommersant'-daily*, 29 November 1995, p. 3. Eight electoral alliances were refused registration (Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, p. 78); Derzhava and Yabloko were initially denied registration, but later allowed to do so after the Supreme Court had intervened on their behalf (*Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 2 November 1995, pp. 5, 6; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 5 November 1995, p. 1).

[19] Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, p. 11.

[20] Any classification is necessarily arbitrary. The fourfold scheme that is employed in our discussion is based upon *ibid.*, p. 242. Five separate groups were identified by the *Financial Times*, 11 December 1995, p. 2; Vladimir Pribylovsky, *43 linii spektra: Kratkoe opisanie vsekh predvybornykh blokov* (Moscow, Panorama, 1995) identifies seven. See also Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov (eds), *Previewing Russia's 1995 Parliamentary Elections* (Washington, DC, and Moscow, Carnegie Endowment, 1995), which identifies five blocs and five 'special interest groups'; Sergei Markov, 'Izbiratel'nye ob"edineniya v Rossii v preddverii parlamentskikh vyoborov 1995 goda', in A. I. Ioffe (ed.), *Analiz elektorata politicheskikh sil Rossii* (Moscow, Komtekh, 1995), pp. 62–91; and White, Rose & McAllister, *How Russia Votes*, Chapter 10, on which we have drawn for this part of

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the discussion. The Central Electoral Commission produced a guide to all the electoral associations and blocs: *Izbiratel'nye ob"edineniya, izbiratel'nye bloki na vyborakh-95* (Prilozhenie k zhurnalu *Vestnik Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1995); see also *Politicheskie partii Rossii* (Moscow, Fond prava, 1995).

[21] See *Izvestiya*, 28 October 1995, p. 5.

[22] Yavlinsky set out his views in *Izvestiya*, 12 July 1995, p. 2, and 13 July 1995, p. 2.

[23] See *Deklaratsiya obshchestvennogo dvizheniya "Yabloko"* (Moscow, Yabloko, September 1995); their political platform and economic programme were included in *Reformy dlya bol'shinstva* (Moscow, Yabloko, 1995) There is a further discussion in V. Ya. Gel'man, ' "Yabloko": opyt politcheskoi al'ternativy', *Kentavr*, 1995, 6, pp. 43–57, and in *Izvestiya*, 23 September 1995, p. 4.

[24] See *Liberal'nyi plan dlya Rossii*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, Vpered, Rossiya, 1995).

[25] Pribylovsky, *43 linii*, p. 8.

[26] See *Platforma izbiratel'nogo ob"edineniya "Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko" (Respublikanskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii)* (Moscow, Institut sovremennoi politiki, 1995).

[27] *Argumenty i fakty*, 1995, 14, p. 16.

[28] Svyatoslav Fedorov, *Mne obidno, chto lyudi, kotorym ya vernul zrenie, vidyat razvalennuyu stranu* (Moscow, Partiya samoupravleniya trudyashchikhsya, 1995), originally an interview in *Pravda*, 10 March 1995. See more generally Fedorov, *Put' istseleniya* (Moscow, Fedorov, 1995).

[29] See Pribylovsky, *43 linii*, pp. 9–10; and *Izvestiya*, 25 November 1995, p. 4.

[30] *Predvybornaya platforma Vserossiiskogo obshchestvenno-politicheskogo dvizheniya "Nash dom-Rossiya". Utverzhdena Vtorym s"ezdom Dvizheniya 12 avgusta 1995 g.* (Moscow, NDR, 1995) (the misprint in the original has been corrected).

[31] Pribylovsky, *43 linii*, p. 10.

[32] *Izvestiya*, 5 November 1995, p. 4.

[33] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 11 November 1995, p. 4.

[34] See *Programmma politicheskogo dvizheniya "Zhenshchiny Rossii*" (Moscow, Zhenshchiny Rossii, 1995). For a further discussion see *Izvestiya*, 5 November 1995, p. 4; and Lakhova's autobiography, *Moi put' v politiku* (Moscow, Aurika, 1995).

[35] *Predvybornaya platforma (bloka Ivana Rybkina)* (Moscow, Realisty, 1995).

[36] Based on the Union's electoral flyers, and (for the 'second edition') Markov, 'Izbiratel'nye ob"edineniya', p. 89.

[37] *Argumenty i fakty*, 1995, 36, p. 2; *Kommersant'-daily*, 7 July 1995, p. 3, placed him first among a list of possible presidential candidates.

[38] *Financial Times*, 3 June 1995, p. 8.

[39] See Aleksandr Lebed', *Za derzhavu obidno ...* (Moscow, Moskovskaya pravda, 1995), pp. 423 (church, army and people) and 432 (for his reference to 'political chatter about reforms, democracy [and] human rights').

[40] For the KRO programme see *Bud'te s nami* (Moscow, Kongress russkikh obshchin, 1995); it also appeared in *Dialog*, 1995, 11–12, pp. 32–39. KRO's 'Appeal to voters' was in *Trud*, 11 November 1995, p. 2.

[41] *Obshchaya gazeta*, 29 June 1995, p. 8. For a further discussion see *Izvestiya*, 16 September 1995, p. 4.

[42] See Vladimir Zhirinovsky, *Programmnyi manifest Liberal'noi-Demokraticheskoi partii Rossii* (Moscow, LDPR, 1995). For a further discussion see *Izvestiya*, 17 October 1995, p. 4.

[43] The Liberal Democrats' support in the armed forces was reported in, for instance, *Argumenty i fakty*, 1995, 38, p. 2.

[44] For a general discussion see Richard Sakwa, *The Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Electoral Process* (Glasgow, University of Strathclyde Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1996); *Izvestiya*, 9 September 1996, p. 4; and Joan Urban & Valerii Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads: Leninism, fascism or social democracy* (Boulder, CO, Westview, 1997).

[45] See *Za nashu sovetskuyu rodinu! Predvybornaya platforma Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow, Informpechat', 1995); it also appeared in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 31 August 1995, p. 3, and *Dialog*, 1995, 10, pp. 3–9. The party programme adopted in January 1995 appeared in *III S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii 21–22 yanvarya 1995 goda* (Moscow, Informpechat', 1995), pp. 95–118.

[46] See *Programma. Ustav Agrarnoi partii Rossii* (Moscow, APR, 1995); it also appeared in *Dialog*, 1995, 11–12, pp. 13–18. For a further discussion see *Izvestiya*, 30 September 1995, p. 4.

[47] *Predvybornaya platforma Izbiratel'nogo bloka "Vlast'-narodu*" (Moscow, Vlast' narodu, 1995); the pre-election platform also appeared in *Pravda*, 12 September 1995, p. 2.

[48] These comments are based on the party's election flyers; for its programme see *Predvybornaya pozitsiya izbiratel'nogo bloka "Kommunisty-Trudovaya Rossiya-Za Sovetskii Soyuz"* (mimeo, 1995) and *Pravda*, 25 November 1995, p. 2.

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[49] *Vestnik Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1995, 6, pp. 78–90.
[50] *Ibid.* 1995, 1, pp. 50–65.
[51] *Izvestiya*, 1 August 1995, p. 2.
[52] European Institute for the Media, *Monitoring the Media Coverage of the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Elections: Final Report, 15 February 1996* (Dusseldorf, EIM, 1996), pp. 19–20, 32–33. Other analyses of campaign spending appeared in *Finansovye izvestiya*, 18 January 1996, p. 6; *Segodnya*, 23 January 1996, pp. 7, 10; and Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, pp. 65–70, reported in Table 1. The Central Electoral Commission's acknowledgement is in *ibid.*, p. 56.
[53] Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, pp. 55–56 (television accounted for 85% of all election advertising).
[54] European Institute for the Media, *Monitoring*, pp. 32–35 and 40 (radio).
[55] *Argumenty i fakty*, 1995, 50, p. 6.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[57] This part of the discussion is based upon our collection of election posters, and upon the display of electoral materials organised by the State Public Historical Library in Moscow during the campaign period.
[58] There were, for instance, 'almost 130' Communist-oriented local newspapers: *Izvestiya*, 12 April 1996, p. 5.
[59] The results of the survey were reported by NTV on 18 December; the survey was conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation, but the number of respondents was not provided.
[60] *Financial Times*, 1 December 1995, p. 6.
[61] *The Times*, 16 December 1995, p. 6.
[62] *Financial Times*, 1 December 1995, p. 6. The parties' commercials were surveyed in *Argumenty i fakty*, 1995, 48, p. 5.
[63] This passage is based on an analysis of free time on ORT and RTR taped during the campaign.
[64] These responses are from a survey of 1568 people across Russia conducted for the authors by VTsIOM between 20 and 26 December 1995; percentages are based on the 1161 people who claimed to have voted in the survey. Respondents were allowed to pick more than one response to the question.
[65] The text of the discussion appeared in *Argumenty i fakty*, 1996, 7, p. 3.
[66] E. G. Andryushchenko, A. V. Dmitriev & Zh. T. Toshchenko, 'Oprosy i vybory 1995 goda', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya*, 1996, 6, pp. 3–18, at p. 13. See also *Vestnik Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1996, 9, pp. 83–88.
[67] *USIA Opinion Analysis*, 11 December 1995, pp. 1, 4. In a VTsIOM poll, 54% of urban workers believed the elections would 'have no impact on subsequent events' (*Segodnya*, 11 August 1995, p. 3; similar findings were reported in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 21 September 1995, p. 5).
[68] *USIA Opinion Analysis*, 11 December 1995, pp. 1–2.
[69] Eltsin's television appeal was reprinted in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 16 December 1995, pp. 1, 3.
[70] *Moskovskie novosti*, 1995, 19, p. 8.
[71] *Rossiya*, 1993, 35, p. 3.
[72] White, Rose & McAllister, *How Russia Votes*, p. 228 (data recalculated). On disproportionality more generally, see for instance Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), chapter 3.
[73] We draw at this point upon two polls of adult Russians conducted by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) for the authors. The first was carried out in early December, immediately before the election, and the second in late December, immediately after it had taken place. The sample sizes were respectively $n = 1606$ and $n = 1568$. Interviews were conducted in respondents' homes, and the results were weighted for age, education, rurality and gender.
[74] See for instance Ioffe (ed.) *Analiz elektorata politicheskikh sil*; Yuri V. Medvedkov *et al.*, 'The December 1993 Russian elections: geographical patterns and contextual factors', *Russian Review*, 55, 1, January 1996, pp. 80–98; and Ralph S. Clem & Peter R. Craumer, 'The geography of the Russian 1995 parliamentary election: continuity, change, and correlates', *Post-Soviet Geography*, 36, 10, December 1995, pp. 459–475.
[75] We draw at this point on our post-election survey.
[76] *Argumenty i fakty*, 1995, 50, p. 2.
[77] Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, p. 61.
[78] See European Parliament, Delegation for Relations with Russia, *Report on the Observation of the Legislative Elections in Russia of 17 December 1995* (Brussels, European Parliament, 29 January 1996), p. 3. Annex I appeared on 31 January 1996, and Annex II on 29 January 1996.
[79] *Trud*, 19 December 1995, p. 2; the first full publication of results was in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 6 January 1996.
[80] *European Parliament Report*, pp. 7–8.

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[81] OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, *Report on the Elections to the State Duma in the Russian Federation 17 December 1995* (Copenhagen, OSCE, 1996), Annex 1.

[82] Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, p. 64; and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Report on the Russian Duma Elections of December 1995: Tver, Tverskaya oblast, and Moscow oblast* (Washington, DC, CSCE, 1996), p. 12.

[83] *European Parliament Report*, p. 7.

[84] *Ibid.*.

[85] *Ibid.*, Annex 1, pp. 8–9.

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[87] *OSCE Report*, pp. 10, 18. 17.

[88] *CSCE Report*, p. 9 (in relation to Tver').

[89] *Izvestiya*, 23 December 1995, p. 4.

[90] *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 29 December 1995, p. 1.

[91] On the purchase of signatures as a 'new form of business' see for instance *Izvestiya*, 18 October 1995, p. 2. In one Moscow constituency more than half the candidates received fewer votes than the number of signatures they had collected for their nomination: *Izvestiya*, 1 February 1996, p. 5.

[92] *Izvestiya*, 1 February 1996, p. 5 (which noted other opportunities to falsify the results). For the CEC ruling see *Vestnik Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1995, 12, pp. 31–36.

[93] *Izvestiya*, 11 July 1995, p. 1. The Central Electoral Commission itself identified some discrepancies: local government bodies recorded an electorate of 104 978 098 on 1 June 1995, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that there were 308 534 voters resident elsewhere. The electoral commissions themselves recorded a total electorate of 107 496 856, with the difference largely accounted for by (i) the inclusion of short-term residents in hospitals, sanatoria and the like, and (ii) immigration from other CIS countries (Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, p. 46).

[94] See *Vestnik Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1996, 7, pp. 32–35.

[95] *Izvestiya*, 30 March 1996, p. 2. The case was eventually handed over to the local procuracy; it was identified as one in which there had been particular difficulties by CEC chairman Nikolai Ryabov (*Vestnik Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 1996, 7, p. 86, and 1996, 9, p. 72).

[96] Andryushchenko *et al.*, 'Oprosy', p. 16.

[97] *Polis*, 1996, 2, p. 95.

[98] *Izvestiya*, 21 December 1995, p. 2.

[99] *Izvestiya*, 18 November 1995, p. 2.

[100] *OSCE Report*, p. 20.

[101] *Izvestiya*, 23 December 1995, p. 1 (at this time early returns indicated that more than half of those who had voted for party lists would be unrepresented).

[102] *OSCE Report*, p. 20.

[103] *Izvestiya*, 18 October 1995, p. 2.

[104] *European Parliament Report*, pp. 4–5, 7–8.

[105] Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, pp. 262–263; the 'State automated system "Elections" ' is outlined in *ibid.*, pp. 18–20. The further reform of the electoral system is considered in Catherine Barnes, 'Federal elections in Russia: the necessity of systemic reforms', *Demokratizatsiya*, 4, 3, Summer 1996, pp. 389–407.

[106] Gennadii Zyuganov, *Pravda*, 20 December 1995, p. 1.

[107] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 21 December 1995, p. 1.

[108] *Moskovskaya pravda*, 21 December 1995, p. 1; *Segodnya*, 20 December 1995, p. 1.

[109] Sergei Filatov, *Izvestiya*, 27 January 1996, p. 4; Georgii Satarov, *Rossiiskie vesti*, 21 December 1995, p. 1.

[110] Such as the Kamaz director Vladimir Kadannikov, appointed a first deputy prime minister in January 1996.

[111] Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, p. 263.

[112] *Izvestiya*, 6 January 1996, p. 2 (the first three names on the Our Home list all withdrew; so did Aman-Gel'dy Tuleev from the CPRF list).

[113] Beloborodov *et al.*, *Vybory*, pp. 205–207. There was also a newly founded 'Russian regions' group. Party identities more generally are considered in Richard Rose, Evgeny Tikhomirov & William Mishler, 'Understanding multi-party choice: the 1995 Duma election', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 49, 5, July 1997, pp. 799–823.

[114] *CSCE Report*, p. 5.

[115] *Izvestiya*, 17 February 1996, p. 2.

[116] *European Parliament Report*, p. 8.

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