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The Russian Elections of December 1993

RICHARD SAKWA

THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS of 12 December 1993 were the first held under the aegis of the reconstituted Russian Federation, and the first democratic direct national elections to be held in peacetime in Russian history. They were intended to put the final nail in the coffin of communism and set Russia on the path of irreversible democratic development. Held in the wake of the dissolution on 21 September of the old Russian legislature chaired by Ruslan Khasbulatov and the crisis of 3–4 October, in which an apparent uprising was crushed by military force, the elections took place against the background of a deeply divided society and with a large section of the political spectrum neutralised by participation in the October events. Despite this unpropitious background, the elections marked a significant turning point in political development, hastening the realignment of Russian political life, accelerating the development of a multiparty system and making possible a new start in the development of parliamentarianism.

The nature of democracy depends on the range of parties and the organisation of the political system. Various institutional choices establishing electoral conventions, the balance between the executive and the legislature and relations between the centre and the localities, determine the type of polity that will emerge. These relations in Russia were to be regulated by a new constitution, simultaneously placed before the electorate for approval in a referendum on 12 December. The electoral campaign was thus interwoven with president Boris El'tsin's attempts to secure adoption of his draft of the constitution, and the juxtaposition of the two had unpredictable consequences for both.

The electoral system

El'tsin's decree No. 1400 of 21 September 1993, 'On Gradual Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation', dissolved the old Russian legislature, whose powers were to be transferred to a new bicameral Federal Assembly, and simultaneously suspended the operation of the old constitution.¹ The existing Federation Council was to be vested with the functions of the upper chamber of the Assembly, while elections to the new lower chamber, the State Duma, were to take place on 12 December 1993. The decree was accompanied by acts establishing the framework for the forthcoming elections: the Provisions (*polozhenie*) on Federal Organs of Power for the Transitional Period; and the Provisions for the Election of Deputies to the State Duma.² The juridical status of these acts was unclear, since 'provisions' fall somewhat short even of decrees, let alone laws, although in this case the provisions were to have the force

of law once the decree dissolving parliament came into force. The new legislature and the rules regulating its election were thus born in a process that was both unconstitutional and anti-constitutional. This irregular procedure, while breaking the 18-month-long impasse in the struggle between the Supreme Soviet and the presidency, undermined the development of a legal basis for Russian government. Moreover, during the course of the campaign the rules governing the election and the referendum were changed apparently at will by the president, further undermining their legitimacy.³

Up to late 1993 Russia was exceptional in retaining a broadly majority-type electoral system, whereas most other post-communist countries had reverted to the proportional systems prevalent before communism, and indeed in Russia the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917 had been proportional. In the first version of the electoral law El'tsin recommended a mixed proportional and majoritarian system for what initially would have been 400 seats in the State Duma. One-third of the seats (130) were to have been elected from party lists by proportional representation, and the remainder (270) were to have been elected from one-member constituencies. On 30 September 1993 El'tsin acceded to the demands of the pro-reform parties to change the terms of his decree on elections to the lower house. Half the seats to the State Duma, which would now have 450 seats, would be elected from single-member constituencies, and the remaining seats would be chosen on a proportional basis from federal party lists. To stand a party or bloc required at least 100 000 nominations (earlier versions had called for 200 000), with no more than 15 000 signatures drawn from any one of Russia's 89 regions and republics, so that the bloc or party had to have demonstrable support in at least seven regions or republics.⁴ This provision was designed to stimulate the creation of a national party system and to avoid the dominance of Moscow, and at the same time to force the creation of larger blocs to overcome the fragmentation of Russian political life. According to Viktor Sheinis, one of the main architects of the new electoral law,⁵ the aim was to ensure that local leaders did not exercise an undue influence on the elections.⁶ A 5% hurdle was incorporated into the 'list' system, a provision copied from the West German *Grundgesetz*, intended to prevent the proliferation of small parties. It was assumed that this would give reformist candidates an advantage since their natural strength in the big cities, above all Moscow and St Petersburg, would counteract the conservatism of rural areas.

Nikolai Ryabov was appointed head of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and Russia's regions and republics were requested to send nominations for its membership within five days.⁷ District (*okrug*) electoral commissions were to be established with representatives of the local executive and legislative authorities, but the *de facto* abolition of local soviets rendered the latter requirement void. The CEC included numerous deputies and experts from the former Supreme Soviet, including Ryabov himself, who had until recently been a deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. By mid-October 1993 local authorities were to have demarcated constituency boundaries.

The old Law on the Election of Russian Federation People's Deputies stipulated that for elections to be valid a minimum 50% turnout of the eligible voters was required, but the new provisions reduced this to 25%. The elections, moreover, in

contrast to earlier practice, were to be held in one round. To be elected to the Federal Assembly a candidate had to poll not, as before, the majority of votes (50% plus one) but simply gain more votes than rivals as long as the minimum turnout requirement was met. Another change affected the Federation Council, which according to the constitution was to consist of appointed representatives from each component of the Russian Federation (see below), whereas after the October events the president decided that it would be elected this time.⁸ Even the duration of the new legislature was changed, and candidates anticipating four comfortable years were shocked when El'tsin reduced the term of the first Federal Assembly to two years.

The early days of the campaign were marked by uncertainty over whether there would be pre-term presidential elections. In the decree of 21 September El'tsin had stated that the question would be one for the new Federal Assembly to decide, but during the confrontation with the Supreme Soviet he had conceded the date of 12 June 1994. On 6 November, however, El'tsin indicated that he favoured allowing his term of office to run its full course to 1996,⁹ and this was confirmed on 8 November. Early presidential elections had been offered as an inducement to parliament to hold its own elections (the so-called zero option put forward by the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valerii Zor'kin), a condition that was no longer relevant after 4 October. El'tsin's supporters insisted that the April 1993 referendum acted as a second mandate, although the figures, with 49.5% of the turnout voting for early presidential elections (which in the context was viewed as an anti-El'tsin vote), and only 34% of the total electorate supporting his policies, were less than enthusiastic.¹⁰

Voters were faced with up to five choices in the election of 12 December: whether to support the new draft constitution; to vote for the 178-seat upper house of the Federal Assembly, the Federation Council; two separate votes for the lower house, the State Duma—for the 225 single mandate seats and the 225 places from party lists; and in some places in local elections.

The constitution

By a decree of 15 October voters were asked to participate in a plebiscite on the new constitution.¹¹ El'tsin's decree stated that the adoption of the constitution no longer required the support of the majority of the registered electorate, as stipulated by the 1990 referendum law, but simply 50% of those who voted,¹² although the minimum 50% turnout was retained. The draft constitution was published on 10 November and, as expected, proposed a presidential system and modified some of the privileges accorded the republics and regions when they had been able to take advantage of the struggle between president and legislature.¹³ Although it was initially published in some mass-circulation newspapers, the pervading criticism of the referendum was the lack of availability of the draft and the shortness of time allowed for discussion of such a crucial document.¹⁴ Moreover, during the campaign El'tsin warned party leaders against criticising the constitution,¹⁵ and a leading government official, Vladimir Shumeiko, exerted crude pressure by insisting that the constitution was not negotiable and that politicians were barred from campaigning against its adoption under threat of being banned from the elections altogether.¹⁶ The question placed on

the ballot paper on 12 December was a simple one: 'Do you support the adoption of the new Russian Constitution?'

The Federation Council

Two seats were available in each of Russia's 89 republics, regions, federal cities and other federal areas. A total of 494 candidates fought directly for seats in the 178-seat upper house. Some 40% of candidates for the Federation Council were leaders of executive authorities and 16% were heads of legislatures. Nearly a quarter were involved in economic or financial matters, including managers of large enterprises, share-holding companies, commercial banks and the like, and about 8% of candidates were teachers in higher and other educational establishments. Between 1% and 3% were journalists, lawyers, health workers, agronomists or other specialists, and just over 13% had been deputies to the old Congress of People's Deputies.¹⁷

These elections were held to be exceptional, and according to the new constitution (Article 95.2), the Federation Council was to consist of one representative each from executive and legislative authorities in the 89 federal components. This laid a whole minefield of potential problems since the relationship between *ex officio* membership and changes in local administration was not clear. Was the membership of the Council to be changed each time the president appointed a new local leader? If so, the president could easily turn the upper chamber into an obedient handmaiden to his or her will.

Single-mandate seats

Candidates required a minimum of 1% nominations to enter the contest in the 225 single-mandate seats unless they had been nominated officially by one of the party blocs, in which case the necessity of obtaining what on average was 4000–5000 signatures was waived. Coming soon after the October events, the requirement that the passport number had to be included alarmed many potential signatories and made canvassing by opposition groups much more difficult. Viktor Aksyuchits, for example, the leader of the oppositional Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RCDM), failed to achieve the necessary number in his own constituency in South-west Moscow. In the event, 1586 candidates contested the elections in Russia's 225 single-member constituencies.¹⁸

Party lists

The other 225 seats in the State Duma were to be distributed to the parties on a proportional basis. To win seats a party had to clear the minimum 5% threshold of the national vote, with the whole country considered as one giant constituency. The increase in the proportion of Duma deputies from party lists from one-third to a half was condemned by independent democrats as liable to exaggerate the support of certain blocs,¹⁹ a warning borne out by events, although it might be noted that the overrepresentation of the most popular parties in stable democracies is often considered a useful way of providing parliamentary coherence.

By September 1993 37 political parties and over 2000 public organisations had been officially registered in Russia,²⁰ although the CEC issued a list with only 91 all-Russian political and social organisations having the right to nominate candidates to the State Duma.²¹ There was, moreover, no law on political parties in Russia and instead the USSR Law on Public Associations, adopted on 9 October 1990, remained in force.²² To stand in the elections, electoral associations had to be registered with the CEC at least six weeks before the election, by midnight 6 November, having provided the minimum 100 000 signatures. Groups allied to the National Salvation Front, which had played a central role in the insurgency of October 1993, were banned from participating in the election, as was Viktor Anpilov's militant Russian Communist Workers' Party (RCWP), but so too initially were two more mainstream parties, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi's People's Party of Free Russia (PPFR).²³ Subsequently the Ministry of Justice allowed the CPRF and individuals from the other banned groups to stand.

Some 31 associations scrambled to form electoral blocs in time for the deadline, and 21 sought to find the required list of nominations. Konstantin Borovoi's Party of Economic Freedom, seeking to contest the election as part of the 'August' bloc, only collected 62 000 signatures and was thus disqualified, although Borovoi competed as an individual candidate.²⁴ Despite expectations that Aksyuchits' RCDM might receive 6–8% of the vote, the party fell at the first hurdle and failed to gain the necessary signatures. There are many suggestions that the authorities hindered the signature campaign, amid allegations that the police detained a number of Christian Democrat activists and confiscated the signatures that they had managed to collect.²⁵ Similarly, the Russian All-People's Union (ROS), headed by El'tsin's bitter opponents Sergei Baburin and Nikolai Pavlov, claimed that the police had raided its offices and stolen some 20 000 signatures and impeded their campaign in other ways.²⁶ They failed to qualify, although Baburin fought the election as an individual candidate in his native Omsk, and won. In sum, eight out of the 21 blocs were turned down by the CEC after the documents were checked; 13 'electoral associations' (the official name given them by the CEC) were allowed to proceed, fielding a total of 1717 candidates, giving a grand total of 3797 candidates in all categories.²⁷ The 13 associations can be grouped as follows, with the number of signatures in brackets.²⁸

Liberal and reformist

Russia's Choice (150 000) put forward a list with 234 names, of whom 16 (7%) were women, headed by Egor Gaidar, First Deputy Prime Minister and author of radical economic reform in Russia, Sergei Kovalev, a well known human rights campaigner and chairman of the presidential Commission on Human Rights, and Ella Pamfilova, Minister for Social Protection. Parties were allowed to include the first three names on their federal list on the ballot paper, hence the attempt to achieve voter recognition by the careful selection of the top candidates.

Russia's Choice represented the official face of the government while trying to build a mass political base. The bloc came together in July 1993 and included Democratic Initiative, the Peasant Party of Russia and above all the Democratic

Russia Movement (DRM), one of the few political organisations with a presence, however tenuous, in over 80 of Russia's 89 regions and republics.²⁹ Its status was formalised at a founding conference attended by over 1000 delegates from 84 regions of Russia on 16–17 October 1993, and there were plans to turn it into a fully fledged party after the elections.³⁰ Russia's Choice was also supported by broad sections of the intelligentsia, and was blessed with generous financial and other support, making it a formidable electoral challenger. However, while the DRM favoured a fairly loose organisational framework, some of the ministers sought to turn Russia's Choice into a fully professional and well organised political party. The election of Kovalev as chairman was an attempt, ultimately unsuccessful, to conciliate both sides.

Gaidar's attempts to create a broad democratic coalition failed and the reformist forces split into four blocs. Russia's Choice was the only group fighting the elections on the basis of its performance in government; ministers in other blocs sought to distance themselves from what was at the very least a very mixed record. The president himself remained true to his declared principle of representing all Russians and remained aloof from formally aligning himself with any particular party, but it was clear that he favoured Russia's Choice and the bloc used this implied endorsement for all it was worth during the campaign.

Russia's Choice represented liberal Westernisers, favouring radical marketising reforms and Russia's unequivocal integration into the world economic and political community. The bloc's programme rested on the formula 'Freedom, Property, Law', promising a continuation of radical economic reforms. Their orientation was radical democratic (as denoted by the presence of Kovalev), strongly pro-market reform (Gaidar) but with a social conscience, represented by Pamfilova. In addition, however, the DRM had insisted on the inclusion of pledges for lustration laws and 'purges' of government and law-enforcement agencies, bans on neo-communist demonstrations and measures against those who had wavered in the final confrontation with Khasbulatov's legislature. The bloc, moreover, suggested that 'democratic values cannot be carried to an absurdity' and that the principle of the separation of powers should be applied 'with due consideration of the political situation'.³¹

The *Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc* (Yabloko) (170 000) was formed in late October 1993 and brought together a list of 172 candidates, of whom 23 (13%) were women, headed by the three names in the bloc's title.³² Grigorii Yavlinsky had come to prominence in 1990 as the author of the '500-Day Plan' for the USSR's rapid transition to the market, and in 1991 he sponsored the so-called Grand Bargain whereby the West was to underwrite the Soviet Union's economic reforms. He remained a deputy prime minister for barely three months before taking his skills to Nizhny Novgorod, where he advised the local administration under Boris Nemtsov on both small and large privatisation, and, from November 1993, land as well. In polls in mid-1993 Yavlinsky surpassed El'tsin in popularity,³³ and he made no secret of his presidential ambitions. Yurii Boldyrev had been the former Inspector-General, overseeing Russia's regions, whose attempts to stem the tide of corruption in the government were halted by his summary dismissal. Vladimir Lukin was the popular Russian ambassador to the USA and a skilled politician, surviving the October crisis when rumours circulated that he would be recalled.

Yavlinsky set harsh conditions for allying with other parties, insisting that the first

11 places on the list went to his own staff, and thus rebuffed Gaidar's attempts to create a coalition of democratic forces. The bloc, however, did gain the allegiance of some of the smaller parties. The Republican Party of the Russian Federation was quite strong in its own right, having gained 70 000 signatures, and was tempted to ally with Gaidar's and Sergei Shakhrai's blocs before finally deciding to join the Yabloko bloc, although adding the caveat that Russia's Choice would remain 'the ally and partner' of the Republican Party, and urged that reformist blocs should not compete against each other in single-member constituencies.³⁴ The Social Democratic Party, much weakened after divisions in late 1992 when one of its erstwhile leaders, Oleg Rummyantsev, had split to form his own Social Democratic Centre, also agreed to support this grouping, as did the Russian Christian Democratic Union and one of its co-leaders, Valerii Borshchev.

The group favoured radical reform but criticised Gaidar for having left the state monopolies intact and called for 'reform from below', a view that left them open to the charge of populism. They favoured close links with the former Soviet republics and criticised El'tsin's pro-Western foreign policy. They were divided over the merits of the proposed constitution, with Boldyrev a bitter opponent, and insisted that the first task of the new parliament would be to rewrite it, rather than economic reform.³⁵ The constitution, indeed, was the cause of many of the divisions in the reformist camp.³⁶

The founding conference of the *Party of Russian Unity and Accord (Partiya Rossiiskogo Edinstva i Soglasiya—PRES)* (222 000) was held in Novgorod on 17 October 1993. Its 193-strong list, of whom six (3%) were women, was headed by Sergei Shakhrai, a Deputy Prime Minister, Aleksandr Shokhin, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for external economic and financial relations, and Konstantin Zatulin, leader of Entrepreneurs for a New Russia, which had declined to join Yavlinsky's bloc. In addition, the Union of Small Cities and the Association of the Cities of Central Russia cooperated with PRES.³⁷ Shakhrai had been the president's adviser on legal affairs and at the time of the elections was the adviser on regional policy. He nursed presidential ambitions, and even when part of the presidential team had jealously guarded his independence, and he now sought to build a power base in the regions while at the same time distancing himself from the radical democrats.

The bloc called itself 'the party of Russian statehood' and favoured a decentralised federation, strong links with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), increased subsidies to state industries and 'sensible protectionism'. It campaigned in favour of market reform, effective social security, federalism and local self-government under the slogan 'house, family, Motherland, tradition and continuity'.³⁸ The notion of statehood in this context was clearly equivocal, since an attempt to force the regional issue while calling for a larger role for the state in the economy and society appeared contradictory. Shakhrai sought to play the role of *gosudarstvennik*, the proponent, like his ally Sergei Stankevich (a political adviser to El'tsin), of an orderly and strong state, and his bloc apparently had the tacit support of the Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Both PRES and Russia's Choice were composed of government ministers and presidential officials, and revealed once again the fatal inability of reformist groups to unite. The emergence of these two groups, moreover, revealed the depth of the

divisions within the government itself, although at one time it appeared that the regime sought to gain the maximum number of votes from two different angles. There was no doubt, however, that the division reflected the overweening ambitions of various personalities. Following the elections PRES sought to transform itself into an all-Russian conservative party. Attempts to form an alliance with the Yabloko bloc were impeded by the mutually exclusive ambitions of Shakhrai and Yavlinsky.

The final bloc in this category was the *Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms* (*Rossiiskoe dvizhenie demokraticeskikh reform—RDDR*) (135 000), established in 1992 on the basis of the older Inter-regional Group in the Soviet legislature and headed by Gavriil Popov. The 153-strong electoral list, of whom 20 (13%) were women, was led by the mayor of St Petersburg, Anatolii Sobchak, and included the former mayor of Moscow, Popov, the ‘architect of *perestroika*’ Aleksandr Yakovlev, and the former head of CIS military forces Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov. The group favoured reform but sought to shift the emphasis from finance to production, to modify the privatisation programme and to cut taxes and the state budget in half. It was not at all clear how this was to be achieved. The bloc united independent democrats who sought to remain aloof both from the infighting and radicalism of the Democratic Russia Movement and the perceived excesses of Gaidar’s shock therapy while remaining loyal to a vision of democratic marketising reform. Sobchak had urged the democratic forces to unite into only two blocs, one in government and the other a democratic opposition, and he sharply condemned Yavlinsky for setting up his own group.³⁹

Centrist

The *Civic Union for Stability, Justice and Progress* (*Grazhdanskii soyuz vo imya stabil’nosti, spravedlivosti i progressa*) (150 000) was established in October 1993 on the basis of the old Civic Union comprising Aleksandr Vladislavlev’s All-Russian Union ‘Renewal’, Nikolai Travkin’s Democratic Party of Russia and Rutskoï’s PPRF. The new body was led by Arkadii Vol’sky, the representative of the directors of state-owned industry. The founders of the new organisation included the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs headed by Vol’sky, the ‘Renewal’ Union and the Social Democratic Centre headed by Rumyantsev. The list also included Nikolai Bekh, the director of the KamAZ truck plant, Vasiliï Lipitsky, one of the leaders of the PPRF, and the political scientists Aleksandr Tsipko and Fedor Burlatsky. Only five (3%) of the 184-strong list of candidates were women.

The Civic Union brought together the directors of state factories and banks and called for subsidies to maintain Russia’s industrial potential and for generous social policies. It was not at all clear how the Civic Union envisaged funding their ambitious spending programmes while achieving a modicum of financial stability. The bloc also called for an active policy in the CIS and the protection of the rights of Russian minorities, and insisted that Russia’s new military doctrine should reflect the country’s geopolitical interests.⁴⁰ When created in June 1992 the Civic Union had been considered a potentially powerful force in Russian politics, but its inability to pursue coordinated action at the Seventh Congress of People’s Deputies in December 1992

or to achieve a working partnership with the president undermined its credibility and influence.⁴¹

The 167-strong party list, of whom 13 (8%) were women, of the *Democratic Party of Russia* (DPR) (109 000) was headed by the party's leader, Nikolai Travkin, the film producer Stanislav Govorukhin and the economist Oleg Bogomolov, the latter being placed high on the list to demonstrate that the DPR had a serious economic policy.⁴² The DPR list included Sergei Glaz'ev, the former minister of foreign economic affairs and a rising star in Russian politics who had resigned in 1993 for political reasons. The DPR's policies echoed those of the Civic Union, favouring a federal Russia, the establishment of parliamentary limits to the powers of the presidency, restrictions on land sales and a protectionist foreign economic policy. The DPR decided to fight the elections independently, arguing that only in this way would they be able to retain full control over their programme and behaviour. Only a relatively small proportion of the DPR list was made up of central party officials, while the great majority of places were given to representatives of the regions.⁴³ Travkin urged his supporters to vote against the draft constitution, arguing that it was 'bloody' and established a dictatorship for the president.

The final component in this category was the *Future of Russia—New Names* (*Budushchee Rossii—novye imena*) (109 000), established in October 1993 and led by Vyacheslav Lashchevsky, the head of the Russian Union of Youth. Its policies were close to those of the Civic Union, which was one of the sponsors of the organisation. The list included Oleg Sokolov, the head of the youth organisation 'Free Russia', and Vladimir Mironov, director of the Institute of Politics. Not many of the new names were to be women, numbering only six (6%) on a 95-strong list, and neither were they that young, with 34 the average age of their candidates. They urged the president to cancel the referendum on the constitution.

Corporatist and interest groups

The centre of Russian politics was also represented by a number of lobbies. The first was the *Constructive Ecology Movement* (*Konstruktivnoe ekologicheskoe dvizhenie Rossii—KEDR*, the Russian word for cedar) (150 000), fielding 44 candidates, of whom nine (20%) were women. The organisation was established in March 1993, registered in August, and on 7 October 1993 its leader, Anatolii Panfilov, signed a cooperation agreement with environmental and other organisations. The list was headed by Lyubov' Lymar' of the Soldiers' Mothers Association. The movement explicitly distanced itself from some of Russia's more radical environmental movements and sought to ensure the health of the people on the basis of constructive, realistic and democratic policies.

The *Women of Russia* (*Zhenshchiny Rossii*) (127 000) movement was established in October 1993 and fielded 36 female candidates in a list headed by Alevtina Fedulova, the leader of the Russian Women's Union (the barely reformed Soviet women's organisation), Ekaterina Lakhova, Presidential Adviser on Women and Family Affairs, and Natalya Gundareva, a well-known actress. The list was marked by a high proportion of former *nomenklatura* officials. Their call for a slower pace of economic reform was balanced by demands for greater social welfare and

education. They avoided radical demands for women's rights and shunned the feminist tag. They insisted that they were a movement rather than a party,⁴⁴ and can be placed firmly in the centre of the political spectrum.

The *Dignity and Charity Movement (Dostoinstvo i Miloserdie)* (130 000) was established on 20 October 1993 by the All-Russian Council of Veterans of War and Labour, the All-Russian Society of Invalids, and the Chernobyl' Society. Its 58-strong list of candidates, of whom three (5%) were women, was headed by Academician Konstantin Frolov and included Nikolai Gubenko, a theatre director and a former Soviet Minister of Culture, and Aleksandr Dzasokhov, the last head of the Central Committee's International Department. The bloc campaigned in favour of effective social protection under the slogan 'reforms for people, and not at the expense of the people'.

Neo-communist parties

The revived *Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)* (187 000) with 151 candidates, of whom 15 (10%) were women, was led by Gennadii Zyuganov, formerly Secretary of the CP RSFSR Ideology Department. The party, claiming 600 000 members,⁴⁵ had been refounded at a congress on 13–14 February 1993 and then briefly banned after the October events. Its list included Anatolii Luk'yanov, the last Speaker of the USSR Supreme Soviet and indicted for his participation in the coup of August 1991. The party considered the elections illegal and unconstitutional, but nevertheless participated on the grounds that a boycott would be counter-productive and inhibit the development of an opposition. The CPRF called for 'the return of civil peace and legality' in a three-stage process involving the restoration of legality, the election of a new representative body and a new constitution. While formally committed to the continuation of reforms, the party called for the end of shock therapy and a return to many aspects of the old state-run economy.

In his election programme Zyuganov emphasised his nationalism and sought to distance his party from communist ideals and to present it as a reformed social democratic party. Condemning El'tsin's 'anti-people course', the aim was to set up a 'broad communist-patriotic bloc'.⁴⁶ The degree to which Zyuganov had become 'deideologised', however, is contentious, and the Communist Party was marked by a virulent anti-Westernism and was not yet social democratic in its economic, social and political programmes. It was Zyuganov who led the attack against Gorbachev's increasingly social-democratic definition of *perestroika* in the year before the coup.⁴⁷ While Zyuganov might personally have adapted to change and to parliamentary politics, his political base, the Communist Party, consisted largely of those who had been hostile to *perestroika*—all the rest had long ago left. The Communist Party retained a formidable network of party cells and local organisations, and indeed a reserve of skilled and experienced politicians, and was by far the strongest party, *qua* party, in Russian politics. In Lithuania and Poland reformed communist parties had returned to power but continued reforms, whereas in Russia a return to communist predominance would probably signal the end of meaningful transformation.

The *Agrarian Party of Russia (APR)* (500 000) was established on 23 February 1993 on the basis of the Supreme Soviet's Agrarian Union. It fought

the election with 145 candidates, of whom seven (5%) were women. The APR was headed by Mikhail Lapshin, one of the leaders of the opposition in the old legislature, and whose policies reflected many of those of the CPRF. Despite claims that they represented the interests of all rural dwellers, and indeed town dwellers, their main concern was to preserve the old system of collective and state farms and they sought a return to fixed prices and state subsidies and condemned the sale and resale of land under the slogan 'the land is for those who work it'. They called for a state-regulated transition and a socially oriented market. Their list included Vasiliï Starodubtsev, the leader of the *kolkhoz* movement who helped lead the coup attempt of August 1991, Aleksandr Zaveryukha, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for agriculture, Vladimir Shcherbak, the First Deputy Minister for Agriculture, and the writer Valentin Rasputin.

Nationalists

The October events and the complex electoral registration rules had filtered out patriotic and nationalist parties to leave only one. The *Liberal Democratic Party of Russia* (LDPR) (153 000) was established in June 1989 and was the first political party registered in the Soviet Union, and was reregistered as a Russian party in December 1992, at which time the party claimed a membership of 80 000–100 000. The party and the 147-strong list, of whom nine (6%) were women, were led by the charismatic Vladimir Vol'fovich Zhirinovskiy, an extreme nationalist who had transferred his allegiance from the USSR to a strong centralised Russia, even though he had little time for monarchist nostalgia and was contemptuous of the last Tsar, Nicholas II.

In the presidential elections of June 1991 Zhirinovskiy had come third after El'tsin and Nikolai Ryzhkov, and following Russia's independence he had built up an effective party organisation in the localities. He called for the restoration of the Russian state 'within the borders of the former USSR', the abandonment of national territories and the restoration of a unitary state based on the pre-revolutionary *guberniya* system. Not surprisingly, he took a dim view of the CIS as an 'artificial formation'. In his book, *The Final Push to the South*, Zhirinovskiy had argued that Russia's arrival on the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean would signal the salvation of the Russian nation, quite apart from enabling the creation of a homeland for the Kurds.⁴⁸ His grandiose geopolitical designs, which he claimed would remove the threat to Russia from the south forever, threatened the integrity of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

The LDPR's basic belief was that it would be possible to restore the economy 'in a very short time' by strengthening the state sector, limiting privatisation, banning unemployment, reducing taxes on producers and retaining state ownership of land, although allowing its renting and inheritance. These policies were to be accompanied by the end of foreign aid, halting conversion, increasing the sale of weapons on the world market, and the suppression of organised crime in the space of a few months, for which special laws would be required. Zhirinovskiy described the LDPR as a 'centre right moderate conservative party, standing on a patriotic platform', and condemned anti-communism while distancing himself from the actions of former

communist leaders. He insisted that every nationality and faith would be guaranteed all 'legal freedoms typical of the civilised world'.⁴⁹

Zhirinovskiy fought by far the most effective campaign, with seductively appealing messages targeted at particular constituencies and stressing that 'I am one of you, I am the same as you'. He was assisted by a series of television profiles, abetted by what were intended to be hostile programmes but which only publicised his policies. The LDPR was one of the few parties actually to go out on to the streets to canvass voters, and at the same time carefully targeted its potential supporters and areas of support, such as the border areas of Russia, the Urals and the Far East. The LDPR itself apparently had around 100 000 members, of whom some 40% were employees and engineering-technical workers, about 10% were scientific workers and about the same proportion each workers, students and entrepreneurs.⁵⁰ The LDPR was marked by its high educational level and, despite much commentary to this effect, was not made up of 'marginals'.

The election and party formation

The 'democrats' had failed to unite into what might have appeared to be two natural blocs: one of supporters of presidential policies and the other of pro-reform democrats in opposition to the current presidential course represented by Gaidar's neo-liberal policies. The centrist group represented a more ambivalent approach to marketisation and Russia's integration into the international division of labour, advocating closer links with the CIS and pursuing once more the chimera of a 'third path' unique to Russia. The rejectionist flank was divided between neo-communist organisations and nationalists. The disappearance of patriotic and other Russian national movements left the field clear for Zhirinovskiy's brand of militant Russian restorationism and for the Communist Party. Groups with a strong regional profile, like the Agrarian Party and PRES, had the greatest success in the signature campaign.

These political characteristics were to a degree reflected in the profile of the candidates themselves. The 225 proportional seats were contested by the 13 party lists containing initially 1756 candidates.⁵¹ Of these 161 (9%) were women and fewer than 100 had been members of the old legislature. Ninety-nine of the candidates (6%) were aged 20–29; 395 (22%) 30–39; 723 (41%) 40–49; 429 (24%) 50–59 and 106 (6%) were 60 and over. The relative youthfulness of communist candidates, at 48 only three years older than the average Russia's Choice candidate, reflected the emergence of a new generation of communists. Russia's Choice was marked by the high proportion of its candidates employed in government and politics (88 or 42%), followed by 55 (26%) in academic life. A slightly different pattern was followed by PRES, with top place again occupied by government workers (78, or 40%), but academics (36, or 19%) were pushed into third place by the 59 candidates (31%) in business. To compensate, academics were way ahead in Yabloko, numbering 79 or 46% of the list. Business people made up 86 (47%) of the Civic Union list but only 22 (15%) of the Communist list, which was dominated by workers (55 or 36%) and academics (46 or 31%). The single largest proportion out of all the party lists was made up by the 75 academics under the LDPR flag, comprising 51% of its candidates, followed by 23

workers (16%), 15 in business (10%) and 12 from the military (8%), the single largest number of military candidates standing in any association.⁵²

These blocs represented the third wave of party formation in Russia: the first accompanied the insurgency phase of the democratic revolution up to August 1991 and was marked by the predominance of movements, popular fronts and other loose forms of organisation; the second lasted from August 1991 to October 1993, during which numerous 'pseudo-parties' mutated and reformed with extraordinary rapidity;⁵³ and the third wave followed the October events as the country prepared for the elections. Only a handful of the first or second-wave parties made it through to these elections, notably Travkin's DPR, Zhirinovskiy's LDPR, and the reformed Communist Party. Travkin pointed out that electoral blocs allowed small parties, which independently would not have been able to cross the 5% threshold, to gain seats in parliament.⁵⁴ He noted that electoral pacts inhibited the development of a normal parliamentary system, and thus the DPR resolved to run independently.⁵⁵

Party formation after the October events was if anything even more chaotic than earlier. The CPRF stood out all the more because it was a genuine party with organisational networks and reserves of political experience on which to draw, while the rest were mostly not political parties at all but movements or coalitions representing particular groups and individuals. A large proportion of candidates were not even members of the parties they allegedly represented, with 42% of LDPR deputies, for example, not members of the party, while the whole notion of membership was barely applicable to most of the other 'electoral associations'. The CPRF was again the exception, with an identifiable constituency in the industrial working class and with 93% of its deputies members of the Communist Party, together with the Agrarians with their pitch directed not only to collective and state farmers but to all rural dwellers and with 75% of its deputies members.⁵⁶

Electors were faced with a choice not so much between parties and distinct programmes as between lists of stars. To make them more attractive, prominent political and cultural personalities were invited to stand, some of whom stood aside once the elections were over. These blocs were not parties in any recognisable sense but temporary alliances in a fluid firmament that changed once again when the State Duma met. Even the names of the parties did not correspond with their views, most spectacularly in the case of the Liberal Democrats, reflecting the lack of differentiation in society itself. However, polls did begin to show the crystallisation of interests in society, with the emergence of reasonably stable 'interest groups' like entrepreneurs, directors of various categories of state enterprises, and the scientific-technical intelligentsia. Nevertheless, these embryonic parties would be reflected in an embryonic party political system dominated once again by executive authority, lobbies and shifting parliamentary factions.

Local elections

Following the crushing of the Supreme Soviet, El'tsin ordered the dissolution of rebel soviets on 7 October and soon afterwards all village and town soviets, but not regional or republican ones.⁵⁷ Most of the powers of the regional soviets, however, were transferred to the Heads of Administration, often known as governors. On 27 October

1993 El'tsin ordered elections to reorganised local councils in Moscow, St Petersburg and the other 66 regions and areas,⁵⁸ to be held between 12 December 1993 and March 1994.⁵⁹ Thus El'tsin fulfilled his promise to put an end to the Soviet era. However, El'tsin did not order elections in Russia's 21 'ethnic' republics, although the decree recommended that these republics reorganise their legislatures and hold elections, and the majority agreed to do so.

The new legislative bodies were to be much reduced in size and to become professional bodies made up of full-time deputies. The new councils, now often called dumas, were to be elected for two years and to have between 15 and 50 deputies.⁶⁰ The old Moscow soviet, for example, had been elected in March 1990 and numbered some 500 deputies. Although apparently elected with a democratic majority, the soviet had proved unable to formulate effective policies or to work with the local executive authorities led, in the first instance, by Popov, and then by Yurii Luzhkov. The elections on 12 December 1993 were for a new 35-member Moscow Duma, now displaced from its grandiose building on Tverskaya Street.⁶¹ As with the national legislature, so too the Duma's new charter, devised by Luzhkov, emasculated the new assembly in an attempt to avoid the old conflicts, giving the mayor the power to veto its decisions and even to dissolve it. The Duma was to be largely non-political and to concern itself with the administration of the city.

The campaign

With El'tsin's most implacable opponents, Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, in gaol, and a number of extreme nationalist and neo-Bolshevik organisations proscribed and their publications banned, it might appear that even before the elections El'tsin had destroyed the opposition. Rutskoi had potentially represented the strongest challenge to El'tsin's authority, and if he had kept his nerve in September–October 1993 he might well have come to power in the new elections, possibly at the head of the Agrarian Party. After the October events a whole swathe of oppositional nationalist and patriotic thinking was left decapitated, and thus while the democrats were dividing the opposition was forced to unite.

The campaign was short and dispiriting, finding many of the parties and groups unprepared. Their platforms were thick with generalisations but short on specific programmes, although it should be stressed that the elections marked a significant stage in the development of programmatic divergence. Considering the enormous choices facing Russia, the lack of focus on the central issues facing the country allowed Zhirinovskiy's stark rhetoric to stand out all the more against the rather dull campaigning by the other parties. The population appeared to be unimpressed by what was on offer, reflecting a widespread disenchantment with the political process as a whole, especially among young people.

The election was marked by the lack of clarity over what its political consequences would be. Gaidar at an early stage had suggested that if Russia's Choice gained a large majority, then he would consider himself the natural candidate for the post of Prime Minister. However, the existing Prime Minister, Chernomyrdin, did not stand for the new parliament but clearly hoped that he would continue in his post as head of a technocratic cross-party government irrespective of the results. El'tsin maintained

a dignified distance from the campaign, except for a recorded broadcast on 9 December appealing for support for the new constitution and warning of civil war in the event of it not being adopted.⁶² As far as democrats like Gennadii Burbulis were concerned, however, El'tsin's neutrality represented one of his greatest political mistakes; El'tsin's intervention, Burbulis argued, could have changed the outcome entirely.⁶³ One of de Gaulle's first acts on coming to power in 1958 had been to establish a presidential party incorporating many of the Fourth Republic's historical parties, whereas El'tsin considered himself the embodiment of the Russian will, reflecting traditional Russian views on the unity of the state and the people.

Foreign policy as such did not figure in the campaign, although most blocs other than Russia's Choice sought to shift the emphasis away from the ostensible obsession with the United States towards more links with Europe (East and West), more attention to the 'near abroad' and to ensure that foreign policy supported not only economic reform in the abstract but domestic production in particular. This programme had been largely adopted, if not fulfilled, by the government since early 1993. To a degree the fate of the former Soviet states was also being decided in the Russian elections, but there is little evidence of direct interference in the elections by the former union republics.⁶⁴ Only Zhirinovskiy's LDPR unreservedly sought to make political capital out of the alleged persecution of 'Russian speakers' in these republics, and indeed by espousing the re-creation of a unitary imperial state dominated by Russia.

Shumeiko, appointed the new Minister of Information during the final confrontation with the Supreme Soviet, had banned 15 opposition papers, and ordered *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* to change their names and editors. In the event, the majority were soon back on sale although usually in revised formats. The paper of the old Supreme Soviet, for example, *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, was now the mouthpiece of the government. The voice of the implacable nationalist opposition, Aleksandr Prokhanov's *Den'*, resumed publication under the name *Zavtra (Tomorrow)*, presumably chosen to suggest the vengeance to come against the 'democrats' in power. Vitalii Tret'yakov, the acerbic editor of what had now become an oppositional paper, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, insisted that freedom of speech and the press had become severely circumscribed by judicial pressure and by attempts to suffocate dissenting voices by financial means.⁶⁵

The three weeks of campaigning were dominated by television, the main source of information for 85% of the population.⁶⁶ El'tsin promised all parties free access to the media, and the electoral regulations stipulated that all candidates and movements were to have equal access to television and radio for political broadcasts (each of the 13 blocs being granted one hour of free television time). This could not ensure that political reporting and news management remained unbiased,⁶⁷ and neither did it take into account paid political advertising or regional broadcasts. Anatolii Lysenko, head of Russian TV, admitted that 'no matter how the elections end up, everyone will be dissatisfied with the work of television'.⁶⁸ Quite how dissatisfied he could not have guessed.⁶⁹ Political commentators were almost entirely eliminated from television presentations, and candidates preferred the form of a monologue with viewers and thus avoided any serious interviews or probing questions. Blocs were allowed to purchase as much paid advertising as they liked and by 10 December Russia's Choice

had taken the most time on the two main channels ('Ostankino' and 'Russia') at 224 minutes, followed by PRES at 154 and the LDPR at 149.⁷⁰

The elections were boycotted by those who considered El'tsin's acts unconstitutional, and many commentators insisted that 'the President is seeking to get a pocket parliament at all costs and in so doing does not particularly care for democratic decorum'.⁷¹ However, the elections were boycotted by only a very small number of parties (above all, unreconstructed communists), and the majority committed themselves to the electoral process. Zyuganov instructed his supporters to turn out in force so that once in parliament they would be able to pursue their opposition to El'tsin's reform programme.⁷² Attempts to impose a boycott by some heads of administration and local legislatures were strongly condemned by the CEC, which insisted that 'voters in the Russian Federation have the right to express their opinion independently'.⁷³ On the day of the vote all public agitation was forbidden, and some 50 000 observers from political parties and public movements took part in supervising the voting.⁷⁴ In his statement dissolving parliament El'tsin invited international observers to monitor the elections. By 9 December some 1030 foreign observers from 58 countries and 20 international, parliamentary, human rights and other organisations had been accredited by the CEC, including large groups from the European Union (EU) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).⁷⁵ By 12 December the observers had fanned out throughout the country to some 100 towns and localities. The presence of these foreign observers was construed by some as interference in Russia's internal affairs, but broadly speaking they were welcomed. A more potent criticism against the observers might be that their remit involved only monitoring the actual elections, whereas the regulations governing the elections, the counting and the larger context in which they were held fell outside their purview.

The elections at the time, with some notable exceptions, were generally held to have been fair.⁷⁶ Gorbachev exaggerated when earlier he had argued that 'these elections will not be free...the organisation of the elections has been taken over wholly and utterly by the executive branch, which has full control over both finances and the press'.⁷⁷ The question of finances was taken up by Stepan Kiselev, deputy editor of *Moscow News*, when he argued that the CEC had failed to establish clear-cut rules for the financing of the electoral campaign by private investors, and had omitted to limit the amount that candidates could spend on themselves in the campaign, thus making possible corruption on a grand scale.⁷⁸ Of particular concern was the fear that special interests would 'invest' in candidates who would thus be beholden to them after the elections. In the event, according to official CEC figures, Russia's Choice spent the most on the campaign, nearly 2 billion rubles, while the LDPR spent only the 100 million granted each party from state funds.⁷⁹ If these figures can be believed (which is unlikely), it cost nearly 50 million rubles to elect one deputy from Russia's Choice but only some 2 million for an LDPR deputy.

Above all, the main criticism that can be levelled at these elections is that it is difficult to talk about the democratic expression of a people's will when the electorate had at best a vague idea of the programmes of the blocs, and were often confused about which candidate represented what bloc or view, and when independent political analysis in the media was notable by its absence—but these criticisms could be levelled against most democratic elections. The farcical nature of the reporting of the

results on the night of 12–13 December appeared vivid testimony to the attempts by the authorities to depoliticise the elections and reduce them to the level of political theatre.⁸⁰ As we shall see below, in the months following the elections persistent allegations of electoral fraud surfaced.

The results

Some 106.2 million citizens were registered, of whom 50% had to turn out for the constitutional referendum to be valid, but only 25% needed to vote for the elections to the Federal Assembly to be legal. The official turnout figure (58 187 755) was rather lower than anticipated, but at 54.8% of registered voters exceeded the 50% threshold required for the constitution.⁸¹ The secular decline in voter participation continued (a trend marked in other post-communist countries as well),⁸² having fallen from 80% in the referendum of 17 March 1991 on the renewed union to 74.7% in the presidential elections of June 1991 and 64.5% in the April 1993 referendum. In traditionally pro-reformist areas, however, the decline was even sharper, a fact which to a large extent determined the results of the elections.

Official figures show that the constitution was supported by 32 937 630 people, or 58.43% of the vote; while 23 431 333 voted against it, or 41.6%.⁸³ Only 30.7% of the total electorate voted for the constitution, and in 17 republics and regions the constitution was rejected.⁸⁴ While the majority of the republics supported the draft constitution, even though their claims to sovereignty were excluded, the closeness of the vote may well undermine the constitution's legitimacy. The constitution officially came into force on Saturday 25 December 1993, when it was published in the Russian media.⁸⁵

The paucity of women on the party lists was now reflected in the low number elected, a total of only 32, 21 of whom were members of the Women of Russia bloc.⁸⁶ In the State Duma as a whole there were just under 50 women, 13% of the total intake, and in the Federation Council there were only nine (5.3%). Although 29 nationalities were elected to the Federation Council, Russians comprised 76% and in the State Duma 82.5%. All but two deputies had completed higher education, and 55% were between the ages of 25 and 50.⁸⁷

The elections to the Federation Council were recognised as having successfully taken place in 85 out of the 89 two-member constituencies, with a total of 171 out of the potential 178 'senators' elected, of whom 49 had been members of the former legislature. Chelyabinsk *oblast'* and the Tatarstan and Chechen republics failed to return their two deputies, and the Yamal-Nenets autonomous *okrug* returned only one.⁸⁸ The results are difficult to fit into the pattern of bloc politics, and 84% of deputies to the upper house declared themselves without party affiliation.⁸⁹ Eleven senators declared themselves members of the CPRF,⁹⁰ six members of Russia's Choice,⁹¹ while the DPR claimed one member with four others as sympathisers.⁹² Some 40 senators supported Russia's Choice, 23 could be classified as moderate reformers, 36 part of the centrist opposition, and 15 supporters of the CPRF, giving the assembly a slightly reformist overall balance, reflected in the election of Shumeiko as Speaker in January 1994.⁹³

The occupational pattern is a more traditional Soviet one, with some 50% of the senators occupying senior posts in the executive branch.⁹⁴ The next largest groups are made up of directors of large state enterprises (some 10%) and former heads of the legislative branch, even if the old soviets to which the latter had belonged had been disbanded. In only a few areas, like the Komi Republic, did the pattern designated by the constitution take place, namely that the senators should represent the executive and legislative authorities, respectively. The anti-El'tsin vote meant that in Bryansk the chairman of the former soviet rather than the new head of administration was elected, and a similar pattern was observed in Tambov. Following the October events the president had dismissed Eduard Rossel', the popular governor of the traditionally pro-El'tsin Sverdlovsk *oblast'*, but he was now elected one of its two senators.⁹⁵

Deputies were elected in only 219 out of the 225 single mandate constituencies. No elections were held in the Chechen Republic constituency, and the elections in Naberezhnye Chelny in Tatarstan were postponed until March 1994 because only one candidate was registered. In the four other Tartarstan constituencies the ballots were invalid because the turnout was less than 25%.⁹⁶ Nearly half the victorious candidates received less than 30% of the vote, and only one fifth received an absolute majority. An astonishing 17% of votes were cast against all the candidates running in any particular constituency, while over 7% of the ballots were declared invalid.⁹⁷ The complicated vote and the unfamiliarity of the names were partly responsible for these figures, but at the same time they reflected a protest vote against the conduct of the elections themselves.

Only eight of the parties and groups in the proportional part of the election cleared the 5% barrier.⁹⁸ The totals in Table 1 include seats won by each party in the 225 seats decided on a party basis, plus seats won by members standing individually in the 219 constituency seats where voting took place. Of the latter, 141 individual candidates officially were not affiliated with any party or bloc,⁹⁹ but the majority later aligned themselves with fractions in parliament. Another eight seats were won in single constituency seats by party members whose parties failed to achieve the 5% threshold.

The combined vote for the four indubitably reformist blocs (Russia's Choice, Yabloko, PRES and RDDR), at 34.21%, marked a sharp fall from the 57.3% gained by El'tsin in the presidential elections of June 1991, the 58.6% supporting him in the April 1993 referendum and, indeed, the 58.4% supporting the constitution in December 1993. Support for the three clearly oppositional blocs (CPRF, APR and LDPR) came to 43.31%, roughly the same percentage as voted against the constitution.

Russia's Choice gained far more seats in the single-member constituencies than any other bloc and thus became the single largest group in the Duma, but the relative failure of this bloc represented the greatest surprise of the election. Just under 16% of the total electorate supported Russia's Choice, suggesting the rejection of 'shock therapy'.¹⁰⁰ In 17 federal units support fell below 10% and in only five exceeded 25%, with the 33.89% in Moscow city their best result.¹⁰¹ Their weakest showing was in border areas and the republics, where neither the titular nationalities nor the ethnic Russians saw Russia's Choice as advancing

TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA

Party/bloc	Proportional		Constituency seats	Total seats	
	%	Seats		No.	%
Russia's Choice	15.51	40	30	70	15.6
LDPR (Zhirinovskiy)	22.92	59	5	64	14.2
Communist Party	12.40	32	16	48	10.7
Agrarian Party	7.99	21	12	33	7.3
Yabloko (Yavlinsky)	7.86	20	3	23	5.1
Women of Russia	8.13	21	2	23	5.1
PRES (Shakhrai)	6.76	18	1	19	4.0
DPR (Travkin)	5.52	14	1	15	3.3
Civic Union	1.93	—	1	1	0.2
RDDR (Sobchak)	4.08	—	4	4	0.9
Dignity & Charity	0.70	—	2	2	0.4
New Names	1.25	—	1	1	0.2
Cedar	0.76	—	—	—	—
Against all	4.36	—	—	—	—
Spoiled ballots	3.10	—	—	—	—
Independents	—	—	141	141	31.3
Postponed	—	—	6	6	—
TOTAL	—	225	225	450	100

Sources: *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, p. 1; *Byulleten' Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi kommissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 12, 1994, p. 67.

Note: Out of a total electorate of 106 170 835, 53 751 696 valid ballot papers were cast, of which 46 799 532 were for the eight groups passing the 5% barrier. The top eight percentages in column 1 refer to the latter figure; the rest to the former, hence the column exceeds 100.

their interests.¹⁰² El'tsin's failure to support them suggested that as far as he was concerned the adoption of the constitution was more important than a strong showing for Gaidar. Much support for El'tsin had clearly been for him as a strong leader rather than for the 'reformist' course that he represented, and thus his vote was not transferable—at least not to the democratic camp appealing to his heritage.

Russia's Choice's campaign was clumsy and inappropriate, appealing to middle class values in a country with a negligible middle class. The leading politicians in Russia's Choice had never had to learn the skills of the hustings, most of them were scions of the old privileged class and had been propelled into politics from comfortable jobs in institutes and agencies. The political narcissism of many of Russia's Choice candidates was reminiscent of the hubris attending the Soviet regime's last years. Their misplaced self-confidence meant that in some places they actually competed against each other.¹⁰³ Above all, the universalism espoused by Russia's Choice seemed to be very distant from the specific concerns of the people in Russia or the problems facing friends and relatives in the 'near abroad'.

The abolition of the traditional second round, when the democratic forces could have combined in support of the front-runners, only exaggerated their divisions, already exacerbated by the October events and by splits over the constitution and the right to debate its merits. Russia's Choice lost ground during the campaign,¹⁰⁴ and despite nearly four hours of paid advertising on television, support for them ebbed

away.¹⁰⁵ Their harsh political judgements and identification with the bloody events of October 1993, and the apparent lack of tangible results of economic reform, alienated the electorate. Moreover, a large proportion of the 45% of the electorate who failed to vote represented potential supporters for democratic parties, and it was their absence that determined the outcome.¹⁰⁶ Groups like Yabloko insisted that the image of Russian politics as divided into two camps, reformers and conservatives, was false and as far as they were concerned there was room for a constructive democratic opposition. This may well be the case, but Yavlinsky and Shakhrai underestimated the threat from the right and directed their main attack against Russia's Choice, despite the calls by Gaidar and Sobchak for the democrats to unite.¹⁰⁷ Yavlinsky, however, with some justification, insisted that a united democratic bloc would have gone down to an even harder defeat.¹⁰⁸

A broader view would suggest that post-communist Russian politics is characterised by a gulf between social beliefs and political organisation. While the liberal principles of individual responsibility and rights might command much support, liberalism as an organised political force is weak. By contrast, while the socialist principles of collectivism and centralised economic decision making command little support, neo-communism as an organised political force is strong. The intellectual hegemony of liberal reformism failed to find effective autonomous organisational forms and thus became reliant on executive structures, a dilemma encountered not for the first time in Russian history.

While there might be room for democratic reformist parties in Russian politics, the Yavlinsky, Shakhrai and Sobchak blocs were not able to convince the electorate that they provided a credible democratic alternative, and indeed the weakness of the democratic opposition to Gaidarist policies was one of the notable features of the elections. The so-called democrats, if not the notion of democracy itself, appear to have become compromised. All shades of the democratic spectrum appeared to have lost touch with popular concerns, which they had earlier so effectively mobilised against the communist regime. The majority of voters who had twice cast their votes for El'tsin, in the June 1991 presidential election and the April 1993 referendum, were forced to choose between at least four blocs claiming the 'democratic' inheritance, but it is clear that many supported the spirit of populist insurgency politics rather than the content, and voted for Zhirinovsky.

The elections demonstrated that the divisions within the democratic camp were real and not a tactic to attract a broader spectrum of votes. Shakhrai's party had bid for the federalist vote, and PRES overcame the 5% barrier in four-fifths of the country's regions and republics and won decisively in Tuva with 43.38% of the vote, in Kabardino-Balkaria with 31.53% and in the Altai Republic with 26.55%.¹⁰⁹ Overall, however, the poor PRES showing, barely overcoming the 5% barrier, suggests that strengthening federalism was not the main issue affecting voting behaviour. On the contrary, the strong support for Zhirinovsky's party, which advocated the abolition of ethno-federalism and its replacement by the unitary *guberniya* system of administrative provinces, and for the CPRF, also representing a centralised form of government, suggests that support for decentralised federalism might be lower than its advocates had suggested. Some republics where the titular nationalities constituted minorities, like Mordovia, Komi, Marii El and Karelia, saw strong support for Zhirinovsky,¹¹⁰

reflecting the concerns of the Russian majorities and indicating the potential for the counter-mobilisation of the non-titular populations in Russia's 21 ethno-federal republics.

The weakness of the centrist blocs was a marked feature of the results.¹¹¹ The centre was squeezed and moderate reformers were the greatest losers, although paradoxically, and in keeping with the observation above about the lack of correspondence between ideologies and organisations, most blocs appealed to the centre for votes. The long-standing problem of the Civic Union in gaining a steady identity and purpose was now shared by other groups that sought to plant their standard on centrist ground, and their views on specific issues appeared hard to formulate and substantiate. The DPR, moreover, lost votes as a result of feuding between its Moscow and regional organisations.¹¹² In the Federation Council, however, some 60 deputies supported the centrist policies of Chernomyrdin, with views close to those of the Civic Union.¹¹³

The events of October had greatly simplified the Russian political spectrum by sweeping away the numerous 'red' and 'brown' movements, the majority of whom had allied in the now banned National Salvation Front. The banning also of Anpilov's RCWP and others, and the elimination from the electoral race of Aksyuchits' RCDM, Baburin's ROS and Mikhail Astaf'ev's Constitutional Democrats, left the field clear for the CPRF, APR and LDPR. They garnered the votes of what has been estimated to be a solid core of 20–30% of the electorate implacably opposed to El'tsin and his reforms, and the support of floating voters as well.

The growth in the support of the CPRF was particularly strong following the October revolt, fuelled by public unease over the deaths at the White House, the liberalisation of bread prices, continued economic decline and fear of unemployment. The CPRF was able to take advantage of its network of party cells and to draw on its political experience. Certain groups, moreover, tended to support the communists, like pensioners (who were more likely to turn out to vote) and certain regions, though the relative weakness of the communist vote among the military was unexpected. Of all the major groupings, support for the CPRF was the most stable, with 68% of its voters having committed themselves within a week of the campaign starting, whereas the corresponding figure for the LDPR was only 32%.¹¹⁴ This might suggest that the CPRF had reached its maximum level of potential support in these elections.

Both the CPRF and the APR increased their representation in the State Duma by the addition of members from the constituency elections, and both did well in some of the republics.¹¹⁵ While the reformers on the whole maintained their support in the cities, the CPRF and APR gained their main support in small towns and rural areas in a paradoxical inversion of classic Marxist expectations. Above all, the elections saw the re-legitimation of the Communist Party, appearing as a force of stability and rationality when compared to Zhirinovskiy's LDPR. Soon after the elections Gaidar suggested that the CPRF might make a useful ally with Russia's Choice to counter the fascist threat, an overture rejected by Zyuganov.¹¹⁶

The success of the LDPR took most observers by surprise, a 'bolt from the blue' as one commentator put it.¹¹⁷ Zhirinovskiy's share of the vote nearly trebled, rising from 7.81% in the presidential elections of June 1991 to 22.92%, but the increase in the actual number of votes cast for him was less impressive, doubling from 6.2 million¹¹⁸ to 12.32 million. The LDPR, moreover, won only five constituencies out of

the 66 it contested, and in the upper house the party enjoyed almost no support.¹¹⁹ Zhirinovskiy, nevertheless, had clearly gained by the abolition of the two-stage electoral system, and by the increase in the proportion of those elected by party lists to the State Duma to 50%. He also gained from the interweaving of the election and referendum campaigns. His personal support for the constitution rendered him *de facto* El'tsin's ally on this issue, and at the same time the simultaneous elections to the upper chamber meant that regional leaders in effect ignored the contest for the lower house. Contrary to a common misperception, however, the adoption of the constitution owed little to Zhirinovskiy since his electorate in the main, despite his urgings, voted against. As noted, the tally of votes cast against the constitution was almost precisely the same as that cast for the three main oppositional groupings, the LDPR, the CPRF and the APR. This occurred not only in Russia as a whole, but also in individual regions and republics, right down to ward level, suggesting a strong correlation.¹²⁰

The reformist and neo-communist camps had been unable to provide a single leader with anything like El'tsin's popularity, and the void in charismatic leadership was filled by Zhirinovskiy. Just as the democrats themselves had come to power on a wave of anti-communist emotions, so now Zhirinovskiy benefited from the reaction against the 'excesses' of the 'August democrats', whose sometimes overenthusiastic participation in the grand redistribution of state property led to charges of corruption. The divisions in the reformist camp allowed Zhirinovskiy to take second place, but it was more than a question of the democrats losing the election rather than the opposition winning. Zhirinovskiy fought an effective campaign, and made particularly good use of television. He appeared to have something to offer most groups in society, including the lifting of the threat of unemployment, the restoration of Russia's dignity and greatness, the reduction of criminality (with the public execution of offenders), and cheap vodka for all. Zhirinovskiy was intelligent enough to avoid making detailed policy promises, addressing the underlying discontents and social tensions rather than laying out blueprints for recovery.

The relative success of the LDPR took place not only at the expense of the democrats but perhaps primarily by drawing on potential supporters of the communists and agrarians, so that without Zhirinovskiy the resurgence of the communist and allied vote might well have been even more impressive.¹²¹ The LDPR came first in the party lists in every *oblast'* except Chelyabinsk, Perm', Sverdlovsk, Tomsk and Yaroslavl', and notably even in those regions in central Russia that had traditionally supported El'tsin or the communists. The LDPR streaked ahead with 43.01% of the vote in Pskov *oblast'*, and in Voronezh *oblast'*, where the communists were expected to win, the latter took only 14.54% compared with the LDPR's 30.63%, and the story was the same in other 'red belt' regions like Belgorod, Smolensk and Tambov, the very heartland of the communist opposition.¹²² Espousing a policy of national capitalist development and the restoration of empire, the LDPR garnered the votes of Russians alienated by economic decline, the end of superpower status and the perceived hostility of the former Soviet republics.¹²³

Young people in flight from education and politics were particularly susceptible to Zhirinovskiy's nihilistic brand of politics. Support came from those with only secondary education, unqualified and blue collar workers, and more in the provinces

than in the big cities, and above all those employed in the so-called budget sphere, dependent on subsidies from the state. LDPR support was particularly strong in small provincial towns, with a particularly high proportion of family people, and among people who had not been members of the old *nomenklatura* élite. A high proportion identified with the old Soviet Union rather than with Russia, and the degree of identification with the leader was rather higher than in other parties.¹²⁴ These categories precisely comprise the classic basis for right radical movements and are relatively easily mobilised.

In the last stages of the election Zhirinovskiy's core supporters were joined by a new cohort, attracted by the mass media, who differed in their social characteristics. If the core consisted of young men aged 25–40, in the final weeks they were joined by an older age group, by those with lower than average education, and finally by women. About half the core group worked in state enterprises, and about 15% of them were earning money in a second job. They were worried about poor management, weak labour discipline, and the threat of unemployment. Zhirinovskiy supporters were particularly concerned about the weakening of state power and corruption.¹²⁵

The LDPR gained strong support in the military. On an 86% turnout for military personnel, 73% voted for Zhirinovskiy's party.¹²⁶ The strategic rocket forces gave Zhirinovskiy 72% of their votes, the CPRF 16.5% and Russia's Choice only 8.5%. In the Moscow military district the Liberal Democrats won 46% of the vote, the Communists 13.7% and Russia's Choice 8.5%. An astonishing 87.4% of the Taman Guards supported the LDPR, and 74.3% of the Kantemir Mechanised Division, allegedly on the side of the president after the October events.¹²⁷ It should be stressed that it is not clear how these figures were derived and they should be treated with caution. In his televised press conference on 22 December El'tsin stated that one-third of the military had voted for the LDPR, but in many cases soldiers had voted in polling stations alongside civilians, so no overall data are possible.

Another source of support for the LDPR is usually considered to be those socially marginalised, the losers from the marketisation transition process, or those who had lost status as a result of the reforms. This includes the intelligentsia, who had previously been close to the power system, the arbiters of taste and influential in policy analysis and prescription, who now found themselves marginalised as a new generation of entrepreneurial 'democrats' took their place. Many LDPR activists and leaders were or had been employed by the KGB and the military-industrial complex, marginalised by the earlier processes of elite reformation and threatened by the changes. It is too early to predict whether all this will be enough to ensure Zhirinovskiy success in the presidential elections since numerous unpredictable factors could play a role, including Zhirinovskiy's ability to discredit himself. By January 1994 polls already showed that Zhirinovskiy's support had collapsed to about 10%,¹²⁸ suggesting that the concept of 'support' here is tenuous.

The accuracy of opinion polls in these elections has been the subject of some controversy. Pollsters have been accused of being politically engaged, giving the results people wanted to hear, and at the same time tending to reflect the views of the urban population. Support for Russia's Choice and the potential of centrist parties was certainly exaggerated in the early stages.¹²⁹ However, rising support for the LDPR was accurately charted by some polls,¹³⁰ and even though the publication of poll

results was banned in the ten days before the election the late surge by the LDPR was identified.¹³¹ For at least a year before the elections, moreover, pollsters had accurately identified a consistent pattern in which 60–70% of the electorate had lost belief in political solutions, trusted no political leader, and insisted they supported no party and would vote for none,¹³² and this quite apart from other data showing the rise in ‘national-socialist’ sentiments over the same period.¹³³ Hence, the volatility of the results should have come as no surprise.

The elections revealed the political geography of Russia to be fractured along several axes, with divisions between metropolitan areas and the countryside (in which 26% of the Russian population lives), and between the North/North-west and the South/South-west. The main base of communist support was in the Central Black Earth region to the south-west of Moscow, whereas the LDPR’s strongest support was in the new Russian border areas (especially in the South) and those in proximity to national conflicts. While Moscow and St Petersburg are distinguished by the greatest concentration of people who have benefited from the reforms and hence supported democratic platforms, the South-western part of the country, including regions like Voronezh with a strong concentration of military and engineering plants, was closer to Zhirinovskiy and the communists.¹³⁴

The elections of 12 December marked only the first stage in a continuing electoral process that would last into spring 1994.¹³⁵ New slimmed-down professional legislative bodies were to be established in the 68 regions (the 21 republics were allowed to make their own arrangements), and elections to 64 of them were to be held in March and three in April 1994.¹³⁶ The results of the elections to the Moscow Duma on 12 December 1993, in which Russia’s Choice triumphed (taking 19 out of 35 places) on a relatively high turn-out and with nine independent candidates,¹³⁷ proved to be the exception once the electoral process moved into the provinces. Representatives of the old communist and managerial élites, including former Communist Party officials, chairmen of collective farms, enterprise directors and former soviet deputies, triumphed.¹³⁸ However, turnout figures were so low, falling on 20 March 1994 below the prerequisite 25% threshold in Kamchatka, Orenburg and Murmansk regions and the city of St Petersburg, that the elections had to be postponed.¹³⁹ In most regions, however, a turnout of some 30–40% was recorded and new Dumas were elected. The return to power of the party and economic *nomenklatura* at the local level led Nikolai Medvedev, head of the presidential administration for work with geographical areas, to warn of the creation of a ‘red belt’ around Moscow woven out of regions with anti-reformist and anti-presidential sentiments.¹⁴⁰

Fraud?

Allegations of fraud were aggravated by the failure to publish the final results until over two months after the election, and even then the results were incomplete.¹⁴¹ Quite apart from possible fraud, the organisation of the elections increased the possibility of errors and undermined traditional Soviet practices which were, if nothing else, efficient. The old intermediate *raion* (urban and rural) and city electoral committees had been abolished and thus the *okrug* (district) electoral commissions were each responsible for certifying the protocols from some 3000 ward (*uchastok*)

polling stations, obviously a system prone to error. Moreover, the CEC had become a unified and ostensibly autonomous electoral agency and was faced with the verification not of 89 reports from each of the country's republics and regions but over 94 000 protocols from the electoral wards,¹⁴² a task far beyond its limited capabilities.¹⁴³ *Ad hoc* 'working groups' were set up in the centre and the localities to help count the election results, but their role and composition were arbitrary and highly irregular.

The changes in the number of registered electors remain to be explained. The CEC finally came up with a figure of 106 171 000 in its results published on 15 February 1994, yet the number of registered voters it gave on 13 December was 105 284 000, a figure repeated on 30 December when announcing the results of the referendum.¹⁴⁴ Even the new total fell short of the 107 310 374 voters registered for the referendum of 25 April 1993. What had happened to over a million voters? There had been no demographic dip in the birthrate a generation earlier, and since April 1993 the Russian population had increased as refugees and migrants came in from the former Soviet republics.

The results for the Federal Assembly were marked by peculiarities but were not as distorted as is sometimes claimed. In the contest for the Federation Council and in the constituency part of the election for the State Duma, only the votes for the winning candidates were given, but not for the losers, who in some cases still did not know several months after the election how many votes they had received. Information on the party list results for the State Duma was also missing, with no details given on the number of ballot papers issued, the number spoiled, or the number of votes cast against all candidates, a special category at the bottom of the ballot paper. Other accusations about the presentation of results are not justified: the numbers voting against the constitution in each federal component were given, and the results for the State Duma were not given in summary form for each of the 89 subjects of the federation but for each constituency.¹⁴⁵

There was plenty of scope for interference by governors. In arrangements drawn up in haste at a time of intense political conflict, El'tsin had granted the regions and republics extensive rights to decide on electoral procedures and appointments to ward and *okrug* electoral commissions. The main accusation was that regional administrations exaggerated voter turnout to exceed the 50% threshold for the adoption of the constitution, thus possibly undermining the legitimacy of the elections as a whole.¹⁴⁶ Ryabov admitted that 19 complaints about the work of *okrug* electoral commissions were examined in court, but only five were upheld.¹⁴⁷ Zhirinovskiy's own victory in a single-mandate seat in the Shchelkovo constituency was found faulty by the local city court, which recommended that it should be annulled, a judgement overruled by the Moscow *oblast'* court on 18 March 1994 on the grounds that only the CEC had the right to annul voting results.¹⁴⁸

The human rights activist and deputy editor of *Novoe vremya*, Kronid Lyubarsky (himself an unsuccessful candidate), led the charge, arguing that the pressure on governors to ensure the adoption of the constitution forced them to make up the numbers if they fell below the required threshold. However, since elections were held at the same time, extra votes had to be fabricated here too, and, unwilling to support either the radical democrats or the neo-communists, they allegedly cast the

surplus votes for what they perceived to be a harmless 'third force', Zhirinovskiy.¹⁴⁹ The main problem, according to Lyubarsky, was that the power of the Soviet apparatus remained intact in the regions and that the falsification of the results of 12 December was a natural result of their predominance. Coming from a 'democrat', these assertions might be questioned, yet much remains to be explained.

The commission set up by El'tsin himself to investigate the fraud allegations was led by the veteran democrat Aleksandr Sobyenin and suggested that some 9.2 million votes out of an electorate of between 105 and 107 million had been falsified in order to inflate the turnout figures above the 50% barrier. The commission suggested that the real turnout figure might not have been the 58.2 million claimed earlier but only 49 million out of 106.2 million registered voters, or 46.1% rather than the alleged 54.8%.¹⁵⁰ While such findings might have threatened the fragile political stabilisation achieved since the October events, the President and most parties were uninterested in challenging the results.¹⁵¹ The major beneficiaries of the 'mistakes' made by the electoral commissions were the Agrarian and Liberal Democratic parties, with the latter (according to Sobyenin's team) receiving up to 6 million extra votes. Only the so-called democrats, the greatest losers in the December election, stood to gain from exposing the alleged fraud, but at the risk of undermining the relative constitutional stabilisation since December 1993.

It was clear that there would have to be a major revision of the electoral law prior to new elections, and on 20 December 1993 El'tsin called on the CEC, now transformed into a permanent agency, to devise a new law and to change the law on referenda.¹⁵² At the very least, the old *raion* and city electoral commissions would have to be restored, with their findings open to local scrutiny and publication in the local press. The role of the CEC itself was questioned, with the electoral process, in the absence of a law, governed by CEC officials themselves. The CEC was dubbed ironically by some 'the ministry of democracy'.¹⁵³

Conclusion

Any judgement on the political situation in Russia based on these elections must be tempered by the relative arbitrariness of the results and their unstable character. If the elections had been held only on a proportional system, the LDPR would have been the single largest group in the Duma; but if the old two-stage first-past-the-post system had been retained, the LDPR would hardly have figured. The confused results reflect genuine confusion in the Russian political scene. A large number were seduced by the promises of easy solutions and the restoration of Russia's great power status; but a solid bloc at the same time voted for the continuation of reforms. The populace had sent two mutually exclusive signals: in apparently accepting the constitution they were voting for stability; but in voting for the opposition they were rejecting the existing basis for order. In the constituency elections the personal factor was generally more important than programmes, and conjunctural factors (like the non-payment of wages in many sectors since September) amplified the protest vote. The elections revealed not so much 'support' for nationalist or neo-communist parties as disenchantment with the democrats.

Liberals who had criticised the authoritarian tendencies in the new constitution

were now reconciled to the increase in presidential powers to maintain the existing regime, and notions of 'enlightened authoritarianism', a view that commentators like Andranik Migranyan had long been advocating, gained in credibility.¹⁵⁴ El'tsin's refusal to hold simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections appeared justified, while the presidential ambitions of Gaidar, Yavlinsky, Shakhrai and Sobchak had all been dealt a severe blow. Regional forces were now firmly established in the Federation Council, while the lower house, however embryonic the party system, became the focus of political debate.

So is Russia really the *strana durakov*, the land of fools that Moscow intellectuals suggested after the elections?¹⁵⁵ As far as the democrats were concerned the electorate had made a 'mistake' in voting for Zhirinovskiy and the communists,¹⁵⁶ while Yurii Afanas'ev insisted that Zhirinovskiy was a mirror to Russian society, reflecting the centuries-long absence of a social space beyond the interests of the state, something that was reflected in the unformed nature of civil society.¹⁵⁷ Elena Bonner argued that 'the tragedy of the democratic organisations is that they were unable to make a civil society and not a mob out of the people',¹⁵⁸ while Tret'yakov riposted that it was not up to democracy to remake the people, something that the communists had long tried to do, and the main tragedy lay in the democratic intelligentsia's failure to educate its own leaders in power.¹⁵⁹

The elections did not so much reveal the immaturity of the Russian electorate and its susceptibility to demagogic promises as reflect a more profound institutional immaturity of the political system and of social processes in their entirety. Crisis appeared to be the normal state of Russian politics, and institutional reorganisation typical of the system. The vote can be placed in the context of a widespread disenchantment with traditional parties in the rest of Europe, but in Russia the protest vote was less against a centre that barely existed than a mark of dissatisfaction with the venality of post-communist politics and the persistence of elite structures across the August divide. The revolutionary implications of the fall of communist power and the change in property relations had not yet given birth to a stable new class or ordered hierarchy of elite privileges and societal values. The strong showing for Zhirinovskiy reflected the insurgency of outsider groups against the embryonic post-communist 'new class'.

The results suggest a highly discerning and sophisticated pattern of voter behaviour, able to take advantage of the multiple voting choices offered by the interweaving of the various campaigns. In Nizhny Novgorod, for example, in casting their ballots for the Federation Council and the constituency party of the Duma elections, voters supported local reformist candidates, but in voting for the LDPR in the party list section the electorate was clearly signalling dissatisfaction with the overall course of government policy.¹⁶⁰ The absence of a second round, moreover, amplified the protest vote and reduced further the possibility of achieving a popular mandate in single-member constituencies. In many cases (as in Novosibirsk), if the total vote cast for reformist candidates is combined this exceeds the vote cast for oppositionists on the party lists. Thus the party list vote was used as a classic instance of the 'protest' vote (dissatisfaction with national policies and so on); whereas in the single-member constituencies the electorate voted *for* rather than *against* particular candidates and programmes.¹⁶¹

The elections marked the development of a new stage in Russian politics. The essentially bipolar opposition between ‘communists’ and ‘democrats’, which had broadly speaking predominated in the first phase of party formation from 1990 to 1993, now gave way to a multipolar situation in which the earlier two were joined by an overtly populist and semi-fascist movement of the leadership type, while at the same time the ‘democratic’ front typical of the insurgency phase of Russian politics disintegrated into numerous competing groups. There was no longer a clear second centre of power (a role played by El’tsin earlier, and the Supreme Soviet later) in opposition to the existing regime. The bipolar struggle had been marked by a certain common attempt to keep the struggle within the bounds of law and ‘civilised’ political discourse, but its very stark bipolarity—ultimately institutionalised in the form of the struggle between the president and the legislature—gave rise to the bloodshed of October 1993. The new multipolar structure of Russian politics offers perhaps a better guarantee for the peaceful resolution of political conflict and the institutionalisation of political struggle.

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¹ ‘O poetapnoi konstitutsionnoi reforme v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, *Izvestiya*, 22 September 1993, p. 1.

² *Izvestiya*, 24 September 1993, pp. 3–5.

³ *Moscow News*, 43, 22 October 1993, p. 1.

⁴ El’tsin decreed the increase in numbers to the State Duma on 1 October (‘Polozhenie o vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy v 1993 godu’); a decree of 11 October allowed the election of the upper house (‘O vyborakh v Sovet Federatsii Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii’); and El’tsin’s decree of 6 November added yet another clause ensuring that a category of votes ‘against all’ was added to ballot papers. *Rossiiskaya Federatsiya*, 13, 1993, pp. 7–20.

⁵ *Moskovskie novosti*, 25, 20 June 1993, p. A9.

⁶ *The Guardian*, 8 October 1993.

⁷ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 25 September 1993, p. 1.

⁸ Decree of 11 October, *Rossiiskaya Federatsiya*, 13, 1993, p. 17.

⁹ *Stern*, 6 November 1993; *The Observer*, 7 November 1993.

¹⁰ For details, see Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (London, Routledge, 1993), p. 248.

¹¹ ‘O provedenii vsenarodnogo golosovaniya po proektu konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii’; accompanied on the same date by ‘Polozhenie o vsenarodnom golosovanii po proektu konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 goda’, in *Rossiiskaya Federatsiya*, 13, 1993, pp. 22–24; *Rossiiskie vestii*, 21 October 1993. The word ‘plebiscite’ (*golosovanie*) was used rather than referendum.

¹² The October 1990 RSFSR Referendum Law stipulated that matters affecting the constitution could be adopted by a simple majority of all registered voters, while non-constitutional matters could be decided by a simple majority of those participating in the referendum. A referendum would only be valid if turnout exceeded 50% of registered voters. *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 2 December 1990.

¹³ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 10 November 1993, pp. 3–6.

¹⁴ A conference of 58 political parties and associations on 3 December subjected the draft constitution to withering criticism, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4 December 1993, p. 2.

¹⁵ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 27 November 1993, p. 1.

¹⁶ *Izvestiya*, 30 November 1993, p. 2.

¹⁷ Ryabov, *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 11 December 1993, p. 1.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *The Political Situation in Russia: Political Parties in Russia* (Moscow, ‘EPIcenter’, 1993), p. 26.

- ²⁰ Alexander Rahr, 'The Future of the Russian Democrats', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2, 39, 1 October 1993, p. 4.
- ²¹ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 14 October 1993, p. 3.
- ²² *Pravda*, 16 October 1990.
- ²³ *Izvestiya*, 14 October 1993, p. 4.
- ²⁴ *Izvestiya*, 9 November 1993, p. 2.
- ²⁵ *Put'*, 31, 1994, p. 3.
- ²⁶ *The Guardian*, 11 November 1993.
- ²⁷ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 11 December 1993, p. 1.
- ²⁸ Figures from *Izvestiya*, 9 November 1993, p. 2; *Moscow News*, 46, 12 November 1993, p. 1. In addition to specific notes, details about the programmes can be found in *Rossiiskie vesti*, 11 December 1993, p. 2; preliminary information in *Izvestiya*, 28 October 1993, p. 4 and *Izvestiya*, 13 October, p. 4, 14 October, p. 4.
- ²⁹ *The Political Situation in Russia*, p. 16.
- ³⁰ *The Independent*, 18 October 1993; *Izvestiya*, 15 February 1994, p. 2.
- ³¹ *Moscow News*, 43, 22 October 1993, p. 2.
- ³² The list included the sociologist Viktor Sheinis, the economist Nikolai Petrakov, Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy, a co-leader of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, and Evgenii Ambartsumov, the chairman of the former Supreme Soviet's Committee for International Affairs.
- ³³ E.g., *Moskovskie novosti*, 37, 1993, p. A5.
- ³⁴ *Moscow News*, 43, 22 October 1993, p. 2.
- ³⁵ *Predvybornaya platforma* (Moscow, November 1993); *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 27 November 1993. The programme's ideas had already been outlined in Yavlinsky's book *Uroki ekonomicheskoi reformy: "Laissez-Faire" v eks-SSSR* (Moscow, 1993).
- ³⁶ *Izvestiya*, 4 December 1993, p. 2.
- ³⁷ *Moscow News*, 43, 22 October 1993, p. 2.
- ³⁸ *Moscow News*, 45, 5 November 1993, p. 2; *Rossiiskie vesti*, 11 December 1993, p. 2.
- ³⁹ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 10 November 1993.
- ⁴⁰ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 7 December 1993, p. 2.
- ⁴¹ See Michael McFaul, 'Russian Centrism and Revolutionary Transitions', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 9, 3, 1993, pp. 196–222.
- ⁴² *Izvestiya*, 24 November 1993, p. 4.
- ⁴³ *Moscow News*, 43, 22 October 1993, p. 2.
- ⁴⁴ *Izvestiya*, 2 December 1993, p. 4.
- ⁴⁵ *Pravda*, 2 April 1993, p. 2.
- ⁴⁶ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 October 1993.
- ⁴⁷ See, for example, Gordon M. Hahn, 'Opposition Politics in Russia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 46, 2, 1994, pp. 305–306, nn. 1 and 2.
- ⁴⁸ V. V. Zhirinovskiy, *Poslednii brodok na yug* (Moscow, TOO 'Pisatel', 1993).
- ⁴⁹ The entire issue of *Yuridicheskaya gazeta*, 40–41 (110–111), 1993, was devoted to the LDPR and its programme.
- ⁵⁰ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 December 1993, pp. 1, 2.
- ⁵¹ Up to a relatively late stage candidates were switching from party lists to single-mandate constituencies (or stood in both), and the original figure of 1756 on the party lists fell to the 1717 given earlier.
- ⁵² Alexander Guroff, Gretchen Kile & Christine Lamber, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, *Special Election Watch: A Report on the Russian Parliamentary Elections*, 7 December 1993, p. 19.
- ⁵³ See Richard Sakwa, 'Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2, 31, July 1993, pp. 7–15.
- ⁵⁴ *Moscow News*, 22 October 1993, p. 2.
- ⁵⁵ *Izvestiya*, 24 November 1993, p. 4.
- ⁵⁶ *Byulleten' Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi kommissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (henceforth *Byulleten TsIK*) 12, 1994, pp. 82–105.
- ⁵⁷ Decree of 9 October, 'O reforme predstavitel'nykh organov vlasti i organov mestnogo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii', *Rossiiskaya Federatsiya*, 13, 1993, p. 25.
- ⁵⁸ The *Osnovnye polozheniya* for local elections were confirmed by presidential decree on 27 October 1993. *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 6–27.
- ⁵⁹ *Rossiiskie vesti*, 26 October 1993.
- ⁶⁰ Decree of 22 October 1993, 'Ob osnovnykh nachalakh organizatsii gosudarstvennoi vlasti v sub'ektakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii', *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 3–6.

- ⁶¹ *Izvestiya*, 11 December 1993, p. 2.
- ⁶² *Izvestiya*, 10 December 1993, p. 1.
- ⁶³ *Russkaya mysl'*, 4010, 23 December 1993, p. 7.
- ⁶⁴ Cf. *Izvestiya*, 10 December 1993, p. 4.
- ⁶⁵ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 December 1993, p. 1.
- ⁶⁶ Julia Wishnevsky, 'The Role of the Media in the Parliamentary Election Campaign', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2, 46, 19 November 1993, pp. 8–12.
- ⁶⁷ For an attack against the bias shown towards Russia's Choice on 'Ostankino' TV, whose head, Vyacheslav Bragin, was on that bloc's list, see Irina Petrovskaya, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 19 November 1993, p. 1.
- ⁶⁸ *Moscow News*, 44, 29 October 1993, p. 3.
- ⁶⁹ The crude attempts by Bragin to discredit Zhirinovskiy backfired, and he himself was sacked and replaced by Aleksandr Yakovlev immediately after the elections.
- ⁷⁰ *Izvestiya*, 10 December 1993, p. 4, gives a full table.
- ⁷¹ Stepan Kiselev, *Moscow News*, 43, 22 October 1993, p. 2.
- ⁷² *The Observer*, 7 November 1993.
- ⁷³ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 11 December 1993, p. 1.
- ⁷⁴ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 13 July 1994, p. 1.
- ⁷⁵ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 11 December 1993, p. 1.
- ⁷⁶ Ryabov noted that the CEC had received some 150 complaints but insisted that the vast majority had no basis, *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, p. 30. Numerous infringements of proper procedures were noted at the time, however. In rural areas voting on behalf of others was a common practice, and in Moscow at least two serious cases of ballot rigging were alleged, for the 194th and 204th constituencies. Dmitrii Ol'shansky's complaints about the latter were never properly investigated, *Segodnya*, 18 December 1993, p. 2.
- ⁷⁷ *Moscow News*, 46, 12 November 1993, p. 2.
- ⁷⁸ *Moscow News*, 47, 19 November 1993, p. 2.
- ⁷⁹ *Moskovskie novosti*, 18, 1 May 1994, p. A7. These figures assume accurate reporting by the electoral blocs themselves, something that is far from guaranteed. Cf. the figures given by Ryabov, *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 30–31.
- ⁸⁰ 'Ostankino' TV presented 'Greeting the New Political Year', but the celebrations proved premature and the plug was pulled as the first results came in showing Zhirinovskiy's success.
- ⁸¹ These figures have been the subject of controversy (see below) and the turnout given here is that given in the official results, *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 21 December 1993, p. 1.
- ⁸² For example, turnout in the Polish elections of September 1993 was only 52%.
- ⁸³ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 21 December 1993, p. 1; *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 34–38.
- ⁸⁴ Seven republics voted against the constitution: Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Karachai-Cherkessia, Mordovia and Tuva; and 10 *oblasti*: Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Lipetsk, Orël, Smolensk, Tambov, Penza, Volgograd and Voronezh, mainly in the Russian South-west, where support for the Communist Party was strongest. *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 34–38. In Tatarstan the referendum was declared invalid since not enough turned up to vote, but of those who did 74% supported the constitution, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 December 1993, p. 1. No vote took place in the Chechen Republic.
- ⁸⁵ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 25 December 1993.
- ⁸⁶ *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 82–105.
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.
- ⁸⁸ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 21 December 1993, p. 1; *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 39–51. New elections were ordered by the CEC (*Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 31 December 1993, p. 6), and took place in Tatarstan on 13 March 1994, in which the president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Farid Mukhametshin, were elected to the Federation Council, and five deputies elected to the State Duma. Elections in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous *okrug* on 15 March saw the acting governor elected to the upper house. The two deputies from Chelyabinsk *oblast'* were elected on 15 May 1993. BBC *Summary of World Broadcasts*, SU/1999 B/3.
- ⁸⁹ *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, p. 31.
- ⁹⁰ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 28 December 1993, p. 3.
- ⁹¹ *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, p. 31.
- ⁹² Wendy Slater, 'The Diminishing Center of Russian Parliamentary Politics', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 17, 29 April 1994, p. 13.
- ⁹³ See Vera Tolz, 'Russia's New Parliament and Yeltsin: Cooperation Prospects', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 5, 4 February 1994, pp. 1–6.
- ⁹⁴ *Rossiiskie vesti*, 18 December 1993.

- ⁹⁵ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 December 1993, p. 1.
- ⁹⁶ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, p. 2.
- ⁹⁷ *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 68–80; Vera Tolz, 'Russia's Parliamentary Elections: What Happened and Why', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 2, 14 January 1994, 4.
- ⁹⁸ *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 52–66.
- ⁹⁹ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 December 1993, p. 1.
- ¹⁰⁰ An interpretation of the results put forward, for example, by the Russian Academy of Sciences, Economics Section, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 3 February 1994, pp. 1, 4.
- ¹⁰¹ *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 52–66.
- ¹⁰² Cf. A. Zubov & V. Kolosov, 'Chto ishchet Rossiya?', *Polis*, 2, 1994, pp. 93–112.
- ¹⁰³ E.g. in three out of four single-member constituencies in Novosibirsk *oblast'* Russia's Choice candidates were opposed by Democratic Russia nominees.
- ¹⁰⁴ Opinion surveys reveal that support for Russia's Choice peaked in early November and fell steadily thereafter, *Moscow News*, 47, 19 November 1993, p. 1.
- ¹⁰⁵ The LDPR (in contrast to Russia's Choice) made effective use of its financial resources, while support for the CPRF, the APR and Women of Russia was less susceptible to the vicissitudes of campaigning and less dependent on financial factors. *Segodnya*, 28 December 1993.
- ¹⁰⁶ This, at least, was Yavlinsky's view, *Moskovskie novosti*, 52, 31 December 1993, p. A9.
- ¹⁰⁷ An interview on the eve of the elections revealed Gaidar's exasperation with the failure of the democrats to unite, *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 11 December 1993, pp. 1–4.
- ¹⁰⁸ This view is supported by Russian political scientists. For example, Vyacheslav Nikonov argued that 'if the reformist forces had not divided into openly pro-presidential and a democratic opposition, the result of the elections would have been even more painful', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 28 December 1993, p. 1; see also Vladislav Chernov, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 December 1993, p. 2.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 52–4.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹¹ Cf. Slater, 'The Diminishing Center of Russian Parliamentary Politics', pp. 13–18.
- ¹¹² Peter Lentini, 'Zhirinovskiy is a Cause for Alarm', *The Prague Post*, 5–11 January 1994, p. 17.
- ¹¹³ *Russkaya mysl'*, 4011, 6–12 January 1994, p. 3.
- ¹¹⁴ The figure for Russia's Choice was 56% and for Yabloko 37%. *Segodnya*, 25 December 1993, p. 2.
- ¹¹⁵ The APR was strongest in Bashkortostan, taking 24.76% of the vote, while the CPRF gained an astonishing 54% in Dagestan. *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 52–54.
- ¹¹⁶ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 14 December 1993, p. 1.
- ¹¹⁷ Stanislav Kondrashev, *Izvestiya*, 16 December 1993, p. 4.
- ¹¹⁸ *Pravda*, 17 June 1991, p. 1. In June 1991 Al'bert Makashov received 3.7% (2.97 million votes), representing potential Zhirinovskiy supporters.
- ¹¹⁹ Peter Lentini & Troy McGrath, 'The Rise of the Liberal Democratic Party and the 1993 Elections', *The Harriman Institute Forum*, 7, 6 February 1994, pp. 1–2.
- ¹²⁰ A. Sobyaniin & V. Sukhovol'sky, *Segodnya*, 10 March 1994; Arkadii Murashev, *Russkaya mysl'*, 4023, 31 March 1994, p. 8; Kronid Lyubarsky, *Novoe vremya*, 7, 1994, pp. 8–12.
- ¹²¹ This was the view of Aleksandr Saburov, the head of a presidential analytical group. *Russkaya mysl'*, 4010, 23 December 1993, p. 7.
- ¹²² *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 52–66.
- ¹²³ In Estonia about 4000 of Narva's 11 500 Russians participated, and of these 60% voted for the LDPR. Villu Kand, 'Estonia: A Year of Challenges', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 1, 7 January 1994, p. 94.
- ¹²⁴ Social-psychological analysis of the elections, Russian Academy of Management, Moscow, 24 December 1993.
- ¹²⁵ These findings were by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM), *Izvestiya*, 30 December 1993, p. 4. For a more detailed analysis, see V. Shokarev & A. Levinson, 'Elektorat Zhirinovskogo', *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, 2, 1994, pp. 30–33.
- ¹²⁶ However, only 36% of officers voted for the LDPR, but 80% of warrant officers, *Novaya ezhdnevnyaya gazeta*, 24 December 1993, p. 1.
- ¹²⁷ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 21 December 1993, p. 1.
- ¹²⁸ Leontii Byzov, 'Novaya faza politicheskogo krizisa ili povorot k stabilizatsii?', *Konstitutsionnyi vestnik*, 17, 1994, p. 83.
- ¹²⁹ Boris Grushin's *Mir mnenie i mnenie o mire* failed to mention the LDPR as a serious challenger until well into the campaign, while a VTsIOM poll in mid-November gave the LDPR only

3.5% (*Segodnya*, 25 November 1993, p. 1) and another VTsIOM poll gave the LDPR only 2% (*Moskovskie novosti*, 49, 5 December 1993, p. A9). For an analysis of the polls, see Amy Corning, 'Public Opinion and the Russian Parliamentary Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2, 48, 3 December 1993, pp. 16–23; also 'How Pundits got it Wrong in Russia', *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 21 January 1994, pp. 14–15.

¹³⁰ E.g. polls conducted by Vladimir Amelin in Moscow *oblast'*, mimeo.

¹³¹ VTsIOM findings were made available to political leaders in the days before the election. *Segodnya*, 11 December 1993, p. 1.

¹³² Cf. Leonid Sedov, 'Mezhdru putchem i vyborami', *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny*, 1, 1994, pp. 14–15.

¹³³ *Polis*, 6, 1993, pp. 74–75.

¹³⁴ Cf. Elizabeth Teague, 'North-South Divide: Yeltsin and Russia's Provincial Leaders', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2, 47, 26 November 1993.

¹³⁵ See Elizabeth Teague, 'Russia's Local Elections Begin', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 7, February 1994, pp. 1–4.

¹³⁶ *Segodnya*, 10 February 1994, p. 2.

¹³⁷ *Rossiiskie vesti*, 15 December 1993, p. 1. There were 161 candidates for the new Duma, 78 of whom had been deputies in the old Moscow soviet or *raion* soviets, which had also been dissolved in October. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 December 1993, p. 2. A total of 3704 806 out of 6 873 153 registered voters (50.97%) participated. *Moskovskaya pravda*, 17 December 1993, p. 1.

¹³⁸ E.g. in Penza *oblast'*, *Izvestiya*, 2 February 1994, p. 1.

¹³⁹ *Segodnya*, 22 March 1994, p. 2.

¹⁴⁰ *Izvestiya*, 3 February 1994, p. 1.

¹⁴¹ The CEC was required to publish full results within ten days after the election, and if that was not possible, then within a month. The official results were published by the CEC only after two months, in *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 15 February 1994.

¹⁴² *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, p. 28.

¹⁴³ See Vera Tolz & Julia Wishnevsky, 'Election Queries Make Russians Doubt Democratic Process', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 13, 1 April 1994, pp. 1–6.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Aleksandr Minkin, *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 11 January 1994, p. 1, and *Pravda*, 28 December 1993, p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ The criticisms are made by Kronid Lyubarsky, *Novoe vremya*, 9 March 1994, pp. 10–13.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Wendy Slater, 'Russia's Plebiscite on a New Constitution', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 3, 21 January 1994, pp. 1–7.

¹⁴⁷ Ryabov, moreover, admitted that falsification of returns had taken place in Amur *oblast'*, and the case went to court. *Izvestiya*, 4 May 1994, p. 4.

¹⁴⁸ Tolz & Wishnevsky, 'Election Queries', p. 2.

¹⁴⁹ Kronid Lyubarsky, *Novoe vremya*, 7, 1994, pp. 8–12; see also an interview with him in *Ogonek*, 6–7, February 1994, pp. 6–7.

¹⁵⁰ Sobyenin's commission derived its findings by extrapolating from detailed samplings of some regional results and estimated that approximately 3.5 million votes were falsified at the ward level and some 5.7 million at the level of the *okrug* electoral commissions. They alleged three types of fraud: 'classic' falsification by stuffing ballot boxes with extra voting papers; falsification of a new type by *okrug* electoral commissions overstating voter turnout, something made possible by the abolition of the intermediate *raion* and city electoral commissions; and mistakes by the CEC in summing up the party list data from the 94 000 ward electoral commissions. The commission thus drew the line at actually accusing the Kremlin or other officials. *Izvestiya*, 4 May 1994, p. 4.

¹⁵¹ On 5 May Vladimir Mezhenkov, a spokesman for the president, stated that the findings would lead to neither new parliamentary elections nor a referendum on the constitution, *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 2–6 May 1994, p. 5. Moreover, the methodology on which the findings were based, Pareto sampling techniques, was challenged. El'tsin's chief of staff, Sergei Filatov, insisted that Sobyenin's group had nothing to do with the presidential administration, and condemned their findings as a 'provocation'. *Russkaya mysl'*, 4029, 12 May 1994, p. 7.

¹⁵² 'O merakh po sovershenstvovaniyu izbiratel'noi sistemy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 31 December 1993, p. 6. A working group of 35 specialists and politicians headed by A. V. Ivanchenko, deputy director of the CEC, was established on 19 January 1994 to work on the new electoral law, *Byulleten' TsIK*, 12, 1994, pp. 105–112.

¹⁵³ *Izvestiya*, 4 May 1994, p. 4.

¹⁵⁴ Andranik Migranyan, 'Avtoritarnyi rezhim v Rossii: kakovy perspektivy?', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4 November 1993, pp. 1, 2; 'Mayatnik ne ostanovilsya v tsentre', *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 29

December 1993, p. 1; and see Igor Klyamkin, 'Kakoi avtoritarnyi rezhim vozmozhen segodnya v Rossii', *Polis*, 5, 1993, pp. 49–54.

¹⁵⁵ Nikolai Medvedev, for example, stressed the 'lumpenisation' of the Russian population, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 29 December 1993, p. 5.

¹⁵⁶ Vladimir Babenko, Head of Administration in Tambov *oblast'*, *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 29 December 1993, p. 2.

¹⁵⁷ *Novoe vremya*, 5, February 1994, pp. 18–20.

¹⁵⁸ *Kuranty*, 14 December 1993, p. 1.

¹⁵⁹ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 December 1993, p. 1.

¹⁶⁰ See Mary Cline, 'Nizhnii Novgorod: A Regional View of the Russian Elections', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 4, 28 January 1994, pp. 48–54.

¹⁶¹ Material on Novosibirsk *oblast'* from Grigorii V. Golosov, Central European University, mimeo.