

international tensions (as with Peru/Ecuador in 1939/1941 or with Chile/Argentina in the 1970s). On the other hand, Washington has been willing to use military force itself, to support or actively promote the use of force by others (as in Central America in the 1980s), and to resist multilateral security arrangements both regionally and within the UN that would seriously curb its traditional unilateralism. The end of the Cold War has done little to alter this historical pattern. Finally, there is the difficult question of civil wars and social violence. Partly because of the relative success of state- and nation-building and the absence of secessionist movements; and partly because of the lack of the kinds of international involvement that characterized Central America in the 1980s, most of this violence is contained within the borders of states. Yet the levels of violence have been very high (165,000 killed in Colombia in the 1980s alone). If, as Deutsch originally argued, security communities have to do with groups of *people*, as well as collectivities, integrated to the point that they will not fight each other, then it becomes impossible to hide behind the distinction between international wars and other forms of social conflict. Precisely how one deals with the relationship between social and international violence is not clear. Yet continued high levels of social conflict and the privatization of violence provides a further reason for doubting the existence of even a loosely coupled security community.

Conclusion

Although no doubt possessing common attributes and sharing an "elective affinity," the Latin American case provides important grounds for doubting that regional "anarchies" are everywhere alike or that we can meaningfully talk of a Westphalian system whose essence remains unchanged and whose logic applies universally. Security communities are not illusions, deceptive islands of peace in a self-help system whose logic carries with it the ever present danger of a return to war and conflict. This chapter has argued that a loosely coupled, if still imperfect, security community can be identified within Mercosur, built around the changes that have taken place in the core relationship between Brazil and Argentina. It is a bounded community, with Chile's position still ambiguous and with the rest of South America still beset by a range of traditional and non-traditional security challenges.

This chapter has also argued that the move away from rivalry and

conflict between Brazil and Argentina cannot be reduced either to power considerations or to a narrow set of issue-specific, instrumentally driven cooperative moves. Rather the process of cooperation challenges both neorealist and neoliberal theories, highlighting by contrast: first, the critical importance of the historical construction of states and of historically specific patterns of interaction; secondly, the ways in which a series of separate but parallel shifts in interests and identities facilitated cooperation; thirdly, the extent to which these shifts were the product of both domestic and international factors and were reflected in, and powerfully reinforced by, the on-going process of interaction and the creation of institutionalized cooperation; but, finally, the way in which barriers to cooperation need to be understood as much as the product of continued divergent identities as of material obstacles and disincentives.

Notes

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- 1 Twentieth century interstate wars in South America consist of: Bolivia-Paraguay, 1931/35 (Chaco War); Peru-Colombia, 1932 (Leticia War); Peru-Ecuador, 1939-41, 1981, 1995; Britain-Argentina, 1982 (Falklands-Malvinas War).
- 2 Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.
- 3 Robert N. Burr, "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 35, 1 (February 1955), p. 98.
- 4 Some recent accounts seriously underplay the extent of previous conflict and hence the difficulties of rapprochement. Reiss, for example, mistakenly believes that the two countries had never seen each other as enemies or even adversaries. Mitchell Reiss, *Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1995), p. 52.
- 5 Because of military fears and suspicions, the first direct bridge between the two countries was not built until 1938.
- 6 Both quoted in Stanley E. Hilton, "The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly* 100, 1 (Spring 1985), pp. 32 and 34.
- 7 For the classic study of this subject see E. Bradford Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

- 8 Geopolitical rhetoric could not be further from the language of security communities. To give a flavour taken from Brazil's most influential geopolitician, Golbery do Couto e Silva: "The insecurity of the citizen within the nation and the insecurity of one state in relation to the others, the omnipresent vision of war - civil war, subversive war or international war - dominate the world of our time ..." *A Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1967), p. 13.
- 9 On the way in which this image of Argentina's regional role was constructed historically and embedded in the education system and the mental maps of elites see Carlos Escudé, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20 (1988), pp. 139-165.
- 10 Gregory F. Treverton, "Interstate Conflict in Latin America," in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico, eds., *The United States and Latin America in the 1980s* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), p. 582.
- 11 Gordon Mace, "Regional Integration in Latin America: A Long and Winding Road," *International Journal* 43 (Summer 1988), p. 426.
- 12 Jack Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbours* (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 3. Along similar lines see Michael Morris and Victor Millán eds., *Controlling Latin American Conflicts* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983); For a more nuanced and sceptical view, see Walter Little, "International Conflicts in Latin America," *International Affairs* 63, 4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 589-601.
- 13 Joseph S. Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), p. 146.
- 14 On the close coincidences of the worsening of relations with Chile and the course of negotiations over Itaipu, see Moniz Bandeira, *Estado Nacional e Política Internacional na América Latina* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1993), p. 240.
- 15 See Maria Regina Soares de Lima, "The Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy, Trade, and Itaipu," PhD. dissertation, University of Vanderbilt, 1986, especially pp. 395-408.
- 16 See Mónica Serrano, "Brazil and Argentina" in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litvak eds., *Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War* (Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 238-239.
- 17 See Helio Jaguaribe, "Brasil-Argentina: Breve Análise das Relações de Conflito e Cooperação," in *O Novo Cenário Internacional* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Guanabara, 1986).
- 18 The relationship between balance of power discourse and the language of fraternal cooperation is often very close and Hilton provides many examples of what one might call the strategic use of cooperative security discourse on the part of the Brazilians. Thus Rio Branco in 1909: "We should treat Argentina with real fraternity, but without neglecting our defenses for a single moment." Or Vargas in 1934: "Our policy has been one of cordial friendship with Argentina. We should continue it, but we need to take military precautions." Hilton, "The Argentine Factor," pp. 36

- and 37. For details on post-war moves to cooperation see Juan Archibaldo Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle, Política Exterior Argentina, 1945-1980* (Buenos Aires, Emecé, 1984), chap. 4, and Bandeira, *Estado Nacional*, chaps. 5 and 6.
- 19 On the use of additional assumptions to salvage realist arguments, see Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20, 1 (Summer 1995), p. 78.
- 20 Joseph S. Tulchin, "Una perspectiva histórica de la política argentina frente al Brasil," *Estudios Internacionales* 13, 52 (Oct./Dec. 1980), p. 464.
- 21 On the details of this process see Sonia de Camargo, "Caminhos que se juntam e se separam: Brasil e Argentina, uma visão comparativa," *Política e Estratégia* 10, 3 (1986), pp. 372-403; and Sonia de Camargo, "Brasil e Argentina: A integração em questão," *Contexto Internacional* 9 (1989), pp. 45-62.
- 22 See Reiss, *Brialled Ambition*, especially pp. 54-58; and Thierry Riga, "Une approche coopérative de la non-prolifération nucléaire: l'exemple de l'Argentine et du Brésil," Working Paper no. 29 (New York and Geneva: UNIDIR, 1994).
- 23 For details of the evolution of the nuclear relationship, see Monica Hirst and Héctor Eduardo Bocco, "Cooperação nuclear e integração Brasil-Argentina," *Contexto Internacional* 9 (1989), pp. 63-78. See also Thomas Guedes da Costa, "A Idéia de Medidas de Confiança Mútua em uma Visão Brasileira," *Contexto Internacional* 14, 2 (1990), pp. 297-308.
- 24 Philippe C. Schmitter, "Change in Regime Type and Progress in International Relations," in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., *Progress in Post War International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 96.
- 25 See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38.
- 26 See Monica Hirst, "La Dimension Política del Mercosur: Politización e Ideología," FLACSO, Buenos Aires, Serie de Documentos (November 1995).
- 27 This argument is made by David R. Mares, "Equilibrios Estratégicos y Medidas de Confianza Mutua en América Latina: La historia de una relación ambigua y compleja," in Francisco Rojas Aravena, ed., *Balanco Estratégico y Medidas de Confianza Mutua* (Santiago: FLACSO/Woodrow Wilson Center, 1996).
- 28 On the limits and weaknesses of the non-proliferation regime as it affects Brazil and Argentina, see Serrano, "Brazil and Argentina," pp. 242-247.
- 29 Roberto Russell, "Los ejes estructurantes de la política exterior Argentina," *América Latina/Internacional* 1, 2 (1994), pp. 5-26.
- 30 See Augusto Varas and Claudio Fuentes, *Defensa Nacional, Chile 1990-1994* (Santiago: Libros Flaco, 1994), esp. ch. 5.
- 31 See Augusto Varas and Isaac Caro eds., *Medidas de Confianza Mutua en América Latina* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1994), especially chaps. 6 and 9.

- 32 For an assessment of regional initiatives see Carl Kayesen et al., *Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean* (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994).
- 33 One might want to salvage some notion of security cooperation by highlighting the degree to which the Peru/Ecuador conflict illustrates a particular pattern of limited border conflict: the use of force not designed to seize large areas of territory or to "win," but rather as a diplomatic instrument to force the issue back onto the agenda and to try and win concessions at the diplomatic negotiations that, as both sides know, will inevitably follow. There is, then, a clear willingness to use force, but this is a limited conception of force within a strong diplomatic culture. Indeed the importance of the Latin American predilection for international law is not that it obviates conflict but that it may provide a framework for its management and limitation.
- 34 For an analysis of the increased activity, see Andres Fontana, "Seguridad Cooperativa: Tendencias Globales y Oportunidades Para El Continente Americano," Working Paper, ISEN, Buenos Aires, May 1996.