
Security Regimes

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Security regimes

Robert Jervis

Can the concept of regime be fruitfully applied to issues of national security? As Viotti and Murray have pointed out, it is anomalous to have a concept that explains phenomena in some parts of the field but lacks utility in others.¹ At the very least, we should be able to understand the differences among various aspects of international politics that account for this discrepancy.

By a security regime I mean, in parallel with the other discussions in this volume, those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate. This concept implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest. To comply with a robber's demand to surrender money is not to participate in a regime even if the interaction occurs repeatedly and all participants share the same expectations. Similarly, the fact that neither superpower attacks the other is a form of cooperation, but not a regime. The links between the states' restraint and their immediate self-interest are too direct and unproblematic to invoke the concept.

I would like to thank the participants at the meeting to discuss this volume, held in Palm Springs, California, in February 1981, for their comments on an earlier draft.

¹ Paul Viotti and Douglas Murray, "International Security Regimes: On the Applicability of a Concept," paper delivered at the August 1980 meeting of the American Political Science Association. For other attempts to apply the concept of security regimes, see Randy Rydell and Athanassios Platias, "International Security Regimes: The Case of a Balkan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone," paper delivered at the March 1981 meeting of the International Studies Association, and Dan Caldwell, "Inter-State Security Regimes: The Soviet-American Case," paper presented at the September 1981 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

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Why security is different

If patterns of international relations can be explained by the distribution of military and economic power among the states, then the concept of regime will not be useful. But if the connections between outcomes and national power are indirect and mediated, there is more room for choice, creativity, and institutions to restrain and regulate behavior, and to produce a regime. Although the research in both security and nonsecurity areas on these points is far from definitive, it appears that the connections are less direct in non-security areas.

Prisoners' dilemma dynamics in security and nonsecurity areas

This is not to say that the politics of security is completely different from the politics of trade, sea-bed exploitation, or international communication. In all these areas a frequent problem is that unrestrained competition can harm all the actors. The obvious model is the prisoners' dilemma, in which the rational pursuit of self-interest leads to a solution that is not Pareto-optimal. When this model applies, states will benefit by setting up rules and institutions to control the competition among them.

Both the incentives for establishing such regimes and the obstacles to so doing are especially great in the security arena because of the "security dilemma." As Herz and Butterfield have pointed out,² many of the policies that are designed to increase a state's security automatically and inadvertently decrease the security of others. Security regimes are thus both especially valuable and especially difficult to achieve—valuable, because individualistic actions are not only costly but dangerous; difficult to achieve, because the fear that the other is violating or will violate the common understanding is a potent incentive for each state to strike out on its own even if it would prefer the regime to prosper.

These dynamics, of course, can be present in nonsecurity areas. Tariff wars can be seen as analogous to arms races, beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies look like attempts to gain short-run security, the despoiling of the global commons resembles a war that both sides hoped to avoid. But four differences remain. First, security issues often involve greater competitiveness than do those involving economics.³ If one state cheats or is a free rider

² John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2 (January 1950): 157–80; Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London: Collins, 1950), pp. 19–20. For elaboration see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 62–83, and Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167–214.

³ This line of argument suggests that the crucial variable is the degree of conflict of interest, not the content of the issue. Some security issues engender less conflict than some economic issues, and an examination of such cases might prove fruitful. When we study security, however, our attention is usually drawn to areas of high conflict.

in an economic regime, it may be better off, and the others worse off, than would have been the case had it cooperated. But the very fact that one state is better off does not make the others worse off. When the security dilemma operates, however, the conflicts between states' security can be inherent. Because military power meets its test in clashes between states, it is relative, not absolute.⁴ The second difference is linked to this problem: offensive and defensive security motives often lead to the same behavior. Whether wanting to ensure that the status quo is not altered to its detriment or wanting to change it in its favor, the state may seek arms that threaten others. The problem is often less severe in nonsecurity questions, where the state can usually prepare for the danger that others will seek to take advantage of its restraint without automatically impinging on others. Here protection, like the purchasing of insurance, is costly, but it does not necessarily harm or menace others, as it usually does in the security area.

A third difference in the operation of prisoners' dilemma dynamics in the security and nonsecurity areas is that the stakes are higher in the former. Not only is security the most highly valued goal because it is a prerequisite for so many things, but the security area is unforgiving. Small errors can have big consequences, and so the costs of living up to the rules of a regime while others are not are great. Temporarily falling behind others can produce permanent harm.

Fourth, detecting what others are doing and measuring one's own security are difficult. Tariff increases, monetary manipulations, and illegal fishing activities can sometimes be disguised, but they are usually more transparent than are military laboratories. Similarly, while the effects of actions in nonsecurity areas are not entirely clear, they are usually clearer than analogous military activities. No one knows exactly what will happen to the stock of fish under various agreements, or knows the consequences of cheating. The relationship between tariffs and the health of countries' economies is also uncertain. But uncertainty is greater in the security area. In many cases the state does not know in advance who its allies and enemies will be. Even if it does know this, it can rarely predict with confidence the outcome of war. The surprising course of the Iran-Iraq war is just the latest case in which observers and at least some participants made strikingly incorrect assessments. Of course, not all wars have surprising outcomes. But enough do to make statesmen realize that what looks an adequate guarantee of their security may not prove to be so if it is put to the test, thus increasing the pressures on statesmen to be less restrained in the pursuit of additional protection.

The primacy of security, its competitive nature, the unforgiving nature of the arena, and the uncertainty of how much security the state needs and has, all compound the prisoners' dilemma and make it sharper than the problems that arise in most other areas. Furthermore, decision makers usu-

⁴ Nuclear weapons have changed this.

ally react by relying on unilateral and competitive modes of behavior rather than by seeking cooperative solutions. Both courses of action are dangerous; each of these strategies has worked in some cases and failed in others. But statesmen usually think they should “play it safe” by building positions of greater strength; rarely do they consider seriously the possibility that such a policy will increase the danger of war instead of lessening it. The result is that security regimes, with their call for mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral actions, rarely seem attractive to decision makers.

One interesting question is raised but not answered by this analysis. To what extent do we need to examine decision-making variables to account for the difficulties of regime formation? The security dilemma creates the main impediment to effective security regimes, but what is the impact of the beliefs outlined above? Can they be altered without a change in the structure of the international system? Do decision makers misunderstand international politics—perhaps because of the teachings of Realist scholars—and so follow less than optimal policies? Some decision makers seem oblivious to the fact that increasing their arms can have undesired and unintended consequences. If such leaders are in power, the chances for developing a security regime will be decreased, not by the structure of the situation but by the ignorance of the actors. Furthermore, even sophisticated statesmen tend to underestimate the degree to which their actions harm others, and so they both take actions they might not have taken had they understood the consequences and also misinterpret others’ reactions as evidence of unprovoked hostility.⁵ These errors reinforce reliance on unilateral actions rather than cooperative arrangements and could, in principle, be altered by a better understanding of international politics. But given the range of statesmen who have opted for relatively unrestrained policies, one must wonder whether in practice it would be possible to alter their beliefs in a way that would produce greater cooperation.

Conditions for forming a security regime

What conditions are most propitious for the formation and maintenance of a security regime? First, the great powers must want to establish it—that is, they must prefer a more regulated environment to one in which all states behave individualistically. This means that all must be reasonably satisfied with the status quo and whatever alterations can be gained without resort to the use or threat of unlimited war, as compared with the risks and costs of less restrained competition. One could not have formed a security regime with Hitler’s Germany, a state that sought objectives incompatible with those of the other important states and that would not have been willing to

⁵ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, pp. 69–72, 88–89, 95–96, 352–55.

sacrifice those objectives for a guarantee that the others would leave it secure in the borders it had attained.

Second, the actors must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation—if a state believes it is confronted by a Hitler, it will not seek a regime. In principle this is simple enough; in practice, determining whether others are willing to forgo the chance of forcible expansion is rarely easy. Indeed, decision makers probably overestimate more than underestimate others' aggressiveness.⁶ This second condition is not trivial: in several cases security regimes may have been ruled out not by the fact that a major power was an aggressor but by the fact that others incorrectly perceived it as an aggressor.

Third, and even more troublesome, even if all major actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion. Statesmen may deny that moderate and cooperative policies can protect them. This belief may be rooted in a general analysis of politics that is common in energetic powers: "That which stops growing begins to rot," in the words of a minister of Catherine the Great.⁷ Similarly, in 1812 an American politician argued: "I should not wish to extend the boundary of the United States by war if Great Britain would leave us the quiet enjoyment of independence; but considering her deadly and implacable enmity, and her continued hostilities, I shall never die contented until I see her expulsion from North America."⁸ This perspective may be a reflection of something close to paranoia, perhaps brought about by long experience with strong enemies. In the interwar period France did not believe that Germany could be conciliated. The belief was less the product of an analysis of specific German governments and leaders than it was the result of the historically-induced fear that Germany was ineradicably hostile and that French security therefore depended on having clear military superiority.

Thus France could only be secure if Germany were insecure. The security dilemma here operated not as the unintended consequence of policy but rather as its object.

Again, the question of the extent to which decision makers' beliefs are independent and autonomous causes of the problem can be raised but not answered. In some cases beliefs are rooted in an accurate appreciation of the effects of military technology, as we will discuss shortly. But in other cases the roots are less easy to trace and may be susceptible to alteration without basic changes in the domestic or external environment.

The fourth condition for the formation of a regime is a truism today: war

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 73–75, 218–20, 340–41, 350–51.

⁷ Quoted in Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 5.

⁸ Robert Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire 1767–1821* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 166. See *ibid.*, p. 389, for a similar justification for pushing the Spanish out of Florida.

and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly. If states believe that war is a good in itself (e.g., because it weeds out the less fit individuals and nations), they will not form a regime to prevent it, although it would still be possible for them to seek one that would impose certain limits on fighting. If states think that building arms is a positive good (e.g., because it supports domestic industries), there will be no incentives to cooperate to keep arms spending down. If states think that arms procurement and security policies can be designed carefully enough so that there is little chance of unnecessary wars, then a major reason to avoid individualistic policies disappears. If hostility in the security area is not believed to spill over into hostility in economic issues, or if decreased cooperation in that sphere is not viewed as a cost, then an important incentive for cooperation will be absent. While it is rare for all these conditions to be met, in some eras the major ones are, thus reducing the pressures to form security regimes.

The possibility for regimes is also influenced by variables that directly bear on the security dilemma. As I have discussed elsewhere,⁹ it is not always true that individualistic measures which increase one state's security decrease that of others. It depends on whether offensive measures differ from defensive ones and on the relative potency of offensive and defensive policies. If defensive measures are both distinct and potent, individualistic security policies will be relatively cheap, safe, and effective and there will be less need for regimes. When the opposite is the case—when offensive and defensive weapons and policies are indistinguishable and when attacking is more effective than defending—status quo powers have a great need for a regime, but forming one will be especially difficult because of the strong fear of being taken advantage of. The most propitious conditions for regime formation, then, are the cases in which offensive and defensive weapons and policies are distinguishable but the former are cheaper and more effective than the latter, or in which they cannot be told apart but it is easier to defend than attack. In either of these worlds the costs or risks of individualistic security policies are great enough to provide status quo powers with incentives to seek security through cooperative means, but the dangers of being taken by surprise by an aggressor are not so great as to discourage the states from placing reliance on joint measures.

The Concert of Europe as a security regime

An analysis of the best example of a security regime—the Concert of Europe that prevailed from 1815 to 1823 and, in attenuated form, until the Crimean War—should provide a complementary perspective to this theoretical discussion. In this era the great powers behaved in ways that sharply diverged from normal “power politics.” They did not seek to

⁹ Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.”

maximize their individual power positions, they did not always take advantage of others' temporary weaknesses and vulnerabilities, they made more concessions than they needed to, and they did not prepare for war or quickly threaten to use force when others were recalcitrant. In short, they moderated their demands and behavior as they took each other's interests into account in setting their own policies. As one scholar notes, "nineteenth-century diplomatic history furnishes several examples of states forgoing gains which they could probably have gotten. . . . Few similar instances can be cited in the eighteenth or the twentieth centuries."¹⁰

Of course the Concert did not banish conflict. But it did regulate it. War was not thought to be likely and states rarely threatened to use this ultimate sanction. The actors were aware of the shift; a Prussian scholar and diplomat described the system, albeit in exaggerated terms, as follows:

The five great powers, closely united among themselves and with the others, for a system of solidarity, by which one stands for all and all for one; in which power appears only as protection for everybody's possessions and rights; in which the maintenance of the whole and the parts within legal bounds, for the sake of the peace of the world, has become the only aim of political activity; in which one deals openly, deliberates over everything collectively and acts jointly.¹¹

Castlereagh, perhaps the most articulate exponent of the Concert, employed his circular dispatch of 1816 to instruct his representatives abroad to work for a new diplomacy in both substance and procedure:

You will invite [the sovereigns to which you are accredited] in the spirit which has so happily carried the Alliance through so many difficulties, to adopt an open and direct mode of intercourse in the conduct of business, and to repress on all sides, as much as possible, the spirit of local intrigue in which diplomatic policy is so falsely considered to consist, and which so frequently creates the very evil which it is intended to avert. . . .

His [Royal Highness'] only desire is, and must be, to employ all His influence to preserve the peace, which in concert with His Allies he has won.

To this great end you may declare that all His Royal Highness' efforts will be directed; to this purpose all minor considerations will be made subordinate; wherever His voice can be heard, it will be raised to discourage the pursuit of secondary and separate interests at the hazard of that general peace and goodwill, which, after so long a period of suf-

¹⁰ Richard Elrod, "The Concert of Europe," *World Politics* 28 (January 1976), p. 168. Elrod attributes this to the damage that lack of restraint would have done to the states' "moral position." I think this is too narrow a focus. Paul Schroeder argues that while most statesmen of this period, even Czar Alexander, were willing to eschew policies of narrow national interest in favor of maintaining the Concert, Metternich generally manipulated the latter to serve the former. See his *Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 238, 251–52, 256, 265.

¹¹ Quoted in Carsten Holbrad, *The Concert of Europe* (London: Longman, 1970), p. 37.

fering it should be the object of all the Sovereigns of Europe to preserve to their people.

To effectuate this, it ought to be the study of every public servant abroad, more especially of the Greater States, whose example must have the most extensive influence, to discourage that spirit of petty intrigue and perpetual propagation of alarm, upon slight evidence and antient jealousies, which too frequently disgrace the diplomatic profession, and often render the residence of Foreign ministers the means of disturbing rather than preserving harmony between their respective Sovereigns.¹²

When Canning, Castlereagh's successor as Foreign Secretary, broke with the Concert in 1822 over intervention to suppress the Spanish revolution, he noted the contrast: "Things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all!"¹³

This is not to deny that each state in the Concert placed primary value on its own security and welfare and did not care much about others' well-being as an end in itself. What is crucial, however, is that "self-interest" was broader than usual, in that statesmen believed that they would be more secure if the other major powers were also more secure. Others were seen as partners in a joint endeavor as well as rivals, and unless there were strong reasons to act to the contrary their important interests were to be respected. Indeed it was not only the individual states that were treated with some respect, but the collectivity of Europe as a whole. There was a sense that the fates of the major powers were linked, that Europe would thrive or suffer together.

The self-interest followed was also longer-run than usual. Much of the restraint adopted was dependent on each statesman's belief that if he moderated his demands or forebore to take advantage of others' temporary weakness, they would reciprocate. For this system to work, each state had to believe that its current sacrifices would in fact yield a long-run return, that others would not renege on their implicit commitments when they found themselves in tempting positions. This implies the belief that conflicts of interest could be limited and contained by shared interests, including the interest in maintaining the regime.

Because cooperation was much greater than usual, diplomatic procedures involved more consultation and openness and less duplicity than usual.¹⁴ The power of these norms is shown in the reaction to their being broken, as Metternich broke them when he ended a stalemate at the Confer-

¹² Quoted in Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1822* (London: G. Bell, 1963), 2: 510-11.

¹³ Quoted in Walter Alison Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe* (New York: Fertig, 1966), p. 183.

¹⁴ For a good discussion of the mutual reinforcing relationships between cooperative processes and cooperation as a substantive outcome, see Morton Deutsch, "Fifty Years of Conflict," in *Retrospections on Social Psychology*, ed. by Leon Festinger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

ence of Troppau by presenting Britain and France with a *fait accompli* in the form of an agreement with Russia and Prussia on intervention in Italy. Metternich's was a standard tactic of normal diplomacy—Britain and France had been blocking his policy and he simply moved to line up support for his position behind their backs. But in the context of the Concert, such deception was not expected. When the British ambassador discovered what was happening “his amazement and indignation were therefore immense,” and Castlereagh shared his anger.¹⁵

The Concert was supported by the shared stake that the major powers had in avoiding war. They had just lived through an enormously destructive series of wars and were acutely aware of the costs of armed conflict, which not only destroyed men and wealth but also undermined the social fabric. Conservatives feared that wars would lead to revolution; liberals associated war and preparations for it with autocracy. All feared that high levels of conflict would destroy their security, not enhance it.

Controlling internal instability was another important shared value—although the states differed on how much instability was tolerable and how it should be kept within bounds. The previous era had taught statesmen that revolutions spread abroad and caused wars, two evils that endangered them all. Even Castlereagh argued that an important object of British diplomacy was to make other statesmen “feel that the existing concert is their only perfect security against the revolutionary embers more or less existing in every State of Europe; and that their true wisdom is to keep down the petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in support of the established principles of social order.”¹⁶

Each state, then, had a stake in seeing that none underwent a revolution; as a result the destabilizing of other governments, an unpleasant but not unusual tool of statecraft, was ruled out and states were not likely to desert the Concert when they feared that embarking on an isolated course of action might lead to unrest.¹⁷ Furthermore, to the extent that revolutions were believed to be caused by foreign setbacks, statesmen had reason to see that no major power suffered too serious a diplomatic defeat. To bring one country low could bring them all down. Only in a world in which moderate policies were pursued could statesmen enjoy the fruits of their triumphs.

The regime as a cause of national behavior

Although these conditions and common interests explain why the Concert was formed, what is more important here is that the regime influenced the behavior of the states in ways that made its continuation possible even

¹⁵ Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, 2: 294 and 301.

¹⁶ Quoted in Holbrad, *Concert of Europe*, p. 119.

¹⁷ Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith*, p. 174.

after the initial conditions had become attenuated. The regime was more than a reflection of causally prior variables; it was a force in its own right, exerting influence through four paths. First, the expectation that the Concert could continue to function helped maintain it through the operation of familiar self-fulfilling dynamics. If an actor thinks the regime will disintegrate—or thinks others hold this view—he will be more likely to defect from the cooperative coalition himself. On the other hand, if he believes the regime is likely to last, he will be more willing to “invest” in it (in the sense of accepting larger short-run risks and sacrifices) in the expectation of reaping larger gains in the future. Important here is the expectation that peace could be maintained. For if war were seen as likely, states would have to concentrate on building up their short-run power to prepare for the coming conflict.

Thus part of the explanation for the Concert’s success was that its health was generally seen as quite good. There were no “runs on the bank,” as each state stopped being restrained in the belief that the system would not last long enough for moderation to be reciprocated. We can, to some extent, trace this belief back to the actors’ common interest in continuing cooperation. Although no states were completely satisfied with the Concert, all felt that it was better than the likely alternative arrangements and so placed a high priority on maintaining it. To equate outcomes with intentions usually violates a basic tenet of systems theory; to talk of the goal of systems maintenance often commits the teleological fallacy. But these actors consciously sought the continuation of the Concert and, partly for this reason, it survived many stresses and shocks. Valuing the Concert did not ensure its survival; however, it was important that the participants expected it to survive.

A second way in which the regime perpetuated itself was the greater opposition it was expected to foster against attempts forcibly to change the status quo. In contrast to eras that lacked security regimes, opposition would not be limited to those states immediately affected. Even if the short-run self-interest of a third party called for neutrality or even aid to the aggressor, there were strong incentives for the third party to uphold the Concert. Since others would be joining in the coalition, the third party would not be isolated or forced to carry an excessive share of the burden and, by strengthening the Concert, it would increase the chance that others would come to its aid if it were to become the target of predation. Under the Concert, then, states were discouraged from expansionist moves that would have looked attractive if others were expected to follow individualistic security policies.

The Concert pattern also strengthened itself through the operation of the norm of reciprocity. This norm did more than codify cooperative relationships; it allowed states to cooperate in circumstances under which they would not have been able to do so had the norm been absent. This in turn increased the value of the Concert to the states. Because reciprocity was expected to guide actors’ behavior, statesmen did not fear that if they made concessions in one case, others would see them as weak and expect further

concessions. This is a major obstacle to cooperation, for statesmen are often less concerned with the substance of the issue they are facing than they are with the inferences about them that others will draw from their behavior. If it is believed that states moderate their demands only when they are forced to, then not only are there no positive incentives to be reasonable in the form of expectations of reciprocal moderation but the costs of not pushing as hard as one can extend beyond the loss of position on the issue at stake and encompass the danger that others will see the state as unable to stand up for its interests. Losses then will tend to snowball. Fearing this, states will be reluctant to make concessions, even if doing so would yield to the other benefits that are significantly greater than the short-run costs the state would pay. Under the Concert, by contrast, reasonableness was expected and so making concessions did not lead others to think the state was weak and would retreat in the future. This drastically lowered the risks and costs of cooperative behavior.

This stress on reciprocation may seem to some to be misplaced. After all, even when there is no security regime states often exchange concessions to arrive at an agreement. But in these cases what the states do is make a bargain—the deal is relatively explicit, it is struck only because each side believes it has driven as hard a bargain as it can, the exchange is between identifiable partners, and it is carried out quite swiftly. Under the Concert calculation was less fine and states would support others without knowing exactly when or even from whom their repayment would come. It was expected that others would not take advantage of their temporary problems just as they would not take advantage of others. This pattern greatly widens the opportunities for cooperation. In normally competitive international politics, trades cannot occur unless they are even, direct, and immediate. The possibilities in normal times are much more limited than they were under the Concert, when states would assist others in the expectation that any one of a number of other states would support them over the next several years.

Finally, the regime became an independent factor by developing at least a limited degree of institutionalization. In an age of limited communication and travel, the opportunities for direct conversations among national leaders were rare. When they occurred, they were seized on not only to conduct important business but also to develop an understanding of the personalities and interests driving other states. Formal machinery was lacking, no supranational secretariat was formed, and all decisions and their implementation remained in the hands of national leaders. But coordination was facilitated, and information and expectations were fairly quickly and effectively shared. Furthermore, the representatives to the conferences worked together long and frequently enough to develop “a common outlook distinct from their governments.”¹⁸ Thus the Prussian Foreign Minister noted that the confer-

¹⁸ Charles Webster, *The Art and Practice of Diplomacy* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), p. 67.

ence which established the new state of Belgium “had grown into a sort of European power of itself, the plenipotentiaries who composed it deliberating and acting without instructions and frequently in opposition to the views of their governments.”¹⁹

Demise of the regime

The Concert, of course, did not last forever. By 1823 it had begun to decay, although an unusual degree of concern for others’ important interests remained for another quarter-century. I have neither the space nor the expertise for a full discussion of the demise of the regime, but several causes can at least be noted.

The memories of the ravages of the Napoleonic Wars faded, and with them the main incentives to avoid confrontations. Similarly, the fear of domestic unrest, its links to war, and its contagion also diminished. Although the revolutions of 1848 revived these concerns, they also cut old ties and brought unsocialized leaders to power. Conflicts among the great powers, never far beneath the surface even during the high points of the Concert, came increasingly to the fore. Controlling revolutions, a shared interest, produced conflict because two powers (Britain and France) had much more tolerance for domestic liberty than did the others (Russia, Austria, and Prussia). Furthermore, the former suspected that the latter were using the excuse of suppressing dangerous revolutions as a cover for expanding their own influence. It was thus felt that the Concert was being used to serve narrow and competitive national interests.

It was not only Britain and France that felt aggrieved. Each state was more sharply aware of the sacrifices it had made than it was of others’ restraint. The gains forgone were painfully clear; the losses that others might have inflicted were ambiguous and hypothetical. Each state thought it was paying more than others and more than it was receiving. This was especially troubling since the possibility that it would have to rely on its own resources to protect itself in the future loomed larger as frictions increased. (This difference in countries’ perspectives weakens most regimes, and an obvious question, parallel to the one we have raised previously, is whether it can be ameliorated by greater understanding of the situation.)

Finally, by controlling the risk of war and yet not becoming institutionalized and developing supranational loyalties, the Concert may have contained the seeds of its own destruction. Since world politics did not seem so dangerous, pushing harder seemed sensible to individual states. The structure appeared stable enough to permit states to impose a greater strain on it. But seeking individualistic gains raised doubts in others’ minds as to whether moderation and reciprocation would last, thus giving all states greater incentives to take a narrower and shorter-run perspective.

¹⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*

The balance of power

The balance of power is clearly different from the Concert. Is it also a regime? The answer turns on whether the restraints on state action it involves are norms internalized by the actors or arise from the blocking actions of others and the anticipation of such counteractions.²⁰ Some of the debate between Waltz and Kaplan can be seen in these terms. For Waltz each actor in the balance of power may try to maximize his power; each fails because of the similar efforts of others. The system restrains the actors rather than the actors being self-restrained. Moderation is an unintended result of the clash of narrow self-interests.²¹ Although patterns recur, actors share expectations, and aberrant behavior is curbed by the international system, states do not hold back in the belief that others will do likewise and they do not seek to maintain the system when doing so would be contrary to their immediate interests. It is hard to see how the concept of regime helps explain the behavior that results.

Kaplan's view is different. The kind of balance of power that Waltz describes, Kaplan sees as unstable. As one of his students has put it, "A system containing merely growth-seeking actors will obviously be unstable; there would be no provision for balance or restraint."²² Similarly, Kaplan points out that in his computer model, "if actors do not take system stability requirements into account, a 'balance of power' system will be stable only if some extrasystemic factor. . . . prevents a roll-up of the system."²³ For Kaplan, if the system is to be moderate, the actors must also be moderate (a remarkably antisystemic view). Thus two of Kaplan's six rules call for self-restraint: "Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor," and "Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners. . . ."²⁴ Of most interest here is that for Kaplan these propositions not only describe how states behave, they are rules that consciously guide statesmen's actions: states exercise self-restraint. In one interpretation—and we will discuss another in the next

²⁰ For a different approach to this question, see Richard Ashley, "Balance of Power as a Political-Economic Regime," paper presented at the August 1980 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

²¹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). This corresponds to Claude's "automatic" version of the balance of power (Inis L. Claude Jr., *Power and International Relations* [New York: Random House, 1962], pp. 43–47). Kaplan also expresses this view in one paragraph of his "Balance of Power, Bipolarity, and Other Models of International Systems" (*American Political Science Review* 51 [September 1957], p. 690), but this paragraph is not repeated in *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957) and, as we shall discuss below, is inconsistent with his analysis there.

²² Donald Reinken, "Computer Explorations of the 'Balance of Power,'" in *New Approaches to International Relations*, ed. by Morton Kaplan (New York: St. Martin's, 1968), p. 469. This corresponds to Claude's "manually operated" balance of power (Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp. 48–50).

²³ Morton Kaplan, *Towards Professionalism in International Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 136.

²⁴ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 23.

paragraph—they do so because they seek to preserve the system.²⁵ This would certainly be a regime, indeed one not so different from the Concert.

If restraint follows from the ability to predict that immoderate behavior will call up counterbalancing actions by others, does the resulting pattern form a regime? A state may forgo taking advantage of another not because it expects reciprocation, but because it fears that unless it exercises self-restraint others will see it as a menace, increase their arms, and coalesce against it. This is a possible interpretation of Kaplan's rules. He says that states obey them because, by accepting the restraints that they embody, each state is better off than it would be if it broke them: "Under the governing assumptions, states would follow these rules in order to optimize their own security. Thus there is motivation to observe the rules. . . . There is in this system a general, although not necessarily implacable, identity between short-term and long-term interests."²⁶

This formulation of the rules is a happy and therefore an odd one. It posits no conflict between the narrow self-interest of each state and the maintenance of the regime.²⁷ The rules are self-enforcing. This is a logical possibility and can be illustrated by the incentives to follow traffic laws when traffic is heavy. Here it is to one's advantage to keep to the right and to stop when the light turns red. To do otherwise is to get hit; cheating simply does not pay irrespective of whether others cheat.²⁸ The matter is different when traffic is lighter and cars have more room to maneuver. Then, running a red light or cutting in front of another car does not bring automatic sanctions. Aggressive drivers want others to obey the law while they cut corners. The generally orderly and predictable pattern that facilitates driving is maintained, but they are able to get through a bit faster than the others.

In this interpretation of Kaplan's rules, the states are operating in an environment that resembles heavy traffic.²⁹ They do not have incentives to

²⁵ Kaplan, *Towards Professionalism*, pp. 39, 73, 86. Since states rarely fight wars to the finish and eliminate defeated actors, Kaplan's arguments seem plausible. But this is to confuse result with intent. The desire to maximize power can limit wars and save fallen states. As long as each state views all the others as potential rivals, each will have to be concerned about the power of its current allies. And as long as each views current enemies as potentially acceptable alliance partners in a future war, each will have incentives to court and safeguard the power of states on the other side. To destroy another state may be to deprive oneself of an ally in the future; to carve up a defeated power is to risk adding more strength to potential adversaries than to oneself. Of the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century, a Russian diplomat said: "If the cake could not be saved, it must be fairly divided" (quoted in Edward Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* [New York: Norton, 1967], p. 72). This has it backwards: it was because the cake could not be divided evenly that it had to be preserved. Also see Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 28.

²⁶ Kaplan, *Towards Professionalism*, p. 139; see also pp. 67, 135.

²⁷ This is partly true because Kaplan excludes some of the main problems when he says that his system assumes that none of the major powers seeks to dominate the system (*ibid.*, p. 136).

²⁸ Thomas Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 120–21.

²⁹ This would seem to contradict Kaplan's argument that the international system is subsystem dominant—i.e., that the environment is not so compelling as to foreclose meaningful national choice (Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 17).

take advantage of others' restraint nor do they have to be unrestrained out of the fear that if they are not, others will try to take advantage of them. The dynamics of the security dilemma, the prisoners' dilemma, and public goods, which are so troublesome in situations lacking central authority, are absent. This makes for an unusual systems theory, since these dynamics are a major element in most conceptions of a system. Such a formulation blots out the possibility that all states could be best off if all were moderate, but that each would suffer badly if any of the others were not. It also denies the more likely situation in which each actor prefers taking advantage of others' restraint to mutual cooperation, but prefers mutual cooperation to unrestrained competition. A regime of mutual cooperation is then better for all than no regime, but each actor is constantly tempted to cheat, both to make competitive gains and to protect against others doing so. This is the central problem for most regimes, and indeed for the development of many forms of cooperation. Kaplan has disposed of it in a formula of words, but it is hard to see what arrangement of interests and perceptions could so easily dissolve the difficulties in actual world politics.

Security in the postwar era

It is not clear whether a security regime regulates superpower relations today. Patterns of behavior exist (although it is hard to trace them), but the question is whether they are far enough removed from immediate, narrow self-interest to involve a regime. I think the answer is no, but the subject is so complex that I lack confidence in this judgment. Because of the difficulties involved, I will examine the subject from several directions.

Rules of conduct

Does the fact that a form of cooperation must have been present to have kept the peace between America and Russia for thirty-five years mean that there is a security regime? I think the answer is no because narrow and quite short-run self-interest can account for most of the restraints. To launch a war is to invite one's own destruction; to challenge the other's vital interests is to risk a confrontation one is likely to lose (as the Russians did in Cuba), not to mention the chance of blundering into a war. That each side has more or less respected the other's sphere of influence does not mean that each side has developed the stake in the other's security or the expectation of reciprocity that was found in the Concert. It merely means that each is able to protect what it values most and that each can see that menacing the other's most important concerns entails costs that far outrun the likely gains.

At the May 1972 summit conference in Moscow, the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to a set of rules that look like the foundations for a regime. The text sounded all the right notes: "mutually advantageous development of

their relations," "exercise restraint," "reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit," forgoing "efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other."³⁰ But it seems likely that from the beginning each side had a different conception of the sort of cooperation that might arise. In any case, the use of regime-like language did not yield a regime.

A greater semblance of agreement on rules is manifest in the way superpowers have fought limited wars. In Korea, the U.S. forces did not attack China, while the Communists not only left Japan as a sanctuary but also spared the port of Pusan, which the U.S. used around the clock for its build-up in September 1950. The Communists also used mines only once, when they blocked the port of Wonsan as they evacuated it. It took the U.S. a month to clear the harbor, an unpleasant reminder of what the Communists could do (perhaps designed to help the Americans avoid the common trap of believing that only they were restraining their conduct). In Vietnam, the U.S. refrained from ground attacks against the North, carefully controlled its bombing of the North, respected the Chinese sanctuary, and only toward the end of the war cut maritime supply lines. Whether there was much the North Vietnamese could have done but chose not to do is hard to determine, but the Russians exercised restraint in limiting the weapons they provided to the North.

The implicit rules established in one conflict seem to have some influence as precedent in the next. In Vietnam, the U.S. bombed the North but for most of the war did not interdict supplies coming into that country. Furthermore, both sides treated this situation as expected and almost "natural." This seems to have affected at least the western perceptions of the guerilla war in Afghanistan. The West seems to have understood that the sanctuaries in Pakistan would be respected as long as the military aid being funneled through that country was sharply limited. But if this restraint were loosened, so probably would be that on attacking the bases in Pakistan.

These sorts of arrangements do not constitute a regime. First, most of them are too directly linked to immediate self-interest. Just as neither side launches a war because of fear of retaliation, so most of the outlines if not the details of restraints in a limited war derive from the ability of each state to punish the other if it steps too far out of bounds, and from each's ability to see that the other's restraint depends on its own moderation.

Second, the precedents are neither unambiguous nor binding; they do not specify what aid, activities, and sanctuaries are permitted. China was a sanctuary in the Korean War; why was North Vietnam not a sanctuary during the war in the South? Indeed, one does not have to accept the argument that the North had a legitimate right to aid the Viet Cong because North and South were part of one country to say that the North's participation was less of a violation of norms than was the entry of China into the Korean war. Yet the sanctions levied against her were greater than those inflicted on China.

³⁰ *Historic Documents, 1972* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1973), pp. 442-48.

The direct role of interests and power is apparent. North Vietnam was a small country, fully engaged in the South. There was little it could do in response to American bombing; there was little it was willing to refrain from doing in order to induce the U.S. not to bomb. China, on the other hand, was more powerful and had more options, requiring the U.S. to be more restrained.

A third reason these limits do not constitute a regime is related to the two previous points. States change or break the rules as their power and interests change. Some attention is paid to the way in which these actions break or set precedents, but these concerns rarely dominate when short-run incentives are strong. Thus, after a decade of respecting the Soviet right to supply North Vietnam by sea, the U.S. finally mined Northern harbors in the spring of 1972. This was doubly striking—it both altered a quite well-established rule, and set what might be seen as a dangerous precedent, for it is the U.S., not the Soviet Union, that relies more heavily on keeping the shipping lanes open. But what was most important was defeating the North Vietnamese offensive, even at the cost of potential problems later; and it is far from clear that this cost would be significant. For the Russians ever to block U.S. shipping would be to run very high risks. The precedent set by the American action would matter only if others believed that because the U.S. had interfered with Russian shipping in Vietnam (and, earlier, in the Cuban missile crisis), it would be more likely to permit others to interfere with its ships. This is improbable; the American response—and others' predictions of it—would be largely determined by the degree to which the situation differentially involved the superpowers' important interests. Double standards may be morally uncomfortable, but they are hardly unusual in international politics.

Different conceptions of security

As we noted earlier, a necessary condition for the formation of a security regime is that major actors prefer the status quo—with the potential for modification by uncoerced political changes—to the world of possible gains and possible losses that they expect to flow from the individualistic pursuit of security policies.³¹ It is far from clear that this condition is now met. Do the Russians value the chance of expansionism so much that they would be unwilling to forgo it in order to gain greater peace, stability, and reduced defense budgets? Even if they mainly want security, do they believe it can be provided by cooperation with capitalist powers? As Kennan remarked, the U.S. feels menaced by what the Soviet does; the Soviets feel menaced by

³¹ It is not enough that both sides want to prevent all-out war. Because this outcome can be avoided by the cooperation of only one side, this common interest opens the door to unilateral exploitation as well as to mutual cooperation.

what that U.S. is.³² Can any country that is unable to live with independent trade unions in Poland live with another superpower with a different political and economic system? If the Russians feel secure only to the extent that the U.S. is weak and insecure, the prospects for a security regime are dim. Similar questions can be posed about the United States. Is the U.S. willing to continue to permit changes in the Third World that erode the unprecedented dominance it achieved in the 1950s and 1960s? Do revolutionary changes make it so insecure that it feels it must respond in a way that is likely to create conflict with the Soviets? If it is menaced by a weak Communist state within its sphere of influence, can it accept the Soviet Union as a superpower with legitimate worldwide interests?

Even if both sides' conceptions of their security interests are compatible in principle, military technology and military doctrine may present formidable impediments to the formation of a regime. As mentioned earlier, the security dilemma is compounded when offensive and defensive weapons are indistinguishable and offense is more efficacious. The dilemma is decreased, and even disappears, when the reverse is true. Leaving aside as only a theoretical but not a real possibility a world in which antiballistic missile systems protect cities, American declaratory policy holds that mutual security results from both sides' having second-strike capability. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD is the telling acronym) escapes from the security dilemma as each side gains security not from its ability to protect itself, but from its ability to retaliate and so to deter the other from launching an attack. If both sides followed this doctrine neither would need to expand its nuclear arsenal beyond the point where it could absorb the other's strike and still destroy the other's cities; neither would need to react if the other were to purchase excessive forces. A security regime in the realm of strategic weapons would be easy to obtain, but might not be necessary. Restraint would be easy because the states gain nothing by larger stockpiles, but for this very reason a regime would not be necessary—mutual restraint will result even if the superpowers do not take account of each other's security requirements, look to the long run, or develop rules and expectations of restraint. It would therefore be possible for states to escape from the security dilemma without developing the sorts of cooperative understandings that help ameliorate political conflicts across a broad range of issues. But even if competitive policies were pursued in many areas, and indeed were made safer by the stability of the strategic balance,³³ the achievement of a high degree of mutual security from attack would be no mean feat.

There are, however, two problems with applying this argument to contemporary world politics. First, American procurement and targeting poli-

³² George Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (New York: Mentor, 1962), p. 181.

³³ This is what Glenn Snyder calls the "stability-instability paradox." Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in *The Balance of Power*, ed. by Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965).

cies have never followed the strictures of Mutual Assured Destruction. Instead the U.S. has not consistently shunned postures that provided at least some capabilities for defense. Similarly, American weapons have always been aimed at a wide range of Soviet military targets as well as at Soviet cities.³⁴ President Carter's Presidential Directive 59 of July 1980, which took the position that the U.S. would not target the Soviet population *per se*, was not a change of policy. As early as January 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were arguing that the U.S. did not seek "to destroy large cities *per se*," but "only to attack such targets as are necessary in war in order to impose the national objections of the United States upon the enemy."³⁵ The second problem is more familiar—Russian declaratory policy as well as its military posture seem to reject the logic of MAD. Instead it appears that the Soviets hold more traditional military views, which deny the conflict between deterrence and defense and argue that both are reached through the same posture (being able to do as well as possible in a war). They thus see mutual security as a myth and thereby present us with the military counterpart to the problem discussed above, that a state may believe that its security requires making others insecure. If the Soviets believe that in order to deter American expansionism or cope with an American attack they need the capability to come as close as possible to military victory, then, even if they do not think that their security requires infringing on U.S. vital interests, forming a security regime will be extremely difficult.

This raises two issues. First is the familiar question of the scope for the independent role of beliefs. Can cooperation be increased by persuading the Russians to alter their military doctrine? The U.S. tried in the 1960s. Epitomizing these efforts was Secretary of Defense McNamara's attempt at Glassboro to explain to Prime Minister Kosygin the destabilizing nature of ballistic missile defenses. Similarly, much of the American energy at the start of the SALT negotiations went not into bargaining but into trying to show the Russians that certain outcomes should be seen as the solution to common problems, which would aid both sides. That these efforts failed does not prove that the task is beyond reach, but at this point the burden of proof rests with those who are optimistic. Successful persuasion depends not only on the validity of the logic of the U.S. position but also on how deeply rooted the Russians' views are, and whether the American posture can be seen as a cover for competitive policy. At this writing, the Russians seem closer to persuading the Americans to adopt their views. If they do, both

³⁴ David Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," *Journal of American History* 66 (June 1979): 62–87; Aaron Friedberg, "A History of the U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'—1945 to 1960," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 3 (December 1980): 37–71; Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon* (New York: Knopf, 1980); Desmond Ball, "The Role of Strategic Concepts and Doctrine in U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Development," in *National Security and International Stability*, ed. by Michael Intriligator and Roman Kolkowicz (forthcoming).

³⁵ Quoted in Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, p. 317.

sides would have the same doctrine, but this cognitive agreement would not pave the way for coordinated policies.

The second issue is whether a security regime is possible if the superpowers hold contrasting military doctrines. The rules of any regime formed under such circumstances could not be symmetrical, and an element of unusual complexity would be introduced. But this would not automatically rule out the possibility of a degree of harmonization of policies aimed at increasing mutual security. The specific content of Soviet doctrine may have this effect, however, since it argues that security is inherently competitive, being produced by pulling as far ahead of the adversary as possible. Of course this modifier hints at a possible solution. The costs of arms, coupled with the competition from the U.S., could lead the Soviets to settle for arrangements that, although far from optimal in their eyes, still are more attractive than unrestrained individualistic policies. Another possibility would be for each side to follow quite different paths. The U.S. would not match Soviet arms increases, but would only maintain its second-strike capability. There would be no formal agreements codifying this, but common expectations would still be possible. The states would have different outlooks and policies, but at least they would understand these differences. This argument, however, is currently rejected by American opinion on the grounds that it would permit the Soviets to infringe on important western interests.

Different perspectives

Even if both sides were to adopt MAD, the theoretical possibility for mutual security could be defeated by the tendency for adversaries to see the strategic balance and international events very differently. American, and presumably Soviet, leaders make their calculations of the nuclear balance very conservatively. That is, they assume that their own systems will work badly and that the other's will work well. It is highly likely that each side's calculation of its own fate in the event of war is more pessimistic than that found in the other's estimate. Each side may fear that it is "behind" the other or even open to a successful first strike when the balance is actually even, thus making it extremely hard to find force levels that are mutually satisfactory.

Furthermore, neither side fully understands this difference in perspective. To each, the other's alarm at its arms procurement seems hypocritical if not a cover for aggressive designs. Each not only underestimates the degree to which its programs disturb the other, but rarely devotes much attention to this danger. For example, U.S. declaratory policy respects Soviet second-strike capability, but one wonders if the U.S. analyzed whether a conservative Russian planner might not see the MX, with its ten accurate warheads, as a threat to Soviet retaliatory capability. Similarly, for several years U.S. officials have argued that stability would be increased if the Russians put a

higher proportion of their strategic forces into submarine-launched missiles, but it is not clear that they made due allowance for how the Russians would interpret this argument in light of the U.S.'s increasingly effective antisubmarine warfare capability.

The problem is magnified because both sides view the strategic balance within the context of world events, a context they also see from different perspectives. Each usually magnifies dangers, concentrates on the gains made by the other side, and overlooks its own threatening behavior. Thus as most American statesmen look back on the past few years, they see increasing Soviet assertiveness and confidence—for example, a buildup of strategic forces, the modernization of the armies in East Europe, the use of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia, the consolidation of Soviet power in Vietnam, the sponsorship of the invasion of Cambodia, and their take-over of Afghanistan. But to the Russians things may look different. It would not be surprising if they were less optimistic than U.S. leaders think they are, paying more attention to defeats and threats than to what may be transient victories. To them, what may loom large are American strategic programs (the MX, the cruise missile, and the “stealth” technology for a new generation of bombers); the long-range tactical nuclear modernization program for NATO, which will significantly increase western capability for destroying targets in western Russia; the setting aside of the SALT II treaty; and increasing western ties with China.³⁶

These measures probably take on a particularly suspicious hue when combined with what the Russians must see as the American habit of suddenly denouncing the Soviet Union for unacceptably altering established patterns when it is American actions that contravene the implicit understandings which have helped bring predictability to the world scene. Three examples probably stand out in the Soviet mind. First, the U.S. discovered the Soviet “combat brigade” in Cuba and threatened to overturn SALT II unless it was disbanded. But these troops had been there for a long time and were not doing anything new. Second, the U.S. did not protest when a coup installed a Communist government in Afghanistan in April 1978, but raised a furious storm when Soviet troops were needed to finish the job off eighteen months later. It was the former move that changed the status quo, although it was not very different in kind from many American actions. The latter move merely consolidated the earlier gain and should hardly have been expected to provide the occasion for cries of outrage, attempts to humiliate Russia, and the final blow to SALT II. Finally, the U.S. tried to deter the Soviet Union from invading Poland, thus upsetting the well-established understanding that East Europe was within the Russian sphere. It is hard to think of anything that could have shown so clearly that the U.S. was not concerned about the growth of Soviet power but instead was seeking to take

³⁶ For a good discussion, see Richards Heuer Jr., “Analyzing the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” *Studies in Comparative Communism* 13 (Winter 1980): 347–55.

advantage of Soviet difficulties to undermine its security. In Russian eyes, the U.S. stance probably undercut the credibility of its grounds for objecting to the invasion of Afghanistan—that it was a unilateral change in the status quo showing that Russia had no interest in equitable cooperation and mutual security—since the U.S. had strongly objected to the Soviet attempt to maintain the status quo in East Europe.

Conclusion

The demand for a security regime is decreased by the apparent stability of the strategic balance. The dangers of Russian expansion and nuclear war are contained by the current posture in such a way that drastic change is not seen as needed. Two kinds of people dissent from this judgment—those who fear that the Soviets are gaining usable military superiority and those who fear some sort of accidental war. The former, most of whom see only limited scope for Soviet-American cooperation, far outnumber the latter. Indeed, it may be doubted whether there will ever be strong political pressures in favor of a regime unless there is dramatic evidence that individualistic security policies are leading to disaster. Of course the strongest possible evidence—an all-out war—would render the project irrelevant. Perhaps a regime could be formed only in the wake of a limited nuclear exchange or the accidental firing of a weapon. Interestingly enough, it was Herman Kahn who saw the effect that such a crisis might have:

I can even imagine something as extreme as the following occurring. There is a well-known book on possible constitutional forms for world government, *World Peace Through World Law*. At this point, the President of the United States might send a copy of this book to [the Soviet] Premier saying, “There’s no point in your reading this book; you will not like it any more than I did. I merely suggest you sign it, right after my signature. This is the only plan which has been even roughly thought through; let us therefore accept it. We surely do not wish to set up a commission to study other methods of organizing the world, because within weeks both of us will be trying to exploit our common danger for unilateral advantages. If we are to have a settlement, we must have it now, before the dead are buried.” I can even imagine [the Soviet] Premier accepting the offer and signing.³⁷

I grant that this is a bizarre chain of events, but it is hard to think of a more plausible shock that could provide the basis for the formation of a regime.

³⁷ Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), pp. 148–49.