

(1) (2) MODEL THEORY

THEORY

(I) BASIC NOTIONS

Let \mathcal{L} denote a first-order language, with a set of constant symbols $C = \{c_\alpha : \alpha \in A\}$, a set of variables $V = \{v_n : n \geq 0\}$; a set of n -ary function symbols $F_n = \{f_i : i \in I\}$ (for each $n \geq 1$) and a set of n -ary relation symbols $R_n = \{R_\lambda : \lambda \in \Lambda\}$ (for each $n \geq 1$).

(I.1) DEFINITION: The terms of \mathcal{L} are as follows:

- (a) each $c_\alpha \in C$ is a term;
- (b) each $v_n \in V$ is a term;
- (c) if $\bar{\gamma}_1, \dots, \bar{\gamma}_n$ are terms and $f \in F_n$ (a n -ary function symbol), then $f(\bar{\gamma}_1, \dots, \bar{\gamma}_n)$ is a term;
- (d) every term of \mathcal{L} can be deduced in a finite number of steps from (a), (b) & (c).

For instance, if \mathcal{L} has $C = \{0, 1\}$, $F_2 = \{+, \cdot\}$, $R_2 = \{<\}$ (or, in a shorter way, \mathcal{L} has $\{0, 1, +, \cdot, <\}$), then $0, 1, v_0, v_1, v_2, v_1 + v_2, v_3 + 0 + 1 \cdot v_2 \cdot v_4$ are terms of \mathcal{L} .

(I.2) DEFINITION: The formulas of \mathcal{L} are as follows:

- (a) if $\bar{\gamma}_1, \bar{\gamma}_2$ are terms, $\bar{\gamma}_1 = \bar{\gamma}_2$ is a formula;
- (b) if $\bar{\gamma}_1, \dots, \bar{\gamma}_n$ are terms, and $R \in R_n$ (a n -ary relation symbol), then $R(\bar{\gamma}_1, \dots, \bar{\gamma}_n)$ is a formula. The formulas defined in (a) and (b) are said atomic formulas.
- (c) if $\varphi, \varphi_1, \varphi_2$ are formulas, then $\neg \varphi, \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2, \varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2, (\exists v)\varphi, (\forall v)\varphi$ (where v is a free variable, i.e., does not appear in any quantifier of φ) are formulas;
- (d) the formulas of \mathcal{L} can be deduced in

(2)

a finite number of steps from (a), (b) and (c).

One says that a formula φ is a sentence of \mathcal{L} (or an \mathcal{L} -sentence) if all variables that occur in φ are bounded (i.e., not free). A theory T of \mathcal{L} is a consistent set of sentences. A complete theory is a theory T such that for all sentence φ in \mathcal{L} , either $\varphi \in T$ or $\neg\varphi \in T$.

An \mathcal{L} -structure \mathfrak{M} consists of a set M (abusing of notation), and for each $f \in F_n$, corresponds a function $\hat{f}: M^n \rightarrow M$, and to each $R \in R_n$ corresponds a relation $\hat{R} \subseteq M^n$. ~~For each structure \mathfrak{M} one defines~~

~~(I-3) DEFINITION: Let $\text{Fla}(\mathcal{L})$ denote the set of \mathcal{L} -formulas. One defines the function $v: \text{Fla}(\mathcal{L}) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, by:~~

Now one wants to define interpretation of terms and formulas in \mathfrak{M} .

(I-3) DEFINITION: Interpretation of terms of \mathcal{L} in \mathfrak{M} :

- (a) if $c \in C$, \hat{c} is an element of M ;
- (b) if $f \in F_n$, \hat{f} is a function $M^n \rightarrow M$;
- (c) if one has defined $\hat{\varepsilon}_1, \dots, \hat{\varepsilon}_n$ for terms $\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_n$ and $f \in F_n$, then one defines $(f(\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_n))^{\hat{}}$ as $\hat{f}(\hat{\varepsilon}_1, \dots, \hat{\varepsilon}_n)$.

(I-4) DEFINITION: Interpretation of formulas.

Let $\text{Fla}(\mathcal{L})$ denote the set of \mathcal{L} -formulas.

One defines $v: \text{Fla}(\mathcal{L}) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, by:

- (a) if $\varphi = \varphi(v_0, \dots, v_k)$ is of the form $\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2$, and $m_0, \dots, m_k \in M$, then $v(\varphi(m_0, \dots, m_k)) = 1$ iff $\hat{\varepsilon}_1(\vec{m}) = \hat{\varepsilon}_2(\vec{m})$;
- (b) if $\varphi = \varphi(v_0, \dots, v_k)$ is of the form $R(\varepsilon_0, \dots, \varepsilon_n)$ then $v(\varphi(\vec{m})) = 1$ iff $(\hat{\varepsilon}_0(\vec{m}), \dots, \hat{\varepsilon}_n(\vec{m})) \in \hat{R}$;
- (c) if one has defined $v(\varphi)$, $v(\varphi_1)$ and $v(\varphi_2)$, then one defines $v(\neg\varphi) = 1 - v(\varphi)$,

(3)

$$v(\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2) = \min(v(\varphi_1), v(\varphi_2)), v(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2) = \max(v(\varphi_1), v(\varphi_2)) \text{ and if } \varphi = \varphi(v, v_0, \dots, v_k), \text{ then}$$

$$v(\exists v \varphi(v, \vec{m})) = \sup \{v(\varphi(m, \vec{m})): m \in M\} \text{ and}$$

$$v(\forall v \varphi(v, \vec{m})) = \inf \{v(\varphi(m, \vec{m})): m \in M\}.$$

If $m_0, \dots, m_k \in M$, then one writes $M \models \varphi(\vec{m})$
 (read " M satisfies φ in $\vec{m} = (m_0, \dots, m_k)$ "), if $v(\varphi(\vec{m})) = 1$.
 If φ is a sentence, then one writes $M \models \varphi$ if $v(\varphi) = 1$.

If T is a theory in \mathcal{L} , one says M is a model of T iff for all $\varphi \in T$, $M \models \varphi$ (or $M \models T$).

One says that a set Σ of \mathcal{L} -sentences is finitely satisfiable if for all finite $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma$, there is a model ~~for~~ of Σ_0 .

(I-5) DEFINITION: Let M and N be \mathcal{L} -structures, and $f: N \rightarrow M$ be a function:

(a) f is said isomorphism (of \mathcal{L} -structures) if f is bijective and for all atomic $\varphi(v_0, \dots, v_k)$, and all $n_0, \dots, n_k \in N$, $N \models \varphi(n)$ iff $M \models \varphi(f(\vec{n}))$

(b) f is an injective map, if f is a 1-1 map of the underlying set of M to that of N , and f respects \mathcal{L} -structure, that is:

(1) f sends interpretation of a constant a in M to that of a in N ;

(2) if $g: M^k \rightarrow M$ is the interpretation of a k -ary function symbol, and $h: N^k \rightarrow N$ is its interpretation in N , then $f(g(x_1, \dots, x_k)) = h(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_k))$;

(3) if R is the interpretation of a k -ary relation symbol in M , and S is its interpretation in N , then, for all $x_1, \dots, x_k \in M$, $R(x_1, \dots, x_k) \leftrightarrow S(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_k))$.

(c) suppose $f: M \rightarrow N$ is an injective map. Then f is elementary if for all \mathcal{L} -formulas $\Phi(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ and all $x_1, \dots, x_n \in M$, then $M \models \Phi(x_1, \dots, x_n) \leftrightarrow N \models \Phi(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_n))$. In this case one says that M is elementarily equivalent to N , $M \equiv N$.

(4)

(I-6) DEFINITION: $M \triangleleft N$, M is an elementary substructure of N , or, N is an elementary extension of M , if M is a substructure of N (that is, $M \subseteq N$, and interpretation of constants, function and relation symbols are induced from N) and the inclusion map $i: M \rightarrow N$ is elementary.

(II) COMPACTNESS

15/10/86

In this section it will be proved the following result:

- (II-1) THEOREM (COMPACTNESS): Suppose \mathcal{L} is a first-order language and Σ is a set of \mathcal{L} -sentences. Then, the following are equivalent:
- there exists \mathcal{M} such that $\mathcal{M} \models \Sigma$;
 - for each finite subset $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma$, there is a model \mathcal{M}_0 for Σ_0 (that is, Σ is finitely satisfiable).

This theorem is due to Malcev (1936). Gödel's work was for countable \mathcal{L} only. Gödel completeness: " Σ has a model iff Σ is consistent (relative to one of the natural axiom systems for predicate calculus)".

- (II-2) LEMMA: Any ^{increasing} union of finitely satisfiable sets is finitely satisfiable.

This will be used in Zorn's lemma arguments to get maximal finitely satisfiable subsets.

NOTE: Replace "finitely satisfiable" by "consistent" and lemma (II-2) is still true.

EXAMPLE: Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. Define $\text{Th}(\mathcal{M})$ by $\text{Th}(\mathcal{M}) = \{\Phi : \mathcal{M} \models \Phi\}$ (Φ sentence).

Then $\text{Th}(\mathcal{M})$ is finitely satisfiable, and in fact is maximal with this property! For any Φ , either Φ or $\neg\Phi$ is in $\text{Th}(\mathcal{M})$, whence maximality.

(II-3) DEFINITION: Let Σ be a set of \mathcal{L} -sentences, and C be a set of \mathcal{L} -constants. Then C is a set of witnesses for Σ if for all $\Phi \in \Sigma$ of the form $(\exists v)\Psi(v)$, there is a $c \in C$ such that the formula $(\exists v)\Psi(v) \rightarrow \Psi(c)$ is in Σ .

EXAMPLE: Let \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure. Add to \mathcal{L} new distinct constants m for each $m \in M$.

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This gives a new language $\mathcal{L}(M)$; convert M into an $\mathcal{L}(M)$ -structure M_m , by interpreting m by m . And let $\Sigma = \text{Th}_{\mathcal{L}(M)}(M_m)$, and $C = \{\bar{m} : m \in M\}$. Then C is a set of witnesses for Σ .

- 3) (II-4) (TRUTH) LEMMA: Let Σ be a maximal finitely satisfiable set of \mathcal{L} -sentences, and C be a set of witnesses for Σ . Then there is an \mathcal{L} -structure M such that $\Sigma = \text{Th}_{\mathcal{L}(M)}(M)$.

PROOF:

M will be constructed as the set of (equivalence classes of) witnesses.

Define \cong on C by $c \cong d$ iff $(c=d) \in \Sigma$.

CLAIM: \cong is an equivalence relation (clear!).

One has to:

(i) interpret all constants, function symbols, and relation symbols;

(ii) prove "TRUTH LEMMA": $M \models \Phi([c_1], \dots, [c_n])$ iff $\Phi(c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \Sigma$, where $M = \{[c] : c \in C\}$.

STEP 1: Interpretation of:

(A) constants: let a be an \mathcal{L} -constant. Now, by maximality of Σ , $(\exists v(v=a)) \in \Sigma$. So, for some $c \in C$, $(\exists v(v=a) \rightarrow (c=a)) \in \Sigma$, since C is a set of witnesses for Σ , and thus $(c=a) \in \Sigma$. Interpret a by $[c]$. By maximality again, the result does not depend on the choice of c .

(B) function symbols: let f be n -ary; interpret f by the n -ary function on M , \hat{f} , where $\hat{f}([c_1], \dots, [c_n]) = [c]$, where $(f(c_1, \dots, c_n) = c) \in \Sigma$.

(C) relation symbols: let R be n -ary; interpret R by \hat{R} , where $\hat{R}([c_1], \dots, [c_n])$ holds iff $R(c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \Sigma$.

STEP 2: Now prove: for all \mathcal{L} -formula $\Phi(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ and all $c_1, \dots, c_n \in C$, $M \models \Phi([c_1], \dots, [c_n])$ iff $\Phi(c_1, \dots, c_n) \in \Sigma$.

This is proved by induction on the complexity of formulas.

CASE 1: if Φ is atomic, by step 1, it is clear.

CASE 2: if $\Phi = \Phi_1 \vee \Phi_2$ and one has proved step 2 for Φ_1 and Φ_2 . Then it is clear that $M \models \Phi_1 \vee \Phi_2 ([c_1], \dots, [c_n])$ iff $M \models \Phi_1 ([c_1], \dots, [c_n])$ or

$M \models \Phi_2([c_1], \dots, [c_n])$ iff $\Phi_1(\bar{c})$ or $\Phi_2(\bar{c})$ is in Σ iff
 $\Phi_1 \vee \Phi_2(\bar{c}) \in \Sigma$ (where $\bar{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_n)$).
CASE 3: if Φ is $\neg \Psi$, then $M \models \Phi([c_1], \dots, [c_n])$
iff $M \not\models \Psi([c_1], \dots, [c_n])$ iff $\Psi(c_1, \dots, c_n) \notin \Sigma$ iff
 $\Phi(\bar{c}) \in \Sigma$.
CASE 4: if Φ is $\exists v \Psi(v, v_1, \dots, v_n)$, then $M \models \Phi([c_1], \dots, [c_n])$
iff there exists a $[c] \in M$ such that $M \models \Psi([c], [c_1], \dots, [c_n])$,
iff $\Psi(c, \bar{c}) \in \Sigma$, iff $\exists v \Psi(v, \bar{c}) \in \Sigma$. □

PROOF OF COMPACTNESS THEOREM (II-1):

Start with a finitely satisfiable set Σ in \mathcal{L} .
One wants to ~~construct~~ construct a model of Σ .

Strategy: Extend \mathcal{L} to \mathcal{L}' with Σ' a set of \mathcal{L}' -sentences, $\Sigma \subseteq \Sigma'$, Σ' maximal finitely satisfiable and with a witness set in \mathcal{L}' . Use the above to get a model for Σ' , giving automatically a model for Σ .

Sketch: one begins with $\Sigma_0 = \Sigma$ in $\mathcal{L}_0 = \mathcal{L}$, and to get Σ_{i+1} and \mathcal{L}_{i+1} , add to \mathcal{L}_i a constant c for each existential formula $(\exists v) \Phi(v) \in \Sigma_i$, and add to Σ_i the formula $(\exists v) \Phi(v) \rightarrow \Phi(c)$. Let $\Sigma_\omega = \bigcup_{i \geq 0} \Sigma_i$ in $\mathcal{L}_\omega = \bigcup_{i \geq 0} \mathcal{L}_i$. Then $\Sigma' = \Sigma_\omega$ and $\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L}_\omega$ are as required. □

Final set of sentences Σ'

(III) CARDINALITY AND LÖWENHEIM-SKOLEM THEOREMS

One wants to show that if a set Σ of sentences of \mathcal{L} has an infinite model, then Σ has a model of "arbitrary" infinite cardinal.

(III-1) DEFINITION: The cardinality of \mathcal{L} , $\text{card}(\mathcal{L})$ or $|\mathcal{L}|$, is the cardinal of the set of \mathcal{L} -formulas.

STRATEGY: Let Σ be in \mathcal{L} ; move up to a new language with extra constants, one for each formula $(\exists v) \Phi(v)$ in Σ ; one wants to add to Σ $(\exists v) \Phi(v) \rightarrow \Phi(c)$ for suitable new c . Repeat process infinitely often. □

(8)

- * (III-2) LEMMA: Let Σ be a finitely satisfiable set of \mathcal{L} -sentences. Let $K = \text{card}(\mathcal{L})$. Add to \mathcal{L} a set C of K distinct new constants. Write $\mathcal{L}(C)$ for the new language. Then there exists Σ' in $\mathcal{L}(C)$, $\Sigma' \subseteq \Sigma$, Σ' maximal finitely satisfiable, and C as a witness set for Σ' .

PROOF:

Enumerate C as $\{c_\lambda : \lambda < K\}$, a well-order of type K . Enumerate the set of all $\mathcal{L}(C)$ -sentences as $\{\sigma_\lambda : \lambda < K\}$.

Σ' is constructed by recursion, meeting K many requirements:

(1) for each formula $\exists v \Psi(v)$, there is some $c \in C$ with $\exists v \Psi(v) \rightarrow \Psi(c) \in \Sigma'$;

(2) Σ' is maximal finitely satisfiable; in particular, for each σ_λ , one of $\sigma_\lambda, \neg \sigma_\lambda$ is in Σ' .

Σ' is constructed as an increasing union $\bigcup_{\lambda < K} \Sigma_\lambda$ so that:

(i) $\Sigma_\lambda \subseteq \Sigma_\mu$, $\forall \lambda < \mu$;

(ii) at limits λ , $\Sigma_\lambda = \bigcup_{\mu < \lambda} \Sigma_\mu$

(iii) Σ_λ is a set of $\mathcal{L}(C_\lambda)$ -sentences, where $C_\lambda \subseteq C$, and $|C_\lambda| < K$ (to ensure that there are plenty of constants c left on each stage).

(iv) Σ_λ is finitely satisfiable.

$\Sigma_{\lambda+1}$ is constructed to take account of requirements given above.

(a) either σ_λ or $\neg \sigma_\lambda$ goes to $\Sigma_{\lambda+1}$

(b) if σ_λ is $\exists v \Psi(v)$, then for some constant c , $\exists v \Psi(v) \rightarrow \Psi(c)$ goes to $\Sigma_{\lambda+1}$. Insist that c is new (does not occur in Σ_λ).

STAGE 0: $\Sigma_0 = \Sigma$

SUCCESSOR STAGE: $\lambda = \delta + 1$: Σ_δ is finitely satisfiable, so it is possible to add one of σ_δ or $\neg \sigma_\delta$ to Σ_δ to preserve finitely satisfaction.

First add one to get $\Sigma_\delta \cup \{\neg\} \sigma_\delta\}$.

Now see if σ_δ is $\exists v \Psi(v)$. Choose minimum $\mu < K$ such that c_μ does not belong to the language of $\Sigma_\delta \cup \{\neg\} \sigma_\delta\}$. Add $(\exists v) \Psi(v) \rightarrow \Psi(c_\mu)$ to $\Sigma_\delta \cup \{\neg\} \sigma_\delta\}$ to get $\Sigma_{\delta+1}$. Usual arguments show this is finitely satisfiable. □

(3)

- (III-3) THEOREM (UPWARD LÖWENHEIM-SKOLEM): Let Σ be a set of \mathcal{L} -sentences with an infinite model. Let $K \geq |\mathcal{L}|$ be any infinite cardinal. Then Σ has a model of cardinal K .

EXERCISE: The above theorem (III-3) implies AC (= axiom of choice).

22/10/86

One has Σ finitely satisfiable and constructed a model M of Σ .

PROBLEM: What is the structure of the class

$$\text{Mod}(\Sigma) = \{n : n \models \Sigma\}?$$

FIRST APPROXIMATION: What is the structure of the class $\{\text{card}(n) : n \models \Sigma\}?$

OBS: Henceforward assume AC.

Cardinality of the model M constructed in proof of compactness: Σ in \mathcal{L} , $|\mathcal{L}| = \lambda$; add to \mathcal{L} a set C of constants, $|C| = \lambda'$ (notice that $|C| \geq \lambda$ is absolutely necessary for proof one gave). $M = \{[c] : c \in C\}$, so $|M| \leq |C| = \lambda$.

- (III-4) LEMMA: If Σ has a model, Σ has a model of cardinal less than, or equal to, $\text{card}(\mathcal{L})$.

NOTE: This is the best possible. Let K be any infinite cardinal. Let \mathcal{L} have constants d_μ , $\mu < K$. Let Σ be the set of all $\neg(d_\mu = d_\nu)$, $\mu \neq \nu$. Σ obviously has a model, but no model can have cardinal less than K , because the d_μ 's require distinct interpretations.

NOTE: One ~~has assumed~~ has not shown that in all cases $\text{card}(M) = \text{card}(\mathcal{L})$ is possible. However if $\lambda = \aleph_0$ one does get that Σ has a finite or countable model.

- (III-5) LEMMA: Let $\text{card}(\mathcal{L}) = \lambda$. Suppose that Σ has an infinite model. Let $K \geq \lambda$ be a cardinal. Then Σ has a model M , with $|M| \geq K$.

PROOF:

Let C be a new set of constants, with $|C| = K$. Fix some $(m, m \models \Sigma)$, and M infinite.

(10)

Now consider $\Sigma' = \Sigma \cup \{\neg(c=d) : c, d \text{ distinct in } C\}$.

CLAIM: Σ' is finitely satisfiable.

Let $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma'$ finite, $\Sigma'_0 = \Sigma_0 \cup \{\neg(c=d) : c, d \in C_0, c \neq d\}$, where $\Sigma_0 \subseteq \Sigma$, $C_0 \subseteq C$, C_0 finite ($|C_0| = n$).

Choose n distinct elements of M . Match those elements ~~of M~~ to C_0 in some fixed way. Since $M \models \Sigma_0$, get a model of Σ'_0 by interpreting $c \in C_0$ by the matched elements.

By compactness, Σ' has a model M' , $|M'| \geq K$, since the elements of C get different interpretations, and $M' \models \Sigma' (\subseteq \Sigma')$. \square

DOWNTWARD VERSION-PROBLEM: Given $M_1 \models \Sigma$,

$\text{card}(M_1) = K_1 \geq \text{card}(\mathcal{L}) = \lambda$. Let $\lambda \leq K \leq K_1$.

Construct $M \models \Sigma$, $|M| = K$. Try for more, M is a substructure of M_1 , i.e.:

- (i) the underlying set of M as a subset of the underlying subset of M_1 ;
- (ii) interpretation of constants, function and relation symbols are induced from that of M_1 .

(Alternatively, say that M_1 is an extension of M).

SPECIAL CASE: \mathcal{L} has a single binary function symbol " \cdot ", and Σ is the natural set of axioms for groups. Let G be a group of cardinal $K_1 \geq \aleph_0$. Does G have a subgroup of cardinal K , $\aleph_0 \leq K \leq K_1$? Yes. Proof: Choose a subset $X \subseteq G$, $|X| = K$. Let H be the subgroup generated by X . Then $\text{card}(H) = K$, since K is infinite.

LEMMA (III-6) (DOWNWARD LÖWENHEIM-SKOLEM): Let $\lambda = \text{card}(\mathcal{L})$. Suppose M is an \mathcal{L} -structure, $|M| \geq \lambda$. Let X be a subset of M of cardinal K . Then there is an elementary substructure N of M such that:

- (i) X is contained in the underlying set of N ;
- (ii) $\text{card}(N) = \max(\lambda, K)$.

NOTE: $N \prec M \Rightarrow \text{Th}(N) = \text{Th}(M)$.

PROOF:

Add to \mathcal{L} constants \bar{m} for $m \in M$. This gives a language $\mathcal{L}(M)$ of cardinality equal to $\text{card}(M)$. Let $C = \{\bar{m} : m \in M\}$. Interpret \bar{m} by m , thereby enriching M to an $\mathcal{L}(M)$ -structure. Let Σ be the set of all $\mathcal{L}(M)$ -sentences true in M . Then C is a set of witnesses for Σ in $\mathcal{L}(M)$.

GOAL: Construct a set $D \subseteq C$, of cardinal $\max(\lambda, |X|)$, with $\{\bar{x} : x \in X\} \subseteq D$, such that D is a set of witnesses for $\Sigma \cap (\text{set of all } \mathcal{L}(D)\text{-sentences}) = \Sigma_D$.

Suppose this is done; note that for $c_1 \neq c_2, c_i$ in C , Σ contains $\neg(c_1 = c_2)$. Also, Σ is maximal consistent.

As in compactness theorem, construct a model living on the set of equivalent classes $\{[c] : c \in C\}$; $[c]$ is a singleton in this case.

It is trivial that the resulting model is isomorphic to M , via the map $m \mapsto [\bar{m}]$.

Now consider Σ_D (as above). One has Σ_D is maximal consistent and D is a witness set. Construct a model as in compactness theorem. Write $[c]_D$ for equivalence classes for relation $c_1 \equiv c_2$ iff $(c_1 = c_2) \in \Sigma_D$. Again, $[c] = \{c\}$. Moreover, the atomic structure on this new model is exactly the restriction of that given in the construction for Σ .

So, the map $[\bar{m}]_D \mapsto m$ defines an isomorphism of this new model with a substructure of M , and that substructure contains X .

Let n_D be the structure on the $[c]_D$'s. Let n be the corresponding substructure of M . Then $n \cong n_D$ as $\mathcal{L}(D)$ -structures.

Let $m_1, \dots, m_k \in n$, and $\Phi(v_1, \dots, v_k)$ be an \mathcal{L} -formula. Then

$$\begin{aligned} n \models \Phi(m_1, \dots, m_k) &\Leftrightarrow n_D \models \Phi([\bar{m}_1]_D, \dots, [\bar{m}_k]_D) \Leftrightarrow \\ &\Leftrightarrow \Phi(\bar{m}_1, \dots, \bar{m}_k) \in \Sigma_D, \text{ by truth lemma} \Leftrightarrow \\ &\Leftrightarrow \Phi(\bar{m}_1, \dots, \bar{m}_k) \in \Sigma \Leftrightarrow \\ &\Leftrightarrow M \models \Phi(m_1, \dots, m_k), \text{ by } \# \text{ truth lemma.} \end{aligned}$$

That is, $n \prec M$. And $\text{card}(n) = \text{card}(n_D) = |D|$.

To finish the proof, one needs to construct

(12)

D.

CONSTRUCTION OF D: (This is a slight generalization of group argument - see "special case" just before this lemma).

First, well-order the sentences of $\mathcal{L}(M)$ as $\{\sigma_\mu : \mu < |M| = |\mathcal{L}(M)|\}$.

Define a series of sets Σ_μ , $\mu < \max(\lambda, |X|)$ of $\mathcal{L}(\Gamma)$ -sentences, such that the series is increasing, one takes unions at limit ordinals, one adds at most two sentences at each successor stage, and $\Sigma_{\{\bar{z} : z \in X\}} \subseteq \Sigma_D$.

Optimal case: X is a set of witnesses for Σ_I , so one does not need to go on, and takes $X = D$.

Suppose that Σ_ρ is constructed, $\Sigma_\rho \subseteq \text{Sent}(\mathcal{L}(\Gamma))$. If Σ_ρ is maximal consistent in $\mathcal{L}(\Gamma)$ and has Γ as a set of witnesses, stop here and take $D = \Gamma$, if not, make (at most) two additions to Σ_ρ , giving $\Sigma_{\rho+1}$ as follows:

(i) Pick the least sentence in Σ_ρ lacking a witness in Σ_ρ . There is a witness implication in Σ . Add the least such to Σ_ρ .

(ii) Pick least sentence in $\mathcal{L}(\Gamma)$ such that neither it nor its negation is in Σ_ρ . Add to Σ_ρ the one of those two which lies in Σ .

EXERCISE: One stops after no more than $\max(\lambda, |X|)$.

□

(III-7) THEOREM (MODIFICATION OF THEOREM (III-3)): Let M

be an \mathcal{L} -structure of cardinality $K \geq \lambda = |\mathcal{L}|$.

Let K_1, K_2 be cardinals, $K_1 \geq K \geq K_2 \geq \lambda$. Then there are models M_1, M_2 , $|M_1| = K_1, |M_2| = K_2$, such that $M_2 \prec M \prec M_1$.

PROOF:

To get M_1 , go to $\mathcal{L}(M)$ as usual, ($|M| = |\mathcal{L}(M)|$). Regard M as an $\mathcal{L}(M)$ -structure. Get, by theorem (III-3), an $\mathcal{L}(M)$ -structure M'_1 of cardinality K_1 , with $M'_1 \models \text{Th}_{\mathcal{L}(M)}(M)$. Define map $f: m \in M \mapsto f(\bar{m}) \in M'_1$, where $f(\bar{m})$ = interpretation of \bar{m} in M'_1 ; (this is an elementary map).

EXERCISE: Use naive set theory to get an actual

elementary extension $M \prec M_1$.
 Notice that one has already done the part $M_2 \prec M_1$. \square

APPLICATIONS:

(1) Existence of a countable (\in)-model of set theory (Skolem).

"Paradox": How can one have a countable model and (by Cantor) uncountable sets?

Let Σ be the set of all sentences true in the universe V of sets. Then Σ has a countable model, but maybe with a weird interpretation of " \in ". But apply Downward Löwenheim-Skolem to V to obtain a countable $M \prec V$ (and thus, \in here is actually membership).

PROBLEM: V is not a set.

(2) Non-standard models of arithmetic and analysis:

(2.1) Arithmetic: \mathcal{L} has $+$, \cdot , 0 , 1 . Let Σ be the set of sentences true in \mathbb{N} . Get $N \prec M$, with M of arbitrary cardinality (even $N \not\cong M$) by an auxiliary use of Downward Löwenheim-Skolem).

(2.2) Analysis: \mathcal{L} has a primitive for each function from R to R and constants \bar{r} for all $r \in R$. Let $\Sigma = \text{Th}_{\mathcal{L}}(R)$. Get $R \prec M$, with $|M| \geq 2^{\aleph_0}$.

OBSERVATION: Let \mathcal{L} be countable, and M be a finite \mathcal{L} -structure, and $\Sigma = \text{Th}_{\mathcal{L}}(M)$. Then, part of Σ pins down the cardinality of any model of Σ in this case.

EXAMPLE: Suppose $\text{card}(M) = n \in \mathbb{N}$; consider the sentence $\Theta = (\exists x_1 \dots x_n)((x_1 \neq x_2) \wedge \dots \wedge (x_i \neq x_m) \wedge (x_2 \neq x_3) \wedge \dots \wedge (x_{m-1} \neq x_n)) \wedge \forall x_{m+1}((x_{m+1} = x_1) \vee \dots \vee (x_{m+1} = x_n))$.

(III-8) THEOREM (TARSKI'S LIMIT-THEOREM): Suppose Λ is an ordered set; let M_λ ($\lambda \in \Lambda$) be an \mathcal{L} -structure, with $M_\lambda \prec M_\mu$, whenever $\lambda \leq \mu$. Let $M = \bigcup_{\lambda \in \Lambda} M_\lambda$, as an \mathcal{L} -structure. Then, for each $\lambda \in \Lambda$, $M = M_\lambda \prec M$.

WARNING: One cannot weaken theorem to hypothesis: $M_\lambda \subseteq M_\mu$ and $\text{Th}(M_\lambda) = \text{Th}(M_\mu)$; conclusion: $\text{Th}(M) = \text{Th}(M_\lambda)$, for all $\lambda \in \Lambda$.

COUNTEREXAMPLE: \mathcal{L} has $=$ and $<$, $\Lambda = \mathbb{N}$. Let $M_n = [-(n+1), (n+1)] \cap \mathbb{Q}$ as an ordered set. Then $M_n \cong M_k$, $\forall n, k \in \mathbb{N}$, so $\text{Th}(M_n) = \text{Th}(M_k)$. However, $\bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} M_n = \mathbb{Q}$ as an ordered set, and $\mathbb{Q} \models (\forall x)(\exists y)(y < x)$, but no M_k satisfies it.

PROOF OF THEOREM (III-8):

Add to \mathcal{L} constants \bar{m} for $m \in M$. Let $\Sigma = \text{Th}_{\mathcal{L}(M)}(M)$ and $C = \{\bar{m} : m \in M\}$. Then Σ is maximal finitely satisfiable and C is its set of witnesses. As usual, the model M_c constructed from this is isomorphic to M . Let $C_\lambda = \{\bar{m} : m \in M_\lambda\}$, $\lambda \in \Lambda$. CLAIM: $\Sigma \cap \mathcal{L}(C_\lambda)$ is maximal consistent, and has C_λ as a set of witnesses.

Notice that this statement is equivalent to the theorem.

Let $\Sigma_\lambda = \text{Th}(M_\lambda)$ in $\mathcal{L}(M_\lambda)$. Exactly because $M_\lambda \triangleleft M_\mu$, $\Sigma_\lambda \subseteq \Sigma_\mu$.

Let $\Sigma_\Lambda = \bigcup_{\lambda \in \Lambda} \Sigma_\lambda$. Each Σ_λ is maximal finitely satisfiable (in $\mathcal{L}(M_\lambda)$), and has C_λ as a set of witnesses. So Σ_Λ is maximal finitely satisfiable (in $\mathcal{L}(M)$) and has C as a set of witnesses.

Construct a model η from Σ_Λ as in compactness theorem. Compare η to M_c . Notice that Σ and Σ_Λ agree on atomic formulas. η is constructed on the set of equivalence classes of $m \equiv n \Leftrightarrow (\bar{m} = \bar{n}) \in \Sigma_\Lambda$, and M_c is constructed on the set of equivalence classes of $m \approx n \Leftrightarrow (\bar{m} = \bar{n}) \in \Sigma$. Clearly $=$ and \approx are the same.

Definition, e.g., of the interpretation of a binary relation symbol R :

- in η : $R([\bar{m}_1], [\bar{m}_2]) \Leftrightarrow R(\bar{m}_1, \bar{m}_2) \in \Sigma_\Lambda$;
- in M_c : $R([\bar{m}_1], [\bar{m}_2]) \Leftrightarrow R(\bar{m}_1, \bar{m}_2) \in \Sigma$.

It follows that $\eta \cong M_c$ via the map $[\bar{m}]_{} \mapsto [\bar{m}]_{\approx}$.

But $M \cong M_c$ by $m \mapsto [\bar{m}]$.

Now, by truth lemma, suppose $\Phi(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ is an \mathcal{L} -formula, and $m_1, \dots, m_k \in M_\lambda$. Then

$$M \models \Phi(m_1, \dots, m_k) \Leftrightarrow \Phi(\bar{m}_1, \dots, \bar{m}_k) \in \Sigma (= \Sigma_\lambda) \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \Phi(\bar{m}_1, \dots, \bar{m}_k) \in \Sigma_\lambda \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\Leftrightarrow M_\lambda \models \Phi(m_1, \dots, m_k).$$

□

(IV) OMITTING TYPES AND K-CATEGORICITY

One wants to determine the structure of $\text{Mod}(\Sigma)$. Assume that Σ has a model of cardinality greater than, or equal to, $|\mathcal{L}|$. Then, by Löwenheim-Skolem, for all cardinals $\kappa \geq \lambda = |\mathcal{L}|$, $\text{Mod}_\kappa(\Sigma) = \{m : m \models \Sigma \text{ and } |m| = \kappa\}$ is not empty.

PROBLEM: How many isomorphism types in $\text{Mod}_\kappa(\Sigma)$? There are cases where there is only one isomorphism type.

One wants methods to construct non-isomorphic models of power κ , when this is possible.

Typical limitation (R.L. Vaught, 1960): Suppose \mathcal{L} countable. For all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $n \geq 1$ and $n \neq 2$, there is a set Σ_n such that $\text{Mod}_\kappa(\Sigma_n)$ contains exactly n isomorphism types. (Denumerable models of complete theories - In Infinitistic Methods Pergamon Press, 1961)

31/10/86:

NOTE: Whereas compactness theorem is about compactness of certain spaces, the omitting types theorem is essentially equivalent to the Baire Category theorem for a related space.

(IV-1) DEFINITION: Suppose M is an \mathcal{L} -structure. Let $\langle a_1, \dots, a_n \rangle$ be a sequence of elements of M . Then the type of this sequence in M is $\{\Phi(v_1, \dots, v_n) : m \models \Phi(a_1, \dots, a_n)\} = \text{Type}_m(a_1, \dots, a_n)$.

NOTE: $\text{Type}_m(a_1, \dots, a_n)$ is consistent with $\text{Th}(m)$ and is maximally so.

(IV-2) LEMMA: A set Γ of \mathcal{L} -sentences is a complete theory iff it is maximal finitely satisfiable.

(16)

One aims for a similar characterization of an n -type over T , where T is a complete \mathcal{L} -theory.

(IV-3) DEFINITION: Let T be a complete \mathcal{L} -theory and Σ be a set of \mathcal{L} -formulas in free variables v_1, \dots, v_n , such that $\Sigma \cup T$ is finitely satisfiable and maximally so. Then Σ is called an n -type over T .

" (IV-4) LEMMA: $\Sigma(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ is an n -type (over T) iff there is some model of T and elements a_1, \dots, a_n in M such that $\Sigma = \text{Type}_M(a_1, \dots, a_n)$.

PROOF:

If $\Sigma = \text{Type}_M(a_1, \dots, a_n)$, then $\Sigma \cup T$ is satisfiable (in M , using a_i for v_i), and is clearly maximally so.

Conversely, suppose Σ is an n -type over T . Add constants c_1, \dots, c_n to \mathcal{L} , and consider $\Sigma(c_1, \dots, c_n) \cup T$. This is finitely satisfiable, so satisfiable. Let N be a model, and a_1, \dots, a_n be the interpretation of c_1, \dots, c_n in N . Then $N \models T$ and $\Sigma = \text{Type}_N(a_1, \dots, a_n)$. \square

(IV-5) DEFINITION: Suppose $M \models T$. Then one says that M realizes the n -type Σ iff there are $a_1, \dots, a_n \in M$ such that $\Sigma = \text{Type}_M(a_1, \dots, a_n)$. One says that M omits Σ if M does not realize Σ .

Lemma (IV-4) shows that any n -type Σ is realized in some model.

PROBLEM: When can one omit Σ in some M ?

A case when Σ cannot be omitted in any M : Σ may be principal, i.e., there may be a formula $\Phi(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ in Σ such that for all $\Psi(\vec{v}) \in \Sigma$, $T \vdash \forall \vec{v} (\Phi(\vec{v}) \rightarrow \Psi(\vec{v}))$.

" (IV-6) LEMMA: If Σ is principal then Σ is realized in all models of T .

PROOF:

Let Σ be principal, Φ be as above. Then $T \cup \{\Phi(\vec{v})\}$ is consistent, so $T \cup \{\exists \vec{v} \Phi(\vec{v})\}$

is consistent.

Either $\exists \vec{v} \Phi(\vec{v})$ or $\neg(\exists \vec{v} \Phi(\vec{v}))$ is in T , by maximality. So $\exists \vec{v} \Phi(\vec{v}) \in T$, so every model of T satisfies $\exists \vec{v} \Phi(\vec{v})$.

Let $M \models T$. Choose a_1, \dots, a_n such that $M \models \Phi(\vec{a})$. So a_1, \dots, a_n realize Σ . \square

(IV-7) THEOREM (OMITTING TYPES): Let \mathcal{L} be countable, T be a complete theory, and $\Sigma(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ be a non-principal n -type. Then there exists a countable model of T omitting Σ .

PROOF:

Strategy: One builds M as in proof of compactness by adding countably many constants $C = \{c_m\}$ to \mathcal{L} and forming a set Γ of $\mathcal{L}(C)$ -sentences, such that:

- (i) Γ is maximal consistent, with C as a set of witnesses;
- (ii) $T \subseteq \Gamma$.

M will be constructed from Γ as always, based on equivalence classes of constants, and $M \models T$ by truth lemma.

Major Requirement: no tuple $\vec{a} \in M^n$ realizes Σ , where $\vec{a} = \langle a_1, \dots, a_n \rangle = \langle [c_{i_1}], \dots, [c_{i_n}] \rangle$. (There are only countably many such tuples.)

Imagine meeting one requirement for each tuple $\langle [c_{i_1}], \dots, [c_{i_n}] \rangle$. One has to find a formula $\Phi(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ such that $M \models \neg \Phi([c_{i_1}], \dots, [c_{i_n}])$. This is equivalent to $\neg \Phi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_n}) \in \Gamma$.

Now, the proof in detail:

Enumerate the n -tuples $\langle c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_n} \rangle$ as t_0, t_1, \dots . Also enumerate the set of $\mathcal{L}(C)$ -sentences as $\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \dots$. Construct Γ as an increasing union $\bigcup \Gamma_n$, so that:

- (i) $T \subseteq \Gamma$;
- (ii) each Γ_n is got from T by adding finitely many $\mathcal{L}(C)$ -sentences;
- (iii) Γ_n is consistent;
- (iv) for n even: Γ_n contains one of $\sigma_{m/2}$ or $\neg \sigma_{m/2}$, and a witness for $\sigma_{m/2}$ if $\sigma_{m/2}$ is existential;
- (v) for m odd: in this case, Γ_m

(18)

05/11/86 should ensure that $\tau_{(m-1)/2}$ should not realize Σ .
 Let $m = 2k+1$: ensure that τ_k does not realize Σ :

One has Γ_{m-1} already, a finite extension of $\Gamma_0 \supseteq T$, that is, $\Gamma_{m-1} = T$ plus a finite number of $\mathcal{L}(C)$ -sentences, and w.l.o.g. (= without loss of generality), one can suppose $\Gamma_{m-1} = T$ plus a single sentence Ψ (i.e., the conjunction of them).

Let $\tau_k = \langle c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_m} \rangle$. Ψ involves finitely many constants. Write Ψ as $\Psi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_m}, c_{i_{m+1}}, \dots, c_{i_{m+r}})$. (One does not suggest that all, or any, of c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_m} occur in Ψ ; $c_{i_{m+1}}, \dots, c_{i_{m+r}}$ are the constants that occur in Ψ but not in τ_k .)

One wants to add to Γ_{m-1} an $\mathcal{L}(C)$ -sentence θ giving Γ_m , so that Γ_m is consistent, and such that no matter how one proceeds later towards $\bigcup \Gamma_e$, in the final model, the n -tuple τ_k (or rather, its interpretation) will not realize Σ . This is obviously accomplished as soon as one has a formula $\Phi(v_1, \dots, v_n) \in \Sigma$ such that Γ_m plus $\neg \Phi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_m})$ is consistent.

Suppose this is not possible. Then for each $\Phi \in \Sigma$, $\Gamma_{m-1} \vdash \Phi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_m})$, i.e., $T \cup \{\Psi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_{m+r}})\} \vdash \Phi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_m})$, or $T \vdash \Psi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_{m+r}}) \rightarrow \Phi(c_{i_1}, \dots, c_{i_m})$, and since T is a set of \mathcal{L} -sentences, obviously $T \vdash \forall v_1, \dots, v_m [\exists v_{m+1} \dots v_{m+r} \Psi(v_1, \dots, v_{m+r}) \rightarrow \Phi(v_1, \dots, v_m)]$.

NOTE: T plus $\exists v_{m+1} \dots v_{m+r} \Psi(v_1, \dots, v_{m+r})$ (call this formula $\Delta(v_1, \dots, v_n)$) is consistent, since Γ_m is consistent, and since T is complete, then $T \vdash \exists v_1 \dots v_m \Delta(v_1, \dots, v_n)$, and for all $\Phi \in \Sigma$, $T \vdash \Delta(v_1, \dots, v_n) \rightarrow \Phi(v_1, \dots, v_n)$. So Σ is principal, contrary to the assumption. \square

NOTE: Countability was crucial in this proof (used in the conjunction of formulas to obtain Δ).

REMARK: One can replace Σ by a countable set $\{\Sigma_0, \Sigma_1, \dots\}$ of non-principal types varying "arities". It is the same proof,

with minor changes in order to meet requirements.

REMARK: By the above, one gets countable m omitting Σ , but no simple Upward Löwenheim-Skolem argument gives m of arbitrary large cardinal.

• (IV-8) LEMMA: If m omits Σ and $n \prec m$, then n omits Σ .

• (IV-9) LEMMA: Let \mathcal{L} be countable and T be a complete \mathcal{L} -theory with a non-principal n -type P . Then T has at least two non-isomorphic countable models.

PROOF:

There is a countable $m_0 \models T$ realizing P , by (IV-4), and there is a countable $m_1 \models T$ omitting P , by (IV-7). So $m_0 \not\cong m_1$. \square

(IV-10) DEFINITION: T is said K -categorical if any two models of T of cardinal K are isomorphic.

(IV-11) COROLLARY: If T is \aleph_0 -categorical, then all types over T are principal.

Now one begins to prove the converse:

MAIN PROBLEM: What is the structure of countable models m of an arbitrary theory T such that m realizes only principal types?

Such a model is called atomic (because of correspondence between principal types and principal ultrafilters in $B_m(T)$ — see problem sheet 3 — and these in turn correspond to atoms — see problem sheet 1).

• (IV-12) THEOREM: Let m_1 and m_2 be countable atomic models of a complete theory T in a countable \mathcal{L} . Then $m_1 \cong m_2$.

NOTE: This theorem is an ultimately generalization of Cantor's theorem of dense linear orders.

PROOF:

Enumerate M_i as $m_{i,0}, m_{i,1}, \dots$, for $i=1,2$.

Construct isomorphism $f: M_1 \cong M_2$ in ω

stages (using a back-and-forth argument), such that at any finite stage, f is defined only on a finite set.

PROBLEM: How to define $f(m_{1,0})$?

STAGE 0: Consider $\text{Type}_{M_1}(m_{1,0})$. This is principal, determined by $\Phi(v)$ say. Since $M_2 \models T$ and $T \vdash \exists v \Phi(v)$ (for it is true in M_1 and T is complete), $M_2 \models \exists v \Phi(v)$. Choose the first element $m_{2,k}$ satisfying Φ . It follows that $\text{Type}_{M_1}(m_{1,0}) = \text{Type}_{M_2}(m_{2,k})$. Put $f(m_{1,0}) = m_{2,k}$.

07/11/86:

STAGE 1: Now one wants to ensure that $m_{2,0} \in \text{Range}(f)$. (If $k=0$ in stage 0, this is done.) Suppose $k \neq 0$.

Consider $\text{Type}_{M_2}(m_{2,k}, m_{2,0}) = \Sigma(v_1, v_2)$, and $\Gamma(v_1) = \text{Type}_{M_2}(m_{2,k}) \subseteq \Sigma(v_1, v_2)$. Then $\Gamma(v_1) = \text{Type}_{M_1}(m_{1,0}) \subseteq \text{Type}_{M_1}(m_{1,0}, x) \stackrel{?}{=} \text{Type}_{M_2}(m_{2,k}, m_{2,0})$ (that is, is there any $x \in M_1$ such that the last equality above holds?).

$\Sigma(v_1, v_2)$ is principal, determined by $\Psi(v_1, v_2)$ say. In particular, for every $\Theta(v_1) \in \Gamma(v_1)$, $T \vdash \Psi(v_1, v_2) \rightarrow \Theta(v_1)$. Thus $T \vdash (\forall v_1) [(\exists v_2) \Psi(v_1, v_2) \rightarrow \Theta(v_1)]$; but $(\exists v_2) \Psi(v_1, v_2) \rightarrow \Theta(v_1) \in \Gamma(v_1) = \text{Type}_{M_2}(m_{2,k}) = \text{Type}_{M_1}(m_{1,0})$. So $M_1 \models (\exists v_2) \Psi(m_{1,0}, v_2)$. Choose least q such that $M_1 \models \Psi(m_{1,0}, m_{1,q})$ (notice that $q \neq 0$, since $(v_1 \neq v_2) \in \Sigma(v_1, v_2)$). Then $\Psi(v_1, v_2) \in \text{Type}_{M_1}(m_{1,0}, m_{1,q})$. As Ψ "generates" Σ , and Σ is maximal, $\Sigma(v_1, v_2) = \text{Type}_{M_1}(m_{1,0}, m_{1,q})$. Put $f(m_{1,0}) = m_{2,0}$. Now $\text{Type}_{M_1}(m_{1,0}, m_{1,q}) = \text{Type}_{M_2}(f(m_{1,0}), f(m_{1,q}))$.

A similar argument, alternating back-and-forth, will ensure that $\text{dom}(f) = M_1$, $\text{Range}(f) = M_2$, and for all t_1, \dots, t_k in M_1 , $\text{Type}_{M_1}(t_1, \dots, t_k) = \text{Type}_{M_2}(f(t_1), \dots, f(t_k))$. In particular, $M_1 \models \Phi(t_1, \dots, t_k) \Leftrightarrow M_2 \models \Phi(f(t_1), \dots, f(t_k))$ for all $\Phi(v_1, \dots, v_k)$. □