

## IV

# Cleavage Structures and Party Systems

The [following] analyses bear on [two] central questions in the comparative sociology of politics:

The first set of questions concerns *the genesis of the system of contrasts and cleavages* within the national community: which conflicts came first and which later? Which ones proved temporary and secondary? Which proved obdurate and pervasive? Which cut across each other and produced overlaps between allies and enemies, and which reinforced each other and tended to polarise the national citizenry?

A second group of questions focuses on *the conditions for the development of a stable system of cleavage[s] and oppositions* in national political life: why did some early conflicts establish party oppositions and others not? Which of the many conflicting interests and outlooks in the national community produced direct opposition between competing parties, and which of them could be aggregated *within* the broad party fronts? Which conditions favoured extensive aggregations of oppositional groups, and which offered greater incentive to fragmented articulation of single interests or narrowly defined causes? To what extent were these developments affected by changes in the legal and administrative conditions of political activity, through the extension of the rights of participation, through the introduction of secret voting and the development of strict controls of electoral corruption, and through the retention of plurality decisions or the introduction of some variety of proportional representation?

To understand the current alignments of voters behind each of the parties, we have to map variations in the *sequences of alternatives* set for the active and the passive citizens within each system since the emergence of competitive politics. Parties do not simply present themselves *de novo* to the citizen at each election; they each have a history

and so have the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate.<sup>93</sup>

In our Western democracies the voters are only rarely called upon to express their stands on single issues. They are typically faced with choices among historically given 'packages' of programs, commitments, outlooks; and, sometimes, *Weltanschauungen*, and their current behaviour cannot be understood without some knowledge of the sequences of events and the combinations of forces that produced these 'packages'. Our task is to develop realistic models to explain the formation of different systems of such 'packages' under different conditions of national politics and socio-economic development and to fit information on these variations in the character of the alternatives into our schemes for the analysis of current electoral behaviour.

Parties have served as essential agencies of mobilisation and as such have helped to integrate local communities into the nation or the broader federation.<sup>94</sup> In competitive party systems this process of integration can be analysed at two levels: on the one hand, each party establishes a network of cross-local communication channels and in that way helps to strengthen national identities; on the other, its very competitiveness helps to set the national system of government *above* any particular set of officeholders. This cuts both ways: the citizens are encouraged to distinguish between loyalty to the total political system and their attitudes to the sets of competing politicians, and the contenders for power will, at least if they have some chance of gaining office, have some interest in maintaining this attachment of all citizens to the polity and its rules of alternation.<sup>95</sup> A competitive party system protects the nation against the discontents of its citizens: grievances and attacks are deflected from the overall system and directed toward the current set of power-holders.<sup>96</sup>

Most of the parties aspiring to majority positions in the West are conglomerates of groups differing on wide ranges of issues, but still united in their greater hostility to their competitors in the other camps. Conflicts and controversies can arise out of a great variety of relationships in the social structure, but only a few of these tend to polarise the politics of any given system. There is a *hierarchy of cleavage bases* in each system and these orders of political primacy not only vary among polities, but also tend to undergo changes over time. Such differences and changes in the political weight of socio-cultural cleav-

ages set fundamental problems for comparative research. When is religion, language, or ethnicity most likely to prove polarising? When will class take primacy and when will denominational commitments and religious identities prove equally important cleavage bases? Which sets of circumstances are most likely to favour accommodations of such oppositions *within* parties and in which circumstances are they more apt to constitute issues *between* the parties? Which types of alliances tend to maximise the strain on the polity and which ones help to integrate it?

It has often been suggested that systems will come under much heavier strain if the main lines of cleavage are over morals and the nature of human destiny than if they concern such mundane and negotiable matters as the prices of commodities, the rights of debtors and creditors, wages and profits, and the ownership of property. However, this does not take us very far; what we want to know is when the one type of cleavage will prove more salient than the other, what kind of alliances they have produced and what consequences these constellations of forces have had for consensus-building within the nation-state. We do not pretend to find clear-cut answers, but we have tried to move the analysis one step further. We shall start out with a review of a variety of *logically possible* sources of strains and oppositions in social structures and shall then proceed to an inventory of the *empirically extant examples of political expressions of each set of conflicts*.



Three of these sets of interchanges are of crucial concern to the political sociologist: he wants to know how the solidary collectivities, the latent communalities of interests and prospects, and the manifest associations and movements within a given territorial society limit the alternatives and influence the decisions of governmental leaders and their executive agencies—these are all processes of interchange between the *I* and *G* subsystems.<sup>97</sup>

He wants to know how ready or how reluctant individual subjects and households in the society are to be mobilised for action by the different associations and movements and how they make up their minds in cases of competition and conflict between different mobilising agencies—these are all questions about interchanges between the *L* and *I* subsystems.

He is concerned finally to find out about regularities in the behaviour of individual subjects and households in their direct interchanges (*L* to *G*, *G* to *L*) with the territorial agencies of government, be it as observers of legal regulations, as taxpayers and conscripted manpower, or as voters in institutionalised elections and consultations.

However, our task [here] is narrower. We do not intend to deal with all the interchanges between *I* and *G*, between *I* and *L*, or between *L* and *G*. We are only concerned with the *I-G* interchanges insofar as they press forward the development of systems of competing parties. We are only interested in the *I-L* interchanges insofar as they help to establish distinct links of membership, identification, and readiness for mobilisation between given parties and given categories of subjects and households. And we are not interested in all the *L-G* interchanges, but only in the ones that find expression in elections and in arrangements for formal representation.

In terms of the Parsonian paradigm our tasks are in fact fourfold. We first have to examine the internal structure of the *I* quadrant in a range of territorial societies: what cleavages had manifested themselves in the national community in the early phases of consolidation, and what cleavages emerged in the subsequent phases of centralisation and economic growth?

Our next job is to compare sequences of *I-G* interchanges to trace regularities in the processes of party formation: how did the inherited cleavages find political expression, and how did the territorial organisation of the nation-state, the division of powers between governors

# 1 [Cleavages and Their Political Translation]

The much-debated fourfold schema devised by Talcott Parsons for the classification of the functions of a social system offers a convenient point of departure for an inventory of potential cleavage bases. The paradigm posited four 'functional subsystems' of every society and six lines of interchange between each pair:




FIGURE 32. The Parsonian paradigm of societal interchanges

and representatives, and the broadening of the rights of participation and consultation affect the development of alliances and oppositions among political tendencies and movements and eventually produce a distinctive party system?

Our third job is to study the consequences of these developments for the *I-L interchanges*: which identities, which solidarities, which communalities of experience and fate could be reinforced and made use of by the emerging parties and which ones had to be softened or ignored? Where in the social structure did the parties find it easiest to mobilise stable support, and where did they meet the most impenetrable barriers of suspicion and rejection?

And our final task is to bring all these diverse data to bear on the analysis of the *L-G interchanges* in the operation of *elections and the recruitment of representatives*: how far do electoral distributions reflect structural cleavages in the given society? How is electoral behaviour affected by the narrowing of alternatives brought about by the party system? And how far are the efforts of indoctrination and mobilisation hampered through the development of a politically neutral electoral machinery, the formalising and the standardisation of procedures, and the introduction of secret voting?<sup>98</sup>

Underlying this interpretation of the Parsonian scheme is a simple three-phase model of the process of nation-building: in the first phase the thrusts of penetration and standardisation from the national centre increase territorial resistances and raise issues of cultural identity. Robert Lee's 'am I a Virginian or an American?' is a typical expression of the *G-L* strains generated through the processes of nation-building.

In the second phase these local oppositions to centralisation produce a *variety of alliances* across the communities of the nation: the commonalities of family fates in the *L* quadrangle generate associations and organisations in the *I* quadrangle. In some cases these alliances will pit one part of the national territory against another. This is typically the case in countries where a number of counter-establishment loyalties converge: ethnicity, religion, and class in Ireland, language and class in Belgium, Finland, Spain, and Canada. In other cases the alliances will tend to spread throughout the nation and pit opponents against each other in all localities.

In the third phase the alliances in the *I* quadrangle will enter the *G* quadrangle and gain some measure of control, not only over the use of

central national resources (*G-A* interchanges) but also over the channeling of the flows of legitimisation from *L* to *G*. This may find expression in franchise reforms, in changes in the procedures of registration and polling, in new rules of electoral aggregation, and in extensions of the domains of legislative intervention.

#### [TERRITORIAL AND FUNCTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT]

[Here] we focus on the possible differentiations within the *I* quadrangle—the locus for the formation of parties and party constellations in mass democracies.<sup>99</sup> Our suggestion is that the crucial cleavages and their political expressions can be ordered within the two-dimensional space generated by the two diagonals of the double dichotomy:




FIGURE 33. A possible interpretation of the internal structure of the *I* quadrant



In this model the *l-g* line represents a territorial dimension of the national cleavage structure and the *a-i* line a functional dimension.<sup>100</sup> At the *l* end of the territorial axis we would find strictly local oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national elites and their bureaucracies: the typical reactions of peripheral regions, and their minorities, and culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the centralising, standardising, and 'rationalising' machinery of the nation-state. At the *g* end of the axis we would find conflicts not between territorial units *within* the system but over the control, the organisation, the goals, and the policy options of the system *as a whole*. These might be nothing more than direct struggles among competing elites for central power, but they might also reflect deeper differences in conceptions of nationhood, over domestic priorities, and over external strategies.

Conflicts along the *a-i* axis cut across the territorial units of the nation. They produce alliances of similarly situated or similarly oriented subjects and households over wide ranges of localities and tend to undermine the inherited solidarity of the established territorial communities. At the *a* end of this dimension we would find the typical conflict over short-term or long-term allocations of resources, products, and benefits in the economy: conflicts between producers and buyers, between workers and employers, between borrowers and lenders, between tenants and owners, between contributors and beneficiaries.

At this end the alignments are specific and the conflicts tend to be solved through rational bargaining and the establishment of universalistic rules of allocation. The farther we move toward the *i* end of the axis, the more diffuse the criteria of alignment, the more intensive the identification with the 'we' group, and the more uncompromising the rejection of the 'they' group. At the *i* end of the dimension we find the typical 'friend/foe' oppositions of tight-knit religious or ideological movements to the surrounding community. The conflict is no longer over specific gains or losses but over conceptions of moral right and over the interpretation of history and human destiny; membership is no longer a matter of multiple affiliation in many directions, but a diffuse '24-hour' commitment incompatible with other ties within the community; and communication is no longer kept flowing freely over the cleavage lines but restricted and regu-

lated to protect the movement against impurities and the seeds of compromise.

Historically documented cleavages rarely fall at the poles of the two axes: a concrete conflict is rarely exclusively territorial or exclusively functional but will feed on strains in both directions. The model essentially serves as a *grid* in the comparative analysis of political systems.

In Britain, the first nation-state to recognise the legitimacy of party oppositions, the initial conflicts were essentially of the types we have located at the *l* end of the vertical axis. The heads of independent landed families in the counties opposed the powers and the decisions of the government and the administration in London. The opposition between the 'Country Party' of knights and squires and the 'Court and Treasury Party' of the Whig magnates and the 'placemen' was primarily territorial.<sup>101</sup>

Such particularistic, kin-centred, 'ins/outs' oppositions are common in the early phases of nation-building: the electoral clienteles are small, undifferentiated, and easily controlled, and the stakes to be gained or lost in public life tend to be personal and concrete rather than collective and general.<sup>102</sup>

Purely territorial oppositions rarely survive extensions of suffrage. Much will depend, of course, on the timing of the crucial steps in the building of the nation: territorial unification, the establishment of legitimate government and the monopolisation of the agencies of legitimate violence, the take-off toward industrialisation and economic growth, the development of popular education, and the entry of the lower classes into organised politics. Early democratisation will not necessarily generate clear-cut divisions on functional lines. The initial result of a widening of suffrage will often be an accentuation of the contrasts between the countryside and the urban centres and between the orthodox/fundamentalist beliefs of the peasantry and the small-town citizens and the secularism fostered in the larger cities and the metropolis.<sup>103</sup> Such cumulations of territorial and cultural cleavages in the early phases of democratisation can be documented for country after country.<sup>104</sup>

Territorial oppositions set limits to the process of nation-building; pushed to their extreme they lead to war, secession, possibly even population transfers. Functional oppositions can only develop after some initial consolidation of the national territory. They emerge with

increasing interaction and communication across the localities and the regions, and they spread through a process of 'social mobilisation'.<sup>105</sup> The growing nation-state developed a wide range of agencies of unification and standardisation and gradually penetrated the bastions of 'primordial' local culture.<sup>106</sup> So did the organisations of the Church, sometimes in close co-operation with the secular administrators, often in opposition to and competition with the officers of the state. And so did the many autonomous agencies of economic development and growth, the networks of traders and merchants, of bankers and financiers, of artisans and industrial entrepreneurs.

#### [FOUR LINES OF SOCIAL CLEAVAGES]

The early growth of the national bureaucracy tended to produce essentially territorial oppositions, but the subsequent widening of the scope of governmental activities and the acceleration of cross-local interactions gradually made for much more complex systems of alignments, some of them *between* localities, and others *across* and *within* localities.<sup>107</sup> For these later phases of societal development we can distinguish in line with our paradigm four lines of social cleavages (see Figure 34).<sup>108</sup>

Two of these cleavages are direct products of what we might call the *National Revolution*: the conflict between the *central nation-building culture* and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct *subject populations* in the provinces and the peripheries (no. 1 in Figure 34); the conflict between the centralising, standardising, and mobilising *Nation-State* and the historically established corporate privileges of the *Church* (no. 2). Two of them are products of the *Industrial Revolution*: the conflict between the *landed interests* and the rising class of *industrial entrepreneurs* (no. 3); the conflict between *owners and employers* on the one side and *tenants, labourers, and workers* on the other (no. 4).<sup>109</sup>

The National Revolution forced ever-widening circles of the territorial population to choose sides in conflicts over *values* and *cultural identities*. The Industrial Revolution also triggered a variety of cultural counter-movements, but in the longer-run tended to cut across the value communities within the nation and to force the enfranchised




FIGURE 34. Suggested locations of four critical cleavages in the a-g-i-l paradigm

citizenry to choose sides in terms of their *economic interests*, their shares in the increased wealth generated through the spread of the new technologies and the widening markets.

Of the two social cleavages created by the Industrial Revolution, one lies in the middle between *l* and *a* (no. 3 in Figure 34), the other at the angle *a* (no. 4). The cleavages resulting from the National Revolution are symmetrically placed towards the angle *i*: most close the conflict between Church and State (no. 2), whereas the cleavage between subjected and dominant ethnic groups (no. 1) lies approximately in the middle between *i* and *l*.

The symmetric representation of the four basic cleavage lines in Figure 34 refers to *average tendencies* only and does not exclude wide variations in location along the *a-i* axis. Conflicts over the civic integration of recalcitrant regional cultures (no. 1) or religious organisations (no. 2) need not always lead to *verzuiling* [see Chapter III.3]. An



analysis of the contrasts between Switzerland and The Netherlands would tell us a great deal about differences in the conditions for the development of pluralist insulation. Conflicts between primary producers and the urban-industrial interests have *normally* tended towards the *a* pole of the axis, but there are many examples of highly ideological peasant oppositions to officials and burghers. Conflicts between workers and employers have always contained elements of economic bargaining, but there have also often been strong elements of cultural opposition and ideological insulation. Working-class parties in opposition and without power have tended to be more *verzuild*, more wrapped up in their own distinct mythology, more insulated against the rest of the society. By contrast the victorious Labour parties have tended to become *ontzuild*, domesticated, more open to influence from all segments within the national society.

Similar variations will occur at a wide range of points on the *territorial* axis of our schema. In our initial discussion of the *I* pole we gave examples of *cultural* and *religious* resistances to the domination of the central national elite, but such oppositions are not always *purely* territorial. The movements may be completely dominant in their provincial strongholds but may also find allies in the central areas and thus contribute to the development of *cross-local* and *cross-regional* fronts.<sup>110</sup>

#### [STATE—CHURCH DIMENSION OF CONFLICT]

Much of the history of Europe since the beginning of the nineteenth century can be described in terms of the interaction between two processes of revolutionary change: the [National Revolution] triggered in France and the [Industrial Revolution] originating in Britain. Both had consequences for the cleavage structure of each nation, but the French Revolution produced the deepest and the bitterest oppositions. The decisive battle came to stand between *the aspirations of the mobilising nation-state* and *the corporate claims of the churches*. The Church, whether Roman Catholic, Lutheran, or Reformed, had for centuries claimed the right to represent man's 'spiritual estate' and to control the education of children in the right faith. In the Lutheran countries, steps were taken as early as the seventeenth century to enforce el-

ementary education in the vernacular for all children. The established national churches simply became agents of the state and had no reason to oppose such measures. In the religiously mixed countries and in purely Catholic ones, however, the ideas of the French Revolution proved highly divisive. The development of compulsory education under centralised secular control for all children of the nation came into direct conflict with the established rights of the religious *pouvoirs intermédiaires* and triggered waves of mass mobilisation into nationwide parties of protest. To the radicals and liberals inspired by the French Revolution, the introduction of compulsory education was only one among several measures in a systematic effort to create direct links of influence and control between the nation-state and the individual citizen, but their attempt to penetrate directly to the children without consulting the parents and their spiritual authorities aroused widespread opposition and bitter fights.<sup>111</sup>

The parties of religious defence generated through this process grew into broad mass movements after the introduction of manhood suffrage and were able to claim the loyalties of remarkably high proportions of the church-goers in the working class. These proportions increased even more, of course, as the franchise was extended to women on a par with men. Through a process very similar to the one to be described for the socialist parties, these church movements tended to isolate their supporters from outside influence through the development of a wide variety of parallel organisations and agencies: they not only built up schools and youth movements of their own, but also developed confessionally distinct trade unions, sports clubs, leisure associations, publishing houses, magazines, newspapers, in one or two cases even radio and television stations.<sup>112</sup>

Perhaps the best example of institutionalised segmentation is found in The Netherlands: in fact, the Dutch word *verzuiiling* has recently become a standard term for tendencies to develop vertical networks (*zuilen*, columns or pillars) of associations and institutions to ensure maximum loyalty to each church and to protect the supporters from cross-cutting communications and pressures. Dutch society has for close to a century been divided into three distinct subcultures: the national/liberal/secular, frequently referred to as the *algemene*, the 'general' sector; the orthodox Protestant column; and the Roman Catholic column.<sup>113</sup>

The Scandinavian countries have seen the formation of several moralist/evangelist parties opposed to the tolerant pragmatism of the established Lutheran Church.<sup>114</sup> They differ from the Christian parties on the Continent: they have not opposed national education as such and have not built up extensive networks of functional organisations around their followers; they have been primarily concerned to defend the traditions of orthodox evangelism against the onslaught of urban secularism and to use the legislative and the executive machinery of the state to protect the young against the evils of modern life. In their rejection of the lukewarm latitudinarianism of the national Mother Church they resemble the Nonconformists in Great Britain and the Anti-Revolutionaries in The Netherlands, but the contexts of their efforts have been very different. In the British case the religious activists could work *within* the Liberal Party (later, of course, also within Labour) and found it possible to advance their views without establishing a party of their own. In the Dutch case, the orthodox dissidents not only set up their own party but built up a strong column of vertical organisations around it.

#### THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY DIMENSION

In the middle between the angles *l* and *a* one finds conflicts over the respective economic interests of the agricultural population and the ever more powerful bourgeoisie. The spectacular growth of world trade and industrial production generated increasing strains between the primary producers in the countryside and the merchants and the entrepreneurs in the towns and the cities. On the Continent, the conflicting interests of the rural and the urban areas had been recognised since the Middle Ages in the separate representation of the estates: the nobility and, in exceptional cases, the freehold peasants spoke for the land, and the burghers spoke for the cities. The Industrial Revolution deepened these conflicts and in country after country produced distinct rural-urban alignments in the national legislatures. Often the old divisions between estates were simply carried over into the unified parliaments and found expression in oppositions between conservative-agrarian and liberal-radical parties.<sup>115</sup>

There was a hard core of economic conflict in these oppositions, but what made them so deep and bitter was the struggle for the maintenance of acquired status and the recognition of achievement. In England, the landed elite ruled the country, and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs, many of them religiously at odds with the established church, for decades aligned themselves in opposition both to defend their economic interests and to assert their claims to status.<sup>116</sup>

The conflict between conservatives and liberals reflected an opposition between two value orientations: the recognition of status through *ascription* and *kin connections* versus the claims for status through *achievement and enterprise*. These are typical strains in all transitional societies; they tend to be most intensive in the early phases of industrialisation and to soften as the rising elite establishes itself in the community. In England, this process of reconciliation proceeded quite rapidly. In a society open to extensive mobility and intermarriage, urban and industrial wealth could gradually be translated into full recognition within the traditional hierarchy of the landed families. More and more mergers took place between the agricultural and the business interests; and this consolidation of the national elite soon changed the character of the conservative-liberal conflict.<sup>117</sup>

A similar *rapprochement* took place between the East Elbian agricultural interests and the western business bourgeoisie in Germany, but there, significantly, the bulk of the liberals sided with the conservatives and did not try to rally the working-class electorate on their side in the way the British party did during the period up to World War I. The result was a deepening of the chasm between burghers and workers and a variety of desperate attempts to bridge it through appeals to national and military values.<sup>118</sup>

In other countries of the European continent the rural-urban cleavage continued to assert itself in national politics far into the twentieth century, but the political expressions of the cleavage varied widely. Much depended on the concentrations of wealth and political control in the cities and on the ownership structure in the rural economy. In the Low Countries, France, Italy, and Spain, rural-urban cleavages rarely found direct expression in the development of party oppositions. Other cleavages, particularly between the state and the churches and between owners and tenants, had greater impact on the alignments of the electorates. By contrast, in the five Nordic countries the cities



had traditionally dominated national political life, and the struggle for democracy and parliamentary rule was triggered off through a broad process of mobilisation within the peasantry.<sup>119</sup> This was essentially an expression of protest against the central elite of officials and patri-cians (a cleavage on the *l-g* axis in our model), but there were also elements of economic opposition in the movement: the peasants felt exploited in their dealings with city folk and wanted to shift the tax burdens to the expanding urban economies.<sup>120</sup>

#### THE WORKER—EMPLOYER DIMENSION

The conflict between landed and urban interests was centred in the *commodity* market. The peasants wanted to sell their wares at the best possible prices and to buy what they needed from the industrial and urban producers at low cost. Such conflicts did not invariably prove party-forming. They could be dealt with within broad party fronts or could be channelled through interest organisations into narrower arenas of functional representation and bargaining. Distinctly agrarian parties have only emerged where strong cultural oppositions have deepened and embittered the strictly economic conflicts.

Conflicts in the *labour* market proved much more uniformly divisive. Working-class parties emerged in every country of Europe in the wake of the early waves of industrialisation. The rising masses of wage earners, whether in large-scale farming, in forestry, or in industry, resented their conditions of work and the insecurity of their contracts, and many of them felt socially and culturally alienated from the owners and the employers. The result was the formation of a variety of labour unions and the development of nation-wide socialist parties.

The success of such movements depended on a variety of factors: the strength of the paternalist traditions of ascriptive recognition of the worker status, the size of the work unit and the local ties of the workers, the level of prosperity and the stability of employment in the given industry, and the chances of improvements and promotion through loyal devotion or through education and achievement. A crucial factor in the development of distinct working-class movements was the *openness* of the given society: was the worker status a lifetime predicament or were there openings for advancement? How easy

was it to get an education qualifying for a change in status? What prospects were there for striking out on one's own?

The contrasts between American and European developments must clearly be analysed in these terms: the American workers were not only given the vote much earlier than their comrades in Europe, but they also found their way into the national system so much more easily because of the greater stress on equality and achievement, because of the many openings to better education, and, last but not least, because the established workers could advance to better positions as new waves of immigrants took over the lower-status jobs (see Lipset 1963: Chapter 5). In nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe the status barriers were markedly higher. The traditions from the estate-divided society kept the workers in their place, and the narrowness of the educational channels of mobility also made it difficult for sons and daughters to rise above their fathers.

There were, however, important variations among the countries of Europe in the attitudes of the established and the rising elites to the claims of the workers, and these differences clearly affected the development of the unions and the socialist parties. In Britain and the Scandinavian countries the attitudes of the elites tended to be more open and pragmatic. As in all other countries there was active resistance to the claims of the workers, but little or no direct repression. These are today the countries with the largest and the most domesticated labour parties in Europe.

In Germany and Austria, France, Italy, and Spain the cleavages went much deeper. A number of attempts were made to repress the unions and the socialists, and the working-class organisations consequently tended to isolate themselves from the national culture and to develop *soziale Ghettoparteien*,<sup>121</sup> strongly ideological movements seeking to isolate their members and their supporters from influences from the encompassing social environments.

This 'anti-system' orientation of large sections of the European working class was brought to a climax in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. The communist movement did not just speak for an alienated stratum of the territorial community but came to be seen as an external conspiracy against the nation. These developments brought a number of European countries to the point of civil war in the 1920s and the 1930s. The greater the numbers of citizens caught in such direct

'friend/foe' oppositions to each other the greater the danger of total disruption of the body politic.

Developments since World War II have pointed toward a reduction of such pitched oppositions and some softening of ideological tensions.<sup>122</sup> A variety of factors contributed to this development: the experience of national co-operation during the war, the improvements in the standard of living in the 1950s, the rapid growth of a 'new middle class' bridging the gaps between the traditional working class and the bourgeoisie. But the most important factor was possibly the *entrenchment of the working-class parties in local and national governmental structures* and their consequent 'domestication' within the established system.<sup>123</sup>

#### CLEAVAGES IN FULLY-MOBILISED POLITIES

The four critical cleavages described in terms of our paradigm were all movements of protest against the *established* national elite and its cultural standards and were parts of a broad wave of emancipation and mobilisation. Quite different types of protest alignments have tended to occur in *fully mobilised nation-states*. In these the focus of protest has no longer been the traditional central culture but the rising networks of new elites, such as the leaders of the new large bureaucratic industries and government, those who control the various sectors of the communications industry, the heads of mass organisations, the leaders in some countries of once weak or low-status minority ethnic or religious groups, and the like. Protest against these new elites and the institutions which foster them has often taken 'anti-system' form, though the ideology has varied from country to country: Fascism in Italy, National Socialism in Germany, Poujadism in France, 'radical rightism' in the United States. In our paradigm such protest movements would cut across the territorial axis very near the *g* pole; the conflict is no longer between constituent territorial units of the nation, but between different conceptions of the constitution and the organisation of the national polity. These have all been nationalist movements: they not only accept, they venerate the historically given nation and its culture, but they reject the system of decision-making and control developed through the process of democratic mobilisation




FIGURE 35. Suggested locations of four 'extremes' in the a-g-i-l schema

and bargaining. Their aim is not just to gain recognition for a particular set of interests within a pluralist system of give and take but to *replace* this system by more authoritarian procedures of allocation.

In one way or another they all express deeply felt convictions about the destiny and the mission of the nation, some quite inchoate, others highly systematised; and they all endeavour to develop networks of organisations to keep their supporters loyal to the cause. They aim at *verzuijling* but want only one column in the nation.

In our a-g-i-l schema, therefore, a fully *verzuijld* nationalist movement would have to be placed at the g-i intersection outside what we might call the 'competitive politics' diamond.

In its early varieties such nationalist movements essentially reflected the reactions of the lower-class strata of the dominant culture against the rising tides of mobilisation within subject populations. In Habsburg Austria the rise of the intransigent Pan-Germans was decisively accelerated through the alliance between the university *Burschenschaften* and Schönerer's nationalist workers' associations; these essentially recruited support among German-speaking craftsmen and workers



threatened by the invasion of Czechs into the new centres of industry (see Whiteside 1962 and 1965). The xenophobia of the Austrian working class proved contagious. There are clear historical links between the early working-class nationalism of the 1880s and 1890s and the National Socialist movement after the defeat in 1918.<sup>124</sup> Hitler inherited his hatred of the Slavs and the Jews from the Austrian working-class nationalists. In our terminology, the National Socialist movement was an alliance at the *g* end of the territorial-cultural axis, the counterpart within the *dominant* national culture to an *l* opposition within some subject population at the periphery.<sup>125</sup>

#### CONDITIONS FOR THE CHANNELLING OF OPPOSITION

Thus far, we have focused on the emergence of *one cleavage at a time* and only incidentally concerned ourselves with the growth of *cleavage systems* and their translations into *constellations of political parties*. In terms of our schema we have limited ourselves to the analysis of the *internal differentiations* of the *I* quadrant and only by implication touched on *interchanges* between *I* and *G*, *I* and *L*, and *L* and *G*. But cleavages do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course: there are considerations of organisational and electoral strategy; there is the weighing of pay-offs of alliances against losses through split-offs; and there is the successive narrowing of the mobilisation market through the time sequences of organisational efforts.

How does a socio-cultural conflict get translated into an opposition between parties? To approach an understanding of the variations in such processes of translation we have to sift out a great deal of information about the *conditions for the expression of protest and the representation of interests* in each society:

1. We must know about the *traditions of decision-making* in the polity: the prevalence of conciliar versus autocratic procedures of central government, the rules established for the handling of grievances and protests, the measures taken to control or to protect political associations, the freedom of communication, and the organisation of demonstrations.<sup>126</sup>
2. We must know about the *channels for the expression and mobilisation of protest*: was there a system of representation and if so how

accessible were the representatives, who had a right to choose them, and how were they chosen? Was the conflict primarily expressed through direct demonstrations, through strikes, sabotage, or open violence, or could it be channelled through regular elections and through pressures on legitimately established representatives?

3. We need information about the *opportunities, the pay-offs, and the costs of alliances* in the system: how ready or reluctant were the old movements to broaden their bases of support and how easy or difficult was it for new movements to gain representation on their own?
4. We must know about the *possibilities, the implications, and the limitations of majority rule* in the system: what alliances would be most likely to bring about majority control of the organs of representation and how much influence could such majorities in fact exert on the basic structuring of the institutions and the allocations within the system?

These series of questions suggest a *sequence of thresholds* in the path of any movement pressing forward new sets of demands within a political system:<sup>127</sup>

1. The threshold of *legitimation*: are all protests rejected as conspiratorial, or is there some recognition of the right of petition, criticism, and opposition?
2. The threshold of *incorporation*: are all or most of the supporters of the movement denied status as participants in the choice of representatives or are they given political citizenship rights on a par with their opponents?
3. The threshold of *representation*: must the new movement join larger and older movements to ensure access to representative organs or can it gain representation on its own?
4. The threshold of *majority power*: are there built-in checks and counter-forces against numerical majority rule in the system or will a victory at the polls give a party or an alliance power to bring about major structural changes in the national system?

This gives us a crude four-variable typology of conditions for the development of party systems [see Figure 36].

Empirically, changes in one such threshold sooner or later generated pressures to change one or more others, but there were many varia-

| Level of each threshold | Legitimisation | Incorporation | Representation | Majority | Resulting party system  |
|-------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------|---|
| High                    | H              | H             | H              | H        | Autocratic or oligarchic regimes. <i>Verfremung</i> <sup>a</sup> of all parties: protests and grievances either channelled through the field administration or through estate representation.   |
| Medium                  | H              | H             | H              | H        | Embryonic internal party systems: cliques of representatives, clubs of <i>notables</i> . Examples: Britain before 1832, Sweden during the quarrels between 'Hats' and 'Caps'. <sup>b</sup>  |
| M                       | M              | M             | H              | H        | Internal party systems generating rudimentary outside support through registration association but safeguards introduced [for] organisations: predominant in Western Europe during period between the breakdown of monarchic absolutism and the introduction of parliamentary rule under manhood suffrage.  |
| Low                     | M              | M             | H              | H        | Initial phase in development of external party system: lower-class movements free to develop, but suffrage still limited and/or unequal. Example: Sweden before 1909.   |
| L                       | M              | M             | H              | M        | Same but with parliamentary rule: Belgium before 1899; Norway, 1884-1900.   |
| M                       | L              | L             | H              | H        | Isolation of lower-class or religious minority parties from the national system: restrictive measures against political organisations but full manhood suffrage. Examples: the Wilhelmine Reich during the period of the <i>Sozialistengesetze</i> , 1878-90; France during the Second Empire and early decades of the Third Republic.  |
| L                       | L              | L             | H              | H        | Competitive party system under universal and equal manhood suffrage but with high pay-offs for alliances and with a clear separation of legislators and executive powers. The best example would be the United States if it were not for the restrictions on Communist Party activities and the low <i>de facto</i> enfranchisement of Negroes in the South. France under the Fifth Republic may be a better example. |
| L                       | L              | L             | H              | H        | Same but with parliamentary rule. Examples: France under later decades of the Third Republic and most of the Fourth; Great Britain since 1918.  |
| L                       | L              | L             | M              | M        | Same but with medium threshold PR (proportional representation): little need for alliances to achieve representation but safeguards introduced against fragmentation through explicit or implicit electoral minima. Examples: the Nordic countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland since 1918-20.  |
| L                       | L              | L             | L              | L        | Same but with maximal PR and fewer restraints against majority power: the fragmented, centrifugal parliament and the plebiscitarian presidency of the Weimar Republic.  |

FIGURE 36. [Thresholds of democratisation and party systems]

<sup>a</sup> This is Paul's term for the initial phase in the growth of parties (see Faul 1964). <sup>b</sup> See esp. (Olsson, 1963).

tions in the sequences of change. There is no 'scalable' dimension of political development from a condition of four 'high' thresholds to one of four 'low' thresholds.

Clear-cut progressions toward lower thresholds are generally observed at the early stages of change: the recognition of freedoms of association, the extension of suffrage. Much greater variations in the paths of development can be observed at the later stages. In fact there is no single terminal stage in the series of changes but several alternative ones:

- LLHH — high-threshold majoritarian representation and separation of powers,
- LLHM — high-threshold majoritarian parliamentarism,
- LLMM — medium-threshold PR parliamentarism,
- LLLL — low-threshold PR and plebiscitarian majority rule.

The early comparative literature on the growth of parties and party systems focused on the consequences of the lowering of the two first thresholds: the emergence of parliamentary opposition and a free press and the extension of the franchise. Tocqueville and Ostrogorski, Weber and Michels, all in their various ways, sought to gain insight into that central institution of the modern polity, the competitive mass party.<sup>128</sup> The later literature, particularly since the 1920s, changed its focus to the third and the fourth threshold: the consequences of the electoral system and the structure of the decision-making arena for the formation and the functioning of party systems. The fierce debates over the pros and cons of electoral systems stimulated a great variety of efforts at comparative analysis, but what they tended to forget was that parties once established develop their own internal structure and build up long-term commitments among core supporters. The electoral arrangements may prevent or delay the formation of a party, but once it has been established and entrenched, it will prove difficult to change its character simply through variations in the conditions of electoral aggregation.

In fact, in most cases it makes little sense to treat electoral systems as independent variables and party systems as dependent. The party strategists will generally have decisive influence on electoral legislation and opt for the systems of aggregation most likely to consolidate their position, whether through increases in their representation,



through the strengthening of the preferred alliances, or through safeguards against splinter movements. In abstract theoretical terms it may well make sense to hypothesise that simple majority systems will produce two-party oppositions within the culturally more homogeneous areas of a polity and only generate further parties through territorial cleavages, but the only convincing evidence for such a generalisation comes from countries with a continuous history of simple majority aggregations from the beginnings of democratic mass politics. There is little hard evidence and much uncertainty about the effects of *later changes* in election laws on the national party system: one simple reason is that the parties already entrenched in the polity will exert a great deal of influence on the extent and the direction of any such changes and at least prove reluctant to see themselves voted out of existence. Any attempt at systematic analysis of variations in the conditions and the strategies of party competition must start out from such differentiations of developmental phases [see also Chapter III.2].

#### THE RULES OF THE ELECTORAL GAME

The early electoral systems all set a high threshold for rising parties. It was everywhere very difficult for working-class movements to gain representation on their own, but there were significant variations in the openness of the systems to pressures from the new strata. The second ballot systems so well known from the Wilhelmine Reich and from the Third and the Fifth French Republics set the highest possible barrier, absolute majority, but at the same time made possible a variety of local alliances among the opponents of the socialists: the system kept the new entrants underrepresented, yet did not force the old parties to merge or to ally themselves nationally. The blatant injustices of the electoral system added further to the alienation of the working classes from the national institutions and generated what Giovanni Sartori has described as systems of 'centrifugal pluralism' (Sartori 1966): one major movement *outside* the established political arena and several opposed parties *within* it.

Simple majority systems of the British/American type also set high barriers against rising movements of new entrants into the political arena; however, the initial level is not standardised at 50 per cent of

the votes cast in each constituency but varies from the outset with the strategies adopted by the established parties. If they join together in defence of their common interests, the threshold is high; if each competes on its own, it is low. In the early phases of working-class mobilisation, these systems have encouraged alliances of the 'Lib-Lab' type. The new entrants into the electorate have seen their only chances of representation as lying in joint candidatures with the more reformist of the established parties. In later phases distinctly socialist parties were able to gain representation on their own in areas of high industrial concentration and high class segregation, but this did not invariably bring about counter-alliances of the older parties. In Britain, the decisive lower-class breakthrough came in the elections of 1918 and 1922. Before World War I the Labour Party had presented its own candidates in a few constituencies only and had not won more than 42 out of 670 seats; in 1918 they suddenly brought forth candidates in 388 constituencies and won 63 of them and then in 1922 advanced to 411 constituencies and 142 seats. The simple-majority system did not force an immediate restructuring of the party system, however. The Liberals continued to fight on their own and did not give way to the Conservatives until the emergency election of 1931. The inveterate hostilities between the two established parties helped to keep the average threshold for the newcomers tolerably low, but the very ease of this process of incorporation produced a split within the ranks of Labour. The currency crisis forced the leaders to opt between their loyalty to the historical nation and their solidarity with the finally mobilised working class.<sup>129</sup>

This brings us to a crucial point in our discussion of the translation of cleavage structure into party systems: *the costs and the pay-offs of mergers, alliances, and coalitions*. The height of the representation threshold and the rules of central decision-making may increase or decrease the net returns of joint action, but the intensity of inherited hostilities and the openness of communications across the cleavage lines will decide whether mergers or alliances are actually workable. There must be some minimum of trust among the leaders, and there must be some justification for expecting that the channels to the decision-makers will be kept open whoever wins the election. The British electoral system can only be understood against the background of the long-established traditions of territorial representation; the MP rep-