

Decolonial Theories in Comparison

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The article examines the theories of decolonization that have originated in the north of the Americas and Oceania and Latin America. It compares settler colonial theories developed by Australian historians Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini with the theory of the coloniality of power of the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano. The author argues that Wolfe's and Veracini's theory of settler colonialism creates a conceptual distancing from what they call exploitation colonialism (which supposedly characterizes Latin America colonialism) that is not only theoretically unsound, but also historically inaccurate. The land/labor binary that they build in their theory of settler colonialism holds up only if it excludes Latin America from the analysis. This becomes evident in their analyses of the state, race, and miscegenation. Both theories, however, largely ignore gender in the description of colonization, a gap that Latin American decolonial theorists and feminist indigenous theorists of the north must fill. The differences between the theories determines also the ways they imagine decolonization.

Key words: settler colonialism; exploitation colonialism; the coloniality of power; land/labor binary; nation-state; race; miscegenation; gender; decolonization

1 Introduction

In the last decades, the academy both in the west and non-west has witnessed a great proliferation of theoretical discourses based on analyses of different colonial experiences around the world. I refer to postcolonial, Latin American decolonial studies, and studies on settler colonialism that are in great vogue today in universities. This recent proliferation of colonial studies has created new disciplines, new possibilities for career academics, new series of publications, new lecture circuits, and new funding opportunities for research (Moreton-Robertson 2016).¹ The colonial is the most important category of analysis today both within the social sciences and the humanities, increasingly displacing the analytical categories of Marxism such as social class and theoretical approaches such as postmodernism and poststructuralism.

Something that stands out from this new academic production is that for the first time some of its main authors are indigenous scholars, scholars of African origin, or scholars from the Global South, although the largest production of colonial studies is still in the hands of the descendants of the colonizers. Moreover, as funding is reduced by budget cuts in the universities, conventional disciplines (almost always dominated by white men) try to appropriate the contents of the new disciplines. As a curious detail, in the United States the new indigenous studies on settler colonialism were for the first time recognized as a discipline at Princeton University, one of the elite universities of that country (Moreton-Robertson 2016: 7). That is to say, there has been an openness at the highest level of the pyramidal structure of US American universities for the study of coloniality or the ways in which colonial structures remain in place after independence. We had witnessed something similar before with postcolonial studies, but today postcolonialism is strongly questioned by the newer studies of settler colonialism and decolonial theory. These new studies not only compete or put in question postcolonialism's value in explaining coloniality, decolonial

theorists also accuse postcolonialism of being an indirect agent of Eurocentrism due to its association with postmodernism.² Whatever the case may be, the issue of coloniality has generated great interest and created a vast demand in the academic market of ideas that does not seem likely to diminish for now.

In the north, this growing interest in the colonial might be in part due to the greater presence of academics from the colony in universities. The last decades have witnessed the entry of indigenous people and migrants from former colonies in metropolitan universities in relatively significant numbers, and even in Latin America we can see greater access of indigenous and Afro-descendant populations to universities. But more important than this has been the growing political mobilization of indigenous people and Afro-descendants worldwide, especially since the nineties with the fifth centenary of the so-called discovery and the struggle against extractivism today. However, this new set of theories about the colonial fact is not produced exclusively in the academy. Outside of academia, indigenous, Afro-descendants, and mestizx intellectuals from different latitudes are also engaged in the investigative work of the colonial as part of an effort to break the monologues of western academics and to create alternative spaces for the production of knowledge based on other epistemic logics.

Another particular characteristic of the recent trend in the field is that studies of coloniality tend to concentrate on the European colonial expansion that began in 1492 with Portuguese and Spaniards in America, extending one hundred years later (1607) with the English, Dutch, French, and Germans occupying the vast territories of North America and towards the end of the eighteenth century (1788) those of Oceania and India. New studies on the late colonization of Africa (1870-1900) carried out by the British, French, Germans, Belgians, and Dutch can be included in this long list as well, as well as studies on the colonization of Hawai'i by the United States (1778/1959). Last, but not least, is the recent incorporation of the Israeli occupation of Palestine in the aforementioned settler colonialism studies.

This almost exclusive attention to European colonialism makes us lose sight of other colonial experiences in which Europeans were not involved at all, or if they were involved, then only briefly or intermittently. This is the case of the colonial experiences of the Austronesians peoples from the territories of what is now Taiwan that were occupied by the Dutch, Chinese, and Spanish in different periods, and also of Indonesia, the Philippines, East Timor, Malaysia and, of course, Vietnam. Vietnam suffered one thousand years of Chinese colonization (from 111 BCE to 938 CE and intermittently later until the fifteenth century), and later, in 1887, they underwent the occupation of France that lasted until 1954 (Shih 2015).³ From the perspective of the indigenous peoples of Asia, colonization has not been an undertaking exclusively of Europeans. The fact that their colonial experience is not considered in postcolonial and decolonial studies as well as in settler colonial studies is due to a form of Eurocentrism that inadvertently persists in these theories. This criticism is beginning to generate greater interest in conducting studies that examine non-European colonialism, and some even begin to think that it is necessary to revise colonial theories that are limited to the study of European colonialism.⁴

But it has not been only the excessive attention to the maritime empires of Europe and the little attention to continental expansionism of non-European empires that can be disputed. Within the new studies of the colonial we can observe other divisions, among them those that focus on the experiences of the peoples who suffered Iberian colonialism and those who were colonized by northwestern Europeans, especially by the British. Another dividing strategy has been to separate the colonial experiences of the First World countries from those of the Third World countries (Moreton-Robinson 2016). In other words, there has not been a rigorous comparative analysis like the one Shu-mei Shi proposes (Shih 2015) that is interested in seeing the inter-imperial connections

and the intersectionality of the different colonial experiences.⁵ Instead these new studies of the colonial have preserved the hierarchical, imperial vision of the north that prioritizes the British Empire while ignoring Iberian empires.⁶ The separation of disciplines and objects of study that has characterized the western university has also been maintained. This prevents us from seeing the interconnectivity and the historical continuity that exists between the different processes of colonization. A problem of another nature that is often mentioned is the use of colonial studies as a platform for the formation of identities that curiously not only often remain tied to colonial definitions, but produce new essentialisms and divisions that end up separating academic projects and the resistance politics of the different colonial subjects (Hokowithu 2016).⁷ A case in point are the Chicanxs in the US who have caused discomfort among US indigenous peoples by claiming an indigenous identity for themselves (Hartley 2012).⁸

In the same vein, postcolonial studies that study the colonial experience of India and the Middle East take little or nothing into account about Iberian colonialism in their analysis of the historical course of colonialism. Nor do we find adequate attention to Iberian colonialism in the indigenous studies of Canada, USA, and Oceania. There is a certain provincialism and even a historical myopia that does not allow us to see common origins, imbricated processes, and juxtapositions of the different colonial trajectories. It is also interesting to note that despite strong criticisms of the settler colonial state, the nation-state remains the unit of analysis of settler colonialism theory. The historical continuities and the interrelationships and rivalries between the different colonial empires and even of those prior to the conquest are obscured in these delimitations.⁹ There is neither integrative analysis of the parallels nor of the connections between the different histories. Often these divisions unconsciously follow the parameters of the so-called Anglo-sphere and Hispanic-sphere. The US American historian Darrin M. McMahon establishes a series of properties and qualities for each sphere that makes societies and cultures as well as imperial/colonial projects of the Iberian and Anglo-Saxon totally different and incompatible (McMahon 2004).¹⁰ There is no doubt that these artificial divisions are related to the mythology of so-called US American exceptionalism which this nation attributes to itself with such a singularity that it separates itself irremediably from other human experiences, making its own superior to all the rest. These separations bring about several analytical problems and political implications that will be the subject of what follows.

What I will present in the next pages is a relational comparative analysis of decolonial theory inspired by Latin American authors such as Aníbal Quijano and settler colonialism theory written by native and non-native scholars of North America and Oceania. My intention is neither to make a genealogy nor an ethnography of these theoretical approaches, nor to establish which offers the best decolonization recipes. My interest is to discover or uncover, as well as create links between these theories which are concealed when they are constituted as separate entities. This I will do through the review of four major areas: 1) the comparison between the concept of the colonality of power of Aníbal Quijano and the concept of settler colonialism of Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini, 2) the different treatment of the idea of race and miscegenation that each theory uses, 3) the place that gender analysis occupies in both theories, 4) and finally, the conceptions that each one has about decolonization. By carrying out these analyses, I hope to show how different processes of colonialism are historically interrelated.

2 Decolonial Theory and Settler Colonialism

Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini, both of European origin, define settler colonialism as a type of colonization carried out by colonists coming from overseas who arrive with the previous intention of permanently establishing themselves in a territory that does not belong to them (Veracini 2010¹¹; Wolfe 1999,¹² 2001,¹³ 2016¹⁴). Their intentions of settlement imply that their migratory project (if one can describe it that way) requires the displacement of the population that originally occupied the territories. They are settlers who come to stay with the firm purpose of establishing a new political order. The settlers are not in this case representatives of an overseas colonial administration, nor do they feel strongly obliged to obey the monarchical will of the metropolis. From the beginning they arrive with the plan to establish a new independent political order. To put it another way, their relationship with the metropolis appears tenuous from the beginning. As Veracini (2010) says, the settlers carry sovereignty with them; it is carried in their bodies. Wherever they set foot, the sovereignty of the settlers is built, and, on their march, they destroy the sovereignty of the indigenous peoples. But whereas the objective is to create a new homeland or an exclusive community of white men, they do not completely leave behind the societies they abandoned; they always seek to replicate them in the new place.

Wolfe and Veracini differentiate the usurper settler from a migrant or refugee who arrives at a territory already preconfigured politically as a nation-state. What the migrant and the refugee are looking for is inclusion in a preestablished order and not the creation of a new one. The refugee is in this sense the antithesis of the usurper settler because he arrives in new lands involuntarily and without a previous plan. Unlike the migrant and the refugee, the usurper settler opens up space by means of the war of conquest of new territories and his plan is to create a new society of settlers. It would make more sense to compare the settler colonial with other agents of colonization like the conquistador and encomendero of colonial Spain.

Interestingly, neither Wolfe nor Veracini make a comparison between the usurper settler from northern Europe and the Spanish conqueror or encomendero. This would be the most logical thing to do given that the migrant and the refugee are rather late modern figures. I think that this silence around the Iberian conqueror is due in part to the sharp division that Wolfe and Veracini make between settler colonialism and what they call exploitation colonialism, that is, a type of colonization that is fundamentally characterized by the exploitation and control of indigenous labor. For them, following the itinerary of Iberianism, exploitation colonialism is what took place in Latin America/Abya Yala and therefore something different and unrelated to settler colonialism.

These conceptual distinctions between colonialisms open an immense theoretical gap between the colonialism that occurs in North America and Oceania and that which occurs in Latin America. It creates a binary opposition between settler colonialism and exploitation colonialism that becomes insurmountable; I say insurmountable because this division is what gives internal consistency to the theory of settler colonialism. Without this distinction, the premises of settler colonialism could not be sustained. Let's see how this theory is constructed.

As in any binary construct, the theory of settler colonialism gives a different valuation to each of the sides. In this case, settler colonialism is seen as the most profound and efficient form of colonization because, as Wolfe (1999) says, it works with a logic of extermination of the indigenous (it gets rid of the obstacles in its way). Exploitation colonialism is based on the labor exploitation of the indigenous people. Therefore, there is an interest in preserving the indigenous population—which means keeping obstacles in the bosom of the new society. Settler colonialism requires the usurpation of indigenous territories, the physical and cultural elimination of the indigenes, and the importation of enslaved Africans to work the expropriated lands. Land is, therefore, of maximum

importance for settler colonialism, while control of labor is of maximum importance for exploitation colonialism. In this type of colonialism, the importation of slaves is complementary, and slave labor does not substitute the exploitation of indigenous labor.

If we follow the definition of settler colonialism suggested by Wolfe and Veracini, we must assume that the colonial situation of Latin America is radically different from that of settler colonial societies. Since land is not essential, we must presume that Iberian colonizers did not arrive with the intention of creating a new political order. Instead they came with the idea of extracting as much wealth as possible, to get rapidly rich and return to where they came from. Such a colonizer would be interested in preserving the labor only temporarily. Nonetheless, unlike the settler usurper, the Iberian colonizers would be a minority in front of a vanquished indigenous mass now reduced to servitude that can become in any moment insurgent. In contrast, in settler colonialism the indigenous population is reduced culturally and physically. It is not used as labor and is simply considered nonexistent. For the settler usurper, the disappearance of the indigenous is indispensable for his project of refoundation. He is forced to imagine the new lands as *terra nullius* and transform this fiction into reality to legitimize his power over the usurped territories, and thus become the legitimate, “real” native. The disappearance of the indigenous—it is said—was so ingrained in the mind of the usurper settlers that the concept of settler colonialism was at first not even associated with processes of conquest and colonization. The activity of the settlers occurred mentally in unoccupied lands even in the heads of its theoreticians (Veracini 2013).¹⁵ According to Wolfe and Veracini, none of this happened in Latin America (although they occasionally include Argentina in their analyses).

This strict separation between settler colonialism and exploitation colonialism presents us with several analytical and historical problems. On the one hand, it is absurd to think that the exploitation of indigenous labor in exploitation colonialism can go without the usurpation of territories. Obviously, labor exploitation was and always is preceded by the occupation of territories. The control of land as well as indigenous labor was essential not only for extractive activities like mining but was indispensable for agriculture also, because it was what guaranteed the reproduction of indigenous labor and the survival of the *encomendero-conquistador*. Needless to say, from the indigenous perspective, whether the control of territories was by settlers who were relatively independent of the metropolis or *encomenderos* under monarchical control did little to change the despoliation of their lands.

Shannon Speed, one of the few indigenous scholars in North America who criticizes the land-work binary of Wolfe’s settler colonialism concept, notes that settler colonialism not only characterizes the colonization of Latin America, but also that the colonization of Latin America was more destructive. Here indigenous peoples were forced to work in the same lands that were expropriated from them (and this we see to this day). In short, in Latin America indigenous people were subject to both forced labor and territorial dispossession (Speed 2017: 785).¹⁶ For Speed, settler colonialism is then a hemispheric phenomenon that has historical continuity and parallels between the north and the south of the Americas.

Also, it would be absurd to think that the Spanish colonizers did not come to stay. More than a century before the usurping settlers of northern Europe, the Spanish conquerors arrived and stayed. In fact, in the new confiscated territories they re-founded the new political societies that are what we have inherited today. Do not forget that it is Iberian colonialism that opened the way to the usurping settlers of northern Europe. It is in the competition and dispute with Iberian colonialism in America that British colonialism itself is constituted, that is, through the invasion and recolonization of territories occupied by Spaniards and oftentimes the French. In other words, without Iberian colonialism there is no British (or French, for that matter) colonialism. That is why there are

similarities, parallels, and points of divergence between both; that is, there is more in common than what is thought.

To illustrate, colonizers of both northern and southern Europe applied a genocidal reason to the indigenous peoples. The Spanish completely exterminated the indigenous peoples of the Caribbean. In the rest of America, they created a dramatic decline in the population through war, forced labor, forced migration, and contagious diseases. Both colonizers, although in different periods, resorted to the massive importation of African slaves to replace indigenous labor. It is also important to mention that new studies (Reséndez 2017; Bossy 2016; Gally 2002)¹⁷ are finding that indigenous labor was not entirely irrelevant to the settler colonialism of North America as has been said so far. Sufficient evidence has been excavated to confirm that indigenous slavery existed in tandem with African slavery. The reason for its invisibility until now is that the indigenous slavery was carried out in secrecy. These studies estimate that between 2.5 and 5 million indigenous people suffered slavery during colonization (Reséndez 2017: 5). In the Spanish colonies, there existed a series of clauses that allowed indigenous slavery even after its prohibition in 1542. It was allowed by just war, if indigenous people did not accept Christianity, if they were part of the practice of ransom, if they served as slaves before the arrival of the Spaniards, if they had been captured by other Indians, or if they were categorized as cannibals, etc. To demonstrate that they did not fit into any of these categories, indigenous slaves had to go to the courts of Spain to regain their freedom, a process which could take several years. Hundreds of indigenous slaves were transferred to Spain or other territories of the Spanish colonies. Many of them never returned to their villages nor enjoyed freedom (van Deusen 2015).¹⁸ It is also important to emphasize that indigenous slavery was not limited to “legal” slaves. It continued in Latin America in an extensive and clandestine way, lasting even to this day.

In the north as in the south, it was above all the trafficking of female slaves and indigenous children that prevailed, which according to Andrés Reséndez, a US American historian, was very similar to the sexual trafficking that we see today. Women were coveted for sexual exploitation and for the biological reproduction of labor. What is really interesting here is that in the nineteenth century, some indigenous peoples in the north of the Americas, among them the Apaches, the Comanches, the Utes, and the Navajos, became slave traders themselves. They traded in other Indians, who were kidnapped in Mexican territory and then sold in the United States! (Reséndez 2016: 7). This reveals the historical links that have always existed between these nations and also the interconnectivity of colonization processes. In other words, the thesis of the irrelevance of indigenous labor that settler colonialism proclaims cannot be held. The presumed differences with exploitation colonialism are more of degree rather than of essence. In sum, this sharp separation between settler colonialism and exploitation colonialism is not very useful.

What does the decolonial theory of Latin America tell us in return? If we compare the concept of the coloniality of power of Aníbal Quijano with the concept of settler colonialism of Patrick Wolfe, we realize immediately that the vision of Quijano is planetary, that it has few overtones of the provincialism that we observe in settler colonialism. For him, the coloniality of power is a pattern of global power that characterized the entire world from 1492 on. The year 1492 is considered a founding date of a new world because it marks the beginning of a colonial rule that covers the entire planet for the first time in history. This does not mean that Quijano does not recognize the different effects that European colonialism had in different parts of the world. On the contrary, Quijano details in his works the differences between European colonialisms in India and elsewhere outside of the Americas. In the case of America, he recognizes the different effects on the indigenous and black populations and the different political configurations that emerge from the differences between the south and the north. But his vision of America is hemispheric. Quijano is

not interested in delineating these experiences as if they were unrelated or as if they could be analyzed in isolation. This does not prevent him from seeing their own particularities in the context of the totality of the European colonial experience. Yet within settler colonialism theory, the separation between the two regions is so categorical and unavoidable that not only does it not allow a comparative analysis, but it becomes necessary to exclude Latin America altogether from the analysis. In turn, what gives Quijano's coloniality of power its global character is at the same time what confines it to Europe.

Despite the distinctions that separate the theoretical and even political project of settler colonialism from the project of coloniality of power, we also find some points in common. The coloniality of power implies a historical process that continues to this day. Coloniality continues today to structure the power relations within the former colonies and between the metropolis and the former colonies. This is the utility of the concept: to discover the historical continuity of the colonial logic in the configuration of power locally and globally in the present. It is not, as Speed points out in her article "Structures of Settler Colonialism in Abya Yala," that Quijano sees the end of coloniality with independence or coloniality as a residue of colonialism (Speed 2017: 786). Quite the contrary, the heuristic capability of the concept of coloniality of power is that it lays bare the coloniality that still shapes power in the present. Lately, Rita Segato has refined Quijano's vision by talking about conquestability to denote that the process of conquest is an unfinished process in Latin America (Segato 2016).¹⁹

Wolfe says something similar when he states that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event (Wolfe 1999). It is not something that occurred in the past and that no longer exists, but something that continues to configure power relations wherever settler colonialism takes up residence. This means that for both Wolfe and Quijano the process of conquest is still ongoing. One could surmise that Wolfe applies the same logic to Latin America, but because he does not carry out a comparative analysis in relation, we cannot know this. Latin America, as we have mentioned earlier, is completely outside his parameters of analysis. But for Speed, who has done a comparative analysis between the north and south of America, although very briefly, it is Quijano and other Latin American anti-colonial theorists who cannot see the continuity of coloniality. She gives the example of Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, who, according to her, views internal colonialism as a relic of the past (Speed 2017: 786). There is no space here to delve deeply into the fine grain of the texts of these theorists. But one has to emphasize that the coloniality of power of Quijano implies by definition a historical colonial continuity that encompasses the present. It is a colonial process that is active, continuous, and structural, and not an occurrence in the remote past of which only ruins are left.

There are still other points in common. Both theories, the coloniality of power and settler colonialism, try to distinguish themselves from the traditional notion of colonialism, although they do it differently. In Quijano, coloniality differs from colonialism because colonialism ends with independence from the Spanish Crown, that is, when external and direct administrative rule comes to an end. But the coloniality of power, or the colonial logic, continues to structure social relations even after independence. Similarly, both Wolfe and Veracini distinguish between colonialism and settler colonialism. According to them, colonialism requires an exogenous domination of a minority over an indigenous majority. The numerical relationship or the demographic ratio seems to have some importance in this vision. This distinction is not strong, as Veracini notes. It would mean that once the colonizers are the majority they would no longer be colonizers, or if the indigenous become a minority they would no longer be colonized. This would be absurd (Veracini 2010: 5). Rather, Veracini and Wolfe seek to differentiate settler colonialism from colonization by exploitation. That is, colonialism is supposedly what happens outside of settler colonialism. Exogenous domination or excessive metropolitan power is what characterizes colonialism, that is,

colonization by exploitation, while endogenous and autonomous domination is what defines settler colonialism. But as Speed correctly says, this definition ignores the permanent tensions between the *encomenderos* and the Spanish Crown (Speed: 2017). As is well known, the *conquistadores-encomenderos* developed very early on their own particular interests outside those of the Crown and created their own projects of domination independently of the objectives of the Spanish Crown. Only when these tensions and the political projects of the Spanish colonizers are ignored can the distinction between exploitation colonialism with settler colonialism retain some meaning. It is a distinction that ends up defining colonialism as what happened in Latin America and settler colonialism as what happened in North America.

3 State, Race, and Miscegenation

The theoretical gaps grow even greater when we analyze the different conceptions of the nation-state and of the idea of race and miscegenation that each theory presents. In the analysis of the nation-state of Quijano, we see an emphasis on the social relations of capital. That is, it is the organization of labor, or of the forms of exploitation of labor based on the idea of race, that will define the form of the national state that is formed after independence. There is no doubt that for Quijano labor is the central category. It is not surprising because we know that Quijano comes from Marxism. However, he adds the role of race in the distribution of labor that not only distances him from Marxism but leads him to very different conclusions. Yet it is notorious that the question of land occupation, which is so important for theorists of settler colonialism, is somewhat absent in Quijano.²⁰ The occupied territory in which capital is organized as a racialized social relationship, and then the nation-state that derives from it, is out of focus. In this sense, Shannon Speed is right when she says that for decolonial theorists, territorial occupation is a *fait accompli*. Decolonial analysis seems to see the occupation of land as irrevocable (Speed 2017: 786). Quijano privileges the question of labor and not the occupation of the land, as if he followed the premises settler colonialism has of the colonization of Latin America.

It could be that the descendants of the Spanish colonizers or *mestizxs* like Quijano (or myself) may not feel they are land usurpers in the present. Do we take for granted the occupation of the indigenous territories of the new Latin American nation-states as an irreversible fact, and that our “rightful” presence in the conquered lands is indisputable? Is it the old dilemma of the *mestizxs* who have no sociological location or *ur-community* to fall back on and who see themselves therefore as the rightful inheritors of the conquered lands? I think the answer to these questions is very important for our decolonization projects.

As far as the state is concerned, for Quijano, what will determine its coherence, stability, and democratic quality will be the greater or lesser presence of indigenous labor, African descendants, and European white populations. This is, in other words, defined demographically. The greater the free, waged white population, the stronger the sovereignty of the state and citizen rights and vice versa. The greater the indigenous population and the black population working in conditions of servitude, the lower the degree of sovereignty that a state can obtain, and the less rights citizens can aspire to have. The racial composition of Latin America truncates the form of the state and citizenship, while given the existence of a white majority in the USA and Canada, it is possible to establish a strong and hyper-sovereign state and a democratic society. We should, however, be reminded that the foundations of the state in the US and Canada were never democratic. Neither women, indigenous, nor blacks were initially included in the political society.

Interestingly, as this demographic composition is inverted in the US due to the massive immigration of Latin Americans, the “American Experiment” comes to an end in the Trump era.

In contrast, for the theorists of settler colonialism, the nation-state is an illegitimate state based on the continuous and violent occupation of indigenous lands. By definition, we are dealing with a settler colonial state that depends on the extermination of the indigenous population to be able to constitute the usurpers or the white majorities not only as legitimate owners of the expropriated territories but as the only ones who can enjoy political rights. From this theoretical perspective, everyone who claims rights to this usurping state becomes a usurper of the rights of indigenous people, including migrants who come from elsewhere (Tuck and Yang 2013).²¹

On the other hand, settler colonialism theory recognizes (although it does not delve much into this topic) capitalism as a prevailing system. But given that indigenous labor is irrelevant to its reproduction as a system, the indigenous political project demands, above all, the restitution of lands and sovereignty. State reform, or inclusion in the nation-state as citizens, does not matter much. From this perspective, the anti-capitalist struggle by itself would not be enough because it would leave intact the possession of the land in the hands of non-indigenous people.

As we see, the analysis of capital and labor is not as essential as it is for Quijano. It only emerges in the analysis of settler colonialism to differentiate the form of subordination of enslaved Africans in the settler colonial state from that of indigenous subordination. According to this analysis, usurper settlers do not apply a logic of extermination to enslaved Africans. On the contrary, during slavery, as many slaves as possible were needed for work on the plantations in occupied lands. The role of enslaved black women was crucial because they provided the supply of slaves. Their children were born slaves (even when the father was white, or the children were the result of rape). In the case of indigenous women, it was the complete opposite. The usurper settler raped them or kidnapped their children to create white kinship (Nahwilet Meissner and Whyte 2017: 157).²²

In the US, these different rationalities towards the indigenous and the enslaved African produced different racial policies for each group. The so-called “rule of one drop” was applied. As Wolfe tells us in one of his last works, the so-called one-drop rule allows the assimilation of the indigenous, because the mixture with the white is enough to make them disappear. In contrast, a single drop of African blood is enough to immediately lose the white or indigenous status of a person (Wolfe 2001: 866). In these racial politics, indigenous blood seems easy to dilute, while African blood is credited with extraordinary polluting powers. This racial policy did not allow the development of a stratum based on miscegenation or mestizaje. From the indigenous point of view, miscegenation meant their extinction; however, for the African, it meant their segregation; and for the white, it was seen as a mongrelization.

In Latin America, the opposite is supposed to be the case. A drop of white blood is presumed to whiten both the indigenous and the African, creating mestizaje and “mulataje.” There is no place to delve deeply into these categories and the politics of the caste system that during the colonization period meticulously regulated the social classification of people according to such notions as the “purity of blood” and the different possible mixtures of race. The notion of “purity of blood” was meant originally to distinguish Old Christians from New Christians or converted Jews and was applied in the colonies as an organizing principle of inclusion/exclusion of the different racialized groups. To be sure, the caste system reveals the complexity and virulence of racial classifications in Latin America. We can see how the creation of mestizaje, or the racial democracy Brazil speaks of, has served as a cloak not only for the deep racism against indigenous and blacks that exists in Latin American societies, but also for the logic of elimination that also characterizes us. This is because mestizaje is nothing more than the extinction of the indigenous in the figure of the

mestizo. In this sense, the ideology of mestizaje as the foundation of the Latin American nation-state is revealed as a stratagem of elimination that seeks to get rid of the undesirable elements of the indigenous and the black (Silverblatt 2012).²³

The different conceptions of the state, race, and mestizaje have political consequences. In Latin America, the indigenous movements combine the claim of the territories and fight against the permanent dispossession of their lands at the same time that they rely on the state to protect their rights. The refoundation of the state in plurinational states, and the incorporation of indigenous principles such as “Buen Vivir” and the rights of nature in the constitutions, are merely reforms to the mestizo-criollo state and not its overthrow. The acceptance of indigenous principles in the constitutions by mestizo-criollo and even indigenous politicians such as Evo Morales have been cosmetic reforms that legitimize rather than transform the mestizo-criollo state. They are not interventions that endeavor to change the colonial character of the state.

In contrast, the indigenous politics of settler colonialism imply a total rejection of the usurper colonial state. In the north of the Americas, the indigenous population has been cornered in reserves or dispersed in different urban centers through forced transfers after massive expropriation of their lands. Their relationship with the state is of exteriority. Their recognition as nations within the settler colonial state has been key to defining this exteriority with the state. Exteriority has allowed the usurper states of the US and Canada not only to build a complex and perverse network of indigenous authorities in the reservations that do not enjoy sovereignty or real autonomy, but also to reserve the right of impunity over any violation of the rights of the indigenous people. To illustrate, for the longest time a white man who raped an indigenous woman could not be judged by indigenous authorities on an indigenous reservation.²⁴ Indigenous women are the ones who suffer most from male violence in the US, and most of their perpetrators are white men.²⁵ It is understandable that this is one of the reasons indigenous peoples in North America insist on the non-recognition of the nation-state as a legitimate authority. Their anti-state policy is non-negotiable. But this position places them in an almost impossible situation because only the destruction of the nation-state of the greatest power in the world could guarantee the return of their lands and the recovery of their sovereignty.

Both in the north and in the south, indigenous people have faced the dilemma of sharing land, sovereignty, and power with their invaders. Both the British settlers and the settlers of other parts of Europe, as well as the Iberians in the south, have come to stay. The mestizxs that are the result of the colonial fact have tried to convert these colonial relations in their favor by raising mestizaje as the substratum of the nation-state (Mendoza 2001).²⁶ In this way they claim the inheritance of the conqueror-encomendero father. In the north, miscegenation works as a way to whitewash the indigenous, make them indistinguishable from whites, and to proclaim whites as the legitimate heirs of the invaded lands. None of these situations are favorable for indigenous people. What to do then? What should decolonization entail? I will return to this topic at the end.

Before closing this section and without being able to go into much detail, I want to address another point in which Wolfe’s settler colonialism differs from Quijano’s coloniality of power. I am referring to the different historiographies that they use to understand the origins of the concept of race and racism. In his latest book, “Traces of History,” Wolfe retraces the history of race and racism to compare the different race regimes that were established in Australia, the US, Brazil, and Israel (Wolfe 2016). As is common in the Anglo-sphere, Wolfe ignores the history of race and racism of Iberian colonialism to locate the origin of the conception of race and racism directly towards the end of the eighteenth century in northern Europe in its transition from mercantilism to industrial capitalism. This transition is aided by the economic conditions that prevailed in the settler colonies, where he includes Brazil as a kind of counterpoint (Wolfe 2016: 8).

It is well known that the Iberian colonizers did not use the terms “race” or “racism” in their social classification systems, nor did they use the term “colonies” to refer to their overseas territories. This does not mean of course that racism and colonization did not exist. Many authors, however, do not recognize the origin of the idea of race and racism in the Iberian colonies because the social distinctions there were based on religious criteria and occurred in a “pre-capitalist” economic environment. For Wolfe, as for many Anglo-centric authors, race is constituted from the advent of the Enlightenment and science as the central nucleus of modern society. Race and racism exist only when science justifies, essentializes, and naturalizes the color of the skin as a proof of biological inferiority. However, to attribute the creation of race and racism to science and industrial capitalism is to put the cart in front of the horse.

Scientific racism is nothing more than the culmination of a long history of racialization that begins as far back as the eighth century with the Muslim enslavement of Africans. If we make use of a long historical memory it can be said that racism somehow predates the European colonial expansion and its origins are even outside Europe. James H. Sweet, in his work “The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought” (Sweet 1997),²⁷ traces its history very convincingly. Eight hundred years before the Iberians, Muslims had already begun to capture Africans as slaves, citing a cultural and biological inferiority based on their skin color and phenotype. Arab-Muslims saw the ways of life of Africans as expressions of a cultural inferiority that was indisputably related to a biological inferiority that placed them close to the animal kingdom. That is why Muslims, who also had white slaves, reserved the heaviest jobs for blacks. It did not take long for black skin to mean inferiority even when one was not a slave. Little by little, blackness came to amount to slavery in the entire Islamic world that for a long time included the Iberian Peninsula. Judeo-Christian traditions began adding new justifications to the degradation of the African by associating black slavery with the curse of Ham, the son of Noah, who in punishment for having sodomized his father is condemned to be black and slave for eternity, according to the Old Testament. These biblical allusions created a religious discourse of racism and black slavery. Arabs began to associate the so-called African inferiority to their condition as infidels. Iberians took up many of the myths and symbols of the Arabs and Jews and added new arguments (Sweet 1997: 8). During the Reconquista, or the historical period when Iberian Christians reconquered the territories occupied by Muslim kingdoms, blacks were not only not Christians, but they were also forced to be servile towards the Arab non-believers, that is to say, they were doubly condemned to slavery. Not even conversion to Christianity or Islam exempted them from their destiny as slaves.

Later, Iberians would turn the same racist principles against Muslims and Jews that they applied to Africans, accusing them of being infidels and taking them as slaves. By 1441, the Vatican had given its blessing to black slavery by extending all power to the kingdoms that imposed Christianity. The purity of blood was not based exclusively on the quality of the Christian. It was based equally on the color of the skin. As a result, both Portuguese and Spaniards began to dedicate themselves to slave trade. As the demand for slaves increased, racist ideology became more coherent in the Iberian world. Portugal even based its entire economy on the slave trade. This became the case before and then after its invasion of what is now Brazil. By 1480, there was already an important flow of slaves through Spain and Portugal.

At the time of the conquest of America, Iberians were already well equipped with a racist ideology that would justify the large-scale slave trade and genocide in America. The idea of race that Quijano and other decolonial theorists refer to is this Muslim and Iberian prelude. That is why Quijano spoke of the idea of race to denote its anteriority and difference from race as a scientific category that the British would develop in the eighteenth century.

To conclude, racism precedes capitalism and does not emerge solely in British space. Rather it has deep roots in the Muslim and Iberian worlds. Yet racism will become the engine of capitalism once it is resourced with the vast territories confiscated in America. Scientific racism is, as has been said several times, just a secularization of a process that had been developing for several centuries. This history of race and racism is completely erased from the history of settler colonialism.

4 The Treatment of Gender

It would be almost redundant to say that gender receives a secondary treatment in both the theory of settler colonialism and in the colonality of power of Quijano. In Wolfe and Veracini there is a sepulchral silence around the subject. And Quijano, although he includes the control of women as a substantive area of the colonality of power, does not develop it in his writings. The younger decolonial theorists are correcting this neglect of gender, but nowhere does gender have the same stature as race. Both for settler colonial and decolonial theorists, the question of race occupies a central stage. To analyze the treatment of gender within decolonial theory and settler colonialism, we have to resort to the works of indigenous and decolonial feminists who have been influenced by these two theoretical currents. Literature in this field is very broad and I cannot do it justice. However, I would like to briefly compare, on the one hand, the texts on violence against women of Rita Segato, an Argentinean author who can be considered a Quijanist, and Maria Lugones (2007, 2020),²⁸ also Argentinean, who coined the term the colonality of gender inspired by Quijano. And on the other hand, I take up the texts of such feminist indigenous theorists of North America as Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, who wrote “Decolonization is not a Metaphor” (2012), and Andrea Smith (2005),²⁹ all feminist theorists of settler colonialism. I will make only a brief sketch of the points of intersection and divergence that exist between these authors.

Segato goes back to the moment of rupture of the gender relations that existed before the conquest, and to the constitution of the public sphere and later the mestizo-criollo state, to understand the extreme violence against women and the levels of cruelty that have been reached in contemporary Latin American societies. She creates a link between the original colonial violence and the violence of what she calls the apocalyptic phase of capital. For her, the constitution of the public sphere and the state as strictly masculine spaces cause the collapse of the patriarchal order that existed before the colonial intrusion. That patriarchal order was by far more benevolent than that brought by the colonizers. It recognized female difference and gave women an ontological status. Despite this, according to Segato, indigenous men enjoyed privileges that women did not have. But this was not an abysmal hierarchical order; there was no binarity, nor did masculinity become a universal referent. Even more, she tells us it was a “trans” order in which masculinity and femininity were accessible for both men and women alike. This historical event, Segato warns us, is not an event that we can relegate to a secondary level in decolonial thinking. For Segato, the collapse of the village world under the colonial regime and the reconfiguration of patriarchy and gender are both the key to understanding the history of the contemporary world, or the colonality of power. Treating the problem of women as an isolated issue separate from the great milestones of history is not just an error; its minoritization and its subordination to other major issues leads to our not understanding the centrality that patriarchy has in the constitution of every society. In this way, Segato reveals herself as a descendent of radical feminism in the classical sense because she sees patriarchy providing the blueprint of all power relations that subsequently emerge.³⁰ We should

deduce from here that race is for Segato a derivative of gender relations and not the other way around, as Quijano proposes.

It is from the pathologies of coloniality and capitalism based on their patriarchal foundation that we can explain the excessive cruelty of the massive femicides that are occurring in Latin America, and also the extreme concentration of global wealth that we are witnessing today.³¹ The concentration of wealth that is observed everywhere from Chile to Qatar is nothing less than the instantiation of the modern/colonial project that is now in its terminal phase. The state is no longer public, but private; its national territories are real estate controlled by personal lordships that repeat the feat of the conqueror based on “plundering, displacing, uprooting, enslaving, and exploiting labor to the fullest” (Segato 2016: 621). The only way to survive this apocalyptic phase of capital is by subjecting the population to a pedagogy of cruelty that renders it immune and insensitive to catastrophe and inhumanity. This process of the decomposition of modern/colonial society is global. What happens in Latin America has parallels elsewhere. Latin America is the mirror of the decline of capital that is now visible worldwide.

Maria Lugones will refute the centrality of patriarchy and gender that Segato proposes because for her gender was non-existent in indigenous societies. Lugones does not grant distinctions between patriarchies, nor can she place patriarchy at the center of a society in cases where it is thought that there were no asymmetric power relations between men and women. For that reason, for Lugones, analyzing the relations between indigenous men and women before (and after) colonial intrusion, as well as using gender as a category of analysis, is equivalent to a colonial gesture. However, the dehumanization that the introduction of a racist logic in the social fabric of the effected colony structured a new order. In this new order, the women of the colonizers became the bearers of a new stratum, namely gender, that reproduced the biological and social order of the colony. Hence, she derives the concept of the coloniality of gender from Quijano’s coloniality of power. Indigenous women and enslaved African women (and men) were reduced to beasts of burden who could be worked to death. They were rapeable, disposable, sexless but without gender. That is, they were not members of human society. For Lugones, then, it was not the loss of an honorable gender status that caused the decline of the indigenous society. Rather it was the dehumanization, violence, and rupture of the communal bond that the conquest produced. Gender in this case, as with race for Quijano, are co-constitutive elements of colonial society that divide humanity between humans, subhumans, and non-humans.

Both Segato’s and Lugones’ arguments begin from the conquest of America, but their vision and scope are hemispheric and planetary. They think the world from the hecatomb of 1492. In doing so, they follow the decolonial tradition from which part of their discourse comes. But they differ from Tuck and Yang and from Smith who, though also starting from 1492, confine their narratives to the experience of the North of America. Like Wolfe and Veracini, Iberian colonization is completely outside the parameters of Tuck and Yang’s and Smith’s analysis. Their vision continues to show signs of provincialism and Anglo-centrism, Tuck and Yang perhaps more than Smith. Notwithstanding, like Lugones, they conceptualize relations between men and women in indigenous societies before the conquest as egalitarian. In reality, Lugones takes up much of the ideas of indigenous feminists from North America to arrive at her conclusion about the nonexistence of gender in indigenous societies. Sexual violence for Tuck and Young and for Smith, as for Segato and Lugones, is a tool of conquest comparable to race and as indispensable. For Smith, settler colonialism functions with a logic of sexual violence—or, better said, the logic of elimination is constructed on the basis of a logic of sexual violence. The indigenous woman is the target of the violence of the usurper settler who seeks to extirpate the indigenous progeny. The destruction of matrilineality, the introduction of heteropatriarchy, and the political degradation of indigenous

women was and still is essential for the disappearance of the indigenous peoples and the expropriation of their lands. The introduction of new identities as oppressors and oppressed is what allowed the internal destruction of indigenous communities. One can say that as indigenous men accepted their new roles as oppressors of women, they preserved western patriarchy within their communities. For this reason, the analysis of sexual violence and patriarchy are fundamental for any project of decolonization. As Maria Galindo from *Mujeres Creando* in Bolivia well said, there can be no decolonization without depatriarchalization (Galindo 2014).³²

Both Tuck and Yang and Smith emphasize the logic of elimination of settler colonialism. They refer to the form of the states of the USA and Canada as illegitimate and as states for which indigenous people should not claim inclusion. In this manner, they follow the programmatic politics of settler colonialism theories of Wolfe and Veracini to the letter, but they insert a feminist analysis that recovers the importance of gender violence and patriarchy that is absent in Wolfe and Veracini. Nonetheless, one of their greatest contributions has been to incorporate the colonial fact into the Anglo-feminist analyses that until now take for granted the legitimacy of the usurping settler state. They have also put on the table a critique of the usurping settler state and the politics of inclusion of some segments of African-American and migrant social movements. Both Smith and Tuck and Yang declare the United States to be an illegitimate state, and identify the return of the land, the recovery of sovereignty, and the reconstitution of the indigenous community as the main demands of their politics of decolonization. All of this depends on the recuperation of indigenous women's autonomy and political authority. Without the demand for the restoration of land, sovereignty, and community, any call to decolonization is only a metaphor, Tuck and Young argue.

These ideas of decolonization are the ones that will differentiate the field of settler colonialism from the theory of the decolonial.

5 Decolonization: Contrasting Conceptions

I want to conclude with some comments on the different conceptions that these theories have about decolonization. As we have seen so far, settler colonialism is motivated by a desire to recover territory and sovereignty. Tuck and Yang's and Smith's criticism of the usurping colonial state is profound, and they question the legitimacy of its continuity. The future of indigenous peoples depends on their achievements on these fronts of struggle. Decolonization can include other issues, such as the struggle against capitalism and environmental destruction, the regeneration of ancestral knowledge, and the reconstitution of sovereignty for peoples now dispersed in cities. But without the recovery of land and full sovereignty, decolonization does not make any sense. In the field of decolonial theory, we have seen that neither the return of the land nor the destruction of the state is in the foreground. I do not mean by this that there is no criticism of the mestizo-criollo state, or that the protection of indigenous territories is outside the political agenda. But this is not the impetus of the theory. Perhaps this is because this theory is not written by indigenous people but mostly by mestizxs and white Latin Americans.

If we read Quijano and other decolonial authors such as Walter D. Mignolo and Catherine Walsh (2011,³³ 2000,³⁴ 2018³⁵), we will see that decolonization is understood in epistemic terms. Both Quijano and Mignolo emphasize the ominous role played by Eurocentrism in the coloniality of knowledge. Eurocentrism not only colonizes lands and bodies, but colonizes how we understand the world, our sense of being. Eurocentrism colonized time and space; it denied the multiple ontologies of human diversity and destroyed the ancestral knowledges of the indigenous people. For these decolonial authors, more for Mignolo than Quijano perhaps, decolonization lies in the recovery of

epistemic rights, the destruction of Eurocentrism, de-westernization (Mignolo 2011), and, to a certain extent, the re-indianization of society. Epistemic decolonization, they tell us, will lead us to the decolonization of society. The decolonization of society cannot precede the decolonization of knowledge. Knowledge will set us free. It will decolonize us.

At the same time, it is interesting to note that despite the centrality of race in decolonial theory, there is very little analysis of race relations in Latin America. There is no elaborate mestizaje analysis, nor is there adequate self-reflection on the writer's place of enunciation in the system of race. Decolonial authors situate themselves geographically and historically in colonial history but do not delve into their own racialized locations. The "I am from where I think" of Mignolo (1999)³⁶ is very suggestive. But it does not go far enough to reach the place that deals with the history of racialization. It seems that no distinction is made between the place of the indigenous, the black, the mestizo, and the white. They all appear in the same plane. Likewise, it gives the impression that decolonial theory continues to operate with unitary analytic categories such as the "indigenous" or the "enslaved African" and does not take a hard look at intersectionality. The absence of mestizaje in the analysis and the fixation on unit categories is curious given the critiques of the very notion of the analytical category that decolonial theory does (in particular, in Lugones' work). I say this because it seems to me that this dislocation of decolonial authors, including feminist theorists like Segato and Lugones, in the system of race in Latin America is what determines the type of decolonization project that is proposed. We do not examine our own involvement in the coloniality of power. We do not question our presence on the land we inhabit; we take it for granted. Although the nation-state is seen as a product of colonization, we do not demand its destruction. At least up to now, such a demand has not been prioritized.

In this point, settler colonialism takes the lead. However, in turn, settler colonialism theorists have to abandon their provincialism and Anglo-centrism to understand their own history. But they must do so not only to understand their history, but also to be able to carry out their decolonization projects. This is because the decolonization of the hemisphere is not limited to a single country, a region, or a specific ethnic group. Decolonization is trans, it is global, and it must be total.

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¹ Aileen Moreton-Robinson, "Introduction. Locations of Engagement in the First World," in *Critical Indigenous Studies* (Tucson: Arizona University Press, 2016), 3-16

² Ramón Grosfoguel (2011) and other decolonial theorists have said that postmodernism as well as postcolonialism are "Eurocentric critiques of Eurocentrism." See Grosfoguel's talk (uploaded 2014) "Postcolonial or Decolonial?" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3WUZTFIkb_4&t=39s (last accessed on 2 March, 2020).

³ Shu-mei Shih, "World Studies and Relational Comparison," in *Modern Language Association of America PMLA* 130, no. 2, (2015): 430-38.

- 4 In theoretical comparisons of postcolonial and decolonial theories, decolonial theorists like Quijano (2000), Dussel (1995), and Grosfoguel (2011) argue that chronological markers in the study of colonialism/coloniality matter. 1492 is viewed as a critical point in world history as it was then that truly global colonial empires encompassing the whole planet could emerge for the first time. From this perspective, postcolonialism errs by fixing their analysis in the experience of British colonialism in India and the Middle East, because it ignores the previous three hundred years of Iberian colonialism. For more, see my “Colonial Connections” (2017). Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America” in *Nepantla: Views from the South* 1, no. 3, (2000): 533–80; Enrique Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas* (New York: Continuum, 1995); Ramón Grosfoguel, “Decolonizing Postcolonial Studies and Paradigms of Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality,” *Transmodernity* 1, no. 1, (2011): 1–36; Breny Mendoza, “Colonial Connections,” *Feminist Studies* 43, no. 3, (2017): 637–45.
- 5 Shu-mei Shih proposes a comparative analysis in relation for the study of world literature. The idea here is to situate world literature within world history and understand how it occurs in the field of power relationships.
- 6 North Atlantic historiographies have a long history of erasing Iberian colonialism from the history of modernity and capitalism. Postcolonial theorists and Marxists have been no exception. For Marxist Iberiantalism, see the work of Meiksins Wood (2003). Some have referred to this practice of erasing Iberian history from modernity and colonialism as Iberiantalism, echoing the meaning of Orientalism, or forms of scholarship that deliberately falsify and disparage a history and a culture. Iberiantalism can be also harked back to the Black Legend. The term “Black Legend” was coined in the nineteenth century but has a much longer history dating to the sixteenth century with the ascent of Spain as the first European global power. The Black Legend portended to portray Spain as a backward and particularly cruel colonial power outside of the history of modernity and capitalism. It also sought to deny Spain membership in the community of European nations. See my “Crítica al debate contemporáneo sobre los imperios” (2014). The Spanish scholar Maria Elvira Roca Barea (2016) offers us a new interpretation of the Black Legend from a conservative perspective. See: Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Empire of Capital* (London & New York: Verso, 2003); Breny Mendoza, *Ensayos de Crítica Feminista en Nuestra América* (Mexico City: Editorial Herder, 2014); Maria Elvira Roca Barea, *Imperiofobia y leyenda negra: Roma, Rusia, Estados Unidos y el Imperio español* (Ediciones Siruela, 2016).
- 7 Brendan Hokowithu, “Monster: Post-Indigenous Studies,” in *Critical Indigenous Studies*, ed. Aileen Moreton-Robinson (Tucson: Arizona University Press 2016), 83–101.
- 8 George Hartley, “Chican@ Indigeneity: The Nation-State, and Colonialist Identity Formation,” in *Comparative Indigenities of the Americas* (Tucson: Arizona University Press, 2012), 53–66.
- 9 Analyses of indigenous empires and indigenous collaboration in the Spanish conquest is still a blind spot in decolonial and settler colonialism theories.
- 10 Darrin M. McMahon, “The Other Transatlantic Tie: The Hispanosphere,” *Orbis* 48, no. 4, (2004): 657–72.
- 11 Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview* (Great Britain: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).
- 12 Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (London and New York: Cassel, 1999).
- 13 Patrick Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race,” in *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 3, (2001): 866–905.
- 14 Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso, 2016).
- 15 Lorenzo Veracini, “‘Settler Colonialism’: Career of a Concept,” in *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 2, (2013): 313–33.
- 16 Shannon Speed, “Structures of Settler Colonialism in Abya Yala,” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 4, (2017): 783–90.

- 17 Andrés Reséndez, *The Other Slavery. The Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America* (Boston, Mariners Books, 2017); Denise I. Bossy, “The South’s Other Slavery: Recent Research on Indian Slavery,” *Native South* 9, (2016): 27–53; Alan Galloway, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
- 18 Nancy E. Van Deusen, *Global Indios. The Indigenous Struggle for Justice in Sixteenth Century Spain* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).
- 19 Rita L. Segato, “Patriarchy from Margin to Center: Discipline, Territoriality, and Cruelty in the Apocalyptic Phase of Capital,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 115, no. 3, (2016): 615–24.
- 20 Quijano follows in part the footsteps of the Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui (1971) but in reversed order. For Mariátegui the “problem of the Indian” was the land-tenure system of Peru and the labor relationships of “Indians” based on servitude that continued after Independence. Perú needed to end feudalism or *gamonalismo* and return communal property to indigenous peoples in order to become a viable modern nation-state. The solution was based on economics. For Quijano, the problem was more the entrapment of the modern nation-state within a colonial society. It was the continuity of the coloniality of power based on the idea of race and Eurocentrism at the societal level that gave shape to the nascent modern nation-state and that determined the persistence of labor relations based on the servitude of indigenous and the descendants of African slaves. As long as the coloniality of power based on race persisted, indigenous peoples had no place within the nation-state and liberal democracy. In this respect, no agrarian reform could solve the “problem of the Indian” successfully inasmuch indigenous peoples were still considered inferior races and as people without rights. The solution is therefore more political or an issue of power distribution. See Mariátegui, José Carlos, Marjory Urquide, Jorge Basadre, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality* (Austin: University of Texas, 1971); Anibal Quijano, “El Movimiento Indígena y las Cuestiones Pendientes en América Latina” in *Cuestiones y horizontes: de la dependencia histórico-estructural a la colonialidad/descolonialidad del poder*. (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2014).
- 21 Eve Tuck and Wayne K. Yang, “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor,” *Decolonization, Indigeneity, Education and Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–40.
- 22 Shelbi M. Nahwilet, and Kyle White, “Theorizing Indigeneity, Gender, and Settler Colonialism,” in *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Race*, ed. Paul C. Taylor, Linda Martin Alcoff, and Luvell Anderson (New York and London: Routledge, 2017), 152–67.
- 23 Irene Silverblatt, “Heresies and Colonial Geopolitics,” *Romanic Review* 103, nos. 1-2, (2012): 65–80.
- 24 The Violence against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 restored tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. However, the criminal jurisdiction is limited only to spouses, former spouses, or dating partners, leaving all other non-Indian criminals scot-free.
- 25 In her book, *The Beginning and End of Rape* (2015), Sarah Deer shows us how fundamental and consistent the rape of Indian women by non-Indian men has been for settler colonialism throughout history. She argues against the idea of thinking of the high rates of rape of Indian women today as epidemic. Instead we should see it as a historical necessity of Indian extermination and the breaking of their spirit. Sarah Deer, *The Beginning and End of Rape. Confronting Sexual Violence in Native America* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).
- 26 Breny Mendoza, “De-Mythologizing Mestizaje in Honduras: Evaluating New Contributions,” *Mesoamerica* 22, no. 42, (2001): 256–78.
- 27 James H. Sweet, “The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 54, no. 1, (1997): 143–66.
- 28 See Maria Lugones, “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System,” *Hypatia* 22, (2007): 186–209, and “Revisiting Gender: A Decolonial Approach,” in *Theories of the Flesh*, ed. Andrea J. Pitts, Mariana Ortega, and José Medina (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 29–37.

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- 29 Andrea Smith, *Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2005).
- 30 I owe this observation to Sandra Harding.
- 31 Sarah Deer (2015) makes us aware of the parallels that exist between femicides in Latin America and the extremely high rates of rape as well as femicides in indigenous communities of North America.
- 32 Maria Galindo, *A Despatricar: Feminismo Urgente* (La Paz, Bolivia: Lavaca Editora, 2014).
- 33 Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2011).
- 34 Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs. Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
- 35 Walter D. Mignolo and Catherine E. Walsh, *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2018).
- 36 Walter D. Mignolo, "I am Where I Think: Epistemology and the Colonial Difference," *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies* 8, no. 2, (1999), 235–45.