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Is International Relations a Global Discipline? Hegemony, Insularity, and Diversity in the Field

Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney

ABSTRACT

Using data from the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) project, we address several questions posed by students of the international relations (IR) discipline, specifically, whether and to what extent: US scholars, institutions, and journals dominate the field; national communities of IR scholars are insular or inward-looking; and/or the discipline is theoretically, methodologically, and epistemologically diverse. We draw from two major data sources: a series of cross-national surveys of IR faculty in thirty-two countries and a database of journal articles published in the twelve leading IR journals from 1980 to 2014. We find obvious signs of US hegemony and insularity. Other national IR communities are relatively open to foreign ideas, if not to hiring scholars trained in other countries. Finally, despite US hegemony in the discipline and pockets of geographic insularity, we see a diverse field characterized by a wide range of theoretical, methodological, and epistemological commitments. We conclude with a discussion on the sources and consequences of diversity in the international relations discipline.

Reflecting on the discipline of international relations (IR) in the post–Cold War era, Ole Wæver reassessed Stanley Hoffman’s famous forty-year-old claim and concluded, “IR is and has been ‘an American social science.’”¹ Not only is American IR hegemonic, according to Wæver; it also is insular: European scholars are aware of theoretical developments in the United States, but US scholars are afflicted with “narrow-mindedness.” Roughly twenty years after Hoffman’s original formulation, Wæver worried that this divide was producing an intellectual loss for all scholars of

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¹Ole Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 687; see also Stanley Hoffmann “An American Social Science: International Relations,” *Daedalus* 106, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 41–60.

IR because it leads to “lower standards, less exchange, and fewer challenges to think in new ways.”² Wæver’s critique of the discipline was fundamentally about the negative effects of hegemony, insularity, and a lack of diversity in the discipline.

Strong claims about hegemony, insularity, and the lack of disciplinary diversity have recurred over the past four decades, but they have increased notably in the past few years. Several scholars have reiterated and broadened the Hoffman/Wæver conclusion about hegemony, but they provide little systematic evidence to support their claims.³ Other students of the discipline—including Jonas Hagmann and Thomas J. Biersteker, Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney, and Helen Turton—have presented qualitative and quantitative evidence to directly test some implications and the persistence of the Hoffman/Wæver hypothesis.⁴ Amitav Acharya and other contributors to a recent *International Studies Review* special issue advocate for integrating non-Western ideas and approaches into the IR discipline.⁵ Many of these calls for greater diversity in the field rest on the assumption (or on anecdotal evidence) that US ideas and practices differ markedly from those in other regions, and that US scholars and institutions continue to dominate the discipline. They argue, in short, that IR is not a global discipline.

In contrast, other scholars claim that there are no distinctive national approaches to the study of international politics. Instead, as Norman D. Palmer argues, any perceived differences in the way IR scholars practice their craft should be attributed to competing theories or paradigms.⁶ He maintained, well before current debates about diversity in the discipline, that there is not an “American approach, but a multitude of approaches,” all of which are well represented inside and outside the United States.⁷ In the same vein, Tony Porter asks rhetorically: “What do [US IR scholars] Kenneth Waltz, Richard Ashley, Cynthia Enloe, and Craig Murphy have in common?” He concludes that the fierce theoretical debates in the American academy reveal that geographic boundaries and nationality in particular constitute “an insignificant determinant of the intellectual development of ideas, theory, and approaches to the study of international politics.”⁸ For Porter, the implication is that place matters less than the content of one’s ideas, and the

²Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline,” 723.

³See Branwen Gruffydd Jones “Introduction: International Relations, Eurocentrism, and Imperialism,” in *Decolonizing International Relations*, ed. Branwen Gruffydd Jones (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 1–19; Nicolas Guilhot, ed. *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

⁴Jonas Hagmann and Thomas J. Biersteker, “Beyond the Published Discipline: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of International Studies,” *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 2 (June 2014): 291–315; Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney, eds., *Claiming the International* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Helen Louise Turton, *International Relations and American Dominance: A Diverse Discipline* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

⁵Amitav Acharya, “Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 4–15.

⁶Norman D. Palmer, “The Study of International Relations in the United States: Perspectives on Half a Century,” *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (September 1980): 343–64.

⁷Ibid., 343.

⁸Tony Porter, “Can There Be National Perspectives on Inter(national) Relations?” in *International Relations: Still an American Social Science? Towards Diversity in International Thought*, ed. Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), 131.

content of ideas are not highly correlated with place. John J. Mearsheimer's similar and more recent claim that "students inside and outside of the United States seem to read the same articles and books and for the most part employ the same concepts and arguments" supports this notion of a global discipline unfettered by geographic distinctions and constraints.⁹

No matter how they currently define the field, many scholars argue that IR suffers from a lack of intellectual and/or geographic diversity. Acharya champions the idea of a "Global IR" that "view[s] the world of IR as a large, overarching canopy with multiple foundations."¹⁰ Some scholars view intellectual diversity as a hallmark of a well-functioning discipline,¹¹ and others call for increased diversity because they view it as a necessary condition for scientific progress.¹² Regardless of motives, increasing numbers of students of the discipline believe that "a diverse theoretical ecosystem is preferable to an intellectual monoculture"¹³ and extend this argument to seek increased diversity in methods, theories, epistemological approaches, and areas of study.

Not everyone agrees, however, that a lack of theoretical and methodological diversity is problematic for the field. Mearsheimer, for example, directly rebuts the Global IR initiative advanced by Acharya; Mearsheimer argues that, although it is good that the discipline involves a geographically diverse set of scholars studying a wide variety of subjects, it is not necessarily bad that US scholars dominate methodological and theoretical choices in the discipline. It is wrong, he claims, to think that "there would be a richer and more diverse menu of IR theories were it not for American gatekeepers policing the discourse." Because US scholars already have developed "a rich variety of theories that are very useful for comprehending the politics of the international system ... there is not a lot of room for new theories or even major twists on existing theories" to be developed by non-US scholars.¹⁴

We do not take a strong position in this debate over whether the IR discipline should be more global and more intellectually diverse, as most of these positions already have been staked out. Rather, our primary contribution is to introduce new data to empirically explore the sometimes-conflicting assumptions underlying these debates. Is IR a truly global discipline, or is it characterized by distinct, national approaches? How diverse is the IR discipline in terms of theory, epistemology, and methods? Does the United States dominate the discipline? Do concepts, methods, and individual scholars easily cross, or are they limited by,

⁹John J. Mearsheimer, "Benign Hegemony," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 2

¹⁰Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (December 2014): 649–50.

¹¹For instance, K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985).

¹²Mearsheimer quoted in D. W. Miller, "Storming the Palace in Political Science," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 21 September 2001, <http://www.chronicle.com/article/Storming-the-Palace-in/36137/>; Benjamin J. Cohen, "Are IPE Journals Becoming Boring?" *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (September 2010): 887–91.

¹³John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 430.

¹⁴Mearsheimer, "Benign Hegemony."

geographic boundaries? If these things and people do travel across the globe, do they travel in only one direction? We answer these questions by systematically measuring these characteristics of the IR discipline. We construct a series of novel metrics of hegemony, insularity, and diversity in IR that provide new insight into the nature and structure of the global IR academic community and its regional and national constituents. We rely on data from the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) project, the most extensive data-collection effort to date on the IR field. Specifically, we draw from two major TRIP data sources: 1) a series of cross-national surveys of 5,139 IR faculty conducted in 2014 in thirty-two countries, as well as four previous waves of surveys conducted in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2011; and 2) a database of all 7,792 peer-reviewed journal articles published in the twelve leading IR journals from 1980 to 2014.

Together, these data provide a number of behavioral and perceptual measures of how the IR discipline is practiced across countries and time. To fully gauge whether IR has become a global discipline, we ideally would map the course of ideas over a longer span of time and a larger number of countries. As the TRIP faculty survey is expanded and replicated over time, and as the TRIP journal article database grows, this will become possible. For now, we analyze data from the countries surveyed to assess three questions that allow us to measure how global the IR discipline is: (1) whether the study of IR outside the United States mirrors and is driven by the approaches adopted in the US academy, as it would if the US approach were hegemonic;¹⁵ (2) whether there are national identities that limit intellectual cross-national scholarly interactions; and (3) how diversity in the practice of IR research—that is, the methods and theories that scholars employ and the topics they study—varies across national IR communities.

A number of important, if sometimes crosscutting, patterns emerge. First, we confirm conventional wisdom about US hegemony in the IR discipline. The IR community in the United States is the largest in the world; US universities train large percentages of IR scholars worldwide; and IR scholars around the world convey substantial respect for US scholars, journals, and research. Across the globe, IR scholars see the profession as dominated by the US academy. Second, however, we find that, with the important exception of the US IR community, IR scholars at institutions outside the United States are relatively open to scholars and ideas from other countries and regions. Respondents in most countries identify top PhD programs in other countries. Outside the United States, scholars cross national boundaries when selecting the most influential and interesting researchers, and they largely identify with a global rather than a national or regional academic community. Despite these signs of openness, we also find that, worldwide, most scholars work in the country in which they were born and received their PhD. In the view of our survey respondents, moreover, academic hiring practices in most countries favor citizens and permanent

¹⁵ See Wæver, "The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline," Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, eds., *International Relations Scholarship around the World* (London: Routledge, 2009); Turton, *International Relations and American Dominance*.

residents. Finally, we find clear signs of a diverse IR discipline, if one tempered by the size and resources of the US academy and by pockets of geographic insularity outside the United States. IR scholars around the world study a broad spectrum of topics and regions, and they exhibit a diverse set of theoretical and methodological commitments in their research. But there is less variation in the methods used in articles published in the top IR journals than in scholars' description of their own work. We also find indications of an epistemological split between the United States and many other countries, but the United States is far from alone in its commitment to positivism, suggesting a degree of epistemological diversity.

Our analysis proceeds in six parts. First, we lay out the observable implications of hegemony, insularity, and intellectual diversity across a number of different variables. Next, we describe the methodology of our surveys and journal article database, which provide the data for this paper. In each of the subsequent three sections, we present our empirical findings on hegemony, insularity, and diversity across the thirty-two countries in our study. Finally, while our primary purpose in this paper is to empirically assess the extent of diversity, hegemony, and insularity in the global practice of IR, we turn in the conclusion to an analysis of the implications of our argument for current debates about diversity in IR and to recommendations for future work on these questions.

Conceptual Framework

In the literature cataloging the development and character of the IR field, two descriptive themes frequently arise: US hegemony and geographic insularity. Students of the discipline often view hegemony—the idea that the IR discipline is dominated and driven by US methods, scholars, and theories—and insularity—the idea that the geographic borders are a defining and even limiting feature of the content of local IR disciplines—as problematic for the development of knowledge about international politics. Diagnosing either or both of these problems frequently leads to calls to move toward a discipline characterized by diversity—in which scholars share knowledge across geographic and intellectual borders in a “reasonably symmetric” fashion.¹⁶ Below, we draw a number of observable implications for hegemony, insularity, and diversity in IR. We then use data from the TRIP Project to operationalize these implications in ways that allow for systematic tests across time and space.

US Hegemony

When Wæver and Hoffmann portray IR as an “American social science,” they depict a field in which the ideas prevalent within a distinctively US

¹⁶Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*, 13. See similar calls from Steve Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: ‘Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline,’” *International Studies Review* 4, no. 2 (June 2002): 67–85; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (September 2007): 287–312.

school flow one way to the rest of the world.¹⁷ This unidirectional movement of ideas is hegemonic, the argument goes, because these flows influence the content and structure of smaller communities in ways that these smaller communities have little ability to control. The hegemon trains and exports scholars to smaller IR communities and in so doing changes, or even defines, the relative value that smaller communities place on different publications, scholars, and universities, and the hegemon shapes as well the epistemological, methodological, and theoretical choices favored in those non-hegemonic countries.

The TRIP data provide several ways to test this proposition. None of our measures alone perfectly captures the concept of hegemony; taken together, however, they provide significant insight into just how hegemonic the United States is within the global IR discipline.¹⁸ In a discipline defined by US hegemony, we would expect to see that:

- 1) US universities hold a privileged status, such that:
 - a) large numbers of IR scholars worldwide are trained in the United States; and
 - b) US PhD programs are highly ranked by IR scholars in other countries;
- 2) US scholars and scholarship hold a privileged status, such that:
 - a) US scholars are highly ranked by non-US scholars who are asked to name the most influential IR scholars;
 - b) US-based scholarly journals are the most highly ranked;
 - c) US scholars are cited disproportionately in publications; and
 - d) US authors appear disproportionately on syllabi around the world such that the “taught discipline” is also US-centric.

Wæver notes that “huge balance-of-trade deficits ... need not have an impact on the content of science,” so we also look for signs of hegemony in the perceptions of IR scholars.¹⁹ In a discipline whose structure is defined by hegemony, we would expect to see that:

- 3) scholars view the discipline as dominated by the United States.

Insularity

Wæver argues that the IR field is characterized not only by US hegemony but also by an insularity in which Americans tend to read and cite work by Americans, paying little attention to scholarship produced elsewhere. That is, even while American ideas, theories, training, and methods move outward, there is relatively little inward movement. But what about the rest of the world? Here it is useful to

¹⁷Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline”; Hoffmann “An American Social Science.”

¹⁸In her study of American dominance in the IR discipline, Helen Turton (*International Relations and American Dominance*) defines dominance in similar terms: agenda-setting capability; theoretical, methodological, and epistemological authority; dominance of the institutional structure of the discipline; and a gatekeeping role regarding the discipline’s boundaries.

¹⁹Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline,” 689.

distinguish the kind of US insularity that would be incidental to a discipline defined by a US hegemon from that which would arise as a result of there being relatively little movement of ideas across geographic borders in general. It may be, for example, that smaller national and/or regional IR communities are also relatively impervious to the flow of ideas and practices from other national IR communities. Were we to observe a distinctly US school—as well as other national schools, such as a British or Israeli school, or regional schools, such as a Latin American or Scandinavian school—the IR discipline might best be described by some form of symmetrical geographic insularity.²⁰

We draw on the TRIP cross-national survey data to measure the extent to which national borders limit intellectual interactions. If insularity is a defining feature of the IR discipline, we would expect to see a field comprised of a number of distinct approaches. We also should see that approaches characteristic of particular countries or regions are significantly isolated from other national or regional IR communities and little movement of people and ideas across the borders that define these geographic communities. In a field defined by insularity, in short, we would expect to see:

- 1) expressed preferences for or an identity with siloed communities—that is, scholars report feeling part of a national or regional IR community at relatively high levels and report feeling a part of a global IR community at relatively low levels;
- 2) little inward flow of scholars: specifically, relatively few scholars are trained outside the country in which they are employed, and relatively few scholars are trained and/or work outside their country of origin; and
- 3) little inward flow of ideas: relatively few scholars report being able to conduct scholarly research in languages beyond their native tongue; relatively few foreign scholars make the lists of the most influential scholars or those doing the most interesting work; and when asked about the top PhD programs in IR, relatively few scholars identify programs outside their own country.

Scientific Diversity

Many students of the IR discipline outline aspirational goals concerning diversity. K. J. Holsti argues that the “ideal model of a community of scholars” is one in which there are “reasonably symmetrical flows of communication, with ‘exporters’

²⁰Peter Marcus Kristensen provides evidence that geography is a key cleavage in the IR literature citation network, and that it is not just Americans who are subject to this insularity. See Peter Marcus Kristensen, “Dividing Discipline: Structures of Communication in International Relations,” *International Studies Perspectives* 14, no. 1 (March 2012): 32–50; Peter Marcus Kristensen, “Revisiting the ‘American Social Science’: Mapping the Geography of International Relations,” *International Studies Perspectives* 16, no. 3 (August 2015): 246–69. Also see Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al., “The IR of the Beholder: Examining Global IR Using the 2014 TRIP Survey,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 16–32.

of knowledge also being ‘importers’ from other sources.”²¹ Others make more instrumental arguments for diversity. Both Knud Erik Jorgenson and Kathleen R. McNamara warn, for example, against the rise of a “monoculture of rationalist methodologies” in their calls for an increased emphasis on constructivist theory in IR and International Political Economy.²² Mearsheimer and Walt similarly call for the preservation of “a diverse theoretical ecosystem” to counter the rise of what they call “simplistic hypothesis testing.”²³

In a field defined by diversity, we would expect to see:

- 1) scholars studying a wide range of issues and places; and
- 2) scholars employing a wide range of theoretical, methodological, and epistemological approaches within and across countries.

Data

We draw on two original sources to provide the most comprehensive view of the IR discipline assembled to date. Our first original dataset is the 2014 TRIP World Faculty Survey. We sought to identify and survey all faculty members at colleges and universities in thirty-two national settings—Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong,²⁴ India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Great Britain, and United States—who do research or teach courses on IR.²⁵ We supplement and compare these data with the results of our: 1) 2011 survey in twenty countries, 2) 2008 survey in ten English-speaking countries; 3) 2006 survey in Canada and the United States; and 4) 2004 survey in the United States.²⁶

²¹Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*, 13.

²²Knud Erik Jorgenson, “Four Levels and a Discipline” in *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, ed. Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgenson (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 36; Kathleen R. McNamara, “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE,” *Review of International Political Economy* 16, no. 1 (February 2009): 72–84.

²³Mearsheimer and Walt, “Leaving Theory Behind,” 430–31. For a direct rebuttal to this argument that employs data from the TRIP Journal Article Database and concludes that the IR discipline is increasingly diverse, see Stephen M. Saideman, “The Apparent Decline of the Paradigms: Examining Patterns of Publications and Citations,” *International Studies Review* (forthcoming).

²⁴In this paper, for shorthand, we sometimes refer to Hong Kong, which is a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China, as a national community or country.

²⁵For more information on the methods we employed in the 2014 survey, see “TRIP 2014 Faculty Survey Report,” <https://trip.wm.edu/home/index.php/surveys/faculty-survey>. We collaborated with thirty-six “TRIP country partners”: faculty members at other universities who are able to encourage participation in the survey, provide cultural context so that questions are comprehensible, provide comparable institutional nomenclature across countries, and provide translation services that allow us to ask appropriate questions and interpret the results of the surveys. All the TRIP country partners are identified in footnote 28 below.

²⁶On the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2011 surveys, respectively, see Susan Peterson and Michael J. Tierney, with Daniel Maliniak, *Teaching and Research Practices, Views on the Discipline, and Policy Attitudes of International Relations Faculty at U.S. Colleges and Universities* (Williamsburg, VA: Reves Center for International Studies, College of William and Mary, August 2005); Daniel Maliniak et al., *The View from the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of IR Faculty in the United States and Canada* (Williamsburg, VA: Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, College of William and Mary, February 2007); Richard Jordan et al., *One Discipline or Many? TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in Ten Countries* (Williamsburg, VA: Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, College of William and Mary, February 2009); Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney, *TRIP around the World: Teaching, Research, and Policy Views of International Relations Faculty in 20 Countries* (Williamsburg, VA: Program on the Theory and Practice of International Relations, College of William and Mary, May 2012).

For our surveys we adopt an expansive definition of “IR scholar”: anyone actively affiliated with a university, college, or professional school who teaches or publishes research on political issues that cross international borders. The overwhelming majority of our respondents have jobs in departments of political science, politics, government, social science, international relations, and international studies, or in professional schools of international affairs. We exclude many researchers currently employed in government, private firms, or think tanks. We also omit scholars at professional schools of international affairs who study or teach economic, legal, or social—but not political—issues.²⁷ In general, our broad definition encompasses scholars who create knowledge, teach students, and provide expert advice to policymakers about transborder political issues. Whether individual respondents engage in these or other activities are indicated in their answers to almost 100 questions on the survey.

With the assistance of our country partners, we constructed comparable, but not identical, surveys for each of the thirty-two countries.²⁸ We adjusted each survey to reflect national differences in terminology, academic institutions, academic rank, public and private institutions, conceptions of political ideology, and policy issues.

We identified the populations to be surveyed in all countries using similar methods, but we tailored those methods to each locale.²⁹ For each country, we compiled a list of faculty members teaching or doing research on IR through a systematic series of web searches, emails, and communications with department chairs,

²⁷For a critique of the TRIP survey methodology based on its exclusion of economists, hard scientists, anthropologists, and lawyers teaching at schools of international affairs, see James Goldgeier “Undisciplined: The Ivory Tower Scholar Is Asking the Wrong Questions of the Wrong People,” *Foreign Policy*, 3 January 2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/03/undisciplined/>. A substantial minority of the scholars surveyed do not self-identify as “international relations” scholars. For this reason, our population may include political scientists specializing in US politics who study trade and immigration. It also includes researchers who study regional integration (for example, politics of the European Union), as well as specialists of comparative politics who happen to teach IR courses.

²⁸We thank our partners who helped tailor the survey to their national academic populations, identify those populations, and persuade them to complete the survey: Argentina (Roberto Russel, Arlene B. Tickner); Australia (Jason Sharman); Austria (Thomas Risse, Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar); Brazil (Rafael A. Duarte Villa, Marília Souza, Arlene B. Tickner); Canada (Anne-Marie D’Aoust, Jérémie Cornut, Steve Saideman); Chile (Eduardo Carreño, Arlene B. Tickner); Colombia (Arlene B. Tickner); Denmark (Ole Wæver, Peter Marcus Kristensen); Finland (Ole Wæver, Peter Marcus Kristensen); France (Frédéric Ramel, Jérémie Cornut, Thierry Balzacq); Germany (Thomas Risse, Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar); India (Navnita Chadha Behera); Ireland (John Doyle); Israel (Arie Kacowicz, Yoram Haftel); Italy (Giovanni Andornino); Japan (Takahiro Yamada); Mexico (Carolina Garriga, Jorge Schiavon, Arlene B. Tickner); Netherlands (Gerard van der Ree); Norway (Ole Wæver, Peter Marcus Kristensen); Poland (Jacek Czaputowicz, Kamil Ławniczak); Singapore (Soo Yeon Kim); South Africa (Suzy Graham); Sweden (Ole Wæver, Peter Marcus Kristensen); Switzerland (Thomas Risse, Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar); Taiwan (Jason Kuo, Min-hua Huang, Tun-jen Cheng); Turkey (Fulya Gokcan, Korhan Yazgan, Mustafa Aydin); United Kingdom (Stephanie Rickard). In 2014 we had no local partner in Hong Kong or Belgium.

²⁹For the 2014 survey conducted in the United States, we used the *U.S. News and World Report* 2007–8 report on American higher education to compile a list of all four-year colleges and universities. There were 943 such institutions. We also included the Monterey Institute and seven military schools that were not rated by *USNWR* but that have a relatively large number of political science faculty who do research and/or teach IR courses. We used the list of colleges and universities ranked by *Maclean’s Magazine* to identify the population of Canadian universities. For the remaining thirty countries in our sample, we used the “Portal to Recognized Higher Education Institutions” from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to identify the population of universities and colleges in the remaining thirty countries in the sample. We used similar procedures in years past. In some countries—for example, in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, India, Mexico, and Argentina—our country partners advised us that core elements of the academic research community have positions in nonuniversity research institutions. See the TRIP survey reports from 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2011 for details.

Table 1. Response rates.

Country	Responses	Population	Response Rate
Italy	113	148	76.35
Brazil	210	321	65.42
Chile	21	33	63.64
Ireland	34	54	62.96
Argentina	47	82	57.32
New Zealand	23	41	56.10
Australia	152	275	55.27
India	321	587	54.68
Colombia	61	115	53.04
Canada	281	544	51.65
Poland	193	374	51.60
South Africa	33	64	51.56
Denmark	77	151	50.99
Taiwan	81	164	49.39
Japan	195	402	48.51
Singapore	30	62	48.39
Israel	72	150	48.00
Germany	234	513	45.61
Netherlands	47	104	45.19
Austria	14	32	43.75
Finland	19	45	42.22
Switzerland	28	69	40.58
Turkey	243	601	40.43
United States	1620	4123	39.29
Sweden	86	219	39.27
Norway	75	194	38.66
Mexico	106	284	37.32
France	105	282	37.23
Hong Kong	9	26	34.62
Belgium	17	52	32.69
United Kingdom	350	1104	31.70
China	242	960	25.21
Grand Total	5139	12175	42.2

administrators, or individual scholars. We also consulted with our academic partners in each country to ensure that our lists of scholars were complete and accurate.³⁰ We identified a total of 12,175 individuals in our sample countries who met our definition of IR scholar. In all, 5,139 scholars responded to the survey, yielding a total response rate of over 42 percent. Table 1 displays the response rate and sample size for each country surveyed in order from the smallest to the largest response rate. Table 2 reports the number and percent of universities per country.

The second original source we employ in this paper is the TRIP Journal Article Database (ver. 3.1), which includes information about articles in the twelve leading journals in the field. The journals selected were the most influential based on James C. Garand and Micheal W. Giles's 2003 "impact" factors:³¹ *American Political Science Review (APSR)*, *American Journal of Political Science (AJPS)*, *British Journal of Political Science (BJPS)*, *European Journal of*

³⁰ A substantial minority of scholars take new positions, retire, or die each year. Partners with local knowledge are crucial in identifying such cases before these transitions appear on websites.

³¹ James C. Garand and Micheal W. Giles, "Journals in the Discipline: A Report on a New Survey of American Political Scientists," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36, no. 3 (April 2003): 293–308.

Table 2. Universities with IR scholars by country.³²

Country	No. of Univ.	Pct. of Sample
United States	943	47.65%
Japan	183	9.25%
Turkey	104	5.26%
India	90	4.55%
United Kingdom	86	4.35%
Germany	70	3.54%
Canada	62	3.13%
Brazil	54	2.73%
Poland	46	2.32%
France	43	2.17%
Italy	41	2.07%
Mexico	34	1.72%
Australia	32	1.62%
Argentina	23	1.16%
Colombia	23	1.16%
Netherlands	15	0.76%
South Africa	15	0.76%
Chinese Taipei (Taiwan)	14	0.71%
Sweden	12	0.61%
Chile	11	0.56%
Belgium	9	0.45%
Ireland	9	0.45%
Israel	9	0.45%
Norway	9	0.45%
Switzerland	9	0.45%
Hong Kong, China	8	0.40%
New Zealand	7	0.35%
Denmark	5	0.25%
Singapore	5	0.25%
Austria	4	0.20%
Finland	4	0.20%
Total	1979	100.00%

International Relations (EJIR), *International Organization (IO)*, *International Security (IS)*, *International Studies Quarterly (ISQ)*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR)*, *Journal of Peace Research (JPR)*, *Journal of Politics (JOP)*, *Security Studies (SS)*, and *World Politics (WP)*.³³ In the IR-specific journals—*EJIR*, *IO*, *IS*, *ISQ*, *JCR*, *JPR*, *SS*, and *WP*—we coded every article, and in the general political science journals—*APSR*, *AJPS*, *BJPS*, *JOP*—we code only those articles that fall within our broad definition of the IR subfield.³⁴ Our sample of 7,792 articles includes every article published in issues one through four of the twelve leading journals for every year from 1980 to 2014.³⁵ We categorize

³²Due to local conditions, we do not have information about institutional affiliation at the individual level for the population of IR scholars in China.

³³Two journals, *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*, had higher impact factors than some of the journals on our list, but we did not include them because neither is peer reviewed.

³⁴We recognize that an increasing proportion of *WP* articles fall within the subfield of comparative politics rather than international politics; however, the status of *WP* as a leading IR journal as reported in numerous surveys of IR scholars suggests that many articles published there are likely to get the attention of IR scholars.

³⁵To ensure intercoder reliability, we conducted multiple test rounds, in which all researchers coded the same sample of articles. We compared our results and discussed discrepancies, allowing us to clarify our rules and procedures. Two researchers then coded each article. If both coders independently agreed on the value of a particular variable, we accepted the observation as part of the final dataset. If the coders disagreed on the value of any observation, a senior coder independently coded that observation.

each article in terms of twenty-two distinct variables, including methodology, epistemology, paradigm, and region under study.³⁶

US Hegemony?

Our results provide clear support for the claim of US hegemony in the IR discipline, but we also find evidence (depending on the measure employed) that that hegemony is more limited than some observers suggest, or that hegemony is declining. Certainly, if one looks only at sheer size and resources, the United States is hegemonic: scholars employed by US universities constitute just over a third of all IR professors in the thirty-two countries in our sample. US universities train a disproportionately high percentage of IR scholars worldwide, and US scholars and journals command significant respect. US hegemony is far from complete, however; US epistemological, methodological, and theoretical preferences do not appear to flow unidirectionally from the United States to the rest of the world.

Importing and Privileging US Training³⁷

US institutions of higher education dominate the IR profession, although not in every measure. Almost 41 percent of our respondents received their highest degree from a US university. But just under 12 percent of respondents employed at institutions outside the United States earned their highest degree from US institutions. On this measure of hegemony, the United States is actually second to Great Britain, which trained just over 15 percent of non-US respondents. When we look at scholars employed in countries other than the United States, but outside the country in which they earned their PhD, the dominance of the US academy is more obvious: nearly 39 percent have PhDs from US universities. Indeed, the top PhD programs in the United States supply the largest share of foreign PhDs in fourteen of the thirty-one non-US countries in our sample.

Demand for US training may be shaped by the expected professional advantages that it conveys. As [Figure 1](#) illustrates, large majorities of respondents in ten countries report believing that US PhDs provide an advantage in the job-search processes in those countries. Nearly half of respondents in four more countries agree.

Perhaps more importantly, the United States remains home to the best universities in the world, according to the scholars we surveyed. When respondents were

³⁶For a complete list of variables, see the TRIP journal article database codebook, which is available upon request: Susan Peterson and Michael J. Tierney, *Codebook and User's Guide for TRIP Journal Article Database* (Williamsburg, VA: Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations, College of William & Mary, 2009).

³⁷We have data on country of highest degree for 88.32 percent of all respondents. Among those respondents who provided us with the name of the university from which they earned their highest degree, we have data on the country of highest degree for 91.42 percent of respondents.




Figure 1. Do US degrees help on the job market?³⁸

asked what the top PhD programs in the world are for a student who wants to pursue an academic career in IR, only three schools outside the United States—the London School of Economics, Oxford University, and the University of Cambridge—made the list of the top ten. Fifteen of the top twenty schools are in the United States. Even when we exclude US respondents from the sample, no additional schools outside the United States make the list of the top ten. As [Figure 2](#) shows, more than 50 percent of the universities that were identified as having top PhD programs by respondents in every country—other than Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, and South Africa—are located in the United States. Taken together, the perceived employment advantages of a US degree and the large share of US universities among top universities—even among those respondents not trained in the United States—is strong evidence that US institutions loom large in the discipline.

Privileging US Scholars and Scholarship

As we note above, a key measure of the degree to which IR is hegemonic is the relative status that non-US scholars accord academics and publications

³⁸We do not include data for the United States in this figure, since US respondents were asked a slightly different question. In the United States we asked whether a US PhD advantaged someone on the job market relative to someone with a PhD from another country. Eighty-one percent of US-based scholars answered affirmatively while only 9 percent said “no.” In other countries we asked whether a US PhD advantaged someone in that national job market relative to someone with a PhD from that particular country.




Figure 2. Average percent US top PhD programs by country.

from the largest national IR community. Survey respondents in the United States and the rest of the world recognize US faculty as the “most influential” scholars in the discipline. In every country in our sample, as [Figure 3](#) shows, majorities—and sometimes very large majorities—of respondents to the question of who has the greatest influence on the discipline cite US-based scholars. The results were similar when respondents were asked who has produced “the most interesting scholarship in the past five years.” Nine of the top ten, and eighteen of the top twenty, scholars listed in response to this question teach, or taught before their retirement or death, at US universities. All of these results are vastly out of proportion to the percentage of US scholars who make up the discipline, suggesting the US is punching well above its weight on this measure.

Second, there is considerable agreement across national IR communities on the most influential journals in the discipline, and those journals are largely American. Of the top twelve journals included in the TRIP database because of their impact ratings, nine were based in the United States in 2015. Similarly, seven of the top ten journals identified by respondents worldwide as having the greatest influence on the way IR scholars think about their subject are currently edited in the United States.




Figure 3. Average percent US influentials by country.

Third, US authors dominate IR syllabi around the world. In 2011, we asked scholars in twenty countries: “Approximately what percentage of assigned readings in your undergraduate Intro to IR course is written” by authors based in the United States?³⁹ US scholars heavily favor US authors; respondents estimated that 71 percent of the assigned readings in their introductory courses are written by US authors.⁴⁰ In fact, US professors likely favor their own to a greater extent than professors in other countries, suggesting a relatively insular hegemon—a theme that we address in the next section of this paper.

At the same time, IR scholars in many other countries also heavily favor US authors: half or more of readings on syllabi in Singapore (71 percent), Turkey (52 percent), Sweden (51 percent), Argentina (50 percent), and Mexico (50 percent) are, reportedly, US-authored. Only in Finland, where 27 percent of readings are written by US-based authors, did the influence of US-penned works drop below one-third of assignments. US-centric reading lists may reflect availability or perceived quality, rather than insularity. Nevertheless, no other national community in the 2011 sample assigned its own work at anything near the same rate as the US community. Only in Finland (42 percent), Britain (37 percent), Denmark (28 percent), and France (27 percent) were more than a quarter of the readings in introductory IR classes written by respondents’ compatriots. The geographic distribution of assigned authors, in short, reinforces the notion that the United States is hegemonic in the discipline, that the flow of ideas is largely outward from an insular United States, and that some national communities are more heavily influenced than others by the IR community in the United States.

The hegemonic role of the United States within the IR discipline should not be surprising, perhaps, since English serves as the lingua franca of the academy.⁴¹ Ranier E. Hamel claims that 75 percent of international periodical publications in the social sciences and humanities and 90 percent of those in the natural sciences are written in English. This dominance of the language compels non-native speakers to publish their research in English.⁴² At the same time, “many scientists in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe still publish

³⁹We did not ask this question in 2014.

⁴⁰Thomas Biersteker reports that 94 percent of assigned readings for PhD students at the top US departments are written by scholars who have spent most or all of their careers at US institutions. See Thomas J. Biersteker, “The Parochialism of Hegemony: Challenges for ‘American’ International Relations,” in Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship around the World*, 308–27. The higher percentage may result from different samples (ours is larger and more diverse), from different definitions of “American,” and/or differences in our methodologies, particularly the fact that we ask respondents to estimate what percentage of their assigned readings are written by “American” scholars, while Biersteker examines the readings that faculty actually assign. It also may result, but likely only in part, from a recent decline in the US-centric nature of reading lists. Biersteker’s research was published in 2009. Our 2008 survey found that 78 percent of assigned readings in undergraduate IR courses in the United States were written by US authors, compared to 67 percent in 2011.

⁴¹For a specific illustration of how “the politics of language” shapes the sociology of the IR discipline, see Anne-Marie D’Aoust, “Accounting for the Politics of Language in the Sociology of IR,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 15, no.1 (January 2012): 120–31.

⁴²Ranier Enrique Hamel, “The Dominance of English in the International Scientific Periodical Literature and the Future of Language Use in Science,” *AILA Review* 20, no. 1 (2007): 53–71.

their work in national journals, often in their mother tongue, which creates the risk that worthwhile insights and results might be ignored simply because they are not readily accessible to the international scientific community.”⁴³ US authors also dominate the top journals in many parts of the academy. In part because of the language barrier, for instance, European scholars publish only a small percentage of articles in the top ten economics journals.⁴⁴ Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Harry Rothman similarly find, based on 1995 data, that nearly 71 percent of all the editors of the top 30 economics journals are located in the United States, with 39 percent housed at only twelve US schools.⁴⁵ Nearly 66 percent of authors in their study are housed at US universities, with 22 percent at twelve schools. The increasing use of English within the economics discipline only threatens to exacerbate this trend. Without a comprehensive, comparative study of the US and British academies, it is impossible to know whether US hegemony within IR and/or other disciplines results (primarily or in part) from the English-language bias, the size of the US academy, the quality of work produced, labor market conditions, or some combination of these and other factors. Regardless, the IR field is far from alone within the academy in terms of the extent of US dominance. If the dominance of American economics and sociology are similar in scale to that of the American IR discipline, then the historically contingent arguments for American hegemony offered by Hoffman, Wæver, and Guillhot may be overstated.⁴⁶ Perhaps there is nothing distinctive about “IR as an American social science” in other words. Instead, if US hegemony is largely driven by scale, resources, and English-language bias, then US dominance characterizes many of the social sciences.

Perceptions of US Dominance

To what extent does the significant global market share enjoyed by US scholars, universities, and scholarship translate into perceptions of US dominance? In the 2014 survey, we asked scholars to “indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement: The discipline of international relations is an American-dominated discipline.” If a respondent said s/he agreed that IR is a US-dominated discipline, then we followed up with the question, “Do you think it is important to counter American dominance in the discipline of international relations?” As [Figure 4](#) shows, respondents overwhelmingly agreed that the IR discipline is dominated by the US academy. Only in

⁴³Rogério Meneghini and Abel L. Packer, “Is There Science beyond English? Initiatives to Increase the Quality and Visibility of Non-English Publications Might Help to Break Down Language Barriers in Scientific Communication,” *EMBO Reports* 8 no. 2 (February 2007): 112.

⁴⁴Mathias Sutter, Martin Kocher, and Robert Mrcic, “Representation and Educational Background of European Economists in Top Journals of Economics,” *Empirica* 29, no. 4 (December 2002): 275–88.

⁴⁵Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Harry Rothman, “The Editors and Authors of Economics Journals: A Case of Institutional Oligopoly?” *Economic Journal* 109, no. 453 (February 1999): 165–86.

⁴⁶Hoffman, “An American Social Science”; Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline”; Guillhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory*.




Figure 4. Perceived American dominance by country.

Brazil, China, and Taiwan do scholars not perceive that they are part of a field dominated by the United States. As Figure 5 illustrates, moreover, majorities in nearly every country say that US dominance should be opposed.

Insularity

In the previous section, we focused on the extent to which the IR community in the United States shapes the structure and content of IR as it is practiced in other countries. Here, we focus on a related question: whether and how geographic boundaries inhibit cross-national and/or cross-regional flows of people and ideas. In a field defined by insularity, we also should see clear national and regional identities and little inward flow of scholars and ideas—from a potential hegemon or any other country. In what follows, we find that the United States is particularly insular. Because American insularity would also be expected in a field defined by US hegemony, we focus most of our attention on other areas of the world. On the whole, we see that many IR communities are open to ideas from outside their borders, but IR communities in Asia and South America exhibit a substantial degree of insularity.




Figure 5. Desire to counter American dominance by country.




Figure 6. Do scholars identify with their national IR community?

Community Identity

In a field defined by insularity, IR scholars across numerous countries should identify as part of a national or regional, rather than global, IR community. On our 2014 survey we asked respondents to select up to two of the following types of IR communities with which they identify: linguistic, ontological, epistemological, issue area, generational, subnational, regional (for example, Latin American, Scandinavian), paradigmatic, methodological, and—most useful for our purposes here—national, and global. As [Figure 6](#) illustrates, in no country did more than 50 percent of scholars identify with a national IR community, and in a handful of countries no scholars identified that way. In only one of the thirty-two countries surveyed, Chile, did a majority of respondents identify with a regional IR community. Affinity with a global IR community was stronger, as [Figure 7](#) suggests, than with either a regional or national community.⁴⁷

Home Bias in Hiring

A second measure, training and hiring practices, provides a proxy for community identity and, therefore, geographic insularity in the profession. In a discipline

⁴⁷Worldwide, the modal response to the question of what type of community scholars felt they belonged to is an issue-area-specific IR community, but this could be misleading. The issue-area communities with which many scholars identify, for example, also may be defined by national or regional characteristics. For example, common issue areas might include US foreign policy or international relations of East Asia.




Figure 7. Expressed global IR community sentiment by country.

populated by inward-looking national communities, we would anticipate that most people would work in the country in which they were born and in which they received their PhD training. We also would expect to see attempts to protect the national academic job market from foreign PhDs.

We find ample evidence of home bias in most places. In all but five countries, a majority of respondents work in their country of origin.⁴⁸ Indeed, more than 75 percent of scholars in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United States work where they were born. The bias is just as apparent when we look at a slightly different metric: the extent to which universities employ individuals with domestic PhDs. All but nine countries in our sample train a majority of their IR faculty locally. Still, there is significant variation across countries in the proportion of scholars working in the country in which they earned their PhDs. Among the most insular on this measure are Poland (96 percent), the United States (94 percent), France (93 percent), Germany (88 percent), and India (87 percent). Among the least insular are Hong Kong (0 percent), Singapore (11 percent), New Zealand (14 percent), Taiwan (20 percent), and Chile (21 percent).

Hiring practices that privilege nationals provide another measure of insularity. We asked respondents if they agree that citizens and permanent residents of their own country should be given priority when universities fill academic positions. [Figure 8](#) displays the mean level of support for these protectionist sentiments in each country surveyed on a scale of 1 to 5, with higher numbers indicating more support for protectionism. Argentina, Colombia, China, India, South Africa, and Taiwan are among the most protectionist on this score, although overall perceptions of academic protectionism are low. Canada is not represented in the map since it served as the baseline country and was embedded in the question for all the other countries in the survey.⁴⁹ Interestingly, the United States is among the least insular on this measure.

⁴⁸Those five countries are Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We did not ask about country of origin in France or Belgium.

⁴⁹The question for US respondents read: "According to Canadian law, Canadian citizens and permanent residents ought to be given priority when evaluating candidates to fill an academic position. Other countries, like the United States, do not have such requirements. Do you agree or disagree that US law should require universities to give citizens and permanent residents priority when filling academic positions?"




Figure 8. Academic protectionism?

Note: The question uses a five-point scale, with 1 = Strongly agree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, and 5 = Strongly disagree. This question was not asked in Canada or New Zealand.

Openness to International Ideas

A third way to gauge insularity measures a national IR community's permeability to ideas from other countries. A community is least insular when its faculty understand multiple languages well enough to conduct scholarly research in them, cite academics from other countries when asked who are the most influential scholars or those doing the most interesting work, and identify universities in other countries when asked about the top IR programs in the world.

In our 2014 survey we asked scholars how many languages, other than their native tongues, they understand well enough to use while conducting research. Consistent with our results from previous years, about 30 percent of US faculty in the 2014 survey are not proficient in a second language. As the map in [Figure 9](#) illustrates, however, the IR community in the United States is far from alone in its insularity on this issue and the United States is not the most linguistically insular. Only respondents in Australia average less than one additional language, but ten other countries average 1.5 or fewer.




Figure 9. Average number of languages in which respondents consume and produce research by country.




Figure 10. "Foreignness" of influential scholars by country.

We also asked faculty about the most influential scholars in the discipline over the last twenty years, as well as about those scholars who have done the most interesting work over the last five years. Relatively few scholars from other countries should make these lists in a discipline characterized by insularity. Figure 10 maps the average “foreignness” of the most influential scholars by country. We calculate the proportion of four influential scholars, listed by each respondent in response to this question, who do not work in the same country as the respondent. We then average this value across all respondents in a given country. In response to this question, faculty in nearly all countries list many scholars from countries other than their own. The outlier is the United States, which again appears highly insular. Strikingly, however, in other countries nearly all the foreign mentions are of US scholars. These countries do not appear to be insular, in other words, but this data provides further support for the claim that the US academy is hegemonic.

As we saw above, many respondents list US schools when asked about the top PhD programs in the world. As Figure 11 shows, however, IR scholars in most countries also list PhD programs in multiple other countries. The United States, where nearly all references to top PhD programs are to US universities, shows substantial evidence of insularity. Only Switzerland, Hong Kong, Israel, and Taiwan approach, and only Britain exceeds, the United States in the extent to which US schools dominate the mention of top programs. To put this more directly, when IR scholars across the globe are asked to list the top PhD programs, they list universities in the United States and the United Kingdom.

There is evidence, in short, of US insularity, as we would expect in a hegemonic discipline, and several other national IR communities are insular on at least one measure. In at least eight countries, including the United States, substantial minorities of scholars cannot conduct research in a foreign language. Most scholars work in the country in which they were born and received their PhD, and they generally believe that they should privilege their countrymen and countrywomen in hiring. At the same time, we do not find major signs of national or regional limits on intellectual interactions among IR scholars. Faculty identify with a global IR community rather than a national or regional one.




Figure 11. Percent foreign top PhD program mentions by country.

Intellectual Diversity

If IR is hegemonic in some ways and insular in others, the solution offered by many students of the discipline is increased diversity. Above, we outlined two specific indicators of diversity in the discipline: a broad range of topics and regions studied, and variation in theoretical, epistemological, and methodological approaches across and within countries. The TRIP data describe a discipline that is diverse in some ways—breadth of topics and regions studied and theoretical approaches to scholarly research—but less diverse in others—including epistemological and methodological approaches.

Topics and Regions of Study

A diverse discipline is one characterized by the study of a broad spectrum of issues and places. Our 2014 survey asked respondents to name their main area of research within IR, as well as any secondary topics. We provided twenty-two possible response options—including international security (IS), international political economy (IPE), international organization (IO), US foreign policy, foreign policy of the respondent’s home country, development studies, human rights, among others—and we allowed respondents to write in additional answers.

We then calculated the effective number of issue areas studied for each national IR community. To summarize the relative diversity in approaches, we use an inverse Herfindahl Index. This metric is widely used in the comparative politics literature to measure how dominant a given group is in some defined community or institution.⁵⁰ The formula for the inverse H-Index is:

$$1 / H = 1 / \sum_{i=1}^N s_i^2$$

where s_i is group i ’s share of the total market. This measure allows us to summarize the relative diversity in theory, methods, issue area of study, and region of study across countries. In our case, the “community” is composed of the IR scholars in a given country. Since we are using this index measure to summarize responses to closed-ended questions or nominal variables with predefined choices, the range of the metric will depend on the concept we are measuring. Across all these concepts, however, higher values represent relatively more diversity, while lower values represent less diversity.

Figure 12 shows the effective number of issue areas studied by IR scholars for each country surveyed. As the figure demonstrates, IR scholars study a wide range of issues. In thirteen of the thirty-two countries surveyed, the effective number of

⁵⁰Those studying political parties, for example, use the index to represent the effective number of political parties in a given country or legislature, while others use it to approximate the ethnic or linguistic diversity of a given country, region, or other relevant political unit.




Figure 12. Effective number of issue areas of study by country.

IR topics studied exceeds ten, and in only three—Austria, Hong Kong, and New Zealand—is it below five.⁵¹ The picture of an IR discipline (especially in the United States) focused overwhelmingly on interstate war and the use of force is not reflected in the 2014 survey results.⁵² If this characterization was ever valid, it no longer is. At the same time, there is substantial variation across national IR communities in the topics studied. Belgian and French scholars (19 and 15 percent, respectively) study international organization in higher proportions than do other countries. Unsurprisingly, European scholars study European integration (36 percent in Austria; 15 percent in Switzerland; 13 percent in Germany, Italy, and Turkey; 20 percent in Poland), while Americans (20 percent) and Israelis (21 percent) study security, and IR scholars in Hong Kong (38 percent) study Chinese foreign policy.

In a diverse field we also should see a wide range of regional interests among scholars. Analysis of the effective number of regions studied by country shows a somewhat lower level of diversity on this measure than on topics studied. In eleven of the thirty-two countries, the effective number of regions studied is equal to or greater than four. We see the greatest variation in China, where IR scholars study approximately seven different regions, followed by Australia at six, and five additional countries, including the United States, at five or more. Again, as [Figure 13](#) shows, Hong Kong is on the low end on this measure of diversity, where it is joined by Argentina, Chile, South Africa, and Switzerland.

Theoretical, Methodological, and Epistemological Diversity

Finally, we expect diversity to manifest itself when scholars are using a wide range of theoretical, methodological, and epistemological tools to study international politics. We asked respondents to select the approach that best describes how they study international politics from a list of widely discussed theoretical schools of thought. Respondents could choose from: “Constructivism,” “English School,” “Feminism,”

⁵¹ All three of these countries have small IR communities. Fewer respondents could drive down the relative number of issue areas independent of any systematic focus on certain issues.

⁵² Smith describes such a view of the IR discipline in “The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2, no. 3 (October 2000): 374–402.”




Figure 13. Effective number of regions studied by country.

“Liberalism,” “Marxism,” “Realism,” “Other,” or “I do not use paradigmatic analysis.” Figure 14 displays the effective number of theoretical paradigms by country. Because of the nature of the response options, this is an incomplete view of theoretical diversity. Together, the response options “Other” (11 percent) and “I do not use paradigmatic analysis” (26 percent) constitute over a third of all answers. In itself, this is evidence of substantial diversity. Even if we treat “Other” and “I do not use paradigmatic analysis” as if they were singular theories alongside more traditionally defined paradigms, we see that there is a good deal of diversity within countries, as well as variation in diversity across countries.⁵³

IR scholars around the world employ a wide range of paradigms and theoretical approaches to their subjects. US scholars are more realist than their British counterparts, certainly, but the US discipline is not nearly so dominated by realism as many IR students believe. The conventional wisdom among critics of the study of IR in the United States that there is a “distinctive American approach, an approach characterized as that of ‘state-centric realism,’ that accepts the ‘billiard ball’ rather than the ‘cobweb’ model of international relations”⁵⁴ was not true when it was first made, and is even less true today. Realism was particularly important in the

⁵³By including “Other” and “I do not use paradigmatic analysis” as categories, we are making the assumption that all those who checked “Other” would have written in the same paradigm not included in the list, and that all those not employing paradigmatic analysis are doing so in some meaningfully consistent way. Since we do not think either of those assumptions is accurate, we almost certainly are underestimating the actual level of diversity within each country surveyed.

If Steve Smith (“The United States and the Discipline of International Relations;” also, Smith, “The Discipline of International Relations”) were doing the classifying, he might code some self-described non-paradigmatic and liberal scholars as realists (especially those working in the liberal-institutionalist tradition and the strategic choice tradition), but in this paper we use survey data that results from scholars’ self-classification. If scholars have different definitions in mind when they answer “realist,” “positivist,” “quantitative method,” or “IPE specialist,” then it will be difficult to make valid comparisons across respondents. This is a perennial problem with survey research and suggests the need for a coding scheme that employs consistent standards and definitions of such variables across countries and over time. For recent efforts in this vein, see: John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thomas C. Walker and Jeffrey S. Morton “Re-Assessing the ‘Power of Power Politics’ Thesis: Is Realism Still Dominant,” *International Studies Review* 7, no. 2 (June 2007): 341–56; Daniel Maliniak et al., “International Relations in the US Academy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 437–64; Turton, *International Relations and American Dominance*.

⁵⁴Palmer, “The Study of International Relations in the United States.” For empirical research on the prevalence of the realist paradigm in published work, which is a more direct measure than asking scholars their paradigm on a survey, see Maliniak et al., “International Relations in the US Academy,” who find a much lower prevalence of realism (an average of 12 percent and never more than 20 percent realist articles in any year from 1980 to 2008).




Figure 14. Effective number of theoretical paradigms by country.

founding of the IR discipline,⁵⁵ but in 2014 fewer than 18 percent of US respondents said their work fell within the realist paradigm.

Far more US scholars, like IR faculty around the world, describe their work as constructivist. In fact, constructivism is now the largest single school of thought in the discipline.⁵⁶ To some extent, of course, this highlights a difference between the United States and “the rest.” Only 20 percent of US scholars describe their research as constructivist, compared with 40 percent of IR faculty in Chile and a third or more of respondents in many European countries. But as Figure 15 shows, the United States is not the country with the fewest converts to constructivism. Most important, in terms of our analysis of diversity within the discipline, Figure 15 shows that in most of the thirty-two countries studied, IR scholars have a diverse set of theoretical commitments.

Teaching practices reflect somewhat less theoretical diversity than that found in IR scholarship. In every country surveyed, faculty members report that they teach realism and liberalism more than non-paradigmatic approaches. Across all countries surveyed in 2011, IR faculty report that 45 percent of readings assigned in introductory IR courses are devoted to realism and liberalism combined, whereas 18 percent are devoted to non-paradigmatic approaches.⁵⁷ This gap is most pronounced in Colombia (where 62 percent of readings examine realism and liberalism, and less than 9 percent are non-paradigmatic), Argentina (59 percent for the two schools and 14 percent non-paradigmatic), Mexico (53 percent realism and liberalism and 14 percent non-paradigmatic), Turkey (57 percent for the two schools and less than 19 percent non-paradigmatic), and Hong Kong (53 percent realism and liberalism and 14 percent non-paradigmatic). At the same time that we see some similarities among countries, the sheer number of different paradigmatic approaches both

⁵⁵Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory*.

⁵⁶For critiques of this conclusion by self-described constructivists, see the recent symposium edited by Brent J. Steele, “The Politics of Constructivist International Relations in the US Academy,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 50, no. 1 (January 2017): 71–74.

⁵⁷The 2014 survey did not include this question. Realism and liberalism may have declined somewhat in the classroom since 2011, although the gap between teaching and research was substantial even in 2011.




Figure 15. Theoretical paradigm by country.

within and outside the United States (none of which constitutes a majority of teaching or research), and the fact that the major theoretical traditions are present in different proportions in each country across the sample, reflects a diverse discipline in which a variety of theoretical paradigms are taken seriously.

Does the discipline reflect epistemological, as well as theoretical, diversity? We find that Steve Smith is partly right here: there is a clear epistemological divide between the United States, on the one hand, and Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, on the other.⁵⁸ Sixty-one percent of IR scholars in the United States call themselves positivists, while 39 percent describe their research as non-positivist or post-positivist. Of course, the United States is not alone in its commitment to positivism. Majorities of respondents in nine other countries reported adopting a positivist epistemology, and Japan, Taiwan, China, Israel, and Hong Kong all had a higher proportion of positivist scholars than the United States. A majority of academics from the other twenty-two countries surveyed report that their research is either non-positivist or post-positivist. There is evidence, in short, of significant epistemological differences among IR scholars across regions; this pattern may suggest more insularity than diversity.

The divide between positivist and non- or post-positivist approaches is potentially more interesting when viewed alongside TRIP data on published research in the field. In 2014, 90 percent of articles published in the twelve leading IR journals were positivist.⁵⁹ Had we coded articles in journals beyond the top twelve on the

⁵⁸Smith, "The United States and the Discipline of International Relations."

⁵⁹We did not distinguish between non-positivist and post-positivist in our coding of journal articles, but it is likely that the majority of articles that do not fit the criteria for positivist are non-positivist rather than post-positivist. The TRIP faculty survey does not provide definitions of positivism, non-positivism, or post-positivism, but rather allows respondents to self-identify. In our journal article database, we code articles as positivist if they implicitly or explicitly assume that theoretical or empirical propositions are testable, make causal claims, seek to explain and predict phenomena, assume that research is supported by empirical means, and aspire to the use of the scientific method to make inferences. Generally, these articles present and develop theory, derive hypotheses from their theory, and test them using empirical observations. We code an article as positivist, however, even when it does not explicitly employ the scientific method, if scientific principles are used to judge the validity of a study or the author is defending a concept of social science that uses these methods to establish knowledge claims. We also code an article as positivist if it describes a scientific research project—such as POLITY, COW, KEDS, or TRIP—and/or explains coding rules and evidence collection procedures. We recognize that there may be differences between our definition and those held by respondents completing the faculty survey. Nevertheless, we believe our definition captures what most IR scholars mean when they use the term. More importantly, regardless of the label attached to this variable, the definition captures what we actually measured. Our codebook (Peterson and Tierney, *Codebook and User's Guide for TRIP Journal Article Database*) permits other scholars to use our methods and replicate our results (or recode the articles), even if they disagree with the label or definition.

“impact factor” scale, we suspect that they would have been disproportionately non-positivist/post-positivist, since four of the next six journals—*Millennium*, *Review of International Studies*, *Review of International Political Economy*, and *Global Governance*—have reputations for publishing non/post-positivist research. In a pilot study of one thousand IR books published between 2000 and 2014, we found that 65 percent are positivist, considerably lower than the 85 percent of articles in the top twelve journals for the same period.⁶⁰ If we limit our analysis to the major peer-reviewed journals, however, we see a field that shares a robust commitment to a positivist epistemology.

Clearly, there is something of a divide on epistemological grounds between the United States and Britain, as well as other countries that might be considered closer to Britain, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian countries. At the same time, the divide is not between the United States and the rest of the world. In nine countries—Austria, Belgium, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, United States, and Taiwan—at least half of respondents call themselves positivists. This group contains countries from multiple regions, but not multiple countries from the same region, belying the notion of strong regional differences on epistemology and suggesting a discipline that is more diverse than insular on this measure.

Not surprisingly, given its positivist bent, the US academy is more rationalist than many other national IR communities. In his study of leading US and European journals, Wæver finds that “rationalism” is more likely to appear in US journals, while “reflectivism” is more likely to appear in European journals.⁶¹ Rationalism, for Wæver, includes theoretical approaches—such as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, formal theory, and non-postmodern constructivism—that are positivist in epistemology, while reflectivism refers to approaches—including critical theory, postmodernism, feminist theory, postcolonial theory, and historical sociology—that are post-positivist.⁶² Figure 16 illustrates substantial differences across and within regions on the percentage of respondents who employ rationalist approaches to the study of IR. In the 2014 survey, 33 percent of respondents in the United States described their work as “rational choice” or “broadly rationalist.” Contrary to Wæver’s findings, however, they are far from alone in their commitment to rationalism. Larger percentages of IR faculty in nine countries (Austria, India, Israel, Poland, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Turkey) describe their work similarly.⁶³

⁶⁰For a preliminary attempt to code books using TRIP methods that reveal very similar findings—positivism is less prevalent in books than in articles—see J. C. Sharman and Catherine E. Weaver, “Between the Covers: International Relations in Books,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 46, no. 1 (January 2013): 124–28.

⁶¹Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline,” 702–3. See also Biersteker, “The Parochialism of Hegemony.”

⁶²Smith, “The Discipline of International Relations,” 70.

⁶³Our findings also contrast with those reported in Wayne S. Cox and Kim Richard Nossal, “The ‘Crimson World’: The Anglo Core, the Post-Imperial Non-Core, and the Hegemony of American IR” in Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, 308–27.




Figure 16. Rationalism by geographic region.

As we did with epistemology and theoretical paradigm, we asked respondents to describe their primary and any secondary research methods. Response options included “quantitative analysis,” “qualitative analysis,” “formal modeling,” “experimental,” “counterfactual analysis,” “pure theory,” “legal or ethical analysis,” and “policy analysis.” Figure 17 uses respondents’ answers about primary methods (where respondents were only allowed to pick one option) to show the effective number of methods by country. At first glance, this data might suggest a field characterized by little methodological diversity, with most countries hovering around two effective methods. A closer look reveals that, in a field in which several of the eight methodologies listed have not traditionally garnered significant devotees, fifteen of the thirty-two national IR communities employ two or more effective methods, and five use three or more.

We find considerable variation across countries in scholars’ commitment to qualitative approaches. As we noted above, the overwhelming majority of faculty employ qualitative research methods: across all countries, 85 percent use qualitative methods as either a primary or secondary approach to their research, and 60




Figure 17. Effective number of methods by country.

percent describe their primary methodological approach as qualitative. As we also noted earlier, Poland, Taiwan, Austria, China, India, Japan, Mexico, and Turkey are among the least qualitative, although this may be misleading, since substantial percentages of IR scholars in all seven countries describe their primary method as policy analysis, which is presumably nonquantitative even if it is not qualitative in the Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba sense of that term.⁶⁴ Austria also tops the list of the countries for use of statistics as a primary method, suggesting diversity within as well as across countries. Indeed, in seven of the countries surveyed no single method draws a majority of respondents.

Perhaps more important as an indicator of methodological diversity, respondents report that they employ a wide variety of qualitative approaches to the study of IR. Worldwide, 64 percent of scholars say they use comparative case studies, and 48 percent conduct single case studies. But 35 percent employ discourse analysis, 34 percent content analysis, 29 percent analytic narrative, 24 percent analytic induction, and 19 percent thick description. Ironically, while this paper employs the quantitative-empirical approach that is said to dominate American IR, it finds that quantitative methods are not the primary mode of analysis in any of the thirty-two countries surveyed, including the United States. Further, we show that the IR discipline is much more diverse on most dimensions than suggested by critics of US dominance, who often advance normative arguments with minimal evidence. In short, the proportion of IR scholars using quantitative methods, as measured in the TRIP survey, has increased over time, and the IR discipline reflected in the top twelve journals has become more quantitative over time, but the majority of scholars in the United States and around the world report that their primary method is qualitative.

Implications

Is IR a global discipline, and if so, how is it structured? We explore three concepts that have been employed in the literature on the IR discipline—hegemony, insularity, and diversity—and we develop a series of replicable measures for each concept in order to address this question. Not surprisingly, which measures of these concepts one uses influences whether one sees the discipline as more or less hegemonic, insular, or diverse, and therefore whether and to what extent one views IR as a truly global discipline. We can say, however, that critics of US domination of the field are right: there is clear evidence of US hegemony in terms of reputation; the top scholars, journals and PhD-granting institutions are overwhelmingly (and disproportionately) located in the United States. Scholars around the world also perceive US dominance of the field, and the majority of these respondents believe that this pre-eminence should be challenged. The IR community in the United States appears to be relatively insular compared to its counterparts in other countries, and there is

⁶⁴Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

evidence of insularity within several other IR communities beyond the United States in terms of the languages scholars speak and the fact that IR faculty rarely work or train abroad. Crucially, however, this insularity does not extend to intellectual interaction; IR scholars generally believe they are part of communities that cross national and regional boundaries. There is substantial variation in what scholars in different countries study and how they study it. Overall, TRIP data paint a picture of a discipline characterized by US hegemony and insularity, but also one in which there are robust differences in how scholars practice their craft.

These findings, based on the most extensive data available on the IR discipline, speak to a number of important and ongoing conversations in the field, particularly the question with which we began: Whether and to what degree is the IR field global? Former International Studies Association President Amitav Acharya has called for the creation of a “Global IR” that erases the divide between “the West and the Rest.”⁶⁵ The underlying premise of such calls for a more inclusive and diverse discipline that includes non-Western ideas, scholars, and approaches is that IR is currently dominated by the United States, a fact that the TRIP data largely confirm. But it also is based on an assumption that there is little diversity—the theory, epistemology, and methods of the discipline largely reflect those practiced and promulgated by US scholars. In fact, while there is significant room to reduce US influence and insularity and increase the diversity of the discipline on some dimensions, there also are clear indicators of epistemological, methodological, and theoretical diversity.

Our research also speaks to other, related debates in the field. Numerous students of international relations lament the “mathematization” of the discipline, for example, because of what they perceive to be its negative implications for theoretical innovation and policy relevance.⁶⁶ Mearsheimer and Walt fear that the discipline’s increasing devotion to methodology has arisen at the expense of theory creation.⁶⁷ Benjamin J. Cohen similarly argues that the study of international political economy has become “boring”—characterized by a “loss of ambition”—because of that subfield’s “love affair with the scientific method” and especially “formal modeling and higher mathematics.”⁶⁸ Other IR scholars, particularly from the international security subfield, mourn the passing of a golden age of policy relevance in favor of a “cult of irrelevance” within the discipline.⁶⁹ These observers attribute the discipline’s lack of relevance to an increasing focus on methods, especially those borrowed from the field of economics.⁷⁰ This argument rests on the belief that the US study of IR is heavily

⁶⁵ Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds.” Also, see Acharya, “Advancing Global IR.”

⁶⁶ The term is Mearsheimer’s. See Miller, “Storming the Palace in Political Science.”

⁶⁷ Mearsheimer and Walt, “Leaving Theory Behind.”

⁶⁸ Cohen, “Are IPE Journals Becoming Boring?” 887–91.

⁶⁹ For instance, Michael Desch, “Technique Trumps Relevance: The Professionalization of Political Science and the Marginalization of Security Studies,” *Perspectives on Politics* 13, no. 2 (June 2015): 377–93.

⁷⁰ Paul C. Avey and Michael C. Desch, “What Do Policymakers Want From Us? Results of a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers,” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (June 2014): 227–46; Desch, “Technique Trumps Relevance.” For an argument that quantitative scholars are increasingly likely to do policy-relevant work, see Tanisha M. Fazal, “An Occult of Irrelevance? Multimethod Research and Engagement with the Policy World” *Security Studies* 25, no. 1 (January–March 2016): 34–41.

and increasingly quantitative.⁷¹ The TRIP data confirm, in fact, that the United States is more quantitatively oriented than most other national IR communities, but the picture is complex: there are IR communities in our thirty-two-country study that are more quantitatively oriented than the United States, and US scholars remain overwhelmingly qualitative in their approach to IR, even if the top IR journals increasingly publish articles using statistical methods.

At their core, these and other contemporary debates concern intellectual diversity and whether, and especially why, we should seek diversity in the discipline. Few observers deny the benefits of increased theoretical, epistemological, and/or methodological diversity.⁷² Nevertheless, students of the discipline sometimes disagree about whether diversity is a means to the end of scientific progress or a normative end in itself, regardless of its effect on our ability to understand the world around us.

On the one hand, a growing number of IR scholars lament Western/US dominance of the discipline because it systematically excludes non-Western voices. Arlene B. Tickner describes a “(neo)imperialist” division of labor between the core of the IR discipline, mainly the United States, and its periphery in the Global South, and the mechanisms that reinforce this unequal division.⁷³ Tickner and David L. Blaney, as well as Tickner and Wæver, seek “to put the international back into IR” by highlighting national and regional variations in the ways scholars think about global politics.⁷⁴ Even stronger demands for change and increased ascriptive diversity in the discipline come from Pinar Bilgin and Zeynep Gulsah Capan.⁷⁵ And, of course, the calls for creation of a “Global IR” fall squarely in this group of IR scholars advocating a more diverse discipline. In a prominent outlet and with the endorsement of the ISA president, contributors to a 2016 *International Studies Review* special issue highlight non-Western concepts and approaches to IR.⁷⁶ These authors sometimes argue that inclusion of non-Western voices will help us better understand global politics, but their primary concern is to create a more

⁷¹ Whether the IR discipline is “heavily quantitative” depends on one’s frame of reference. But both the published discipline (methods used in IR articles) and responses to survey questions over the past ten years show an increase in the use of quantitative methods over time. (see Daniel Maliniak and Michael J. Tierney, “The American School of IPE,” *Review of International Political Economy* 16, no. 1 (February 2009): 6–33 and Maliniak et al., “International Relations in the US Academy”). We also find a particularly striking pattern, with younger scholars being much more likely to employ quantitative methods than their senior colleagues.

⁷² For a partial exception, see Mearsheimer, “Benign Hegemony.”

⁷³ Arlene B. Tickner, “Core, Periphery, and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 627–646. Also see Jones, “Introduction.”

⁷⁴ Tickner and Blaney, *Claiming the International*; Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations Scholarship around the World*.

⁷⁵ Pinar Bilgin “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR,” *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (January 2008): 5–23; Zeynep Gulsah Capan, “Decolonising International Relations?” *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (January 2017): 1–15.

⁷⁶ See especially Acharya, “Advancing Global IR;” and Melisa Deciancio, “International Relations from the South: A Regional Research Agenda for Global IR,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 106–19. For an empirical effort that seeks to explain variation in perceptions of US and Western domination at the individual level and measures the normative desire to reduce this domination among IR scholars, see Nicholas Bell and Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar, “Beyond Borders: Perceptions of Dominance in International Relations,” (paper presented at the 5th Global International Studies Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, 1–3 April 2017). Ironically, given the previously cited arguments about the exclusion of non-Western voices, Bell and Wemheuer-Vogelaar find that the strongest critics of both US and Western domination are found in the West.

representative and truly global discipline, one characterized by diversity and the absence of hegemony and insularity.

Another group of scholars celebrate diversity within the IR discipline primarily as a means to the end of scientific progress. In their own distinctive ways, David A. Lake, on the one hand, and Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein on the other, celebrate an IR field characterized by “analytical eclecticism” in which problem-based, mid-level theories that selectively combine concepts drawn from multiple, often competing, theoretical schools of thought have begun to replace interparadigmatic wars that characterized the 1990s.⁷⁷ Previous focus on debates among the major “isms,” according to Lake, hindered theoretical progress, reduced prospects for “cumulating knowledge,” and prevented IR scholars from producing information or ideas of practical importance to policy practitioners.⁷⁸

In addition to advocating theoretical diversity, some of these same observers also advocate letting a hundred flowers bloom epistemologically and methodologically. In his Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, Lake rejects the idea of a common standard for assessing the quality of an argument or judging between two or more explanations.⁷⁹ Positivists should apply their own standards to judge research published in the positivist—or what Lake calls the “nomological”—tradition, whereas those scholars working in what he calls the “narrative” tradition should develop and apply their own methods for assessing the quality of arguments. Lake is skeptical about the utility of cross-epistemological assessments, but he embraces epistemological and methodological diversity.⁸⁰ Other scholars, including Lake himself in earlier writings, are less hospitable to non-positivist approaches.⁸¹ Indeed, many positivists (channeling Thomas S. Kuhn)⁸² believe that disciplinary progress can occur only within one’s own scientific community—in this case, by employing positivist approaches with a shared understanding of the standards by which research should be judged.⁸³ As Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey note, “Not all perspectives and subfields of I[nternational] S[tudies] are directed to accomplishing cumulation . . .”⁸⁴ In other words, a

⁷⁷David A. Lake, “Theory is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 558–78; Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism: Not Perfect, but Indispensable,” *Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 8, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 19–24; Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, “De-Centering, Not Discarding, the ‘Isms’: Some Friendly Amendments,” *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 481–85.

⁷⁸David A. Lake, “Why ‘Isms’ are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress,” *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 465–80; Lake, “Theory is Dead, Long Live Theory.”

⁷⁹Lake, “Why ‘Isms’ are Evil.”

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹David A. Lake, “Progress in International Relations: Beyond Paradigms in the Study of Institutions” in *Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies*, ed. Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 135–152.

⁸²Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1st ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁸³For example, King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*; Zeev Maoz, “Case Study Methodology in International Studies: From Storytelling to Hypothesis Testing,” in *Evaluating Methodology in International Studies*, ed. Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 455–75.

⁸⁴Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey, “The Essence of Millennial Reflections on International Studies: Methodology” in *Evaluating Methodology in International Studies*, ed. Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 3.

healthy IR discipline, one in which normal science flourishes, is characterized by epistemological monism, but theoretical and methodological pluralism. Diversity, in short, is valued as a means to the end of advancing scientific knowledge and our understanding of world politics.

In the end, alternative arguments for diversity and their implied epistemological commitments may be more a matter of taste than of logic or evidence. Acharya and his fellow travelers advocate a disciplinary conversation in which all participants are welcome and willing to share their ideas with everyone.⁸⁵ As important, everyone is willing to listen to everyone else within a single global discipline. In this imagined world IR scholars have a single conversation that is informed by many different voices, and there are few rules about methods, epistemologies, and theories. Alternatively, Lake and his sympathizers favor a very different style of conversation.⁸⁶ Anyone is allowed to join the conversation(s), but each new arrival typically chooses to converse with people who share her epistemological, methodological, and theoretical commitments. Multiple conversations occur simultaneously, and those seated nearby likely cannot hear, or if they can, they do not completely understand, the conversations of their neighbors. A diverse group of scholars happily shares this disciplinary space, but they rarely interact across slowly shifting boundaries both because they choose not to, and because doing so would be difficult without substantial individual investments in learning a shared language and shared norms of professional assessment. There is, of course, a third possible view that includes multiple, separate conversations from which large numbers of scholars are formally excluded. In this view, regardless of whether you learn certain methods, adopt the right epistemological stances, or learn to speak the language of a particular debate, if you are not white, male, or from the Global North, it is difficult to break into these ongoing discussions. No one is openly advocating this kind of segregation in the discipline, but some scholars do argue that this is the *de facto* state of affairs today for many IR scholars, particularly non-Western ones.

Our data-collection efforts, our new measures of old concepts, and the future use of these data in statistical analyses tell us little or nothing about what the discipline should look like. Normative prescriptions, which are proliferating rapidly not just on blogs and in social media conversations but also in peer-reviewed journals, do not follow directly from empirical evidence, absent some normative theory of what is good. Scholars ultimately will decide, both individually and in groups, what kind of discipline to pursue. For our part, we prefer the idea of multiple, simultaneous conversations where the costs of entry are low. Mostly, this is where we think the IR field is right now. Our findings reveal an increasingly diverse discipline with many options in terms of what one can study and how one might study them. Although the field is still dominated by scholars at US institutions, we hope

⁸⁵ Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds;" Acharya "Advancing Global IR."

⁸⁶ Especially Lake, "Why 'Isms' are Evil."

that the increasing diversity of ideas, theories, and methods means that more scholars get to opt into the intellectual communities of their choice based on their own intellectual interests and merit. But, then, we recognize that it is relatively easy for us, as IR scholars in the United States, to believe that this is the discipline in which we work and the one we would like to perpetuate.

In the end, such a system works and is fair only if particular groups of people are not systematically excluded intellectually or institutionally. The findings presented above on the disadvantages on the US academic job market of not having a PhD from a US institution as a candidate are striking, especially once we know that the US IR academy is the largest and perceived as the most prestigious in the world. Further, there has been enough empirical research on the discipline in the past decade to make even the most confident classical liberal blush: women are cited less frequently than men, do more service work, and receive lower teaching evaluations, even when other measures of performance outcomes are similar.⁸⁷ Recent work also confirms that citations are highly constrained and defined by geography;⁸⁸ race as an analytical category is systematically excluded from the teaching of IR;⁸⁹ and racial-minority faculty are evaluated more harshly than white faculty by their students.⁹⁰ The systematic exclusion of particular classes of people—whether because of gender, race, geography, or other factors—should be resisted because it unfairly limits or harms the careers of individual scholars and deprives the discipline of important voices. Those voices, based on individuals' lived experiences, influence the development and explanatory power of our theories.⁹¹ A truly pluralist and merit-based discipline, in short, requires that structural barriers be knocked down.

Different disciplinary actors are enacting or advocating different, and potentially contradictory, responses to the perceived barriers to entry for underrepresented scholars. In 2017 the *Journal of Global Security Studies* adopted a new presubmission exchange policy that offers “two rounds of limited feedback to authors based or trained in institutions typically underrepresented in mainstream international relations journals.”⁹² More widespread

⁸⁷Daniel Maliniak, Ryan Powers, and Barbara F. Walter, “The Gender Citation Gap in International Relations,” *International Organization* 67, no. 4 (October 2013): 889–922; Kathleen J. Hancock, Matthew A. Baum, and Marijke Breuning, “Women and Pre-Tenure Scholarly Productivity in International Studies: An Investigation into the Leaky Career Pipeline,” *International Studies Perspectives* 14, no. 4 (November 2013): 507–27; Jeff Colgan “Gender Bias in International Relations Graduate Education? New Evidence from Syllabi,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 50, no. 2 (April 2017): 456–60; Lisa L. Martin, “Gender, Teaching Evaluations, and Professional Success in Political Science,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 49, no. 2 (April 2016): 313–19; Anne Boring, “Gender Biases in Student Evaluations of Teaching,” *Journal of Public Economics* 145 (January 2017): 27–41.

⁸⁸Kristensen, “Dividing Discipline.”

⁸⁹Geeta Chowdhry and Shirin M. Rai, “The Geographies of Exclusion and the Politics of Inclusion: Race-Based Exclusions in the Teaching of International Relations,” *International Studies Perspectives* 10, no. 1 (February 2009): 84–91.

⁹⁰Landon D. Reid, “The Role of Perceived Race and Gender in the Evaluation of College Teaching on RateMyProfessors.com,” *Journal of Diversity in Higher Education* 3, no. 3 (September 2010): 137–52.

⁹¹See David A. Lake, “White Man’s IR: An Intellectual Confession,” *Perspectives on Politics* 14, no. 4 (December 2016): 1112–22.

⁹²See the entire policy approved by the editorial board at: https://academic.oup.com/jogss/pages/pre_submission_exchange?platform=hootsuite.

policy reforms by journal editors and authors to include more citations to works by women and non-Western authors are a direct attempt to consciously put a thumb on the scales to correct imbalances resulting from unconscious bias.⁹³ Alternatively, moves by some journal editors toward a triple-blind review process, in which even the editor does not know the identity of an author submitting to the journal, attempt to guarantee the neutrality of editors and reviewers.⁹⁴

Straightforward normative policy solutions do not flow clearly and logically from the descriptive or analytic statistics presented here, but we believe that over time such systematically collected evidence can inform disciplinary policy decisions. Here, we ask whether the discipline has moved beyond the dominance of the US academy to become a truly global discipline and the extent to which multiple, national IR communities are open to ideas, individuals, and approaches from other countries. We find that the United States remains the biggest player on the field by far, and it remains relatively insulated from other countries' intellectual outputs. But around the world, IR scholars study a diverse range of topics using a wide variety of theoretical and methodological tools. Whether this is good news depends in part on one's view of how the field progresses. Hegemony limits the voices heard, topics studied, and tools of the craft employed. For positivists, however, the dominance of the scientific approach, combined with the cross-national diversity of topics and theoretical perspectives highlighted by the TRIP survey, generate optimism that the IR field has made significant progress toward becoming a healthy, mature social science. We hope this study contributes to and sparks more, and more rigorous, inquiry using well-defined terms and systematic evidence on perceptions, behavior, and outcomes within the IR discipline.

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Due to the confidential nature of the survey data, replication data cannot be released in a form where responses are linked to an individual respondent. We provide replication data where aggregate values for any given question are reproducible, but those data that could be used to link an individual respondent to his or her response are randomized.

⁹³For one example, see Daniel Nexon, "ISQ Guidelines and Policy," at <http://www.isanet.org/Publications/ISQ/Guidelines-and-Policy>.

⁹⁴Of course, such triple-blind processes may have the unintended consequence of reducing the number of papers accepted by female scholars or the number of citations to female authors if gender is correlated with other factors (such as methodology or issue area) that are driving choices about acceptance or citation. For a clear recent example see Dawn Langan Teele and Kathleen Thelen, "Gender in the Journals: Publication Patterns in Political Science," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 50, no. 2 (January 2017): 433–47.

Thus, additional analysis is limited across variables, but descriptive statistics within each variable are valid. Replication data and notes are available at <https://trip.wm.edu/home/index.php/data/more-data>.

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