

Trustees of Princeton University

Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma

Author(s): John H. Herz

Source: *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan., 1950), pp. 157-180

Published by: [Cambridge University Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009187>

Accessed: 28/03/2011 08:18

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *World Politics*.

IDEALIST INTERNATIONALISM AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA

By JOHN H. HERZ

THE heartbreaking plight in which a bipolarized and atom bomb-blessed world finds itself today is but the extreme manifestation of a dilemma with which human societies have had to grapple since the dawn of history. For it stems from a fundamental social constellation, one where a plurality of otherwise interconnected groups constitute ultimate units of political life, that is, where groups live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity.

Wherever such anarchic society has existed—and it has existed in most periods of known history on some level—there has arisen what may be called the “security dilemma” of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.

Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question. The condition that concerns us here is not a biological or anthropological but a social one. This *homo homini lupus* situation does not preclude social cooperation as another fundamental fact of social life. But even cooperation and solidarity tend to become elements in the conflict situation, part of their function being the consolidation and the strengthening of particular groups in their competition with other groups. The struggle for security, then, is merely raised from the individual or lower-group level to a

higher-group level. Thus, families and tribes may overcome the power game in their internal relations in order to face other families or tribes; larger groups may overcome it to face other classes unitedly; entire nations may compose their internal conflicts in order to face other nations. But ultimately, somewhere, conflicts caused by the security dilemma are bound to emerge among political units of power.

Such findings, one might agree with Henri Bergson, "*ont de quoi attrister le moraliste,*" and men have reacted to them in dissimilar ways. The two major ways of reacting will here be called Political Realism and Political Idealism. Political Realism frankly recognizes the phenomena which are connected with the urge for security and the competition for power, and takes their consequences into consideration. Political Idealism, on the other hand, usually starts from a more "rationalistic" assumption, namely, that a harmony exists, or may eventually be realized, between the individual concern and the general good, between interests, rights, and duties of men and groups in society; further, that power is something easily to be channeled, diffused, utilized for the common good, and that it can ultimately be eliminated altogether from political relationships. The distinction is thus not simply one between thought concerned with the actual and the ideal, "what is" and "what ought to be." It is true that Realism, frequently, is more concerned with description and analysis of what is than with political ideals, while Idealism often neglects factual phenomena for political ideals. But Realism may well, and often does, glorify "realist" trends as the desirable ones, while Idealism may take notice of power phenomena. The distinction is rather one of emphasis: Realist thought is determined by an insight into the overpowering impact of the security factor and the ensuing power-political, oligarchic, authoritarian, and similar trends and tendencies in society and politics, whatever its ultimate conclusion and advocacy. Idealist thought, on the other hand, tends to concentrate on conditions and solutions which are supposed to overcome the egoistic instincts and attitudes of individuals and groups in favor of considerations beyond mere security and self-interest. It therefore usually appears in one or another form of individualism, humanism, liberalism, pacifism,

anarchism, internationalism—in short, as one of the ideologies in favor of limiting (or, more radically, eliminating) the power and authority which organized groups claim over men. As one author has expressed it, if “the children of darkness” are realists, pessimists, and cynics, the “children of light” sin through a facile optimism that renders them blind and sentimental.¹

The distinction here suggested, while frankly inadequate in the realm of more refined political theory, seems to be a fertile one for the study of the great social and political movements of history. Its importance becomes evident when one starts to analyze the characteristic attitude-patterns and emotions of leaders and followers in such movements. Either the approach has been expressive of a utopian and often chiliastic Political Idealism, or—when disillusionment with the ideal’s ability to mold the “realist” facts frustrates expectations—it has taken refuge in an equally extreme, power-political and power-glorifying Political Realism. This fatal reversal time and again has constituted the tragedy of Political Idealism, which, paradoxically, has its time of greatness when its ideals are unfulfilled, when it is in opposition to out-dated political systems and the tide of the times swells it toward victory. It degenerates as soon as it attains its final goal; and in victory it dies. One is tempted to sum up the history of the great modern social and political movements as the story of the credos of Political Idealism and their successive failures in the face of the facts observed and acclaimed by Political Realism. Nowhere, perhaps, has this been more striking than in the field of the relations among the “sovereign” units of organization and power, *i.e.*, in modern times, in the “international” realm.²

I

There is some typical “Idealism” in the very exclusion, or comparative disregard, of international problems from political thought. Unlike thought regarding form and structure of government, theories in the realm of international relations have traditionally formed a side issue. Systems and theories centered

¹ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense*, New York, Scribner, 1944.

² The following, under I through VII, condenses a chapter of a larger manuscript, entitled “Political Realism and Political Idealism, A Study in Theories and Realities.”

around units of government were considered in isolation from their international milieu. A state of peace, in which the fact of international relationships could be eliminated from theoretical consideration, was assumed to be "normal." Thus, most of the well-known utopias located their ideal commonwealth upon some island, wilderness, or similarly isolated place, and even less utopian theorists devoted their main attention to problems of internal politics and the internal improvement of the community.

A lover of the paradoxical might say that the absence of theories of international relations constitutes in itself the most typical idealist theory of international relations. It implies, indeed, that with the solution of the internal political problems no other problems remain; interrelations of political units then automatically become harmonious. But with the passing of the relative self-sufficiency of the highest political units, with their increasing interdependence in a world-wide international society, theories of international relations have at last been given more significant expression and have come to constitute the basis of political movements and political action. Among them, nationalism and internationalism will be analyzed here with regard to their basic idealist assumptions and their failure in the world of "realist" phenomena.

II

With the rise of sovereign nation-states there emerged the idea and ideal of a system of equal, free, and self-determining nationalities, each organized into its own state, and all living peacefully side by side in harmonious mutual relations. This "idealist" nationalism stands in contrast to the nationalism that developed with the rise of exclusive, aggressive, expansionist, and imperialistic national policies, and which will be called here "integral" nationalism. Integral nationalism represents Political Realism in its extreme: a Realism which starts by analyzing political tendencies in order to evaluate them, and which, through their glorification, then becomes the ideological foundation of the resulting movements. Idealist nationalism, on the other hand, has proved to be utopian in its expectation

of an ideal international society which runs counter to actual tendencies of international politics.

As is well known, nationalism as an "ism" hardly existed prior to the French Revolution. The Revolution established the People as a self-conscious unit; foreign attack upon the Revolution created the nation-in-arms and, thereby, French nationalism, revolutionary, missionary, and visionary; resistance to French Caesarism on the part of subjugated countries created a love of nationality in these countries; and in the Wars of Liberation the revolutionary principle of national self-determination was victor over the very nation which had made the Revolution.

Idealist nationalism as a system of thought amalgamated pacifist-humanitarian with liberal-democratic elements. The doctrine of national self-determination had as its source the same ideology that produced the idea of the right of individual self-determination. Rationalistic individualism was opposed not only to restrictions enforced upon the individual but also to "cabinet politics" that disposed of populations without their consent. Thus, the "fundamental" rights of nationalities were considered to be the same as those of man, namely, freedom from interference and oppression. Once such freedom had been achieved in a system of self-determining nation-states, there would no longer be any reason or justification for international friction and war. Freedom of nations was to be the common concern of all humanity; witness the famous decree of November 19, 1792, in which the French National Convention declared that France would "come to the aid of all peoples who are seeking to recover their liberty." But the most significant spokesmen of humanitarian nationalism came from nationalities which were still seeking unification. Because of the later transformation of Germany and Italy from nationalities seeking redemption in a world-wide humanitarian nationalism to power states that were violently aggressive and authoritarian, early nationalists such as Herder, Fichte, and Mazzini, have been widely misrepresented as forerunners of integral nationalism; this obviously does them great injustice. Yet in a deeper sense it may not be without significance that the countries whose early aspirations expressed themselves in these authors

later produced a Treitschke and a Hitler, a Corradini and a Mussolini. In both countries it reflects the transformation of idealist utopianism in the realm of theory into the stark reality of power politics for which integral nationalists like Treitschke merely shaped the ideology and the apologetics.

Although in Herder's concept of nationality, nationalism was mixed with elements of romanticism (each nationality having its peculiar "soul" and worth among the "flowers in God's garden"), the emphasis put on the necessity of political freedom was as strong as the expectation that self-determination would make for peace and harmony: It is the cabinets that make wars upon each other, but not so the *Vaterlaender*.³ One and a half centuries later, with the history of the coexistence of these *Vaterlaender* in mind, a French author, sadder but wiser, could speak of them as "these merciless fatherlands, full of greed and pride."⁴ But it was Fichte in whose political philosophy the idea of peculiar "missions" of nations assumed a central importance. In conformity with his philosophy of history, which conceived that an age of utilitarian individualism was being succeeded by one of rational freedom under law and moral norms, Fichte ascribed to Germany a mission to become the model of a *Kultur-nation*, a country which for the first time in history would combine political liberty with that social and economic equality without which the dignity of man as a rational being cannot be realized. Patriotism was still the means toward the higher end of the realization of free man and free humanity. To Mazzini, likewise, nationality was not only the natural unit in an association of free peoples, but also the only unit in which the internal task of emancipation from tyranny and exploitation could be performed. God, he maintained, has, in a kind of pre-established harmony, divided humanity into distinct groups on the basis of language. This natural division has been disfigured by the arbitrary boundaries of the "countries of Kings and privileged classes." National unification thus simply means restoration of preordained harmony; and between nations so established "there will be harmony and brotherhood."⁵ The

³ See *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, Riga and Leipzig, 1784, Book IX, Chapter IV.

⁴ Georges Bernanos, *Journal d'un curé de campagne*, Paris, 1936, p. 300.

⁵ *The Duties of Man*, New York, Everyman's Library, Dutton, 1907 p. 52.

battle symbol, so often applied by Political Realists for their own purposes, is utilized by Mazzini for such harmonizing conclusions :

Humanity is a great army moving to the conquests of unknown lands, against powerful and wary enemies. The Peoples are the different corps and divisions of that army. Each . . . has a special operation to perform, and the common victory depends on the exactness with which the different operations are carried out. Do not disturb the order of battle.⁶

The unanswered question as to whom these divisions were to do battle with was soon to be answered by history itself: not perceiving a common enemy, they would turn against each other.

This turning against each other had as one of its major reasons the security dilemma of politically unintegrated units, and their ensuing competition for power. Nationalities inevitably became competing units after having abandoned their state of innocence and established themselves as nation-states. Nationalism in the major nation-states now became allied with ideas of national or racial inequality and superiority; liberal-humanitarian nationalism wandered to the East. Theories of integral nationalism, which now blossomed, had forerunners in certain earlier theories, especially political romanticism, which had ridiculed the concepts of "man" and "humanity" as mere abstractions. Thus the same author who had opposed Rousseau's ideology of the spontaneous formation of the general will with an emphasis on an elite's capacity for "instilling the right prejudices" opined: "I have seen, in my time, Frenchmen, Italians, and Russians; I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one may be a Persian; but as for Man, I declare that I have never met him in my life; if he exists, it is without my knowledge."⁷ It was through this elimination of the concept of humanity that the universalist ideology was taken out of nationalism.

What remained was either pseudo-Realism, such as that found in theories of racialism (of white, or Nordic, or Aryan

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁷ Joseph de Maistre, *Considérations sur la France*, Lyon, 1843, p. 88.

superiority, etc.), or genuine Political Realism with a recognition of the inevitabilities of power politics in an age of sovereign states. How did it happen that earlier nationalism, with its vision of international peace and harmony, could have so completely overlooked this central phenomenon? Some explanation may be found in the chiliastic character of all Political Idealism, its inclination to expect the millennium, the "totally and radically different situation" on the other side of the great divide which in such thought separates the present evil world from the brave new world of the future. Thus, the "heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philosophers" (which turned out to be the bourgeois revolution) was expected to follow the abolition of feudalism and absolutism. Socialism expected, and still expects, the "altogether different" to become real, once the capitalistic regime is overthrown. And humanitarian nationalism expected the golden age of international brotherhood to come true once nationalities were set free to determine their fate in liberty. Final victory over the power policies of "kings and privileged classes" was supposed to constitute these nations' "leap into the realm of freedom." But in some respects the mechanical balance-of-power politics of the absolutist cabinets, which nationalists blamed for most international evils, was more suitable for safeguarding peaceful, if not permanently stable, relations than was a policy based on the more emotional impulses, aims, and claims of nation-states whose foreign policy was influenced by the nationalism of the masses.

III

Among movements expressive of idealist internationalism we may count those revolutionary movements which were genuinely universalist, those which, in the conception and programs of their leaders as well as during the early stages of their implementation, tended to bring about a general transformation of society. In the cases of the French or the Bolshevik Revolutions, birthplace and actual theater of the movement were regarded as merely accidental starting points of what was conceived as a world-embracing development; such movements were thus world-revolutionary in the strict sense.

The Puritan revolution in England did not, in the main,

conceive of itself as a world-revolutionary movement aimed at changing feudal-monarchical institutions all over the world. Similar ideological isolationism characterized the American Revolution, where even the appeal to "the opinions of mankind" was made for what was considered the cause of one single nation. But world-revolutionary appeal and propaganda were of the essence of the French Revolution. It is true that, except for some radical cosmopolitans like Anacharsis Clootz, neither Girondists nor Jacobins advocated internationalization of world society in the sense of blotting out countries and peoples; but they all foresaw an impending expansion of the revolutionary ideas over the world; it was France's mission to help other nations to achieve their freedom and to join with France in a society of free nations. "The Revolution is a universal religion which it is France's mission to impose upon humanity."⁸

This religious fervor was characterized by two convictions: one, that the revolutionary ideas, being the expression of undoubted truth, were bound to prevail, so to speak, by themselves, by the sheer force of their truth and reason; the other, that the total transformation of society, which these ideas were bound to bring about, was imminent. This belief in the absolute truth of the gospel and the imminence of the coming of the Savior puts French revolutionary enthusiasm alongside similar universalist-idealistic movements of chiliastic utopianism. This attitude, in the first stage of the Revolution, was common to all groups, leaders, and factions. Said Brissot: "The American Revolution engendered the French Revolution; the latter one will constitute the sacred spot whence will spring the spark that shall put all nations to fire."⁹ And Lebrun wrote to Noel: "It is without doubt that our principles will spread everywhere by themselves sooner or later, simply because they are principles of pure reason for which the major part of Europe is now ripe."¹⁰ Robespierre, in the Convention, exclaimed: "What! You have an entire nation behind you, reason as your aid, and you have not yet revolutionized the

⁸ Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la révolution française*, Paris, 1889, Vol. II, p. 109.

⁹ July 10, 1791, quoted in F. Laurent, *Histoire du droit des gens*, Paris, 1868, Vol. XV, p. 24.

¹⁰ November 11, 1792, quoted in Sorel, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 165.

world? . . . In England, the party of freedom awaits you . . . If only France starts marching, the republicans of England will reach out their hands to you, and the world will be free.”¹¹ Adherents of the revolutionary gospel in other countries were imbued with the same chiasm. An address of English republicans to the Convention contained this statement :

Frenchmen, you are already free; the Britons expect to be free soon. The Triple Alliance, not of crowned heads, but of the peoples of America, France, and Great Britain, will bring liberty to Europe and peace to the world. After the example set by France, revolutions will be easy. We should not be surprised if very soon an English National Convention will likewise receive congratulations.¹²

In the unhistoric fashion characteristic of chiliastic movements, conditions prevailing elsewhere were considered as mere replicas of those in France, hence bound to undergo the same development. While overestimating fantastically the importance of revolutionary movements and sympathizing groups abroad, however insignificant or isolated, one vastly underestimated the hostile reaction the Revolution was bound to evoke in a Europe still largely feudal and monarchist. The war against the coalition thus appeared as a fight against toppling old powers, while appeals to the masses of the people would suffice to win them as allies on the side of the Revolution. The war would thus become one of propaganda :

Let us tell all Europe . . . that the battles which the people fight at the orders of the despots resemble blows which two friends, incited by a mean instigator, exchange in the dark; as soon as they see the light, they will drop their arms, embrace each other, and punish their deceivers. So the peoples, when suddenly at the moment of the battle between the enemy armies and ours the light of philosophy strikes their eyes, will embrace each other before deposed kings and a satisfied heaven.¹³

And Robespierre, in 1793, intoned: “Might heaven at this moment allow us to have our voice heard by all peoples: Immediately the flames of war would be extinguished and all peoples would form a nation of brothers.”¹⁴

Thus the Dutch, the Belgians, the Germans were addressed as potential allies. The war against the tyrants was to be the

¹¹ March 10, 1793, *ibid.*, p. 344.

¹² November 7, 1792, *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 214.

¹³ Isnard, quoted in Laurent, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁴ Quoted in Laurent, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

last war. But until ultimate victory was won, there could be no neutrals: "The Republic recognizes only friends or enemies!"¹⁵ Ideological movements carry their own idea of legitimacy, and the established order appears as mere brute force, without foundation in law or morals.

The new movement claimed a "legitimate" right to carry the war to those whose only title was force. Then, when the peoples of Europe failed to respond to the message, disillusioned revolutionaries claimed the right to force them to be free. Expectation of universal revolution was postponed: "Prejudice, unfortunately, spreads like a torrent, while truth arrives at a snail's pace."¹⁶ Napoleon had to report from Italy: "Love of the people for liberty and equality has not been my ally . . . All this is good for proclamations and speeches but it is imaginary."¹⁷ Propaganda was now used as a weapon of national warfare, a sure sign that the stage of universalist idealism was over and *Realpolitik* had taken its place.

The rejection of the principle of revolutionary intervention by the declaration of the National Convention of April 17, 1793—a declaration which stated that France "will not interfere in any way in the government of other powers"¹⁸—marked the real end of the world-revolutionary period and the beginning of national *Realpolitik*. Nothing makes clearer this transformation than Danton's explanation of the new policy:

It is time that the Convention makes known to Europe that it knows how to ally political wisdom with Republican virtues. In a moment of enthusiasm, you issued a decree whose motive was no doubt beautiful, and which obliged you to assist peoples desirous of resisting the oppression of their tyrants. This decree would have involved you if some patriots had wanted to make a revolution in China. But we must think above all of the preservation of our own body politic and of laying the foundation for French greatness.¹⁹

Genet now was instructed, in the typical terms of classical diplomacy ("government," "party," etc., as compared with the

¹⁵ Kersaint, January 1, 1793, quoted in Sorel, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 244.

¹⁶ Baraillon, January 13, 1793, quoted in Albert Mathiez, *La révolution et les étrangers*, Paris, 1918, p. 88.

¹⁷ Quoted in Laurent, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

¹⁸ See Vernon Dyke, "The Responsibility of States for International Propaganda," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XXXIV, (Jan. 1940), p. 61.

¹⁹ Jules Basdevant, *La révolution française et le droit de la guerre continentale*, Paris, 1901, p. 164.

revolutionary vocabulary of “sovereign peoples,” “tyrants,” etc.) “to treat with the government, and not with a faction of the people; and to be the representative of the French Republic at the [American] Congress, not the head of an American Party.”²⁰ The Revolution had now become the “revolution in one single country,” and, with Bonaparte’s appearance quite definitely “le jour de gloire est arrivé,” with the glory and might of one’s own country as the aim. Napoleon coolly denied that the French Republic had ever “adopted the principle of making war for other peoples. I would like to know what philosophical or moral rule demands the sacrifice of 40,000 Frenchmen against the well-understood interest of the Republic.”²¹ With the establishment of French hegemony over Europe, propaganda became of the well-known “co-prosperity sphere” type, as when it spoke of France’s mission to unify Europe in “one family,” where “civic dissensions constitute attacks on the common weal.”²² The oppressed nations, on the other hand, having started a war of conservative intervention, ended by taking over much of the original French revolutionary ideology, which they now were able to turn against its creator. A Prussian general could now appeal to the people in the name of the liberties of 1789: “It is for Germany’s freedom that we shall win or die. . . . Any distinction of rank, birth, or origin is banned from our ranks. We are all free men.”²³ The circle had become complete.

IV

The history of the Workers’ Internationals is yet another confirmation of the prevalence of power-political, “realist” phenomena over too facile assumptions of a utopian Political Idealism. The idea of a classless society, which was to result from the concerted international action of the proletarians of *all* countries, combined internal and international utopianism in one comprehensive structure. The Second International conceived the task of the different Socialist parties as one of opposing “capitalistic” wars or of turning them into struggles for the overthrow of the capitalistic system :

²⁰ Sorel, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 431.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. 66.

²² Laurent, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

If war threatens to break out, it is the duty of the working class in the countries concerned, and of their parliamentary representatives, with the aid of the International Socialist Bureau, to do all in their power to prevent war by all means which seem to them appropriate, and which naturally vary according to the sharpness of the class struggle and the general political situation. Should war, nevertheless, break out, it is their duty to cooperate to bring it promptly to a close and to utilize the economic and political crisis created by the war to arouse the masses of the people and to precipitate the downfall of capitalist domination.²⁴

But despite its apparent strength on the eve of the World War, the Second International, with its millions of well-organized adherents, proved impotent in 1914. The great majority of workers' representatives in practically every country concerned, with only feeble and scattered resistance, voted for war. Even if it were true that this *volte-face* was engineered by bureaucratized and "treacherous" leaders against the will of the masses, this would only prove the impotence of "party democracy" in the face of oligarchic tendencies in the organization. But such an explanation is of doubtful adequacy. What Socialist party could, in good conscience, have assumed the responsibility of paralyzing the war effort in its own country, unless it could be sure that its "opposite number" in the enemy country would be equally successful? Might not the outcome then simply have been the sacrifice of the independence of one's own country, including its proletariat, in favor, not of the cause of international revolution, but of the capitalists of the enemy country? The allegation of self-defense was certainly more than a mere fraud. It was indicative of the profound dilemma connected with the security factor.²⁵

While the realities connected with the security and power factors led the Second International to founder in impotence, they eventually turned the Third International, and the movement it carried, into instrumentalities of power politics. There is a striking similarity between the structure and fate of the world-revolutionary ideology of the French revolutionaries and that of its counterpart, the Bolshevik ideology. Even prior to the October Revolution this ideology had been fully established.

²⁴ Resolution adopted by the Congress of the Second International at Stuttgart, 1907; see Lewis L. Lorwin, *Labor and Internationalism*, New York, Macmillan, 1929, pp. 91 ff.

²⁵ Nowhere, perhaps, has the tragic situation confronting internationalists during those days been more poignantly portrayed than in Martin du Gard's *Les Thibaults*.

In April, 1917, Lenin declared that, owing merely to historical accident, the Russian proletariat would be chosen to be the "skirmishers of the world proletariat," and that its action would be only a "prelude to and a step towards the socialist world revolution." World-wide expansion of the revolution he considered as imminent, the preconditions for its outbreak being present in all countries, and the responsibility of the Russians for the fate of the oppressed everywhere was stressed.²⁶ In striking parallel to the French decree of November 19, 1792, a Bolshevik party resolution of August 1917, stated that "with the liquidation of imperialist domination the workers of that country which will first set up a dictatorship of proletarians and semi-proletarians will have the duty to render assistance, armed, if necessary, to the fighting proletariat of the other countries."²⁷ Even more striking is the fact that the revolution itself was undertaken only because world-wide revolution was considered a certainty,²⁸ a fascinating example of how ideologies, by the very fact of being accepted by leaders of a movement, create world-historic events. Even after the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, the interest of the Bolshevik Party was considered as subordinate to that of the world-proletariat. Indeed, it was thought the duty of any particular revolutionary movement or party to sacrifice its specific interests if and whenever broader international interests demanded such sacrifice.

Inevitability as well as imminence of world revolution were taken for granted even when events seemed to shatter such belief. The slightest indications became proofs; some strikes in Germany and Austria in early 1918, were taken as sure signs of imminent revolution, not only in these countries, but in England, France, and Spain. The year 1919 constituted the peak of utopian enthusiasm. Following events in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Lenin predicted the imminent birth of an "All-World Federative Soviet Republic"; in July he promised that that month would be the last of the "difficult" July's, and that July 1920 would witness the final victory of the Communist Inter-

²⁶ See V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, London, 1936, Vol. VI, pp. 17 f., 230, 288, 297.

²⁷ Resolution on "The Present Situation and the War," adopted by the Sixth Party Congress. I owe this and the following references to Ossip K. Flechtheim, who kindly made available to me a manuscript entitled "The Struggle of Bolshevism for World Dominion."

²⁸ Cf. resolution of the Central Committee of the Party of October 23, 1917.

national. About the same time an article by Zinoviev expressed the chiliastic hopes of that period:

As these lines are being written, there exist already three Soviet Republics as the main basis of the Third International: Russia, Hungary, and Bavaria. Nobody will be surprised if, when these lines are published, there will be not three, but six or even a greater number of Soviet Republics. With dizzying speed Old Europe rushes toward the proletarian revolution.²⁹

When the article appeared the number of Soviet Republics had been reduced to one. But its author, not to be discouraged, now predicted a development of such speed and dimensions that "a year hence we shall already begin to forget that Europe once witnessed a fight for Communism; for a year hence all Europe will be Communist, and the fight for Communism will have begun to extend to America and perhaps also Asia and other continents."³⁰ It took about thirty years, and the transformation of the regime into the autocratic rulership of a country which now had become one of the two poles of world-power, to bring this prediction to a beginning of truth, though in a very different sense. Stalinism adapted the international ideology of Bolshevism to the "realist" fact that the one country in which the revolution had succeeded was forced to live in the same world with its non- or counter-revolutionary neighbors. Realistic appraisal of power phenomena led the regime to abandon its world-revolutionary ideology, except for propaganda purposes. As a unit in international affairs the Soviet Union now acts with at least the same degree of insistence on self-preservation, "sovereignty," security, and power considerations as do other countries. Whereas world-revolutionary ideology upheld the primacy of international over "national" proletarian considerations, Stalinism acts on the assumption that no interest anywhere can possibly be above the existence and maintenance of Soviet rule in Russia. Whatever appears today as Soviet internationalism has in reality become subservient to a primarily "national" cause, or rather, the maintenance of the regime of one specific "big power." From the point of view of genuine internationalism, this attitude, with its cynical and unabashed misuse of internationalist idealism, constitutes Po-

²⁹ Quoted in Flechtheim MS cited above.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

litical Realism in the extreme. Moreover, the facts and the struggle connected with the phenomenon of "Titoism" tend to refute the allegation that this Realism is going to last only as long as the entire globe is not yet Communist, and that with the transformation of all countries into Soviet or "popular-democratic" republics, genuine federation on the basis of equality will replace insistence on Russian predominance. The Political Idealism contained in this "federalistic" ideology seemingly is foundering upon the rock of realities inherent even in a system of plural Communist entities. Such questions as "Who will be industrialized first and at whose cost in regard to living standard of the masses?" or "Who will form the 'colonial' raw material basis for exploitation by a more 'advanced' comrade-republic?"—questions which are at the very basis of the Tito conflict—show that the security and power dilemma would have its impact on actual policies in a collectivized world as it has had in capitalistic and pre-capitalistic aeons.

V

Besides the universalism of "world-revolutionary" ideologies, internationalism in the field of political thought has even more commonly taken the form of a general idealism, which has been relatively independent of specific social-political creeds and movements and has centered around what may be broadly described as pacifism. Arising in an age that witnessed an increasing international integration of society in a wide variety of fields, such as communications, trade, finance, this type of Political Idealism had the same traces of rationalist utopianism as were characteristic of humanitarian nationalism. Its chiliastic nature is apparent from its assumption that international integration in certain fields of society will inevitably be followed and implemented by the socio-political integration of mankind into one community. All the more radical among the well-known recent schemes for world government assume the "directedness" of history, as progress toward internally ever more democratic, internationally ever more comprehensive societies, which will eventually constitute one great community. Belief in the desirability of the political oneness of the world leads to the assumption of its virtual oneness in fact. All that remains to be done is to lay technical-organizational founda-

tions. Wars and power politics are considered as anachronisms. The philosophy of this school is perhaps nowhere more neatly expressed than in a resolution passed by the North Carolina legislature in 1941:

Just as feudalism served its purpose in human history and was superseded by nationalism, so has nationalism reached its apogee in this generation and yielded its hegemony in the body politic to internationalism. . . . The organic life of the human race is at last indissolubly unified and can never be severed, but it must be politically ordained and made subject to law.³¹

This was said at the time of the greatest and most "total" war in history, a war which resulted in the polarization and concentration of power in "super-powers" to an extent never witnessed before. The theory of the anachronism of state and sovereignty, of wars and power politics, simply overlooks the opposite tendency growing out of the technical interdependence of the sovereign units in the world: Faced with this growing interdependence but also with the security dilemma, their attempted way-out is to expand their *individual* power, economically (in order to be self-sufficient in war), strategically (in order to safeguard its defense requirements), etc. This may be international provincialism, but it is hard to see how to escape it in a still anarchic international world. The facile proposal of the world federalists that all that is needed is to abolish sovereignty by *fiat* of international law, simply "takes legal symbols for social realities."³² Such an unrealistic attitude is responsible for what has been aptly called "the unreality of international law and the unlawfulness of international reality."³³ In view of the security dilemma of competing powers, attempts to reduce power by mutual agreement, for instance through disarmament, were bound to fail, even if there had not been additional, economic factors driving them into the direction of imperialism. If Marxism maintains that political relations and developments form the "superstructure" over the systems and developments of the means of *production*, for the sphere of international relations it might rather be said that political developments have constituted a superstructure over the developments of the means of *destruction*.

³¹ Text in *International Conciliation*, No. 371, June 1941, pp. 585 ff.

³² Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government," *Nation*, March 16, 1946.

³³ Gerhard Niemeyer, *Law Without Force*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1941.

VI

It was partly these additional factors driving states in the direction of imperialism that accounted for the failure of yet another type of idealistic internationalism, the one connected with economic, or laissez-faire liberalism. Whenever and wherever the trading class with its commercial interests came to the fore in competition with feudal groups, it developed an internationalist-pacifist ideology based on the assumption that once the "irrational" monopolistic, militaristic, and nationalist obstacles to free exchange of goods among nations were eliminated, all nations would readily realize their common interest in peace. We hear even before 1400 from a contemporary observer of Florentine policies that these policies were "not determined by ambitions, which are typical of the nobility, but by the interests of trade; and since nothing is more hostile and detrimental to merchants and artisans than the disturbance and confusion of war, certainly the merchants and artisans who rule us love peace and hate the waste of war."³⁴ England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was filled with the pacifist ideology of commercialism; and similar enthusiasm was expanded, in the work of an early poet of a nation whose very origin was a fight for freedom of trade, into the vision of a world federation "by commerce joined":

Each land shall imitate, each nation join
The well-based brotherhood, the league divine,
Extend its empire with the circling sun,
And band the peopled globe within its federal zone.

Till each remotest clan, by commerce join'd,
Links in the chain that binds all humankind,
Their bloody banners sink in darkness furl'd
And one white flag of peace triumphant walks the world.³⁵

While philosophers such as Comte and Spencer later developed this ideology into a more general philosophy of history—according to which an age of science, technology, industrialism, and peace would follow upon eras of more warlike traditionalism, militarism, and aristocracy—it found its more fac-

³⁴ Salutati, quoted by Felix Gilbert in his chapter "Machiavelli," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. by Edward M. Earle, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943, p. 21.

³⁵ From Joel Barlow's "Columbiad," as quoted in Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York, Macmillan, 1944, p. 299.

tual-economic, though more pedestrian, elaboration in the theories of economic internationalism of the Manchester School. Thus Cobden was an active protagonist of the peace movement, which he tried to ally with his anti-colonial free trade crusade: "The efforts of the Peace Societies, however laudable, can never be successful as long as the nations maintain their present system of isolation. . . . The Colonial System of Europe has been the chief source of war for the last 150 years." "I see in the Free Trade principle that which shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the Universe—drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race and creed and language, and uniting us in the bonds of peace."³⁶

The reality was imperialism and world war. The economic system of industrial capitalism, while internationalist in its early theory, was put into practice in national economic units: "Economic theory is cosmopolitan, but political fact is nationalistic."³⁷ But it was in the economic as well as in the political realm that the "realist" obstacles to the implementation of the laissez-faire gospel were found. Exactly as in internal economies accumulation of economic power by monopolies, etc. has prevented a genuinely "free enterprise" system from functioning, so in the international realm complete freedom of interchange of goods, of migration, etc. could not prevail over the tendencies of monopoly and exclusiveness. Thus tariffs (while at first perhaps justified in certain countries in order to protect rising industries from older ones in other countries—such as England, which otherwise might have frozen the economic status quo in her exclusive favor just by utilizing the free trade principle) became powerful instruments for the preservation of vested economic interests. Also, liberal economic theory overlooked the fact that, side by side with trades and industries interested in peace, such as export or investment banking, there are powerful interests in actual war or at least in conditions under which war always threatens, such as those of the armaments manufacturer. Even with regard to foreign investments, which apparently flourish better in peace than in war, need for protection and desire for better exploitation have often resulted in conflicts

³⁶ From addresses in 1842 and 1846, quoted in Lorwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 21 f.

³⁷ Frank D. Graham, "Economics and Peace," in *The Second Chance: America and the Peace*, ed. by John B. Whitton, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944, p. 126.

among countries backing the respective interests. Political and economic causes here are inextricably intertwined. Just as economic interests would induce governments to intervene on behalf of business, alleged business interests would be used by governments as a pretext for power politics, for instance for strategic aims.³⁸ For, even if capitalism had not developed inherent oligarchic and imperialistic trends, the security dilemma inherent in the system of sovereign nation-states as such would have prevented capitalism from forming a genuinely free-enterprise system on an international basis. It seems unnecessary to enumerate all of the different power-political factors connected with "security," "defense," etc. which have borne upon the national economic policies of the various nation-states.

VII

If the theory of economic liberalism in its international aspects proved to be utopian, one might assume that its opposite, the theory of economic collectivism, with its strong and realistic criticism of liberal fallacies, would be expressive of Political Realism. But an analysis of collectivist assumptions shows that, as in the case of nationalism and internationalism, opposed ideologies may *each* partake of realist and idealist elements. Realistic in their criticism of the opponent, they turn utopian-idealist when their own positive program is involved. Thus a laissez-faire liberal like Hayek criticizes the collectivist for believing that in a system of planned economies the causes of international friction and wars would be eliminated, pointing with good reason to the fact that "if the resources of different nations are treated as exclusive properties of these nations as wholes . . . they inevitably become the source of friction and envy between whole nations. . . . Class strife would become a struggle between the working classes of the different countries."³⁹ Positively, however, his brother-in-arms among latter-day specimens of "classical" liberalism, von Mises, asserts that "within

³⁸ While liberal economic theory has tended to play down the economic factor, Marxist criticism of "finance capitalism" and imperialism has tended to overlook the power factor. Both are realistic in their critique but reveal the harmonistic tendencies of their general doctrines by their respective de-emphasis. Cf., e.g., the writings of Eugene Staley, notably his *War and the Private Investor*, New York, Doubleday, 1935, and Wolfgang Hallgarten's book *Vorkriegs-imperialismus*, Paris, 1935.

³⁹ Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1944, p. 221.

a world of pure, perfect, and unhampered capitalism” there are “no incentives for aggression and conquest.”⁴⁰ To this the collectivist, Laski, retorts, also with good reason, that “in any capitalist society which has reached the period of contraction every vested interest must be aggressive if it wishes to maintain its ground,” and yet he simultaneously denies that the same factor can play a role in a system of planned economy: “The motive of aggression, except on grounds of external security, is ruled out by the nature of the Russian system.”⁴¹ This, of course, is begging the question; for it is plain that the “exception” embodies the very problem, that of the impact of security and competition factors on the policies of collectivist societies. It has been observed above (section IV) that, in view of recent development within the Soviet “sphere” itself, there is no reason to assume that even in a system of socialist commonwealths all causes for friction among the units of the system would suddenly disappear. But those among the ideologists of collectivism who now bewail the unbrotherly power politics of a socialist fellow-nation,⁴² may take some consolation in the fact that even in classical antiquity the representative of economic materialism had been color-blind with respect to the power and security factor facing a Communist state, an omission for which he was criticized by no less a critic than Aristotle.⁴³

VIII

The foregoing may have created the impression that the two extremes—utopian idealism, with its chiliastic approach and its failure in practice, on the one hand, and cynical realism, with its cool acceptance or even idealization of power, on the other hand—were the only existing and possible approaches to

⁴⁰ Ludwig von Mises, *Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total War*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944, p. 5.

⁴¹ Harold J. Laski, *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, New York, Viking, 1943, p. 245.

⁴² Thus Moshe Piyade, of the Yugoslav Politbureau, complains: “They have betrayed socialism . . . They accuse us of meddling in their internal affairs, but they have brought back their diplomacy . . . to the line that existed in Russia before the October Revolution . . . We have learned that even the great principles of Socialism and international Socialist solidarity can become business phrases in the mouths of Socialist statesmen. We have learned that behind the phrases of Socialist internationalism there can be hidden the most selfish interests of the great powers toward the small.” (From a speech made July 7, 1949, as reported in *New York Times*, July 9, 1949.)

⁴³ Aristotle, *Politics*, Book II, Chapter 7, with regard to the theories of Phaleas the Chalcedonian.

the problem of politics. If so, a corrective statement in a however brief paragraph is called for. True, time and again these approaches and corresponding movements have been recurring in the history of the last few centuries, or even millenia, one leading to, and provoking, the other in what appears as an endless chain or a vicious circle. But there have also been possibilities and actualities of synthesis, of a combination of Political Realism and Political Idealism in the sense that the given facts and phenomena were recognized which Realism has stressed, coupled with an attempt to counteract such forces within the realm of the possible on the basis of the ideals of Political Idealism. We suggest to call such an approach, and the policies based upon it, Realist Liberalism. The term "Realist" indicates that the system or policy in question must start from, and accept, the factual insights of Political Realism as its firm basis and foundation, lest it turn into unrealizable utopianism. The term "Liberalism," on the other hand, points to the type of aims or ideals which are to be the guiding stars of such an attitude. As proposed here, the term "Liberalism" is broader than the liberalism of the nineteenth-century free traders and constitutionalists. It includes all socialism that is not totalitarianism, all conservatism that is not authoritarianism or mere defense of some status quo. It is not pledged to any specific economic theory, nor to any particular theory of the "best" form of government. It is derived from the ideal of freedom that underlies the major idealistic theories, thus accepting the age-old ideals that center around terms such as "liberal," "democratic," "humanitarian," "socialist." Negatively it tends to combat all use of power that is not put into the service of the liberal ideal but serves to establish or maintain privilege and oligarchism, exploitation and the infliction of violence; in short, it opposes all the natural forces and trends which are the direct or indirect consequence of the security and power dilemma.

In order to avoid mere eclecticism in the juxtaposition of the "realist" insights and the aims of Idealism it is very necessary to keep this basic difficulty in mind. Liberalism in this sense is, to quote Ortega y Gasset, "paradoxical," "acrobatic," "anti-natural."⁴⁴ It partakes of the general antinomy between ethical

⁴⁴ Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, London, 1932, p. 83.

ideals and natural trends and forces which was already clearly perceived at the heyday of Darwinism (both biological and social) :

The practice of that which is ethically best involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion, it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. . . . The ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.⁴⁵

In following this advice, Realist Liberalism must, above all, be conscious of the limits which the "gladiatorial" facts put to its endeavors. Realist Liberalism is the theory and practice of the *realizable* ideal. As Koestler once put it, "the difference between utopia and a working concern is to know one's limits." Such policy is the most difficult of arts, and to formulate its principles the most difficult of sciences. But if successful, Realist Liberalism will prove to be more lastingly rewarding than utopian idealism or crude power-realism. While less glamorous than Political Idealism, it is also less utopian; while less emotional, it is more sober; while less likely ever to become the battleground of great political movements which stir the imagination of the masses, it has more of a chance to contribute to lasting achievements for human freedom. Even though it will be attacked from both sides—for it can say, with Ibsen, "I have within me both the Right and the Left"—it may be able to lend to both Realism and Idealism some measure of attenuation, thus rendering the former more humane and the latter less chimerical. A kind of "second liberalism," it emerges as synthesis from the "thesis" of utopian idealism and the "antithesis" of cynical realism.

While it is impossible here to convey a more precise impression of the great variety of approaches, devices, and institutions which Realist Liberalism would suggest for the realm of internal government and politics, it may be remarked in conclusion that in international relations the mitigation, channeling, balancing,

⁴⁵ Thomas H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays*, New York, Appleton, 1896, pp. 81 ff.

or control of power has prevailed perhaps more often than the inevitability of power politics would lead one to believe. Thus, a conscious balance-of-power policy, despite the opprobrium attached to the term, has in modern times maintained a system of major and smaller nations which, while not able to prevent wars, injustice, or even the independence of *all* units in the system, at least preserved many of them from total subjugation at the hands of one hegemonial power. A system of collective security, as rationalization of the balance principle (automatic formation of the "Grand Alliance" whenever a member turns aggressor), perhaps came closer to practical realization in the interwar period than debunking of the League-of-Nations experiment would have us assume. Concessions, even if made out of "enlightened self-interest" (such as made by the British in respect to the Dominions and now India) may substitute relations of cooperation and comparative equality for those of enforced domination. Today, it is true, any such devices seem to incur even greater difficulties in view of the bipolarity of the present power-system, which, lacking the traditional balancing power or group of powers, renders the maintenance of the balance more precarious and excludes collective security; for, while one may have collective security with ten, or five, or possibly even three units of power, it cannot be achieved with two. The use of a terminology of collective action then becomes mere ideology and subterfuge in order to provide bloc-building with a semblance of legality; thus, collective self-defense becomes a pretext, however understandable and justified such regionalism may be, in East or West, from the standpoint of security. For the security dilemma today is perhaps more clear-cut than it ever was before. It would appear that from the point which concentration of power has now achieved, it can only either proceed to actual global domination by one power-unit or recede into diffusion and disintegration. But the greater the difficulties, the greater is the task of a policy of restraint and the merit of those who, as Realist Liberals, would know how to forego the "easy" solution, the "Gordian knot" solution of force, in favor of a peace that would be neither appeasement and abdication nor the Carthaginian result of a war which might spell the destruction of our civilization.