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ABSTRACT
Political leaders appeal to home audiences as well as 'others' beyond the state's borders. Using leadership trait analysis, in the example of Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, this paper questions if and why a leader can exhibit different leadership traits and styles at home and away. The paper is concerned with how Erdoğan's leadership traits and style connect to Turkish foreign policy between March 2003 and May 2013. First, two profiles of Erdoğan are assessed from the interviews he gave to domestic and foreign press. The paper then reports Erdoğan's profiles by distinguishing between different Western, Eastern, European, American, and Middle Eastern audiences. Based on these profiles, this paper argues that Erdoğan has two different profiles at home and away. Furthermore, it finds that Erdoğan's profile from his foreign policy interviews with American news outlets stand out from his other profiles. Among other traits, Erdoğan's task focus changes noticeably among audiences.

Introduction

Well-established research traditions in political psychology provide a means to explore if leaders' personality and style differ across audiences. Notwithstanding the hints that leaders' style can change depending on their audience,[1] there is a dearth of research on this possible effect. Such contextual differences are worth exploring in assessing leaders and the way they act in response to situational demands.[2] There are two established research programs that one can draw inferences to study this issue: 'at-a-distance' approaches to assessing leader profiles and the broader personality theory. 'At-a-distance' techniques look at leaders' discourse and use their words as data. The literature on personality, on the other hand, can provide many insights on various effects on behavior. This paper primarily follows the former but also brings in

personality theories. It assumes that one way to answer if the audience leaders are talking to makes any difference in their leadership style is to look at how leaders respond to domestic and foreign media.

Having spent over fifteen years in power, first as the country's prime minister and since 2014 as its president, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the focus of this paper. Erdoğan's record in office and Turkey's foreign policy orientations under his leadership serve the purposes of the paper well. On 29 January 2009, Erdoğan walked off the panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. 'I don't think I will come back to Davos after this,' he said. An emotional and frustrated Erdoğan first confronted Israeli President Shimon Peres. Later, when the moderator did not grant his request to speak for 'one minute,' Erdoğan furiously stormed out of the panel in protest. Many were simply shocked by this behavior; after all, it is not an everyday happening that prime ministers act in such a manner. Erdoğan has not attended the summit since. After Davos, Erdoğan was welcomed in Turkey as the 'conqueror of Davos' and many Arab and Muslim nations celebrated him. In an earlier and somewhat similar incident, in November 2005, Erdoğan abruptly canceled his press meeting in Denmark with Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen when Danish authorities did not ask representatives of ROJ-TV[3] to leave the meeting. Do such examples tell anything about Erdoğan's leadership style and his foreign policy? Is it a mere coincidence that these events happened outside Turkey? In contrast to such extreme acts abroad, Erdoğan is considered a pragmatic leader at home.

Historically speaking, Turkey's foreign policy has been located 'between two worlds.'[4] Indeed, the country's geographic location and historical heritage oriented it to its immediate neighbors in the Middle East as well as Europe, and other major actors, most notably, Russia and the United States. Owning to its conservative origins, Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) once sought an opening to Turkey's neighbors to its Middle East. Arguments about Turkey 'turning East' or following an 'Islamic foreign policy' were common after a few years of AKP rule. In the meantime, the AKP governments also initiated significant reforms towards the goal of Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU).

Erdoğan and his leadership style remain a puzzle to understand. Arguably turning authoritarian (or, mildly put, less liberal) in the most recent years of his reign, Erdoğan continues to govern Turkey, and leads a predominantly Muslim and EU candidate country (though one now with serious reservations). The contrasting audiences Erdoğan deals with in Turkey (domestic political scene and the actors therein – especially in foreign policy decision-making) and abroad (the international audiences Erdoğan addresses to regarding his foreign policy ambitions) in some ways suggests a two-level

game in Turkey's contemporary foreign policy.[5] Are there any differences in Erdoğan's leadership style at home and abroad? If so, what do they say about Turkey's foreign policy under Erdoğan?

In the case of Erdoğan and Turkey's foreign policy, this paper first aims to reignite a conversation about leaders' behavior across audiences. As Erdoğan's reign continues and he seeks an active foreign policy agenda, conclusions of this study are significant not only for presenting a profile of Erdoğan but also for offering clues about the future of Turkish foreign policy.[6] The paper reviews the relevant literature to this inquiry, and introduces the sources and methods used in the analyses. The paper presents Erdoğan's average personality profile and his audience-specific profiles at home and abroad. Furthermore, Erdoğan's profiles speaking to Eastern and Western outlets are included in the discussion, specifically, those from the Middle East, the US, and Western Europe. Erdoğan's profile from his foreign policy interviews with the American news outlets stand out from his other profiles. One leadership trait, task focus, displays statistical significance when Erdoğan's profiles are compared. The findings support the claim that leaders adjust their discourse for their audiences.

At-a-distance assessment of political leadership[7]

At-a-distance study of personalities of political leaders is a necessity because those who hold the highest public offices are not readily available for researchers to conduct interviews with them or participate in personality assessment tests like other individuals. However, one can infer leaders' personality traits or beliefs from their public speeches and/or other spontaneous utterances.[8] This approach motivated many studies in past decades and led to multiple, fruitful lines of research such as the leadership trait analysis[9] and operational code analysis.[10] It is assumed that the frequency of use of certain words in leaders' discourse indicates the very saliency of the content.[11] Leadership trait analysis (LTA) is one of the most prominent approaches to the study of political leaders. Developed by Margaret Hermann, LTA integrates her decades of research on the role of personality characteristics in foreign policy.[12] In this approach, personality is conceptualized as a combination of seven traits: belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-confidence, and task orientation (see Table 1). Each trait score ranges from 0 to 1.

Hermann's LTA is an especially useful approach to understand leadership style (see Table 2), and serves very well for the purposes of this inquiry. This method is designed specifically to explain how leaders react to constraints, are motivated towards the world, and their openness to information, etc. and then with these to assess a leadership style profile. A leader's trait score is considered high or low in comparison to a reference group's average and standard

Table 1. Personality characteristics in leadership trait analysis (LTA).

LTA trait	Description
Belief in ability to control events	Perception of own degree of control over political world
Need for power	Interest in developing, preserving, or reinstituting own power
Conceptual complexity	Ability to distinguish complexities of political life
Self-confidence	Notion of self-importance, and of his/her capacity to take on the political environment.
In-group bias	Belief that own group constitutes the center of political world
Distrust of others	Suspicions, skepticism, worry of others than own group
Task focus	Concentration on problem solving vs. Building relationships

Source: Cuhadar et al., "Personality or Role?" originally adapted from Hermann, *Assessing Leadership Style*.

deviation. Leaders who have a high belief in their ability to control events and a high need for power, for example, are expected to challenge constraints; and leaders low in need for power and/or who do not believe they can control events are expected to respect constraints. Conceptual complexity and self-confidence are related to and predict leaders' openness to information. Leaders with high scores on both traits, and leaders who have high complexity and low self-confidence are expected to be open to information, whereas leaders with low scores on both traits and leaders with high self-confidence and low complexity are expected to be closed to information. These combinations of traits along with a leader's motivation for leading produce eight different leadership styles; according to Hermann, a profile suggests how 'leaders relate to those around them and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions.'[13]

Leaders' situational/contextual factors: audiences

The personality theory literature and the LTA literature suggest that individuals can adjust their discourse and behavior depending on situational demands. For instance, Levi and Tetlock remind of the importance of the social context in interpreting measures of content analysis.[14] Likewise, in an assessment of conclusions he draws from studying personality of political

Table 2. LTA trait Combinations

Leader composite characteristic	Leader types	Component traits
Responsiveness to constraints	Challenger/Respecter	Belief in Ability to Control Events + Need for Power
Openness to information	Closed/Open	Complexity + Self-Confidence
Leadership style	Active Independent, Collegial, Evangelical, Directive, Expansionist, Incremental, Influential, Opportunistic	Responsiveness to Constraints + Openness to Information + Task Motivation

Source: Cuhadar et al., "Personality or Role?", originally adapted from Hermann, *Assessing Leadership Style*.

leaders at-a-distance, Winter argues that personality interacts with both the opportunities and obstacles of situational contexts.[15] Other research on political leadership also looked at differences across time,[16] if leaders exhibited different personalities in scripted and spontaneous utterances.[17] Schafer and Walker framed their inquiry around the audience issue: they ask if Clinton and Blair differentiated between democracies and non-democracies.[18] In an analysis of U.S. president George W. Bush's beliefs, Renshon showed that leaders are prone to adjusting the way they interpret the world in response to such dramatic events as the terrorist attacks of September 11. Renshon concedes that while leaders may change their beliefs in a dramatic way, over a longer period, severe changes become slightly attenuated as the new belief system is consolidated.[19] Such studies have been undermining the assumption that leaders have stable personality traits or beliefs across time or issue.[20]

Discussions about the audience, in contrast to the previous examples, are thin and few. As to what effects audiences may have on leaders, Holsti noted that political discourse aims to 'persuade, justify, threaten, cajole, manipulate, evoke sympathy and support, or otherwise influence the intended audience … to serve and advance practical goals of the moment.'[21] Some research on personality looked at the level of complexity in private (letters or diaries) and public (books, articles, or speeches) communications with respect to the audience effect on leaders' discourse and style. Dille brings in an impression management hypothesis as to possible audience and contextual effects on leaders, yet his discussion later focuses on differences in a temporal context.[22] Lerner and Tetlock's review of accountability literature mentions audience effects in similar vein.[23] Likewise, the integrative complexity literature talks about audience effects. For instance, Suedfeld and Rank found no difference in revolutionary leaders' complexity in letters to specific individuals against writings for a general audience.[24] Later, Suedfeld, Tetlock, Ramirez highlighted that 'the relationship between the complexity of individuals and the nature of the intended audience' calls for an inquiry, since 'it appears likely that different audiences tend to elicit different levels of complexity from the communicator.'[25] Guttieri, Wallace, and Suedfeld examine how various studies found the subject has high complexity when there is a lack of complete agreement with him or her and the audience.[26] They aptly warn that integrative complexity differences suggest that there exists an audience effect but to what degree these are reflected in policy cannot be concluded from those.[27] This literature, though, is much concentrated on the differences between what is called the private and public words of leaders, and works only with the assumption that leaders' audiences can be deducted from these two types of materials.

As far as the LTA literature is concerned, it arguably has not kept up with the same sort of expansion in the operational code analysis literature. The use of LTA in this study also adds to the literature that uses this technique, and

revives an earlier interest on the topic.[28] The theoretical conceptualization of LTA research suggests some answers to this question. Specifically, Hermann argues that certain traits are particularly important and can act as intervening variables between triggers from leaders' environments and the other aspects of leaders' personalities.[29] Some leaders are more sensitive to their environments and will adapt themselves to the demands of that environment, including the demands of their institutional roles. For less sensitive leaders, their personality characteristics are likely to remain consistent across different situations and environments. Sensitivity to the environment can be assessed in a number of ways in the LTA framework, including some of the trait combinations. Those with the combination of traits, for example, that make them constraint respecters (see Table 2) are more likely to change other traits with role changes since changing roles involve new constraints. Similarly, those leaders who are open to information (see Table 2) are more likely to change other traits when they take on new roles and are exposed and attend to new information environment.

Whether the audience makes a difference to leaders' style remains a relatively uncharted territory. Indeed, it is one of the paths Hermann pointed out as a venue of research, but still has been understudied.[30] Earlier, Hermann considered if personalities of Soviet Politburo member changed depending on their audiences – along with two other situational factors, topic and spontaneity.[31] Hermann found that task focus was the most sensitive to all three situational factors. 'Scores for distrust of others and self-confidence,' on the other hand, 'were least influenced by these situational variables.'[32] For the interests of this paper, Hermann found that Soviet leaders' in-group bias scores changed noticeably depending on their audience.

In 2003, Hermann asks if leaders' personality traits scores would differ across domestic and international audiences, topics and time, also if their scores would differ in a crisis as opposed to a non-crisis situation. She argues: 'If the changes are found for audience, chances are that these leaders are influenced by the people, groups, and organizations with whom they are interacting. If, however, the changes occur by topic, then the leaders are probably attending to solving the problem at hand and tailoring their behavior to deal with what is happening.'[33] According to Hermann, 'leaders of third world countries often show such differences in the way they speak at home and abroad. They are much less directive, more charming, and more diplomatic in dealing with the governments of larger, more developed states from whom they may want something than when they focus on their own countries.'[34] As she claims these leaders are more decisive and act in 'authoritarian and autocratic' manner when they talk with the domestic audience. This argument explains how leaders may be constrained by systemic factors, but fails to account for, or even recognize, if and how domestic limitations may affect political leaders and their style. Hermann's discussion,

nonetheless, should suggest that leaders would have different traits and styles depending on their audience.

Data and method

This article tackles the questions posed earlier, and seeks answers in the leadership profiles of Erdoğan. Following at-a-distance approaches,[35] this article takes public domain texts – here, the transcripts of interviews with Erdoğan – as its data. ProfilerPlus,[36] a content analysis software that calculates leadership traits scores based on Hermann's principles, is used to analyze these texts (see, Appendix 2 for a summary of coding procedures). Analyzing text with this program guarantees uniformity in the treatment of text; hence, words become the data.[37] ProfilerPlus is important not only for significantly reducing the time spent for analysis but also for developing systematic and objective results.

Under investigation is Turkey's Erdoğan. He serves the goals of this paper very well, given the country's foreign policy orientations and Erdoğan's foreign policy ambitions. Only the words directly spoken by the leader, Turkey's Erdoğan, are analyzed here. Specifically, Erdoğan's interviews with domestic and international media on only foreign policy issues are studied from March 14, 2003 (the date Erdoğan became Turkish prime minister) until May 2013.[38] Hence, these interviews discuss various issues at different times during Erdoğan's tenure in government and are representative of his general foreign policy approach. The interviews are drawn from *LexisNexis Academic*, *Factiva*, and *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS). In addition, a few sources also posted the transcripts of their interviews online – these were accessed directly from the Internet.[39] A list of Erdoğan's interviews analyzed in this manuscript are in Appendix 1. It should be noted that as a non-English speaking leader, all of Erdoğan's interviews were translated, but as Hermann suggests, translation effects are minimal[40]: inter-coder reliability between native speakers' coding and Hermann's coding of translated text averages 0.92 across all seven traits. This paper employs one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to Erdoğan's leadership traits scores in interviews at home in Turkey and abroad.

Erdoğan and Turkish foreign policy

Political leaders have always controlled significant political power since Ataturk, the founder of modern day Turkey,[41] and Turkish politics has always been 'a stage for leader-based politics.'[42] Specifically, prime ministers have been important actors in Turkish foreign policy-making. For instance, during his one-year in office Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan attempted to steer away from the Republican Era Western-oriented Turkish foreign

policy to explore new alternatives in the Muslim world.[43] Although not all Turkish leaders have had the same level of interest in foreign policy, Erdoğan has been very involved in foreign policy and his administrations have followed a very active foreign policy agenda since coming to power in November 2002.[44] In present day, Erdoğan, occupying a newly empowered presidency, continues to manage Turkish foreign policy.

To understand the role Erdoğan plays in Turkish foreign policy-making, it is necessary first to attend to the decision-making environment. Historically speaking, Turkish foreign policy-making has included other actors along with the prime minister: the civilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy, the Turkish military, the president, as well as the parliament.[45] Prime Minister Erdoğan's role in foreign policy-making as the chief executive, arguably, was constrained by these institutional and historical factors in Turkey. In addition, Erdoğan has been limited by international constraints such as Turkey's dependence on the United States in economic and security matters as well.

During the timeframe of this analysis, Turkey's foreign policy under Erdoğan is largely based on Ahmet Davutoğlu's principle of strategic depth.[46] According to the strategic depth doctrine, due to the historical depth of the Ottoman Empire's legacy contemporary Turkey finds itself with geographical depth.[47] The latter is then part of historical depth, but translates into many geographical influences (in Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Mediterranean) where the former Ottoman Empire ruled. Davutoğlu's book *Stratejik Derinlik* ('Strategic Depth') guides Turkey's foreign policy with such principles as 'zero problems with neighbors.'[48] In a way, in the post-Cold war era transition, where Huntington in his *Clash of Civilizations* found a 'torn country' in Turkey,[49] for its Ottoman past and ethnic as well as religious ties, Davutoğlu finds immense opportunities to materialize. Hence, the strategic depth doctrine prescribes an active involvement in Turkey's potential spheres of influence and assumes eventually its becoming of a global actor.

To explain his role in Turkey's contemporary foreign policy, first, the paper covers Erdoğan's personal background and political career. Then, the discussion shifts to how Erdoğan may have different personality styles at home and away.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Erdoğan's life experience, for his socio-economic background, stands in stark contrast to that of many other Turkish leaders. For instance, Cagaptay marked Erdoğan's 'upbringing in secularist Turkey as a pious man,' and his schooling experience.[50] Born to a family of modest economic status, in Rize (a province on the Black Sea coast of Turkey), Erdoğan was the youngest of five children; his father worked as a ferry captain. Again, in contrast to most other Turkish

political leaders, Erdoğan did not study at prestigious schools, nor lived abroad at any point in his life. Instead, Erdoğan was educated in an Imam Hatip (prayer-leader and preacher) school, and then at Marmara University earning a bachelor's degree in business management. Erdoğan was active in sports, and briefly played professional soccer. While he later became a businessman, Erdoğan was actively involved in local politics of Istanbul as a member of Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party. Gradually rising within Erbakan's parties of National Outlook Movement, Erdoğan became the metropolitan mayor of Istanbul in 1994. Because of his relative success as mayor, Erdoğan became more visible in national politics. Yet, Erdoğan's political career was halted temporarily after he gave a speech in Siirt and citing a poem of Ziya Gokalp, which reads:

> the mosques are our barracks
>
> the domes our helmets
>
> the minarets our bayonets
>
> and the faithful our soldiers.

After the Siirt speech, Erdoğan was imprisoned for ten (served only four) months and banned from politics. In the early 2000s, Erdoğan and other moderate leaders of the National Outlook Movement parted from Erbakan and established the Justice and Development Party. In November 2002 elections, the AKP gained the majority in the Turkish parliament and became the ruling party in Turkey. One of the earlier agenda items for the new government (and, the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party) was to amend the constitution so that Erdoğan can run for public office. While Erdoğan was arguably behind the scenes leader of the government, he assumed the premiership only after he was elected to parliament after a by-election. Ironically, this election was in Siirt where he gave the speech for which he was imprisoned.

On Erdoğan's profile, Yavuz argued that the Turkish populace perceives Erdoğan as a *kabadayi* and a *mazlum*.[51] A *kabadayi* is a figure of reputation, authority, honor, and someone with a role of 'neighborhood disciplinarian.' A *mazlum*, on the other hand, refers to someone who was wronged. According to Yavuz, 'Erdoğan's personality is shaped by four institutions of socialization: the Kasimpasa neighborhood, the religio-conservative Imam Hatip school system, the ethno-religious (MTTB [National Turkish Student Union]) student union, and the National Outlook Movement of Erbakan.'[52] To these, Cagaptay added a Sufi sheikh, Mehmet Zahid Kotku.[53] Moreover, Yavuz claimed Erdoğan represents 'a split identity, torn between his Islamic identity and the politics that he is obliged to pursue in order to stay in government. He has to play *a dual role*: one for his traditional Islamic supporters, and one for his secularist domestic and international audience.'[54]

Erdoğan's worldview is primarily shaped by his religion; Erdoğan does not place much emphasis on notions of a nation or nationalism.[55] In other words, while he cannot be viewed as unpatriotic, 'his worldview is shaped by his religious upbringing, which supersedes his ethnic or regional origins.'[56] Yavuz also argued that Erdoğan's understanding of secularism resembles that of Suleyman Demirel (a prominent right-wing leader, who served as prime minister multiple times and as president from 1993 to 2000); for both, 'secularism should not be interpreted as hostility to religion: the state could be secular, but not individuals.'[57] In contrast, Cagaptay would mark a difference between center-right leaders (including Demirel) and Erdoğan, because the former were Western oriented though conservative.[58] Finally, Yavuz argued that Erdoğan 'enjoys public rallies wherein he ignites hopes and raises the people's expectations and emotions'[59]; though he adds, in a footnote, that '[Erdoğan] is not very convincing in one-and-one interviews where people can question his comments. Thus, one would argue that Erdoğan is a man of mass rallies rather than deliberative democracy.' In short, Yavuz's profile of Erdoğan as an individual – in domestic politics – is that he is a pious but a pragmatic[60] leader. Erdoğan places significant importance on authority, honor, and loyalty.

Erdoğan's personality and his foreign policy: at home and away

Since November 2002, Erdoğan has put his own mark on Turkey's (domestic and) foreign policy.[61] Erdoğan led Turkey in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war; he openly collided with Israel multiple times over Palestine, initiated accession talks and later sparred with the European Union, and in 2010, unlike the rest of the United Nations Security Council, voted against more sanctions on Iran. As mentioned earlier, Erdoğan was the main actor in the most memorable event at the 2009 World Economic Forum. Afterwards, Erdoğan has continued to shape Turkey's foreign policy and occasionally – if not often, made controversial statements about or introduced aggressive policies to Turkey's foreign relations. Is it possible that Erdoğan has two leadership styles, one in Turkey and another abroad?

Table 3 reports mean scores for Erdoğan's leadership traits for 62 interviews he gave to Turkish media and 57 interviews he gave to foreign media, as well as Erdoğan's profile as prime minister (March 2003–May 2013). The two profiles suggest differences between each other. At home, Erdoğan has a higher score in belief in ability to control events at home than away (statistically significant at .10), and the same average score for need for power in all profiles. Then, compared to his average scores abroad, Erdoğan has higher conceptual complexity and lower self-confidence in his profile based on the interviews he gave to the Turkish media. The difference in his conceptual complexity is significant at .05 level. At home, Erdoğan's distrust of others

Table 3. Erdogan's leadership traits scores at home and away.

	World leaders n = 284	Erdogan's profile n = 119	Erdogan at home n = 62	Erdogan away n = 57	p-value
Belief in ability to control events	.35 (.05)	.384	.410	.355	.061
Conceptual complexity	.59 (.06)	.599	.623	.574	.016
Distrust of others	.13 (.06)	.114	.125	.102	.267
In-group bias	.15 (.05)	.087	.073	.101	.058
Need for power	.26 (.05)	.240	.240	.240	.994
Self confidence	.36 (.10)	.357	.331	.383	.327
Task focus	.63 (.07)	.645	.696	.590	.001

Notes: World leaders' means and standard deviation numbers obtained from Margaret Hermann (email communication). All scores are calculated by the ProfilerPlus program (version 5.8.4).

is higher and in-group bias is lower than his averages abroad. Erdoğan's in-group bias scores home and away are statistically different from each other (at .05 level). Finally, Erdoğan is concentrated more on tasks at home than away. In fact, according to ANOVA results, Erdoğan's task focus scores significantly differ (at .001 level) between home and abroad.

Compared to an average profile of world leaders (n = 284), Erdoğan has more confidence in his ability to control events when he is talking about foreign policy to the Turkish media. Otherwise, his average scores remain close the world leaders' mean score. The same applies to Erdoğan's task focus: at home, Erdoğan's problem solution interest is high compared to other world leaders. Finally, Erdoğan's in-group bias is low in comparison to an average world leader's score; in his interviews with the Turkish media, Erdoğan has an even lower in-group bias score.

These differences, following the LTA profiling procedures summarized in Table 2, dictate that Erdoğan has different leadership styles at home and abroad. To start with, Erdoğan's belief in ability to control events and need for power scores in his two profiles lead to different outcomes. At home in Turkey, Erdoğan challenges constraints in foreign policy. High in belief in his ability to control events and low in self-confidence, Hermann predicts that these leaders will challenge constraints 'but will be less successful in doing so, because they are too direct and open in use of power. Furthermore, these leaders are less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence.'[62] Abroad, for his belief in ability to control events declines significantly, Erdoğan respects constraints. Accordingly, we would expect that Erdoğan will 'work within such parameters toward his goals, and that compromise and consensus building will become important.'[63] Then, Erdoğan's conceptual complexity and self-confidence averages in two profiles indicate that he would be inclined to be open to new information when talking with non-Turkish media but closed to new information when talking with the Turkish media. Finally, as explained

above, the most significant difference between Erdoğan at home and away is his task focus: problem and relationship focused, respectively. All in all, these lead to two different leadership styles for Erdoğan: in Turkey, Erdoğan is expansionistic where his focus of attention is on expanding leader's, government's, and state's span of control. Abroad, Erdoğan is collegial and focused on reconciling differences and building consensus – on gaining prestige and status through empowering others and sharing accountability.

A corollary to the question if leaders exhibit different personality traits and styles on foreign policy at home and abroad is dissecting leaders' traits and styles further by foreign audiences. The differences between the two Erdoğan profiles and the earlier discussion about Turkey's foreign policy orientations, Erdoğan's ideological background, and Erdoğan governments' attempts to redirect the country's foreign policy motivate further inquiry into Erdoğan's conversations about foreign policy with non-Turkish outlets by additional distinctions in audience.

Table 4 shows Erdoğan's leadership traits averages based on his foreign policy interviews with Western, Eastern, European, American, and Middle Eastern outlets. At first glance, Erdoğan's average traits across different audiences do not suggest any stark differences. Some variations are noteworthy – albeit, lacking statistical significance. For instance, Erdoğan's distrust of others is expressed higher when he is speaking to Western media than Eastern; furthermore, Erdoğan's distrust others score is significantly higher when is speaking to the American audience. There is also a weak statistical significance (at .10 level) between distrust of others scores for the American and Middle East audiences. Then, Erdoğan's self-confidence is the highest when he is speaking to the American audience. Notwithstanding, Erdoğan has a lower self-confidence in his Western media profile compared to Eastern media. Erdoğan's lowest self-confidence is with the European media. Again, the task focus trait exhibits some differences in all five profiles.

Notwithstanding the expectations for a major difference between Erdoğan's Western and Eastern profiles (due to 'axis shift' arguments), Erdoğan's average scores in Table 4 rather indicate his distinction within the Western

Table 4. Erdogan's leadership traits across audiences.

	Erdogan West $n = 45$	Erdogan East $n = 12$	Erdogan Europe $n = 16$	Erdogan US $n = 19$	Erdogan Mid East $n = 9$
Belief in ability to control events	.354	.360	.336	.403	.351
Conceptual complexity	.576	.565	.561	.600	.572
Distrust of others	.106	.086	.100	.153	.092
In-group bias	.100	.104	.093	.107	.105
Need for power	.236	.258	.232	.255	.270
Self confidence	.376	.408	.360	.411	.394
Task focus	.586	.601	.619	.583	.576

Note: All scores are calculated by the ProfilerPlus program (version 5.8.4).

profiles – that is, between the European and American audiences. While Erdo-ğan's mean scores between the two audiences are noticeably different, there exists only a weak statistical support (at .10 level) for differences between belief in ability to control events and distrust of others. Erdoğan is more task oriented according to his European profile than his American profile; this suggests that Erdoğan is concerned about preserving relationship with the American audience – compared to the European. Erdoğan-led govern-ments preoccupation with the European Union, during the timeframe of this study – and earlier in his tenure, may also lead to Erdoğan's higher task focus score with the European audience.

When Erdoğan's scores with these different audiences is compared to his averages at home, talking to Middle Eastern media Erdoğan's task focus ($p = .066$), and talking to Western media Erdoğan's belief in ability to control events ($p = .082$), conceptual complexity ($p = .033$), in-group bias ($p = .098$), and task focus ($p = .001$) are different. In addition, Erdoğan's reac-tion to constraints – particularly, as derived from his interviews with the Middle Eastern media is worth mentioning; again, Erdoğan challenges con-straints. The combination of his low belief in ability to control events and high need for power points to a leader, who is more comfortable challenging constraints in an indirect fashion-behind the scenes and is good at being 'power behind the throne.'[64] These leaders, Hermann notes, can pull strings but are less accountable for result.

Once again, these differences also translate to distinct leadership styles. Erdoğan's leadership style, derived from his talk to the American audience, is evangelistic. That is, he is concentrating on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message. This profile of Erdoğan is very similar to his profile at home – with the major difference that Erdoğan is problem solving focused in this instance. The observation above that with the European and American audiences Erdoğan exhibits different leadership traits averages should suggest a different leadership style based on his profile from the European outlets. Indeed, Erdoğan's leader-ship style is incremental with the Europeans. This, according to Hermann, would indicate that Erdoğan's focus of attention is on improving Turkey's economy and/or security in incremental steps, while avoiding the obstacles that will inevitably arise along the way. Finally, in the Middle East, Erdoğan has an influential leadership style profile: in other words, Erdoğan's focus is on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states in order to play a leadership role.

Discussion

Close attention to the context in which individual leaders function provides further information about how they make decisions and expands our

understanding of how leaders may indeed alter their leadership styles depending on their audiences.[65] In Erdoğan's case, these results show that Erdoğan responds to a different environment at home in Turkey and outside the country as he discusses foreign policy issues. This argument can indeed be supported by Erdoğan's political background,and the institutional and historical dynamics of Turkey. Writing about 'Erdoğan's Islamist movement,' Cagaptay similarly observed that the AKP had 'an awkward pendulum-like political identity: the party would be pro-Western and anti-Western, pro-"soft secularism" and anti-secularist, all at the same time.'[66] In addition, Erdoğan's approach to foreign policy would explain the differences in his different profiles.

As argued earlier, traditionally, among other actors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish military have enjoyed significant power in Turkish foreign policy. This institutional structure, civilian and military, successfully excluded the political traditions that Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party represented. If this is to be interpreted a 'secular' versus 'Islamist' clash[67], then the Ministry and Turkish military were the bulwarks of secularism in Turkish foreign policy and Erdoğan has been an 'Islamist' 'threat.' Indeed, this concern with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments and its leaders that they are facing Turkey eastwards (often to mean, integrating 'Islamism' into its foreign policy) has existed since November 2002. This argument, to many, found support in Turkey's political history. Given Erdoğan's and many of the AKP leaderships' political backgrounds, there has been a suspicion about their true intentions in power. Erdoğan and his governments functioned in this domestic political context. These have certainly had implications for Erdoğan's administration of his foreign policy agenda – especially earlier in his tenure, since these traditional constraints later weakened.[68] Hence, the leadership traits scores for Erdoğan's home and away interviews possibly reflect this context.

Erdoğan's higher self-confidence score in interviews with foreign media may imply that Erdoğan is more confident away than home, or he tries to appear more confident when speaking to a foreign audience, or both. More specifically, Erdoğan has higher self-confidence when talking foreign policy with the American and Eastern audiences. Eventually, this feeds an aggressive 'can-do' mentality, which is a latent but very much central principle behind the recent activism in contemporary Turkish foreign policy and indeed in Erdoğan himself, as his profiles suggest here as well. Notwithstanding, Erdoğan's lower self-confidence with the European audience may be attributable to a gradual decline in Turkey's Europeanization progress.

One might expect that Erdoğan's higher self-confidence abroad would be supported by a higher belief in ability to control events scores away than home. However, Erdoğan's average score at home is higher than his away score, and there is also no statistical significance between the two. One

possible explanation is that Erdoğan thinks that there are systemic constraints on Turkey's foreign policy, and hence does not believe in his ability to control events despite his aspiration to do so. Nevertheless, overall, Erdoğan has a high score in this trait; then, Erdoğan's highest average score abroad for his belief in ability to control events is with the American audience. While with other foreign audiences, Erdoğan's trait is somewhat stable; Erdoğan's foreign policy profile, from the American media, suggests that he has a high belief in his ability to control events.

At home, during this paper's timeframe, Erdoğan has a strong electoral mandate, and an increasing grab on politics, which translate into a higher belief in ability to control events average score. One can read this such that as the chief executive of Turkey, Erdoğan feels more in control of foreign policy agenda, and is more assertive in his interviews away. Possibly, earlier in government, Erdoğan was rather defensive, or somewhat restrained at home, and hence is careful about his foreign policy discourse. Given his personal and political background (likewise the political movement he is affiliated with), he may have felt limited rather than free at home.[69] Erdoğan's approach to foreign policy reflects Davutoglu's strategic depth doctrine; his personality and aspirations based on this approach push him to be more assertive in foreign policy. Hence, this paper would argue that Erdoğan was possibly doing his best to look like he is in control by exhibiting a self-confident leader.

Erdoğan's mean scores for task focus indicate that in Turkey Erdoğan is motivated about problem solving but away he is rather concerned about building relationships. Together these are telling of Erdoğan's behavior in the international arena. For instance, his high task focus score at home signals that Erdoğan is concentrated on solving foreign policy problems. This may also indicate that he is making attempts to ascertain a working relationship with the institutions of the Turkish state by keeping a task orientation – consistent with the argument made earlier.[70] Erdoğan's lower task focus score in his interviews abroad explains his attempts to establish personal relationships with his audience. For example, Erdoğan often referred to such leaders as Italy's prime minister Berlusconi, Greece's Karamanlis, or Spain's Aznar as 'my friends.' To highlight Erdoğan's relationship emphasis, he even invited and hosted Berlusconi and Karamanlis at his son's wedding. Hence, relationships are possibly offering an explanation to Erdoğan's behavior at Davos. In that infamous example, Erdoğan's affiliation with the Palestinians was causing his outburst. At the most extreme, as Gorener and Ucal marked Erdoğan's relationship focus translated into 'his embrace of Sudanese policies in Darfur, when he claimed that "Muslims do not commit genocide".'[71] However, this relationship focus is not necessarily only oriented towards the Muslim societies, as Berlusconi, Karamanlis, Aznar examples suggest otherwise. According to Gorener and Ucar, these examples suggest Erdoğan's concerns with reliability.[72]

The profiles of Erdoğan at home and away, and other audience-specific profiles, are possibly not exclusive to him. Hermann (and others) is right to project that contextual factors affect political leaders. However, expanding Hermann's argument (that the leaders of the 'third world' are more prone to exhibit changes in leadership style due to systemic constraints), this paper posits that any leader can assume a different leadership style over a multiplicity of concerns. In Erdoğan's case, the domestic political setting may constrain him at home but he can assume a much different style abroad. The constraints that exist within the Turkish context, though, may take other forms in other countries. Institutions such as the legislative or public opinion may force leadership to attend to them in foreign policy matters. Much like Erdoğan, then the leader may assume a more 'liberal' discourse abroad, free from such constraints that might exist at home. For instance, various U.S. administrations' policies such as an attempt to reach out the Islamic world or withdrawal from Iraq have been controversial at home, but more appealing to an international audience; and, accordingly, American policymakers may have directed these as much to foreign audiences as the domestic. In a similar vein, when an Israeli leader talks about sacrifices for the peace process, he or she may prefer a different discourse to domestic and foreign audiences where the appeal as well as the criticism would be different. Alternatively, a reverse relationship would mean leaders may have to 'sell' certain international constraints to their domestic audiences[73], and again take on a different discourse and leadership styles.

Leaders would most likely differ to what degree they would be influenced by contextual factors and to the degree that those would affect policy. Yet, among those factors is the audience, and it has been neglected this far. Further investigations are necessary to explore this argument for other leaders than Turkey's Erdoğan. This study illustrates that it is a worthy venue of research. Audiences can be receptive, hostile, or neutral, and leaders try to convince audiences to their policies and agendas. This, in turn, may require different language and tactics to appeal to these audiences; hence, leaders may indeed take on different leadership styles depending on their audience. Moreover, it is worth reiterating that, as this paper illustrates, beyond international constraints, domestic political circumstances affect leaders' style on foreign policy matters. In Erdoğan's case, it shows his domestic audience pushes him to engage in a working relationship with other actors involved in Turkey's foreign policy-making so that he, and his government, did not deviate from established norms. On an international scene, motivated by his goal to establish Turkey as a powerful actor and free from domestic constraints and expectations, Erdoğan displays a leader who is more assertive and abrupt. Arguably, it is in such occasions as Davos that Erdoğan becomes particularly likeable in the Arab or broader Muslim world – at the expense of alienating others. At home in Turkey, Erdoğan

can find a working balance with the traditionally strong elements of foreign policy-making.

In Erdoğan's case, the examples of the World Economic Forum panel and the press conference in Denmark highlight Erdoğan's reactions at the public stage. However, these examples are not exceptions to the way Erdoğan responds to his immediate environment. More than a decade in national office, Erdoğan is known for his abrupt, emotional, unstatesmanlike choice of words or actions. In the domestic context, such incidents often related to domestic politics of the country – examples abound. In the context of foreign policy, these have led to some serious confrontations (i.e. with Israel, the United States). While a temporal analysis of Erdoğan's personality is beyond this paper's interest, it is a worthwhile question to pursue in the context of these findings. What changes, if any, does Erdoğan's personality exhibit after major domestic developments (which Erdoğan connects to 'foreign powers')? Future research can investigate Erdoğan's traits by audience and across time.

Overall, Erdoğan's past experiences and domestic political setting may be affecting his foreign policy discourse in his interviews at home and away. The question, then, is to explain Erdoğan's behavior in Davos or in Copenhagen. An oft-made reference is that Erdoğan acts emotionally or in an uncalculated manner on some occasions. There is some merit to these arguments. Indeed, Erdoğan feels an emotional connection with the Palestinians and thinks that Europeans are not assisting Turkey's fight against terrorism as much as they could. These feelings are motivating such reactions like in Davos and in Copenhagen. Leadership traits analysis of Erdoğan's interviews on foreign policy issues explain his behavior.

Skeptics may argue that the argument here is in fact against the assumptions of at-a-distance assessment (that leaders can strategically change their traits or beliefs) in the first place. That is not the claim here; it is rather that leaders do attend to their audience, which in turn is reflected in their styles. One may posit that this change due to audience indeed can be expected; hence, what is the contribution of this study? As argued earlier here, this very analysis is one that scholars have ignored so far. Here, by existing methods of studying political leaders, this paper illustrates that audiences matter.

Broadly speaking, an at-a-distance analysis of the interviews Erdoğan gave in Turkey and abroad also suggests that leaders can alter their style depending on their primary audience. Arguably, the variability of personality traits can be a personality trait itself. More research is needed to assess the validity of such an argument, though. The literatures discussed here provide the theoretical as well as empirical background to such an inquiry; the findings from Turkey's prime minister Erdoğan's foreign policy interviews at home and away confirm that this would be a fruitful line of research and contribute to our understanding of political leaders and their leadership styles.

Notes

1. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 208.
2. Ibid.
3. Turkey claimed that ROJ-TV has a direct connection with the PKK terrorist organization.
4. Kinzer, *Crescent and Star*.
5. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics."
6. There are only a few scholarly studies of Erdoğan. Among them, Gorener and Ucal wrote about Erdoğan's personality profile ("Personality and Leadership Style"). Recently, Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin, and Ozkececi-Taner discussed Erdoğan's role in Turkish decision-making in the 2003 Iraq war ("Examining Leaders' Orientations"). Other published works do not necessarily have a foreign policy focus (Heper and Toktas, "Islam, Modernity, and Democracy"; Yavuz, Se*cularism and Muslim Democracy*). The most authoritative piece on Erdoğan is by Cagaptay (*The New Sultan*). Some other work on Erdoğan is journalistic, or rather partisan, published in Turkish (for instance, see Bayhan, *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'in Liderlik*; Dindar, *Bi'at ve Ofke*; Kuzu, *Davos Fatihi*).
7. This presentation borrows from the author's recent scholarship on this topic.
8. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style"; Schafer, "Issues in Assessing"; and Winter et al. "The Personalities of Bush".
9. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy," "Assessing Leadership Style"; and Dyson, "Personality and foreign policy."
10. George, "The operational code"; Holsti, "The operational code"; Walker, "The Interface Between"; Walker et al. "Systematic Procedures"; and Schafer and Walker, "Operational code analysis."
11. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 186.
12. Hermann, "When Leader Personality," "Explaining Foreign Policy," "Assessing the foreign policy," and "Assessing Leadership Style."
13. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style,"181.
14. Levi Tetlock, "A Cognitive Analysis," 209.
15. Winter, "Things I've Learned," 573.
16. Malici and Malici, "The operational codes."
17. Dille, "The prepared and spontaneous"; Dille and Young, "The Conceptual Complexity"; Renfro, "Presidential decision-making"; and Renshon, "When Public Statements."
18. Schafer and Walker, "Democratic Leaders."
19. Renshon, "Stability and Change."
20. Also see Alker "Is personality situationally."
21. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation," also cited in Levi and Tetlock "A Cognitive Analysis," 209.
22. Dille, "The prepared and spontaneous."
23. Lerner and Tetlock, "Accounting for the effects."
24. Suedfeld and Rank, "Revolutionary Leaders," 173.
25. Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Ramirez, "War, Peace and Integrative Complexity," 439.
26. Guttieri, Wallace, and Suedfeld, "The Integrative Complexity," 605–7.
27. Ibid., 606.
28. Hermann, "Assessing Personalities."
29. Hermann, "Leaders and Foreign Policy."

30. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style." Then, Shannon and Keller expressed interest in audience effects on the Bush administration officials' leadership traits during the 2003 Iraq war; nonetheless, the corpus had mostly a similar audience in the American people and did not allow for a meaningful inquiry ("Leadership Style").
31. Hermann, "Assessing Personalities," 335.
32. Ibid., 343.
33. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 208.
34. Ibid., 208–9.
35. Hermann, "When Leader Personality"; Post "The Psychological Assessment"; Schafer, "Issues in Assessing"; Winter et al. "The Personalities of Bush".
36. Social Science Automation, 2009.
37. Laver, Benoit, and Garry, "Extracting Foreign Policy," and Dyson and Billordo, "Using Words."
38. Widespread protest events first in Istanbul and later elsewhere in the country started in late-May 2013. This date offers a fitting timeframe for the paper, as it allows to look at Turkey's leader in the first decade while in office and holds Erdoğan's role constant. Erdoğan remained in the office of the prime minister until August 2014, and later became Turkey's first popularly elected president.
39. This paper benefits partly from data collected in a collaborative project, funded by TUBITAK Evrena grant (110K112).
40. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy," and "Assessing Foreign Policy." Despite calls for expanding the study of political leaders beyond the Western countries (Schafer and Walker, "Operational Code Analysis"), the bulk of the existing literature remains rather focused on the Western leaders. This call has been only partially met; some studies of non-English speaking leaders exist (see, Feldman and Valenty, *Profiling Political Leaders*; Malici, *When Leaders Learn*; and Malici and Buckner, "Empathizing with."). Hence, Erdoğan's profile becomes a significant addition to the list of political leaders studied.
41. Heper and Sayari, *Political Leaders*, vii.
42. Yavuz and Ozcan, "Crisis in Turkey." Despite this generally agreed phenomenon, scholars of Turkish politics and foreign policy rarely attended to systematically studying leaders' personalities and tracing their potential effects on foreign (as well as domestic) policy. Two edited volumes (Heper and Sayari, *Political Leaders*, and Demir, *Turk Dis Politikasinda Liderler*), would be the exceptions here. Some recent scholarship started to highlight Turkish leaders include: Cuhadar et al. ("Examining leaders' orientations," "Personality or Role"), Gorener and Ucal ("Personality and Leadership Style"), Inal ("Gender and political leadership"), and Kesgin ("Leadership Traits," "Tansu Ciller's Leadership").
43. On Erbakan's foreign policy ventures, see Robins, "Turkish foreign policy."
44. Erdoğan was initially not in the government after the AKP won the elections in November 2002 under his leadership.
45. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, and Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*.
46. Davutoglu, *Stratejik Derinlik*.
47. Murinson traces this approach to Ozal's presidency and his foreign policy perspective ("The Strategic Depth").

48. For a review see Murinson ("The Strategic Depth"), also see Davutoglu ("Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision," and "Turkey's Zero-problems").
49. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations."
50. Capaptay, *The New Sultan*, 3 and 19.
51. Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy*.
52. Ibid., 121.
53. Cagaptay, *The New Sultan*, 46.
54. Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy*, 121 (emphasis added).
55. Ibid, and Cagaptay, *The New Sultan*.
56. Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy*, 131.
57. Ibid., 133.
58. Cagaptay, *The New Sultan*, 41.
59. Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy*, 81.
60. One interesting reminder of Erdoğan's pragmatism is Cagaptay's observation that while Erdoğan initially distanced to 'anything to might sully the party's essence … He took photo opportunities at *meyhanes* – tavern-style Turkish restaurant where alcohol flows freely' during the 1989 local elections (*The New Sultan*, 63; italics in original).
61. As much as Erdoğan influenced Turkish foreign policy, Davutoglu was the ideologue of Turkey's foreign policy for the period under investigation.
62. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style."
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Cagaptay, *The New Sultan*, 104.
67. Ibid., 104.
68. Gorener and Ucal, "Personality and Leadership Style," 358.
69. This may have changed significantly since May 2013, as Erdoğan has solidified his control of the Turkish political scene – especially after an unsuccessful coup attempt in July 2016.
70. Since November 2002, AKP governments under Gul and Erdoğan clashed, as much as they cooperated, with these institutions on both domestic and foreign policy issues. The AKP governments did not hesitate to take initiative and introduce major policy changes, for instance regarding Turkey's Cyprus policy. Even then, one would argue that on foreign policy issues the AKP governments were attempting to coordinate with the country's foreign policy establishment; clashes between the two actors have been more serious on domestic issues (such as the election of Gul to the presidency).
71. Gorener and Ucal, "Personality and Leadership Style," 373.
72. Ibid., 373.
73. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics."

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Disclosure statement

Notes on contributor

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Appendices

Appendix 1. List of interviews

Domestic Media	
April 13, 2003	Sabah
November 3, 2003	Sabah
January 8, 2004	Sabah
March 15, 2004	Hurriyet
March 21, 2004	NTV
March 22, 2004	Hurriyet
April 30, 2004	Turkish Daily News
June 2, 2004	Sabah
June 3, 2004	Milliyet
July 22, 2004	Sabah
August 8, 2004	Sabah
September 3, 2004	Sabah
September 25, 2004	Anatolian Agency
October 29, 2004	Anatolian Agency
February 24, 2005	NTV
April 4, 2005	Hurriyet
April 5, 2005	Hurriyet
April 6, 2005	Hurriyet
May 1, 2005	Turkish Daily News
June 8, 2005	Milliyet
July 7, 2005	Hurriyet
July 8, 2005	Sabah
July 9, 2005	Turkish Daily News
September 1, 2005	Anatolian Agency
September 5, 2005	Anatolian Agency
November 8, 2005	Milliyet
October 27, 2006	Turkish Daily News

November 24, 2006	Anatolian Agency
December 22, 2006	Turkish Daily News
February 25, 2007	Hurriyet
March 2, 2007	Hurriyet
March 12, 2007	Sabah
April 4, 2007	Milliyet
April 16, 2007	Hurriyet
May 29, 2007	Anatolian Agency
August 22, 2007	Turkish Daily News
October 24, 2007	Anatolian Agency
October 25, 2007	Hurriyet
April 6, 2009	Anatolian Agency
July 7, 2009	Anatolian Agency
October 14, 2009	Milliyet
November 8, 2009	Hurriyet Daily News
December 7, 2009	Sabah
April 18, 2010	Sabah
April 19, 2010	Sabah
May 15, 2010	Anatolian Agency
June 28, 2010	Anatolian Agency
June 29, 2010	Anatolian Agency
August 29, 2010	Anatolian Agency
October 19, 2010	Anatolian Agency
January 2, 2011	Sabah
January 11, 2011	Sabah
April 14, 2011	Sabah
May 13, 2011	Anatolian Agency
April 22, 2012	Milliyet
May 22, 2012	Milliyet
June 22, 2012	Hurriyet
November 13, 2012	Milliyet
November 20, 2012	Sabah
March 25, 2013	Milliyet
April 14, 2013	Yeni Safak
May 19, 2013	Milliyet
International Media	
February 9, 2003	Der Spiegel
March 31, 2003	Newsweek
June 16, 2003	New Straits Times (Malaysia)
June 22, 2003	To Vima
July 14, 2003	Die Presse (Austria)
November 14, 2003	CNN
January 7, 2004	Al-Bath
January 30, 2004	PBS
March 24, 2004	Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon)
May 7, 2004	To Vima
May 21, 2004	Wall Street Journal
September 8, 2004	Al Jazeera
October 4, 2004	Der Spiegel
October 13, 2004	Athens NET
October 22, 2004	Le Monde
October 24, 2004	To Vima
November 29, 2004	Munich Focus
December 13, 2004	Athens NET
February 7, 2005	Newsweek
March 14, 2005	MIA (FYR Macedonia)
June 7, 2005	CNN
June 8, 2005	NPR
June 12, 2005	Al-Arabiya (Saudi Arabia)
September 3, 2005	La Repubblica (Italy)
September 14, 2005	PBS

October 12, 2005	Le Monde
November 19, 2005	Al Jazeera
December 1, 2005	ABC (Spain)
December 19, 2006	PBS
December 20, 2006	Reuters
April 15, 2007	Der Spiegel
April 18, 2007	Süddeutsche Zeitung
September 27, 2007	PBS
October 21, 2007	The Times
November 5, 2007	La Repubblica (Italy)
March 26, 2008	Trud (Bulgaria)
February 9, 2009	Newsweek
September 28, 2009	Trend (Azerbaijan)
October 26, 2009	Al-Iraqiya (Iraq)
December 8, 2009	PBS
February 24, 2010	El Pais
March 29, 2010	Der Spiegel
October 9, 2010	BTA (Bulgaria)
November 27, 2010	Al-Safir (Lebanon)
December 5, 2010	Agence France Press
March 13, 2011	Al-Arabiya
May 11, 2011	PBS
September 21, 2011	PBS
September 25, 2011	CNN
September 26, 2011	NPR
September 26, 2011	Time
November 2, 2011	Die Bild
April 25, 2012	Al Jazeera
May 7, 2012	Corriera Della Sera
September 7, 2012	CNN
September 14, 2012	Oslobodjenje (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
September 20, 2012	Slate

Appendix 2. Leadership traits analysis: definition and operationalization

Trait	Operationalization
Belief in ability to control events	The score is 'the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has taken responsibility for planning or initiating an action. The overall score for any leader is the average of this percentage across the total number of interview responses being examined' (Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 189).
Conceptual complexity	This trait focuses on the use of certain words in speech. For instance, 'approximately,' 'possibility,' 'trend,' and 'for example' suggest high conceptual complexity. In contrast, 'absolutely,' 'without a doubt,' 'certainly,' and 'irreversible' indicate low levels of conceptual complexity. The score is derived from the percentage of high complexity words to the total number of words that suggest either high or low conceptual complexity.
Distrust of others	'In coding for distrust of others, the focus is on noun and noun phrases referring to persons other than the leader and to groups other than those with whom the leader identifies' (Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 202). When the noun or noun phrase indicates distrust, then it is coded. The score is the ratio of such uses to the total number of references to other actors in the leader's response.

(Continued)

Continued.

Trait	Operationalization
In-group bias	'In coding for in-group bias, the unit of analysis is a word or phrase referring to the particular leader's own group. Of interest is ascertaining the following information when the leader makes a reference to his or her group: are the modifiers used favorable (e.g. *great, peace-loving, progressive, successful, prosperous*); do they suggest strength (e.g. *powerful, capable, made great advances, has boundless resources*); or do they indicate the need to maintain group honor and identity (e.g. "need to defend firmly our borders," "must maintain our own interpretation, decide our own policies")? If any of these modifiers are present, the phrase indicates in-group bias' (Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 201; italics in original). The score is the ratio of references to the in-group that have these modifiers to the total number of references to the group.
Need for power	The score 'is determined by calculating the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has engaged in one of those behaviors. The overall score for any leader is the average of this percentage across the total number of interview responses examined' (Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 190).
Self confidence	'A score on this trait is determined by calculation the percentage of times [*my, myself, I, me,* and *mine*] are used in an interview response' (Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 195). When a leader uses these pronouns in his/her speech, then three criteria have to be met for a count: the use of the pronoun (1) represents instigation of an activity, (2) presents the self as an authority figure, and (3) reflects the self as the recipient of a positive response from another person or group. The score for this trait is the percentage of positive usages to all the references to self.
Task focus	This score is calculated by the count of certain words in an interview response. Examples of task-oriented words are 'accomplishment,' 'achieve (ment),' 'plan,' 'position,' 'tactic'; examples of group-maintenance words are 'appreciation,' 'collaboration,' 'disappoint(ment),' and 'suffering.' The score is the ratio of task-oriented words to the total of task-oriented and group-maintenance words.

Source: Kesgin, "Political Leadership and Foreign Policy."