The causal effects of ideas on policies

Albert S. Yee

The causal effects of ideation on policy

The inability of both neorealism and game theory ultimately to skirt the cognitive complexity of decision making by utilizing some form of rationality assumption has led many analysts of international relations to rediscover the importance of ideas and beliefs in policymaking.[1] This current rediscovery has coincided with recent momentous changes in world politics where new or revived ideas apparently played crucial roles. However, the analysis of the effects of ideas and beliefs on policies is hampered by various interrelated problems.

Some of these problems arise from the imprecise specification both of the policy resultants being affected and of the ideas that allegedly are generating these effects. Differentiating the policy resultants according to various stages in the policymaking process (e.g., preference, choice, enactment, and implementation) can mitigate these problems.[2] Similarly, ideas and beliefs (defined as mental events that entail thought) can be differentiated according to both their ascending levels of generality (e.g., specific programs, issue-area doctrines or policy paradigms, ideologies or public philosophies, and cultures) and to their

My thanks to the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University for a fellowship that made possible the research and writing of this article. In particular, I thank Thomas Biersteker, Cynthia Weber, Neil Harvey, Leslie Armijo, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Peter Katzenstein, Neta Crawford, Randall Stone, John Odell, and two anonymous *IO* referees for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. Biersteker as usual provided good cheer and other much appreciated help. During the early revisions, Katzenstein's generosity inspired me to tackle (although with limited success) some of the metatheoretical and philosophical issues. During the later revisions, Odell supplied incisive and detailed criticisms that significantly improved the article.

1. See Axelrod and Keohane 1986, 229; Jervis 1988, 317–19; Lumsdaine 1993, 288 and 137; Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 17; and Katzenstein 1993, 294–95.
2. On restricting analysis to the policy preferences of policymakers, see George 1979, 104.

International Organization 50, 1, Winter 1996, pp. 69–108

possession by different politically relevant social entities (e.g., policymakers, organizations, social groups, and society).[3] Moreover, since political analysts address only specifically political ideas or beliefs with political consequences, they can restrict these mental events further to encompass only those political ideas and beliefs that are given public or interpersonal expression.

The "central" or "core" problem, however, concerns the causal effects of these differentiated political ideas and beliefs (henceforth, simply "ideations") on the differentiated policy resultants (henceforth, simply "policy").[4] In the usual social science understanding of causation, "causes are responsible for producing effects."[5] But since causes are usually multiple and indeterminate (i.e., nonnomic, contingent, and likely) in the social world, ideation is generally only one of many probable and partial causes of policies.[6] Moreover, since ideation and policy are both differentiated, specifying their likely causal connections across their differentiations becomes even more formidable and complex.

Many analysts of international relations, however, deny that ideations cause policies.[7] Ideational analysts have not responded convincingly to these criticisms because they have not explained adequately this causal link.[8] To understand these inadequacies and to better explain ideational effects require a more extended critique of the conceptions of causation employed by existing ideational analyses. Accordingly, the following two sections argue that prevailing behavioral explanations are hampered by their reliance on inadequate correlational and quasi-experimental approaches to causation. To avoid these inadequacies, the fourth section outlines an alternative causal "mechanisms" or "capacities" approach derived from the recent philosophy of science. The fifth section then evaluates several recent analyses of institutional causal mechanisms, while the sixth section examines some broadly construed discursive analyses that emphasize the importance of various ideational mechanisms or capacities. Finally, the seventh section concludes by delineating two overarching dilemmas in the analysis of the causal effects of ideations on policies.

3. On doctrines or policy paradigms (e.g., Keynesianism or containment), see Hall 1992, 91–92. On public philosophies or ideologies (e.g., liberalism), see Beer 1978. On culture, see Geertz 1973.

4. On causation as the "central" issue, see Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 11. On causation as the "core" problem, see Shimko 1991, 58; and Smith 1988, 33.

5. Marini and Singer 1988, 347; see also 385.

6. Collier and Collier 1991, 20; Humphreys 1986, 1–2; Marini and Singer 1988, 357–60.

7. For a review of some materialist (i.e., power and self-interests) arguments, see Odell 1982, 60–61. For criticisms of "historical analogies," see Snyder 1991, 14 and 308. For arguments by neorealists that the constraints of the international system render ideation and other unit-level factors largely underdeterminative, see Hollis and Smith 1991, 85, 184, and 206. For an argument derived from "self-perception theory" that behavior affects beliefs rather than vice versa, see Larson 1985, 342–48.

8. Khong 1992, 9 and 10.

Statistical associations and meaning-oriented behavioralism

Since they generally limit their analyses to observable, preferably quantifiable, regularities that can be measured and subjected to empirical tests, strict behavioralists (according to Bernard Susser) usually "ignor[e] . . . the underlying moral purposes and human visions that animate political life."[9] Some "meaning-oriented behavioralists," however, analyze these ideational factors by using research strategies that render these ideations or their surrogates observable and measurable.[10] Yet their explanations of the causal link between ideations and policies are hampered by certain inadequacies.

In some cases, according to many mainstream critics, the causal effects of ideations are implied or assumed rather than ascertained.[11] In other cases, the causal effects of ideations on policies are displaced onto the effects of socialization, education, propaganda, etc.[12] For example, some analysts argued recently that certain ideas and beliefs prompt policymakers in subordinate states to pursue certain policies favored by a hegemonic state not because these ideations possess the ability to produce these policy effects, but because these ideas and beliefs have been internalized by those policymakers through a socialization process.[13]

Some meaning-oriented behavioralists have avoided these problems by directly analyzing the causal effects of ideation on policy in two ways. The first relies on statistical associations and some implicit but often unstated notion of statistical causal inference. The second relies on the quasi-experimental designs of Alexander George's "congruence" and "process tracing" procedures to infer causation (see the third section, below).

Causal inferences from correlations and regressions

Although many analysts such as David Dessler have warned that "associations or covariations in themselves reveal nothing about the causal relationships that bring them about,"[14] many meaning-oriented behavioralists have relied on correlations and implicitly on the criteria of contiguity and temporal succession to imply some sort of causal link between ideations and policies. For example, Richard Herrmann speculated that correlations between U.S. policymakers' general perceptions of the Soviet Union and U.S. foreign policy choices imply a causal link.[15] Similarly, Ole Holsti and James Rosenau used

9. Susser 1992, 9; see also 6; Neufeld 1993, 41; and Hollis and Smith 1991, 28–29 and 71.
10. The term is from Neufeld 1993, 42, 44, and 52–53.
11. See the criticisms by Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 11; Rosati 1987, 31; and Garrett and Weingast 1993, 203.
12. Woods 1995, 166.
13. See Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 283 and 285.
14. Dessler 1991, 339.
15. Herrmann 1986, 842–44, 848, and 869.

correlations to uncover three foreign policy belief systems among U.S. elites and speculated that these "beliefs about the international system and the United States' proper role within it are likely to play an important role in shaping and constraining American foreign policy."[16] Meanwhile, focusing on the policy effects of public opinion, Alan Monroe found some consistency between American public opinion and public policy in 64 percent of his cases.[17] Similarly, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro found a temporal congruence (i.e., within a one-year lag time) between changes in U.S. public opinion and subsequent changes in public policy in 66 percent of their cases. They therefore concluded that "substantial congruence between opinion and policy (especially when opinion changes are large and sustained, and issues are salient), together with the evidence that opinion tends to move before policy more than vice versa, indicate that opinion changes are important causes of policy change."[18]

All of these analyses are descriptively useful and causally suggestive, but they are hampered because correlations cannot establish a causal link between ideation and policy. Monroe recognized this problem and explicitly avoided claims of a causal relationship.[19] Yet "in the absence of a theory that ties shifts in public thinking to their sources and policy consequences," Charles Kegley concluded that "the causal role and significance of foreign policy beliefs will remain poorly understood."[20] With regard to public opinion, Holsti similarly concluded that "A finding that major decisions seemed to be correlated with public preferences does not, by itself, establish a causal link."[21]

Some meaning-oriented behavioralists have used regression models to analyze the effects of ideation on policy. For example, Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl used a linear structural model to analyze the effects of a decolonization norm on whether the independence of colonies entails military conflict. Their model contains four independent variables derived from various (not all obvious) "indicators" and a dichotomous dependent variable. On the bases of significant *t* statistics and standardized coefficients, Goertz and Diehl concluded that "the likelihood of military conflict increas[es] as the colonial state declines in power, as the norms of independence are weakened, and when the territory has economic importance for the colonial power." Of these three factors, "the variable with the most influence on military conflict is the norm variable."[22] Goertz and Diehl recognize that their model contains a number of difficulties.[23] In addition, their model suffers from other more basic deficiencies

16. Holsti and Rosenau 1984, 20; see also xiv.
17. Monroe 1979, 3–19.
18. Page and Shapiro 1983, 188–89.
19. Monroe 1979, 8.
20. Kegley 1986, 466. For a similar criticism, see Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 11. For related criticisms of "question-wording effects," see Tetlock 1989, 355–56.
21. Holsti 1992, 453; see also 459.
22. Goertz and Diehl 1994, 120; see also 113–19; and Goertz 1994, 255–63.
23. Goertz and Diehl 1994, 120–21.

stemming from the use of statistical associations in general and regression analysis in particular to infer causation.

Limitations of statistical associations

To derive causal inferences from correlations, analysts need to go beyond establishing statistical associations and implicitly relying on some sort of Humean criteria of contiguity, temporal succession, and constant conjunction to infer a causal link between the ideational cause and the policy effect.[24] Philosophers have criticized extensively these basic criteria, as well as other more elaborate formulations such as Carl Hempel's high probability criteria for his inductive-statistical explanation and Wesley Salmon's early work on statistical relevance criteria.[25] The defects of "causal modeling" using regressions also are well-known and have been detailed extensively by statisticians, social scientists, and philosophers of science.

Some of these defects stem from the numerous practical and operational problems plaguing this method.[26] As these models become more complicated, some analysts such as David Freedman have warned that "the sheer technical complexity of the method tends to overwhelm critical judgement."[27] In addition, the measurement of ideas poses particular problems for causal modeling. Since mental events "reflect ongoing processes that are difficult to measure repeatedly," Margaret Marini and Burton Singer warned that the assumption of temporal succession in this method "can grossly misrepresent the influence process."[28]

Even more troubling, correlational analysis and causal modeling contain other fundamental deficiencies. One basic defect stems from the assumption that correlations between cause and effect permit causal inferences to be drawn because the occurrence of the cause supposedly increases the likelihood of the occurrence of its effect. Yet as Nancy Cartwright and many other philosophers repeatedly and extensively have pointed out, this assumption errs because "the cause fails to increase the probability of its effects . . . [when] the cause is correlated with some other causal factor which dominates in its effects." In other words, "A cause . . . increase[s] the probability of its effects . . . only in situations where such [background] correlations are absent."

24. On these Humean criteria, see Hume [1748] 1976.

25. For criticisms of these Humean criteria, see Brand 1976, 8–11; and Ducasse 1976. For criticisms of Hempel's inductive-statistical model and a statement of Salmon's statistical relevance model, see Salmon et al., 1971. For criticisms of the statistical relevance model, see Salmon 1984, 36–46; and Irzik and Meyer 1987, 495–514.

26. See Freedman 1985, 344–45, 348–50, 352–53, and 389; Wang 1993, 61 and 72–87; Holland 1988, 457–60 and 472–73; and Archdeacon 1994, 243–46.

27. Freedman 1987, 102. For a wise and richly rewarding analysis of the conditions for—and the impairments to—social inquiry and social problem solving, see Lindblom 1990. For an analysis of foreign policy in particular, see George 1993.

28. Marini and Singer 1988, 390.

Generally however, such background correlations are absent only in "situations in which all other causal factors are held fixed, that is [in] situations that are homogeneous with respect to all other causal factors."[29] Yet identifying all these other causal factors and holding them constant are daunting tasks that require causal information derived from sources other than statistical associations.

Another related problem with causal inferences from statistical associations stems precisely from this plurality of causes usually operating in the social world. Since causes usually "conjoin with other 'causes' to produce effects," Marini and Singer observed that "a conjunction of factors may constitute a minimally sufficient cause of Y, that several such conjunctions may be multiple causes of Y, and that a single factor may operate in one or several of these conjunctions." Consequently, "Partialling out other 'causes' of an outcome in an effort to estimate the effect of a single cause, as is commonly done, may not be appropriate."[30]

As a largely "confirmatory" analysis, causal modeling requires a particular prioritizing of analytical tasks that leads to other fundamental problems. According to Peter Cuttance, "A researcher using structural modeling techniques must first have a substantive model from which to construct a mathematical representation of the social or behavioral process of interest. The object of constructing the mathematical representation of the process is to provide a means of testing whether the model accounts for the underlying grid of relationships in the data."[31] Yet in order to link the substantive model to the data, various "methodological and statistical assumptions are brought to bear in both the parameter estimation stage and in the assessment of the fit of the model." But since these assumptions "make relatively strong demands on the functional form of the model and on the statistical properties of the data used to estimate the model," Cuttance observed that "Caveat emptor haunts the literature on applied structural modeling."[32] Indeed, by now even purveyors of this method are issuing stiff warnings. For example, Hubert Blalock recently concluded that "statistical models cannot stand alone and must be supplemented by a series of assumptions, many of which cannot be tested with the data that one has in hand. Technical fixes alone, therefore, cannot be relied on to resolve one's theoretical problems, nor can inadequate or missing data be compensated for by a statistical *tour de force.*"[33]

The confirmatory method of causal modeling raises an even more basic problem. Since a substantive model is needed to construct the regression model, Cartwright observed that "the appeal of this strategy [e.g., econometr-

29. Cartwright 1983, 25; see also 23–24; Salmon 1984, 43–44; and Marini and Singer 1988, 368–69.
30. Marini and Singer 1988, 389–90.
31. Cuttance 1987, 242.
32. Ibid., 274.
33. Blalock 1991, 325–26.

rics] will depend on how confident one is about getting the necessary starting knowledge. . . . When [a] theory was in fashion, it was possible to adopt the pretense that the set of factors under consideration includes a full set of genuine causes."[34] But since the existence of such a theory is uncertain, prominent statisticians such as Freedman have argued that "the technique depends on knowledge that we do not have."[35] Indeed, since the "results of a path analysis depend for their validity on some underlying causal theory," Freedman concluded that "If the theory is rejected, the interpretations have no foundation."[36]

Even if this prior substantive model is not rejected, and even if the needed methodological and statistical assumptions are defensible, regression analysis still contains other basic problems of causal inference. According to Clark Glymour, Peter Spirtes, and Richard Scheines, "The deepest problem with regression is that it mistakes the connection between causation and probability." Specifically, this "mistake can arise if the time order or other prior information does not guarantee that none of the candidate regressors are effects of the outcome variable, or if the set of variables considered is not causally sufficient." Both of these defects, moreover, "cannot be corrected by increased sample sizes, or by testing for linearity or autocorrelation, or by transforming variables, or by any of the conventional statistical" procedures.[37]

Even when the causal model fits the data, all of the above problems cast uncertainties upon the validity of the model for the real world. According to Marini and Singer, "Because the coefficients estimated are conditioned on an assumed causal structure, knowing that they are statistically significant and can generate good predictions of the data does not prove the existence of causal relations. It indicates only that the data are consistent with the proposed causal hypothesis."[38] Consequently, as Cuttance pointed out, "Alternative models may fit the data equally well, and until all such models were tested and tests designed to differentiate among the efficacy of each, we could not say with certitude which model was the true model."[39]

Causal modelers seek to resolve this uncertainty through a cumulative process. Since it is impossible to specify all the models that fit the data, Cuttance observed that "progress rests on the idea of accumulating evidence about competing models and making extrastatistical assessments of the evidence in support of each."[40] Similarly, Blalock argued that the solution is to devise "much more complex causal models" by collecting new data to assess "specific questionable assumptions" and to progressively rectify inadequate

34. Cartwright 1989, 87.
35. Freedman 1991a, 304; see also 302–10.
36. Freedman 1987, 124. See also Marini and Singer 1988, 389.
37. Glymour, Spirtes, and Scheines 1994, 339–40 and 345; see also 342–44.
38. Marini and Singer 1988, 389.
39. Cuttance 1987, 242.
40. Ibid. See also Woodward 1988, 259–60.

models. Yet greater cumulative complexity does not resolve the basic defects of causal modeling and exacerbates the practical and operational difficulties.[41] Indeed, even if cumulative complexity succeeds in identifying the "true model," causal modeling reveals only whether or not causes exist, not how causes operate. This method assumes the existence of causes in the prior substantive model and proceeds to confirm or disconfirm this assumption by testing whether the regression model fits the data. As Cartwright observed, "The method of econometrics, and indeed of most probabilistic studies of causality, are of little help in determining the form of the influence that a cause contributes; rather, they are designed to find out whether the cause really contributes at all, given that the form of its contribution is assumed."[42]

Experimentation and meaning-oriented behavioralism

A second, more empirically successful, behavioral strategy for analyzing the causal link between ideations and policies uses George's seminal analysis of the "causal nexus" between beliefs and decision-making behavior. In a sensible and exemplary contribution, George delineated two procedures (congruence and process tracing) for assessing the effects of ideation on policy choices. The validity of the analyses derived from both procedures, however, depends upon George's "functional equivalent of a controlled experiment."[43]

The congruence and process tracing procedures

The congruence procedure essentially entails "establishing 'congruence' (or consistency) between the content of given beliefs and the content of the decision(s)." This procedure "goes beyond noncausal correlation" because it "relies on a nomothetic-deductive mode of explanation." According to George, "The determination of consistency is made deductively. From the actor's operational code beliefs, the investigator deduces what implications they have for decision. If the characteristics of the decision are consistent with the actor's beliefs, there is at least a presumption that the beliefs may have played a causal role in this particular instance of decision-making."[44]

Among meaning-oriented behavioralists, the congruence procedure is the most popular strategy for establishing some sort of causal link between ideas, beliefs, etc. and policies.[45] Yet these analysts also recognize that congruency or

41. Freedman 1991b, 355–57.
42. Cartwright 1989, 106; see also 121–27 and 153–55.
43. George 1979, 114.
44. Ibid., 105–6.
45. See, for example, Walker 1977, 153 and 155; Hoagland and Walker 1979; Shimko 1991, 58–60; and Rosati 1987, 166.

consistency does not by itself adequately establish causation.[46] Indeed, the criteria used to ascertain consistency need to be specified more clearly.

Although it requires much more data than the congruence procedure, George's process tracing procedure is "a more direct and potentially more satisfactory approach." This procedure "trace[s] the process—the intervening steps—by which beliefs influence behavior. Process-tracing seeks to establish the ways in which the actor's beliefs influenced his receptivity to and assessment of incoming information about the situation, his definition of the situation, his identification and evaluation of options, as well as, finally, his choice of a course of action."[47]

Process tracing is a plausible procedure for establishing an explanatory link between ideas, beliefs, etc. and policies. By following the intervening cognitive steps that exist between beliefs and policies, the analyst hopes in the end to traverse the gap between them and thereby explain their linkage. Despite its plausibility, however, knowing the various intervening cognitive steps taken by decision makers does not reveal how ideas and beliefs caused them to take those steps. A distinction exists between citing the ways in which something occurs and knowing why it occurs in those ways. Delineating "the steps in the process by means of which" beliefs influence and shape the cognitive operations of decision makers does not reveal how these beliefs influenced decision makers to take these steps.[48]

For example, in a richly detailed analysis, Yuen Foong Khong employed process tracing to analyze the effects of historical analogies on the Vietnam decisions of American policymakers. In carrying out this procedure, however, he discovered that "Process tracing . . . seldom establishes a direct one-to-one relationship between a given belief and the specific option chosen."[49] Khong responded by resorting to the congruence procedure in order "to ascertain the degree to which the analogy is able to account for the options chosen."[50] However, congruence does not adequately establish the existence of causal relations either. For example, Khong's congruence derived conclusion that the Korea analogy caused American policymakers to choose gradual and moderate Vietnam decisions instead of the "harsher or harshest options" in the air war and in the ground war does not consider adequately whether the analogy coexisted with other geopolitical factors (i.e., fear of nuclear war with China and the Soviet Union) and domestic considerations (i.e., unwillingness to mobilize reserve troops and the economy for war) that were sufficient to prompt policymakers to choose the same moderate options.[51]

46. See, for example, Shimko 1991, 60; Rosati 1987, 166; and Walker 1990, 412.
47. George 1979, 113.
48. The quotation is from ibid., 105.
49. Khong 1992, 65.
50. Ibid., 68.
51. Ibid., 138–47.

The functional equivalent of experimental design

Although the congruence and process tracing procedures generate descriptively useful and causally suggestive analyses, George argued that "Two methodological questions . . . must be addressed before the presumption of a causal relationship is granted plausibility."[52] These questions serve as a "functional equivalent of experimental design" by "requiring causal interpretations in single-case analysis to pass a series of hurdles (questions inspired by the logic of controlled experiments) before granting them plausibility."[53]

The first question is "whether the consistency is of genuine causal relevance or is merely fortuitous and spurious." To answer this question, George appeals primarily to some sort of "nomothetic explanation."[54] The presumption of causation derived from congruence can be enhanced "if a general law or statistical generalization can be found to support the consistency between the specific beliefs and the specified decisional characteristics."[55] Unfortunately, no such laws or generalizations have been found and few social scientists still believe that nomological explanations are possible.

The second question is "whether the consistency is explainable largely with reference to antecedent variables other than the operational code beliefs in question." Ideally, this question can be answered with experiments or through a comparative analysis with other cases. When these preferred solutions are unavailable, George recommends that the "disciplined single-case analyst" use "analytical imagination" to devise "mental experiments" in which "he varies critical variables in order to estimate variance in outcomes."[56] However, such mental experiments entail numerous conceptual and verificational problems that undermine their ability to serve as functional equivalents of a controlled experiment (see below).

Nevertheless, the existence of defects in George's functional equivalent of experimental design does not mean that experimentation or quasi-experimentation are not viable approaches to the causal effects of ideation. Indeed, many political scientists have advocated the use of experiments and even mental experiments.[57] A more adequate critique of the experimental bases for the congruence and process tracing procedures, therefore, requires a more detailed examination of other forms of experimentation.

52. George 1979, 106.
53. Ibid., 105.
54. For his secondary appeals to plausible cognitive consistency theories and to the sheer repetition of observed instances of consistency, see ibid., 106–7.
55. Ibid., 106.
56. Ibid., 106 and 108.
57. See the essays in Kinder and Palfrey 1993. For "mental experiments," see the version of the Rubin-Holland "model for experiments" formulated by King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.

Random-assignment experiments and quasi-experimentation

Where the ideal of laboratory control and experimental isolation are not possible, some scientists beginning most explicitly and prominently with Ronald Fisher devised random-assignment experiments to ascertain causal effects.[58] In these experiments, the random assignment of multiple samples to control and treatment groups serves to statistically homogenize the samples across all confounding factors and thereby permit valid inferences (within statistical error) for larger populations. Where laboratory controls target "*specific* threats to validity that are judged to be plausible in disputes within the scientific community *at a particular time,*" random-assignment experiments offer "control[s] for *all* of an *unspecified set* of threats to validity."[59]

Despite its usefulness, however, randomization might not be possible or might not be replicated with sufficient samples to be effective.[60] For ethical, logistic, or voluntarist reasons, moreover, important or relevant political and social actors usually cannot be subjected to the treatments in these experiments.[61] Yet even when applied to compliant human subjects, random-assignment experiments encounter various selection and reporting biases that threaten to undermine their causal explanations.[62] Furthermore, Cartwright points out that randomization can fail to reveal important causes because "a cause whose net result across the population is entirely nil may nevertheless have made a profound difference, both in producing the effect where it would not otherwise have been and in preventing it where it otherwise might have been."[63] For all these reasons, random-assignment experiments have not been used extensively in political analysis and do not appear promising for the analysis of ideational effects on policy.

The drawbacks of random-assignment experiments have led some analysts to devise quasi-experimental designs to control explicitly for specific threats to the validity of causal inferences in the absence of randomization. In particular, Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell identified a variety of threats to the internal validity, external validity, statistical conclusion validity, and construct validity of causal explanations.[64] In nonrandomized situations, quasi-experimentation generally relies on "interrupted time-series designs" or on "nonequivalent group designs."[65] But since these designs raise problems of

58. Fisher [1925] 1970.
59. Cook and Campbell 1986, 143, emphases original.
60. See ibid., 144; Wang 1993, 48; and Cartwright 1989, 103.
61. Blalock 1991, 331–32.
62. For various misreporting and selection biases (placebo effect, "Hawthorne effect," self-selection bias, failure-to-weight bias, etc.), see Neuberg 1989, 61–72, 83, 292, and 296. For a similar analysis using different categories, see Cook and Campbell 1986, 148.
63. Cartwright 1989, 104.
64. Cook and Campbell 1986, 144, and 152–54. See also Kidder 1981; and Cook and Campbell 1979, chap. 1.
65. See Cook and Campbell 1979, chap. 1; and Marini and Singer 1988, 387.

selective assignments, confounding factors, and self-reporting biases, the approach contains large inherent uncertainties.[66] As Cook and Campbell acknowledged, "Ruling out alternatives is an especially assumption-riddled process in quasi-experimental research where researchers have to compare worlds that differ in multiple ways, most unknown."[67] Given all these dilemmas, quasi-experimentation appears impractical for the analysis of ideational effects.

The "model for experiments" and its variants

If quasi-experimentation and random-assignment experiments are useful but often impractical, the experimental aspirations of George's congruence and process tracing procedures might still be approximated by one other experimental approach devised by statisticians and increasingly popular among some political scientists and sociologists. According to Paul Holland, "Rubin's model" or its variants use an experimental framework, conditional (or counterfactual) probabilities, and random assignments to measure the effects of causes.[68] This "model for experiments" proceeds first by rendering each randomly assigned unit (i.e., into treatment and control groups) "*potentially exposable* to any one of the causes," then averaging the various hypothetical counterfactual effects, and finally subtracting the average treatment effects from the average control effects to calculate the average causal effect of some "cause."[69] In some versions, this "model for experiments" applies also to small samples of cases and even to a single unit. For example, King, Keohane, and Verba argued that we can hypothetically "rerun history" by "imagining" a hypothetical experiment repeated many times "in the same country and at the same time." The effects of a cause then are calculated by averaging "the realized causal effects across replications of these experiments" and subtracting the average treatment effects from the average control effects to derive the "mean causal effect" of some cause.[70]

Like quasi-experimentation and random-assignment experiments, however, such an approach also faces many difficulties. In a basic trade-off, the measurement of the average causal effects entails the cost of not analyzing the individual unit-level causal effects. Hence, in cases where the analyst seeks these singular effects, the model offers little help.[71] Another basic problem is that the reliance on counterfactual conditionals is plagued by the well-known logical difficulties of counterfactual reasoning.[72] Such an approach also faces

66. Lieberson 1985, 15–17.
67. Cook and Campbell 1986, 174; see also 165–77.
68. On Rubin's model (or the Rubin–Holland model for experiments), see Rubin 1974, 688–701.
69. Holland 1986, 946–47, emphasis original.
70. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 84; see also 76–85.
71. See Holland 1994, 273; and Sobel 1995, 17.
72. See Brand 1976, 19–27; and Glymour 1986, 964–65. For some possible solutions to the problems of imagining hypothetical "possible worlds," see Fearon 1991, 190–95; and Sylvan and Majeski 1985, 191–93.

empirical difficulties because hypothetical experiments often cannot be carried out in practice in the analysis of social phenomena.[73] Moreover, even if such experiments can be conducted empirically, inference from and evaluation of experimental results are difficult because counterfactual arguments "appeal to unobservables" and to "possible worlds we will never see."[74]

Even if counterfactual reasoning and hypothetical experiments are possible, the model contains other serious problems. In Holland's "statistical solution" to what he calls the "fundamental problem of causal inference," the random assignment of the units ensures the *statistical* independence of these units from exposure to other confounding factors.[75] However, such an "independence assumption" is problematic for much of the social sciences because "physical randomization" usually is not possible when analyzing social phenomena (e.g., due to ethical concerns, sample size, unmanipulability, etc.). Yet in the absence of randomization, the measurement of the effects of causes is subject to various selection biases. Indeed, Holland acknowledged that without randomization, the model is premised "without any real basis" on "untested and often untestable assumptions about the assignment of units to treatments."[76] To substitute for randomization, some analysts have argued that the assignment of units to treatments can be "strongly ignored" by making various "conditional independence assumptions."[77] As Richard Berk pointed out, however, the three key assumptions needed for this "strong ignorability" problematically require other untested assumptions about large amounts of missing information.[78]

Holland's "natural lack of conviction in the validity of untested and often untestable assumptions about the assignment of units to treatments" is exacerbated in versions of the model that are applicable to only a few units or even a single unit.[79] According to King, Keohane, and Verba, the "true solution to the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference" requires "rerun[ning] history at the same time and the same place with different values of our explanatory variable each time."[80] However, such a solution not only is impossible empirically but also necessarily contains large practical uncertainties because the unit assignments and hypothetical replications are devised (imagined) by the (nonblind) researcher. As Berk wondered, "how does one learn about the activities necessary for a conceptual experiment, and how does one replicate them?"[81]

73. Granger 1986, 967–68.
74. Glymour 1986, 965.
75. Holland 1986, 948, emphasis added.
76. Holland 1994, 274.
77. See Rosenbaum 1984, 41–48; Holland 1986, 949; and Sobel 1995, 20–21.
78. Berk 1988, 161–62 and 166. See also Sobel 1995, 26; and Smith 1990, 75.
79. The quotation is from Holland 1994, 274.
80. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 91.
81. Berk 1988, 166.

When applied to one or a few units, therefore, this approach to causation actually depends on a "second-best assumption" of "unit homogeneity."[82] But since actual units differ in many (some unknown) ways, this assumption in turn depends upon some uncertain "matching" of units and some problematic hypothetical replications by the researcher to attain an average homogeneity.[83] Given all the assumptions needed to derive this "second-best assumption," assuming unit homogeneity in general appears to be problematic.[84] For all these reasons, Holland concluded that the notion of "distinct-but-identical units is a much less useful idea" in the social and biological sciences.[85]

Given all these uncertainties plaguing the "second best assumption" and the empirical impossibility of the "true solution," the advantages of this approach to causation over alternative approaches remain unclear.[86] Indeed, even if all the above uncertainties can be minimized, the measurement of the average effects of causes "still beg[s] the question of how such effects arise" or how causes operate to bring about their effects.[87] As Cartwright argued about randomized experiments in general, "the probabilities that show up in a randomized experiment, even in a model experiment where all the ideal specifications are met, will not reveal the true capacities which a cause may have."[88]

Toward an analysis of causal mechanisms

Given the many problems and uncertainties with causal approaches that rely on statistical associations and various forms of experimentation, analysts of the causal effects of ideation might legitimately explore other alternatives. One possible source of guidance is the recent evolution of scientific explanation in the philosophy of science. According to Salmon, the fourth decade of scientific explanation (1978–87) saw the maturation of certain themes that emerged in reaction to Hempel and Oppenheim's "covering-law model."[89] Two of these themes are of particular relevance for the analysis of causation. The first is the emerging consensus that despite nearly a half-century of efforts, statistical analyses have not and apparently cannot generate causal explanations merely from statistical associations. The second is that causal explanations require

82. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 91.
83. Ibid., 91–93, 95, and 200–206.
84. Lieberson 1985, 19–32.
85. Holland 1994, 266.
86. For other criticisms of King, Keohane, and Verba's analysis, see the review symposium in *American Political Science Review* 1995. Among these critics, only Collier mentioned King, Keohane, and Verba's conception of "causal effect." See Collier 1995, 464. For King, Keohane, and Verba's acknowledgment of their debt to Holland, see King, Keohane, and Verba 1995, 476; and King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 76n. 2, 79n. 6, 82, and 92.
87. The quotation is from Smith 1990, 80.
88. Cartwright 1989, 103; see also 64.
89. Salmon 1990, 117–86.

fundamentally an analysis of the "capacities," "powers," or "mechanisms" that enable causes to produce effects.[90] Given his central role in devising the earlier statistical-relevance model, Salmon's report of his own intellectual evolution nicely illustrates the emergence and convergence of both themes:

> I was aware that explanation involves causality, but I hoped that the required causal relations could be fully explicated by means of such statistical concepts as screening off and the conjunctive fork. A decade later, I was quite thoroughly convinced that this hope could not be fulfilled. Along with this realization came the recognition that statistical relevance [S-R] relations, in and of themselves, have no explanatory force. They have significance for scientific explanation only insofar as they provide evidence for causal relations. By 1984 they had been relegated to *the S-R basis* upon which causal explanations can be founded. Causal explanation, I argued, must appeal to such mechanisms as causal propagation and causal interactions, which are not explicated in statistical terms.[91]

This shift to causal mechanisms and capacities in the philosophy of science is mirrored by a similar shift in the philosophy of social science. For example, Jon Elster recently argued that explanation usually and ultimately "takes the form of citing an earlier event as the cause of the event we want to explain, together with some account of the causal mechanism connecting the two events."[92] Similarly, Daniel Little observed that "the fundamental idea underlying causal reasoning in social science is that of a causal mechanism: To claim that C caused E is to claim that there is a causal mechanism leading from the occurrence of C to the occurrence of E."[93]

This shift to causal mechanisms among philosophers marks a return to central research concerns common among empirical social scientists. For example, Herbert Smith observed that "a hallmark of sociological inquiry" is the analysis of "causal mechanisms" that "elaborate the causal effects of a given treatment in terms of their effects on variables intervening between treatment and response."[94] Similarly, Marini and Singer noted that "one is interested, at least ultimately, in understanding *why* X causes Y. In other words, one seeks to identify the mechanism by which X causes Y."[95] Recently, some analysts of international relations also have reemphasized such a conception of causation. In his causal analysis of war, for example, Dessler suggested that causal explanations "seek to identify the mechanisms through which specified outcomes occur, when they do."[96]

90. On capacities, see Cartwright 1989; on powers, see Harré and Madden 1975; and on mechanisms (such as causal forks and causal processes), see Salmon 1984, 155–56, 178–79, 182, 203, 239–41, 260–61, and 267–76.
91. Salmon 1990, 166, emphasis original; see also 156, 168, 170 and 182.
92. Elster 1989, 3.
93. Little 1991, 37; see also 15–17, 22, and 24–25.
94. Smith 1990, 76; see also 78–80. See also Hayes 1985, 3–4.
95. Marini and Singer 1988, 394, emphasis original; see also 379–80.
96. Dessler 1991, 343; see also 344–45.

Criticisms of causal mechanisms

Advocates of statistical associations and controlled experiments, however, have criticized the causal mechanisms approach in two ways. First, some advocates of Rubin's model or its variants argued that a definition of causation in terms of the mean causal effect is needed "to demonstrate the causal status of each potential linkage in such a posited mechanism" and hence is "logically prior to the identification of causal mechanisms."[97] Yet the existence of "well-done case studies . . . identifying these causal mechanisms" suggests that, even without Rubin's model or its variants, the operation of causal mechanisms can be (and have been) identified and detailed through empirical analysis.[98] Indeed, these mechanisms produce the effects that would be measured by the model for experiments if it is capable of doing so empirically. Causal mechanisms and capacities are ontologically prior to, and account for, both statistical associations and controlled experimental results. As Cartwright argued, "the metaphysics that underpins both our experimental and our probabilistic methods for establishing causes is a metaphysics of capacities. One factor . . . produce[s] the other . . . only if it has the capacity to do so." Accordingly, statistical associations "are the consequence of the operation of capacities" while "generic causal laws record these capacities."[99]

A second criticism of the causal mechanisms approach concerns the problem of "infinite regress" due to the existence of "an infinity of causal steps between any two links in the chain of causal mechanisms."[100] Again, however, the existence of well-done case studies suggests that this problem does not prevent the identification and analysis of causal mechanisms. Indeed, this problem of infinite regress applies only if the analyst seeks to explain all the relevant causal connections contained in what Peter Railton called the "ideal explanatory text." Realistically, however, analysts seek to explain only parts of this ideal, and hence require only that "explanatory information" needed for this limited task.[101] Additional microentities and intermediate causes always can be identified, but not all of them are needed for necessarily partial explanations.

Implications of causal mechanisms for ideational analysis

The recent evolution of scientific explanation toward an emphasis on causal mechanisms or capacities, together with the unpersuasiveness of criticisms of such an approach, have certain implications for ideational analysis. Explanation becomes a "two-tiered affair" where statistical associations and quasi-experimentation generate valuable descriptive information that "must be

97. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 86.
98. The quotation is from ibid.
99. Cartwright 1989, 136, 140, and 181.
100. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 86.
101. Railton 1981, 240.

explained in terms of *causal* relations. The explanation . . . is incomplete until the causal components . . . have been provided."[102] Meaning-oriented behavioralist explanations of the causal link between ideas and policies, in other words, "must be accompanied by a *causal story* indicating the mechanisms through which observed correlations evolve."[103] In ideational analysis, these mechanisms stem significantly from institutions and from the ideas themselves. To develop causal stories of these institutional and ideational mechanisms, ideational analysts need to complement their use of statistical methods and quasi-experimental designs with alternative research strategies. As Page, in a notable departure, recently argued, "historical methods can provide excellent leverage for causal inference." "For all the progress that statistical wizardry has brought us," he concluded, "I have come to believe that sorting out important aspects of opinion–policy links also requires such nonquantitative methods as archival research, interviewing elite informants, and participant observation."[104]

Some meaning-oriented behavioralists recognize that statistical associations contain uncertainties and need to be complemented with an analysis of causal mechanisms.[105] For example, in his recent analysis of the effects of "moral vision" on foreign aid policies, Lumsdaine bolstered his impressive array of correlational evidence (i.e., aid programs correlated with social welfare expenditures, charitable contributions, and elite support but not with trade) with various plausible institutional and discursive arguments.[106] His illuminating, but asystematic, discursive arguments will be cited in the section on discursive approaches below. His institutional arguments, meanwhile, focus mainly on the lobbying and advocacy effects of international organizations on the foreign aid programs of member countries. In addition, the norms, standards, and targets established by these organizations subject donor countries to public scrutiny, mutual criticism, and other pressures for compliance.[107] Although Lumsdaine's institutional arguments are suggestive, the next section examines other more systematic formulations of institutional ideation advanced by recent analysts of "epistemic communities" and by various "new institutionalists."

102. Salmon 1984, 22, 34, and 260–61, emphasis original. See also Hayes 1985, 3–4.

103. Little 1991, 159, emphasis original; see also 177–78, 25; and Marini and Singer 1988, 349, 361, 367, and 402.

104. Page 1994, 28. See also Holsti 1992, 453; and Levy 1994, 310–12.

105. On the uncertainties of his own correlational evidence, see Lumsdaine 1993, 137–38 and 143.

106. Lumsdaine 1993, 3–6, 29–32, and 290. For aid correlations with social welfare expenditures, charitable contributions, and elite support, see Lumsdaine 1993, 31, 41–45, 63–65, 119–25, and 142–43. For lack of correlations between trade and aid, see Lumsdaine 1993, 31, 39–41, 76–79, 93–103.

107. Ibid., 66–67, 69, and 276–77.

Three approaches to institutional ideation

Various analysts have argued recently that ideas affect policies through institutions in three general ways. These three versions of institutional ideation present valuable descriptive information and supply illuminating accounts of institutional causal mechanisms. However, they also contain various inadequacies or insufficiencies that can be mitigated by a complementary analysis of ideational causal mechanisms.

The bureaucratic power of epistemic communities

Of the three, the narrowest version of institutional ideation was advanced recently by analysts of epistemic communities. According to Peter Haas, "An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area."[108] Such a community exerts influence on policymaking primarily in two ways (as depicted on the left side of Figure 1). First, members of these communities exert political influence by "diffusing ideas and influencing the positions adopted by a wide range of actors, including domestic and international agencies, government bureaucrats and decision makers, legislative and corporate bodies, and the public."[109] Second, epistemic community members exert direct policymaking influence by acquiring bureaucratic positions. According to Haas, "epistemic communities can insinuate their views and influence national governments and international organizations by occupying niches in advisory and regulatory bodies. This suggests that the applicability of consensual knowledge to policymaking depends on the ability of the groups transmitting this knowledge to gain and exercise bureaucratic power."[110] When this bureaucratic power is consolidated in some unspecified way, then the influence of epistemic communities is institutionalized.[111] In the long term, this institutionalization is maintained allegedly through some process of socialization.[112]

In theory, according to Peter Hall, an expert-centered approach to the effects of ideas on policies "suggests that ideas may have a persuasiveness, and hence a political dynamism, *of their own*" which "forces us to ask which *ideational qualities* make for persuasiveness and which detract from it."[113] Unfortunately, the epistemic communities approach neglects these ideational qualities that enable ideas themselves to affect policies. Instead, the causal effects of ideas on policies are displaced onto the political effects of experts.

108. Haas 1992, 3.
109. Adler and Haas 1992, 379. See also Haas 1992, 2–3.
110. Haas 1992, 30, see also 4. See also Adler and Haas 1992, 374.
111. See Haas 1992, 4; and Adler and Haas 1992, 374–75.
112. Adler and Haas 1992, 374.
113. Hall 1989, 9–10, emphasis added.



FIGURE 1. *Institutional approaches to the causal linkage between ideas and policy*

The persuasiveness of ideas, meanwhile, is assumed rather than analytically allowed for and empirically ascertained. As Judith Goldstein observed, this approach "assumes that 'good' ideas, like science, will be recognized for their objective merits."[114] Indeed, the definition of an epistemic community stipulates that the ideas advocated by such communities are persuasive for both community members and for policymakers.

As defined by Haas, epistemic community members possess "a shared set of normative and principled beliefs," "shared causal beliefs," "shared notions of validity," and "a set of common practices associated with a set of problems."[115] Presumably, given all these commonalities, community members also would agree on the objective merits and hence persuasiveness of specific policy ideas. But as Jack Levy, John Jacobsen, and others have pointed out, such a consensus

114. Goldstein 1993, 238.
115. Haas 1992, 3.

among experts might not occur and "is the exception rather than the rule in security policy."[116]

Meanwhile, according to Haas, policy ideas advocated by epistemic community members also are persuasive to policymakers. Epistemic community members "become strong actors" when "decision makers solicit their information and delegate responsibility to them."[117] Yet as John Odell pointed out, it is also common for politicians to "shape scientific agendas" and to "use science selectively to legitimate policies chosen independently of scientific criteria."[118] Indeed, why would decision makers solicit information from and delegate responsibility to an epistemic community? For Haas, the answer is because policymakers, defined as lacking and needing expertise, will consult and defer to an epistemic community defined as an already constituted "network of professionals" with already "recognized expertise and competence" and already possessing "an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge."[119] In short, policymaking nonexperts find the ideas of epistemic community members persuasive because these policymakers accord these members access, legitimacy, authority and influence.[120]

Ideas "encased" within institutions and policymaking bearers of ideas

A second version of institutional ideation goes beyond the general arguments of expert-centered approaches by emphasizing other ways in which ideas affect policies through institutions.[121] In her analysis of developmentalism in Argentina and Brazil, for example, Kathryn Sikkink argued that when ideas are embodied in institutions, these institutions facilitate the implementation of those ideas by giving them organizational support and means of expression.[122] For Goldstein, meanwhile, institutions do more than simply supply organizational support to ideas. Institutions also "reflect a set of dominant ideas translated through legal mechanisms into formal government organizations."[123] In other words, ideas are "encased" and "embedded" within institutions in the form of legally prescribed organizational rules, procedures, and the like. For example, she argued that the belief in the efficacy of free trade was encased in "laws and institutional structures that service continued trade

116. The quotation is from Levy 1994, 293. See also Jacobsen 1995, 288–89 and 302–3.
117. Haas 1992, 4.
118. Odell 1988, 311.
119. Haas 1992, 3; see also 16–17.
120. Ibid., 17.
121. On the political influence of economists and central policymakers, see Goldstein 1988, 182–83n. and 214; Goldstein 1989, 71; and Sikkink 1991, 2, 26, 244, 248, and 254–55.
122. Sikkink 1991, 2, 23–27, 248–50, and 255.
123. Goldstein 1988, 181–82.

liberalization and ensure minimal legitimacy for social claims for protectionism."[124]

In Goldstein's analysis of the effects of ideas on trade policy, therefore, ideas "play a dual role" by for example "appear[ing] twice in the explanation of protectionism." First, ideas and beliefs affect policy by influencing policy experts and central decision makers. Second, ideas and beliefs also affect policy when they are encased or embedded in institutions (see Figure 1).[125] Yet both of these arguments contain unresolved dilemmas.

In Goldstein's second instance of ideational effects, ideas affect policy through their legal manifestations as institutional rules, procedures, etc. In this "longitudinal" or "intertemporal" argument, ideas that are embedded in institutions affect subsequent policies. According to Goldstein, "ideas do not influence behavior simply at one moment in time. Once a set of beliefs has become encased in institutions, these ideas can influence policy even after the interests of their creators have changed."[126] In such a formulation, however, the causal connection between ideas and policies remains unclear. The linkage between ideas and policies is mediated by institutions, but institutions are the products of ideas as well as other factors. Moreover, once ideas have been transformed into institutions that in turn affect policies, it is more accurate and less cumbersome to say that these institutions affect policies, rather than to argue that ideas affect policies by being encased in these institutions.

In Goldstein's first instance of ideational effects, meanwhile, ideas and beliefs affect policy by influencing policy experts (in her analysis, economists) and central decision makers who then affect policy. According to Goldstein, "ideas provide political entrepreneurs with strategies that suggest ways to maximize their interests. Ideas serve as focal points or road maps, providing guidance to leaders."[127] These "causal ideas" perform these guiding tasks by delineating "cause–effect relationships that interpret for leaders how their interests are affected by changes in market forces and then indicate the appropriate policy response."[128]

For Goldstein (and predecessors like Odell), the cause–effect relationships posited by causal ideas are persuasive because of various practical reasons.[129] For example, the complexity of ideas, or the authority of the bearers of ideas, have plausible effects on the persuasiveness of ideas. However, while complexity or abstraction can separate comprehensible ideas from incomprehensible ideas, they have much less effect on the persuasiveness of those ideas that have been comprehended.[130] Meanwhile, Goldstein's useful "political sponsorship

124. Ibid.
125. See Goldstein 1993, 3; and 1988, 183; see also 182 and 214.
126. Goldstein 1993, 3; see also xii, 183, and 238.
127. Ibid., 3; see also 11, 21, 237–38, 249, 250, and 254.
128. Ibid., 250; see also 249.
129. On some practical sources of policy ideas, see Odell 1982, 67–68.
130. On the complexity of ideas, see Goldstein 1993, 15, and 19. See also Odell 1982, 68.

argument" leaves unanswered the question of why these powerful bearers of ideas find the cause–effect relationships posited by ideas persuasive. It also subordinates the effects of ideas themselves to the influence of powerful bearers of ideas.[131]

Aside from these practical considerations, there are also other potentially more decisive factors that might enhance the persuasiveness of these cause–effect relationships. In some instances, according to Goldstein, individuals are taught to believe in the cause–effect relationships posited by causal ideas. For example, the cause–effect relationships posited by liberal trade ideas are persuasive to many people because they were taught classical economics in school. As Goldstein observed, "Only with the gradual expansion and professionalization of the discipline of economics, and the insistence by most major universities that all students have a grounding in classical economics, did individuals who believed in these ideas become able to translate them into a form usable for policy prescription."[132]

This teaching of ideas can be viewed in a number of ways. One possibility that Goldstein does not consider explains the influence of economic ideas as the result of disciplinary practices and regimes of truth (see the section on discursive approaches below). In another possibility, which she considers but apparently rejects, the persuasiveness of the cause–effect relationships posited by liberal trade ideas might stem from the logic and evidence supplied by classical economics. For classical economists, these cause–effect relationships are persuasive because they approximate empirical reality. However, Goldstein appears wary of such an appeal to objective merits (at least for policymakers, if not for scholars). "Throughout American history," she noted, "elected officials have confronted clear but contradictory statements by experts on the economic effects of particular trade policies."[133]

This existence of putatively objective yet contradictory assessments by economic experts challenges the adequacy of objective merits as the sole or main source of the persuasiveness of cause–effect relationships. Alternative explanations of this persuasiveness, therefore, are needed. Although undeveloped, Goldstein's discussion of the teaching of classical economic ideas suggests one such alternative. According to her, it was the "diffusion of classical thought" through the "train[ing] in classical economics" of "a generation of students" that "underlay the shift in the theoretical basis of American trade policy."[134] Apparently, knowledge about classical economics leads people to regard liberal trade ideas favorably and to be persuaded by the cause–effect relationships posited by these ideas. More generally, ideas that "fit" with existing ideas gain persuasiveness, while "ideas that do not 'fit' with underlying

131. See Goldstein 1993, 11, and 15 for her political sponsorship argument; and Jacobsen 1995, 295 for criticism of it.
132. Goldstein 1993, 15; see also 249. Also see Odell 1982, 67.
133. Goldstein 1993, 238–39.
134. Ibid., 249.

social values are unlikely to find support among political entrepreneurs and the attentive public."[135] For Goldstein, this "fit" between policy ideas and underlying ideas requires policymakers to "regard" and "package" ideas in appropriately meaningful ways. As she concluded:

> First, underlying social, institutional, and cognitive patterns affect how political entrepreneurs regard policy ideas. Ideas vary in their "fit" and thus their affinity to political environments. Efficiency is valued only to the extent that the means to a goal adhere to existing ideas, values, and institutions. And second, to be sold to both elites and the mass public, ideas must be "packaged"—again, usually in terms of existing social, institutional, and normative patterns. Ideas are politically salient only when embedded within some set of existing cognitive and political structures. If entrepreneurs do not make these connections, even the most functional of ideas invariably will be ignored.[136]

Goldstein's suggestive appeal to interpretation and meaning as bases for the persuasiveness of ideas is given a fuller and more explicit treatment in Sikkink's analysis of developmental ideas. "New ideas are more likely to be influential," she observed, "if they 'fit' well with existing ideas and ideologies in a particular historical setting."[137] For example, in evaluating the effects of CEPAL's (the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) economic recommendations in various countries, Sikkink found that they were most influential in Brazil and Chile and less influential in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. These disparities suggest that the persuasiveness of ideas stems not simply from objective merits, but rather depends on their meaning and interpretation. As Sikkink argued, "It is difficult to attribute the varying degrees of influence and penetration of CEPAL's ideas in the region solely to the correctness of CEPAL's economic diagnosis in relation to the various economies. The notion of persuasiveness itself is interpreted. One must also look at the political and ideological conditions in the various countries that influenced the acceptance and nonacceptance of CEPAL's ideas."[138]

For Sikkink, this interpreted persuasiveness applies particularly to the ideas of important groups in society and to the public. Indeed, the consolidation of developmental ideas "often depends on the degree to which the new model fits with existing ideologies of important economic and social groups." Political leaders can shape this interpreted persuasiveness and thereby garner political support "by framing their ideas in terms of existing ideologies and by using symbolic appeals to commonly held beliefs."[139] Although neither Sikkink nor Goldstein explains how ideas "fit" with existing ideologies, Sikkink's explicit

135. Ibid., 12; see also 15.
136. Ibid., 255–56.
137. Sikkink 1991, 26.
138. Ibid., 253.
139. Ibid., 2; see also 20–21, 247, 252, and 253. For an analysis of public campaigns of persuasion and the policy effects of ideas, see Odell 1988, 303–5.

appeal to interpretation and meaning, together with Goldstein's more tentative steps in this direction, point to important ideational bases for the persuasiveness of causal ideas. In the next main section, other more systematic interpretative analyses of ideational effects will be delineated.

The new institutional analysis of the effects of ideas on policy

An important and illuminating third version of institutional ideation generally encompasses, but also goes beyond, the analyses of the first and second versions. It acknowledges the role of experts and the theoretical persuasiveness of their ideas posited by recent analysts of epistemic communities. For example, with regard to the influence of Keynesian economists on policymaking, Hall observed that "Once the new terms gained currency among economic experts, the growing role of these experts in contemporary governance carried them into the heart of the policy process."[140] The third version also coincides with Goldstein's and Sikkink's arguments about the direct effects of ideas and beliefs on policymakers and the enmeshment of ideas in institutions. As Hall argued, "ideas acquire force when they find organizational means of expression."[141] However, instead of simply positing the constraints of ideas embedded in institutions, the third version specifies these institutional constraints not only on policymakers' decisions, but more importantly on the access, flow, and impact of ideas within the policymaking process.

In this more specified version of institutional ideation, institutions are more or less "formal rules, compliance procedures, and customary practices that structure the relationships between individuals in the polity and economy."[142] These institutions affect the influence of ideas on policy in a number of ways.

By regulating the permeability of the policymaking process, institutions influence which ideas gain political access. In terms of personnel, civil service regulations facilitate or impede the entry and impact of ideas into the policymaking process by governing the recruitment and promotion of bureaucratic carriers of ideas. More broadly, the organization of the political system as a whole affects the entry of ideas into the policymaking process by allowing or restricting the access of social groups to political leaders and bureaucratic officials (see Figure 1).[143]

Just as institutions govern the entry of ideas into the policymaking process, they also affect the access of policymakers to these ideas. Ideas percolate up to decision makers, but decision makers also search down into the bureaucracy for ideas. Both processes occur within and are shaped by institutions. "The organization of decision making," as Hall argued, "can affect the flow of

140. Hall 1989, 365; see also 378.
141. Hall 1986, 280.
142. Hall 1992, 96.
143. See Weir 1992, 192–93; Weir 1989, 59–60 and 84–85; and Hall 1989, 378–79.

information within it, including the access that policy makers have to particular ideas and the kind of authorities they consult about them."[144]

Once contact is made between ideas seeking access to policymakers and policymakers seeking access to ideas, institutions further affect the policy impact of ideas by influencing their administrative and political viability. Ideas possess administrative viability when they appeal to government officials with relevant jurisdictions and when institutions exist to implement them. Political viability, meanwhile, refers to the appeal of ideas to political organizations (such as parties) outside the government's administrative apparatus. The more viable the ideas politically and administratively, the more likely policymakers will embrace them.[145]

Institutions also affect the long-term influence of ideas on policy. Once ideas have entered the policymaking process, their sustained impact depends partly on the strength of bureaucratic and political authority. When this authority is hierarchical and concentrated, the influence of established ideas on policy endures. This influence diminishes, however, when bureaucratic authority fluctuates with recruitment and political authority is divided or shared.[146]

By persuasively specifying the various ways in which institutions affect policymakers' assessment of and access to ideas, the third version of institutional ideation improves upon other institutional accounts of the impact of ideas on policy. These specifics permit a better understanding of the institutional mechanisms that render some ideas more politically influential than others.[147] However, like other institutional analyses, even this illuminating third version of institutional ideation does not adequately analyze the capacities of ideas that enable them to affect policy.

In this version of the new institutionalism, experts are persuaded by ideas that are "theoretically appealing."[148] Yet for policymakers, ideas apparently are persuasive mainly because of current conditions and institutional constraints. As Margaret Weir argued, "institutional development renders some interpretations of problems more persuasive" than others.[149] Meanwhile, Hall observed that "persuasiveness is an inherently relational concept, determined as much by the shape of current economic and political circumstances as by the *shape of the ideas themselves.*"[150] No doubt, existing political-economic conditions and existing institutions affect the applicability and persuasiveness of ideas. Nevertheless, the shape of ideas themselves also needs analysis. Indeed, since Hall believes that institutions are "critical mediating variables" while "interests and ideas" are "the ultimate motors of political action," a comple-

144. Hall 1989, 370.
145. See ibid., 370–71 and 373–75; and Weir 1992, 192.
146. Hall 1989, 379.
147. See ibid., 362; and Hall 1992, 96.
148. Hall 1989, 372.
149. Weir 1992, 192.
150. Hall 1989, 370, emphasis added.

mentary analysis of the capacities of ideas themselves would enhance even this illuminating institutional approach.[151]

Symbolic languages, intersubjective meanings, and discursive practices

When meaning-oriented behavioralists and ideational institutionalists attempt to explain the effects of ideations, they generally argue that ideas and beliefs "shape," "constrain," "orient," "guide," etc. the policy preferences of decision makers.[152] These depictions of the tasks performed by ideations are useful, but they do not reveal how ideas and beliefs possess and exercise the capacity to perform all these tasks. How do ideas and beliefs prescribe, shape, constrain, guide, etc. courses of action? Among conventional studies of ideational effects, the most persuasive works such as Stephen Van Evera's fine analysis of World War I offer illuminating descriptive answers to this question.[153] However, to answer this question theoretically and across different cases requires a more adequate specification of the causal mechanisms or capacities stemming from the ideas themselves.

Beginning apparently with Donald Davidson, many philosophers have argued that reasons (i.e., beliefs and attitudes) can causally explain actions.[154] Since the mid-1960s, the majority view among Anglo-American philosophers of mind is that mental properties, events, states, etc. can cause the behaviors of individuals.[155] This section builds on this causal conclusion but relies instead on linguistic and interpretive approaches to explain how the capacities of ideations enable mental events to produce their effects. Specifically, the ideational capacities or mechanisms that enable ideas and beliefs to affect policies can be illuminated if networks of ideas and systems of beliefs are viewed as languages or discourses. In recent years, a number of scholars have drawn linguistic insights from various contemporary social theories to analyze international relations.[156] Although they contain various deficiencies, these analyses can remedy some of the key inadequacies of behavioral and institutional approaches. In general, they can be divided into five overlapping groups.

Vocabularies and rules of languages

In one basic group of analyses, language operates to define the range of possible utterances and hence the range of possible actions. According to

151. Hall 1992, 109.
152. For an elaborate behavioral account, see Holsti 1976, 20. For a similar institutionalist account, see Hall 1986, 278.
153. Van Evera 1986, especially 99–108.
154. Davidson 1963, 685–700.
155. For examples, see the essays in Heil and Mele 1993; and Child 1994, especially 191–221 on the causal explanatory relevance of mental properties.
156. See George and Campbell 1990, 270ff; and George 1989, 272ff.

J. G. A. Pocock, available vocabularies "with and within which the author operate[s] . . . function paradigmatically to prescribe what he might say and how he might say it."[157] By prescribing and proscribing speech, these (admittedly multivalent and multifunctional) vocabularies enable the actor to conceive and hence to undertake actions. More precisely, languages or vocabularies authorize or restrict, as well as prioritize and distribute, the ideas and beliefs that policymakers can think and in so doing partly delimit the policies they can pursue. According to Hall, by supplying the words and concepts, languages "define the terms of political debate and provide participants in the political arena with a discursive repertoire to be used there."[158] Moreover, once particular arguments and phraseology have been deployed, a "rhetorical momentum" is generated which operates independently to affect policies.[159] In the case of foreign aid programs, for example, Lumsdaine argued that "Once aid had been placed on such a [humanitarian] footing, it could be criticized on such a footing. Ever afterward it became politically difficult to set up aid practices—especially international ones—except on a basis that had to be defensible as appropriate to programs with primarily developmental intent. Foreign aid became embedded in a context of debate that made it easiest for those who wanted to have aid geared to developmental and antipoverty purposes to argue their case."[160]

Besides vocabularies, languages also supply rules and conventions that govern the speech or utterances that are possible and hence in part the political actions that can ensue.[161] In some well-defined instances, these speech acts are themselves actions that perform illocutionary functions (i.e., the utterances themselves are doing something). More generally, however, speech acts produce perlocutionary effects (i.e., the effects of utterances on listeners) only within "the structure of the discoursive interaction." This structure consists not only of the context or "situation," but also "the sequence of discoursive moves." As Friedrich Kratochwil argued, "perlocutionary effects depend more clearly on *discoursive* gambits, by which the hearer is 'brought around' in giving assent to an assertion of the speaker."[162]

Symbolic languages and interpretive meaning.

Languages and discourses affect policy in a second general way by supplying policymakers with meanings of their political situations. As cultural "webs of significance," they imprint meaning onto the minds of policymakers through their symbolic power.[163] Moreover, as narratives, scripts, codes, etc., they

157. Pocock 1973, 25.
158. Hall 1989, 383–84.
159. Lumsdaine 1993, 274 and 275.
160. Ibid., 275.
161. Hollis and Smith 1991, 70, 177–79 and 184–85.
162. Kratochwil 1988, 273, emphasis original. For an analysis of speech acts, see Searle 1969.
163. The quoted phrase is from Geertz 1973, 5.

generate interpretive meaning through their plots, storytelling, and blueprints.[164] Through their significations and narrations, these cultural entities operate (according to Clifford Geertz) "as a set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers call 'programs')—for the governing of behavior."[165] They also operate as epistemic switches that assign ideas "a particular niche within the web of meaningful concepts and associations" thereby rendering some of them "immediately plausible, and others . . . barely comprehensible."[166] Whether as control mechanisms or epistemic switches, languages or discourses affect policies by organizing and imprinting meaning.

The quasi-causal effects of intersubjective meanings

The effects of symbolic meaning on actions and the need for discursive interaction in generating perlocutionary force both indicate that intersubjectivity plays an important role in the generation of meaning and hence of actions. Languages and discourses consisting of vocabularies, rules, symbols, narratives, and the like are necessarily public and therefore intersubjectively constituted and accessed. A third way in which discursive languages affect policy thus emerges from emphasizing the intersubjective dimensions of symbolic languages. In this third overlapping approach, interpretive analysts seek "to uncover the sense of a given action, practice or constitutive meaning: it does this [1] by discovering the intentions and desires of particular actors, [2] by uncovering the set of rules which give point to these sets of rules or practices, and [3] by elucidating the basic conceptual scheme which orders experience in ways [such] that the practices, actions, and experiences . . . are made intelligible, [i.e.] by seeing how they fit into a whole structure which defines the nature and purpose of human life."[167] In the study of international relations, various analysts (to varying degrees and with varying success) have employed an interpretive method to analyze international regimes, the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. bombing raid on Libya, and the foreign aid programs of capitalist democracies.[168] As Lumsdaine argued, "policy can be influenced by plausible arguments about a long-term future, and plausibility will be based in part upon a policy's affinity to a broad base of domestic political experience and interpretation, and upon generally accepted principles of practical reasoning, including a society's ethical traditions."[169]

Some controversy exists, however, over the type of analysis entailed in using such an interpretive method. In a long-standing disagreement within the social

164. See, for example, Luke 1989; 1991; Nathanson 1988; and Bruner 1991.
165. Geertz 1973, 44.
166. Hall 1989, 383.
167. Fay 1975, 79.
168. On regimes, see Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 764; and Kratochwil 1988, 277. On the Cuban missile crisis, see Ball 1987, 104–8. On the U.S. raid on Libya, see Hollis and Smith 1991, 181–85.
169. Lumsdaine 1993, 273.

sciences, "naturalists" argue that a scientific analysis offers an "explanation" of the causes of behavior, while "humanists" argue that the analysis of intentional human beings requires an interpretive method that generates an "understanding" of meaning. As Alexander Rosenberg baldly but usefully recapitulated, "On one side are those . . . who have held that meanings can't be causes, that the knowledge social science seeks must be causal knowledge, and that therefore we must turn our backs on meaning. On the other side [are those] . . . who have agreed that meanings cannot be causes, but that they provide knowledge, so that the aim of social science cannot be causal knowledge."[170]

For Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, these two modes of analysis are "fundamentally distinct," "mutually exclusive," and "cannot simply be combined."[171] For Smith in particular, understanding is incapable of and unnecessary for the explanation of social phenomena. Indeed, interpretive understanding is not even "*merely* a link" in a causal chain because understandings are largely determined by external social factors. Consequently, Smith concluded that "the actor's own understanding is an area of underdetermination."[172]

Many analysts, however, reject such a characterization of interpretive understanding and the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. For example, Michael Gibbons argued that "The attempt to understand the intersubjective meanings embedded in social life is at the same time an attempt to explain why people act the way they do."[173] In some cases, Little acknowledged, understanding these meanings can serve to explain actions because "interpretations capture states of the world that can function as causal conditions (states of agency), and therefore interpretations can serve as the basis for explanations."[174] Furthermore, Rosenberg argued that "we cannot identify the rules that give an action meaning without presupposing that recognition of the rules is part of the cause of action."[175] Indeed, arguing that such interpretive explanations can offer "quasi-causal" analyses of actions, Brian Fay observed that "men act in terms of their interpretations of, and intentions towards, their external conditions, rather than being governed directly by them, and therefore these conditions must be understood not as causes but as warranting conditions which make a particular action or belief more 'reasonable,' 'justified,' or 'appropriate,' given the desires, beliefs, and expectations of the actors."[176] In other words, intersubjective meanings quasi-causally affect certain actions not by directly or inevitably determining them but rather by rendering these actions plausible or implausible, acceptable or unacceptable, conceivable or inconceivable, respectable or disreputable, etc.

170. Rosenberg 1988, 109. See also Hollis and Smith 1991, 71; Little 1991, 68–69; and Fay and Moon 1977, 209 and 216.
171. Hollis and Smith 1991, 210; see also 6–7, 211, and 214.
172. Ibid., 206, emphasis original; see also 211.
173. Gibbons 1987b, 3. See also Hayes, 7.
174. Little 1991, 74.
175. Rosenberg 1988, 87–88.
176. Fay 1975, 84 and 85.

In the case of foreign aid policies, for example, Lumsdaine observed that "The arguments for the policies made sense, and found support, in a variety of OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] polities because those countries' domestic political discourse and structure made the policies seem sensible, and provided links between the societies' ethical and religious traditions and public policies designed to assist those in need."[177]

The intersubjective constitution of meanings and practices

Some "expressivist" interpretive analysts draw further implications from the importance of intersubjectivity, yielding a fourth overlapping approach to the effects of discursive languages. More explicitly than other interpretivists, they emphasize the medium of language in constituting meaning. According to Charles Taylor, "ideas do not properly exist before their expression in language or some other of the range of media men deploy. That is what is meant by saying that language, or expression in general, is constitutive of thought."[178] Since thought is constitutive in part of reality, language is crucial to the constitution of that reality. As Gibbons argued, "language, in some fundamental sense, helps constitute our social life, practices, and our world. Hence, it is only through language that we come to know, reflect upon, and act upon the world."[179]

Expressivist interpretive analysts emphasize a second implication of intersubjectivity. Not only do intersubjective meanings supply the context that render practices and actions intelligible, they also are enmeshed inseparably with these practices and actions. Fundamentally, intersubjective meanings are "constitutive" of social practices (i.e., modes of social relations or mutual actions) while being "embedded in and instantiated through those same practices."[180] This second implication is linked necessarily with the first. As Taylor argued, "the vocabulary of a given social dimension is grounded in the shape of social practice in this dimension; that is, the vocabulary would not make sense, could not be applied sensibly, where this range of practices did not prevail. And yet this range of practices could not exist without the prevalence of this or some related vocabulary. . . . The language is constitutive of the reality, is essential to its being the kind of reality it is."[181]

The intersubjective constitution of discursive practices

Although they have many differences, postmodern or poststructural analysts share with expressivist interpretive analysts both of these implications of

177. Lumsdaine 1993, 274; see also 277.
178. Taylor 1987, 114.
179. Gibbons 1987a, 138.
180. The quotations are from Neufeld 1993, 44; see also 45 and 47.
181. Taylor 1979, 45; see also 46 and 50.

intersubjective meanings. Like expressivists, they emphasize the linguistic construction of reality in presenting a fifth approach to the effects of discursive languages. In particular, postmodernists highlight the linguistic construction of subjects and objects. According to Jim George and David Campbell, "the focus is on language, understood not as an asset employed by a preexisting subject or as a constraint imposed on the subject, but as a medium through which the social identity of the subject is made possible. This understanding of language underlies the notion of discourse which, for Foucault, involves not simply a group of signs or symbols but the overall social practices that systematically form social subjects and the objects of which they speak."[182]

Postmodernists also share the expressivist emphasis on the enmeshment of intersubjective meanings with social practices. They use the concept of "discourse" to denote systematic statements linked to social practices. These linkages of meanings and practices affect actions by somehow performing a variety of definitional and diagnostic functions and by somehow implementing a "regime of truth." According to Jim George, a discourse "[1] gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behavior. . . . [2] generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained. . . . [3] makes 'real' that which *it* prescribes as meaningful. . . . [4] establishes the sociolinguistic conditions under which . . . theory and practice can take place, and . . . [5] establishes . . . that which, by discursive definition, does not correspond with reality."[183] In addition, "these statements [6] define a phenomenon; [7] provide a basis for analyzing, assessing, and evaluating it; and [8] provide guidance for action with respect to it in terms of both ends and means."[184] These discourses or discursive practices, furthermore, give rise to and are reinforced by knowledge disciplines and regimes of truth. As James Keeley elaborated:

> When embodied in an array of implementing instruments and practices, a discourse becomes a creative part of the reality it purports to understand. The discourses of particular interest to Foucault develop and implement standards of "normal" behavior. . . . In conjunction with disciplines, discourses also provide statements about how such behavior might be produced: when implemented, they are exercises in social engineering.
>
> A dominating or hegemonic discourse provides a "regime of truth," a means of assessing not only whether statements are true or false but also whether they have a meaning at all or are mere nonsense. . . . A regime of truth goes beyond agenda setting and "decisions and non-decisions." It endorses certain language, symbols, modes of reasoning, and conclusions.[185]

182. George and Campbell 1990, 285.
183. George 1994, 29–30, emphasis original; see also 104, 155–58 and 191–92.
184. Keeley 1990, 91.
185. Ibid., 91.

Controversies rage, however, over these discursive practices and their implications for knowledge. Although postmodern analyses present in detail the diagnoses and legitimations carried out by discursive practices, they nevertheless need to specify better where these discourses come from, how discursive practices form, and how they perform their tasks. Postmodernism also needs to address more adequately and explicitly the evaluation of competing interpretations in the absence of some suitable nonpolitical criteria.[186] Finally, their neglect of causal explanation needs to be reassessed. For as Brian Fay and Donald Moon observed about humanist social science:

> an account of a society's world-view, or its intersubjective or constitutive meanings, is not a theory which explains why the society has the institutions it has, or why certain processes of social change occur, or why it is characterized by certain regularities, or why people of a certain sort perform particular kinds of actions. To explain such phenomena we need theories that are, broadly speaking, causal, and the fixation of the humanist tradition with the meaningful dimension of human action has prevented it from developing an account of this kind of social-scientific theory.[187]

In general, postmodernists and some interpretivists appear untroubled by these dilemmas. Geertz, for example, observed that "culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed" and hence "the analysis of it ... [is] therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning."[188] More radically, meanwhile, postmodernists readily abandon the search for causes and objective truths to celebrate semantic instability and interpretive multiplicity. "Contrary to the logic of explanation," Campbell proclaimed, "I embrace a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloging, calculating, and specifying the 'real causes,' and concerns itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another."[189]

In stark terms, the controversies between modernist analyses (both naturalist and some humanist) that seek causal explanations and postmodernist analyses that celebrate interpretive indeterminacy are irresolvable.[190] However, a limited accommodation might be possible if postmodern analyses are recast to offer indeterminate explanations of the causal or quasi-causal effects of ideational mechanisms.[191] For although postmodernists might reject "real

186. Neufeld 1994, 31–32. For a political and normative response to this dilemma, see George 1994, 24.

187. Fay and Moon 1977, 217. See also Little 1991, 74 and 85–86.

188. Geertz 1973, 14 and 5.

189. Campbell 1992, 4; see also 5, 20–21, and 248; and George 1994, 11 and 24–25.

190. Bernstein 1992, 8–9 and 201ff.

191. On "indeterminacy" as the absence of unique, nomic, predictions due mainly to human choice and contingency, see Bohman 1991, 6–7, 12–13, and 232–33.

causes" or "some simple cause-and-effect scenario," their empirical analyses of ideation and foreign policy cannot avoid causal effects altogether.[192]

For example, some postmodernists posit the discursive construction of external "others" by a national "self" as important for permitting and justifying the foreign policies of that self toward those others. As Michael Shapiro argued, the American construction of Guatemala as a subordinate other supported U.S. intervention in that country.[193] According to Simon Dalby, meanwhile, the American construction of the Soviet Union as a threatening other contributed to the cold war policies of the United States.[194] Similarly, Cynthia Weber argued that President Wilson's construction of the Mexican people as emerging liberal-democratic capitalists threatened by authoritarianism enabled him to authorize the military occupation of Vera Cruz.[195] More recently, Roxanne Doty argued that the relational constructions of the Filipino other by the American self prompted the United States to choose counterinsurgency rather than either nonintervention or a direct and overt military expedition in response to the Huk rebellion.[196] In all these cases, discursive constructions of subjects and objects causally or quasi-causally affected U.S. foreign policies. As Jim George explained, if the American "self is identified in terms of a worldwide security dilemma, then states such as Guatemala are identified as indirect threats whose *potential* for disorder must be disciplined and controlled" through various forms of intervention.[197]

Similar causal or quasi-causal effects also exist in other recent postmodern analyses where the need to constitute and sustain national self-identity prompts policymakers to pursue policies required to construct relationally different others and indeed to develop an appropriate supply of them. For example, Campbell argued that American constructions of otherness in a variety of foreign policy contexts served to constitute and sustain American identity.[198] Similarly, William Connolly argued that external and internal others are linked and that the "western self-definition" produces external others as threats and enemies in order to support and protect Western collective identity.[199]

Two overarching dilemmas of ideational analysis

To respond to critics and skeptics who deny the importance of ideas and beliefs in policymaking, meaning-oriented behavioralists and ideational institutional-

192. The quotations are from Campbell 1992, 4; and George 1994, 209.
193. Shapiro 1988, chap. 3.
194. Dalby 1988 and 1990.
195. Weber 1992, 328–31. See Weber 1995 for analyses of how discourses of sovereignty legitimated other military interventions in Grenada, Panama, and elsewhere.
196. Doty 1993, 309–16.
197. George 1994, 205, emphasis original; see also 207.
198. Campbell 1992.
199. Connolly 1991, 40–45, 158–159, and 209.

ists have sought to specify the causal linkage between ideations and policies. Behavioralists have attempted such causal inferences by problematically using either statistical associations or quasi-controlled experiments. Some institutionalists, meanwhile, have relied more successfully on institutional causal mechanisms. A more adequate specification of this causal linkage, however, also requires an analysis of the ideational causal mechanisms or capacities that render the meanings of ideas and beliefs compelling to actors. Yet such a necessary focus on ideas themselves poses troubling methodological dilemmas for behavioralists and institutionalists. Their commitment to empirical analyses of observable behavior that can be tested or falsified renders them reluctant and ill-equipped to analyze the intersubjective meanings and symbolic discourses that give ideas their causal effects. Prompted by neorealist critics, self-perception skeptics, and other detractors to establish the causal link between ideation and policy, yet constrained methodologically from analyzing the ideational causal mechanisms, they resorted instead to various alternative strategies to bridge this causal gap. However, as earlier sections argued above, these strategies contain various limitations that prevent them from adequately establishing this causal link.

In contrast, various broadly construed discursive approaches that focus on interpretive understanding are equipped methodologically to analyze the symbolic languages and intersubjective meanings of ideas themselves. However, these approaches routinely neglect causal analysis by emphasizing instead the interpretation of meanings and/or the ambiguity and instability of all interpretations. In interpretive analyses, causation (if mentioned at all) is normally "a secondary by-product" that is "provide[d] derivatively."[200] Postmodern analyses, meanwhile, usually regard a causal focus as misdirected because in a world of ambiguity, indeterminacy, and multiplicity, causal connections (if mentioned at all) are unstable, impermanent, and obscure.

Two overarching dilemmas thus emerge from existing analyses of ideational effects. First, meaning-oriented behavioralists and ideational institutionalists who focus on causation generally do not analyze the causal mechanisms stemming from the ideas themselves. Second, discursivists who analyze ideas themselves generally do not focus on their causal effects. Together, these dilemmas constitute the particular manifestations within the international relations field of both the enduring disagreement between explanation and understanding in the social sciences and the more recent controversy over modernity and postmodernity in contemporary social theory.

The resolution of the first dilemma extrapolated from earlier sections requires behavioralists and institutionalists to bolster their explanations with an analysis of the ideational mechanisms or capacities that enable ideations to produce their effects. Accordingly, behavioralists and institutionalists need to

200. Rosenberg 1988, 28.

pay greater attention to the effects of symbolic languages, intersubjective meanings, and discursive practices.

The resolution of the second dilemma requires discursivists to offer causal or quasi-causal accounts of the effects of ideational factors. The previous section argued that even interpretive analyses of intersubjective meanings and discursive practices can be recast to offer some sort of causal or quasi-causal explanations. Since such explanations encompass the quasi-causal effects of ideational mechanisms, they are compatible with the indeterminacy of both the intentional actions analyzed by interpretivists and the semantic instability emphasized by postmodernists. Indeterminate causal explanations, in short, can account both for "the protean character of reflective, social agency"[201] and for the possibility that all explanations might be unstable and impermanent at some future conjuncture. However, once cause–effect relationships are broached, even indeterminate causal explanations can be reasonably assessed because at any one moment their causal mechanisms can be identified and evaluated. The truth of interpretive indeterminacy, in other words, can be subordinated to the reasoned assessment of indeterminate causal effects within specified parameters.[202]

Resolving these two dilemmas of ideational analysis also suggests some wider implications for the international relations field. If behavioralists and institutionalists make the methodological adjustments needed to analyze intersubjective meanings and symbolic languages, while interpretivists and postmodernists amend their radical skepticism about nonpolitical adjudication in order to analyze indeterminate causal effects, then perhaps the current impasse of incommensurable approaches might abate.[203] At the very least, these resolutions would raise the level of the "third debate" in international relations.[204]

References

Adler, Emanuel, and Peter M. Haas. 1992. Conclusion: Epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program. *International Organization* 46:367–90.

American Political Science Review. 1995. Review symposium: the qualitative–quantitative disputation. *American Political Science Review* 89:454–81.

Archdeacon, Thomas J. 1994. *Correlation and regression analysis.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1986. Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. In *Cooperation under anarchy,* edited by Kenneth A. Oye. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Ball, Terence. 1987. Deadly hermeneutics; or, *sinn* and the social scientist. In *Idioms of inquiry: Critique and renewal in political science,* edited by Terence Ball. Albany: State University of New York Press.

201. Bohman 1991, 13.

202. These parameters can include, but are not limited to, the "particular eras" cited by Cox 1986, 244.

203. For a discussion of the possibilities and difficulties of "multimethod convergence," see Tetlock 1989, 370–72. See also Hayes 1985, 5–8.

204. Lapid 1989.

Beer, Samuel H. 1978. In search of a new public philosophy. In *The new American political system,* edited by Anthony King. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.

Berk, Richard A. 1988. Causal inference for sociological data. In *Handbook of sociology,* edited by Neil J. Smelser. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.

Bernstein, Richard J. 1992. *The new constellation: The ethical-political horizons of modernity/postmodernity.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Blalock, Hubert M., Jr. 1991. Are there really any *constructive* alternatives to causal modeling? In *Sociological methodology 1991,* edited by Peter V. Marsden. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bohman, James. 1991. *New philosophy of social science: Problems of indeterminacy.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Brand, Myles. 1976. Introduction: Defining "causes." In *The nature of causation,* edited by Myles Brand. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Bruner, Jerome. 1991. The narrative construction of reality. *Critical Inquiry* 18:1–21.

Campbell, David. 1992. *Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Cartwright, Nancy. 1983. *How the laws of physics lie.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1989. *Nature's capacities and their measurement.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Child, William. 1994. *Causality, interpretation, and the mind.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Collier, David. 1995. Translating quantitative methods for qualitative researchers: The case of selection bias. *American Political Science Review* 89:461–66.

Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the political arena: Critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Connolly, William E. 1991. *Identity/difference: Democratic negotiations of political paradox.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Cook, Thomas D., and Donald T. Campbell. 1979. *Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis issues for field settings.* Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

———. 1986. The causal assumptions of quasi-experimental practice. *Synthese* 68:141–80.

Cox, Robert W. 1986. Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. In *Neorealism and its critics,* edited by Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cuttance, Peter. 1987. Issues and problems in the application of structural equation models. In *Structural modeling by example,* edited by Peter Cuttance and Russell Ecob. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dalby, Simon. 1988. Geopolitical discourse: The Soviet Union as other. *Alternatives* 13:415–42.

———. 1990. *Creating the second cold war: The discourse of politics.* London: Pinter.

Davidson, Donald. 1963. Actions, reasons, and causes. *Journal of Philosophy* 60:685–700.

Dessler, David. 1991. Beyond correlations: Toward a causal theory of war. *International Studies Quarterly* 35:337–55.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1993. Foreign policy as social construction: A post–positivist analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines. *International Studies Quarterly* 37:297–320.

Ducasse, C.J. 1976. Causality: Critique of Hume's analysis. In *The nature of causation,* edited by Myles Brand. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Elster, Jon. 1989. *Nuts and bolts for the social sciences.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fay, Brian. 1975. *Social theory and political practice.* London: Unwin Hyman.

Fay, Brian, and J. Donald Moon. 1977. What would an adequate philosophy of social science look like? *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 7:209–27.

Fearon, James D. 1991. Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. *World Politics* 43:169–95.

Fisher, Ronald A. [1925] 1970. *Statistical methods for research workers.* Reprint, New York: Hafner.

Freedman, David A. 1985. Statistics and the scientific method. In *Cohort analysis in social research,* edited by William M. Mason and Stephen E. Fienberg. New York: Springer-Verlag.

———. 1987. As others see us: A case study in path analysis. *Journal of Educational Statistics* 12:101–28.

———. 1991a. Statistical models and shoe leather. In *Sociological methodology 1991,* edited by Peter V. Marsden. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

———. 1991b. A rejoinder to Berk, Blalock, and Mason. In *Sociological methodology 1991,* edited by Peter V. Marsden. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Garrett, Geoffrey, and Barry R. Weingast. 1993. Ideas, interests, and institutions: Constructing the European community's internal market. In *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change,* edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The interpretation of cultures.* New York: Basic Books.

George, Alexander L. 1979. The causal nexus between cognitive beliefs and decision-making behavior: The "operational code" belief system. In *Psychological models in international politics,* edited by Lawrence S. Falkowski. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

———. 1993. *Bridging the gap: Theory and practice of foreign policy.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace.

George, Jim. 1989. International relations and the search for thinking space: Another view of the third debate. *International Studies Quarterly* 33:269–79.

———. 1994. *Discourses of global politics: A critical reintroduction to international relations.* Boulder, Colo.: Rienner.

George, Jim, and David Campbell. 1990. Patterns of dissent and the celebration of difference: Critical social theory and international relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 34:269–93.

Gibbons, Michael T. 1987a. Interpretation, genealogy and human agency. In *Idioms of inquiry: Critique and renewal in political science,* edited by Terence Ball. Albany: State University of New York Press.

———. 1987b. Introduction: The politics of interpretation. In *Interpreting politics,* edited by Michael Gibbons. New York: New York University Press.

Glymour, Clark. 1986. Comment: Statistics and metaphysics. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 81:964–66.

Glymour, Clark, Peter Spirtes, and Richard Scheines. 1994. In place of regression. In *Patrick Suppes: Scientific philosopher,* vol. 1, edited by Paul Humphreys. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Goertz, Gary. 1994. *Contexts of international politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. 1994. International norms and power politics. In *Reconstructing realpolitik,* edited by Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Goldstein, Judith. 1988. Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy. In *The state and American foreign economic policy,* edited by G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

———. 1989. The impact of ideas on trade policy: The origins of U.S. agricultural and manufacturing policies. *International Organization* 43:31–71.

———. 1993. *Ideas, interests, and American trade policy.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane. 1993. Ideas and foreign policy: An analytical framework. In *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change,* edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Granger, Clive. 1986. Comment. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 81:967–68.

Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination. *International Organization* 46:1–35.

Hall, Peter A. 1986. *Governing the economy: The politics of state intervention in Britain and France.* New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1989. Introduction and Conclusion. In *The political power of economic ideas: Keynesianism across nations,* edited by Peter A. Hall. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1992. The movement from Keynesianism to monetarism: Institutional analysis and British economic policy in the 1970s. In *Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis,* edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harré, R., and E. H. Madden. 1975. *Causal powers.* Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Hayes, Adrian C. 1985. Causal and interpretive analysis in sociology. *Sociological Theory* 3:1–10.
Heil, John, and Alfred Mele, eds. 1993. *Mental causation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herrmann, Richard. 1986. The power of perceptions in foreign-policy decision making: Do views of the Soviet Union determine the policy choices of American leaders? *American Journal of Political Science* 30:841–75.
Hoagland, Steven W., and Walker, Stephen G. 1979. Operational codes and crisis outcomes. In *Psychological models in international politics,* edited by Lawrence S. Falkowski. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
Holland, Paul W. 1986. Statistics and causal inference. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 81:945–60.
———. 1988. Causal inference, path analysis, and recursive structural equations models. In *Sociological methodology 1988,* edited by Clifford C. Clogg. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association.
———. 1994. Probabilistic causation without probability. In *Patrick Suppes: Scientific philosopher,* vol. 1, edited by Paul Humphreys. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hollis, Martin, and Steven Smith. 1991. *Explaining and understanding international relations.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Holsti, Ole R. 1976. Cognitive process approaches to decision-making: Foreign policy actors viewed psychologically. *American Behavioral Scientist* 20:11–32.
———. 1992. Public opinion and foreign policy: Challenges to the Almond–Lippmann consensus. *International Studies Quarterly* 36:439–66.
Holsti, Ole R., and James N. Rosenau. 1984. *American leadership in world affairs: Vietnam and the breakdown of consensus.* Boston: Allen and Unwin.
Hume, David. [1748] 1976. Of the idea of necessary connection. In *The nature of causation,* edited by Myles Brand. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Reprint of *An inquiry concerning human understanding,* section vii.
Humphreys, Paul. 1986. Causation in the social sciences: An overview. *Synthese* 68:1–12.
Ikenberry, G. John, and Charles A. Kupchan. 1990. Socialization and hegemonic power. *International Organization* 44:283–315.
Irzik, Gurol, and Eric Meyer. 1987. Causal modeling: New directions for statistical explanation. *Philosophy of Science* 54:495–514.
Jacobsen, John Kurt. 1995. Much ado about ideas: The cognitive factor in economic policy. *World Politics* 47:283–310.
Jervis, Robert. 1988. Realism, game theory, and cooperation. *World Politics* 40:317–49.
Katzenstein, Peter J. 1993. Coping with terrorism: Norms and internal security in Germany and Japan. In *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change,* edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Keeley, James F. 1990. Toward a Foucauldian analysis of international regimes. *International Organization* 44:83–105.
Kegley, Charles W., Jr. 1986. Assumptions and dilemmas in the study of Americans' foreign policy beliefs: A caveat. *International Studies Quarterly* 30:447–71.
Khong, Yuen Foong. 1992. *Analogies at war: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam decisions of 1965.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Kidder, Louise H. 1981. Qualitative research and quasi-experimental frameworks. In *Scientific inquiry and the social sciences,* edited by Marilynn B. Brewer and Barry E. Collins. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Kinder, Donald R., and Thomas R. Palfrey, eds. 1993. *Experimental foundations of political science.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
———. 1995. The importance of research design in political science. *American Political Science Review* 89:475–81.

Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1988. Regimes, interpretation and the "science" of politics: A reappraisal. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17:263–84.

Kratochwil, Friedrich, and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. International organization: A state of the art on an art of the state. *International Organization* 40:753–75.

Lapid, Yosef. 1989. The third debate: On the prospects of international theory in a post-positivist era. *International Studies Quarterly* 33:235–54.

Larson, Deborah Welch. 1985. *Origins of containment: A psychological explanation.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Levy, Jack S. 1994. Learning and foreign policy: Sweeping a conceptual minefield. *International Organization* 48:279–312.

Lieberson, Stanley. 1985. *Making it count: The improvement of social research and theory.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lindblom, Charles E. 1990. *Inquiry and change.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Little, Daniel. 1991. *Varieties of social explanation: An introduction to the philosophy of social science.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

Luke, Timothy W. 1989. On post-war: The significance of symbolic action in war and deterrence. *Alternatives* 14:343–62.

———. 1991. The discipline of security studies and the codes of containment: Learning from Kuwait. *Alternatives* 16:315–44.

Lumsdaine, David Halloran. 1993. *Moral vision in international politics: The foreign aid regime,* 1949–1989. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Marini, Margaret Mooney, and Burton Singer. 1988. Causality in the social sciences. In *Sociological methodology 1988,* edited by Clifford C. Clogg. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association.

Monroe, Alan D. 1979. Consistency between public preferences and national policy decisions. *American Politics Quarterly* 7:3–19.

Nathanson, Charles E. 1988. The social construction of the Soviet threat: A study in the politics of representation. *Alternatives* 13:443–83.

Neuberg, Leland Gerson. 1989. *Conceptual anomalies in economics and statistics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Neufeld, Mark. 1993. Interpretation and the "science" of international relations. *Review of International Studies* 19:39–61.

———. 1994. Reflexivity and international relations theory. In *Beyond positivism: Critical reflections on international relations,* edited by Claire Turenne Sjolander and Wayne S. Cox. Boulder, Colo.: Rienner.

Odell, John S. 1982. *U.S. international monetary policy: Markets, power, and ideas as sources of change.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1988. From London to Bretton Woods: Sources of change in bargaining strategies and outcomes. *Journal of Public Policy* 8:287–315.

Page, Benjamin I. 1994. Democratic responsiveness? Untangling the links between public opinion and policy. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27:25–29.

Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1983. Effects of public opinion on policy. *American Political Science Review* 77:175–90.

Pocock, J. G. A. 1973. *Politics, language and time.* New York: Atheneum.

Railton, Peter. 1981. Probability, explanation and information. *Synthese* 48:233–56.

Rosati, Jerel A. 1987. *The Carter administration's quest for global community: Beliefs and their impact on behavior.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Rosenbaum, Paul R. 1984. From association to causation in observational studies: The role of tests of strongly ignorable treatment assignment. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 79:41–48.

Rosenberg, Alexander. 1988. *Philosophy of social science.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview.

Rubin, Donald B. 1974. Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies. *Journal of Educational Psychology* 66:688–701.

Salmon, Wesley C. 1984. *Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1990. *Four decades of scientific explanation.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Salmon, Wesley C., James G. Greeno, and Richard C. Jeffrey. 1971. *Statistical explanation and statistical relevance.* Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Searle, John. 1969. *Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shapiro, Michael J. 1988. *The politics of representation: Writing practices in biography, photography, and policy analysis.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Shimko, Keith L. 1991. *Images and arms control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan administration.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Sikkink, Kathryn. 1991. *Ideas and institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Smith, Herbert L. 1990. Specification problems in experimental and nonexperimental social research. In *Sociological methodology 1990,* edited by Clifford C. Clogg. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Smith, Steve. 1988. Belief systems and the study of international relations. In *Belief systems and international relations,* edited by Richard Little and Steve Smith. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Snyder, Jack. 1991. *Myths of empire: Domestic politics and international ambition.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Sobel, Michael E. 1995. Causal inference in the social and behavioral sciences. In *Handbook of statistical modeling for the social and behavioral sciences,* edited by Gerhard Arminger, Clifford C. Clogg, and Michael E. Sobel. New York: Plenum.

Susser, Bernard. 1992. From Burgess to behavioralism and beyond. In *Approaches to the study of politics,* edited by Bernard Susser. New York: Macmillan.

Sylvan, David and Majeski, Stephen. 1985. A methodological perspective on causal analysis in political science. In *Theories, models, and simulations in international relations,* edited by Michael Don Ward. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Taylor, Charles. 1979. Interpretation and the sciences of man. In *Interpretive social science: A reader,* edited by Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 1987. Language and human nature. In *Interpreting politics,* edited by Michael Gibbons. New York: New York University Press.

Tetlock, Philip E. 1989. Methodological themes and variations. In *Behavior, society, and nuclear war.* Vol. 1, edited by Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly. New York: Oxford University Press.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1986. Why cooperation failed in 1914. In *Cooperation under anarchy,* edited by Kenneth A. Oye. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Walker, Stephen G. 1977. The interface between beliefs and behavior: Henry Kissinger's operational code and the Vietnam war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21:129–68.

———. 1990. The evolution of operational code analysis. *Political Psychology* 11:403–18.

Wang, Chamont. 1993. *Sense and nonsense of statistical inference.* New York: Marcel Dekker.

Weber, Cynthia. 1992. Writing sovereign identities: Wilson administration intervention in the Mexican revolution. *Alternatives* 17:313–37.

———. 1995. *Simulating sovereignty: Intervention, the state and symbolic exchange.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weir, Margaret. 1989. Ideas and politics: The acceptance of Keynesianism in Britain and the United States. In *The political power of economic ideas: Keynesianism across nations,* edited by Peter A. Hall. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1992. Ideas and the politics of bounded innovation. In *Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis,* edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Woods, Ngaire. 1995. Economic ideas and international relations: Beyond rational neglect. *International Studies Quarterly* 39:161–80.

Woodward, James. 1988. Understanding regression. In *PSA 1988.* Vol. 1, edited by Arthur Fine and Jarrett Leplin. East Lansing, Mich.: Philosophy of Science Association.