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

Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid

A Comparative Analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan

Douglas A. Van Belle, Jean-Sébastien Rioux, and David M. Potter

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

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There was also a great deal of financial assistance for the project. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Canada Research Chairs program, the International Studies Association and the FDR grant program at East Stroudsburg University.

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Thank you all.
DVB
JSR
DMP

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE CONVERGENCE OF THREE AREAS OF STUDY

One of the unexpected difficulties of tackling a multidisciplinary project like this is the inability to apply a simple label to the end product. This book might be described as a comparative analysis of the news media's role in foreign policy. The main arguments regarding governmental responsiveness to the news media are derived from conflict and crisis-oriented models of foreign policy decision-making and the substantive focus on foreign aid serves as an extension of those foreign policy studies to the more cooperative interactions represented by aid distributions. From this perspective, this work represents a substantial empirical contribution to our understanding of news media's role in foreign policy. Aid relationships are nearly ideal for statistical hypothesis testing, and the results reported in the following chapters demonstrate a clear relationship between news media coverage of international events and related foreign policy actions. Such a relationship is far more difficult to identify directly in analyses of international conflict.

Alternatively, this book could be considered in terms of foreign aid policy making and the substantive determinants of foreign assistance allocations. It not only explores the influence of news media coverage as a domestic influence on the foreign aid decision-making process, it also expands the empirical base of the academic debate to include U.S. foreign disaster aid. This work, therefore, adds significantly to the existing base of knowledge of these processes. The empirical findings for the news coverage indicators are robust and substantial, but the analyses also repeatedly confirm the general findings of previous studies and show that the news

media variables add to the current base of knowledge without substantively challenging the basic understandings that have evolved over the last quarter century of intense empirical study. In short, news media coverage serves as an indicator of the myriad of uncategorized events, issues and other things that contribute to the perception of the domestic political importance of an aid recipient.

Still, from the goal of a theoretical contribution to the study of politics, what might be the most valuable of the insights gained from this project relate to a third area of study that is almost always considered as separate from the previous two. Foreign aid, particularly U.S. foreign disaster aid, is predominantly a bureaucratic process. The discussion of why these bureaucracies should be responsive to the news media challenges many commonly and broadly held conceptions of bureaucracies and provides clear support for the agency theory depiction of bureaucracies as dynamic and responsive governmental structures. When this is combined with the strength of the empirical results, it generates some interesting and, hopefully, provocative insights into the persistent debate over the reconciliation of the seemingly antithetical political structures of democracy and bureaucracy.

The convergence of these three areas of study could also be depicted more comprehensively as an effort at theoretical integration and, with all the hand-wringing over the atomization of theory in political science and international relations, it is always tempting to make such a claim. In his inaugural address to the International Studies Association, the then-incoming president, Michael Brecher, made an impassioned plea for scholars to take up the challenge of theoretical synthesis in the study of international politics (Brecher, 1999). Though Professor Brecher's speech was unique in its presentation and enthusiasm, this was not the first call for efforts to integrate the isolated islands of theory that dominate the study of international relations. Most and Star (1989) summarize an extensive literature on critiques of the discipline's lack of theoretical integration and make a similar call to arms. Ricci (1984) went so far as to call the atomized state of political science theory and the bleak prospects for meaningful integration "a tragedy." Fitting the Greek definition of tragedy, Ricci argued that even though we might be aware of the disastrous consequences that would inevitably arise from the continued division of the discipline into smaller and smaller islands of theory, the reality of a peer-reviewed publication system and the demands of tenure made that fate impossible to escape.

It is not unreasonable to depict this book as an attempt at theoretical integration. Professor Brecher's call to arms provided some motivation for initiating and some crucial encouragement to persevere in what became a

substantial project and the results do represent some of the goals he outlined. The linking of these three areas of study leads to the modeling of some novel theoretical interconnections and produces insights that would be impossible to identify when looking at any one of these areas in isolation. When combined with the extensive comparative data sets covering six aid programs across five donor countries the resulting hypotheses produce robust empirical findings. However, we must admit that it was necessity rather than some grand, meta-theoretical ambition that brought foreign aid, the bureaucracy and the news media together for this analysis. Foreign aid cannot be completely understood if it is separated from the more general foreign policy context and processes of the donor state. At the same time, it has become increasingly clear that the news media are an integral part of the democratic foreign policy process. The literature on foreign policy, however, is primarily focused on leaders, their motives and the contexts in which they make choices. In contrast, foreign aid allocations are a largely bureaucratic process. These simple facts made it necessary to bring these three elements together to complete this book.

Structure of the Book

A second difficulty that arises from the convergence of these three areas of study relates to the organization of this book and the presentation of earlier work. The foreign policy decision-making literature alone is far too diverse and extensive to summarize easily. Add to that the literature on foreign aid, studies of the role of the press in politics, along with the monumental volume of research on bureaucracies and even the seemingly straightforward task of constructing a literature review starts slipping into the realm of nightmares. Part of the solution to this challenge, therefore, was organizational.

In chapter 2 we present a somewhat extensive literature review that also lays the theoretical foundation for the analyses that follow. We begin by exploring previous work on foreign aid, and then discuss the role of the news media in foreign policy. This segues into a review of bureaucratic processes by noting that most of the foreign policy literature focuses on leaders, while foreign aid is to a rather large extent the result of bureaucratic processes. After briefly summarizing the prominent themes in the study of bureaucracy we take some space to place an emphasis on agency theory and the role of bureaucracies in modern democracies. We tie the threads of this extended literature review together by describing the logic driving bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media, and outlining how it should become apparent in the empirical study of foreign aid.

The convergence of these three areas of inquiry not only results in an unusually complex literature review chapter; it also leads to a more extensive and diversified analysis and a longer presentation of empirical results than might normally be expected. We analyze the foreign aid processes and the relative impact of media coverage on the products of six aid programs across five states. Therefore, the six chapters following the literature review are dedicated to the detailed empirical examination of each of these cases.

Chapter 3 presents the results from the analysis of coverage levels as an influence on the United States (U.S.) development aid program from 1985–1998, providing a baseline for further comparative analysis. The chapter focuses on the second stage of the commonly used two-stage analysis—the examination of levels of aid offered to recipients. The analyses demonstrate that the salience of a recipient country in the domestic news media has a substantial influence on the levels of aid offered. Included in all of the analyses of development aid are analyses that use a simple coding of the content of the coverage to address questions that consistently arise regarding the potential variations the content might cause in the influence of coverage.

One general trend the reader might notice about the empirical chapters is a chapter by chapter increase in the length and detail of the discussion of political, social and governmental structures within the donor states as we move on from the U.S. case. The bulk of the theoretical and empirical literature that was used to develop the conceptual foundations for this book is from the study of the United States and to a somewhat lesser degree, the British. Thus, much of the detailed discussion relevant to these cases is in Chapter 2, and we use the empirical chapters for the U.S., and to a lesser degree the British, development aid programs as both theoretical and empirical baselines. As the nature of the aid programs and the political structures of the donor countries diverge from the U.S. and British cases, it becomes necessary to add more detail to the discussion accompanying the analyses.

Chapter 4 builds upon the findings offered in Chapter 3 and extends the application of the model to the British foreign aid program. The baseline analysis is duplicated for the aid allocations of the United Kingdom and this chapter also takes advantage of the diverse nature of the British press to compare the use of liberal and conservative news sources as indicators of news media coverage. Chapter 5 studies the French case, where the bureaucracy is a respected if not revered part of the government, and the aid program is explicitly focused on the support and extension of French culture. Chapter 6 looks at Japan, which has a uniquely disaggregated foreign aid program and has a legacy of using aid primarily as an economic

security tool. Together, these four powerful and wealthy states represent the largest aid donors and the model shows strong cross-national applications with some interesting variations for the Japanese case.

Chapter 7 focuses on Canada, providing yet another dimension for comparison. Canada is unique, if not peculiar among aid donors in that it is a small power with two national languages reflected in two parallel news media sources and it has no history of colonialism or prominent geostrategic interests to define its foreign policy. There are other small aid donors, but they are all European countries and most have a historical legacy of either continental power or colonialism. Further, with the exception of Belgium, the other small donors do not have the intensity of the dual language issue that engages Canadian national politics.

Chapter 8 represents both an additional case and something of a transition from the analysis of development aid programs to the effort to address some of the most likely of questions and criticisms that arise from this kind of effort. This chapter applies the news media responsiveness argument to the allocations of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). This analysis shows that the effect of news media coverage is not limited to the foreign development aid programs. This disaster aid bureaucracy functions in relative obscurity, almost completely isolated from elected officials yet it is also responsive to the news. In fact, in many ways it can be argued to be even more responsive to media salience than the U.S. development aid program. The analysis of this bureaucracy is also significant in that the way the disaster aid bureaucracy functions, procedurally and budgetarily, is markedly different than development aid bureaucracies. Many of the conceptually based criticisms of findings from the development aid analyses, and even some of the empirical concerns, can be addressed through this analysis.

Finally, as a way of concluding the book, chapter 9 is a discussion relating these results to the debate over the role of bureaucracies in democracies. While the conclusions drawn from any study are, by definition, tentative, it appears that bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media is a wide-ranging phenomena and the model is generally applicable to the study of all democratic states. The empirical results presented throughout the book demonstrate that this extension of agency theory is extremely robust.

Given the wide and diverse audience that might find this book interesting, a conscious effort has been made to keep this book as accessible as possible. This is particularly obvious in the presentation of the empirical results. Simple tables of typical statistical results are presented in the context of the analytical chapters with much of the technical discussion of the methods applied placed in footnotes. Even though some

moderately complex statistical tests are still needed for the analyses presented in the analytical chapters, the textual description of the results is sufficiently detailed so that readers unfamiliar with econometric time-series techniques will still find this text useful.

For those readers who are comfortable with these statistical methods, apologies are offered in advance for the extra descriptive material in the analytical sections of the book and also for the limited number of tables included in the text. For the readers that utilize other methodologies or conceptual perspectives in their approach to the study of politics or policy, we offer one point, these statistical findings are robust. At one time or another, every approach to analyzing pooled, cross-sectional data has been applied to these data and, regardless of the specifics of the statistical analytical methodologies applied, the basic findings presented in the tables or discussed in the analytical chapters have remained consistent.

CHAPTER 2

FOREIGN AID, FOREIGN POLICY AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS: THEORIES AND POLICY MOTIVES

Foreign aid allocations are generally explained in terms of international politics or state-centric models of foreign policy.[1] In fact, foreign aid allocations were recently used as an empirical measure of how the end of the Cold War may have changed the underlying determinants of U.S. foreign policy (Meernik et al., 1998). While the entirety of research findings related to the various foreign aid programs around the world are too extensive to be briefly summarized, analyses have repeatedly demonstrated that aid allocations do tend to reflect the international political roles and interests of individual aid donors.[2]

As might be expected, this international perspective is also integral to the theoretical foundations for the study of foreign aid. Analysts have generally examined foreign aid in the context of one or more of the three most widely adopted paradigms of international relations. A strategic motive for aid fits with a realist, security and conflict-oriented conceptualization of world politics. A Marxist, or structuralist/globalist perspective supports an economic motive, and the humanitarian motivation for providing aid represents a liberal, pluralist or idealist view of world politics.[3] Variables representing all three of these motives have found support in studies of foreign aid allocations and it is presumed that policies, calculations and decisions regarding the volume, direction and terms of aid routinely cut across these three boundaries. However, the distinctions between these worldviews, and the motives for aid they suggest, provide a particularly useful organizational tool for reviewing the academic studies of foreign aid flows.

Underrepresented in the scholarly literature on foreign aid are studies of how foreign policy influences from sources other than the international political arena affect foreign aid allocations. Given the recent emphasis on domestic aspects of foreign policy (i.e. Putnam, 1988; Mintz, 1993; Van Belle, 1993; James and Rioux, 1998) combined with Ruttan's (1996) arguments regarding the importance of domestic factors in the U.S. foreign aid program, the limited effort to look inside or beyond the state is a bit troubling. Thus, aside from a few classic case studies (e.g. Poe, 1992) and a few empirical studies produced by Imbeau (1988, 1989), Noël and Thérien (1995) and Thérien and Noël (2000) linking domestic political ideologies with levels of aid, relatively little empirical work has been published assessing the donor-side motivations and processes of foreign aid policy (see Schraeder et al., 1998).

In the context of foreign aid research, this book addresses this by examining the role of the news media in foreign aid allocations. The media can be thought of as both part of the domestic sources of foreign policy and a critical non-state actor in global politics. An extensive body of literature has emerged regarding the news media's impact on other aspects of foreign policy (e.g. Neuman, 1996; Strobel, 1997); however, prior to the initial analysis of television news and U.S. foreign aid (Van Belle and Hook, 2000), the linkage between media coverage and aid behavior has been overlooked.[4]

Four Perspectives on the Determinants of Foreign Aid Allocations

The four perspectives we use to describe the dynamics of foreign aid include the three predominant analytic perspectives on foreign aid just mentioned as well as an introduction to the basics of a fourth: a foreign policy analysis, linkage politics or domestic sources of foreign policy perspective. This fourth perspective is loosely based upon an internally oriented "domestic political imperatives" model of foreign policy decision-making (Van Belle, 1993). The domestic imperatives perspective argues that there is a domestic primacy in the process of foreign policy decision-making and, among other things, it models the role of the news media content as a generalized influence on the domestic political context of foreign policy choice. This provides a conceptual linkage between news media coverage and the foreign policy decisions that foreign aid is argued to represent.

Realism and the Strategic Motive

Throughout its various incarnations (Carr, 1946; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979), realism has always focused on power, anarchy and the resultant

security dilemma as the most crucial elements defining international politics. Lacking an overarching political structure that can protect the weak from the strong, the anarchical international political environment is a self-help context where the basic values, even the very existence of states, are constantly threatened. In such a political environment, security must be the prime concern and must drive the dynamics of the system and the actors within it. Foreign policy choices, including foreign aid allocations, are thus strategic choices focused on pursuing security through power. To those adhering to the realist paradigm, international relations are seen as generally conflictive and foreign policies as self-serving by necessity.

Given that worldview, realists generally define "good in terms of interest rather than morality... a realist ethic of the national interest is therefore typically both statist and amoral" (Donnelly, 1992: 91). From that perspective, foreign assistance is "inseparable from the problem of power. Politics is the governing factor, not an incidental factor which can be dispensed with" (Liska, 1960: 15). Aid programs thus should primarily be designed to facilitate donor interests. Aid can be used to secure new allies, or it can be directed to existing allies, enhancing their level of commitment, strength or internal stability.

Humanitarian objectives are generally dismissed as naive. Aid is viewed either as minimally related to recipient economic development or, if an effect is identified, development gains are seen as significant solely in terms of their indirect effect on the donor's political influence or military security. From the realist perspective, prescriptions regarding aid policy range from the elimination of aid programs that have little bearing on the donor's interests, to qualified support for aid based on demonstrable benefits to the donor. Relating this view to early U.S. aid policy, Brown and Opie (1953: 580) believed:

> (T)he egalitarian principle has not been in the past and should not be in the future the basis of action in any phase of American foreign assistance.... (F)oreign assistance must be rooted in the interest of the United States...

Many realists have questioned the assumed linkages between the transfer of foreign assistance, recipient economic development and subsequently harmonious relations between donor and recipient. Morgenthau (1963: 79), for example, found these assumptions to be "borne out neither by the experiences we have had nor by general historic experience." In his view, U.S. foreign assistance could better be understood as "bribes" from rich to poor countries. Similarly, Banfield (1963: 26–27) criticized the "fog of moralizing" that often accompanies foreign aid rhetoric. "The most influential writings about aid doctrine are full of clichés and sweeping statements that

turn out on close examination to be meaningless or else entirely unsupported by evidence." Moralistic analysis, he argued, "tells U.S. how we ought to act in a world that is not the one in which we must act." Ten years later, Knorr (1973: 166) dismissed notions of "genuine philanthropy or humanitarianism" and added that "merely a small fraction of foreign economic aid can be safely attributed to a plain sense of human solidarity or to a sincere feeling that the wealthy . . . have the responsibility to share with the destitute two-thirds of mankind." He identified altruistic goals as one factor in aid calculations, but considered them to be subordinate to other motivations, including economic and military needs, postcolonial control, long-term stability and bureaucratic inertia. More recently, Gilpin (1987: 32) concluded that humanitarian concerns played an important role in foreign assistance allocations, but "the primary motives for official aid by governments have been political, military, and commercial."

Other realists have based their critiques or analyses of foreign assistance on the inability of recipient states to utilize the resources effectively. Wolfson (1979), for example, argued that the nondemocratic and crisis-prone political cultures in many less developed countries limit their responsiveness to First World economic models and development assistance. This perspective convinced Bauer (1984) and Eberstadt (1988), among others, that aid programs must be more "business-like" and therefore limited to recipients that could effectively convert the funds into sustained economic development. An assumption underlying this view is that aid must provide some "return on the investments" by donors, including their long-term presence as markets for exports and, through sustained growth, their diminished need for future concessional financing.

For the empirical analysis of development aid, these views lead to the expectation that greater levels of aid will be directed toward recipients that are strategically important to the donor and/or threatened, directly or indirectly, by opposing powers. Aid, therefore, becomes an extension of security policy. This strategic use of aid is often put forth as an explanation of the disproportionate levels of aid the United States awards to Israel and Egypt (Organski, 1990), while variables representing strategic motives, such as levels of militarization or alliance ties find consistent of support in more general analyses of aid (Meernik et al., 1998; Hook, 1995; McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1991, 1992; McKinlay, 1979; McKinlay and Little, 1978; Kaplan, 1975; Kato, 1969).

Idealism and the Humanitarian Motive

Though it might not exactly be appropriate to lump pluralist, liberal and idealist perspectives on international relations into a single worldview, they

all share a common perspective on the value of progress or human development. While the underlying importance of power and security are usually acknowledged as an unavoidable part of aid programs, the well-being of the individual, at home and abroad, is considered a crucial motivating force in international politics and foreign policy (Hughes, 2000). From the idealist perspective, security is not completely defined by the zero-sum competition for power that characterizes the realist perspective. Instead, the absolute gains that might be attained through peaceful or cooperative interaction must also be considered. Progress, development and cumulative advances in the human condition can then be stabilizing, with the increasing satisfaction of individuals within the states that achieve such gains reducing their willingness to put that comfort at risk through warfare and conflict.[5] This challenges realist assumptions and prescriptions in virtually every respect, advancing a vision that is more positive regarding the motivations of individuals and state actors and more optimistic about their potential for cooperative relations.

The debate between realists and idealists, predictably, has found expression in the area of foreign assistance. In the view of most idealists, national interests should be minimized or eliminated from aid calculations. Aid should instead be guided by transnational humanitarian concerns, targeted at improving the conditions of the broader populations within the recipient states. Some assessments (e.g. Lumsdaine, 1993) have challenged the prevalent view that foreign aid has served primarily as a vehicle for the interests of donors, with a blind eye to the developmental needs of Third World populations. These views seek to identify linkages between domestic values regarding social welfare and aid policies (e.g. Noël and Thérien, 1995) and they emphasize empirical relationships between many bilateral aid flows and the demonstrable human needs of Third World populations.

Idealist critiques of foreign aid tend to focus more on its execution than its legitimacy or value, condemning the transfer of aid to repressive elites, large landholders or agribusiness concerns, or to recipients that marginally qualify as needy or less developed. The use of military assistance is especially criticized for a variety of reasons: promoting the militarization of developing countries, diverting funds otherwise available for development, subsuming less developed countries in Great Power conflicts and undermining the developmental basis of foreign aid.[6] Others working from this perspective emphasize the institutional mechanisms by which aid programs are implemented and how they fail in the effort to get the aid where it is needed most. The decentralized structure for disbursing Japanese aid has often been criticized in this respect, as has the cumbersome bureaucratic processes associated with the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID). Critics from this perspective point to the tendency of bureaucratic inertia to drive these aid programs, and the tendency for single development programs to be reproduced within many recipient states. These critics often advocate streamlined aid bureaucracies and aid programs more responsive to the specific needs of each recipient state. As Tendler (1975: 12) observed,

> The rationale behind development assistance . . . causes donor organizations to surround themselves with a protective aura of technical competence—an aura which must be maintained if they are to survive in their institutional world. This makes it difficult to generate the experimental environment necessary for their work. It also tends to result in placing the blame for failure on the wrong thing.

The idealist paradigm is reflected in the existing standards of aid quality, which continue to be advanced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations: multilateral aid is preferable to bilateral aid given its less "political" nature; aid transfers should not be tied to donor goods and services; grants are more appropriate than low-interest loans; and aid should be directed toward recipients with the greatest demonstrable human needs. In the 1990s, standards of sustainable development have been added that promote aid relationships rewarding recipients that undertake population-control measures and preserve environmental quality. In addition, expectations of democratic practice within recipient states are most often advanced by idealists.

This idealist perspective is clearly part of aid programs. Canada's aid policy since the mid-1990s was influenced by the U.N. human security agenda[7] with Canadian aid policy reoriented to promote the advancement of humanitarian issues such as de-mining, women's education, children's health and civil society institution-building. In terms of the factors driving the levels of development aid offered by the United States and other industrialized countries, these views seek to identify linkages between domestic values regarding social welfare and aid policies and between aid flows and the human needs of recipient populations.

Variables reflecting the wealth or need of the country are used in almost all models of the aid allocation decision, with per capita GDP (or GNP) the most commonly used indicator of the level of need within the recipient country (Meernik et al., 1998; McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1991, 1992; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; McKinlay, 1979; McKinlay and Little, 1978; Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; Kaplan, 1975; Kato, 1969). Other measures of development or need for assistance that have been used include

balance of payments (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Kaplan, 1975), per capita energy or caloric consumption (Kaplan, 1975; Schraeder et al., 1998) and political quality of life indexes (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984). The analyses of human rights practices and U.S. foreign aid could also be included in this category if human rights are thought of as an aspect of the quality of life in recipient countries (see Hook, 1998; Meernik et al., 1998; Poe, 1992).

There is a reasonable amount of support for this perspective. Measures representing the overall wealth of the recipient country and its overall level of need, such as GDP or GNP, have consistently shown a clear and substantial correlation with aid levels. Other measures of human need, such as life expectancy or calorie consumption, however, have not consistently produced expected correlations. Particularly interesting for this study, Payaslian found that measures representing recipient states' respect for human rights "exercised no significant influence on U.S. foreign assistance decisions" (1996: 101). However, the news coverage of human rights abuses did have a significant negative impact on the choice of U.S. aid recipients. In other words, U.S. decision-makers did not appear to consistently incorporate human rights considerations into their decision process, but when the information was publicized in the elite news media, the U.S. government appeared to react to these cues.

Marxism and the Economic Motive

Marxist–Leninist assumptions about the role of economic wealth in enhancing the political power of elites in industrialized as well as developing countries underlie the third major perspective applied to the analysis and critique of foreign aid programs. Sometimes referred to as a structuralist perspective, the commonality of these studies includes the argument that foreign aid functions to preserve or widen economic disparities between wealthy donor states and less developed recipients. For example, Wood (1986: 5) found that world-systems analysis offers a "useful starting point" in considering aid. Leaders of aid-donating core states, through their control of both public and private sources of financing, are able to dictate the development strategies of peripheral states in the Third World. Specifically, aid donors impose "outward, export-oriented" growth strategies. This tends to deprive impoverished countries of "real inward-oriented, self-reliant strategies" (Wood, 1986: 314) for growth and development. Donor states are often seen as engaged in collusive behavior in extending aid, unfairly coordinating aid flows to exploit their individual and collective advantages (Weissman, 1975).

This perspective was broadly shared within the Group of 77, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and other international

organizations in the 1970s. Their members argued that a First World division of labor had emerged in the three decades after World War II in which foreign aid programs were coordinated by donors to perpetuate their structural advantages over poorer states. "In an environment of essentially unmoderated competition, [donor] states employ control and influence strategies in order to protect their interests and thereby preserve their dominance" (McKinlay, 1979: 450). Traditional cultures and political economies were seen as corrupted by aid relationships, transforming many societies with noncapitalist modes of production, such as subsistence farming or nomadic herding, into wage economies trapped at the lowest levels in the global division of labor. The donor–recipient relationships that resulted from aid programs merely aggravated the preexisting inequalities in the world economy. Within recipient states, aid transfers strengthened the economic and political hegemony of elites while relegating lower classes to the execution of the elite's self-serving development schemes (see Hayter and Watson, 1985). The perceived effects of this manipulation of foreign assistance include tightening reliance of less developed countries on the monetary policies, consumption patterns and export policies of core states; restricted political autonomy among leaders in developing states; and the overall subjugation of their economies to the Western-led global economy. In short, aid policies further encourage the "dependent development" of peripheral states.

This perspective leads to the expectation that development assistance allocations will be directed disproportionately toward the donor's trading partners, particularly ones where the economic context reflects the advantages bestowed upon wealthier industrialized states versus the periphery in bilateral trade. Significant linkages may also be anticipated between aid and industrial development and raw materials production within developing countries. Specifically, variables reflecting the trade flows between recipient and donor are commonly used in analyses of bilateral aid commitments and disbursements (Meernik et al., 1998; McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1991, 1992; McKinlay, 1979; McKinlay and Little, 1978; Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; Kaplan, 1975; Kato, 1969). The exact way in which the levels of imports, exports and overall economic activity in the recipient state are combined varies considerably from study to study and the empirical results of the analyses also vary, providing no clear consensus on the role of economic relationships in the foreign aid process.

These competing views, and what they mean for aid and aid programs continue to be a contentious point of debate within the United Nations, the OECD, the World Bank and other multilateral arenas. The tenor of debates has usually reflected the broader climate of world politics at the

time. Thus, the Cold War infused the debate with ideological polemics and its end has ushered in a shift to other salient global issues such as the environment and population. In addition, accumulating experience with development efforts has contributed to the debates over the economics of aid, what the priorities should be, how the aid is used and why donors do or should provide assistance. Both the linear developmental models, predominant in the 1940s and 1950s, and those premised upon the nationalization of industries and import-substitution strategies in the 1960s and 1970s were weakened by their failed applications. The success of other approaches, particularly the East Asian model of market-driven, export-led growth, gained adherents but the recent economic crises and in some cases collapses of these prototypes has taking the glimmer off that approach.

Throughout the post–World War II period, mounting empirical evidence relating to previous efforts was widely circulated and became manifested in aid reforms and initiatives (see Todaro, 1977). By the mid-1990s the institutionalization of the aid regime had sufficiently developed such that ongoing criticism from the Left and the Right has had limited impact on the scope and direction of aid flows. Despite the often contentious debate, it appears that some degree of consensus has emerged that favors the expansion of North–South development cooperation and the maintenance of qualitative standards along the lines favored by many idealists.

However, the presumptions of realists are also recognized by the aid regime, which acknowledges the intrusion of donor self-interests into aid relationships and the need for aid programs. The self-interests of donors are often incorporated into "business-like" macroeconomic policies. In general, a pragmatic approach to aid has emerged, which recognizes the inseparable coexistence of national interests and foreign aid (Hook, 1995). This pragmatic approach is also apparent in the study of aid, with most empirical studies adopting a multicausal model incorporating a combination of variables that represent a simultaneous influence by realist, idealist and Marxist motives for the provision of development assistance.

The Domestic Political Motive: A Linkage Approach

Although often overlooked in the study of aid programs, a domestic political component also exists in the allocation of development aid. Within any government, even the most affluent, development assistance competes with other demands for finite public resources. The real costs incurred in the humanitarian or self-interested uses of aid must therefore be justified to domestic constituencies both in terms of the inherent rationale for aid and

in terms of the relative merits of aid versus other spending programs.[8] In this environment, the process, context and dynamics of the process of foreign policy decision-making are likely to play a significant role in the final allocation of aid.

Ruttan (1996) provides the most comprehensive and authoritative study of the domestic sources of U.S. foreign aid. His detailed analysis of the actors, issues and processes involved in the evolution of U.S. aid policies is based upon the premise that "domestic sources (of policy) have been more important in determining the size and direction of assistance than has the international economic and political environment" (Ruttan, 1996: 17).[9] Allison's model (1971) as well as other models of bureaucratic politics and standard operating procedures (see Bendor and Hammond, 1992) have provided a useful starting point for this type of inquiry, helping to explain, for example, the tendency of aid organizations to develop a "protective aura of technical competence" (Tendler, 1975: 12). Putnam's construction of two-level games (1988) has also been usefully applied to the related cases of U.S. aid to Israel and Egypt after the Camp David accords (see Stein, 1993).

The application of domestic factors to the study of foreign aid has been limited to critiques, specific cases or historical analyses of programs. Other than the preliminary analyses for this study (Van Belle and Hook, 2000;Van Belle, 1999), domestic influences have not been included in the empirical examination of aid allocations. This is conceptually disturbing for those who espouse a domestic perspective on foreign policy, but it is also at odds with the concerns expressed by aid officials and international aid organizations such as the OECD.

A recent conference[10] organized by the OECD focused exclusively on the domestic political side of the provision of foreign development assistance. Based upon the premise that public support is a fundamental prerequisite for an effective aid program dozens of practitioners, officials, critics and academic researchers were brought together to examine the multifaceted relationship between public education, public support, aid programs and aid policies.The effort that aid practitioners invest in providing information regarding the effectiveness of aid programs to the public within donor countries demonstrates their belief in the domestic basis of aid and that is simply not reflected in the empirical analysis of aid programs.

The Foreign Policy of Aid

While it is clear that aid allocations provide an excellent analytical reference for the examination of foreign policy (Meernik et al., 1998), it is less clear that the insights provided by the empirical and theoretical literature

on foreign policy analysis has been fully exploited for what it can lend to the study of foreign aid.[11] Similarly, it is not clear that scholars examining theories and models of foreign policy choice and process have fully recognized the analytical opportunity provided by the foreign aid programs of the United States and other major donors. One of the biggest obstacles to the empirical analysis of foreign policy is in the identification of a large enough set of comparable cases where a carefully considered decision was clearly made and, where that decision leads to a result or output that can be quantified. All of these difficulties can be addressed by using foreign aid allocations as an indicator. However, there are few efforts to explicitly apply foreign policy decision-making models to the study of foreign aid.

Foreign policy decisions occupy the nexus between domestic and international politics and represent a locus where forces and influences from both arenas interact to shape the outcomes of choices and processes. The foreign policy analysis approach to international politics examines the decision-making process, constraints, influences or context within states as a potentially significant influence on the actions of the state. In essence, foreign policy analysis perspectives share the argument that the domestic political forces that shape a decision-maker's choices and actions must be included to fully understand the interactions of nations. In fact, the model of foreign policy decision-making that serves as the foundation for this book argues that domestic considerations are paramount, leading to a domestic political imperative (Van Belle, 1993)[12] in the foreign policy process.

It is important to note that the international perspective is not rejected by foreign policy analysis. It is acknowledged that the leaders of nations must act within the spectrum of constraints and opportunities defined by the dynamics of the international system (e.g. Kaplan, 1957; Waltz, 1964; Modelski, 1983; Thompson, 1983; Doran and Parsons, 1980) and their choices are enabled or substantially constrained by their nation's capabilities to act within that system (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Huth and Russett, 1984; Organski and Kugler, 1980). However, in addition to the external considerations imposed by the global political system, a foreign policy analysis perspective includes the argument that the leaders of nations must also act within the spectrum of constraints and opportunities defined by their own nation's domestic political structure (e.g. Allison, 1969, 1971; Putnam, 1988). That is, the foreign policy decision-maker must answer to a domestic audience that includes supporters, agents responsible for enacting policy, critics of the leadership and most importantly, challengers for the leadership position (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992).

The domestic facet of international politics is not, by any means a new idea. Scholars have examined different aspects of the reciprocal influence

that the international and domestic political arenas have upon each other since at least as far back as the time Machiavelli wrote the Prince ([1532]1952) and there is a substantial body of related conceptual and empirical research. However, this domestic aspect of foreign policy has received far less attention in the study of foreign aid than international influences and it is seldom represented in empirical studies of the output of aid programs. As noted earlier, it has not been ignored (i.e. Ruttan, 1996), but it has been underutilized.

Part of the difficulty in bringing the foreign policy analysis literature to bear on the aid question and part of the reason its use has been limited might be the sheer magnitude of the task. The variety of conceptual and methodological approaches to the study of foreign policy is truly staggering. Even if you limit the consideration of the foreign policy literature to categories of studies that explicitly examine the connection between the internal and external political arenas, the list is still impressive.

Just a few of these categories include: rally events (Mueller, 1970, 1973; Lee, 1977; Kernell, 1978; Erikson et al., 1980; Sigelman and Johnston-Conover, 1981; MacKuen, 1983; Brody, 1984; Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Russett, 1990; Brody, 1991; James and Rioux, 1998); the diversionary use of force (Rummel, 1963; Wilkenfeld, 1968, 1972; Hazelwood, 1973, 1975; James, 1987; Levy, 1989, Richards et al., 1993; Morgan and Bickers, 1992); domestic contextual determinants of foreign policy choice (Ostrom and Job, 1986; Marra et al., 1990; James and Oneal, 1991); and domestic structural determinants of foreign policy choice (Zinnes, 1980; Weede, 1984, 1992; Vincent, 1987; Domke, 1988; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Kilgour, 1991; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993); Gaubatz' (1991) discussion of electoral cycles and war; the role of democratic structure and conflict (Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Maoz and Russett, 1992, 1993; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Oneal and Russett, 1997a, b; Rioux, 1998); the role regime-type, more generally, plays in conflict (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Kilgour, 1991); and also efforts to measure just how extensive the relationship is between internal and external politics (James and Oneal, 1991; Marra et al., 1990; Barnett, 1990).

There are consistencies across this diversity. For the most part, the implicit theoretical foundation of much of this work is laid upon our understanding of the dynamics of groups and the unifying role of intergroup conflict (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956). However, unlike the relatively simple and clear motives that can be derived from the realist, Marxist and Liberal theories of international politics, there is no clear, simple or obvious consensus in the foreign policy literature on basic causal forces. As a result,

there is no obvious indicator that could be used to operationalize variables to represent a general and broad domestic political influence on aid allocations. Thus, this aspect of foreign continues to be underrepresented in the foreign aid literature.

The Domestic Political Imperatives Model of Foreign Policy

The domestic political imperatives model of foreign policy decision-making (Van Belle, 1993) is used as the theoretical foundation for this book. Obviously, this is not the only foreign policy analysis perspective that could be employed. Other models could be used and might also lend insight to the foreign aid process, but the domestic imperatives model has certain conceptual and pragmatic benefits that make it ideal for this specific application.

Building upon a rational choice model of foreign policy decision-making, the domestic imperatives model focuses on the leader's personal interests, specifically sustaining his or her tenure and maximizing the power of the office. The model identifies the political competition for favorable news media coverage as one of the key variables driving the foreign policy decision-making process in modern democracies and one of the conclusions drawn from that modeling exercise is that elected leaders will react to the salience of political issues in the news media. In the democratic context, the news media represent vital nongovernmental conduits of influence through which domestic political support is often won or lost. Leaders are expected to respond to news media reporting as part of their effort to maintain broad-based domestic political support.

One of the most important of the dynamics in the model is similar to the connection Brody (1991) identified between balance of favorable versus critical coverage of the president and the popularity boost he receives from rally events. The resources presidents, and presumably other executives in free-press societies, invest in relations with the media are not simply part of an effort to control the message coming from the executive branch. Instead, they are an attempt to manage the overall content of the news media (see Mannheim, 1991; Bennett, 1990). For the democratic leader, it is not just a matter of providing information, but of providing the right information at the right time in the right manner in order to gain or maintain political support. On important issues, this responsiveness to the news media may go so far as to shape the timing and nature of actions (see Livingston and Eachus, 1995; Natsios, 1996; Shattuck, 1996; Strobel, 1996).

As there are several alternative conceptualizations and analytical models of the foreign policy decision-making process, there is also a diversity of

work regarding the connection between the news media and foreign policy. Significant in much of the work is a focus on media dynamics, the business imperatives of news reporting and how that shapes the political role of the domestic news media. Significant lines of inquiry related to, or similar to the dynamics identified in the domestic imperatives model or in the subsequent operationalizations and extensions include: presidential efforts to manage the content of the media and how that relates to foreign policy (Herman, 1985; Hallin, 1986; Bennett, 1990); the impact foreign policy events have upon the content of the domestic news media (Brody and Shapiro, 1989; Brody, 1991, 1994) and how the news media influence foreign policy formulation or choice (Cutler, 1984; Larson, 1988, 1990; Serfaty, 1991; O'Heffernan, 1994; Bennett and Paletz, 1994; and Livingston and Eachus, 1995).

Of recent prominence in this latter category of studies, and directly related to this effort to examine the effect of the news media on foreign policy, are the efforts to come to grips with what has been labeled as the "CNN-effect." While the term CNN-effect might be loosely used to refer to any instance where dramatic coverage of international events appears to influence foreign policy, the research is more narrowly focused on Western involvement in complex humanitarian emergencies.[13] In these tangled and unwieldy foreign policy nightmares, such as Bosnia or Somalia, intense political and military conflicts are intertwined with famine, genocide or other human tragedies. The initial claim was that the swift, if not instantaneous coverage of human suffering that was made possible by the increasingly effective global communication and news-gathering networks created a domestic demand for intervention that drove unwilling policy makers in the United States and Western Europe to become involved (see Livingston and Eachus, 1995; Natsios, 1996; Shattuck, 1996; Strobel, 1996).

Despite the salient debates and laments on the issue of media-driven foreign policy, the degree to which news coverage actually drives Western states to intervene in these conflicts is unclear, and probably overstated (Jakobsen, 1996, 2000; Natsios, 1996; Strobel, 1997). Jakobsen (2000) argues that the news media can only influence domestic demand, which is only one out of the multitude of factors (i.e. logistics, costs, geostrategic concerns) involved in international crisis management and intervention by Western states. He goes on to argue that the media's biggest impact is on the timing of involvement or withdrawal and the nature of the intervention strategy. Because of live global coverage, Western powers engage these conflicts when they are dramatic rather than at more quiescent times when resources could be more effectively applied to resolving the underlying causes of conflict. The way these conflicts are engaged, with air power and

casualty-minimizing policies, is also shaped by the expected domestic political impact of coverage.

Two aspects of the CNN-effect research are key for the study of news media coverage and foreign aid allocations. First is that the effect of news media does not overwhelm or supercede other factors known to influence foreign policy. Instead, an understanding of the domestic political influence of news media adds to the insights of existing frameworks, providing a refinement or extension. The second is the clear conclusion that the news media are considered, by both analysts and policy officials, as a general indicator of actual or potential domestic political demands and influences on foreign policy. This belief or presumption by the latter—the policy makers—is critical because as long as they believe news media either reflects or drives the demands and interests of the public, they will act as if it does, regardless of how tenuous the empirical connection between the media and public opinion might be.

Beyond the work that specifically examines a CNN-effect or a more general influence of the news media on foreign policy, a number of arguments can be offered to justify the use of the media as a general indicator of actual or expected domestic demands. The news media play a crucial political communication role in modern democracies, carrying information between dispersed political actors. As a result, the content of the news media often contains indicators of domestic political debates and policy disputes.[14] Further, the news media are clearly related to some very basic dynamics within democracies that should influence leaders such as elections, rally events, agenda setting and priming.

The domestic political imperatives model has been reasonably successful in connecting the news media with the domestic influences on foreign policy. The initial case studies of international conflicts (Van Belle, 1993, 1998) indicated that foreign policy decision-makers did appear to respond to and attempt to manipulate the media to attain their own political ends. More extensive hypothesis-testing using statistical analyses was frustrated by a difficulty common to the empirical application of foreign policy analysis theories—identifying a set of cases to use for the analysis. The violent international confrontations that are obvious instances in which the news media might drive foreign policy leaders to act are rare and extreme events with just a few hundred serious conflicts[15] occurring across the entire globe over the last century.

Beyond the straightforward statistical difficulties associated with examining a small number of conflicts, there are serious concerns regarding the comparability of the cases. Should the U.S. invasion of Grenada, or the 1991 Gulf War be treated as equal to World War I? And what about

cases involving different countries? Even with the most inclusive definition of conflicts or crises, the most conflict-prone states have only a few dozen cases. Aggregating all of the conflicts for all the countries around the globe increases the number of cases sufficiently to allow statistical analysis, but is the decision-making process in Cuba or China sufficiently similar to the United States or Mexico to assume the same processes work the same in these countries? The literature on regime characteristics and war has demonstrated that aggregating the cases across the globe can be used to test how the differences between countries can influence conflict-proneness. However, these analyses are limited to hypotheses related to gross, general characteristics that vary from state to state. It is not at all clear, and in fact it seems unlikely, that this strategy will support the direct analyses of specific, transitory influences within states such as news media coverage.

Indirect analyses of the news media responsiveness hypotheses as it was derived from the domestic imperative model have been conducted on international conflict data. Van Belle (2000) extends this responsiveness mechanism to argue that the way in which press freedom shapes flow of information between different nations should influence foreign policy in a manner that systematically limits policy options. When social–psychological propositions regarding dehumanization and the acceptance of killing in war are introduced to the model, shared press freedom is shown to provide a mechanism that prevents lethal conflicts. The effects of press freedom on international conflict, particularly on hypotheses related to escalating conflicts past the threshold of casualties, are quite robust. This analysis is, however, an indirect result of the responsiveness hypothesis and to test this hypothesis directly, a sufficient number of comparable foreign policy decisions for a single state are needed. It was in the search for a useful set of cases for the responsiveness analysis that the domestic political imperatives model became connected with foreign aid allocations.

Despite the fact that the domestic imperatives model was initially applied to instances of conflict, the expectation of responsiveness to the content of the news media is not conflict-specific. Conflicts provide instances when high levels of coverage are common and can often be connected with actions, but any policy issue—foreign or domestic—that generates or might generate news coverage has the potential to influence actions and choices by the involved decision-makers. Foreign aid provides a set of cases where the connection with the news media is less obvious, but the large number of comparable cases, the frequency of aid decisions and the ability to connect a numerical measure—aid allocations—to a specific decision all make aid decisions ideal for the analyses of the hypotheses. There is also, however, a difficulty.

Models of foreign policy, including the domestic imperatives model, are almost invariably leadership-oriented and this presents a difficulty when applying these arguments, hypotheses or conceptual frameworks to the analysis of foreign aid allocations. Foreign aid is primarily bureaucratic. In all but a few high-profile cases, which are commonly excluded from statistical analyses as outliers anyway,[16] the involvement of top-level, elected foreign policy decision-makers in the development aid allocation process is typically quite limited, and in the case of U.S. foreign disaster assistance, almost nonexistent.

There are hints from the foreign policy literature that bureaucracies will respond to the news media. Our understanding of public opinion and how it shapes the bureaucracy's role in foreign policy, suggests that within the range of operational and financial discretion allowed, the bureaucracy will be responsive to public opinion.[17] This is not a direct connection to the news media but Powlick (1995) demonstrated that the news media is the single most important source of a bureaucratic decision-maker's perception of public opinion. Further, the linkages between different sources of this perception of public opinion suggest a significant indirect influence, making the overall effect of the media even greater than that identified by Powlick (1991).[18] However, by exploring the research literature on bureaucracies, and specifically, by extending the agency model of a dynamic bureaucracy, a much stronger case for news media responsiveness can be made.

Bureaucracies and Responsiveness to Domestic Pressures

The previous discussion of foreign development aid describes it as an output of the foreign policy process, which is shaped by the general foreign policy motives of the state. The section ends with a discussion of the foreign policy analysis perspective, the domestic political imperatives model and the argument that the foreign policy of democracies should be responsive to the content of the domestic news media. The implied conclusion is that foreign aid should also demonstrate some measurable degree of responsiveness to the news media. However, making such a conceptual leap, regardless of how often and to what degree foreign aid has previously been assumed or argued to be an indicator of a state's foreign policy process, may not be prudent without some additional theoretical groundwork. As was just noted, the majority of foreign policy research is leadership-oriented, assuming, arguing for, or modeling a decision-making process that has an individual or single coherent entity making decisions on behalf of the state. In terms of this book, the argument for foreign policy responsiveness to the news media, the foreign policy decision-making model it is based on, and just about all of the

related empirical studies that have been noted are leadership-oriented. Leaders respond to the news media because the news outlets are serving as the arena where elected officials, their critics and their potential challengers are all competing for broad-based political support.

This leadership focus is a serious point of concern for this study because the foreign aid allocation process is largely bureaucratic. Aside from a few notable outliers such as Israel, Egypt and possibly South Africa for the U.S. case, the direct involvement of top-level, elected, foreign policy decision-makers in the development aid allocation process tends to be quite limited. This is even clearer in the allocation of U.S. foreign disaster aid, which is almost entirely bureaucratic. When it comes to the U.S. response to disasters, elected officials provide almost no input and seldom attempt to exert any overt influence whatsoever.

Even if leaders did try to directly influence the aid allocation process, the literature on bureaucracy provides little reason to expect that they could consistently exert the influence necessary to translate their responsiveness to the media all of the way down to the specific outputs of the foreign aid bureaucracies. In fact, until the introduction of agency theory and new analytical techniques in the 1980s, the general conclusions from the academic literature reflected the popular belief that bureaucracies were all but impervious to the influence of the president or other elected officials and it was difficult to find studies that concluded otherwise. Recent work has demonstrated, however, that there is a more dynamic relationship between the administrative and elected branches of government (Wood and Waterman, 1994). This work focuses on adaptation by the bureaucracy, through gradual changes in structure or process and it is not immediately clear if the dynamics of agency theory and these studies of adaptation will support an argument for a correlation between coverage and aid allocations.

In the absence of any obvious, direct role for elected officials in the aid process, it is difficult to argue that the media responsiveness of these politicians will find its way into aid allocations. Thus, it is necessary to present a plausible argument that explains why bureaucracies will choose to be responsive to the content of the news media. This is, in itself, a challenge. There is no obvious reason to expect that these agencies will respond to the news media in the same manner as elected officials. The bureaucrat's decision-making and professional contexts seem fundamentally different than that of elected officials. Bureaucrats do not have to continually compete against challengers for their positions and they do not rely directly on popular public support to maintain their tenure. Thus, a fundamental element of the leadership-oriented argument for news media responsiveness is missing from the bureaucratic process. In the end, however, the connecting mechanism described later is

actually quite simple and can be depicted as no more than a modest refinement of recent work from the perspective of agency theory.

Bureaucracies in a Democratic Context

In terms of responsiveness to something as immediate and transitory as levels of news media coverage, the vast majority of the academic literature from the study of bureaucracy is thoroughly discouraging.[19] In fact, the bureaucracy has generally been considered to be so unresponsive to the public that there is still serious debate over the basic compatibility of bureaucracy with democracy. As Krislov and Rosenbloom put it, "Structurally, procedurally, and psychologically, bureaucracy and democracy are almost diametrically opposed. Their bases of legitimacy are also at marked variance. Whether the two kinds of rule can be successfully integrated remains an open question" (1981: 10).[20] It is not that bureaucrats are bad or undemocratic, it is the fact that they operate within constraints which, for the most part, we as the public insisted on to ensure fair and unbiased execution of the administrative tasks of the government (Wilson, 1989).

Wood and Waterman (1994) argue in the conclusion of their study of bureaucracies and agency theory that the belief that these agencies are beyond the reach of their political masters has slowly changed. The advent of agency theory and new empirical methodologies in the early 1980s produced analytical results which, like the results reported later in this book, tend to generally support such depiction of a more dynamic and responsive bureaucracy. However, it is only recently that anything remotely reassuring on this compatibility concern has begun to emerge (see Gawthorp, 1998).[21] There are undoubtedly numerous reasons for the prominence of this compatibility question, but an obvious explanation is suggested by the fact that the bulk of the research literature still generates a Frankensteinian image of the bureaucracy as a monster that once created not only frightens the average villager but also cannot be effectively controlled by its elected masters. Whether it is referred to as controlling (Dunsire, 1978; West, 1995), taming (Gormley, 1989), overseeing (Ogul, 1976), influencing (Waterman, 1989) or capturing (Huntington, 1952), it is safe to say that the struggle for control of bureaucracies in the democratic context has been the predominant theme in their study.

Overhead Democracy and the Iron Triangle

The persistent image of impotent political efforts at control is probably also the source of much of the concern over the compatibility of bureaucracy

and democracy. The most obvious way to integrate bureaucracies into a democratic system is to create a system of overhead democracy where elected officials, who are periodically held accountable to the desires of the voting public, can effectively control the unelected portions of the government. In this way the public's influence on the bureaucracy is indirect, operating through representatives, but it is still clearly democratic. However, from the moment the concept of overhead democracy was first labeled and proposed as a means of conceptually integrating bureaucracies into the ideals of democratic government (Hyneman, 1950), the debate over the ability of leaders to exert control, even if they had the political impetus to make the effort, has cast serious doubts upon a top-down model of a democratic bureaucracy.

There is a great deal of literature on this and closely related points,[22] but Downs (1967) presents what is perhaps the most compelling logical argument questioning the plausibility of top-down control. Applying concepts from Tullock's (1965) discussion of message distortion in hierarchical communication systems, Downs describes "authority leakage" (1967: 134–137) where even if you assume good faith efforts on the part of subordinates, the effort directed at controlling output gets distorted as each successive layer of the bureaucracy interprets any ambiguities in the order and adjusts the order to fit its abilities to implement. Even if each of these alterations is minor, they multiply and cumulate quickly as the order passes down through the levels within the bureaucracy. As a result, even with the assumption that subordinates are completely dedicated to carrying out the order, it becomes almost impossible for the top of the hierarchy to consistently and effectively direct the outputs at the bottom. When the assumption that bureaucrats and bureaucracies are making good faith efforts to serve the public interest is relaxed or abandoned, or the limits on elected officials' ability or motivation to oversee bureaucracies are recognized, the prospects for overhead democracy, and through it any thought of an indirect mechanism creating responsiveness to the news media, seem to diminish to the point of impossibility.

In applied research, the failure of overhead democracy as a means of subjugating bureaucracies to the public interest is most obvious in the iron triangle or interest group capture models that might in some collective historical sense be called the dominant paradigm for the study of bureaucracy. These models describe an imbalance of interests that leads to bureaucracies being "captured" by those they are directed to regulate or otherwise control.

From this perspective, the president and Congress have little interest in bureaucratic oversight. Members of Congress are more concerned with

electoral politics and oversight is a high-cost endeavor with little promise of enhancing their standing or providing salient services to constituents (see Scher, 1960; Bryner, 1987). Similarly, and probably for the same reasons, the president has shown little interest in exerting the effort necessary to control the bureaucracy (see Fenno, 1959; Noll, 1971; and Bryner, 1987). However, the interest groups directly affected by the bureaucracy have a great deal of interest in the bureaucracy and in controlling or influencing its outputs.

When this imbalance of interests is combined with the fractured and highly dispersed nature of congressional or parliamentary oversight it creates a situation where a bureaucracy can be captured and redirected so that it focuses on the needs of an interest group rather than the public interest or even its original mandate. As Dodd and Schott (1979) describe it, the iron triangle is formed by bureaucracies, interest groups and the Congress. Congress crafts legislation that reflects the preferences of interest groups and then encourages bureaucracies to act in deference to those preferences. The interest groups then provide resources such as cash or mobilized voters to support the reelection efforts of cooperative congressmen. Bureaucratic agencies that respond as the interest groups' desire then receive benefits from the Congress in the budgeting and oversight process. The end result is a pluralist process gone wrong (Lowi, 1979), with congressmen deferring to the greater information resources of the bureaucracies, and bureaucracies obtaining much of their information from the interest groups they were meant to regulate and the interest groups using their resources to sustain the relationship at the expense of the broader public. While this model might suggest that bureaucracies could be responsive to powerful interest groups, it is pessimistic in regard to bending them to the broader public interest. For this book, these models provide little or no indication that bureaucracies might be responsive to the salience of issues in the news media.

Agency Theory and the Dynamic View of Bureaucracy

Beginning in the 1980s, the application of agency theory to the study of bureaucracy led to more dynamic models of bureaucracy that are more positive about the role of bureaucracies in democracies and more positive about the potential for responsiveness to the demands or desires of the broader public. The addition of new statistical techniques has produced empirical results that demonstrate that there does seem to be an interactive relationship between bureaucracies and political forces in the democratic context (Randall, 1979; Weingast, 1984; Moe, 1982, 1985; Cohen, 1985; Sholz and Wei, 1986; Brudney and Hebert, 1987; Hansen, 1990;

Hedge et al., 1991; Sholz et al., 1991; Wood and Waterman, 1991, 1993, 1994; Wood, 1992, 1993). Bureaucracies appear to adapt to their political environment, responding to both hierarchical (top-down) and pluralistic (bottom-up) domestic influences by making incremental changes in their processes, areas of focus, even their levels of activity.

Agency theory, also referred to as the principal–agent model, is adapted from economics (see Weingast, 1984) and it is structured around the basic premise that bureaucracies are agents that act on behalf of Congress in a relationship similar to a business contract. Bureaucracies essentially are hired by Congress to perform a specified set of functions. The relationship is clearly hierarchical, with the bureaucracy serving its elected customers. However, unlike the conceptual foundations of earlier studies, which included an implicit assumption that control only occurs when Congress actively monitors the bureaucracy,[23] the principal–agent model does not require constant, direct supervision for control to occur. As Weingast (1984) concluded, the systems of control by Congress require little direct congressional monitoring of decisions but are still remarkably effective.[24] This point regarding monitoring is particularly important for the news media responsiveness argument presented later and the basic dynamics might be more easily conceptualized in terms of a simple contract made in a context other than the congressional–bureaucratic relationship.

In the same way that a hypothetical suburban homeowner does not sit and closely watch every action of the landscaper hired to tend his or her yard, the Congress does not need to constantly supervise every action of the bureaucracy. Instead of the costly effort of constant supervision of the landscaper's activity, the homeowner chooses the low-cost option of keeping an eye open for unsatisfactory results. Should a hedge be poorly trimmed or some flowers die the homeowner can complain. If the problems go uncorrected, the homeowner can withhold payment, or hire a new landscaper. Similarly, if unsatisfactory output from the bureaucracy is brought to the attention of its congressional overseers, they can complain or hold hearings and if the problems go uncorrected they can pull out "the big club behind the door" (Weingast, 1984: 155) and threaten the budget of the bureaucracy, the tenure of upper-level officials or even the existence of the bureaucracy as an entity.

The research conducted from the theoretical foundation of the principal–agent model has provided more than just the conceptual impetus for breaking away from the idea that constant monitoring is a necessary condition for control. It also led to a substantial foundation of broad-based empirical evidence demonstrating the responsiveness of bureaucracies. Despite the fact that very few of the upper-level bureaucrats are political

appointees and the ability of presidents to directly monitor and direct the actions of their subordinates is limited, bureaucracies clearly do adjust, incrementally at least, to the will of presidents (Randall, 1979; Moe, 1982; Cohen, 1985; Wood and Waterman, 1994). Congressional oversight may be disjointed, and individual congressmen may not find it cost-effective to invest much in the monitoring of bureaucratic activity, but a principal–agent modeling based upon the electoral imperative driving congressmen demonstrated that congressional oversight is clearly driving adaptations by bureaucracies (Weingast, 1984) and bureaucracies demonstrate a strong responsiveness to elected officials in general (Wood and Waterman, 1994).

A trip to the department of motor vehicles may still be an experience worthy of Dante's inferno, but bureaucracies, including notoriously indifferent U.S. state agencies (Brudney and Hebert, 1987; Hedge et al., 1991) do respond to a wide variety of pluralist influences (Moe, 1985) including local politics (Sholz and Wei, 1986; Sholz et al., 1991), business groups and patronage institutions (Jones, 1981). In fact a summary of the work from the agency perspective on bureaucracy might reasonably emphasize just how many different influences have now been shown to spur bureaucratic adaptations.

The Logic of the Bureaucratic Responsiveness Model

The argument for bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media builds on both the conceptual and empirical contributions of the principal–agent model. In its simplest form, the logic for news media responsiveness is nothing more than a modest refinement, positing that the news media provide a common referent that both principals and agents use to judge the current or expected demands from the domestic political arena. Alternatively, the responsiveness to the news media could be depicted as a reconceptualization of the principal–agent relationship, which emphasizes the perspective of the agent instead of those tasked with oversight. Though the imperatives that drive the bureaucracy are obviously critical to the principal–agent model, the predominant questions being addressed by the majority of existing work from that theoretical perspective reflect the long-standing concern regarding ability of the principal, elected officials, to control or direct the agent, the bureaucracy. In contrast, this book focuses primarily on the activities of the bureaucracies themselves; what motivates them to act rationally as entities and how might that translate into motives for the individuals making decisions within the bureaucracy?

The initial impetuous for approaching the principal–agent relationship from the perspective of the bureaucracy also reflects the foreign policy

nature of this research subject. In the foreign policy literature, bureaucracies tend to be treated as reasonably coherent decision-making entities, much the same as the other domestic political actors involved in the external relations of a state. For example, Allison (1971) argued that bureaucracies are self-interested actors within the policy process. They are driven to protect their existence by demonstrating effective action toward a publicly desired end and they must constantly struggle against other demands for limited funds within the government budget. Bureaucracies and bureaucrats realize that if they fail to provide a public good proportional to the government resources they consume, they face the prospect of being sanctioned.

At the extreme, the entire bureaucracy could be eliminated by the public officials responsible for budgeting and oversight. A more realistic depiction that generates the same expectations of responsiveness is that the bureaucracies that fail to meet their public service mandate and draw critical attention in the domestic political arena are likely to suffer a degradation of their position in the competition for resources and, possibly more importantly, threats might be generated toward the tenure of the bureaucracy's leaders. An embattled bureaucracy might have its director or directors replaced, and/or the directors of an embattled bureaucracy might try to fend off such a replacement by cleaning house and shuffling lower levels of management within the agency. This potential threat to individual tenure within the bureaucracy provides a connection, at least conceptually, between the fate of the entity as a whole and the individuals that are making the actual choices on its behalf. Again, a quick look at the studies employing agency theory shows that none of this is new. These potential sanctions represent, in a collective sense, the "big club behind the door" (Weingast, 1984: 155).

When considered from the perspective of the bureaucracy, however, the question turns more to what happens when the big club stays behind the door? How often is the full extent of possible sanctions against a bureaucracy even mentioned or considered in political discourse in any of the countries included in this study? We know that bureaucracies make incremental changes (Chub, 1985; Moe, 1985) that are not necessarily tied to any specific threat from an elected official, but how do they monitor their political environment? What cues do they use to shape their choices to avoid even being threatened?

It seems logical to propose that bureaucracies would preemptively try to avoid the harsh negative sanctions that could be turned against them by adjusting their actions in accordance with the same cues they expect their potential punishers, elected officials, are using. The motivation to respond to the news media arises out of the fact that bureaucracies and bureaucrats

realize that if they fail to meet their public service mandate and draw sufficient critical attention in the domestic political arena, particularly attention from the news media, they will draw unwelcome scrutiny from their elected overseers. Given sufficient public dissatisfaction with a bureaucracy, elected officials will find it electorally worthwhile to engage the cumbersome oversight mechanisms and once this process begins it is unlikely that the bureaucracy will escape without suffering at least some political damage or degradation of their position in the domestic competition for resources.

Combining this with the central role of the news media in the democratic politics related to foreign policy (Van Belle, 1993) it is expected that bureaucracies should use the news media content as a part of their effort to avoid negative attention and critical scrutiny of their operations and their leadership. Under certain circumstances bureaucracies might try to gain budget share or increase the security of their leader's tenure by attaining positive recognition for actions. This is a distinct possibility when the mandates for different agencies overlap because this overlap gives reasons for them to compete for predominance over specific domains, issues or actions (see Allison, 1971). However, this is not expected to be much of a factor in the foreign aid processes of the states examined here. The avoidance of negative scrutiny, the preemptive effort to avoid possible punishments, is probably a more realistic depiction of the driving motive for bureaucracies trying to use news media coverage to match bureaucratic outputs with public demand.

Like other actors in the political arena, bureaucracies rely on the news media for many of the strongest of the cues of public demands, if only because they expect their potential punishers—elected officials—to use it as well. High levels of coverage indicate that the issue, in this case the foreign aid recipient, is important, or will be important depending on which direction of causality is assumed between media coverage and aggregate levels of issue importance (see Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Preemptively matching bureaucratic outputs with these indicators of public demand is an easy way for bureaucracies and bureaucrats to try to avoid negative attention and critical scrutiny of their operations.

Unfortunately, the best conceptual analogy for conveying the general ideas driving this responsiveness to the news media might be referred to as the Cockroach Theory of Bureaucracy. Simply put, just like the beloved insect, the bureaucracy that finds itself caught out in the light is the one that is going to be stomped on. Thus, an effective strategy that both bureaucrats and roaches can use to thrive and survive is to avoid attention, to actively avoid the light because those who get caught in the light are also the ones that get stomped on. In the case of bureaucracies the

metaphorical light is the attention of a corporate media that is driven by business imperatives to seek out government failures that can be depicted as scandals. Thus, bureaucracies serve the public as best as possible and match their actions with what they believe the public wants in the effort to stay hidden and well fed in the darker recesses of an anonymous administrative state.

This depiction of the news media as an easily accessible indicator of current or future public opinion fits well with the broader understanding of public opinion and the bureaucracy's role in foreign policy noted earlier. Holsti (1992), Hinckley (1992) and Powlick (1991 and 1995) have all demonstrated a connection between bureaucracies and public opinion. The surveys of bureaucratic officials conducted by Powlick indicate that the news media is the single most important direct and indirect source of a bureaucratic decision-maker's perception of public opinion.

Public opinion is a vital aspect of this conceptualization of how news media coverage might influence the actions of a bureaucracy; however, it is important to emphasize that this does not imply a causal chain from coverage to opinion to aid allocations. Instead, public opinion is argued to remain latent even while its influence shapes the choices of bureaucratic officials. The causal chain proposed here goes directly from coverage to action but it does so because of the belief among policy officials that there is a connection between the media and public opinion and the potentially substantial political impact public opinion could have on the fate of a bureaucracy. This can be thought of as conceptually similar to a panoptic mechanism for social control (Foucault, 1979). Much like the way the fear of a police officer hiding around the corner, combined with the potential costs of a ticket motivate the vast majority of drivers to stay within shouting distance of the speed limit, it is the fear of the potential for sanctions that motivate bureaucratic monitoring of and adjustment to the domestic political arena.

If a bureaucracy was to find itself substantially out of step with prevailing public opinion then that disparity would significantly increase the probability that elected officials might find it politically beneficial to engage the cumbersome democratic oversight mechanisms available in modern democracies. Once these mechanisms are engaged, the chances are slim that the bureaucracy could escape the process without some, probably substantial, damage in the domestic political competition for budget and administrative responsibilities. Thus, this oversight mechanism must be avoided at all costs. Bureaucracies use the news media as one of possibly several indicators of the current, immediate importance of an issue in the domestic political arena, reacting to its information in an anticipatory or preemptive effort to remain in sync with what they believe to be public opinion.

Measuring Responsiveness in Foreign Aid Bureaucracies

In general, the role of a bureaucracy in foreign policy is often multifaceted and the specific role of public opinion in the bureaucratic decision-making process is similarly multifaceted and difficult to determine with precision. In some cases, public opinion, latent or otherwise, may inform debate over the nuances of complex and detailed options; in other cases, public opinion may play a marginal role in the decision-making process. Similarly, the exact actions that might indicate a bureaucratic response to the content of the news media might be difficult to define precisely. However, this difficulty actually makes this book's focus on foreign aid all the more valuable.

The bureaucracies responsible for foreign aid avoid most of this complexity. Unlike military conflict, trade discussions, arms control or treaty negotiations, the substance of the aid decision centers almost solely on the level of aid. There are no complex strategic variations, little nuance and limited trade-offs between jobs and trade, or between security and spending. Public opinion on the issue should be roughly one-dimensional, demanding generally more or less aid rather than the multiple options and strategies involved in a policy arena such as international conflicts. Thus, the bureaucratic effort to avoid negative scrutiny by matching aid allocations to what it believes is the public expectation for aid should manifest itself primarily in the levels of aid awarded. Providing too little aid to countries that the public deems important would raise effectiveness questions. Providing too much aid to countries considered trivial or undeserving would raise accusations of wasteful spending.

The unidimensionality of aid, when combined with the assumption that the decision-makers involved are trying to match their actions with the country's level of political importance (and therefore the level of demand for action) suggests that levels of media coverage should be directly related to the levels of aid: the greater the media coverage, the more important the country, the higher the assumed public expectation for action and therefore, the greater the aid commitment.

Empirical results generated by recent research indicate that, for the U.S. case at least, the news media have a significant, substantial and robust influence on foreign aid allocations. Payaslian (1996) introduced news media coverage into the study of U.S. economic and military aid, demonstrating that even though measures of human rights did not have a systematic effect on U.S. aid, the news media coverage of human rights abuses did have such an effect. The initial study of a more general media influence on foreign aid (Van Belle and Hook, 2000) examined variations in the commitments of U.S. development aid in relation to levels of network television news

coverage of recipient countries. Within the range of tests possible with their data, the news media variables are significantly and robustly associated with the levels of U.S. development aid, explaining as much of the variation as the variable representing a geostrategic motive for aid.

The argument for bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media is one of the key theoretical insights that this book provides. Foreign development aid allocations have been argued to be a reliable and empirically useful indicator of the general foreign policy of a state (Meernik et al., 1998) and they do appear to serve reasonably well in that role. Further, it is becoming increasingly clear that the news media are an important aspect of foreign policy. In the light of cases like the U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, an argument that leaders respond to the news media in making foreign policy decisions is reasonably accepted in policy and research circles. However, most foreign policy models focus on national leaders, their choices, their interests and the forces that motivate them and in the foreign aid process leaders do not always play a central or even consistent role.

In fact, depending on the specific domestic political structure of the donor and the specific aid program being examined, it is actually more likely that bureaucrats are the predominant actors in the allocation of foreign aid. This is significant because the literature relating to bureaucracies in democratic states provides little reason to expect any kind of natural convergence between elected leaders and bureaucrats. Responsiveness to the news media could provide a means by which these unelected portions of government behave in a somewhat democratic fashion.

The implications for the debate over bureaucracy and democracy are addressed in detail in the concluding chapter, after a thorough exploration and several empirical tests of the responsiveness argument. We now turn to chapter 3, which provides the first, baseline analysis, examining the effect of the news media on U.S. foreign development aid allocations.

CHAPTER 3

A BASELINE FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS: NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE AND LEVELS OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT AID

The responsiveness argument presented in chapter 2 leads to the expectation that aid bureaucracies will try to roughly match the levels of aid they offer with their perception of the domestic political importance of the recipient. The news media content provides a simple, clear and easily accessible indicator of that importance and, as a result, it is expected that aid bureaucracies will respond to the content of the news media by matching development aid allocations with levels of coverage. Whether or not there actually is a relationship between the news media and the allocation of foreign aid is an empirical question that needs to be explored through careful and extensive testing. However, it is not necessarily a simple question and there is no single analysis that can easily provide a definite answer. To provide an empirical foundation for further argument and study, this chapter presents the first of several analyses of a variety of aid programs from throughout the world.

The analysis of the U.S. development aid program is used here as something of a baseline for the comparative study across programs and across donor nations. The U.S. case also serves as a critical empirical test because almost all of the foundational empirical and theoretical material is derived from the study of the U.S. case. The vast majority of the empirical analyses of aid programs from the last quarter of a century use data for the United States. The tripartite theoretical approach used to organize the review of the foreign aid literature presented in chapter 2 was originally developed in the context of examining the United States. The addition of the domestic

sources of foreign aid to that framework is best exemplified by the detailed examination of the U.S. case by Ruttan (1996). Further, the theorizing on bureaucracies that is used to extend the conceptual foundations and derive the responsiveness argument is almost exclusively drawn from the U.S. case. Thus, the United States represents a critical case. If the hypotheses regarding the news media and foreign aid should find little or no support in the analysis of the United States, then the argument is unlikely to fair better when applied to the other cases.

Overall, the U.S. aid program might best be described as reflecting a split between a strategic and a humanitarian motive foreign policy. The geopolitical nature of the program (Hook, 1995) is evident in both rhetoric and practice and must be emphasized. The bulk of U.S. foreign aid is directed to Egypt and Israel, with the explicit goal of sustaining peace and securing two vital allies (Organski, 1990), and it would be difficult to explain those two cases in anything other than strategic terms.[1] Even when these two states are excluded from empirical analyses as outliers, which they usually are, variables representing Cold War strategic concerns or continuing security interests are significant and substantial influences on aid allocations. Measures of need are also consistently significant reflecting the idealist humanitarian influences on U.S. foreign policy in general (Hook, 1995), but unlike the Japanese case where trade is possibly the most significant factor, economic factors do not demonstrate substantial, consistent or robust effects.[2]

The practical and political division between the strategic and the humanitarian use of aid is, perhaps, most apparent in the policy debates over aid and human rights abuses in recipient states. Politically, human rights were brought to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy debates by the Carter administration with a salient campaign to link respect for human rights to foreign aid allocations. The two Reagan administrations, rhetorically at least, retreated from this position, arguing for a more strategic focus for U.S. foreign policy with an emphasis on U.S. power and strategic needs. The Bush administration's position appeared to "lay somewhere between those of its predecessors" (Donnelly, 1993: 116), then Bill Clinton, like Jimmy Carter, championed support for human rights and humanitarian causes in foreign policy. While the emphasis of the president has varied, consistent across all administrations is the split between a strategic and humanitarian focus for foreign policy in general and in the aid program as an expression of U.S. foreign policy.

Though they are treated as antithetical in the debates, the reality has been that both sides of this division find expression in the U.S. aid program. There is no clear consensus on specific impact of human rights on aid allocations or how it might vary across these presidencies, but the weight of evidence does

lean toward a modest influence (Schoult, 1981; Stohl et al., 1984; Carleton and Stohl, 1985, 1987; Poe, 1991, 1992; Poe et al., 1994; Payaslian, 1996; Apodaca and Stohl, 1999). Further, need as an expression of the humanitarian motive finds consistent support in most studies.[3] Similarly, a variety of measures of strategic interests have been shown to influence U.S. aid programs. This can be seen in the analyses presented later, and, at the very least, control variables need to be included in any analysis of aid to account for these two basic thrusts of U.S. policy.

Despite the predominance of the U.S. case in the theorizing and empirical analysis of aid programs, it is important to keep in mind that the United States is, in many ways, unique among aid donors. The power, wealth and relatively isolated geographic location of the United States provide it with a freedom of action that is unmatched. The unabashed strategic use of aid runs contrary to the norm of humanitarian motives espoused in the international, particularly European rhetoric on aid. The levels of U.S. aid, though high in absolute terms, are proportionally modest in relation to GNP or governmental budget shares. Smaller countries, such as Ireland, donate a far greater portion of their GNP and government budget to aid than the United States. Public support for aid is lower in the United States than in most other donors, and the public in the United States drastically overestimates the portion of the U.S. budget committed to aid (Diven, 2001).

Furthermore, the U.S. experience with bureaucracies, which underlies almost all of the theorizing, analyses and discussion that support the argument for bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media, also appears to be relatively unique among aid donors. The trust and respect for bureaucrats in the French political system, the comical extreme of secrecy of bureaucrats in Britain and the decentralized nature of the Japanese aid bureaucracy are each a striking contrast to the United States. Further, unlike the United States, where a deep foundation of distrust defines the political role of bureaucracies, the bureaucracies in most other democracies generally are accepted as responsible, reliable and representative organs of government.

In the absence of empirical evidence, it is unwise to assume that the dynamics of all these aid bureaucracies will be the same. It is clearly inappropriate to assume that what might work for the analysis of the U.S. aid program is universal and it is absolutely necessary to comparatively test any hypothesis on the determinants of foreign aid. This is the reason for the extensive empirical testing in this and following chapters. It is also the reason for the effort to insure that many of the empirical tests performed in this chapter are designed in such a way that they can be replicated for the analysis of programs of other aid donors.

Analytical Approach

In each of the five chapters examining foreign development aid programs the analysis begins from the foundation of a relatively simple regression model that is kept as consistent as possible across all the cases in order to provide a solid basis for making comparisons. Using standard cross-sectional, pooled, time-series regression techniques, the impact of news media salience on levels of commitments of official development assistance (ODA) is examined in each of these baseline analyses. The dependent variable, the effect we seek to explain, is foreign aid (or ODA) commitments. The independent variables in these regression models are factors that we expect to potentially affect foreign aid commitments and they include:

- The level of coverage in a major newspaper of national circulation as a measure of the salience of the recipient country.
- Per Capita GNP of the less developed country to control for the level of need in the recipient.
- The previous year's aid commitment to that recipient to control for the incremental nature of the aid decision.
- The balance of trade between the donor and recipient to control for the economic motive for aid.
- An indicator for each donor that roughly captures the presence of a geostrategic interest in the recipient, such as alliance ties or past colonial ties.

From this baseline analysis, the studies in each chapter then expand to explore the unique and interesting aspects of each country's aid program, governmental structure or foreign policy.

A second consistency across the analytic chapters is a focus on the levels of aid offered across the pool of recipients. Since the 1980s, the statistical analysis of foreign aid has typically been conducted using a two-stage analytical model (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1991; Poe and Meernik, 1995). In the first stage of the analysis, a selection or eligibility determination is examined through the statistical analysis of all the states in the world using an econometric statistical technique appropriate for addressing associations with the dichotomous dependant variable of aid or no aid. The second stage, which is what is primarily examined in this book, then examines an allocation process among those selected as aid recipients. That stage uses the appropriate statistical techniques for analyzing variations in aid levels.

This book focuses on the second stage of the analysis for the analysis of development aid. Thus, the statistics reported relate to the variation in the

levels of aid offered to recipients. This could be justified solely on conceptual grounds. Bureaucracies will have the most autonomy and the greatest opportunity exercise discretion in the allocation of various levels of aid among recipients. Further, the subtlety of variation captured in the levels of aid, as opposed to the dichotomous nature of the aid/no-aid dependant variable, should make it possible to more easily identify modest effects of independent variables.

A clearer and more straightforward argument, however, is that we simply do not expect to see any correlation between the news media and the initial selection of aid recipients.[4] Since the end of the post–World War II reconstruction effort, Japan, the Soviet Union and Eastern block nations (until 1991), Australia, New Zealand and most of the countries in Western Europe are never seriously considered as potential recipients of aid. However, one characteristic that is consistent across all of these countries is high levels of news coverage in the United States and other donors. Because of the extensive coverage these states receive in the press, any influence by the news media on the determination of who will receive aid is not expected to be clear or robust in the first stage of the analysis. It will be buried by the coverage of these important and wealthy global actors. This is analogous to the difficulty in connecting the hosting of U.S. military forces and the awarding of U.S. aid (Meernik et al., 1998). As a result, most of the analytical effort in the study of foreign aid allocations reported in this chapter and in this book is directed at the second stage of the analysis, the levels of aid awarded to recipients.

Data, Variables and Methods of Analysis

For the baseline analyses, aid commitments rather than actual disbursements of aid are utilized as the dependant variable. While many, if not most of the studies of the United States utilize the net disbursement data provided in *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants* (a U.S. government publication), commitments better reflect the decision-making involved in the foreign aid allocation process (see McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1991, 1992; Hook, 1995; Van Belle and Hook, 2000). In a changing economic and international environment, the highly variable lag time between commitments and actual disbursements can obscure the political aspects and the dynamics of the choices driving an aid program. Thus, commitments, which are reported as they are officially made by the donor, are a more adequate expression of donor foreign policy objectives at a given point in time and are better indicators of the decision-making behavior we are trying to understand more fully. For development assistance, commitments are

documented and reported by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD in the organization's annual study, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.[5]

For the analysis of foreign aid, particularly for the U.S. case, this is clearly not the only way that the dependant variable could be operationalized, beyond the common use of net disbursements to represent the output of the aid program, many studies aggregate development and military aid disbursements for the examination of the United States.[6] This is justified by arguing that the fungibility of aid (Zahariadis et al., 1990) makes development and military aid substitutable instruments of U.S. foreign policy, which are best represented by the aggregation of the output of these two aid programs for the analysis (i.e. Meernik et al., 1998). While this is not an unreasonable argument, these are two separate aid programs and it is likely if not certain that the agencies and officials responsible for each program hold divergent interpretations of the specifics of their mandate and their role in U.S. foreign policy. Second, maintaining a focus on development aid makes it easier to compare results for the United States with the results for the other donors. The OECD data available for those countries do not include military aid.

The independent variables of primary interest in all of the analyses are the news media coverage measures. Throughout this book these measures are kept as simple as possible to facilitate coding and enhance reliability.[7] For the baseline analyses, a simple count of stories in a prominent newspaper with a reasonably national circulation or influence is used as the indicator of salience. However, in the subsequent analyses within the empirical chapters, a variety of refinements and extensions of this basic coding are utilized to thoroughly examine the questions related to the impact of news coverage on foreign aid.

Because of its prominence and consistency over time, the *New York Times* is used as the primary indicator for the content of the U.S. news media.[8]

> *New York Times*. The level of New York Times news coverage is coded using the New York Times Index. This is an annual count of the number of news stories listed under the heading for the country. This includes all country-specific cross-references to stories listed under other headings.

In the analyses in this chapter, as well as most of the analyses in chapters 4 through 7, we use the current year's coverage of the recipient state. We do this because news media is envisioned as an indicator of the immediate salience, the current political importance of the recipient state and the transient political influences in the society. The basic argument for lagging

some of the other variables is that the previous year's values represent the most recent information available to decision-makers and the current level of coverage is the most recent and most relevant available to the decision-makers. Some might argue that this creates the potential for a causal order problem, and we should lag the media variable a year or even more, just to make sure that the coverage is occurring before the aid decision.

Fortunately, we can have it both ways. In the tables and discussion, we present the results for the use of current coverage. We feel is conceptually most appropriate, but we also address the causal order concern by running robustness tests for all analyses using the lagged media variable. In all cases, lagging the variable reduces the media variable's contribution to the explanatory power of the regression model and generally has some effect on the measures of statistical significance, but the variable is still statistically significant. The basic relationship described in every table, and thus the conclusions drawn and discussed, remain the same.

Four additional independent variables are employed in the baseline analyses to control for other known or potential determinants of U.S. aid flows. In addition to the news media coverage variable of primary concern, commonly used indicators are included to control for the incremental nature of the decisions as well as the strategic, economic and humanitarian use of aid.[9]

Previous Year's Commitment. In most depictions of the aid allocation process it is argued that the previous year's aid commitment is used as a reference level from which the current year's allocation is made. To account for this incremental type of decision-making in the aid process, the previous year's aid commitment is used as an independent variable in the regression equation.

Per Capita GNP. To capture the humanitarian motive for aid, the per capita gross national product (GNP) of a country, as reported by the World Bank,[10] is used as a measure of the level of need in the potential recipient. In the analysis, this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.

Balance of Trade. To capture the economic interests in the recipient country, a measure of the aggregate volume of bilateral trade between the donor and the recipient state is used. The balance of trade is simply the aggregate volume of exports from the donor to the aid recipient minus imports from the recipient as reported by the International Monetary Fund in the Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook and this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.[11]

This variable is intended to capture the degree to which the donor might be exploiting the country or extracting capital. We expect a positive

relationship with U.S. aid allocations, meaning that the United States will send more aid to countries that purchase U.S. goods.

> Alliance. To capture the underlying strategic relationship between the U.S. and the recipient, a dummy variable is coded to indicate the presence of a formal alliance between the recipient state and the U.S. Data on alliances are taken from the Correlates of War international alliance data. (Singer, 1995; updated by O'Neal and Russett, 1997)[12]

These four variables provide controls for the three commonly modeled motives for and influences on foreign development aid, as well as the presumption of an incremental aid decision-making process. Their inclusion in a regression model provides a solid foundation for comparatively exploring the effect of the news media on the selection of aid recipients.

Analysis of Aid Levels

To examine the relative influence of the news media measures, pooled, time-series, cross-sectional regression analyses are applied to the data. Specifically, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses using panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995) are applied. Variations on this or earlier techniques are common in the analysis of U.S. foreign development aid.[13] Each case is an annual observation of a less developed country receiving an aid commitment from the U.S. government. Pooling the data for these recipients combines the data across several years to include an extended temporal domain of comparable cases in the analysis. This increases the number of cases included in the analysis and allows the exploration of more subtle forces and generates greater confidence that the relationships reported are not a fluke of a specific year or case.

Additionally, the statistical analysis of U.S. aid data over the period of 1985–1998 is complicated by the disproportionate aid allocations to Israel and Egypt. There are many unique aspects to these two recipients and the extraordinary nature of these two intertwined cases makes it difficult to include them in a generalized explanation of U.S. aid commitments. Thus, for the analyses reported in table 3.1 Egypt and Israel are excluded as outliers.[14] This is a common practice in the analysis of U.S. aid and it is similar to the exclusion of Papua New Guinea from the analysis of Australian aid programs (McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1991). This is done to reflect standard practices in this area of study. However, the statistical significance of the news media variable remains robust even if these outliers are included analysis. Egypt and Israel may have received great deal of aid, but they also get a lot of media coverage.

Table 3.1 Effect of *New York Times* coverage on commitments of U.S. development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	*P*>|*z*|
New York Times coverage	0.1971984	0.0434633	4.537	0.000
Per capita GNP (lag)	−6.706702	1.561074	−4.296	0.000
Trade balance (lag)	0.002831	0.0014536	1.948	0.051
U.S. alliance	16.81136	8.133923	2.067	0.039
Previous year's aid	0.5302492	0.0689442	7.691	0.000
Constant	17.57176	3.299456	5.326	0.000

R-square = 0.4236; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 153.17; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 760.

The regression results in table 3.1 seem quite clear. The levels of *New York Times* coverage produce a clearly significant, positive correlation with aid commitments. Increases in coverage correspond with increases in commitments of aid.

Further, the other variables demonstrate statistically significant correlations in the theoretically predicted direction. The previous year's aid commitment is a significant indicator of the new commitment, demonstrating that decision-makers do seem to work incrementally from the established level of aid. Per capita GDP is negatively correlated with aid, thus wealthier recipients tend to receive less aid and it is also clear that U.S. allies receive more aid. The balance of trade variable is right on cusp of statistical significance in the analysis, which fits with the sometimes-yes sometimes-no results for this variable in the larger body of research examining U.S. aid program. The fact that the variables chosen to represent the well-established explanations of aid produce correlations that are consistent with both theoretical explanations and most previous empirical analyses provide some assurances that there is nothing unusual about this analysis. The similarities with current theory and previous analyses also provides some indication that the news media responsiveness argument and the news media variable are adding to the existing base of knowledge rather than challenging the current understanding of U.S. aid allocations.

Beyond the simple conclusion that there appears to be a connection between salience in the news media and the allocation of aid, the robustness of the correlation for the news media variable needs to be emphasized. The news salience measure consistently produces a statistically significant positive correlation with U.S. foreign development aid across a wide range of

indicators, methodologies and model specifications. These robustness tests include: using a lagged measure of media coverage; using aid disbursements instead of commitments as a dependent variable; excluding the lagged dependent variable (previous year's aid) as an independent variable; using "older" techniques for analyzing pooled data;[15] and including the Egypt and Israel outliers in the analysis. The specific coefficients produced and degree of variance explained by the different regression models and the different statistical techniques vary, but in all of the robustness tests that were conducted, the correlation between news salience and the levels of U.S. aid commitments remains clear. The previous year's aid is the only one of the other variables used in the baseline analysis to demonstrate such consistency.[16]

Despite this consistency, one of the robustness tests requires further explanation before the analysis is refined and extended. Any discussion of news media and foreign aid inevitably brings to mind cases such as Somalia in the early 1990s or the global response to the Sahal drought in the mid-1980s. The intense news coverage generated by the aid effort directed toward Somalia, the Sahal drought of the mid-1980s and more recently the intense coverage of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, raises concerns over causal ordering. With these cases in mind, it seems possible, if not probable, that aid may be driving coverage rather than the news media driving the actions of aid bureaucracies as argued in the responsiveness argument presented earlier.

As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8 during the examination of the U.S. disaster aid program, these cases are extreme outliers and are creating a misleading impression of the impact aid or aid programs have upon coverage. Foreign aid disbursements to countries are not prominent features in the coverage of those countries. The vast majority of the news coverage of aid recipients is completely devoid of any mention of aid or aid programs.[17] Only three out of 200 randomly selected articles from the *New York Times* coverage used here include any mention of aid and only one of those refers to U.S. aid.[18] Approaching it from the other direction by using the appropriate index to locate coverage of foreign aid in the newspaper used here, it is immediately apparent that most of the coverage of aid is focused on the donor country's overall program or budget and, except for a few outlying cases such as those already mentioned, the coverage of aid is seldom associated with a specific recipient. In the absence of clear indications that aid drives a substantial amount of the overall levels of coverage, it seems difficult to argue that the correlation identified in table 3.1 and in the robustness tests represent aid driving coverage.

This question has also been addressed statistically. The analysis reported in table 3.1 was replicated using a one-year lag for the news media coverage

variable. Thus the analysis of 1989 used the *New York Times* coverage from 1988. Since the effect cannot precede the cause and the effect of the previous aid allocation is already included in the analysis, this robustness test provides additional assurance that aid is not driving coverage. Whether the news media variable should or should not be lagged for the analysis represents, in and of itself, an interesting point of conceptual debate, but the simple fact is that, for this study, it does not alter the basic findings reported.

Coverage Content and Aid Commitments

Another concern with the correlation between coverage levels and aid commitments is that not all coverage is the same. The coverage of many of the most salient less developed countries usually deals with conflicts with the donor or other events that seem more likely to detract from the motivation to give aid, rather than increase it, such as coverage of Cuba in the U.S. media. To some degree this common perception is similar to the way a few salient cases create the impression that aid drives a substantial amount of coverage of developing nations, but it is also something that can and should be addressed through an extension of the analysis to examine the content of coverage.

To explore the potential impact of variations in the content of coverage, some very simple[19] content measures were coded for the *New York Times*[20] coverage of foreign aid recipients, using the brief story descriptions in the index. The following categories were used as a sorting sieve in the order presented here. These coding rules function like a series of filters used in the noted order, each filter has a definition that pulls out the stories that fit the category. Thus, all stories were checked to see if they fit the definition of a negative story. If the story did not, then it was considered for the next category, unrest, and so forth to the residual category at the end. Whenever a story was found to fit a definition, it was coded for that category and the coding process moved to the next story.

Negative. This measures the number of stories involving conflicts, political disputes with the donor country, violent crimes against the donor nation's citizens and reports of human rights abuses or support for international terrorism. Also included in this category are reports of antidemocratic government actions in recipient countries that do not involve human rights abuses (such as the suspension of elections). Only stories that clearly met one of these criteria were coded as negative.

Unrest. This includes stories where ongoing violent political unrest is a significant or primary focus of coverage.

While we view unrest as essentially negative coverage, there have been hints in previous research (Van Belle, 2000) that separating unrest coverage might generate additional insights into the influence of the media on foreign aid. Specifically for the United States, it appears that unrest in a democratic or allied country may be seen as a need for aid, while unrest in other countries may be perceived as an obstacle to effectively providing aid (Van Belle and Hook, 2000).

Need. This category includes articles reporting natural disasters, famine, poverty or general conditions of want or need in recipient countries.

Net Coverage. This was treated as a residual category to capture the neutral and positive coverage that did not fit in the other categories. It was calculated by subtracting the above categories from the total coverage variable.

Replacing the single news media salience variable with these rough measures of the content of coverage produces the results reported in table 3.2.

The striking aspect of the results presented in table 3.2 is that neither of the potentially negative media content variables produces a statistically significant negative correlation with commitments of aid. The other coverage variables demonstrate a positive correlation with aid. In fact, there is no combination of immediate or lagged content variables that produce a negative correlation for any news media content variable in the analysis of U.S. commitments or net disbursements of aid. This is an interesting contrast to the findings for some of the other aid programs analyzed later in this book, but focusing on the U.S. case for now, it seems to indicate that it is the

Table 3.2 Effect of *New York Times* content on commitments of U.S. development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	$P>\|z\|$
New York Times net coverage	0.1719508	0.0664778	2.587	0.010
New York Times neg. coverage	0.3102472	0.3954137	0.785	0.433
New York Times unr. coverage	0.3431653	0.2287447	1.500	0.134
New York Times need coverage	4.413782	1.4807	2.981	0.003
Per capita GNP (lag)	−6.906222	1.724392	−4.005	0.000
Trade balance (lag)	0.0026558	0.0015401	1.724	0.085
U.S. alliance	18.03389	9.237236	1.952	0.051
Previous year's aid	0.4843943	0.0773917	6.259	0.000
Constant	18.77178	3.788224	4.955	0.000

R-square = 0.4034; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 148.01; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 643.

overall salience that is the key to understanding the relationship between the news media and aid.

Despite the seeming clarity of these results, it is quite possible that negative aspects of coverage content do have an effect but it is just not captured by this analysis. These categories, though they produce interesting results for the other aid donors, simply might not be the best categorizations of coverage to use. It remains possible that alternative codings might produce results that show certain types of content having a negative effect on aid.

A more compelling explanation for how negative content might still have an effect on U.S. aid despite the findings presented here is that by analyzing the levels of aid as they are distributed among recipients this analysis simply misses the effect of negative coverage. It seems reasonable to argue that negative coverage will have its greatest impact on the selection of who gets aid, with states that capture a great deal of negative media attention getting dropped entirely from the U.S. aid program and thus not being captured by the analysis of the second stage of aid allocations. From that perspective it could be the case that U.S. decision-makers are actually very sensitive to negative coverage and quick to exclude recipients that gain substantial levels of the media attention that has been coded as negative. With no colonial ties defining the aid program, the United States often does drop recipients at a moment's notice. Other donors with aid relationships largely defined by former colonial relationships cannot exclude recipients so easily and as a result it is possible that their response to negative coverage is limited to cutting, but not eliminating aid.

We have not been able to identify any specific evidence of this in our limited analyses of the first stage of the U.S. aid allocation process, but the empirical difficulties with analyzing the news media coverage's impact on the selection of aid recipients produces sufficient uncertainties to leave this general idea open as a reasonable possibility.

What this analysis does show is that a very basic and simple conclusion can confidently be drawn: the effect of news media salience is robust for the U.S. case and it is not substantially altered by exploring the impact of the content of coverage. Before moving on to examine the other development aid programs, there is one unique aspect of the U.S. case that provides an opportunity to address empirically a question regarding the use of the print media as the indicator of news media salience.

Television Versus *Print Sources of News Media Salience*

Rather than simply assume or argue that the *New York Times* provides a reliable measure of levels of U.S. news coverage, we take advantage of the

Vanderbilt Television News Archives to use network television news coverage levels as a second measure of news media salience. The results reported suggest that both print and television news outlets can reasonably be used as indicators of news media salience and its influence on bureaucracies.

The differences between television and print news media can be as subtle as they are obvious. Most of the obvious distinctions arise from three basic dissimilarities in the formats (Peer and Chestnut, 1995; Weaver, 1975). First, television is primarily a visual medium, presenting the news with images and a spoken narrative while newspapers are written. This leads to divergences in voice (Peer and Chestnut, 1995), the authority of the reporters (Sperry, 1976; Hallin, 1986) and the persuasiveness of the reports (Newhagen and Nass, 1989).

Second, the organization of content is fundamentally different for the two media. Newspaper content is organized spatially and the stories are built with an inverted pyramid structure, presenting the most crucial information at the beginning. Information of lesser importance is printed at the end of the article and can often be left unread without much loss in the integrity of the story. In contrast, television is organized temporally. Every report has a coherent beginning, middle and end (Altheide, 1974, 1985; Hallin, 1994) and it is intended as a complete story (Weaver, 1975). This relates to the presentation of thematic elements and the way the information is related to the other news reported.

Third, perhaps because of the visual nature of television news, there are clear differences in the emphasis on the dramatic aspects of the news. This is argued to relate to the content-related choices of reporters and editors, even to the point of influencing which events are covered (Weaver, 1975). The general conclusion often drawn is that television provides a superficial treatment of the more spectacular aspects of the news, compared to the greater depth of information and more extensive connection with context found in newspapers (Entman, 1991; Esslin, 1982; Hallin and Gitlin, 1993; Parenti, 1986).

Examining the connections between these news media outlets and politics exposes some of the more subtle differences between them. A substantial amount of this research relates to their relative effectiveness at disseminating political information (Stamm et al., 1997; Robinson, 1974; Quarles, 1979; Becker and Dunwoody, 1982; McLeod and McDonald, 1985; Garramone and Atkin, 1986) or their ability to convey information in general (Facorro and DeFleur, 1993; Newhagen, 1994; Stauffer et al., 1981). Related to this are studies of education, disparities in political knowledge and preferred sources of political information, which show a correlation between levels of education and a preference for print sources (Quarles,

1979; Newhagen, 1994; Stamm et al., 1997; Eveland and Scheufele, 2000). However, voters of all education levels, regardless of whether they are image- or issue-oriented, seem to turn to television for information on the electability of candidates (Lowden and Anderson, 1994). Peer and Chestnut relate format differences to the independence of the media from the government and official sources, suggesting, "the tendency of television to search for a general idea that provides the frame of reference for interpreting the story is one important factor contributing to the greater susceptibility of television news to manipulation" (1995: 83).

It is an open question whether the theoretical bases of these findings on the mass responses to the news media can be directly applied to the question of bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media that is analyzed here. However, the simple fact that previous research demonstrates differences in the responses to these media, regardless of who is involved, suggests that the differences in print and television news coverage are substantial enough to create measurable differences in the behaviors.

The television coverage of recipient countries is operationalized as follows:

> Television. The level of television news coverage is coded using the Vanderbilt Television News Archives. This is an annual count of the number of news stories in which the name of the country or its leader appears in the abbreviated abstract of the stories. This measure is aggregated to include the coverage of all three of the major networks to obtain an overall coverage level.

Unsurprisingly, given the known colinearity between television and print coverage of international news, the basic relationship identified in table 3.1 is also seen in the analysis of television coverage.

The results reported in table 3.3 show that the television variable is significant and the other independent variables in the analysis reveal exactly the same relationships they did in the baseline analysis. Furthermore, the R^2 measure of explained variance is almost identical to an analysis for the same time period using the *New York Times* indicator of news media salience. Several robustness tests were run using the television and *New York Times* variables and regardless of which of these two variables or their combination is included, the overall R^2 measure for the analysis remains almost unchanged.[21] This suggests that for the analysis of U.S. development aid, either of these measures can be used as an indicator of overall salience. However, for practical reasons, the *New York Times* measure, which covers a more extensive overall temporal domain and is more easily coded for content, is probably going to be a more useful source for most analyses.

Table 3.3 Effect of network television coverage on commitments of U.S. development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	$P > \|z\|$
Television coverage	0.463627	0.1105231	4.195	0.000
Per capita GNP (lag)	−8.160665	1.796388	−4.543	0.000
Trade balance (lag)	0.0007303	0.0008405	0.869	0.385
U.S. alliance	23.21242	8.147083	2.849	0.004
Previous year's aid	0.5462656	0.0683959	7.987	0.000
Constant	20.36377	3.436143	5.926	0.000

R-square = 0.4234; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 141.70; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 759.

There may still be significant effects related to the presentation and format of these news sources and a refined exploration of the effect of content differences may still yield insights into the different effects of these two sources of public information, but it is not apparent in this analysis. In the examination of U.S. disaster aid allocations, presented in chapter 8, a slight difference between television and print news sources does become apparent in the robustness tests but the emphasis should be on the slight nature of the difference and the overall conclusion should probably focus on the consistency across these two indicators.

News media salience has a statistically significant positive influence on the levels of aid commitments by the United States. As the comparative scope of this book is expanded through the following chapters, it becomes possible to draw more extensive and detailed conclusions and insights into the relationship between aid and the news media. The first point of comparison is offered in chapter 4, where commitments of British development aid are analyzed.

CHAPTER 4

A FIRST POINT OF COMPARISON: NEWS COVERAGE AND BRITISH FOREIGN AID

From the vast array of adjectives that might be used to describe British bureaucracies or the British civil service, "responsive" might be the most unlikely of choices. They are so often the target of satire that even textbooks on British politics refer to the civil service in terms of their depiction in the television comedy, *Yes Minister* (Jones and Kavanagh, 1998; Pilkington, 1999). They are commonly believed to be elitist and unresponsive to the point of defiant, and to argue that the secretive and insular denizens of Whitehall might respond to something as immediate and transitory as news coverage appears, on the face, to be an exercise in futility. However, the evidence presented in this chapter provides support for just such a contention. British foreign aid allocations, which are predominantly the result of a bureaucratic process, are clearly correlated with fluctuations in the news coverage of recipients.

The British Bureaucracy in Comparative Perspective

As noted in previous chapters, one of the greatest difficulties in exploring the dynamics of bureaucracies, and one of the primary motivations for choosing to assemble the comparative analyses offered in this book, is the predominant focus on the United States in much of the scholarly work that is available. The U.S. case is predominant in the empirical and even the theoretical literature on both bureaucracies and the determinants of foreign aid. Further, the foreign policy model that initially led to the integration of

the media into the model of bureaucratic responsiveness was developed from the study of the U.S. case (Van Belle, 1993). To presume that the wealthy, powerful, geographically isolated federal system of the United States will produce insights and empirical results that are representative of democratic bureaucracies as a whole is as unwise as accepting the popular satirical depiction of British bureaucracies at face value.

It is in the recognition of the U.S. centered foundations for this study that it becomes clear that the British case provides a valuable first point of comparison. Of all the democratic donors of foreign aid, the U.S. and British bureaucracies are likely to have the most in common. The basic legal, governmental and bureaucratic structures of the United States are built from a legal foundation inherited from the British. Thus, many of the most central structures and institutions should share whatever dynamics are created by this common foundation. Still, there are clear differences between the two that could intercede between these shared foundations and the media responsiveness hypothesized for the foreign aid bureaucracies.

Many aspects of the British civil service are even more isolated from the influence of elected officials than is the case in the United States. Unlike the limited spoils system of the United States, the upper ranks of the civil service are not appointed by the party in power. Instead, the British system is built upon the idea that a civil service populated by tenured professionals will serve as a neutral administrator of the policies set by whichever party is in power in Parliament. Textbook descriptions of the civil service focus on the permanence, anonymity and impartiality of its members and structures, discussing these points both in terms of the ideals of a professional administrative body and as persistent problems.

The structure of the British civil service does create stability over time and it can be argued that such bureaucratic stability is important for the British system of democratic government, especially in comparison to the U.S. case. The United States has fixed executive terms and even when the presidency changes parties, the ideological differences between Republicans and Democrats are, at most, slight compared to extreme diversity found amongst European political parties. In the British multiparty, parliamentary democracy, a change of government is never more than a vote of no confidence away and the new party or coalition that comes to power can represent a substantial ideological shift. Thus, the British democratic system has the potential for far greater fluctuations and diversity in elected leaders. The permanency of the top bureaucratic officials helps counter the potential for radical government shifts, but it also, by its very nature, resists changes driven by electoral politics.

Additionally, the British civil service embodies certain biases and traits that reflect some of the unique qualities of British society. It is also shaped

by the extended continuity of Britain's social and political history. For example, despite the diversification created by the influx of specialists during the two world wars, not to mention repeated reform efforts focused on open-access and shifting the system toward a meritocracy, the British civil service is clearly elitist in comparison to the United States. The influence of the Oxbridge elite, particularly at the highest levels, is still a clear feature. In many ways this tendency is compounded by the British cultural respect for the classically educated generalist, sometimes referred to as the cult of the gifted amateur (Pilkington, 2000: 21). Since this type of education is more typical of Oxford and Cambridge graduates than of those from other British universities, it works against reforms and other efforts that might enhance the recruitment and career possibilities of technical specialists from working-class backgrounds. In contrast, the educational and social background of U.S. bureaucrats, including those appointed to the top levels, is decidedly more diverse, with a substantial tally of subject-specific experts and trained administrative experts not to mention a far wider range of educational backgrounds.

Some divergences between the U.S. and British systems were intentionally created by the founders of the United States and the framers of its constitution. Those that arise from the doctrine of the separation of powers come immediately to mind, but many of the most significant differences in the administrative functions of government that occurred as reforms or adaptations were pursued independently on one side of the Atlantic or the other. The United States had gone its own way long before many of the significant reforms, reorganizations or modernizations of the British civil service transformed it into the political institution examined here. The establishment of the Civil Service Commission, the implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms (1870), Sir Warren Fisher's reorganization (1919), the Fulton Report (1968), the establishment of the Civil Service College (1970) and the Thatcherite "revisions" in the early 1980s, are a few notable events that have changed the British civil service. These changes include everything from fundamental alterations in the basic organizational structures to the introduction of competitive recruitment.

The changes wrought by the Thatcher government deserve particular mention in the context of any responsiveness argument. Thatcher's efforts to trim the civil service and to make it more responsive to the political will of elected officials are prominent aspects of current studies of the British civil service, and probably a significant reason for the recent emphasis on reform and bureaucratic reactions to reform and the process of change. The changes were clearly significant. There has been a substantial and sustained reduction in the size of the civil service, which was over 30 percent smaller in 1998 than it was in 1981 (Jones and Kavanagh, 1998). Entire

departments have been abolished, and more importantly for this study, Thatcher's ability to make policy changes and to exert influence clearly contradicts the popular satiric depiction of the bureaucracy as the driving force. Since the period of study here occurs, for the most part, after the Thatcher reforms, it is impossible to say what effect they might have on the responsiveness argument offered. At the very least, the sheer number of jobs eliminated during this period, not to mention the dismantling of the Civil Service Department in 1981, would be a clear and salient reminder for all bureaucrats and bureaucracies of the "Big Stick behind the Door" of potential punishment that is central to agency theory.

For this study, the most important point to make is that the last 200 years have seen the British civil service system evolve into something far different than the limited version of a spoils system seen in the United States today. Most of the top administrators in the United Kingdom are effectively permanent, professional and tenured officials who, in theory at least, are apolitical servants of their elected superiors. In the United States a significant number of the top bureaucratic officials are presidential appointees, their service is unquestionably temporary and they are clearly political actors. This is significant for the analysis here because it is possible that the responsiveness of the U.S. aid bureaucracies is in some ways a reflection of the democratic influences on the political appointment and temporary nature of these top administrators. Despite the arguments against, and practical difficulties associated with, top-down or overhead models of bureaucratic control, it still could be that political appointees create the responsiveness to the news media measured in chapter 3. The tenured administrators, who direct the various bureaucracies in Britain, long argued to be an impediment to change, may insulate their agencies from the shifts of politics enough to prevent any noticeable responsiveness to the media content.

Parallel developments, reforms and changes can often be identified in bureaucracies around the world, including the United States. However, any presumption that the U.S. and British bureaucracies function in the same way because they share a common heritage is difficult to support. Still, despite the differences briefly outlined earlier, there is every expectation that British foreign aid commitments will demonstrate a correlation with news media coverage similar to that found in the U.S. case.

The argument for responsiveness to the news media is based directly upon basic dynamics of democratic bureaucracies and there is no reason to expect these fundamentals to be radically different in these two cases. In both cases the mechanisms for democratic oversight are primarily big sticks behind the door. Like the U.S. system, there are substantial punitive

possibilities open to elected officials unhappy with the performance of a bureaucracy but these mechanisms are cumbersome and seldom invoked (Pilkington, 2000: 104–122).

In both cases the news media are clearly a significant part of domestic politics. The news media themselves share several traits between the two countries. Beyond shared norms of media freedom and mutually accepted standards for the gathering information, media outlets in both Britain and the United States share business imperatives and norms that motivate them to leap upon the story of a bureaucracy shown to be significantly out of step with the desires or demands of the public or its elected leaders. In fact, the commitment to secrecy that is comically exaggerated in the British case might suggest an even greater bureaucratic desire to avoid the spotlight of public attention than is seen in the United States. This might create a greater bureaucratic motive to monitor and adjust to the importance of issues in the political arena. Of all democratic bureaucracies, it is easiest to believe that British civil servants would wish to avoid public scrutiny in the media.

The differences between the United Kingdom and the United States are clear and there are reasonable causal connections that could be argued to drive the British foreign aid bureaucracy to act differently from its U.S. counterpart. However, the causal explanation underpinning the bureaucratic responsiveness argument is built upon the very basics of the integration of a bureaucracy into an electoral democratic political structure. The driving force for the news media's influence is not expected to arise from the details or unique aspects of the U.S. system but instead through the latent threat that unwanted media attention will motivate elected officials to pull the big stick out from behind the door. Therefore, if the responsiveness argument is valid as presented, it should also hold for the British case. That, however, is clearly an empirical question. If no support were found in the analysis of the British case, this would lead us to reconsider the causal explanation offered in terms of less fundamental, more idiosyncratic aspects of the U.S. case.

British Foreign Aid

Typically, in analyses of foreign aid programs, the presumed influences on foreign aid, the variables that are used to operationalize them and the results they produce are so similar for both U.S. and British aid, that literature reviews often mix references from the studies of both countries without distinguishing between them.[1] Like the studies of the United States,

international political motives and other influences from outside of Britain are the primary focus in empirical analyses.

Still, even casual comparisons of the domestic political context of the aid programs in the United States and the United Kingdom show that, despite similarities as liberal democracies, the processes and political dynamics within the two countries can at times be radically different. One only has to compare the political party structures or the debates in the U.S. Congress to those in the House of Commons to find striking examples.[2] The bureaucratic aspect of the British foreign aid program is also somewhat more complex than its U.S. counterpart, with at least four departments directly connected with the aid program and the interaction between them often becoming quite complex (Morrissey et al., 1992).[3] The aid bureaucracies in the United States are far more distinct in their mandates and their operations and the divisions within the U.S. development aid bureaucracy tend to be less substantial than the British case.

There is also one substantial difference between U.S. and British foreign aid that must be accounted for in this analysis. Unlike the relatively blank slate of the initial U.S. aid program and the Cold War motives that drove its development, the British program was explicitly founded on the relationships with its former colonies and this has developed into a key fixture of the British Commonwealth. In fact, the most thorough historical record of the British foreign aid program is part of the official history of colonial development (Morgan, 1980a,b,c).[4]

The colonial roots of the British aid program need to be considered in the analysis and in this study the legacy of the British Empire is subsumed under the strategic motive for aid by operationalizing it as a dichotomous (dummy) variable representing membership in the British Commonwealth. This replaces the alliance variable used in the U.S. analysis. In statistical analyses this proves to be a significant, positive correlate of aid, with a continuing connection to the British colonial legacy substantially increasing the level of aid rewarded.

Unlike the U.S. case, there have not been a large number of empirical analyses of the British foreign aid program. However, the British case often seems to be a source of analytical innovation. The first article to reconceptualize the analysis of aid in terms of foreign policy (McKinlay and Little, 1978) examined the British case. Further, the application of the two-stage approach to the analysis of aid (McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1992) used the British case. These analyses have produced clear results that are comparable with the findings from the U.S. case. The one notable difference is that the analysis of the British case tends to include far more complex depictions of the strategic motive for aid than we use here.

Baseline Analysis

The initial analysis of British development assistance from 1985–1995 replicates the initial analysis of U.S. development aid offered in table 3.1 as close as possible. The operationalization of the variables is either the same, or as close to the same as possible.

Times Coverage. This variable, measured annually, equals the number of news stories in the *Times* (London). This is an annual count of the number of news stories listed under the heading for the country in the *Times* index. This includes all country-specific cross-references to stories listed under other headings, excluding sports coverage.[5]

In addition to the news media coverage variable of primary interest, some commonly used indicators are also included in the regression model to represent the strategic, economic and humanitarian motives commonly applied to the study of foreign aid allocations.

Per Capita GNP. To capture the humanitarian motive for aid, the per capita gross national product (GNP) of a country, as reported by the World Bank,[6] is used as a measure of the level of need in the potential recipient. In the analysis, this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.

The expectation is that there is a negative relationship: the higher the aid recipient's per capita GNP, the richer it is, the less aid the United Kingdom will give to that country.

Balance of Trade. To capture the economic interests in the recipient country, a measure of the aggregate volume of bilateral trade between the donor and the recipient state is used. The balance of trade is simply the aggregate volume of exports from the donor to the aid recipient minus imports from the recipient as reported by the International Monetary Fund in the Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook and this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.[7]

This variable is intended to capture the degree to which the donor might be exploiting the country or extracting capital. We expect a positive relationship with aid allocations, meaning that the British will send more aid to countries that purchase British goods.

Commonwealth. This dummy variable is used to represent both the strategic motive for aid and the legacy of the British Empire. These data are widely

available and in this particular instance they are coded from Internet listings of commonwealth members.

The use of the commonwealth variable represents a choice from among three highly collinear variables, the other two being formal alliance ties to represent the strategic motive alone and status as a former British colony to represent the colonial legacy alone. In terms of British relations with less developed states, the commonwealth variable captures most formal alliances as well as the majority of former colonies. It can also be said to demonstrate an ongoing cultural interest that goes beyond just the legacy as a colony as well as a strategic interest that is beyond an alliance.

Previous Year's Commitment. In most depictions of the aid allocation process it is argued that the previous year's aid commitment is used as a reference level from which the current year's allocation is made. To account for this incremental type of decision-making in the aid process, the previous year's aid commitment is used as an independent variable in the regression equation.

Analysis of British Aid Commitments

To examine the relative influence of the news media measures, the same pooled, time-series, cross-sectional regression analyses that were applied to the U.S. case are applied here. Additionally, the statistical analysis of British aid data over the period of 1985–1998 is complicated by a quirk in the reporting of aid to Iraq. After 1991, it appears that the aid the British government directed toward the Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq is listed as aid to Iraq. Clearly this was not aid to Saddam Hussein's regime and it is impossible to effectively separate the coverage of the Kurds from the massive amount of media coverage of the regime in Baghdad. As a result, the case had to be dropped from the analysis.

The results of the British baseline analysis are presented in table 4.1.

As in the U.S. case, the regression results in table 4.1 seem quite clear. The levels of *Times* coverage produce a clearly significant, positive correlation with aid commitments. Increases in coverage correspond with increases in commitments of aid. Further, the other variables demonstrate statistically significant correlations in the theoretically predicted direction. The previous year's aid commitment is a significant indicator of the new commitment, demonstrating that decision-makers do seem to work incrementally from the established level of aid. Per capita GDP is negatively correlated with aid, thus wealthier recipients tend to receive less aid and like

Table 4.1 Effect of *Times* (London) coverage on commitments of British development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	*P*> |*z*|
Times coverage	0.0556877	0.0164998	3.375	0.001
Per capita GNP (lag)	−1.722178	0.4024498	−4.279	0.000
Trade balance (lag)	0.0102271	0.0073745	1.387	0.165
Commonwealth	10.33701	2.097623	4.928	0.000
Previous year's aid	0.5347957	0.0995016	5.375	0.000
Constant	2.88182	0.9147034	3.151	0.002

R-square = 0.4587; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 294.06; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 1,150.

the U.S. case, the balance of trade variable is not significant. The commonwealth variable is clearly significant, reflecting the colonial foundations of the British aid program. The fact that the variables chosen to represent the well-established explanations of aid produce correlations that are consistent with both theoretical explanations and most previous empirical analyses provide some assurances that there is nothing unusual about the results from this analysis. Like the U.S. case, the similarities with current theory and previous analyses also provide some indication that the news media responsiveness argument and the news media variable are adding to the existing base of knowledge rather than challenging the current understanding of aid allocations.

The Effect of the Content of Coverage

While high coverage levels in the news media provide an easily accessible indicator of the political importance of the country, they do not necessarily indicate a positive reflection on the recipient countries and substantial negative coverage might actually lead to a decrease in aid. To get at this, a simple content coding scheme was used to categorize the stories used in the analysis. Due to the sheer volume of stories involved (almost 200,000 for the study) this coding was, by necessity, simple and admittedly crude, but it still captures enough of the differences in content to indicate if there is a substantial relationship between the nature of the content and the effect on British aid.

As in the U.S. case, the following categories were used as a sorting sieve. These coding rules function like a series of filters used in the order presented here. Each filter has a definition that pulls out the stories that fit the

category. Thus, all stories were checked to see if they fit the definition of a negative story. If it did not then it was considered for the next category, unrest, and so forth to the residual category at the end. Whenever a story was found to fit a definition, it was coded for that category and the coding process moved to the next story.

Negative. This measures the number of stories involving conflicts or political disputes with the donor country, violent crimes against the donor nation's citizens, reports of human rights abuses and reports of support for international terrorism. Also included in this category are reports of antidemocratic government actions in recipient countries that do not involve human rights abuses (such as the suspension of elections). Only stories that clearly met one of these criteria were coded as negative.

Unrest. This includes stories where ongoing violent political unrest is a significant or primary focus of coverage. While we view unrest as essentially negative coverage, there have been hints in previous research (Van Belle, 2000) that separating unrest coverage might generate additional insights into the influence of the media on foreign aid (Van Belle and Hook, 2000).

Need. This category includes articles reporting natural disasters, famine, poverty or general conditions of want or need in recipient countries.

Net Coverage. This was treated as a residual category to capture the neutral and positive coverage that did not fit in the other categories. It was calculated by subtracting the above categories from the total coverage variable.

Replacing the single news media salience variable with these rough measures of the content of coverage produces the results reported in table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Effect of *Times* (London) content on commitments of British development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	*P*> |*z*|
Times net coverage	0.0744845	0.0246565	3.021	0.003
Times negative coverage	−0.1037816	0.1011871	−1.026	0.305
Times unrest coverage	0.2192894	0.4502412	0.487	0.626
Times need coverage	0.5291354	0.2310407	2.290	0.022
Per capita GNP (lag)	−1.990705	0.4434395	−4.489	0.000
Trade balance (lag)	0.0105865	0.0071793	1.475	0.140
Commonwealth	10.94705	2.296983	4.766	0.000
Previous year's aid	0.5337523	0.1050296	5.082	0.000
Constant	2.868486	0.998784	2.872	0.004

R-square = 0.4722; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 376.69; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 1,046.

The striking aspect of the results presented in table 4.2 is the limited effect of the content of the coverage on the commitment of aid. Like the U.S. case, disaggregating the coverage into categories that might roughly be expected to have differing effects on aid has no substantial impact upon the analysis. This does not rule out the possibility that content does have an effect. Two obvious possibilities remain. First, this crude categorization of the content of the stories may not be effectively capturing the relevant variations in content. Perhaps a different coding scheme will produce results that reflect differing effects of the content of coverage.

A more likely explanation is that it is the nature of this analysis that prevents variations in the content of coverage from influencing the results. The analyses of development aid offered throughout this book focus on the second stage of the analysis. Thus, the cases in the statistical analysis that produced the results reported in table 4.2 are only those countries that received aid commitments. Countries that were excluded from the pool of aid recipients are also excluded from the analysis. If negative coverage can quickly lead to the complete cut-off of aid, then negative coverage is pushing cases completely out of the analysis and preventing the negative coverage variables from becoming statistically significant. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that coverage content matters.

Ideological Differences in News Sources

An additional value of a comparative analysis is that differences between the cases can facilitate the exploration of questions, concerns and possible alternative explanations for the proposed or demonstrated relationships. In the U.S. case, the availability of a catalog of television news stories allowed the comparison of these two markedly different media as news sources. In the British case, the breadth of political ideologies embodied in the editorial structures of the available newspapers that can reasonably claim a national readership, makes it possible to test the possibility that these differences might alter the findings.

To explore this possibility, the coverage in the *Guardian* was coded for a five-year subset of the data (1991–1995).

> *Guardian* Coverage. This variable, measured annually, equals the number of news stories in the *Guardian* (London) that address the recipient country in the headline or lead paragraphs, excluding sports coverage.

The search function on Lexus/Nexus database was used to identify the stories that potentially meet these criteria and then the stories retrieved were individually reviewed to determine if they actually concerned the

relevant country. This review was necessary because there were several sources of potential error that might lead to erroneous inclusion of stories for a particular country. For example, some country names are also commonly used words. A search for China retrieves several stories regarding clay pits and the British dish-making industry, while a search for Turkey locates dozens of stories related to holiday meals. Additionally, the Lexus/Nexus search function provides no easy way to include the lead paragraphs but exclude the taglines of a story, so a search for a country name also brings up stories that are simply filed from the country being searched for, even though the stories regard another country or subject entirely. Finally, country names might be in the lead paragraphs of a story but might not actually be referring to the country as a subject of the story. This is common for obituaries and book reviews, but it is also a factor in instances where an international agreement or historical event gets tagged with a certain country's name. For example, stories regarding trade disputes often reference the Uruguay round of negotiations on the GATT in the lead paragraph, regardless of the story's relevance to Uruguay. All of these are stories that might confuse the measure of a country's news media salience for the year and must be removed from the story count.

Replacing the *Times* measure of salience with the *Guardian* measure as an independent variable in the analysis of British development aid commitments produces results that are similar to those presented in table 4.1.

As is clear in table 4.3, per capita GNP is negatively correlated, with aid commitments dropping as the average income, or the wealth of the country goes up. Both membership in the Commonwealth and the previous year's aid commitment are also correlated with the aid commitment as expected. Most importantly, the results presented demonstrate quite clearly that the finding

Table 4.3 Effect of *Guardian* (London) coverage on commitments of British development assistance, 1991–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	$P> \|z\|$
Guardian coverage	0.0826994	0.0221761	3.729	0.000
Per capita GNP (lag)	−1.64585	0.4106035	−4.008	0.000
Trade balance (lag)	0.0056933	0.0046796	1.217	0.224
Commonwealth	9.420696	2.439259	3.862	0.000
Previous year's aid	0.4976639	0.1216401	4.091	0.000
Constant	2.168613	0.8203574	2.643	0.008

R-square = 0.6218; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 270.20; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 656.

of news media responsiveness in British aid is not limited to the coverage in the *Times*. Media coverage in the *Guardian* is positively correlated with aid levels. Aid rises as coverage rises. If the causal explanation offered in chapter 2 is taken at face value, these findings are exactly as expected.

It was argued that bureaucracies would use levels of media coverage as an indicator of the importance of a recipient and it was the salience, the amount of coverage that would be the critical factor. The ideological spin on the coverage of a country is less important to the bureaucrat than how much attention it is getting by the public and elected officials.

Conclusions

The British case provides a valuable first point of comparison. First and foremost, the clear correlation between news media coverage and commitments of development aid suggest that the news media responsiveness found in the analysis of U.S. development aid allocations is not unique to the United States. It is not a result of the power, wealth, federal system of government, direct election of the president, limited spoils system for top-level administrative appointments or the historical roots of the U.S. program. The parliamentary system of Britain, with its prime minister, permanent top-level bureaucrats and an aid program with its roots in a history of extensive colonialism also demonstrates bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media.

This helps narrow the conceptual focus of both theorizing and critique on the commonalities between the U.S. and British aid bureaucracies. Any critiques that rely solely on an argument regarding the unique nature of the United States in the world political system, or the unique nature of the U.S. development aid program, become difficult to sustain. Focusing on the common elements shared by the U.S. and British democracies and bureaucracies lends credence to the assertion that bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media reflects something fundamental in the integration of bureaucratic structures into modern democratic government. There are still several aspects of the British and U.S. cases that could be considered unique in comparison to the other democracies, the most notable might be the common foundation the governments share in British common law, but as the empirical base of comparison is expanded in the following chapters, this and several other points are addressed.

More specific insights include the simple fact that the notoriously insulated, secretive and unresponsive British bureaucracy does in fact respond as predicted to the content of the news media.

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CHAPTER 5

A TRUSTED, ELITE BUREAUCRACY: NEWS COVERAGE AND FRENCH FOREIGN AID

In terms of foreign policy decision-making processes that can affect the allocation of foreign aid, the French case shows few similarities with the United States. The most obvious feature shared by the United States and France is that they are both presidential republican democracies; that is, states with popularly elected presidents who are their country's head of state, commander-in-chief of the armed forces as well as diplomat-in-chief, although the exact levels of presidential powers differ in each case.[1] Aside from the shared presidential feature, however, there are some major differences with the United States; to "those familiar with the making of United States foreign policy, the way in which French foreign policy is made must come as something of a shock" (Kramer, 2002: 59), making this contrast an interesting case study.

Generally speaking, foreign policy making is much more centralized, owing to France's unitary political structure (as opposed to the decentralized, federal structure of the U.S. political system), which makes the central bureaucracies in France more powerful and independent, while civil society traditionally has been weaker than in the United States. (This fact normally would not augur well for the model we propose; yet, we find results that again are strongly supportive of the agency model developed herein.) Therefore, as previously mentioned there are several features that differentiate France from the United States as a case study.

A first major difference is that the structure of France's so-called hybrid (Safran, 1985: 127) political system is markedly different from that of the

United States; in some ways it resembles a traditional parliamentary system while in others it is closer to an American style presidential republic. The French president presides over the council of ministers formed by parliamentary leaders, which includes the prime minister and the foreign minister, who generally (but are not required to) come from the Parliament (Safran, 1985: 147). This feature allows for potentially interesting results in France, which were observed twice recently during the so-called periods of *cohabitation*, that is, when the president and the government were of opposing political parties from 1986–1988 and again from 1993–1995. (An imperfect illustration of this would be as if a Republican U.S. president's cabinet included a Democratic secretary of state and vice-president.)

Although the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic names the prime minister as the titular head of the government, the president is unquestioningly at the apex of the government's power structure and Parliament is considered to be the weak branch of government (Blondel, 1997: 134). Therefore, in France the president has the ultimate authority over the government and the bureaucracy; "Olympian position" in the words of Safran (1985: 23), particularly in the presidential reserved domains, which include foreign policy and defense matters (Safran, 1985: 130; Cohen, 1996: 32). The president and his "parallel organization" (Blondel, 1997: 133) of senior staff and counselors are, in this case, the big stick behind the door.

A second important difference in the French case is its membership in the European Union (EU), which continues to strive to achieve a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) among the member states. There is a balance to be struck between building a strong and united Europe that can act independently on the world stage, and protecting the freedom of action and sovereignty of the member states; France is seen as one of the countries seeking to have it both ways (Kramer, 2002). There currently exists, in a sense, parallel foreign policies in Europe: national foreign policies pursued by the individual states, and the EU's foreign policy, coordinated by the so-called Troïka along with the EU commissioner responsible for External Relations.[2]

This situation of parallel foreign policies is clearly the case in the area of international development. For example, according to the European Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), "the European Commission provides nearly 30% of global humanitarian aid, while European Union Member States are separately responsible for the management of 25% of all official humanitarian assistance distributed worldwide" (European Commission, 2003: 1). There is strong pressure to achieve consistency among the foreign affairs bureaucracies, to which the French bureaucracy cannot be immune. Another example of the

coordination challenge for France (and the other active EU members) is that in the United Nations, the EU tries to speak as one single voice on the vast majority of issues under consideration, with the European consensus having been negotiated in advance and articulated in the various UN committees by the country assuming the EU presidency at the time.[3]

Finally, a third major difference between the U.S. and French foreign policy structures is the legacy of French colonialism and the continuing special relationship that still exists between France and its former colonies, especially its former African colonies. French international aid policies and development programs give primacy to Africa, and French presidents in the Fifth Republic traditionally have followed African development programs very closely (Kessler, 1999: 301–306). Thus, one legacy of colonialism is the structural influence on foreign aid policy that may constrain the French foreign policy bureaucracy. In a way, while strategic and alliance concerns may shift over time, a country's ex-colonies remain so.

In summary, many features of the French case differentiate it from the United States and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the analysis presented in this chapter strongly supports the model developed in this book: media coverage has a significant impact on French foreign aid disbursements.

The French Philosophy of Foreign Policy

The purpose of this section is not to undertake a sociopolitical dissertation of the French foreign policy process, but rather to underline its most important aspects in order to provide some context for the empirical analysis that follows. Indeed, when analyzing France it is sometimes difficult not to caricature the cultural motivation underlying French foreign policy. William Safran notes that although French diplomacy has suffered its fair share of foreign policy misadventures, nevertheless "the affective relationship of the citizen to the regime has been heavily influenced by France's position in the international system, her internal self-image having depended upon the image she could project to the world outside" (Safran, 1985: 263–264). This feature is particularly true in the governing elite, but even the average French citizen is intensely aware of the past *grandeur* (greatness) of France where, under Louis XIV, it was the cultural center of the Western world. The French language and French customs were adopted by foreign elites and the ideals of the French revolution inspired people all over the globe. France's slow decline since Napoleon's defeat in 1815 did not ever diminish France's adulation of its own cultural and linguistic heritage—and legacy.

As a result, the strong (and easily caricatured) consensus is that France generally seeks to support the spread (*rayonnement*) of the French language

and culture through its foreign policy generally, and its aid program more particularly. Wherever there is a French-speaking national population (or minority), or former colonial tie, there is an obvious and determined effort to support and encourage a tie to the center through cooperation and membership in the *Francophonie* (see Schraeder et al., 1998: 301).[4]

The fundamental basis for this policy is unquestionably founded on France's aspirations to recover its global stature. In his ascension to power in the 1950s, General Charles de Gaulle, frustrated by France's decline as a global power over the previous century, sought to restore her position in the international system, specifically as a counterweight to Anglo-American dominance of the Western, Euro-Atlantic alliance that so "frustrated French aspirations for prestige" (Safran, 1985: 266). Aside from the realist/nationalist-based principles of foreign policy designed to protect France's sovereignty and freedom of action on the global scene, de Gaulle's policy of offering a third way or third force was also aimed at keeping France's former colonies in her orbit of influence by promoting the *Francophonie*, with France at the center of a global francophone community of nations, promoting the *grandeur* (greatness) of French culture and history (Kramer, 2002).

One concrete aspect of "the politics of *grandeur*" (Kolodziej, 1974) was the French government's policy of supporting "local military forces designed to keep pro-French elites in power and therefore ensure the continuation of the status quo" (Schraeder et al., 1998: 321). Thus, French foreign aid policy was adapted in a way to capture local elites and maintain former colonies within her orbit.

Nowhere was this policy more obvious than in the *chasse gardée* (private hunting domain) of Africa, which was traditionally the focus of French foreign policy, especially during the Cold War (Schraeder et al., 1998; Kessler, 1999; Kramer, 2002). The French foreign aid program was designed to provide technical expertise to less developed states; monetary support to those states belonging to the Franc Zone; the prevention of Soviet inroads in Africa; a counterweight to British influence in Africa; and, ultimately, the preservation and *rayonnement* (spread) of French culture. This policy of *rayonnement* was executed by members of a bureaucratic-administrative class that was drawn from the elite, enamored with its own culture and thus more than willing to spread it to all like-minded people of the world.

The French Aid Bureaucracy

The French civil service is charged with implementing the grand policies discussed previously, and as an institution it is respected and powerful.

It would be difficult in this section as well to exaggerate the central role played by the French bureaucracy in running the State. In France,

> . . . the State is much more than a set of bodies designed to initiate and implement public policies; it is the legal embodiment of the nation . . . the French State is not only a legal entity; it is a legal entity with a purpose . . . one of "social engineering." (Blondel, 1997: 141)

Moreover, at the higher echelons, the civil servants even make policy (Safran, 1985).

One historical argument to explain the great power of the French bureaucracy is the tumult experienced in France after the overthrow of the Second Empire in 1871. The instability of the Third and Fourth Republics caused an increase in the power of the bureaucratic sphere: as governments came and went, the civil servants provided continuity of day-to-day management of the government's affairs. Yet, notwithstanding this hypothetical historical explanation, one scholar asserts that the French bureaucratic tradition "antedates the republican system," and that the "French civil service has increased its importance in decision making during the Fifth Republic" (Safran, 1985: 199).

The French bureaucratic elite is typically recruited from its own version of Oxbridge, called *les grandes écoles* (such as the *École nationale d'administration*, ÉNA), on the basis of technical expertise and high academic performance through competitive examinations (Blondel, 1997: 143). One difference with the British system is that the French civil servants are "not expected to be completely nonpartisan" (Safran, 1985: 204). In summary, the individual civil servants have a great degree of power and discretion, as befitting their education and exalted stature.

The French ODA disbursement system is rather complex. Many of the different government ministries are involved one way or another in the planning and disbursement of French ODA; however, the Foreign Affairs and the Finance[5] ministries currently are the principal actors involved. In the late 1990s, French foreign aid was distributed approximately as follows, principally amongst four sources:

— 41% from the Ministry of Finance;
— 16% from the Ministry for Cooperation;
— 10% from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
— 33% from others.[6] (France, National Assembly, 2001)

As is the case with many other industrialized states, it is the Ministry of Finance that distributes a large bulk of nondiscretionary aid, that is, funds

intended for multilateral agencies and UN System funds that are assessed automatically in proportion to its GNP or capital stake in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). But Finance also distributes the direct grant and loans to recipient states' treasury and is the lead agency in the Paris Club discussions of the major creditor nations. In France, the Treasury Department of the Finance Ministry also helps with structural adjustment programs and monetary cooperation with the countries in the "Franc Zone," that is, states that use the overseas Franc currency, based on the French Franc.

Prior to a major reform undertaken in 1998—which falls within the period studied in this book—it was the Ministry for Cooperation[7] that was charged with the development and implementation of aid policy for France's former colonies, particularly for 37 countries of special interest principally located in Africa and the Caribbean (called *les pays du champ*—we shall roughly translate this as countries of special interest). In addition, the Ministry for Cooperation was charged with participating in international negotiations such as implementing the Lomé conventions of the 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific or ACP states, and presiding over the executive committee of the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC in French). The FAC was the primary discretionary tool available to the Ministry for Cooperation and represented at one point over one-third of its budget (France DCGID, 2000); critics charge, however, that the FAC was primarily used as an investment subsidy for French industry (Naudet, 1995).

The Ministry for Cooperation had an extensive on-site presence in 32 countries of special interest by way of its "Cooperation and Cultural Action Missions" situated in French embassies. These acted as the local antennae for the Ministry for Cooperation and had a strong role in developing aid policies that could be adapted to local conditions, as well as the eventual execution and control of these policies. The cooperation officers had a great deal of discretion and acted independently of the local ambassador (and therefore, of the Foreign Affairs Ministry; see Kessler, 1999: 312–316).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was (until the 1998 reforms) responsible for ODA outside the scope and responsibilities of the Cooperation Ministry, that is, managed aid policy outside the countries of special interest. It also had a coordinating role to play with the Finance Ministry in meeting its responsibilities pertaining to multilateral aid outside the IFIs (Naudet, 1995).

The multitude of involved actors with their various responsibilities, as well as the relative autonomy given to the resident cooperation officers in the countries of special interest, resulted in a diffuse aid program with little coordination. While the different actors gained a strong understanding and expertise in their respective fields, there was no central guiding policy

(Naudet, 1995). This feature actually augurs well for the model proposed here: if the civil servants have increased autonomy then they may more easily respond to media effects. Yet the uncoordinated and decentralized structure of the French aid program resulted in some serious challenges when, for example, discussing development projects in LDCs: the Cooperation Ministry was not empowered to manage ODA outside its mandate (which only included the designated countries of special interest), although it had acquired much expertise in development issues. In certain cases, disagreements or uncertainties would have to be negotiated at the interministerial level—or even at the prime ministerial or presidential levels (Naudet, 1995).[8]

In the period examined here, 1985–1995, one general characteristic of the French ODA program is shared by the other states analyzed in this book: it is the steady decline of aid funding. French ODA diminished by 25 percent between 1982 and 1999; in proportion to its GDP, it decreased from about 0.60 to 0.42 percent and, just as the other countries studied herein, never reached the 0.7 percent UN-established benchmark (Charasse, 2001: 11, 14). Throughout the same period, half of France's total ODA budget was spent on two different fronts. First, about 25 percent of France's aid program is spent as debt reduction or annulment; France is the world's second largest creditor (after Japan) to the least developed countries. Since this type of aid is very discretionary (one can forgive the debts of the countries one likes!) there is no problem applying the model to this case.[9] Another form of aid disbursement evolved as the EU's aid budget increased: nowadays, France's contribution to the EU's common aid fund (the European Development Fund) represents about one quarter of its aid budget. Therefore, one fourth of French ODA is not under French government or parliamentary control (Charasse, 2001: 20).[10]

Another feature, notwithstanding the discussion in the previous section, is a noticeable disengagement from the poorest sub-Saharan African states. By the late 1990s, only three of the top-ten largest French aid recipients were special interest countries (the top ten were, in order: New Caledonia; Polynesia; Egypt; Morocco; Senegal; Ivory Coast; Cameroon; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Tunisia and Vietnam) (OECD, 2000). Moreover, the total development aid sent to Africa diminished from 55 percent of the total in 1988 to 48 percent in 1998, leading one critic to note that France risks losing what was traditionally considered to be her *chasse gardée*, loosely translated as a "private domain" (Charasse, 2001: 21). In summary, France's ODA program is the fourth largest in the world in absolute terms (behind the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom) but it is eighth in terms of its percentage of GDP spent on ODA (OECD, 2000), leading critics to believe that France's standing will suffer ("*La France avare,*" 2002).

Having discussed the philosophy and bureaucratic structure behind France's foreign affairs and foreign aid program, we now turn to the analysis of the potential impact of the strategic, humanitarian and economic factors—in addition to the media's impact—to assess how these come into play in explaining French ODA policy.

Foreign Development Aid: Data and Variables

The dependent variable of interest is the same: the commitment of Official Development Assistance as reported by the DAC of the OECD in the organization's annual study, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.[11] The major independent variable on media coverage used for the analysis of France is:

> *Le Monde*. The level of *Le Monde* news coverage is coded using the *Le Monde* index. This is an annual count of the number of news stories listed under the heading for the country. This includes all country-specific cross-references to stories listed under other headings, but excluding sports coverage.

The choice of using *Le Monde* was based principally on two factors. First and most simply, the data were available in print form for the entire period under study. Using a print index as opposed to a CD-Rom index, however, posed some interesting challenges. Multiple listings were frequent in the *Le Monde* index and great care was taken by the researchers to cover as many cross-listings as possible. For example, a story on Morocco could be listed under the normal heading Morocco or as France/Foreign Policy/Morocco; also under King Hassan II; or even as Regional Conflicts/Western Sahara. We noticed that while a CD-Rom search would tend to include more items than we wanted (recall the example for "Turkey" provided earlier: in the *Times* (London) Index on CD-Rom we had to disregard entries related to the bird and the holiday, among others), the print version of a newspaper index tends to scatter entries.

Another challenge was to avoid double-counts. For example, some stories could appear several times: a typhoon in Bangladesh could be listed in the index under the normal entry Bangladesh but could also be listed under Natural Catastrophes or even Typhoons. In this case as well, great care was given to minimize errors of omissions (missing an entry) and double-counts (when stories appeared in more than one entry).

A second reason for selecting *Le Monde* was that, in our opinion, *Le Monde* coverage is generally the most neutral. Just as is the case in Britain and in other European countries, the French press is partisan in nature.

Thus, newspapers such as *Le Monde Diplomatique* and *Libération* have a decidedly left-wing bias, and the daily *Figaro* is associated with the RPR party (the center–right party of President Chirac).

Indeed, a problem in France is that "France has not been truly well served by its media" (Blondel, 1997: 146). Until one generation ago the media were controlled by the government. Moreover, the standard of objectivity and competition for a scoop are Anglo-Saxon ideals. The French media

> suffer from the classic French characteristics of nationalistic elitism . . . [c]ulture is given great emphasis . . . but culture is regarded as being true if it is essentially French. As a result, the "Americanization" of the media is (officially, at least) . . . markedly frowned upon. (Blondel, 1997: 146)

In this national situation of partisan coverage, uneven quality and elitist bias, *Le Monde* therefore stands out as an exception. Of all the newspapers we sampled, *Le Monde* has the most consistently neutral coverage and focus on international news.

As previously argued, development assistance is often argued to be a humanitarian effort directed toward impoverished states and this is most effectively captured by using the per capita GNP or GDP of the recipient country to measure the level of economic need in the recipient state. The GNP data are coded from the same source as the aid data and the expectation for the analysis is again that there will be a strong inverse relationship between per capita GNP and aid.

> Per Capita GNP. To capture the humanitarian motive for aid, the per capita gross national product (GNP) of a country, as reported by the World Bank, is used as a measure of the level of need in the potential recipient. In the analysis, this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.

To capture the economic exploitation motive for aid, the balance of trade between the donor and the recipient country is used in this analysis as well.

> Balance of Trade. To capture the economic interests in the recipient country, a measure of the aggregate volume of bilateral trade between France and the recipient states is used. The balance of trade is simply the aggregate volume of exports from the donor (France) to the aid recipient, minus imports from the recipient as reported by the International Monetary Fund in the Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook and this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.

Consistent with a Marxist/globalist perspective, we expect a positive relationship to emerge from the statistical analysis. Moreover, French aid to Africa is and has been seen—rightly or wrongly—as a way to preserve the region "for French business" (Kramer, 2002: 63).

Our previous analysis of the British case points out that its ODA is greatly influenced by its membership in the Commonwealth, which represents Britain's strategic motive for giving aid to certain countries. As discussed earlier in the chapter, France is also a former colonial power and has a long tradition of exporting its culture as a counterweight to American or Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony; we fully expect this to be borne out in a statistical analysis of aid levels. In this analysis we evaluate the hypothesis that, all else being equal, France is more likely to give foreign aid to its former colonies, where it has continuing interests. Thus, the dummy variable described here serves the same purpose as the Commonwealth membership variable used to evaluate British aid, and represents the strategic motive for aid as embodied in the continuing legacy of France's empire (see also Schraeder et al., 1998):

> French Colony. Formal alliance commitments fail to capture the full extent of France's strategic relationships with many less developed countries. The special relationship that defines France's interactions with its former colonies is of particular importance in relation to the distribution of aid. To capture the effect this has on aid, a dummy variable is coded to indicate if a recipient was formerly a French colony.

Finally, the model incorporates previous aid commitments to recipient countries, which captures the normal bureaucratic process of ODA decision-making.

> Previous Year's Commitment. In most depictions of the aid allocation process it is argued that the previous year's aid commitment is used as a reference level from which the current year's allocation is made. To account for this incremental type of decision-making in the aid process, the previous year's aid commitment is used as an independent variable in the regression equation.

The models we evaluate in the following analysis are therefore as closely constructed to the other models as possible, in order to measure the same fundamental influences.

Results and Analysis

The results presented in table 5.1 provide substantial evidence for the proposition that French foreign aid bureaucracies respond to the overall

Table 5.1 Effect of *Le Monde* coverage on commitments of French development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	$P > \|z\|$
Le Monde coverage	0.0666392	0.0276176	2.413	0.016
Per capita GNP (lag)	−0.8174042	0.4009943	−2.038	0.042
Trade balance (lag)	0.008212	0.0114677	0.716	0.474
French colony	43.95902	9.411102	4.671	0.000
Previous year's aid	0.4933542	0.1279491	3.856	0.000
Constant	6.647353	2.040825	3.257	0.001

R-square = 0.4246; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 290.10; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 1,116.

salience of a recipient in the news media. *Le Monde* coverage is significantly and positively correlated with levels of French foreign aid; more specifically, since the data on foreign aid allocations are expressed in millions of dollars US, we can crudely say that every additional article in *Le Monde* correlates with an increase of additional $66,640 in aid.[12] This figure is significant to the $p < 0.05$ level.

Confidence in this relationship is enhanced by the results reported for the other independent variables in the analysis, all of which are consistent with expectations and similar to findings reported for other aid donors.

Increases in recipient states' GNP correlate significantly with a decrease in aid; thus, poorer states get more aid. As an example of the magnitude of the relationship, we can estimate that for every $1,000 increase in recipient states' per capita GNP, French ODA levels decrease by approximately $817,000.

While potentially exploitative relationships between France and recipient states as expressed in trade imbalances were expected, it is not supported since the coefficient is not statistically significant. This interesting finding suggests that domestic economic considerations do not figure in France's foreign aid policies. Incidentally, this finding was exactly the same in Schraeder et al.'s (1998: 318) study, where they found that "[i]n contrast to the expectation of the case study literature, the statistical findings suggest that economic interests did not play in French foreign aid policies toward Africa." They go on to explain that the relationship probably washes out because of the "Franc Zone" policy mentioned earlier. The cultural considerations of maintaining a strong *Francophonie* "at all costs eventually led to the subjugation of economic factors to cultural ideals" (Schraeder et al., 1998: 319). Thus, the power of the cultural motivation can hardly be overstated.

It is therefore not surprising to find in table 5.1 that France's continuing relationship with its former colonies is extremely strong. In fact, just being a former French colony correlates with an increased aid grant of over $43 million per year. The coefficient is thus much stronger than the Commonwealth variable representing the British ties to its former colonies. The deep tie to the notion of an international *Francophonie* and the cultural imperative discussed earlier in this chapter is further substantiated.

Finally, and as expected, the bureaucratic aid process is represented by the variable representing previous year's aid levels, and there are no surprises. The conclusions that can be drawn are that while France's aid program is overwhelmingly tied to its former colonies, our model depicting the media's influence on the bureaucratic decision-making process is supported and continues to be a factor through an analysis of a third country's ODA program.

Nevertheless, a more nuanced analysis of media coverage also was conducted for France to capture the various dimensions of news coverage and the impacts it could have on the donor's decision-making process. The same type of news content analysis was conducted for the 89,982 news stories about recipient countries that we counted in the *Le Monde* index. To recap:

> Negative. This measures the number of stories involving conflicts or political disputes with France, violent crimes against French citizens, reports of human rights abuses and reports of support for international terrorism. Also included in this category are reports of antidemocratic government actions in recipient countries that do not involve human rights abuses (such as the suspension of elections). Only stories that clearly met one of these criteria were coded as negative.
>
> Unrest. This includes stories where ongoing violent political unrest is a significant or primary focus of coverage. While we view unrest as essentially negative coverage, there have been hints in previous research (i.e. Van Belle, 2000) that separating unrest coverage might generate additional insights into the influence of the media on foreign aid (Van Belle and Hook, 2000).
>
> Need. This category includes articles reporting natural disasters, famine, poverty or general conditions of want or need in recipient countries.
>
> Net Coverage. This was treated as a residual category to capture the neutral and positive coverage in *Le Monde* that did not fit in the other categories. It was calculated by subtracting the above categories from the total coverage variable.

The results of the second model are reported in table 5.2. We find here that the explanatory power of the media coverage variables wash out. The coefficients generally are in the expected direction, specifically the net

Table 5.2 Effect of *Le Monde* coverage content on commitments of French development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	$P > \|z\|$
Le Monde net coverage	0.0687652	0.0419517	1.639	0.101
Le Monde negative coverage	0.4794511	0.780712	0.614	0.539
Le Monde unrest coverage	−0.1089203	0.1954406	−0.557	0.577
Le Monde need coverage	0.2059246	0.9831882	0.209	0.834
Per capita GNP (lag)	−0.7821013	0.4231571	−1.848	0.065
Trade balance (lg)	0.0099459	0.0117651	0.845	0.398
French colony	43.74893	9.390324	4.659	0.000
Previous year's aid	0.4914223	0.1282554	3.832	0.000
Constant	6.585106	2.139082	3.078	0.002

R-square = 0.4249; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 289.19; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 1,105.

coverage, unrest and need categories. We could normally say here that general coverage as well as disaster coverage of recipient states in *Le Monde* correlates with increased aid, and that unrest in a recipient country would tend to decrease aid. However, neither of the coefficients are statistically significant to the conventional $p < 0.05$ level.

An interesting observation is that the negative coverage variable's coefficient, although not statistically significant, is positive. We surmise that many African states that are negatively covered in the press are former colonies, and that France's extremely strong official commitment to its former colonies overrides any negative feedback caused by abuses that might occur, perhaps with the idea that constructive engagement through ODA will eventually produce positive sociopolitical results in these poor states.

The rest of the variables in this model continue to tell the same story as previously described in the first general model, except that the variable representing the humanitarian motive (per capita GNP) is no longer statistically significant—but it is just barely beyond the conventional threshold.

Conclusions

This analysis has implications for both the study of the French foreign aid program specifically, and for comparative foreign aid and foreign policy studies in general. The strongest relationship that we uncovered was not very surprising the strong relationship between France and its former colonies. This result had been empirically demonstrated by previous studies (e.g. Schraeder et al., 1998), yet the magnitude of the coefficient was

unexpectedly large. Recall that former colonies received, on average and all else being equal, over $4.3 million more in aid than other poor states. Unquestionably, the cultural motive of the French aid program cannot be overstated.

Another stimulating result for the study of France and French foreign policy was the evidence of a relationship between *Le Monde*'s coverage and foreign aid allocations, supports the previous analyses that emphasize the role of the news media in foreign policy decisions. Scholars arguing that the news media is looked to as an indicator of the public interests, or that it serves as an intermediary between the groups or individuals expressing interests and public officials, may find this evidence—coming from a country that is very different from the United States both culturally and politically—very encouraging.

We found, however, that the relationship was weaker in the second analysis. This may be due to the profound differences in French culture generally or in the unitary and centralized nature of the French bureaucracy specifically. Or it may simply be an artifact of our selection of *Le Monde* as being a center or neutral representative of the news media. France's politically very polarized landscape means there is a multitude of pressures, information sources and outlets. Perhaps the closed nature of France's bureaucracy is more immune to these outside pressures.

As this chapter was being researched and prepared, we found no exhaustive empirical studies of the French media and its influence in French politics (which obviously should not be construed as meaning that none exist, but rather that none were discovered by the authors, one of whom is a native French speaker). In an interview conducted for this study, the French Embassy's Second Counselor to Canada, Mr. Emmanuel Rousseau denied that the media has an impact on policy making in Paris, stating that the CNN-effect is marginal (except perhaps, he noted, in certain crisis or emergency situations, which is a topic we address in chapter 9) (Rousseau, 2002).

At the very least, however, the evidence presented in this chapter can cast some doubt on arguments that would exclude or deny a role for the media in French politics or in French foreign policy.

CHAPTER 6

THE CHALLENGE OF A DISAGGREGATED AID PROGRAM: NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE AND JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT AID

We begin this chapter with an assertion of convergence and then a puzzle. While the data on press influence over aid allocations in Japan presented in this chapter are generally consistent with the findings for the other four countries, there are some intriguing differences. To put one conclusion from the data first, the complex and disaggregated nature of the Japanese aid program, encompassing as many as 18 agencies with no overarching coordinating mechanism or doctrine, complicates the analysis and makes it difficult to tie the results to the actions of a coherent bureaucratic entity. The initial results from the baseline analysis appear discouraging and it is not until steps are taken to cut through the complexity of the Japanese multiagency system that the effect of the media and other influences becomes apparent. Even with these difficulties, the analyses indicate that the media are more influential than generally supposed in the study of Japanese foreign policy. The finer-grained analysis of the data that suggest that press influence, while not as simple or straightforward as might otherwise be concluded from the other donors analyzed is still quite clear.

Beyond what these analyses can say about the bureaucratic responsiveness proposition, in drawing conclusions specific to the Japanese case, we urge a reexamination of the standard interpretations of Japanese aid policy making as a largely internal bureaucratic game. We also suggest some insights into press–bureaucratic interactions in what has been termed both an elite-dominated and a media-saturated society.

The Media in Japanese Politics

An extensive body of literature has emerged regarding the news media's impact on other aspects of foreign policy in countries other than Japan. Scholarship on the relationship between media and politics in Japan, however, has been framed largely in terms of domestic politics (Pharr and Krauss, 1996; Feldman, 1993; Krauss, 2000). There has been little attention paid to media impact on foreign policy. Studies of Japan's foreign policy and diplomacy, both in Japanese and English, routinely fail to even mention the media in their assessments of foreign policy actors and processes. Recent Japanese social science work on media impact on foreign policy focuses on relations with the United States (Ishizawa, 1994) or on how the foreign media presents Japan in its coverage (Kimura and Tadokoro, 1998). Calder (1997) and Hook et al. (2001) briefly speculate on the increased role of the media in the foreign policy process in the 1990s, but their comments are tentative and largely repeat the conclusions of those scholars of domestic media. The overwhelming emphasis on diplomatic history among Japanese scholars is one explanation for this. Given the social science tools available to scholars to alert them to the possible effects of media institutions on the content and process of foreign policy making, this is a bit of a puzzle.

As with the other empirical chapters, this tests the proposition that, controlling for other factors, developing countries that attract high levels of news coverage are more prone to receive relatively large volumes of development aid than countries that are neglected or ignored entirely by the news media. Beyond what examining this proposition in the Japanese case can tell the United States about Japanese foreign aid programs, evidence of a relationship between news coverage and aid flows raises important theoretical issues relating to the domestic determinants of state behavior, a subject of increasing interest in the study of Japan and its foreign policies. Further, since foreign aid is a largely bureaucratic process, such a relationship also provides broader insights into the role of the news media in the responsiveness of unelected officials in an otherwise democratic environment.

In this chapter, we review the predominant approaches to the study of Japanese foreign aid. We add the domestic political model of foreign policy, which, when combined with an agency theory perspective on the responsiveness of bureaucracies, provides surprising results given the current understanding of aid policy. Finally, we evaluate statistically the hypothesized effect of news media coverage. We conclude that the news media is more influential in aid policy than previously thought, and that the role of the news media should be part of any comprehensive model of foreign aid and foreign policy in Japan.

The Japanese Political Context

The Japanese case is particularly intriguing because the conventional view of the Japanese state flies in the face of the bureaucratic politics model we use here. The bureaucratic responsiveness model laid out in chapter 2, and elaborated throughout this study, derives from the experience of U.S. politics. That framework assumes, explicitly or implicitly, the following about policy making at the national level. First, divided government strengthens the potential influence of media on policy making because it multiplies the principals that interact with bureaucratic agents. Strong congressional oversight demands bureaucratic responsiveness to changes in the political agenda. Equally, strong executive leadership, manifested in strong presidential leadership in foreign policy and, *inter alia*, significant appointment power over the upper levels of the federal civil service itself (especially compared to most parliamentary systems), can be brought to bear on bureaucrats. Second, a pluralistic political system sustains an independent media and provides multiple channels of access to decision-makers.

These assumptions are questionable in the Japanese case. As in the French case, Japan has long had a national bureaucracy characterized by its elite status originating in recruitment from top universities. In further contrast to the United States, Japanese bureaucracies play a significant and proactive role in policy formulation, they have wide discretion over policy implementation and there is only a minimal amount of systematic supervision by the legislature. In general, legislative oversight of the bureaucracy is weak, both because of the lack of legislative interpellation skills and resources and because of the long-standing habit of cabinet members relying on their chief bureaucrats to answer Diet members' questions during interpellation.

In the case of ODA specifically, legislative interest tends to be country-specific (in the case of parliamentarians' friendship councils) or project-specific. Executive leadership is equally weak. Even the strongest arguments in favor of prime ministerial power in Japan pale in comparison to the resources an American president wields (see Hayao, 1993). The conventional view of cabinet ministers pictures them as neither interested nor expert in their ministries' purviews. Additionally, the power that the senior career bureaucrats in any cabinet-level ministry, administrative vice ministers, have over their ministers' understanding of policy issues is legendary. This information imbalance is exacerbated by the quick turnover in cabinet positions, changing annually since the onset of Liberal Democratic Party dominance in the mid-1950s.

Perspectives on Japanese Foreign Aid

Scholarly study of Japan's aid has focused on three main motives. The first is the economic motivation. Japan's case is significant in that its resource dependency and emphasis on economic diplomacy as a substitute for military power projection make it difficult to neatly distinguish the pure trade and a direct foreign investment motivation for aid-giving from security considerations. It is widely observed that Japan's aid program grew out of its early postwar reparations settlements with East Asia, the agreements for which paved the way for Japan's commercial and diplomatic reentry into the region. Aid has been closely linked to commercial exports to developing countries. It also supports Japanese construction companies and project consultants, and through the 1980s Japan only slowly and reluctantly untied its loan aid program.

In the 1970s especially, aid was formulated as a component of resource diplomacy, in which countries that supplied raw materials critical to Japanese industry received aid as part of Japan's attempts to stay on good terms with them. Since the 1980s, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has been a vigorous proponent of a strategy of linking aid, trade and direct foreign investment to facilitate the orderly relocation of declining Japanese industries to the rest of Asia. Arase (1994, 1995) has demonstrated that the private sector is a critical source of technical expertise within the official aid program, and that position helps sustain the commercial orientation of aid. The empirical record of aid flows over the last 30 years shows consistent evidence for the economic motivation (Hook, 1995; Schraeder et al., 1998); if anything, the 1990s recession has refocused attention on aid's economic benefits to Japanese companies (Hook and Zhang, 1998). Policies retying certain kinds of loan aid since 1997 reinforce the continued salience of domestic economic considerations in the program.

The second motive involves the traditional concern of security. In the 1980s, the Japanese government began to consider aid in terms of international security more strictly defined. Aid was linked to maintenance of the Western alliance in the Cold War and to a new doctrine of comprehensive security formulated by the Ohira cabinet. Countries without significant prior aid relations with Japan, such as Turkey, Pakistan and Jamaica, began to receive development aid because of their strategic positions in the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, while long-term recipients of strategic importance, such as Thailand, received augmented funding (Yasutomo, 1986). In addition, increasing levels of aid were seen as a way Japan could demonstrate to its key ally, the United States, that it was serious about maintaining the international system. Given the domestic

impediments to a serious military role in international affairs, aid has acted as a substitute for a proactive and significantly enhanced defense capability. Moreover, aid as a demonstration of defense burden-sharing with the United States became an important policy priority in itself as bilateral economic friction increased in the 1980s (Orr, 1990; Igarashi, 1990).

The third motivation is closely related to the second. As Japan emerged as the world's largest bilateral donor in the 1990s, questions about its international role naturally came to the forefront. Aid became a measure of foreign policy leadership in the international community (Rix, 1993). The formulation of an Official Development Assistance Charter in 1992 should be seen as an attempt to establish a basic policy framework for this international contribution. The Charter lays out four priority areas for foreign aid: assistance for the promotion of democratization, demilitarization, human rights and environmental protection. While the Charter remains contested even within the bureaucracy, increased attention to international environmental protection (Potter, 1994, 2002) and linkage of aid to human rights (see Oshiba, 1999) are best understood as ways in which Japan has accommodated new issues in post–Cold War international politics. Whether the aid program changed fundamentally as a result remains unclear. Shimomura et al. (1999) have found at best ambiguous statistical evidence that Japanese aid supports Charter issue areas. Saito (1996) found empirical support in the grant aid program for the humanitarian considerations embodied in the Charter, but found that the much larger loan aid program still correlated with the economic motivation for aid. Hook and Zhang (1998) argue that there has been little actual change in aid implementation.

ODA Administration in Japan

Aid administration in all of the donors examined in this study is subject to problems of overlapping jurisdictions and bureaucratic competition in any country (e.g. Ruttan, 1996). The high degree of decentralization in Japan's aid bureaucracy, however, distinguishes it from other major donors. There is no aid ministry, nor does any other single agency control the budgeting and implementation process. During the period under investigation here, aid policy was decided by negotiation among the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, International Trade and Industry and the Economic Planning Agency. This so-called four-agency system (*yon-shouchou taisei*) sat atop an even more decentralized implementation system. The aid budget was calculated by pooling the separate allotments of up to 18 agencies. Two official implementing agencies, JICA and the OECF (see table 6.1 for

Table 6.1 Agencies relevant to the administration of Japanese official development assistance

Agency Name	*Acronym*	*Function*
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	MFA	Policy making
Ministry of Finance	MOF	Policy making
Ministry of International Trade and Industry	MITI	Policy making
Economic Planning Agency	EPA	Policy making
Ministry of Agriculture	MAFF	Implementing
Ministry of Health and Welfare	MHW	Implementing
Ministry of Justice	MOJ	Implementing
Ministry of Transport	MOT	Implementing
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications	MPT	Implementing
Ministry of Education	MOE	Implementing
Ministry of Labor	MOL	Implementing
Ministry of Construction	MOC	Implementing
Environment Agency	EA	Implementing
National Police Agency	NPA	Implementing
National Land Agency	NLA	Implementing
Management and Coordination Agency	MCA	Implementing
Science and Technology Agency	STA	Implementing
Japan International Cooperation Agency	JICA	Implementing, coordination
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund	OECF	Implementing, coordination

Source: Gaimusho, *Waga Kuni no Seifu kaihatsu Enjo*. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Kokusai Kyoryoku Suishin Kyokai, 2000, p. 144. Relevant ODA agencies are defined as those concerned with ODA policy making and implementation during the period under discussion in this chapter. Administrative reforms implemented between 1998 and 2001 have altered this list somewhat.

a listing of these agencies and their acronyms), oversaw the implementation of the grant and loan aid programs, respectively. Administrative reform culminating in the reshuffle of cabinet ministries in January 2001, has resulted in a modest change in the aid structure since 1998, but the comparatively extreme decentralization remains mostly intact and was clearly intact throughout the period studied here. The inevitable consequence of this diffuse administrative structure has been competition among agencies for budgetary resources and policy influence. Another is the inability to agree on creation of an aid agency along the lines of USAID in the United States, the ODA in Britain or the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in Canada, or even on a basic policy that would govern aid allocations.

Table 6.1 shows the national agencies involved in the policy making and distribution of Japan's foreign aid in 1998, the last year of our survey. The annual "ODA budget" is in some sense fictional, in that it is not a coherent budgetary expenditure. The figures reported simply reflect the aggregation of individual agency requests and subsequent allocations. It is also important to note that budget allocations are far from even across these agencies. In 1998 the top two ministries accounted for almost 87 percent of the total aid budget. With jurisdiction over multilateral aid, the Ministry of Finance accounted for 57.7 percent of the total aid budget and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has jurisdiction over grant aid, accounted for another 29 percent. While not all agencies receive budget allocations every year, the major players consistently do and the sheer number of relevant agencies accounting for the remaining 13 percent is arresting and has important implications for policy. In particular, interagency coordination has always been difficult. In fact, it was not until March 1999, at the tail end of a year in which the overall aid budget declined by an unprecedented 10 percent, that a 17-agency coordination council was finally established.

Decentralization fosters divergent understandings of the nature and purpose of foreign aid. Most scholars agree that the main division in the aid program lies between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Economy and Industry (METI, previously MITI). Each perceives aid in terms of its broader mission, and each continues the longstanding practice of issuing its own annual foreign aid white paper. MITI/METI champions a mercantilist perspective, understanding foreign aid as part of broader economic interactions, such as trade and direct foreign investment, intended to support Japanese industry abroad. Its policy reintroducing tied yen loans in Japan's aid, a response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, demonstrates the continuation of a mercantilist bent in that ministry's orientation to foreign aid. MFA, in contrast, champions a strategy tied to considerations of diplomacy and adherence to international norms. Thus, it sees aid as closely related to Japan's political position internationally. Aid is a tool of foreign policy that is to be used to seek support from recipient countries that are important to Japan. Aid also serves to demonstrate Japan's leadership in international affairs.

The contrast in policy orientations can be seen in two key policy documents issued in the last decade: the 1992 ODA Charter and MITI's 1997 *White Paper on Economic Cooperation*. The first, produced under MFA auspices, includes support for democratization, support for demilitarization and support of the environment as principles fundamental to the aid program. MITI's 1997 White Paper, on the other hand, calls for greater

privatization of economic cooperation with Asia, the clear intent being a reduction of official flows in favor of expanded private sector trade and investment.

Extreme decentralization has a clear impact on the empirical analysis of Japanese aid, but it also has implications for policy input by actors outside the government. It may increase points of access for particularistic demands while, at the same time, it also diffuses those points. Decentralization is widely decried by aid scholars and journalists as a serious obstacle to overall accountability. Decentralization, however, has also increased the likelihood of a domestic political imperative because different parts of the aid bureaucracy cultivate different allies in civil society. This also relates to the well-known bifurcation in aid policy. Saori Katada (2002) argues that the bifurcation continues because each perspective is supported by and serves the interests of different domestic constituencies.

Further complicating matters, bureaucratic understandings of the appropriate roles to be played by societal forces are rather schizophrenic. On one hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that aid officials are dismissive of public opinion and media roles in policy making (Rix, 1993: 54, 55, 59). On the other, foreign ministry documents have admitted the importance of such inputs, but defensively. Statements are usually couched in terms of the need to gain public understanding of foreign aid, which suggests that greater public education efforts by the government would eliminate discrepancies between societal expectations and policy.

Foreign Policy and the Domestic Political Motive

Japan presents a particularly challenging case for the domestic imperatives model. Most important, the Japanese state possesses a national civil service that has long been seen as autonomous from societal pressures. The Meiji state in the late nineteenth century created a bureaucracy designed to control and transform society. The bureaucracy since World War II has been noticeably weakened and democratized compared to its prewar predecessor, but the image of an administrative elite that stands above political pressure has until recently prevailed in Japanese society and in the bureaucracy itself (Koh, 1989). In reality, of course, some parts of the civil service are relatively autonomous from societal influence while others are not. A distinction can be made between the so-called politicized ministries (e.g. Construction, Transport, Agriculture) that are subject to a great deal of societal demands for compensation mediated through the Diet, and nonpoliticized ministries (e.g. International Trade and Industry, Finance and Foreign Affairs) that retain independence of action.[1] Yet, overall, we

should expect less potential outside influence on bureaucratic decision-making than we find in, say, the United States.

As noted here, aid policy in Japan has been characterized as largely the preserve of bureaucratic actors and certain parts of the private sector that support them. Indeed, we may say that the domestic political imperative has been cast in terms of support for the construction and engineering industries,[2] with little or no attention systematically paid to the impact of other actors on aid policy. While public awareness of the aid program has increased in the last 15 years, the public is not well versed in the details of the aid program. One quarter of respondents to a recent public opinion poll said they do not know about the aid program at all. Significantly, public understanding of the aims and priority sectors of Japan's aid were at variance with the realities of the program (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 1999). The Diet has the legal authority to direct aid policy, but does so rarely and only to set the broad parameters of policy. The involvement of top-level, elected officials in the aid allocation process, however, is usually quite limited. Individual Diet members generally interest themselves with aid policy only on behalf of clients interested in specific projects (see Rix, 1993; Asaumi, 2000). The cabinet usually involves itself only when issues are too controversial to be handled through routine bureaucratic channels. Yasutomo (2000) characterizes Diet lawmaking to restructure the aid program and to reduce annual aid budgets since 1997 as unusually active parliamentary intervention. Significantly, the ODA Charter set forth in 1992, and that represents the closest thing to an aid basic policy Japan now has, was the product of the Foreign Ministry. The Charter was never passed as a bill in the legislature. Corporate input is felt most strongly at the project level (Arase, 1994). NGOs remain marginal to the aid program and are viewed by the bureaucracy as implementers of development assistance priorities rather than makers of those priorities (Rix, 1993; Potter, 1999).

Applying the Logic of Bureaucratic Responsiveness Argument to Japan

As was made clear in chapter 2, the argument for bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media builds on both the conceptual and empirical contributions of the principal–agent model (see Weingast, 1984). Agency theory is structured around the basic premise that bureaucracies are agents that act on behalf of elected officials in a relationship similar to a business contract. Bureaucracies are employed by elected representatives to perform a specified set of functions. The relationship is clearly hierarchical, with the bureaucracy serving its elected "customers." The application of agency

theory to the study of U.S. bureaucracies led to dynamic models depicting bureaucracies that were responsive to demands. This theoretical perspective, combined with the development of new statistical techniques has produced empirical results that point to an interactive relationship between bureaucracies and political forces in the democratic context. Assessments of agency theory in terms of Japan are limited. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) have applied agency theory to the analysis of policy-making relations between Diet and national bureaucracy in Japan, although this remains a minority position in discussions of that relationship.[3]

As noted elsewhere in this book, the principal–agent model assumes that the elected officials charged with bureaucratic oversight do not constantly monitor every action of the bureaucracy. Instead, they react to indications or complaints regarding poor performance. If unsatisfactory output from the bureaucracy is brought to the attention of its elected overseers, then oversight mechanisms are triggered. Bureaucracies are then expected to be responsive to the desires of the public and strive to effectively fulfill their assigned tasks because they wish to avoid triggering this oversight measure.

Theoretically, the application of this model in the Japanese case is consistent with the principal–agent approach championed most famously by Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993). This has not proved to be a popular framework for subsequent study of Japanese politics, however. Empirical study of bureaucracy–politician relations nevertheless supports the bureaucratic responsiveness model. Park's study of bureaucrat–minister relations (1986) concludes that politicians exercise considerable influence over the content and direction of public policy. Strikingly, elite bureaucrats interviewed by Park admit to this state of affairs. Most important for the research at hand, Park argues that bureaucratic proposals must be approved by Liberal Democratic Party policy mechanisms, the *zoku*, and the cabinet before they can be enacted. This is true not only of the so-called politicized ministries and agencies (a term Park does not use) but of the elite ministries as well. The bureaucrats understand this and engage in extensive extra-Diet negotiations with their legislative counterparts prior to formal introduction of proposals.

The ministry's policy coordination with the party starts in the earliest stages of agency policy making. It needs to be stressed anew here that the bureaucrats are very much governed by the "rule of anticipated reaction" (*jishu kisei*) in all stages of policy making and party–bureaucracy policy coordination, starting with the initial and foremost decision of whether the matter on hand should be taken up or not (Park, 1986: 100).

To rephrase Park in our terms, in this characterization of policy making Japanese bureaucrats are clearly in the place of agents trying to anticipate

their principals' preferences. Through their power over policy, personnel decisions and other resources ministers are in a position to sanction agents who act contrary to those preferences. The fact that ministers do not always do so is not inconsistent with the agency theory. Principals do not always have to threaten sanctions in order for their agents to anticipate and act on ministers' policy preferences.

There is also some qualitative evidence that aid bureaucrats use the media to anticipate political reactions. Rix (1993) points out that aid "scandals" erupt from time to time, and the media tends to cover them intensively even if only for a short time. Questions during Diet interpellations are likely to accompany breaking scandals, a possibility that aid bureaucrats are eager to avoid:

> The aid programmed is affected primarily by political sensitivities, fuelled by wider public discussion of aid, and reflected in the parliamentary arena. Because the Japanese political process provides for questioning of civil servants in parliamentary committees, bureaucratic policymakers become quickly exposed to the heat of political scandal involving aid. These occasions are not frequent, nor long-lasting, but they can be intense. (Rix, 1993: 49)

Rix elsewhere cites an interview with an aid official who acknowledges both the possibility of Diet interpellation and bureaucrats' preference for avoiding it (Rix, 1993: 55).

To summarize the findings, there is circumstantial but real support for the proposition that the public and the media exercise an effect on policy, specifically on aid policy. We do not yet know, however, whether the media exercise an influence on bilateral aid allocations.

Beyond the larger study of the role of media in bureaucratic politics, this research is also interesting because it suggests a line of research that challenges current conventional wisdom about foreign policy in Japan. For most scholars of Japanese foreign policy, especially those writing in Japanese, neither public opinion nor the media is a key foreign policy actor. Case studies of individual foreign policy instances suggest that public opinion is a background factor that rarely directs the course of bilateral negotiations or the formation of government policy positions. On issues key to foreign policy makers, the public is largely ambivalent and often self-professedly uninformed (Hellmann, 1969: Fukui, 1977a,b; Watanabe, 1977; Inoguchi, 1991). Risse-Kappen (1991) concluded that Japanese public opinion on defense spending and the perception of Soviet threat in the 1980s set the outside parameters for policy innovation. Schoppa's (1997) study of Japanese–American economic relations suggests that public

opinion has at most an indirect impact on bureaucratic decision-making. Consistent with this assumption, most research on public opinion and Japan's foreign aid typically confines itself to examinations of public support for ODA in general (see Imai et al., 1992).

Similarly, there is widespread consensus among scholars that the press plays only a marginal role in Japan's aid policy making. Until the mid-1980s the media did not pay much attention to the aid program. Coverage was fragmented and episodic when it did, and tended to cover either government statements or scandals involving award of contracts. Media coverage of foreign aid increased in the mid-1980s in the wake of scandals involving collusion between Japanese contractors and the recently ousted Marcos administration in the Philippines, and continued as Japan rose to prominence as the world's largest bilateral donor. Attention still focuses on short-term phenomena such as bid fixing or involvement by politicians in contract negotiations. Alternatively, stock government pronouncements of the conclusion of agreements between the government of Japan and recipient counterparts continue to remain a staple of day-to-day coverage by the mainstream press. Coverage often lapses as other newsworthy topics emerge. In any case, media focus on the underside of the aid program, it can be argued, limits its impact on aid policy because the information it provides is short-term and fails to provide the public with a larger understanding of aid policy and its process. Quantitative research on determinants of Japan's foreign aid found no correlation between media coverage of foreign aid per se and geographic or sectoral disbursements (Mori, 1995). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that the foreign aid bureaucracy tends to view the public and media roles as properly marginal (see Rix, 1993).[4]

The scholarly consensus, however, is based on qualitative research observation. Rix (1993) and Kusano (1999, 2000), for example, discuss media coverage of foreign aid, but the concern is with alleged bias of such coverage, how journalists go about investigating aid stories and how that affects what they write. Kusano in particular is concerned with what he sees as misguided criticism of the aid program while Rix's account makes finer distinctions between kinds of coverage. Most recently, Katada (2002) argues that, *inter alia*, the media played a role in shaping Japan's decision to suspend foreign aid to China in 1995. While these analyses are plausible and interesting, they are too limited to allow generalizations about media impact either on the aid program or public opinion about it.

There are structural reasons for considering the possibility of media influence on aid policy to individual countries. It is widely argued that the press club system acts as a serious obstacle to independent, critical coverage

of politics in Japan because journalists depend on officialdom for news about government (Pharr and Krauss, 1996; Feldman, 1993). Mainstream media, it is argued, are reluctant to publicize critical news about public officials, and often wait for the tabloid press to raise a scandal before proceeding with sensitive stories (Farley, 1996). While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains a press club, coverage of international events does not rely on the press club system. The major media pool resources to support independent international news sources. Kusano (1999) observes that reporters covering ODA stories in developing countries rely on a variety of sources, including business and NGOs, for their information. The possibility for a news stream independent of official Japanese sources is correspondingly greater than with domestic political news. Agenda setting, moreover, is clearly a media function that the press exercises in the foreign aid realm, perhaps not always well (Rix, 1993). More broadly, the media in Japan influences public opinion on domestic and foreign affairs and as a source of information and insight. Bureaucratic policy makers take the media seriously (Kabashima, 1990; Feldman, 1993). There is no compelling reason why this should not be the case with foreign aid, albeit subject to the problem of diffuse responsibility mentioned earlier.

The expectation of leadership responsiveness to the news media arises out of the functional role the news media play in the democratic political process. In democratic political systems, officials will at some point be accountable to the public for the policies they make and implement. Elected officials will most clearly understand this, nonelected officials undoubtedly less. In his study of Japan's foreign policy making, Fukui asserts the following:

> (W)e may assume that politicians, who depend directly on the support of the electorate for their status and power, are more sensitive and vulnerable than the bureaucrats to the pressure of public opinion and mass media. As the role of politicians increases in a controversial situation, so does the influence of the general public and the mass media. (Fukui, 1977a: 139)

The basic argument for bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media, the idea that the media serve as an indicator of the domestic political importance of an issue, event or country, is clearly applicable to the Japanese case. We also offer some more detailed connections with the conclusions and arguments from the study of Japanese politics and foreign policy.

In the context of applying the bureaucratic responsiveness argument to the Japanese case, we propose that Japan's bureaucracy is responsive to media input for two reasons related to classic media functions: mobilization

of public opinion and information provision. The first requires a link between bureaucratic politics and the mass public; the second does not. In the second case, bureaucrats may value media information for their own reasons. As Kabashima and Broadbent note, "(E)ven though not expert . . . information, the news provides information about events that would not be available otherwise, except perhaps to privileged decision makers" (1986: 353n). Similarly, prime ministers lack coordinated foreign intelligence from bureaucratic agencies. Journalists sometimes act as substitute foreign intelligence sources (Green, 2001: 70). Considering that approximately 120 countries receive some form of aid from Japan, the media undoubtedly plays a significant role simply by reporting on smaller recipients at all.

In this vein, we expect the print media, specifically daily newspapers, to do a better job of fulfilling the information function. Broadcast news programming is necessarily limited by time constraints, so there is a constant tension in the allocation of domestic and foreign news. In contrast, the daily newspapers allocate fixed amounts of page space for foreign news, meaning that international news will be covered no matter what domestic news is also printed.[5]

The news media not only provide information about other countries, they structure that news. Events overseas happen constantly. Whether and how they are reported in the Japanese press is a matter of editorial decision-making. Not all countries get equal coverage. In the case of aid, it is highly likely that China will receive more coverage than Senegal, regardless of "neutral" factors such as GNP, need, volume of raw news and so on. In this regard, we agree with Kabashima and Broadbent (1986: 356) that by structuring the news, the media serves as an agenda setter not so much by determining policy but by structuring what people think about policy.

Green (2001: 69) notes that "the media has played an even greater role in amplifying the external shocks and pressures the Japanese system has felt since the end of the Cold War. This growing influence on foreign policy-making has everything to do with the unbundling of the 1955 system and the fluidity of Japanese politics. Kent Calder argues that '(T)he very salience of the mass media in Japanese decision-making today no doubt heightens the potential importance of any dramatic events overseas in the day-to-day policy calculus in Tokyo and could well be a force for substantial and rapid foreign policy transformation in the future, in response to overseas developments' " (quoted in Green, 2001: 69).

Finally, the media can provide a common frame of reference for policy makers. We have already noted the high degree of decentralization in Japan's aid bureaucracy. Sectionalism and bureaucratic infighting are well

known in Japanese government, and aid is no exception. MITI (now METI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) are known for dispatching their own staff to overseas embassies with the expectation that they will act independently of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) staff. Each of the more than one dozen implementing agencies has its own interests to be furthered by the aid program but lack their own overseas newsgathering channels. Green (2001: 56–58) points out that the foreign policy bureaucracy has been less cohesive since the liberalizations spawned by the Plaza Accord (i.e. more ministries trying to defend domestic constituencies from foreign competition) and especially since 1993 the bureaucracy's policy primacy has been challenged by Diet politicians. These trends have complicated the foreign policy process for the bureaucrats precisely during the period under study here. In terms of geographic allocations, the media can be expected to act as a common point of reference for these competing agendas.

Moreover, none of these details contradicts the basic argument of this study. The news media provide a clear, simple and easily obtainable indicator of the domestic political importance of other countries. High levels of coverage will also tend to indicate a country's policy and public salience. Whether aid officials are motivated by good faith efforts to fulfill their assigned tasks or by career advancement, they have incentives to address politically important countries and avoid wasting time and money on those of little or no significance. We suggest that the aid bureaucracy reacts to news media coverage because it is attempting to carry out its mandate in an efficient manner and media coverage provides a convenient surrogate indicator of the political importance of recipient states. As we argued for the general model, the causal process goes as such: Other things being equal, the greater the media coverage, then the more important the country, and the higher the assumed public expectation, and therefore the greater the justification for aid.

Assuming that the media influences foreign aid, the question is how and to what extent. Influence may be exercised through the mobilization of public opinion or through direct influence on policy makers. Both are conceivable, although as yet untested empirically in the area of foreign aid. As to the former, there is evidence that policy makers themselves admit of such a possibility. Hellmann (1969) assumes a connection when he uses newspaper polls to test the depth and direction of public opinion on normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. Watanabe (1977: 145) found that respondents to public opinion polls on foreign policy "tend to echo as their own those opinions they have already heard expressed and defended, *especially in the mass media*" (emphasis added). He also posits that increased media attention to controversial foreign policies might lead to increased

popular concern about those policies. The Prime Minister's Office regularly conducts public opinion polls on aid, although the emphasis is on general levels of public support for the program as a whole.

The second possibility is that the media directly influence policy makers. There is limited anecdotal evidence to support this thesis. Dilema (1981) found evidence of newspaper influence on specific policies. In civil aviation negotiations with the United States, one negotiator acknowledged that relevant editorials from the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (the leading economic newspaper) were always a discussion item in strategy sessions when the Japanese negotiating team met before negotiating with its American counterpart. More generally, the press acts as an important source of information, especially for middle- and lower-level bureaucrats, and substitutes as an indicator of the public mood (Destler et al., 1976).

Japan's Foreign Aid: Data and Variables

The methodology used to examine the potential relationship between news media and foreign aid in Japan is the same as is used for the other cases in this book. As with the other chapters, only the second stage of the two-stage analyses strategy is utilized here. High coverage levels that the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia before 1993, and the Western European states receive in the Japanese news media would almost certainly overwhelm any meaningful correlation between coverage levels and the selection of states that receive development assistance. Instead, the presumption here is that news media salience will influence variations in how much aid is given to the various recipients, and the analysis is designed to capture that. Each case in the analysis is an annual observation of a country that received development aid from the Japanese government. Pooling the data for recipients of Japanese foreign aid for the decade 1986–1995 results in a total of 976 cases.[6]

As in the previous analytical chapters, the dependant variable in the baseline analysis is the commitment of development assistance as reported by the DAC of the OECD. This information is reported in the organization's annual study, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.

The independent variable was operationalized as news stories about recipient countries included in the *Asahi Shimbun*, one of Japan's three major daily newspapers.

Asahi Shimbun. The level of *Asahi Shimbun* news coverage is coded using the *Asahi Shimbun Index*. This is an annual count of the number of news stories listed under the heading for the country. This includes all country-specific cross-references to stories listed under other headings.

The *Asahi Shimbun* is a representative example of media coverage for three reasons. First, newspaper coverage of political events in general tended to be more significant for attentive publics than television news during the period in question (Krauss, 2000). Second, while editorial differences are attributed to the various national dailies, political scientists tend to view the *Asahi* as mainstream (albeit left of center) and not very different in coverage from its mail rivals, the *Yomiuri* and the *Mainichi*.[7] That said, Feldman's (1993) survey of print media use by Diet members found that respondents considered the *Asahi* to be the best print source for foreign news. We have no reason to assume that the latter view the *Asahi* any differently. Third, Kusano (1993, 1999) found that the general level of coverage of foreign aid stories in the *Asahi* and the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Japan's most prominent business daily, followed the same trend over the period in question, albeit with different frequencies from year to year. Sudo (2001) has found a good match between major events in the development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and *Asahi* coverage of the organization. We are satisfied, therefore, that the measure used here fulfills our purpose.

Four additional independent variables are employed in the baseline analyses to control for other known or potential determinants of Japanese aid flows. In addition to the news media coverage variable of primary concern, commonly used indicators are included to control for the incremental nature of the decisions as well as the strategic, economic and humanitarian use of aid.

Previous Year's Commitment. In most depictions of the aid allocation process it is argued that the previous year's aid commitment is used as a reference level from which the current year's allocation is made. To account for this incremental type of decision-making in the aid process, the previous year's aid commitment is used as an independent variable in the regression equation.

Per Capita GNP. To capture the humanitarian motive for aid, the per capita gross national product (GNP) of a country, as reported by the World Bank, is used as a measure of the level of need in the potential recipient. In the analysis, this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.

Balance of Trade. To capture the economic interests in the recipient country, a measure of the aggregate volume of bilateral trade between the donor and the recipient state is used. The balance of trade is simply the aggregate volume of exports from the donor to the aid recipient minus imports from the recipient as reported by the International Monetary Fund in the Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook and this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.

The trade variable is intended to capture the degree to which the donor might be exploiting the country or extracting capital. Unlike our expectations for the other major donors, we expect a negative relationship with Japanese aid allocations, meaning that the Japanese will send more aid to countries that sell more goods to Japan than they buy in return. This reflects the Japanese effort to use aid to secure their relationships with the countries that provide raw materials and other resources to Japanese industry.

The final control variable included in the baseline analysis may be considered problematic and, in fact, it was the first point to be questioned when the baseline analysis produced results at odds with current understandings of the determinants of Japanese aid. Unlike the other aid donors, there is no simple official designation that can be used to represent the strategic security interests of Japan. Japan has no formal alliances with aid recipients, no remnant ties from a colonial empire and there is no other international political structure like the Commonwealth that can be used as a proxy, as is the case for Britain. Further, it could even be argued that the mercantilist aspects of Japan's foreign policy make it impossible to separate strategic from economic interests. To match the strategic variable used in the other baseline analyses, we code an East Asia variable to capture expressed security interests in Japan's closest neighbors. From the very beginning of the analysis, this variable is a point of concern, but our conclusions indicate that it serves reasonably well as a measure of security interests.

East Asia. This dummy variable represents the strategic and security interests Japan has expressed in its immediate neighbors and closest trading partners. States coded as East Asia include: South Korea,[8] China, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, Singapore, Laos and Taiwan.

Japanese Development Aid: Analyses

In all the other analyses in the book, the news media variable is absolutely robust regardless of the test used or the model specification. In the Japanese case, there are instances where the news media variable is not significant and this is carefully explored. After examining all the analyses and results thoroughly, we conclude that there is still significant evidence that the basic relationship between the media and bureaucracy is applicable to the Japanese case. As we discuss later, the problems immediately obvious in the baseline analysis result from collectively examining the uncoordinated input of such a large number of agencies into the overall aid allocations.

These agencies have differing conceptualizations of aid and conflicting official mandates and that complicates the analysis.

The results of these analyses are presented in tables 6.2 through 6.5. Table 6.2 presents the baseline analysis for Japan.

What is clear in table 6.2 is that the news media coverage variable is not statistically significant.[9] If it were just the media coverage variable that was insignificant, the simplest conclusion to draw would be that the media simply does not have the effect upon the Japanese program that it has on the other donors. However, further questions are raised by the lack of statistical significance for the wealth of the recipient country. The negative relationship with per capita GNP is one of the most robust findings in the larger body of empirical analyses of foreign aid, and even taking into account the mercantilist aspects of Japanese foreign aid, it was expected to be a clear factor in this analysis. The first suspicion was that the East Asia variable might be to blame. While conceptually sound, that variable was created for the analysis and does not represent a documented relationship in the same way as an alliance. Dropping the East Asia variable from the analysis produces the results reported in table 6.3.

While the news media variable is statistically significant in the results reported in table 6.3, the results of the analysis still raise questions. Per capita GNP still is not even close to dropping below the $p < 0.05$ threshold commonly used for determining statistical significance. Again, if the per capita GNP variable had been significant—as the vast majority of previous studies indicate it should be—there would be reason for some confidence in the findings from table 6.3, but further diagnostic analyses lead to the conclusion that it is the tremendously disaggregated nature of the Japanese aid program that is creating the difficulties.

Table 6.2 Effect of *Asahi Shimbun* coverage on commitments of Japanese development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	*P* > |*z*|
Asahi Shimbun coverage	0.1887857	0.1219807	1.548	0.122
Per capita GNP (lag)	−4.055432	2.811367	−1.443	0.149
Trade balance (lag)	−0.0324912	0.0104971	−3.095	0.002
East Asia	221.6286	55.91109	3.964	0.000
Previous year's aid	0.5872059	0.0851518	6.896	0.000
Constant	26.72095	6.489441	4.118	0.000

R-square = 0.5653; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 172.27; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 1,021.

Table 6.3 Dropping East Asia from the analysis of commitments of Japanese development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	*P* > |*z*|
Asahi Shimbun coverage	0.3021592	0.1250096	2.417	0.016
Per capita GNP (lag)	−1.970383	3.10735	−0.634	0.526
Trade balance (lag)	−0.024115	0.0105624	−2.283	0.022
Previous year's aid	0.7085849	0.0768825	9.216	0.000
Constant	26.80845	6.702917	4.000	0.000

R-square = 0.5355; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 110.97; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 1,021.

Table 6.4 Effect of *Asahi Shimbun* coverage on Japanese assistance, grants only, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	*P* > |*z*|
Asahi Shimbun coverage	0.0121817	0.0046979	2.593	0.010
Per capita GNP (lag)	−0.5084344	0.1397845	−3.637	0.000
Trade balance (lag)	−0.0007997	0.0003534	−2.263	0.024
East Asia	7.178418	2.912058	2.465	0.014
Previous year's grants	1.015997	0.0230765	44.027	0.000
Constant	2.709729	0.5287575	5.125	0.000

R-square = 0.9366; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 4547.71; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 994.

Table 6.4 directly addresses the problem with the multiagency structure of Japan's foreign aid program by running the baseline analysis on just the grants portion of the Japanese aid program. Grant aid is reported by the OECD as a separate subcategory of aid, so the data is readily available from the same source as the other aid data used in this study. Further, Japanese grant aid is controlled by a single agency, the MFA. Loan aid, in contrast, is subject to the four-agency review process outlined earlier. Isolating the output of this agency clarifies the results tremendously and shows clear correlations not just with the media variable of interest for this study, but also for all the other influences that have long been established as part of Japanese foreign aid. Coverage is clearly correlated with grant aid. Increasing wealth is correlated with reduced grants. The negative correlation with the trade balance variable indicates aid is going to lesser developed sources of materials and goods. The East Asia variable shows additional aid going to close neighbors of strategic and security concern.

Further adding to the confidence in these results is the tremendous jump in the R^2 measure. The R^2 provides a rough measure of how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent or causal variables included in the regression model. In the analysis of the overall Japanese aid program, these variables accounted for about 56 percent of the commitments of aid. Focusing just on grants, these same variables account for almost 94 percent of variation in grants given to recipients. This massive jump in explained variance demonstrates that focusing on grants has greatly clarified the picture.

The responsiveness to the media seen in the examination of grant aid tends to reinforce that view that the MFA is in fact responsive to changes in its diplomatic environment, and it further suggests that at the very least the print media conveys information that diplomats find useful in calculating the political utility of grant aid. Despite officials' anecdotal denials of the importance of societal pressures (including the media) on policy decisions, the data above suggest that such pressures are an important shaper of geographic aid preferences.

Grant aid can be argued to be sensitive to media coverage than loan aid in part because cross-pressures from rival bureaucratic agendas are eliminated. However, another factor might be that grant aid typically takes less time to commit and disburse. Specific categories of grant aid, such as cultural grant aid and food aid, in particular, are designed to be quick-disbursing. This is due in no small part to the fact that direct MFA control over grants means that much of that kind of aid will have overt diplomatic purposes. Conversely, the scale of loan aid, and the kind of infrastructure it typically funds, usually takes longer to identify and negotiate, thus blunting its short-term diplomatic utility. Still, we can show that separating grant aid from loan aid appears to be clarifying both. A separate analysis of the non-grant portion of the Japanese aid commitments also produces clearer results than the analysis of overall aid commitments.

In the examination of non-grant Japanese aid, the same variables produce stronger relationships than in the analysis of all Japanese aid commitments and the R^2 measure is slightly higher for the analysis of this category of aid. Again, media is a significant influence.[10]

Examining the data on grant versus loan aid for the Japanese case also provides a relatively simple empirical explanation for why the same set of variables can produce such strong results on subsets of the aid data, but not on the overall program. It is a simple matter of scale. Japanese grants of aid are far smaller than loans and spread across a much larger pool of recipients. Grant aid is 27.67 percent of all Japanese aid spread across 994 cases during the ten-year period being examined. Loans on the other hand

Table 6.5 Effect of *Asahi Shimbun* coverage on Japanese assistance, aid excluding grants, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	*P* > |*z*|
Asahi Shimbun coverage	0.1149438	0.0506504	2.269	0.023
Per capita GNP (lag)	−4.063189	0.2.877199	−1.412	0.158
Trade balance (lag)	−0.014586	0.0060909	−2.395	0.017
East Asia	108.7198	36.067	3.014	0.003
Previous year's non-grant aid	0.6114432	0.0861951	7.094	0.000
Constant	23.11038	0.5.149468	4.488	0.000

R-square = 0.7318; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 332.22; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 429.

compromise over 72 percent of ODA and with only 443 recipients, less than half as many annual commitments during the decade in question. Thus, grant decisions are made on a much smaller scale than loan decisions.

This difference in scale has a tremendous impact upon the statistical tests used here. One reason is that a property of Ordinary Least Squares is that it attempts to place a linear measure on the correlation between independent and dependent variables. This is the coefficient reported in the tables and it can be thought of as a ratio; for every additional news story for that country, aid increases by 'x' number of dollars. The difference in scale between these two types of aid becomes immediately apparent if you compare the coefficients reported in table 6.4 versus those in table 6.5. In the analysis of loan aid, in table 6.5, the coefficient for the media variable is ten times greater than the same variable in the analysis of grant aid, in table 6.4, and differences between some of the other variables is even greater. Thus, when the MFA is making grant aid decisions, it is on a scale where one news story increases the average grant by US$12,182. When it comes to loans, that same news story would have an average effect of US$114,944. When these data are lumped together in the aggregate report of total Japanese aid commitments and analyzed, the statistical software attempts to find a mathematical compromise which, in the end, is far less effective at explaining either than looking at each separately.

Conclusions: Media Functions in Japanese ODA

While the complexity of the aid program in Japan made it a bit more difficult to get a clear analytical picture of the influences on aid, we are confident that we have found a positive and significant correlation between

print media coverage and bilateral aid allocations. For drawing conclusions relevant to the study of Japanese foreign policy and the Japanese aid program, we can note a few clear points of conclusion. First, as we have argued, print media acts as a sorting device, providing a rough and ready mechanism for determining the importance of an aid recipient at any given time. We do not claim that coverage will displace other indicators of recipient importance. Israel, for example, got far more Asahi coverage in the period under question than it got aid. Clearly, Japan's position on the Arab–Israeli conflict and Israel's level of economic development made it an unlikely candidate for Japanese ODA. Allowing for these outliers, however, there is a fairly consistent relationship between a developing country's coverage in the *Asahi Shimbun* and its aid profile in both grant and loan aid.

We suspect that this sorting function is useful to bureaucrats for two reasons. One, it allows bureaucrats to anticipate politician perceptions of foreign policy (and therefore aid). Second, it provides a common point of reference in the process of interagency policy coordination. This would be especially crucial in the kind of highly decentralized aid policy process created by the *yon shou-chou taisei*.

This study differs from previous studies of Japanese foreign aid in two ways. First, it systematically and deliberately evaluates the relationship between media and foreign aid. Second, it expands the analysis beyond coverage of aid policy narrowly defined to consider the relationship between media coverage of recipient countries and aid disbursements and commitments by the government of Japan. The independent variable is thus not confined to specific aid scandals or bilateral agreements. Our research suggests that the lack of correlations and conclusions drawn only from examinations of how aid and the aid program are covered by the news media are the result of too narrow a specification of the independent variable. This study affords a broader view of how the media treat developing countries and how that might influence aid policy toward those countries. Doing so, we argue, provides a richer understanding of the ways the news media might affect foreign aid decision-making. At the very least, our findings suggest that it is high time to move beyond the bureaucratic politics model that has so long dominated the study of Japan's foreign aid. Domestic actors besides the business sector deserve closer scrutiny and in particular, the principal–agent model deserves renewed consideration.

In the foreign aid policy arena, is the print media an agenda setter or agenda confirmer? Despite the connection demonstrated between the news media and aid, this remains an issue for further study. Kabashima (1990) found that bureaucrats discerned media influence less in terms of setting agendas than in terms of maintaining or undermining public

support for policies that already have been decided. Ishikawa (1990), in a similar study of the *Asahi Shimbun*, found the paper's coverage to follow events rather than to anticipate them, and concluded that the government exercises influence over the media as much as the other way around. We do not deny that possibility. Indeed, given the different missions of print media and government in gathering overseas news, it does not surprise US that the media follow stories. Our research suggests, however, that in the kind of long-term interactions that characterize bilateral aid giving, sustaining salience or not is in itself an important kind of political influence. A media outlet does not have to continually confront government agencies in order to affect what the latter do.

We also would like to offer strongly worded recommendation regarding the empirical analysis of the Japanese aid program. Based upon the extreme differences between grant and loan aid and the related analytical difficulties we encountered, explored and documented through this analysis, we believe that the statistical study of the Japanese aid program must separate grant and loan aid. When separated the results are not only clear, but also the robustness for all variables matches that of the other donors examined in this book. Unlike the results reported in table 6.2, the results in tables 6.4 and 6.5 are robust regardless of the statistical method applied. This is not the case when the aggregate is analyzed. We attribute this directly to the disparity in scale between huge loans going to a small number of recipients and small grants going to a much larger pool.

The comparative aspect of these findings may be the more valuable of the contributions made by this study. Japan has the largest bilateral foreign aid program in the world and the statistical relationships found here are consistent with the results from the analyses of the second (U.S.), third (French) and fourth (British) largest foreign aid programs. Combining these findings suggests that there is a connection between domestic news media coverage and foreign aid allocations that is common to the major aid donors. This part of the study buttresses our conviction of the importance of media influence on foreign aid in industrial democracies, and remains clear even when recognizing the difficulties in examining the Japanese foreign aid program and when considering that something much broader than media coverage is at work in the Japanese case.

CHAPTER 7

THE MULTILINGUAL CONTEXT OF A SMALLER POWER: NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE AND CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT AID

There are several interesting and compelling reasons to include Canada in a five-country comparative analysis of national ODA programs (notwithstanding, of course, the nationality of one of the authors of this book). First, there are geopolitical considerations that set this country apart from the others examined herein. Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom, France or Japan, Canada is neither very powerful nor a past colonial or imperial power. In fact, Canada was itself a colony until 1931.[1] Also, its isolated position on the North American continent and its strong ties to the United States affords Canada a strong sense of physical security. These realities signify that security and geostrategic aspects of aid are negligible concerns for Canada.

A second reason for our interest in analyzing Canada's ODA program is steeped in its colonial history. Discovered in 1534 by France and first settled by French colonists, then acquired by Britain at the Treaty of Paris in 1763 after the Seven Year War, Canada is still strongly linked to both founding powers and is a member of the British Commonwealth as well as the *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie*. While the *Francophonie* is not an intergovernmental organization with strictly the same political significance as the Commonwealth, many of the 51 member states are former French colonies and have the French language in common. Thus, Canada is associated with two multilateral organizations whose membership comprises mostly former colonies of either Britain or France.

Moreover, this international duality of founding nations is still present and mirrored within Canada, where 6.7 million Canadians (about 22% of a population of 31 million) are French-speaking, over 80 percent of which are concentrated in the province of Québec. Along with dual international loyalties,[2] this results in a dual national media where, for example, the national Canadian Broadcasting Corporation also broadcasts television and radio nationally, in French, through Radio-Canada.

Third, and perhaps partially as a result of its lack of a colonial past, Canada enjoys an enviable international reputation. For example, from 1994 to 2000 Canada was ranked first on the UN Human Development Index (United Nations Development Program, 2002).[3] Canadians are consistently proud of their high-profile efforts in international peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Most Canadians know that their country had a role in inventing peacekeeping in 1956 when Canadian Foreign Secretary Lester B. Pearson convinced the UN General Assembly to send neutral peacekeepers to the Suez, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize the following year. Moreover, Canadians report the second highest level of personal satisfaction with their lives compared to other nations on earth (Pew Research Center, 2002: 19).

In a 1995 survey, 86 percent of Canadians thought that the rest of the world had either "very" (44%) or "fairly" (42%) positive attitudes regarding Canada (Insight Canada Research, 1995: 2). This result is attributed, by these same respondents, to two positive aspects of Canada's foreign policy as they perceived them: participation in peacekeeping (39%) and its generous foreign aid (13%; Insight Canada Research, 1995: 2). Furthermore, 82 percent said it is important to help people in poor countries, and 74 percent believed that Canadian foreign aid spending should either stay the same (51%) or be increased (23%; Insight Canada Research, 1995: 4).

More recently, Black and Tiessen (forthcoming) report that the Canadian Council for International Cooperation published results from a May 2000 Earnescliffe poll showing that "66% of Canadians thought that the government was spending either the right amount or not enough on aid, and that this percentage increased to 73% when respondents were told what the actual expenditure was." In other words, Canadians generally accept the prevailing wisdom that their country is a generous and important player in the international arena. Furthermore, unlike their American counterparts but more in tune with the Europeans, Canadians are not at all reticent about 'giving away their hard-earned money' to developing nations.

This chapter assesses how these features might affect Canada's ODA program, and more specifically of course the media's impact on the foreign aid bureaucracy. To evaluate these issues, we begin this chapter like the

others by describing the Canadian aid bureaucracy and providing an overview of its foreign aid program. The statistical analysis of the Canadian ODA program demonstrates yet again the explanatory power of the model presented here: the salience of international coverage is strongly correlated, once again, with Canadian ODA levels. This analysis is followed by a discussion of these results in light of one issue likely to affect it more than any other in the next few years: the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) that was championed by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in 2001–2002 when Canada was chair and host of the G8 Summit at Kananakis in June, 2002.

Canada's Foreign Aid Bureaucracy

Canada joined the ranks of international donor states in 1950, with its participation in the Colombo Plan. In these early years Canada's ODA program was administered by the Department of External Affairs and was very modest: it represented only 0.08 percent of GDP, or $13 million CDN[4] (Morrison, 1998: 453; Canadian International Development Agency, 2003a: table A). Nowadays, while several agencies are tasked to participate in allocating foreign aid, the principal donor agency is the Canadian International Development Agency – CIDA, established in 1968 for this purpose. It handles over 75 percent of Canada's ODA. It is headed by a Minister for International Cooperation and the senior civil servant who advises the minister is appointed president of CIDA. The agency, however, does not enjoy cabinet status.

Like most foreign affairs and international development bureaucracies, CIDA is structured along both regional directorates and multilateral issues/policies directorates. There are four geographical branches (Americas; Asia; Central and Eastern Europe; and Middle East and Africa) and three multilateral/policy branches (Multilateral Programs; Canadian Partnership and Policy). There are about 1,600 employees working at CIDA, approximately 88% of which are permanent while the rest work on a contractual basis. Permanent employees of CIDA are eligible for postings abroad and most Canadian diplomatic missions to developing nations have CIDA development agents assigned to them. The primary method of recruitment is not through elite schools, but *via* an annual national postsecondary drive held every October by the Canadian government, which involves a full day of tests; those scoring above a predetermined threshold are invited for a second round involving personal interviews.[5] In 2002, CIDA hired 22 officers in this way (about average for the past several years).[6] However, while the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) Foreign Service officers are recruited in the

same manner and consider themselves part of the elite, CIDA development agents generally do not hold an elitist attitude and there is a certain tension between the two organizations (Pratt, 1999).

Other bureaucracies are part of the foreign aid disbursement process, however, and warrant mentioning. The aforementioned DFAIT is the agency in charge of Canada's foreign policy and diplomatic representation abroad—the equivalent of the U.S. State Department. In the specialized circles in Ottawa, a popular saying describes the two bureaucracies' distinct roles as 'DFAIT does High Politics and CIDA digs wells.' While this caricature mostly is factual, DFAIT does administer some programs, for example relating to human rights, education, scholarships and humanitarian emergencies.

The other Canadian ministries with a role in international development include the Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for funding the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to which Canada belongs—the World Bank and three regional banks (the Inter-American, African and Asian Development Banks) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—while Agriculture Canada can be involved in technical assistance, for example. However, as previously mentioned, CIDA is the main actor in Canada's ODA program.

A first observation that characterizes Canadian foreign aid to developing countries is that it tends to be scattered. In terms of international presence, CIDA and the other agencies of the Canadian government are all over the world. According to CIDA's own website, it "supports projects in more than 150 countries around the world" (although the Statistical Report for 2001–2002 mentions only 100 countries).[7] Given that the United Nations has 191 members, and leaving out the 27 richer countries of the OECD, this leaves very few areas where CIDA is not active.[8] Indeed, Canadian ODA has been described as being "a mile wide and an inch thick" (Thérien and Lloyd, 2000: 21).

This generally is thought to be caused by at least three factors. First, there is a lack of a clear and strong foreign aid policy agenda in Canada (Black and Tiessen, forthcoming). The CIDA does issue periodic policy papers (currently, a document titled *CIDA's Sustainable Development Strategy 2001–2003: An Agenda for Change* is one of the guiding documents, along with another document titled *Strengthening Aid Effectiveness*; see CIDA, 2001; CIDA, 2002) and there is an official Canadian foreign policy White Paper, published in 1995, which is used to guide ODA policy (Government of Canada, 1995). However, these documents are to set priorities more than policy and these are articulated quite broadly. Thus, the lack of a focused aid policy does not set many limits to the wishes and imagination of the civil servants who administer aid.

Second, to guide its ODA policies CIDA also takes its cues from the pronouncements of the UN and OECD on development needs. While DFAIT is concerned with Canada's interests and positions in the world, CIDA is an aid agency that is tasked with helping people on the ground, in cooperation with the NGOs and international organizations, without necessarily having to be concerned with the foreign minister's personal agenda. Therefore, CIDA has a tendency to want to have a seat at every table and to work with all NGOs, regardless of the actual size of its ODA envelope.

Finally, Canada displays three different and sometimes competing impulses in international affairs and, more particularly, with respect to foreign assistance: a multilateral impulse, that is, to fund development projects through multilateral forums, the preferred method of the developing countries since that type of aid is not tied; the bilateral impulse, which is politically most desirable since Canada, through CIDA, can continue to be present in "over 150 countries" (and thus show the Canadian flag); and the third partner approach whereby aid is subcontracted to NGOs and civil society organizations on the ground, which can be more efficient (Nossal, 1988; Black and Tiessen, forthcoming).

While these competing impulses undoubtedly influence Canadian foreign aid policy, there is strong evidence to demonstrate that the Canadian bureaucracy would act in a manner consistent with the agency model developed in chapter 2. Nossal's classic studies of the Canadian foreign policy and foreign aid bureaucracies (1979, 1988), as well as more contemporary insider accounts (Rempel, 2002), attest to the fact that Canadian bureaucracies strongly drive policy in the foreign policy arena.

Statistical Analysis of Canada's Aid Program: Variables

The period studied here actually represents an interesting period of Canada's ODA program; it captures both the high point in the history of Canada's ODA program and the years of declining budgets allocated to foreign aid; like the other countries examined in this book, Canada never reached the UN's goal of 0.7 percent of GDP allocated to foreign aid; Canada's share varied between 0.5 and 0.3 percent of GDP during the 1985–1995 period. In dollar terms, it translates to an average of approximately $2.8 billion CDN per year (approximately US$2 billion at modern exchange rates).[9]

The same basic statistical model used previously was applied to evaluate the media's impact on the bureaucratic process of allocating development aid. Before discussing the variables and data, it is important to note that a description of Canadian ODA using one or all three of the approaches

described in chapter 2 (realist, Marxist/globalist and pluralist) yields the following observations. First, although strategic (realist) motives for aid have been shown to influence American, British and French aid, which is not surprising given their Great Power status and worldwide interests, it is difficult to ascribe such motivations to Canada. As for military alliances, Canada is a member of NATO only and does not have the network of defense pacts that the other states have.

Second, another important observation can be made regarding the globalist approach. Canada's trade is overwhelmingly concentrated with the United States: about 85 percent of all Canadian exports are to the United States and 40 percent of Canadian jobs are directly linked to trade with its neighbor. To claim that the remaining 15 percent would be directed to maintaining an asymmetric balance-of-trade with developing states is unrealistic, especially given the fact that a large proportion of the remaining 15 percent non-U.S. trade is directed at Japan and Western Europe; in fact, the Least Developed Countries' share of Canada's foreign trade represents about 0.1 percent—one-tenth of 1 percent—of Canada's total trade (Industry Canada, 2001: 7). Thus, we should not realistically claim that Canadian ODA policy would be directed at maintaining economic exploitation, dependency or market share in developing (periphery) states.

Nevertheless, it is Canada's explicit policy that development assistance be linked to trade (Government of Canada, 1995). CIDA's own website explains that "[T]hanks to the ties created by the aid program, the Canadian economy is directly connected to some of the world's fastest-growing markets—the markets of the developing world. The assistance we contribute in goods and services provides jobs, contracts and export sales for Canadians" (CIDA, 2003b). Canada has the third highest percentage of tied aid of the OECD states (Black and Tiessen, forthcoming). Therefore, while Canadian exports to the developing world are negligible, tied aid is part of Canadian policy, and we therefore expect this fact to show up in the empirical analysis that follows.

Finally, a last observation is that Canada's ODA spending has been on a downward trend since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, foreign aid spending reached a recent high of about 0.5 percent of GDP in 1986–1987, but has been declining since 1992 and currently represents only about 0.27 percent of GDP (CIDA, 2003a: table A). This is despite the fact that, in 1987, CIDA published a "white paper" on Canada's international aid commitments called *Sharing Our Future: Canadian Assistance to International Development*, which stated that it was the government's objective to raise the ODA/GNP ratio by gradual increments, beginning in 1991–1992, to 0.6 percent by 1995 and to 0.7 percent by 2000 (CIDA, 1987).

The variables used in the statistical analysis are very similar to the other cases but there a few modifications were made to take into account certain unique features of Canada's situation.

The dependent variable is still the commitment of ODA as reported by the DAC of the OECD in the organization's annual study, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.[10] The independent variables are:

> *Globe and Mail.* The level of *Globe and Mail* news coverage is coded using the *Globe and Mail* index. This is an annual count of the number of news stories listed under the heading for the country. This includes all country-specific cross-references to stories listed under other headings, but excluding sports coverage.

The choice of using the *Globe and Mail* was based on two factors. First and most simply, the data were relatively easy to collect. The index is available on CD-Rom for the period under study. Second, the *Globe and Mail* is still considered the closest thing to a national newspaper of record that can exist in Canada (Soderlund et al., 2002). This choice is supported by the extensive longitudinal studies that have shown that, for the period examined here—1985 to 1995—the *Globe and Mail* is widely acknowledged to have the best international news reporting in the country (Soderlund et al., 2002; Burton et al., 1995). There exists another excellent national newspaper, the *National Post*, which also is respected for its international coverage, but it was founded only in 1998. Furthermore, the hypothetical causal process implied by this analysis implies that top leaders and bureaucrats take their news and cues as to the salience of issues from the newspaper, and this choice is supported by Stairs' 1976 study showing that our leaders in Ottawa do in fact read the *Globe and Mail* (Stairs, 1976).[11]

A thoroughly complete analysis would involve comparing the French and English national medias, for there are differences. In their extensive survey of newspaper reporting, Burton et al. (1995: 57) state that some of the major differences in reporting uncovered in the early 1980s were still prevalent ten years later:

> In the treatment given to various themes by English and French-language papers, with the most outstanding example remaining the Quebec press's tendency to focus on the international role of Quebec while the English language papers continued to look at foreign policy almost exclusively from an overall Canadian perspective.

Nevertheless, we stand by our choice of the *Globe and Mail* because the scientific evidence—as well as the anecdotal—demonstrates that even

when French Canadian public servants read a French-language newspaper such as *La Presse* or *Le Devoir*, the *Globe and Mail* is still part of the "required reading" in Ottawa's policy circles (Stairs, 1976).

As previously argued, development assistance is often argued to be a humanitarian effort directed toward impoverished states and this is most effectively captured by using the per capita GNP/GDP of the recipient country to measure the level of economic need in the recipient state. The GNP data are coded from the same source as the aid data and the expectation for the analysis is again that there will be a strong inverse relationship between per capita GNP and aid.

> Per Capita GNP. To capture the humanitarian motive for aid, the per capita gross national product (GNP) of a country, as reported by the World Bank, is used as a measure of the level of need in the potential recipient. In the analysis, this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.

To capture the economic exploitation motive for aid, the balance of trade between the donor and the recipient country is used in this analysis as well.

> Balance of Trade. To capture the economic interests in the recipient country, a measure of the aggregate volume of bilateral trade between the donor and the recipient state is used. The balance of trade is simply the aggregate volume of exports from the donor to the aid recipient minus imports from the recipient as reported by the International Monetary Fund in the Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook and this variable is lagged by one year to represent the most recent data available to decision-makers.

We expect a positive relationship to emerge from the statistical analysis: this would be consistent with Canadian foreign policy, which states that aid should benefit the recipient country as well as provide jobs for Canadians.

Previous analyses point out that Canada's ODA is influenced by its membership in international organizations such as the Commonwealth and the *Francophonie* more so than through its military alliances (Thérien, 1989; Arvin and Choudhry, 1997). Thus, we examined two dichotomous independent variables designed to test the hypothesis that, all else being equal, Canada is more likely to give foreign aid to countries that are members of the Commonwealth and/or the *Francophonie*. The dummy variable for Commonwealth membership is the same one used in the analysis of the British case to represent strategic motive for aid as embodied in the continuing legacy of the British Empire.

Commonwealth. This dichotomous variable is used to represent the influence of Canada's place in the legacy of the British Empire. These data are widely available and in this particular instance they are coded from Internet listings of Commonwealth members. We expect this variable to be positive and significant. (Thérien, 1989; Arvin and Choudhry, 1997)

Francophonie. This dummy variable is used to represent the continuing influence of the legacy of the French Empire. These data are widely available and in this particular instance they are coded from Internet listings of *Francophonie* members.

These variables take the place of the strategic variable used in the other baseline analyses. Finally, as with the other analyses, the model incorporates previous aid commitments to recipient countries.

Previous Year's Commitment. In most depictions of the aid allocation process it is argued that the previous year's aid commitment is used as a reference level from which the current year's allocation is made. To account for this incremental type of decision-making in the aid process, the previous year's aid commitment is used as an independent variable in the regression equation.

Statistical Analysis of Canada's Aid Program: Results

The coefficients reported in table 7.1 represent the marginal effects of each of the variables on the levels of Canadian ODA. All the coefficients but one are in the expected direction and are highly significant statistically, demonstrating once again the explanatory power of the agency model developed in this book.

The first coefficient representing the overall effect of reporting in the *Globe and Mail* is in the expected direction and is highly significant statistically. We can crudely interpret the coefficient (0.0433) in the following manner: all else being equal, the marginal impact of each additional story in the *Globe and Mail* signifies an approximate increase of US$43,393 in foreign aid—but keep in mind that this is a very crude interpretation intended as an illustration.

Moreover, the results show there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between a country's wealth and ODA levels: the poorer the country, the more it is likely to receive Canadian aid. Again, to give an idea of the magnitude of the relationship, we crudely estimate that an increase of US$1,000 in a country's per capita GNP correlates with a decrease in Canadian ODA of US$1 million. We can confidently say that the richer a country becomes, the less Canadian ODA it is likely to receive, and *vice versa*.

Table 7.1 Effect of the *Globe and Mail*'s coverage on commitments of Canadian development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	$P > \|z\|$
Globe and Mail coverage	0.0433934	0.0123975	3.500	0.000
Per capita GNP (lag)	−1.086629	0.2009799	−5.407	0.000
Trade balance (lag)	0.0110641	0.0029724	3.722	0.000
Commonwealth	2.350407	1.051843	2.235	0.025
Francophonie	−0.4151305	0.8633664	−0.481	0.631
Previous year's aid	0.4768097	0.0614007	7.766	0.000
Constant	4.222317	0.7492269	5.636	0.000

R-square = 0.3665; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 169.77; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 1,177.

The coefficient representing the balance of trade is very interesting. Although, as we stated earlier, very little trade is conducted with the developing states (less than 1%), Canadian aid is disbursed exactly as the government intends: ODA levels do indeed appear to be tied to trade, as the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Canadian aid thus seems to favor countries that purchase Canadian goods and services.

The last two coefficients evaluate the relationship between aid and Canada's international commitments as expressed *via* its membership in the Commonwealth and the *Francophonie*. It is interesting to note that members of the Commonwealth received, on average between 1985 and 1995, $2.35 million more in aid than states not belonging to that organization. This statistic is thus in the predicted direction, as well as being significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. It reflects Canada's shared colonial ties with the other former British colonies.

The only coefficient in this model that does not conform to our theoretical expectations is that states belonging to the *Francophonie* do not receive more aid. The coefficient is not statistically significant. Two explanations come immediately to mind. The first is that the *Francophonie* is not the same kind of political and historically based Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) as the Commonwealth, so the political ties are not as strong. A second possible explanation emerges when we look at the raw ODA figures. The leading aid recipient during the period under study was Bangladesh (a member of the Commonwealth), which alone consistently received about 5 percent of the entire ODA envelope; another huge aid recipient was China. These are outliers and possibly skew the data; yet even this possibility does not change the fact that, on average, it pays to join the Commonwealth.

Table 7.2 Effect of the *Globe and Mail*'s coverage on commitments of Canadian development assistance, 1985–1995 (linear regression, panel corrected standard errors)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	*Z*	*P* > |*z*|
Globe and Mail net cov.	0.0379946	0.01756	2.164	0.030
Globe and Mail negative cov.	0.0919363	0.0671134	1.370	0.171
Globe and Mail unrest cov.	−0.2315265	0.2233223	−1.037	0.300
Globe and Mail need cov.	0.2102124	0.1848798	1.137	0.256
Per capita GNP (lag)	−1.142104	0.2116601	−5.396	0.000
Trade balance (lag)	0.0105462	0.0032171	3.278	0.001
Francophonie	−0.5413849	1.022628	−0.529	0.597
Commonwealth	3.03983	1.16056	2.619	0.009
Previous year's aid	0.4634154	0.820303	7.337	0.000
Constant	4.542736	0.820303	5.538	0.000

R-square = 0.3668; Wald chi-sq. (5 df) = 173.98; Prob. > chi-sq. = 0.0000; Observations = 1,020.

As with the other analyses, we conducted more sophisticated evaluation of the impact of the media on foreign aid allocations by studying the content of the media coverage, for it is obvious that a country can be in the news for the wrong reasons. The total scores reported from the *Globe and Mail* were refined using the basic content analysis performed on the other four cases.

The results reported in table 7.2 demonstrate the robust explanatory power of the salience of the media's coverage of events. The net coverage (the neutral residual category) remains positive and statistically significant at the conventional $p < 0.05$ level.

The coefficients for the other variables are in the same direction and tell the same story as the results reported in table 7.1. Per capita GNP is significant, in the expected direction and about the same strength as previously. The same goes for Trade Balance and the two variables representing Canada's membership in the Commonwealth and the *Francophonie*. The general model is robust and it is the general media salience that has the strongest and most consistent effect on foreign aid.

Discussion of the Results

It is interesting to put these results in perspective with an analysis of what is to come in the future for Canada's ODA program. One interesting upcoming challenge to Canada's foreign aid policy results from the unveiling in June 2002 of the G8 Africa Action Plan in support of the New

Partnership for Africa's Development (originally called the New Africa Initiative), widely known by its acronym, NEPAD. This is an important discussion for analysis because this single issue may be able to focus Canadian ODA in a way that no other issue was able before. A large portion of the Canadian foreign policy and foreign aid apparatus was mobilized to take the lead on this international issue beginning in February 2001.

The NAI/NEPAD plan was originally articulated somewhat separately by three African presidents—Abdoulayé Wade of Sénégal, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa—in documents calling for a new relationship between donor countries and African states. At the core of these plans was the articulation of the heretofore taboo notion that traditional aid did not do much to help Africa and a new paradigm, based more on private investment and investment in social capital, health and education, was needed.[12] The different plans were presented at various forums at the turn of the millennium and at the 2001 meeting of the World Economic Forum. The African presidents and architects of the plans were then invited to present them at the 2001 G7 + 1 meeting (as it was then called) in Genoa, and the presentations were so successful that the G8 countries urged the Organization for African Unity (OAU) as a whole to propose an African development strategy to which the rich states could respond. This was accomplished at the OAU Summit in Lusaka in July 2001, when the 53 African countries agreed on a policy and formally proposed a New Partnership for Africa's Development. Through the NEPAD, developed countries were invited to "enter a new partnership based on mutual obligations and interest" (NEPAD, 2001: 5–6). According to DFAIT, "the underlying objective of the Action Plan is neither to provide a massive infusion of funding nor to underwrite NEPAD projects more generally. The goal is to put in place a new partnership that will unlock greater resources, both public and private" (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002: 1).

In response to this African initiative, and at Canada's suggestion, a Sherpa process was initiated to prepare the formal G7/G8 response, which was then unveiled at the Kananaskis summit in the province of Alberta, Canada, in June 2002. This Africa Action Plan—a Canadian initiative—was thus the formal response to NEPAD and paved the way for industrialized states to work in concert with African partners to end Africa's economic marginalization, principally by promising increased funding in relation to how well the African countries stick to the goals they themselves set forth in their Plan (NEPAD, 2001; DFAIT, 2002).

This NEPAD process is unprecedented because, as mentioned previously, it had been approved by the 53 member states of the OAU (now the

African Union (AU)), and was intended for African states to jointly manage ODA from the industrialized states. Led by a Steering Committee of the five founding states (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa) and an implementation committee of representatives of 15 states,[13] NEPAD is intended for Africa to manage the main elements of what would constitute durable development for Africa, which include:

— peace and security (including conflict prevention);
— better governance (including peer review and action against corruption);
— fostering economic growth and private investment (including financing for development);
— education/knowledge and health (including information and communications technology).

The Africans themselves enunciated their development goals and priorities, and the G8 responded by pledging financial support and debt relief to help them in achieving these goals. Prime Minister Chrétien deserves great credit for keeping Africa's development on the G8's agenda, even after the increased priority given to security matters since September 11, 2001. In the two days prior to the G8 meeting, events flared up in the Middle East and President Bush had proposed a plan for Palestinian statehood, which stole much of the spotlight.

One factor that will affect the direction and viability of the NEPAD, in which Canada has invested a lot of political capital, concerns the willingness of the United States to participate in it. It appears that the G. W. Bush (#43) administration does not accord a great priority to economic, political or social development in Africa, for various reasons. Chief among these reasons are, the U.S. concern for international terrorism, Islamic extremism and the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the higher priorities for the United States that include, more or less in the following order, the Israeli–Palestinian crisis in the Middle East, relations with Russia and the related NATO expansion issues and the Far East (North Korea and China in particular).

Also, the U.S. administration may believe that much of Africa is not governable, and that the recent events in Zimbabwe, the poor record of governance in states such as Kenya, Malawi and Liberia, and the bloody civil wars in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo demonstrate that the region is a foreign policy disaster area. The election crisis in Zimbabwe discouraged the United States; Mugabe's actions and the timid response from Commonwealth members generally, and the shocking attitude of many African leaders (namely, Mbeki of South Africa) who seemed to support Mugabe's power grab, demonstrated to the Bush administration

that the good governance issues to be championed by the NEPAD implementation committee, which includes a peer review mechanism to distribute ODA to deserving states, will be a joke. Adding to this perception is the decision taken at the 2002 AU Summit in Durban, South Africa, which enlarged the Implementation Committee to include two states that are among the least democratic states in Africa, and one of which is even a long-time enemy of the United States: Libya and Kenya (Swarns, 2002). The United States (and Canada, for that matter) rightly wonders how such an Implementation Committee will advance the goals of improving governance in Africa.

The 2003 G8 Summit in Evian, France, did nothing to encourage the NEPAD process. Indeed, instead of tackling Africa's poverty and the associated problem of agricultural subsidies to Western farmers, AIDS or education, the 2003 G8 meeting was dominated by the contemporary security concerns: the rebuilding of postwar Iraq, and North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues (Pfanner, 2003). Thus, as the world's attention is diverted from Africa's development, Canada's ODA priority is likely to change as well, as Canada certainly cannot tackle African underdevelopment alone.

The second factor is the relevance of the empirical factors associated with Canada's ODA spending in the period from 1985–1995 given this new orientation. If Canada has pledged, through NEPAD, to give additional aid to the states demonstrating better progress toward goals such as governance, transparency, women's education and private enterprise, how will Canada manage to balance this with its demonstrated tendency to ignore these attributes and its focus on spreading aid either to Commonwealth members or to a few large states, such as China and Egypt?

Conclusions

Canadian Prime Minister Chrétien has increased ODA spending (mainly for Africa) by CDN $500 million in the December 2001 Budget, and has pledged to increased ODA by 8 percent per year (cumulatively) until Canada has doubled its ODA spending. However, Canada's foreign aid program faces at least three challenges in the coming years, two of which are endogenous—internal to the Canadian foreign policy establishment—and one of which is exogenous to Canada.

A first issue to tackle internally will be the *éparpillement* (scattering) of aid and the lack of a clear and strong foreign aid policy agenda in Canada. As previously mentioned, CIDA takes its cues from the pronouncements of the UN and OECD on development needs—a visit to the CIDA website

makes this fact plain. Furthermore, there is often a tension between DFAIT and CIDA that will have to be managed: while DFAIT is concerned with Canada's interests and positions in the world, CIDA is an aid agency that is tasked with helping people on the ground in cooperation with the NGOs and international organizations, without necessarily having to be concerned with the foreign minister's personal agenda (Black and Tiessen, forthcoming).

Finally, another internal challenge for Canada will be to manage the three competing agendas or ways of disbursing aid in light of the renewed commitment to double ODA spending in the next few years. Canada displays three different and sometimes competing impulses in international affairs and, more particularly, with respect to foreign assistance: a multilateral impulse, that is, to fund development projects through multilateral forums, the preferred method of the developing countries since that type of aid is not tied; the bilateral impulse, which is politically most desirable since Canada, though CIDA, can continue to be present in over 150 countries and thus show the Canadian flag; and the third partner approach whereby aid is subcontracted to NGOs and civil society organizations on the ground, which can be more efficient.

While Canada's ultimate impulse is to want to be liked by everybody and thus to be active in all these methods, the risk is, again, that Canada's aid program will remain "a mile wide and an inch thick," to paraphrase Thérien and Lloyd (2000). This would not be new, but choices will have to be made in light of the challenges presented here, especially if it loses NEPAD as a guiding issue.

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CHAPTER 8

AN EVENT-DRIVEN AID PROGRAM: NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE AND U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Any argument connecting media coverage and foreign aid inevitably brings to mind the massive humanitarian relief efforts made in response to the Sahal drought in the mid-1980s, Somalia in the early 1990s, or perhaps the global response to one of the handful of other catastrophic disasters from the past few decades. As discussed later in this chapter, these well-known events are extreme outliers and in many ways are more misleading than helpful. However, what is more curious is the simple fact that even though disaster aid events are at the top of everyone's awareness, the substantial U.S. program devoted to providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of foreign disasters is almost always overlooked in the discussion or the empirical study of U.S. foreign aid.

This chapter presents a discussion and analysis of the official U.S. response to these events, examining the aid allocations made by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).[1] However, the value of this portion of the study extends well beyond just adding an additional example of a foreign aid bureaucracy that is responsive to the news media. It even goes beyond the value of addressing a set of aid allocations that is often associated with media and foreign assistance. In several ways, the disaster aid program stands in sharp contrast to the development aid programs studied thus far and through these contrasts, several concerns and conceptual points can be addressed.

The relative absence of the disaster aid program from the broader empirical study and discussions of U.S. foreign aid is all the more

remarkable in light of how amenable the subject is to statistical analysis. The U.S. OFDA is the sole agency responsible for the official U.S. response to foreign disasters.[2] This reduces conceptual and empirical problems that might arise from coordination or influences between aid programs, which can be problematic when dealing with development and military aid programs. The disaster aid process is also almost entirely bureaucratic, insulating it from many of the domestic political forces that complicate the study of foreign development aid such as budgetary earmarking, interest group lobbying or the political orientation of the party in power (Imbeau, 1988; Thérien and Noël, 2000). Thus, when we focus on disaster aid we can be relatively certain that we are examining the actions of this specific bureaucracy and not the reflection of an elected official or an artifact from the interaction of several agencies.

Related to this, the unidimensionality of disaster aid is also worth emphasizing. While development aid programs have a reasonable focus on a single action, the one-dimensional focus of the OFDA is the exemplar. In general, the role of a bureaucracy is often multifaceted and the exact action that could indicate a response to the content of the news media might be difficult to define precisely. The OFDA however, is mandated specifically to respond to disasters, that is its only substantial mandate and it has little overlap of responsibilities with other agencies. The substance of the disaster aid decision centers almost solely on the level of aid. Unlike foreign development aid, which can be intertwined with military aid and trade issues, there are no complex strategic variations in disaster aid or substantial concerns about fungibility. There is little nuance in the process, no trade-offs between jobs and trade, and no conflict between security and spending. Public opinion on the issue should be almost perfectly one-dimensional, demanding generally more or less aid rather than the multiple options and strategies involved in international conflicts, trade relationships or treaty negotiations.

The nature of disaster aid itself can clarify or simplify several aspects of the analysis. In the examination of development aid, the interconnections between the individual aid allocations analyzed are the primary reason for the need to employ complex statistical methods. For development aid, the allocations or commitments for any one country are connected to the previous aid offered or given to that country. Thus, statistical efforts have to be made to control for effects occurring from year to year. Further, the money available for development aid varies tremendously with the overall U.S. budget, and significant portions of the funds allocated for aid are earmarked by Congress for certain recipients or to address certain issues. This further complicates the statistical analysis and makes it more difficult to be certain

that the results of the analysis reflect the actions of the aid bureaucracy. These are not problems for the study of disaster assistance.

In contrast to the annual nature of the development aid decision, disaster aid is event-based. U.S. disaster assistance is given in response to specific events. Disasters occur without warning, relatively randomly over time, without regard to politics or economics and they are distributed all around the world. The funding for OFDA also helps isolate each event from not only other events, but also the waxing and waning of the U.S. federal budgetary cycle. Working from a relatively small base budget, OFDA has both the expedited authority to spend funds on the spot, free from normal bidding or contracting requirements and it can borrow and spend money without immediately identifying the source. Thus, when a disaster strikes a foreign country, OFDA can and does spend money it doesn't technically have, whenever it needs to, and in the amount it deems appropriate. There is of course, some general supervision and an understanding that justifications will be expected after the fact, but still, the federal budget cycle and the frequency of disasters within any one-time period have no substantial effect on OFDA spending.

As a result, the cases in the statistical analysis are independent of one another and this is a critical concern in statistical analyses because the assumption that the individual cases are independent from one another is central to the conceptual foundation of statistical analytical methods. When this assumption is violated, as it clearly is in the analysis of development aid, it becomes necessary to apply corrections and the complexity of the analysis increases dramatically. These corrections are not necessary here and as a result, simple cross-sectional analysis techniques can be applied with a great deal of confidence.

The Politics of Disaster Aid

The differences between the disaster aid program and the other U.S. aid programs also extend into conceptual or academic discussions. The fact that political considerations play a large part in foreign development aid decision-making is hardly disputable. As noted in the earlier chapters of this book, a wide array of scholars have shown that two general sets of factors greatly influence allocations of development aid: (1) domestic political considerations, including budgets and the influence of constituencies, and (2) international factors, including a recipient state's ideological orientation, trade ties, regime type, alliances, military profile and its general geostrategic significance. In fact, politics play such a central role in the allocation of development aid that studies of U.S. foreign aid allocations

have been used to test different models of U.S. foreign policy during and after the Cold War (Meernik et al., 1998).

In contrast, politics are considered the antithesis of disaster assistance and the absence of political considerations is more than an oversight in the conduct and the study of foreign disaster aid. Indeed, for many practitioners and scholars examining this aspect of the U.S. aid program, the reaction to the term politics is visceral. For example, in a 1979 book on the problems in international disaster assistance, a book that is well known within the community of scholars studying disasters, the disdain for politics—despite its clear and acknowledged importance—is evidenced by how politics is defined in the preface:

> The final section of the book analyses the politics of relief and explores many issues that were central to much of the Panel's work. [1] "Politics" was used by the Panel to refer to those situations in which relief assistance is delayed or prevented . . . by the conscious policies or actions of public authorities. (Stephens and Green, 1979: ix)

All politics were referred to as obstructionism and politics was considered only in analyzing four major types of political problems in international disaster assistance: domestic politics, domestic corruption, rejection of aid and international politics (Freudenheim, 1979: 225–244; see also UNA-USA, 1977). This is, in fact, the predominant perspective on the role of politics in disaster assistance. Green (1977) had made several of the same basic points in a previous work for the Council on Foreign Relations, and similar attitudes can be found explicitly or implicitly in works ranging from Mayer (1974), Glantz (1976), Wiseberg (1976), Cuny (1983), and Wijkman and Timberlake (1988) to Albala-Bertrand (1993). The common threads in all these works are that (a) the goal of humanitarian assistance is, or should be, the creation of a more efficient and equitable (a fairer) set of international prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response measures, and (b) the barrier to achieving these worthy goals is politics within, among and between donors and recipients.

This disdain for politics in the allocation and study of disaster assistance is also remarkable if considered from the perspective of the so-called CNN-effect. While the term CNN-effect might be loosely used to refer to any instance where the dramatic coverage of international events appears to influence foreign policy, the academic research is more narrowly focused on Western involvement in complex humanitarian emergencies.[3] In these tangled and unwieldy foreign policy nightmares, such as Bosnia or Somalia, intense political and military conflicts are intertwined with famine, genocide

or other disastrous human tragedies. The initial claim was that the swift, if not instantaneous coverage of human suffering that was made possible by the increasingly effective global communication and news-gathering networks created a domestic demand for intervention that drove unwilling policy makers in the United States and Western Europe to become involved (see Livingston and Eachus, 1995; Natsios, 1996; Shattuck, 1996; Strobel, 1996).

Despite the salient and public debates and laments on the issue of media-driven foreign policy, the degree to which news coverage actually drives Western states to intervene in these disasters is unclear, and probably overstated (Livingston and Eachus, 1995; Jakobsen, 1996, 2000; Natsios, 1996; Strobel, 1997). Jakobsen (2000) argues that the news media can only influence domestic demand, which is only one out of the multitude of factors (i.e. logistics, costs, geostrategic concerns) involved in international crisis management and intervention by Western states. Jakobsen goes on to argue that the media's biggest impact is on the timing of involvement or withdrawal and the nature of the intervention strategy. Because of live global coverage, Western powers engage these combined disasters and conflicts when they are dramatic rather than at more quiescent times when resources could be more effectively applied to resolving the underlying causes. The way these conflicts are engaged, with air power and casualty-minimizing policies, is also shaped by the expected domestic political impact of coverage. Notable in all of the work on the CNN-effect is the central role presumed for domestic politics in the response to a humanitarian crisis. This is in clear contrast to the disdain for politics expressed by the communities involved in U.S. foreign disaster assistance.

In part, this chapter addresses the question of politics in U.S. disaster assistance, applying the empirical insights and theoretical understandings derived from the study of U.S. development assistance to this seldom tapped source of data. In doing so, it not only provides a new set of data for exploring the determinants of U.S. aid allocations, it allows U.S. to further test the bureaucratic responsiveness hypothesis. This analysis also provides a direct and somewhat generalized test of the underlying argument for the CNN-effect. Media coverage does appear to be part of the driving force behind international disaster relief. To help with the connection to the development aid literature and the previous analyses offered in this book, we first identify the players involved in the disaster aid process and note the predominance of the bureaucracy. We then offer some general arguments of how politics may influence U.S. disaster assistance allocation decisions by discussing how international and domestic political concerns within the donor state might influence decision-making. Then, we discuss the data and perform several statistical analyses.

In conclusion, we focus on the fact that U.S. disaster aid allocation appears to be predominantly driven by the magnitude of the disaster and bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media. The magnitude of the effect of the media is substantial, both in absolute and proportional measures. When this is combined with the freedom of action enjoyed by the OFDA and compared to the other analyses in this book, it suggests that the magnitude of the effect of the media may be related to the degree of policy discretion allowed within the official mandate of the bureaucracy. The more flexibility elected officials give to bureaucrats, the more the bureaucrats seem to use the media to adjust their actions.

Myths and Misperceptions of Foreign Disaster Aid

It is important to dispel some of the myths or misperceptions of the disaster aid process and the actors involved. These complications arise from the simple fact that whenever the topic of foreign disaster aid is discussed, the cases that come to mind and provide a conceptual foundation for consideration are the highly salient outliers. Take Somalia for an example. First, an event like Somalia is rare. During the fiscal year of 1992, OFDA identified 99 foreign disasters other than the famine in Somalia and the United States provided aid to ten of these events.[4] Who are the other ten disaster aid recipients? How about the disasters and aid recipients in 1991 or 1993? While an educated guess or two might be made, it is unlikely that even an academic with an interest in U.S. foreign aid would be able to recall those other disasters that received U.S. assistance. A massive and catastrophic disaster that captures sustained global attention only occurs once or twice in a decade and events like those in Somalia are rarer still. The data on foreign disasters that were cataloged by the OFDA includes over 2,500 events spread across a period of slightly less than 30 years. At most, five or maybe six of these events, a quarter of 1 percent, are even remotely comparable to Somalia or the Sahal drought.

Second, the responses to Somalia, the Sahal drought and the handful of other extremely salient events are unusual, even for catastrophic disasters. Most people will begin thinking about U.S. foreign disaster relief by recalling the Sahal drought and as a result will believe or assume that disaster relief efforts are huge policy actions that engage elected officials (not to mention rock stars and actors). The Sahal drought case also implies that foreign disaster relief is a significant source of media coverage of foreign disasters. Nothing could be more misleading.

The instigation for news media coverage is quite transparent, usually it is trumpeted in the headline, and if the aid effort was driving a substantial

proportion of the coverage then aid should be one of the predominant subjects in the news stories related to the disasters. This is not the case. With the exception of a dozen or so very large disasters, the international relief effort generally receives little if any coverage. Further, specific reference to any kind of U.S. government aid is extremely rare. For example: The Iranian earthquake of 1972 is relatively typical of the coverage of a medium-sized foreign disaster. Of the 67 paragraphs of coverage it received in the *New York Times*, only three mention aid and only one single paragraph mentions, indirectly, the U.S. aid effort. Even in the outlying cases of disasters that gain a great deal of news media coverage such as Somalia, the Sahal droughts and a few others that received more than 100 news stories, a sample of 552 randomly selected paragraphs revealed only 55 paragraphs that mention the global aid effort, and only 22 that mention aid and the United States in the same paragraph (regardless of how the referents are associated in the text). This totals less than 5 percent of the total coverage measured in paragraphs and these are the extreme outliers. These are the cases where the aid effort receives the most coverage. The three or four stories that report a typical disaster receiving official U.S. assistance almost never mention the U.S. aid effort.

Political Actors in the Aid Process

These outlying cases, which include the complex humanitarian emergencies that are usually referred to as evidence of a CNN-effect, also seem to indicate a significant role for elected officials in the disaster aid process. Again, this is misleading. The president is one of three political actors that can play a role in the disaster aid response, but the foreign disaster aid allocation, even more so than the development allocation, is almost entirely bureaucratic. In addition to the bureaucratic officials charged with disaster relief, the ranking in-country U.S. diplomatic representative, the Chief of Mission (usually an ambassador) can become involved. However, the Chief of Mission is limited to $25,000 of aid and even that amount must be approved by the OFDA in Washington.

The president can occasionally become involved and when he does he has tremendous power and discretion, but the best evidence indicates that the president is only involved in the rare handful of extreme cases already mentioned as outliers. However, in those few cases, presidential involvement adds urgency and can clearly brand the disaster as even more politically important. Not only might this stimulate a stronger bureaucratic response, but the president also has the ability and authority to direct extra-normal funds to the disaster.

An example of such a presidential initiative includes the actions of President Nixon in response to the 1970 earthquake/landslide in Peru. Nixon reacted after a great deal of news coverage and his actions were reported as the augmentation of funds for disaster relief (Vanderbilt Television News Archives, June 8, 1970). From that news broadcast onward, the earthquake in Peru was often reported in relation to U.S. aid and this might be an interesting point in the discussion of news media and U.S. politics, but the actual effect of presidential involvement on U.S. assistance is probably modest. It was clear from the content of the coverage and the broader political context of the event that the president was attempting to use the salience of the event to capitalize politically upon this disaster assistance opportunity. Not only did Nixon's involvement come at a time when criticism was raging over the war in Indo-china, but also the media focus of the efforts was exemplified by the personal trip of Mrs. Nixon to deliver relief supplies. The First Lady's trip garnered quite favorable news coverage. However, despite this effort, the overall effect of presidential involvement was limited because it occurred so late in the course of the event. Most of the coverage of the disaster had already been produced at this point and most of the global response was already in the past. The result was that the percentage of coverage that mentioned U.S. aid was still relatively low in comparison to the overall coverage of the landslide/earthquake.

Presidential involvement in the disaster aid program is, as mentioned, extraordinarily rare. This appears to be the only example of presidential involvement from the hundreds of foreign disasters that occurred and were cataloged by the OFDA during the Nixon presidency. While the nature of the data makes it difficult to be completely certain that every single instance of presidential involvement is identified, it appears that less than 1 percent of events include any indication that the president even comments on the event, actual evidence of involvement of any substantive nature is even rarer.[5] In the typical case, when aid is offered it is the result of bureaucratic action that receives little or no attention in the media or by the public.

Politics and Disaster Aid

Despite the clear disdain for politics expressed by officials in the OFDA, particularly international politics, the potential for political influences to shape the U.S. allocation of disaster assistance is there and it is important to consider that possibility while exploring the question of bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media. While it might seem unpalatable to humanitarians to argue that the United States might use disaster aid to further its international political interests, at the very least, it seems likely that

money and other resources would encounter fewer questions and less resistance when flowing to allies rather than to international opponents. Beyond the simple contention that the United States might be more apt to help its allies in times of crisis, especially during the Cold War, there is evidence that suggests that the effects of disasters are destabilizing in general (Olson and Drury, 1997), and the United States could conceivably use additional disaster aid to help friendly governments in allied nations stay in power. Conversely, withholding aid might destabilize the governments of international opponents. Thus, it is not unreasonable to consider the foreign disaster aid allocation in light of the international political factors demonstrated to be an influence on development aid and we test for this possibility in our examination of bureaucratic responsiveness.

In the end, exactly which factors influence the allocation of foreign disaster aid is an empirical question, a question that is best answered not by argument or even by an example or two, but through a careful examination of the aid that is actually offered to assist the victims of disasters.

The Data on Foreign Disasters and U.S. Aid

This chapter uses data on U.S. foreign disaster assistance from 1964 through 1996 (Olson and Drury, 1997) to generate a set of cases for analysis. All disasters included were identified by various agents of the U.S. government, usually but not always the in-country U.S. diplomatic representative, and cataloged by the agency responsible for foreign disaster assistance (OFDA). The data set includes a wide variety of disaster types, including volcanoes, earthquakes, floods, storms, avalanches and droughts. Although the data derive from a U.S. government source, this analysis attempts to avoid political bias by limiting the study to natural disasters, eliminating the U.S. government disaster categories of civil strife, displaced persons, accidents and explosions.[6] The full data set consists of 2,552 cases, but when the analysis is limited to natural disasters and missing data cases are removed, the total falls to about 2,000 cases.[7] No selection of cases, however, is ever free of problems, and careful consideration must always be given to the strengths and weaknesses of the data set in relation to the hypotheses being studied.

The inclusion of null cases is a crucial concern for this analysis and the null cases question is particularly a concern for the larger set of analyses that comprise this book. The examination of foreign development aid offered in the previous chapters focused on the second stage of the commonly used two-stage analysis, where only the recipients of aid are examined. As a result, those analyses are open to any criticism based upon the exclusion of

null cases. The most basic of those criticisms is that data sets that lack null cases cannot identify sufficient conditions that prevent the examined behavior from occurring and they are biased against factors that limit or reduce the studied behavior. This concern is important here because some aspects of politics that we include in the analysis are expected to be factors that reduce or limit U.S. disaster assistance.

Although the disasters in this data set are cataloged by the OFDA, the cases themselves are relatively independent of the actual allocation of aid. A significant number of cataloged disasters did not receive any U.S. aid. More specifically, of the 2,552 cases in the full data set, 1,681, or 65 percent, received no aid. For a study of disaster assistance allocations this certainly represents a reasonable number of null cases. Moreover, because all the cases appear in the OFDA listing, we can be certain that the U.S. agency we are examining was aware of all of these events. This means that all the cases in the analysis had the opportunity to receive aid but the agency chose not to award aid. Thus, no bias is created by including cases that were never recognized by the U.S. government as disasters and were therefore never considered candidates for aid. In this way, this analysis provides another valuable contrast to the development aid chapters. The null cases problem is one of the persistent difficulties in the study of development aid and a big part of the reason for the adoption of a two-stage analysis strategy.

Although the possibility still exists that some bias may exist in the inclusion or exclusion of cases in this data set, it does not appear very high. In fact, the large number of null cases—including 14 disasters in Cuba, a state against which the United States has a clear and unmistakable negative political bias—suggests that it is unlikely that other biases caused disasters to be excluded from the data set. It is still possible that political bias might influence the awarding of aid, which is something that will be tested later, but it does not appear to affect the inclusion of cases in the data set and helps assure that the analysis will be a fair test of those political questions.

Variables

For the analyses here, the dependent variable—the effect to be explained in the statistical analysis—is the aid offered by the OFDA to a country stricken by disaster. It was coded by Olson and Drury (1997) from the cumulative and annual OFDA reports, controlling for inflation by converting the amounts to 1994 constant U.S. dollars.

The independent variable of primary concern for the bureaucratic responsiveness argument is the salience of the disaster in the U.S. news.

New York Times. The number of stories in the *New York Times* directly addressing either the disaster or its impact is used a measure of the news media coverage in the United States, and it is coded using the *New York Times Index*.

Given the extended temporal domain of this study, however, there are some difficulties gathering even a simple count of stories. First, finding all the stories related to any one disaster is not always easy. In the *New York Times Index*, for example, stories concerning cyclones and their impact can be found under Cyclones, Typhoons, Hurricanes and Tropical Storms, Weather and Flood. Drought coverage was listed under Water, Weather, Agriculture, Food, Famine and specific crop names. In major foreign disasters, some of the coverage also appears under the country name without a cross-listing under one of the disaster headings. Furthermore, the index is inconsistent over the temporal domain of this study, with fundamental changes in the indexing scheme occurring in 1968 and in 1983. To insure that all relevant stories were included, all possible index headings were checked for every disaster, and the listings were checked for duplication. Finally, weather-related disasters, which are the most difficult to code, were double-checked by a second coder.[8]

One technical difficulty also arises with disasters that strike more than one country, such as Atlantic hurricanes that pass through the Caribbean. To resolve this issue, each case is coded as if the others did not exist. When a news story mentioned more than one affected country, it was coded as a news story for each country and when a story mentions multiple disasters, such as when two earthquakes hit Turkey within the span of a few months, the story is coded as coverage for both disasters.

Several additional independent variables are used to control for a variety of factors that might influence disaster aid allocations. The number of control variables employed here is far larger than that used in the analysis of development aid allocation.

Since disasters vary in their magnitude, the way they strike and the human impact, it is important to control for these factors. These variables were coded by Olson and Drury (1997) from the OFDA cumulative and annual reports.

We control for the magnitude of the event by using three measures of the human impact of the disaster.

Killed. Number of people killed as a direct result of the disaster.

Homeless. Number of people made homeless as a direct result of the disaster.

Monetary Damage. Monetary damage (in thousands) as a direct result of the disaster.

The nature of the event itself could reasonably have an impact upon the response to the disaster and the overall level of aid provided. Presuming that reconstruction efforts are going to be roughly equal regardless of the type of disaster, the predictability and duration of the threat to human life as well as the duration of social and economic disruption during the event itself may effect the more immediate relief efforts.

Drought. Droughts and famines caused by natural phenomenon are characterized by a slow onset and lingering of harmful effects. The extended duration of these events should facilitate the movement of large and bulky forms of relief materials, such as surplus grain. This may have a positive impact on overall levels of assistance.

Earth Movement. Earthquakes, avalanches and landslides are characterized by completely unpredictable onset with immediate damage. This provides and extremely brief window for relief and this time constraint may decrease the overall level of aid.

Flood. Floods have an onset that can often be predicted a few days in advance and they persist for a short time. This provides some opportunity for aid mobilization before the fact and a brief period of up to a few weeks for providing relief.

Storm. Hurricanes, cyclones, typhoon, tropical storms and other major storms have a very brief window for prediction and pre-event mobilization, usually 24 hours or less for a specific location, and the event persists for a shorter duration than floods.

Volcano. Volcanic eruptions can be predicted well in advance and tend to persist for months to years.

Once the magnitude and nature of the events are controlled for, it is still important to control for possible political influences on disaster aid. The limited nature of the empirical explorations of U.S. disaster aid allocations creates something of a difficulty on this point. There is no established and accepted set of variables considered important to this type of aid allocation. Therefore, it is necessary to employ a wider array of control variables than it was for the development aid analyses. These variables are coded from commonly available sources.

Geostrategic Political Influences

Despite the disdain for politics expressed by practitioners and analysts of humanitarian relief efforts, it is reasonable to expect that the United States might use disaster aid to pursue its international political interests. At the very least, it seems likely that money and other resources would flow more readily to allies than to opponents. In part, we use the literature on U.S.

developmental and military aid to identify indicators for possible geostrategic influences on U.S. disaster relief assistance. This rather extensive literature has explored a variety of possible influences both theoretically and empirically. We limit our analysis to three factors: alliance, sanctions and regime type. These three effectively capture most of the broad strategic and ideological interests of the United States.

The United States might be more apt to help its allies in times of crisis, especially during the Cold War. Further, as noted earlier, there is evidence that suggests that the effects of disasters are destabilizing in general (Olson and Drury, 1997), and the United States might use disaster aid to help friendly governments in allied nations stay in power. The converse could also be true. Withholding disaster aid could be part of a larger effort to destabilize the governments of international opponents. Therefore, we include an alliance variable in the analysis that is similar to the alliance used in the analysis of U.S. development aid.

Alliance. A dummy variable to indicate the presence of a formal alliance between the recipient state and the United States Data on alliances are taken from the Correlates of War international alliance data (Singer, 1995), updated by Oneal and Russett (1997).

To capture the current state of economic and political conflict between the United States and the recipient country, a variable is used to measure trade sanctions. Without exception, whenever the United States is involved in overt hostilities with a country, trade sanctions are also imposed. Furthermore, most of the more intense political disputes between the United States and other countries are also accompanied by U.S. trade sanctions. Trade sanctions tend to be one of the first actions the United States takes in an international dispute, and their removal effectively marks the end of the dispute (Drury, 1998).

Trade Sanctions. A dichotomous variable indicating the presence of official U.S. economic sanctions against the affected country. The data were coded from Hufbauer et al. (1990a, b) and from Drury (1997, 1998).

International ideological differences might also motivate variations in the aid offered by the United States. It seems reasonable to expect that donor countries might be more interested in providing aid to nations that share similar political and social norms. To capture this, a commonly used measure of democracy is included in the analysis.

Democracy. The Polity III data of Jaggers and Gurr (1995, 1996) are used to code the democracy score of the recipient states. Because the U.S.

democracy score remains constant at the absolute highest level of the scale during this period, the score of the recipient effectively provides a measure of the political distance between the United States and the potential recipient state.

Domestic Political Influences

The bureaucratic responsiveness argument is, in itself a domestic political argument, but there are additional domestic influences that might influence the allocation of disaster aid. To control for the potential effect of domestic political considerations we introduce two relatively simple indicators.

Assuming that the more liberal Democratic Party is likely to be more responsive to humanitarian concerns than the more conservative Republican Party, we code a dummy variable to indicate a Democratic president. This also assumes primacy for the president among elected U.S. officials.

Democratic. A dichotomous variable indicating a Democratic presidential administration.

As an indicator of how much money is available relative to demands on that money, we include a measure of the U.S. budget deficit. The assumption is that the greater the deficit, the greater the domestic demands as a function of the ability of the tax base to support those demands, and the less willing government officials and agencies should be to spend money on new, ad hoc or discretionary items. The net effect is that a greater budget deficit should reduce aid allocations.

Budget Deficit. The U.S. budget deficit, or surplus, adjusted to constant 1994 dollars (in millions).

Again, this set of variables is far larger and more diverse than that used in the development aid analyses primarily because of the lack of a large or substantial base of previous empirical work to draw upon for guidance. There is no set of commonly used indicators, nor is there a relatively standard model of the determinants of aid allocations.

Analysis

The analysis of U.S. assistance to foreign disasters reported in table 8.1 employs a relatively simple and standard OLS regression technique.

Table 8.1 Effect of *New York Times* coverage on U.S. foreign disaster assistance, 1964–1995 (ordinary least squares linear regression)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	$P> \|z\|$
New York Times coverage	388731.8	36264.1	0.000
Killed	395.883	30.318	0.000
Homeless	1.091	0.439	0.013
U.S. ally	824552.2	679528.1	0.225
Sanctions	992418.3	718902.6	0.168
Democratic	35526.6	44233.2	0.422
President's party	−380115.4	747692.4	0.611
Budget deficit	−80052.4	50623.1	0.114
Drought	3762744.0	1783899.0	0.035
Earth movement	−1000025.0	1709828.0	0.559
Flood	−115247.7	1637762.0	0.944
Storm	−1170730.0	1664059.0	0.482
Volcano	−1626690.0	2461724.0	0.509
Constant	1605766.0	1751375.0	0.359

R-square = 0.27.

Table 8.2 Effect of *New York Times* coverage on U.S. foreign disaster assistance, 1964–1995: reduced model (ordinary least squares linear regression)

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Std. Error*	$P> \|z\|$
New York Times coverage	377066.0	33097.5	0.000
Killed	465.958	28.026	0.000
Homeless	1.059	0.434	0.015
Budget deficit	−44740.9	43321.1	0.302
Drought	4266881.0	922231.1	0.000
Constant	696678.6	668118.6	0.297

R-square = 0.31.

It is safe to say that the results provide clear evidence for the contention that bureaucracies are responsive to the news media. Other factors do matter, but only four of the 14 variables are significant.

Using the reduced model offered in table 8.2 for discussion, we see that the number of killed accounts for almost US$454 in aid for each disaster-caused death, and each person made homeless generates only US$1 in disaster relief. While in personal terms this amount seems trivial, the model would predict US$2.27 million in aid for 5,000 deaths, which is not a trivial amount of total assistance. This effect is relatively small, however,

compared to the influence of the media. Just one story in the *New York Times* is worth more than US$375,000. This effect is particularly striking when considered in the context of an analysis where the severity of the disaster has already been taken into account. Thus, the model predicts that the same disaster that kills 5,000 people will have its aid level nearly doubled if it generates just five news stories. Those stories would increase the aid allocation to US$4.28 million.

The robustness of both the statistical significance and the substantive impact of the news media coverage measure should not be understated. The full model, including the large number of statistically insignificant variables, is reported in table 8.1, but no matter what combination of independent variables are employed, news media coverage levels are positively correlated with the aid allocation.

This is a single stage analysis, including both cases that did and did not receive U.S. assistance. Unlike development or military aid, a two-stage analysis in the examination of disaster aid may be of questionable value. The development and military aid analyses suffer from a difficulty in identifying a reasonable set of cases for the analysis because so many wealthy and powerful states in the world are never considered as potential recipients. As a result, the two-stage model provides a reasonable solution. Including Britain and France along with less developed countries in an analysis of development aid levels would add meaningless noise that could skew the results substantially. With the disaster aid analysis, we have the actual catalog of disasters the OFDA considered; thus we know all cases had the opportunity to receive aid and the levels of aid, including those that receive no aid, are meaningful. Still, if a two-stage model similar to the approach commonly used in the analysis of development aid is used, the effect of the news media coverage variable remains robust. In the selection stage, coverage is a statistically significant indicator of which disasters will receive U.S. assistance. In the allocation stage, where the analysis is limited to only those disasters that received aid, news media coverage is a statistically significant and substantial correlate of the levels of aid distributed.

We mention the two-stage analysis we used as a robustness test, because modifying the analysis of the allocation stage, the second stage, slightly also makes it possible to guarantee the isolation of the actions of the bureaucracy from the other actors that can have an influence on the U.S. response to foreign disasters. Raising the threshold for inclusion in the allocation stage to the maximum that the in-country diplomatic representative can award (which is US$25,000) eliminates any cases where this actor might have made allocations but the OFDA bureaucracy did not become involved. On the opposite end of the scale, the extreme cases, where there

appeared to be presidential involvement, can be excluded as outliers. This almost completely isolates the actions of the bureaucracy for the analysis of aid allocations and the media coverage variable remains robust, producing results that are all but identical to those found when all recipients are included in the allocation stage robustness test.

Conclusion

This analysis provides clear and substantial evidence for the influence of the news media on disaster aid allocations. The implications for the bureaucratic responsiveness argument are clear. Bureaucratic responsiveness is clear in an event-based aid program that is extremely autonomous, and has a great deal of discretion within the bounds of a clearly defined mandate. This demonstrates that the effect of the media is not exclusive to the development aid programs. Further, the effect is not some artifact or quirk of the analysis technique employed. Nor can the effect be attributed to some unnamed factor that connects one year's aid allocation to the next.

Chapter 9 will attempt to place these in a broader context through the comparison with the other findings presented in this book. However, there are aspects specific to disaster aid and the CNN-effect that deserve attention here. Not only does this provide an empirical confirmation of what seems apparent in a few high-profile cases, it also indicates that this responsiveness to the news media is probably more generalizable than the extreme examples of complex humanitarian emergencies, such as Somalia or Bosnia, would otherwise lead us to believe. Further, the amounts of aid that are correlated with coverage are substantial and the robustness of the finding should not be understated. In every single analysis of the levels of disaster aid, the news media is a statistical and substantively significant factor regardless of what combination of control variables, or what set of cases is used.

In terms of the politics of U.S. foreign disaster aid, the magnitude of the effect of a *New York Times* article is quite striking, generating over US$375,000 per article. Rather than attempt to argue how this analysis reflects on the relative merits of political versus humanitarian influences on the disaster assistance aid process, we would like to make the normative claim that the finding of a substantial influence for the news media is generally good from several perspectives. First, from the perspective of our bureaucratic responsiveness hypothesis and the claim that politics, from a more neutral perspective, needs to be included in disaster aid analyses, the findings clearly support the contention. The *New York Times* variable is clearly significant and has a considerable substantive effect on the levels of aid.

These findings could also be used to address the concerns of how disaster aid bureaucracies, which are insulated from electoral pressures, can fit within the ideals of a democratic government that is expected to be responsive to the needs and desires of the public (see Seldon et al., 1998; Meier, 1979; Rourke, 1984). From the humanitarian perspective, the responsiveness to the news media can be seen as a relatively benign aspect of political influence on the aid process. The simple fact that humanitarian factors by themselves explain a great deal of disaster assistance allocations is encouraging. In terms of disaster assistance, the data show that the United States tends to allocate the disaster aid just about as it says that it does, on a humanitarian basis. This agency has a clearly defined mandate that allows us to isolate its actions and within the bounds of that mandate, it has a great deal of discretion. For the bureaucratic responsiveness argument presented throughout this book, the results found in this analysis suggest two things. First, this data allowed us to isolate the actions of a single bureaucracy for the analysis and the results were substantial, clear and unmistakable. Adding some insights from the challenges of the Japanese case, it appears that the more you look at a single bureaucracy the clearer the effect of the news media seems to become. Second, we would like to suggest that the magnitude of the correlation demonstrated here might reflect the breadth of discretionary leeway inherent in the U.S. disaster assistance program. When bureaucrats do not have hard-and-fast institutional rules to guide their decisions, when they must apply their expert judgment, that is when they use the media to guide their choices.

CHAPTER 9

BUREAUCRACY, DEMOCRACY, THE MEDIA AND FOREIGN AID

In many ways, this book is a simple and straightforward product of social science research. A conceptual expectation was created through the integration and extension of existing theory and research findings. The responsiveness argument presented in chapter 2 lead to the expectation that aid bureaucracies will try to roughly match the levels of aid they offer with their perception of the domestic political importance of the recipient. It was argued that the news media provide a simple, clear and easily accessible indicator of that importance and, as a result, it was expected that aid bureaucracies will respond to the content of the news media by matching development aid allocations with levels of coverage.

From that conceptual foundation, a comparative battery of tests were conducted to evaluate the empirical implications of that expectation, and to address at least a few of the obvious potential objections or critiques. In analysis after analysis, the predicted relationship was found: aid levels and media coverage are clearly correlated. The robustness of this result should leave little room for disputing the substance of that relationship. For the development aid analyses at least, we chose to present models and analyses in the tables that were as comparable as possible across donor programs. The specific choices we made in creating these tables may not match the preferences of every reader. However, the choices we made there were presentation choices that should be considered aesthetic rather than substantive. With our rather extensive, integrated database and the ease of running statistical analyses on a desktop computer, it was a simple but tedious job to run a multitude of statistical tests examining variations on the models and methods used. Hundreds of these robustness tests have been

run, with many of the most obvious alternatives reported in the discussion, or the footnotes.

The media variable is consistently statistically significant in all the development aid analyses. A random-effects GLS pooled, time-series, cross-sectional analysis produces exactly the same results—out to several decimal places—as the panel-corrected standard errors OLS model presented in the tables. "Older" methods, including the dummy variable methods from the early 1980s and a straight OLS analysis also produce the same results. Similarly, the media salience measures are significant regardless of whether we include or exclude outlying cases, or if we keep or drop the lagged dependent variable from the regression model. The specific choice of aid commitments as the dependant variable also has little effect on the basic finding. The media variable is significant in the analysis of aid disbursements, be it total aid or net aid. In every donor program analyzed, the media salience variable was significant regardless of the combination of independent and control variables used in the regression model. The only exception we found in the hundreds of analyses run was reported in table 6.4. The media coverage variable was not significant in the Japanese case using lagged media coverage measure.

The analysis of the U.S. disaster aid program provides further assurances of the robustness of this empirical connection between domestic news coverage and the output of aid bureaucracies. Not only are there substantial differences between the way development aid bureaucracies and the U.S. disaster aid bureaucracy function, but the methodologies used to analyze statistically the disaster aid allocation are also quite different. This makes many obvious critiques more difficult to sustain. It is hard to argue that the basic connection between the output of these bureaucracies and the media is a fluke from the pooled, time-series technique. Similarly, this finding significantly reduces the range of possible spurious influences from processes or other factors that might be common across the global development aid regime.

Media coverage and the bureaucratic process of awarding foreign aid are clearly correlated. We have gone to great lengths to test this basic empirical finding and within the constraints of a scientific approach where empirical "facts" are by definition tentative and always subject to future challenges, we are confident in the robustness of this finding. Exactly what the correlation between media and foreign aid means is the part of this study where it is far more difficult to establish such confidence. The theoretical, conceptual and even the practical implications of this empirical regularity are open to debate, discussion and criticism.

We use the theoretical framework from chapter 2 to interpret and discuss the overall implications of this research. The discussion here is

written as if the empirical results confirm the theoretical explanation. While we recognize the difference between not falsifying a theory, and the impossibility of proving a scientific argument to be true, the results do fit with the explanation and in the end, it is the explanation that is potentially the most important offering from this study. The whole idea of applying the rules of scientific inquiry to social and political phenomena is to explain why and how these things work.

Having now worked on this book for several years—counting news articles in several different papers, developing, refining and testing the argument for bureaucratic responsiveness to the media, running various models—we are confident that what we have offered as a theory, model, explanation or whatever label might seem most appropriate, represents a conceptually valuable contribution to several areas of study. For readers, we offer the simple argument that since the theoretical and conceptual discussion presented in chapter 2 led us to these tests and ultimately these empirical findings, there is reason beyond ego and personal involvement in this research to accept this theoretical framework as reasonable until something better is developed that leads to new insights. It is from the perspective that we have established a foundation for tentative acceptance of the explanation that we offer many of the comments of this chapter, particularly the discussion of bureaucracy and democracy.

Implications for the Study of Foreign Aid

For the study of foreign aid allocations, the implications of this study are both clear and relatively simple. The effect of news media coverage adds to our existing understanding of the determinants of foreign aid allocations. In the analyses, variables representing the three predominant explanations of foreign aid allocations—the strategic, economic and humanitarian motive—demonstrated correlations with development aid allocations that were roughly representative of the findings from previous studies. The media salience measure did not significantly alter the statistical significance of these accepted factors and it consistently added to the overall explanatory power of the regression model.

The boost in the R^2 measure was at times quite modest. In the French case it added only a few percentage points to the variance explained by the model, but still it was an addition to the basic explanation. Since most of the explanatory power of the regression models comes from the inclusion of the lagged dependant variable, it is somewhat difficult to quantify the extent of the media's contribution in a practical and meaningful way. When the lagged dependant variable accounts for 60 percent or more of the R^2,

does an increase from 0.39 to 0.43 from the inclusion of the media variable represent a 10 percent increase in explanatory power in the model? Or, does it represent a 40 percent increase in the explanatory value of the theoretically interesting variables in the model? The answer to those questions may well depend on the reason for including the lagged dependent variable in the regression model. What can be said is that the size of the increase in the explanatory reported in the development aid chapters is statistically significant.[1] Thus, we can say, empirically at least, the salience measure adds to the existing foundation of knowledge.

Conceptually, we would like to suggest two contributions to the study of foreign aid. First, the media salience variable provides a means of capturing at least some of the domestic political motivation for aid in a large-N empirical model of aid distributions. Domestic salience is argued to represent the actual or potential domestic political importance of a donor and that is shaping part of the allocation. To date, no one has offered an alternative to the media as a means of capturing the domestic influence in the statistical analysis of a donor's aid allocations.

Second, the coverage measure seems to be picking up a large number of ad hoc or transient international motivations for aid. While much of the strategic or international political importance of a recipient country can be captured by some combination of strategic variables used in this study and/or earlier analyses, much of the variation in the immediate international political importance of countries can be linked to events occurring in and around them (i.e. unrest in El Salvador prompts aid to both El Salvador and Honduras). Those same events that temporarily increase the strategic importance of a country also attract news coverage.

We might be able to try some other combination of variables to capture this. However, the way the business imperatives of the news industry drive it to make judgments regarding the interest in these diverse events suggest that it may truly be the indicator or the best proxy measure. Looking at the content of the media coverage is particularly informative in this regard. In the process of coding the content of the coverage and categorizing the stories in the simple scheme used here, it is hard not to notice the astounding number of reasons why countries obtain coverage. From coups, to earthquakes, to elections, to trade, to human rights, to the cutting of the rain forest, to the latest consumer trend, the reasons seem boundless. Most of the stories, however, do reflect something that makes the country being covered by the news significant to viewers. Whether it is causing the importance or reflecting it remains an open question, but media does seem to catch the transient issues and events that might be argued to be important to those that will vote in the democracies studied here.

The Role of Media in Politics

This leaves an important question unanswered: is media coverage just a convenient indicator of this menagerie of other influences, or does it actually drive bureaucratic actions? Put another way: does the coverage cause the importance of a subject for the bureaucrat, or is it the events and issues causing the importance, with bureaucrats and media outlets simply reacting to the same thing?

From the perspective of the role of media in modern politics we offer the very unhelpful answer of, yes. Yes, media is an indicator. The diverse outlets that bring news to domestic audiences are part of a business, driven by the imperatives of capturing viewers (Underwood, 1993) to sell to advertisers.[2] Coverage choices are shaped by the media's institutional beliefs regarding what people want to see,[3] known as "newsworthiness." This leads them to capture the events and issues that are related to the importance of the aid recipients, regardless of the specifics of the nature of the events or issues.

However, from the perspective of the bureaucratic responsiveness argument we can also answer "yes" when asked if the media coverage is a causal force. Media coverage is an indicator of political importance, but whether it drives or reflects public opinion, or whether it even reflects actual public opinion is irrelevant as long as the decision-makers in question believe that it is a valuable indicator. That belief drives bureaucrats and other politicians to use the news media to monitor domestic politics and they react to its content. Thus, it is an indicator that is also a causal force. To bring this point home, we can invoke the tree in the woods argument from the larger discussion of mediated politics. If the media does not report it, does anyone hear it? While it is quite likely that bureaucrats are reacting directly to events, we can point to the disaster aid analysis to show that they are reacting less to the events that no one hears.

The disaster analysis is event-based and we can both define and offer measures of the magnitude of the event. We can put a solid number on the presumed need for an aid response—the human impact of the event. When the magnitude of the human impact is controlled for in the statistical analysis, the media coverage still has a substantial correlation with levels of aid. The disasters that go unreported get far less aid than disasters of comparable human impact that do gain coverage. If media coverage was simply paralleling the importance and not actually influencing bureaucrats, then it should not be statistically significant in event-based analyses where we can control for how important the event should be for the bureaucrats involved in the aid response. Yes, the media is acting as an indicator of importance,

but it is a causal force because it is acting as an indicator of that importance for the bureaucrats as well as other political actors in the mediated political environment of a modern democracy.

Looking at the role of the media in politics and foreign policy more generally, the findings here have two clear implications for the broader study of the role of media in politics and foreign policy. The first is that the influence of the content of the media on government actors reaches beyond elected officials. For an elected official, who personally or indirectly through his or her party must face public evaluation in the voting booth, the need to monitor, react to and engage with the mass media as a means of connecting with the voting populous is obvious to all. Modern elections are media elections and modern politics are mediated politics. However, a media connection with nonelected actors in the foreign policy process is a relatively new idea and given the extensive role of bureaucracies in foreign policy, this could have substantial implications for expectations of state behavior. This is clearly something worth exploring.

Second, the basic idea of a CNN-effect need not be limited to extreme events. Media coverage, even in very small doses, can have an influence on foreign policy and can drive Western democracies to act. A reasonably appropriate analogy might be the tidal wave and the tricking stream. The effects of a Tsunami are usually obvious. Villages can be swept away, forests leveled; the crushing wall of water can alter the very shape of a coastline. However, any geology student will tell you that the gradual effects of running water, even a small stream, have far more profound effects on the shape of the earth. We would be hard-pressed to notice the effect of the stream in the same way we notice the Tsunami, but over time, the effects may be far greater.

Similarly, we notice the tidal waves of media coverage of the tragedies in places like Bosnia or Somalia and we see the frightened villager running for the hills and the reactions of world leaders. We have studied these big media events. We have worked to define the related parameters of action and reaction. What had not been examined, until now, are the effects of the constant stream of coverage of smaller events in the media. The impetus is smaller and the reaction is smaller, but accumulated over time, the smaller disasters account for far more aid than the handful of larger ones. Further, the effect seems to be generalizable to all aid bureaucracies, possibly to all bureaucracies.

The Agency Theory Approach to Bureaucracy

We could even carry the tidal wave and stream analogy into the discussion of the implications for the study of the bureaucracy by referring to the

British case. Recent studies of the British civil service tend to focus on the tidal wave of Thatcher's reforms/assaults on the British bureaucratic arm of government. In contrast, most of the studies from an agency theory perspective focus on smaller, incremental changes over time in response to political pressures.

The implications of this study for the broader inquiry into bureaucracy are somewhat outside the recent and current focus on adaptation or reform. This study and these results provide some clear support and a conceptual extension of agency theory, but the real contribution is in the connection made to the immediate actions of bureaucracies. Other studies from the perspective of agency theory have focused primarily upon adaptation, changes in process, method, policy or focus. Here we looked at the output of the aid bureaucracies and found that the basic logic of agency theory could find effects not just in how the output of agencies may have changed in response to significant changes in the political environment, but in how the regular output of administrative government fluctuates with transient influence represented by coverage.

A second contribution to the study of bureaucracies lies in identifying media as a political element that is relevant to this whole line of inquiry. The idea of such a generalizable indicator of the demands or expectations of the domestic political environment should be applicable to many other bureaucracies and many other topics of inquiry.

Thinking Bigger: Implications for Modern Democratic Governance

To this point, we have approached the written culmination of this study in a reserved if not cautious manner. Though the multidisciplinary nature of the study creates a complex web of relevant ideas and research, the theoretical advances we have offered are relatively clear and simple. That effort at extending theoretical foundations led to novel hypotheses and robust empirical findings. The comparative nature of the study allowed for repeated and varied tests that addressed many of the obvious questions or concerns that might arise. With that kind of end result, as researchers, authors and—if we may stretch the term enough to apply it to ourselves—scholars, we believe that, for the most part, this research speaks for itself and we have intentionally chosen a reserved, if not cautious approach to the discussions and conclusions—until now.

We would like to conclude this book with some bold and perhaps provocative arguments regarding how this research might speak to our understanding of bureaucracies as democratic institutions and even the

nature of democracy itself. In short, the idea, and more importantly the evidence of bureaucratic responsiveness to the news media, radically alters the very foundation of some fundamental debates in the study of politics, starting with the long-standing obsession over subjugating bureaucracies to the democratic ideal.

We say the democratic ideal, rather than democracy, because part of the difficulty we see in the arguments regarding how bureaucracies do or should function in a democratic context arises from equating democracy with the electoral selection of governors. Modern representative democracy, regardless of the specific form, is simply a political structure for attaining the more philosophical democratic ideal of rule by the public. In the debate over democratic bureaucracies it is the ideal that is more important than the specifics of the structure used to attain it. Mueller (1992) makes a particularly relevant point on this issue that, to the best of our knowledge, has never been brought into the debate over bureaucracies. Mueller argued that a democratic government is responsive to the demands, desires, wishes or needs of the public. How that responsiveness is achieved is inconsequential. Thus, even though elections have proven to be reasonably effective at creating responsive governments, they are not by any means a necessary condition (nor, in many areas of the world, are they a sufficient condition).

Part of Mueller's argument connects with the news media, because he argues that freedoms of expression will create responsive government regardless of a country's political structures. That proposition, while offered as part of a conceptual argument, is more than hypothetical or anecdotal, leading to concrete empirical results in the analysis of democracy's role in international conflict. By using press freedom rather than electoral structures as the defining element of a liberal democratic government, many of the apparent discrepancies in the extensive study of the democratic peace can be addressed (Van Belle, 1997). Furthermore, by using press freedom rather than electoral structures, the democratic peace argument can be extended to address not just war, but the more sensitive condition of the escalation of conflicts from nonlethal to deadly. Shared press freedom is an almost perfect preventive condition for lethal international conflict (Van Belle, 2000).

Thus, working from Mueller's idea that responsive is democratic, we argue that no matter how insulated a bureaucracy is from electoral pressures, as long as a mechanism is in place to make it responsive to the public, it is a democratic institution. In conclusion, we are going to assert that responsiveness to the news media makes bureaucracies democratic, but first there are a few critical points that must be made regarding the news media's role in democracies.

There is a significant degree of pessimism regarding the media in democratic societies and the degree to which they can serve as a conduit

of influences, opinions or voices from the public to those that govern. To a significant degree, this pessimism is fueled by the clear and substantial predominance of official voices in the media. Not only do the business imperatives of the news media consistently drive them to report the often self-serving information offered by leaders and other elites but also the very breadth of the debate is, to a great degree defined by these official voices. Thus, even when the media turn to voices from outside of parliaments, congresses and executives, they index their coverage of those sources to match the degree of disagreement in the official halls of government (Bennett, 1990). Analyses repeatedly confirm this overwhelming predominance of officialdom in the media and in the face of this, it is hard to imagine how media could serve as a conduit of public influence on leaders.

We offer two points, again recognizing that they are likely to instigate debate if not criticism. First, the pessimism over the predominance of official voices in the news media has some interesting parallels with an aspect of the literature on bureaucracies. Until the application of agency theory, it was presumed that democratic oversight only shaped the actions of bureaucracies when elected officials were actively engaged with the bureaucracy. It was not until agency theory connected the latent threat of punishment from oversight, the big stick behind the door, that the more dynamic nature of the connection between bureaucracies and the elected arms of government were revealed. The big stick almost always stays behind the door, but the threat, the possibility that it could be brought to bear, has tremendous effect. All the findings presented in this book are derived from that latent influence.

The predominance of official voices in the news media, or more accurately the limited voices from outside of officialdom is like the absence of active congressional or presidential oversight. The potential, the possibility and perhaps an occasional example of an elected official getting his or her career destroyed by media coverage of voices or events from outside the halls of power are sufficient to profoundly influence actions. The news media is truly the stick behind the door in democratic governance. Thus, rather than a constant presence, an occasional but dramatic entry into the content of the news media is sufficient for the public voice to have an effect.

As an example of how these voices might intrude on the elite conversation in the media, we point to the coverage of protest. In terms of volume of coverage, protest pales in comparison to official voices, but it does, quite regularly gain coverage. In gaining coverage, it also gains the opportunity to connect with the opinions of the larger public. The specter of Vietnam is salient in every conflict the United States enters and the lesson of avoiding massive public protest and political backlash are just as

salient as the lessons learned from the military failures. Dolphin-safe tuna, pollution on the Hudson River, Rosa Parks; there are numerous examples of a policy agenda arising from this kind of source.

These examples also connect with the second point. To be effective, these public voices do not need to dominate or even approach parity with the official voices. Protests over the Vietnam War gained a great deal of coverage, but nowhere near as much as either the Johnson or Nixon administration. Still, few would argue that protest and public discontent altered the conduct of the war and that shaped subsequent U.S. foreign policies. In fact, the expression of a public voice might do no more than serve as a catalyst. Democratic politicians are opportunists and if an issue position demonstrates the ability to connect with a portion of the electorate, someone is likely to take up the cause, particularly in a proportional representation system where that portion of the electorate need not be overwhelmingly large to have an effect on the results from the voting booth.

Whether it is a challenger or incumbent that rallies to the voice is not as important as the fact that it is brought into the official debate. In fact, if it is a challenger that takes up the issue, that would be an example of how the latent is occasionally transformed into the active. It does not have to happen all the time. It does not even have to be frequent as long as the possibility is salient in the minds of elected officials. It only takes an occasional Richard Nixon, Gary Hart or Gary Condit to remind elected political leaders that they are just one journalistic feeding frenzy from the end of their aspirations, or even their careers.

While the media is critical to modern democracy, critical to the degree that the two aspects of a liberal social order may well have coevolved to the point of inseparability (Cook, 1998), for the democratic idea of responsiveness to the needs, wants and desires of the public, we may all have been looking in the wrong places. The way the news media makes a modern electoral democracy democratic may largely be this latent threat. Bureaucracies attempt to match public expectations in order to avoid coverage. When coverage occurs, that represents a failure, an example of the failure of a bureaucracy to be sufficiently responsive. Leaders constantly interact with the media, constantly shape the content of coverage, but they are limited in how far and how fast they can lead. No matter how much they might be able to get their point of view inserted into the media, they have to keep their actions and policies within the bounds of what the public will accept. The media will cover those who protest, and if that protest resonates in the electorate, challengers and opponents are constantly waiting to take advantage. Thus, what the media might report is just as important for a democratic leader as what it does report. The latent is just as important as the actual.

NOTES

Chapter 2 Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Politics

1. We must extend a sincere thank you to Steven Hook. His patient tutelage on the foreign aid literature was, perhaps, the key to this entire project. We are sure he will see echoes of his explanations and descriptions throughout this chapter.
2. See, e.g.: Schraeder et al. (1998); Meernik et al. (1998); Noël and Thérien (1995); Hook (1995); Lumsdaine (1993); and McKinlay (1979).
3. This tripartite division of the theoretical literature is developed in Viotti and Kauppi (1999); see also Schraeder et al. (1998).
4. An important exception is the study by Payaslian (1996).
5. Mueller (1989) goes so far as to argue that this will make major wars obsolete.
6. For a discussion of the fungibility of foreign aid, see Zahariadis et al. (1990).
7. The 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) document, *Human Development Report*, first used this term.
8. See Mosley (1984) for an empirical treatment of this domestic political economy of aid.
9. In many ways the argument for responsiveness to the news media presented as part of this study can be viewed as an effort to operationalize the basic premise behind Ruttan's arguments. The analysis presented in subsequent chapters can be seen as either a statistical extension or compliment to his study.
10. Informal Experts' Meeting—International Development Co-Operation in OECD Countries: Public Debate, Public Support and Public Opinion, October 25 and 26, 2001, Dublin, Ireland.
11. For a thorough review of the full scope and history of foreign policy analysis see Gerner (1995) or Hudson (1995).
12. In the Van Belle model, international influences are important, but they are filtered through the domestic political structure, which translates them into specific benefits or threats to the leader's power or tenure.

13. For a definition and discussion of complex humanitarian emergencies see Albala-Bertrand (2000).
14. This could be connected to the Indexing hypothesis of Bennett (1990).
15. Serious conflicts are roughly defined as events in the Correlates of War categories of *Use of Force* and *War* (Singer and Small, 1972).
16. The arguments justifying these exclusions and an example can be found in McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991).
17. See Holsti, 1992 for an overview; see also Hinckley, 1992; Powlick, 1991 and 1995.
18. For example, elected representatives are the second most mentioned source of public opinion and it can be expected that these officials' perceptions, particularly their perception of the issue's importance, are related to news media coverage.
19. This section provides only a modest survey of the available literature, guided by a focus on the potential for responsiveness, for more thorough treatments of the broader literature, see Wood and Waterman (1994).
20. See also Redford (1969); Gawthorp (1998); Hwang (1999) for works exploring this compatibility question.
21. Gawthorp's analysis on the desire to effectively serve the public could also be complimented by the empirical works from the principal–agent approach (discussed later), which could be included as reassuring on this point.
22. Wood and Waterman (1994:19) cite 14 references as examples and imply that there are numerous others.
23. See Weingast and Moran (1983) and McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) for a review of how the assumption that control only occurred when bureaucracies were being actively monitored was the standard prior to the application of agency theory.
24. Another highly salient point in the study of bureaucracies that is addressed by agency theory is information asymmetries and deception. See, Wood and Waterman (1994: 23–25).

Chapter 3 A Baseline for Further Analysis

1. A similar argument could be offered for recent U.S. aid directed toward the former Soviet Union.
2. The economic variable can reach statistical significance in the analysis of the United States, but that variable is always the most sensitive to changes in the model specification and often drops from significance in robustness tests.
3. Apodaca and Stohl (1999) are an exception, finding that Per Capita GDP is not a factor in the second stage.
4. This expectation, formulated as a null hypothesis, is somewhat confirmed by the exploratory analysis of the first stage of the U.S. aid allocation process.

5. In the print version of this publication the commitment data are only available from 1978–1992. The CD-ROM version, however, provides aid commitment data for the period 1960–1999.
6. Disbursements of U.S. military aid are reported annually in *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants*, a U.S. government publication.
7. The sheer magnitude of this coding effort is also a significant factor in the choice of a simple story count and simple content measures. For every year analyzed, there are around 100 countries to be coded for each donor. For the *New York Times* coverage variable used in this chapter, some aid recipients receive several thousand stories in a single year. Heartfelt thanks are offered to the army of research assistants who helped with the coding of the data used in this chapter: Sean Tischler, Linda Shaytar, Joseph S. Cravath, Peter Goes, Chris Pritchard, Deborah L. Mannhaupt, Makkiko Fukada, Nat Gibbens, Madina Arkayeva, Athena Vliet, Christy Schlachter, Gretchen Vogt, Danielle Black, Paul Gumper, Chris Hoffert, Bruce Knott and Jamie Konrad.
8. Rather than simply assume or argue that the *New York Times* provides the best measure of levels of U.S. news coverage, a subsequent analysis in this chapter utilizes network television news coverage levels as a second measure of news media salience.
9. These variables are selected because of their prominence in the extensive literature on the empirical analysis of U.S. foreign development aid (Meernik et al., 1998; McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1991, 1992; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; McKinlay, 1979; McKinlay and Little, 1978; Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; Kaplan, 1975; Kato, 1969). In the analysis variables other than the news media variable are lagged by one year. Such a lag, common in the aid literature, represents the most recent information available to decision-makers. The question of lagging the news media variables is addressed later.
10. Data from the Penn World tables (Summers and Heston, 1988; Summers et al., 1995) provide what many would argue is a better measure, but it does not cover the entire period being examined.
11. Measures of trade are commonly used to capture this potential motivation in aid transfers. However the operationalization of the trade variable ranges from using either exports or imports, to various composite measures that also bring in the GNP or overall levels of trade for one or both of the countries involved in the bilateral aid relationship. With no clear consensus on how to use these potential indicators of the trade relationship, the method described here was chosen because it seemed to capture the exploitation—the amount of benefit—obtained by the donor from the unequal trade relationship.
12. Alliances are not used to capture the underlying geostrategic motive in all of the baseline analyses. Other roughly comparable binary measures of a demonstrated strategic interest that are more appropriate to the other cases are substituted.

13. Every analysis reported in this book was also run using other, well-established and tested procedures for analyzing pooled data. Specifically, a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression analysis of a random effects model in a pooled cross-sectional time-series was also employed using the function (*xtreg*) built in to the latest version of the Stata statistical software package. The results from both methodologies are all but identical.
14. Iraq is also excluded, but this is due to a difficulty with the data on aid and Iraq is excluded from all of the analyses. Since 1991 it is quite clear that none of the aid donors, particularly the United States, have given aid to the Iraqi government. However, an aid commitment is listed for several donors and it appears that the aid given directly to the Kurdish population in the North is listed as aid to Iraq.
15. In addition to the GLS robustness test conducted for all reported results, using annual dummy variables to control for heterskedasticity between cross-sections in an OLS regression with robust (Huberdized) standard errors still produces a positive correlation for news media coverage.
16. Per capita GNP comes close, but it drops below the commonly used 0.05 threshold for statistical significance when Israel and Egypt are included in the analyses.
17. News media coverage is quite transparent and the impetus behind the inclusion of any specific story is almost always clear in the content of the coverage.
18. These articles were randomly selected from the period 1994–1996.
19. Ensuring replicability is a concern addressed by keeping the measures simple, but again, the sheer magnitude of the effort is a consideration. For each donor country, coding the content of a single year for just the recipients of aid took approximately 20 hours of work for an experienced research assistant. With five donor countries and analyses covering more than a decade, not to mention a significant portion of the British coverage being coded for two separate papers, the sheer number of hours of work involved is substantial.
20. The abstracts in the *Vanderbilt Television News Archives* are not detailed enough to make it possible to consistently code the content of television news coverage, so it is not possible to replicate this content coverage for the television variable used in the next section.
21. Interestingly, there is a slight difference in the examination of net aid disbursements with the *New York Times* indicator showing a modest superiority over the television variable.

Chapter 4 A First Point of Comparison

1. For example McGillivray Oczkowski (1992) and McKinlay and Little (1978) are often cited in empirical studies of U.S. foreign aid with no mention that they examine the British case.

2. With the staid and formal image of the British, it is more than a little amusing to note that raucous debates are the norm in the House of Commons and the rowdy cowboy culture of the United States produced a Congress with the most boring mode of political debate known to mankind.
3. This is not to argue that the U.S. aid bureaucracy is uniform or unified. See Ruttan (1996) on this point. However, most of the structural division in the United States is between development and military aid and in comparison to the British case, the U.S. system for awarding development aid is reasonably coherent.
4. For a succinct summary of the British foreign aid program see Morrissey et al. (1992).
5. For some countries, particularly small countries that have national cricket teams or developing countries that make it past the qualifying rounds of the World Cup, sports coverage can make up as much as 90% of a year's coverage and for large European countries, sports coverage can total as many as 300 stories. Leaving out the sports coverage in the analysis reduces the levels of significance for the total news coverage variable, but the variable still remains clearly significant.
6. Data from the Penn World tables (Summers and Heston, 1988; Summers et al., 1995) provide what many would argue is a better measure, but it does not cover the entire period being examined.
7. Measures of trade are commonly used to capture this potential motivation in aid transfers. However the operationalization of the trade variable ranges from using either exports or imports, to various composite measures that also bring in the GNP or overall levels of trade for one or both of the countries involved in the bilateral aid relationship. As stated previously, the method described here was chosen because it seemed to capture the exploitation—the amount of benefit—obtained by the donor from the unequal trade relationship.

Chapter 5 A Trusted, Elite Bureaucracy

1. Actually, French presidents have more constitutional powers than their U.S. counterpart (see Taylor, 1999: 55); the powers of the executive have even been described as "quasi-monarchical" (Safran, 1985: 13). For example, although the first institution mentioned in the U.S. constitution is the Congress (Article 1, Section 1), the French constitution first describes the president (in Title II), then the government (Title III) and only then the Parliament (Title IV).
2. The "Troïka" is composed of the state that has recently relinquished the EU Council presidency, plus the current president and the next president. This consultative group thus changes by one member every six months. As of the time we are writing this book, the official voice of the EU is thus articulated by the current EU Council president or in certain cases by the

relevant EU Commissioner for the specific issue being addressed (e.g. Chris Patten for External Relations as of 2003). However, the forthcoming European Constitution will change this dynamic if it is adopted at the Summit in Athens.

3. Obviously, during the period studied for this analysis (1985–1995) these concerns would not apply to the same extent as they would today. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the "second pillar" of Europe—the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—was not a strong factor and the kind of coordination among the EU members that prevails today on many issues was not a reality then. The conflicts endured in the former Yugoslav republics from 1991 to 1995 accelerated the process of CFSP.
4. A concrete example of the policy of cultural and linguistic *rayonnement* is that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs finances the international system of French secondary education establishments called the *Lycées français* (Safran, 1985: 268; France, 2003). There are hundreds of these schools in all regions of the world, where the education curriculum is absolutely identical and mirrors the exact pedagogy in France, as established by the Ministry of Education. It is even rumored that at any given moment, the Minister of Education knows exactly what is being taught for a particular grade, for the curriculum is standardized throughout the *Lycée* system (see Safran, 1985: 42–43).
5. The current official name of the ministry is the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEFI in its French acronym); however we shall use Finance as a shorthand.
6. Many other ministries participate in technical cooperation ventures: Education; Health; Agriculture; Youth & Sports; etc.
7. After 1998 the Ministry for Cooperation was integrated into the Foreign Affairs Ministry as the *Direction générale pour la Cooperation internationale et le développement*, DGCID (the head of which is a Minister delegate), yet due to the temporal domain of the data analysis of this present study, which is from 1985 to 1995, it is relevant to describe the functioning of this defunct French government bureaucracy.
8. Many of these issues have been smoothed over by the 1998 reforms. Effective from January 1999, much of the French aid program has been concentrated within the Foreign and the Finance ministries. Moreover, the traditional special zone in Africa—the *pays du champ*—has officially been dissolved. Most importantly, there is now an Inter-Ministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (the French acronym is CICID) that regroups all interested parties (currently at least 12 different ministries) and coordinates the interests of the different actors. The French development priorities are set forth each year by this group, such as the orientations and target countries for the following year. See France (2003).

9. The issue of grant aid *versus* loans will be discussed in the following chapter dealing with Japan, as it posed a methodological challenge for the analysis of that country's ODA.
10. Moreover, less than half of the EU's aid goes to the ACP countries, which are favored by France; much of the EU's common fund aid is directed at the former Eastern Bloc states. See Charasse (2001: 20).
11. As usual, the data are reported in U.S. dollars.
12. We stress that this number should be interpreted as an example. Due to the nature of pooled analyses and the number of control variables, the reader should interpret this number as expressing an order of magnitude, as opposed to an exact figure.

Chapter 6 The Challenge of a Disaggregated Aid Program

1. We are grateful to Ellis Krauss for pointing out this distinction.
2. For the consequent relationship between domestic public works policy and aid policy, see Potter (1998).
3. The mainstream view avers that the bureaucracy dominates routine policy making. For a conventional explanation of bureaucratic dominance see Richardson and Flanagan (1984).
4. This attitude appears to be reflected most in the MFA. Alan Rix's conversation with then-director of the Economic cooperation Division, Matsuura Koichiro, reported in Japan's Foreign Aid Leadership, is an object lesson in this attitude. Significantly, the Association for the Promotion of International Cooperation, an organization funded and sponsored by the Foreign Ministry, has only begun to conduct such polls since 1997 (and unfortunately after the time period under study here).
5. For a full discussion of the difference in coverage allocation between print and broadcast media see Krauss (1996, 2000).
6. The exact number in any one analysis will vary depending on missing data.
7. See, e.g., Thayer (1969).
8. North Korea is not included in the analysis.
9. Confusing the picture further, in some of the robustness tests using other statistical analysis techniques, it is statistically significant. Specifically, a random effects model in a Generalized Least Squares analysis produces a statistically significant finding for the media coverage variable when using this specification of independent and control variables. The GLS results have been reported in conference presentations and publications completed prior to the application of the methods used for table 6.2.

10. An additional point is that unlike the troubling results in table 6.2, the results reported in tables 6.4 and 6.5 are robust regardless of statistical technique employed.

Chapter 7 The Multilingual Context of a Smaller Power

1. The British North America Act of 1867 organized Canada as a Dominion of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom recognized Canada as an independent member of the British Commonwealth in 1926, but it was not until the Statutes of Westminster were passed in 1931 that Canada gained *de jure* independence.
2. World Cup Soccer provides interesting anecdotes: French Quebecers cheer for the French team while English Canadians are loyal to either England or Ireland.
3. Making Canada, in the contemporary opinion of then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, the "best country in the world" to live.
4. In those days, and until the 1970s, the U.S. and Canadian dollars were approximately on par with each other.
5. The annual national postsecondary recruitment drive is used to fill positions in all federal departments.
6. Personal communication with a CIDA Human Resource Division officer, Mr. Marc Gosselin, on May 28, 2003.
7. See CIDA's website: www.acdi-cida.gc.ca.
8. The OECD has 30 member states (plus the EU), and Canada has, in recent years, sent ODA to three of them: South Korea, Mexico and Turkey (although only Mexico received any substantial aid).
9. As of this writing, Canadian ODA for FY 2001–2002 is CDN $2.9 billion, and expected to rise in the next five years by 8% per year.
10. These data are, as usual, reported in U.S. dollars.
11. Senior civil servants will point out that what decision-makers actually read are the press clippings compiled by junior staff—like the *Early Bird*. The point is that these press clippings do in fact come from national newswires and newspapers such as the *Globe and Mail* and the *Associated Press*.
12. The founding documents of NEPAD are generally regarded to be the *Plan Omega* (prepared by Sénégal) and the *Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery* (originally prepared by Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria). These documents and other information on NEPAD can be found on-line at http://www.nepad.org/.
13. The AU summit of July 2002 in Durban proposed enlarging the Implementation Committee to 20 members.

Chapter 8 An Event-Driven Aid Program

1. The authors would like to express a heartfelt thank you to Richard Olson and A. Cooper Drury. Beyond providing the data, Professor Olson's patient tutelage on the U.S. disaster assistance program will be recognized by anyone familiar with his research. In addition, Professor Drury's help with the statistical methods used in all the analytical chapters in this book, was above and beyond what one can normally ask of a colleague.
2. There is a slight degree of discretion, a few thousand dollars, available to the in-country diplomatic representative of the United States, but even this must be subsequently authorized by the OFDA.
3. For a definition and discussion of complex humanitarian emergencies see Albala-Bertrand (2000).
4. The disaster data are from Olson and Drury (1997).
5. There were 17 events, out of over 2,500 where media coverage of the events suggested presidential comments or involvement.
6. The analyses discussed later were also run on the entire data set and there were no significant deviations from the results presented in the tables; in no instance was an insignificant variable in the analysis of natural disasters significant in the analysis of all disasters.
7. This varies slightly depending upon which independent variables are included and how data might be missing in the independent variables.
8. A thank you must be extended to Jerrilyn Batiste for the research assistance she provided.

Chapter 9 Bureaucracy, Democracy, the Media and Foreign Aid

1. We use a simple *F*-test to test for the statistical significance of adding the media coverage variable to the regression model. While we see no conceptual reason why the pooled, time-series nature of these analyses will nullify the results of an *F*-test, we could identify no clear statement on this point and so we use this result with caution.
2. Or to justify the expenditures in the case of government-supported free media.
3. We discount the argument that the media is a coherent and intentional actor in politics.

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