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A NEW MILITARISM IN LATIN AMERICA

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The absence of traditional coups d'état in Latin America since democracy returned to that region several decades ago should not make us forget that true civilian control over the armed forces remains an ongoing challenge. A state's military and police forces will always be its greatest repositories of sheer coercive force; setting and maintaining limits on their power will always be necessary if the state is to remain free.

A democracy, it is generally agreed, cannot be considered consolidated unless its armed forces are firmly under the control of duly constituted civilian authorities.¹ For obvious reasons given Latin America's history of putsches and coups, the question of how to handle the military was at the center of debates about democratic consolidation that followed the transitions. Since then, however, the "military question" has become less salient, nudged aside by more routine concerns regarding economic prosperity, as well as by pressing demands for improved public order and security in a region that holds less than a tenth of the world's population but suffers about a third of its homicides.²

Nevertheless, the role of the military remains a puzzle and a problem for Latin America's democracies. Although public and scholarly attention may have wandered, the truth is that no country in the region has established full civilian control over its military institutions. And now we are witnessing the appearance of new forms of military power that make it doubtful whether the traditional understanding of civil-military relations still applies to Latin America.

With democracy's return to the region, the number of legitimate governments has expanded, and with that expansion—curiously—has

risen the political power of the armed forces. This is not the old-school type of military influence once familiar to students of Latin American politics: In the past it was typically long-ruling elites, fearing displacement by the expansion of suffrage, who went knocking on the barracks

In no case has a Latin American military's involvement in civil policing improved public security.

door. Military interventions in politics back then were about restoring the old conservative order and protecting those who benefited from it. Today, the armed forces have returned to the center of the political sphere as allies of—and often substitute institutions for—elected Latin American governments.

This is most clearly the case in the five Spanish-speaking ALBA countries—Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—where civilian elites increasingly depend on the military to keep them in power.³ In the region's most notorious recent use of military power for domestic political purposes, Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro—facing massive demonstrations fueled by public anger at basic consumer-goods shortages—has not only relied on the armed forces to suppress protests, but has several times even sent troops to take over stores.⁴ As Roberto Giusti has said, the Venezuelan armed forces have become a “military oligarchy” with economic and political interests that make them an “autonomous bloc in Venezuelan politics.”⁵

But even outside the ALBA countries, Latin American presidents have been responding to urgent citizen demands for improved public order and security by granting extralegal powers to military officials. In the bargain, the elected civilians not only lose power but also hand the soldiers a direct and privileged relationship with society. The armed forces are not grabbing power by force; instead, desperate presidents are gladly giving it to them.

The rise of Latin American armed forces as key political allies of governments (with the implication that, as allies, they need to be placated and to have their interests served) stems in part from the imperfect civilianization of the region's defense ministries. Thus it can be understood in part as “unfinished business” left over from the era of democratic transition. A second worrisome trend has been a double dynamic in which military forces are increasingly called on to carry out domestic-policing functions, even as police agencies receive missions and equipment that render them increasingly military-like. To have police officers acting almost like soldiers (as in the case, for instance, of Mexico's drug war) while civilian authorities become directly and dramatically dependent on the military for domestic security is obviously problematic for democracy. The unfinished business that must be tackled is not an optional item: No Latin American democracy can be called consolidated until civilian control of the armed forces is securely institutionalized.

It is true that in Latin America the old-style military coup seems to have become a thing of the past. In Honduras in 2009 and Paraguay in 2012, presidents were toppled in what some called coups, but in neither case did the military intervene directly (even if it was a major player). The lack of military interventions in politics has not, however, meant that civil-military relations have been placed on a uniformly smooth, democracy-friendly footing in every country. All Latin American nations have achieved some degree of civilian control over the military, but beyond that, performance has been uneven. Some countries have pushed through deeper reforms, while others have lagged. Shaping each country's unique experience in this area has been its own particular set of political and socioeconomic variables. The diversity of experiences makes it hard to fit all the cases within a comprehensive theory of civil-military relations.

The chief novelty is that the military is now a central ally not of democracy's losers (the predemocratic old guard), but of its winners: Soldiers are serving election victors as police officers, as praetorian guards, and even as leaders of what amounts to a political party. In this new state of things, civil-military relations are thinly institutionalized at best. Following the transition, the military was sent back to its barracks, but civilian authorities failed to focus on reforming defense ministries. Instead, it seems, civilians have opted to give the soldiers more tasks to keep them busy, not only in the field of domestic order-keeping but also in terms of social-welfare projects. This may explain why Latin America's elected officials have become so prone to misuse the armed forces for ends that are far from their professional competence.

There is no denying that the need for improved public security is real and pressing. As the UN Development Programme reported in 2011:

Latin American countries are heavily involved in an illegal [drug] trade mobilizing tens of trillions of dollars every year. This immense flow of resources has transformed the reality of security in the region, exposing police, military, judicial and political institutions to unprecedented levels of corruption with a dramatic increase in violent crime.⁶

The rule of law suffers every day. Weak justice systems, political impunity, powerful criminal organizations, security institutions crippled by corruption—these all lay siege to the state's ability to provide citizens with safety and order.

Yet in no case—*not one*—has a Latin American military's involvement in civil policing improved public security. If anything, as a string of disturbing Human Rights Watch reports attests, military policing has raised concerns over human-rights abuses. Some politicians reacting to rising crime and disorder have suggested that human rights and the rule of law are luxuries that Latin American countries can ill afford, but a military acting like a police force threatens not only the rights of civil-

ians but also its own proper institutional identity. Let us consider how that is so.

Militarizing the Police, and Vice-Versa

The militarization of the police is not a new phenomenon. For the past three decades, several authors have warned about the militarization of public security and the *policialización* of the military as two sides of the same coin.⁷ What once could be seen as a novelty has now turned into a pervasive dependence of civilian authorities on the use of military force for domestic-security purposes.

According to the Latinbarómetro survey, insecurity is *the* main concern cited by Latin American citizens when asked what they worry about.⁸ Eager to win votes, presidents disregard laws, support police repression, and approve military conduct of such illegal activities as confiscations in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro or street patrols in Guatemala. This creates a peculiar situation in which political authorities depend on the military to enforce order and keep them in power. Meanwhile, duly constituted legal authorities and institutions are pushed aside and undermined. Although the region's political and security reality has been transformed by the tremendous flow of resources through illicit channels and the growing sophistication of organized crime, legislation has failed to keep up. Pushing the military into the gap, however, has sparked more violence without improving public order, as seen in Mexico and Central America (whose countries, aside from Costa Rica and Nicaragua, continue to be plagued by some of the world's highest murder rates).

Failure to guarantee security damages executive power and can push democratic political institutions into a spiral of deterioration. The desperate turn to the military compels elected authorities to renegotiate the terms of civil-military relations. When the armed forces are drafted into the task of maintaining the rule of law—a mission for which military organizations are not designed—the division of responsibility between the civilian and military arms of the state loses its weight and significance. In 2009, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights warned of the dangers this poses:

It is essential to make a clear and precise distinction between internal security as a function for the police and national defense as a function for the armed forces, since they are two substantively different institutions, insofar as the purposes for which they were created and their training and preparation are concerned. The history of the Hemisphere shows that, broadly speaking, the intervention of the armed forces in internal security matters is accompanied by violations of human rights in violent circumstances.⁹

Latin America experts have written extensively about the mistakes and

problems resulting from the use of the military in policing roles. Several authors also warn about the special dangers of involving the armed forces in the fight against the drug trade. Using the military against *narcotraficantes*, these experts caution, may lead to increased corruption, institutional weakness, and the criminal infiltration of public agencies. When troops are used to enforce domestic order, abuses against civilians always result. Even in the less ambiguous role of fighting organized guerrillas, army officers have committed inexplicable miscalculations. As a Human Rights Watch report on Colombia points out:

More than 800 members of the army—most of them low-ranking soldiers—have been convicted for extrajudicial killings committed between 2002 and 2008. . . . The convictions have covered a handful of former battalion and other tactical unit commanders, but not a single officer who was commanding a brigade or holding a position higher up in the chain of command at the time of the crimes. Of the 16 active and retired army generals under investigation, none have been formally charged.¹⁰

The Center for International Policy notes that in Honduras, 25 thousand children receive training from troops at military installations and militarized parks and public squares every Saturday as part of the “Guardians of the Homeland” program. Evidence suggests that the use of the military to conduct domestic policing in Honduras has increased human-rights violations committed by soldiers. The March 2015 appointment of retired general Julian Pacheco as Honduran security minister (a post previously always held by a civilian) stands as another token of the country’s drift toward militarization.

By contrast, Costa Rica has not had an army since 1949 (when its civil war ended), and Panama has not had one since 1990 (when U.S. troops toppled the dictatorship of General Manuel Noriega), and yet both countries have better domestic-security records than their neighbors. Panama, considered the second most pacific country in Central America by the Peace Global Index in 2014, reduced the number of murders by nearly 20 percent between 2009 and 2013.¹¹ As of 2012, according to figures published by the Global Study on Homicide of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Costa Rica had an intentional-homicide rate of 8.5 per 100,000 residents, which was Central America’s lowest. The rate in Honduras was a shocking 90.4 per 100,000, by far the world’s highest, and the average across all seven Central American nations was 36. In Costa Rica, unlike in the rest of Latin America, citizens enjoy the relative luxury of being able to cite public corruption rather than violent crime as their biggest worry.¹²

The use of troops as police is typically billed as an exception adopted for a limited time, but in all too many cases they never leave the task. Moreover, their new domestic roles have given militaries bargaining power and encouraged them to negotiate politically with their nomi-

nal civilian superiors. The prospects for a spreading sense of impunity and a weakened rule of law are plain. Then too, the division that arises between troops involved in police work and their comrades who continue to focus on more traditional military missions distorts the normal chain of command as officers on police duty lose touch with the military structures and doctrines that still apply to those who remain “back in barracks.”

In Ecuador, President Rafael Correa has insisted that he needs the armed forces to fight crime, and has added that organized crime should be their main target—a clear sign of his intention to expand the military’s role in providing internal security.¹³ In May 2014, the National Assembly, in which the president’s party enjoys a lopsided majority, passed a new Public Security Law that gives the armed forces power to intervene in the maintenance and control of public order.

In Mexico, President Felipe Calderón (2006–12) of the National Action Party (PAN) deployed tens of thousands of troops to wage war against the country’s drug cartels. Soldiers supplemented—and in many cases, replaced—local police. Reaching its greatest intensity in northern Mexico, the military offensive led to an enormous spike in killings (often these were triggered when military strikes against cartel leaders set off power struggles to replace them), but did little to diminish the cartels’ overall presence or power. With sad predictability, the use of the army as a domestic-security force soon became associated with numerous human-rights abuses (including the deaths of civilians) and violations of legal guarantees. In some areas, the violence spurred the rise of local self-defense forces strong enough to threaten state sovereignty.

Bolivia’s government has deployed 2,300 troops to patrol jointly with police on the streets of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, the country’s four largest cities.¹⁴ In Uruguay, a country with a strong political class and an inclusive society, 63 percent of citizens support the idea of using the military to combat insecurity, even though the same poll finds Uruguayans less likely than any other Latin Americans to express pride in their national armed forces.¹⁵

Military involvement in public-security roles is already an irreversible fact. According to the *Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and the Caribbean*, the armies of fifteen of Latin America’s twenty-six countries conducted 488,000 operations against drug-trafficking from 2012 to 2014. The countries that have spent the most resources on these tasks are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.¹⁶

When it comes to the military and domestic-security operations, Latin American societies seem to want it both ways: They demand that the military do more to fight crime and protect their domestic security, but then—when the army goes too far, as it surely will when pressed

into a service for which military units are poorly suited—they complain about armed repression. It used to be said that militaries typically resisted acting like police.¹⁷ Is this still the case? Taking on policing tasks has allowed militaries to buy new weapons, to be in direct contact with citizens, and to develop political relationships with mayors, governors, and businesspeople.

Without effective means for fighting crime, Latin American governments turn to the armed forces for favors, but favors must be repaid. Accepting them can even make you a hostage, as politicians are learning. Soldiers tasked with providing public security say “trust us,” and what choice do the political authorities have but to do just that, once the ordinary ways and means of civilian supremacy have gone by the board? The problem may be even more acute when irregular rather than regular armed forces are involved. Initially organized to defend the Bolivarian Revolution, Venezuela’s *colectivos armados* have gained autonomy and now answer more to particular political figures rather than the government. As Larry Diamond has noted, “the [Venezuelan] government’s toleration (or even organization) of criminal violence to demobilize middle-class opposition has risen.”¹⁸ *Colectivos* have clashed several times with security forces, showing how hard it is to control them.¹⁹

Presidents appeal to the armed forces to ensure their power, but the result is a loss of power. Unlike in the recent past, the armed forces have become one of the most important institutions in the region. They have developed a direct relationship with society. As the Latinbarómetro survey shows, people trust militaries more than political institutions. The armed forces have become a direct provider of a crucial public good (security) with no mediation by any democratic agency, and their power continues to grow.

The Military as a Political Party

Latin America’s left-wing populist governments have learned to use the military as the equivalent of a political party. The armed forces have become a tool for government policies and an apparatus to neutralize opposition. The armed forces also appeal to a feeling of national dignity by portraying themselves as the defenders of the nation against the imperialist desires of Western powers.

Venezuela is the leading case, but Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua merit mention as well. Argentina’s government made efforts in this direction, but lacked the power and public consensus to follow through. On the right, the current Colorado Party government in Paraguay has been using the military to go after social activists, thereby revealing continued reliance on the idea—long a mainstay of the Colorado Party dictatorship under General Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89)—that the officer corps and the government are historic partners. Something similar

might be said regarding the ways in which Guatemala's current president, retired general and elite military-intelligence officer Otto Pérez Molina, has demonstrated his affinity with his comrades in arms.²⁰

In May 2015, when bakers in La Paz and neighboring El Alto went on strike to protest the ending of state subsidies for flour, the army began turning out rolls to ease shortages.

Venezuela's President Maduro is a civilian with no military background, but under him the government features more military officers than it had under Chávez. The defense minister is a serving general; like him, all five of his vice-ministers are uniformed officers. The cabinet member who was named to run the Ministry of Popular Power for Interior, Justice, and Peace in March 2015 is an

active-duty army general named Gustavo González López. He is one of the seven Venezuelan officials targeted by U.S. sanctions for, among other things, violently suppressing civil protests. Was López's appointment to the cabinet the president's idea or the military's? Armed soldiers, the *Wall Street Journal* reported in August 2015, were monitoring supermarkets amid shortages of food and basic consumer goods and were using force in efforts to suppress the lucrative trade in heavily state-subsidized Venezuelan goods that goes on across the long border with Colombia.²¹

Article 328 of Venezuela's constitution, a document crafted by Chávez in 1999, says that the armed forces are "an essentially professional institution, with no political orientation. . . . in no case at the service of any person or political partisanship." Nonetheless, the government has put more members of the military into the civil administration and augmented the partisan character of the high command.²²

President Evo Morales of Bolivia has congratulated his nation's armed forces by noting how "they make history by supporting the political change process that is moving forward in the country."²³ The Bolivian military has become involved in implementing social policy, taking an active part in distributing education vouchers to schoolchildren and Dignity Income payments from the state to those over 60 years old. In May 2015, when bakers in La Paz and neighboring El Alto (the country's largest conurbation) went on strike to protest the ending of state subsidies for flour, the army began turning out rolls to ease shortages.²⁴

In a country with structural deficits like Bolivia's, it may seem natural to use the armed forces to cover institutional gaps. It could also be seen as praiseworthy that a society values its soldiers. Yet there is a risk that this new friend could become a behemoth. The executive gives the armed forces autonomy and power in exchange for loyalty and political support. It seems similar to the relationship that existed between

the military professionals and the ruling party in communist countries during the Cold War. Yet there is a big difference: Communist parties were strong, whereas today, in the countries that I am concerned with, civilian political parties are weak and the military has, for all intents and purposes, become a *de facto* party in its own right, and often one of the strongest.

For the armed forces of some countries, this has meant the ability to secure their business interests and other material benefits. Not long after his election as president of Ecuador in late 2006, Rafael Correa launched the process of crafting a new constitution for the country. Among the reforms that he sought was a curb on the military's economic power—specifically, he wanted to end its ability to own businesses unrelated to defense production. This would have forced the Directorate of Army Industries (DINE) to give up over a third of the 31 enterprises that it controlled.²⁵ (The military owns, among other things, a steel plant, Quito's 257-room J.W. Marriott hotel, textile concerns, flower and banana exporters, shrimp fisheries, and a fleet of small commercial trucks.)

As things now stand, Article 162 of the 2008 Constitution does say that “the Armed Forces can only participate in economic activities involving national defense,” but eight years later there is no evidence that the process of shrinking the military's business empire is anywhere near completion. Correa himself has noted that Ecuador's military has long enjoyed “a kind of autarchy, almost a parallel state with its own system of justice, education, health, and social security, its own business system with multiple companies . . . and even unnecessary luxury clubs.”²⁶ Yet he has been extremely cautious about trying to remove these prerogatives, especially after he needed army special forces to rescue him from a police rebellion (staged by law-enforcement officers angry over planned benefit cuts) in September 2010.²⁷

In Nicaragua, military companies are under the authority of the Military Social Security Institute, which is involved in the projected Nicaragua Interoceanic Grand Canal venture. Experts on corruption are worried by the opportunities for graft associated with this gargantuan, Chinese-financed construction project, a worry that seems all the sharper in light of the close ties that exist between President Daniel Ortega and the Nicaraguan military, many of whose senior officers expect to profit from the scheme.

A 2014 revision of the Nicaraguan Military Code gives the army more power and authority in national-security affairs, but also increases its political fealty to Ortega. In return for this political dependency, Ortega has allowed active-duty police and military personnel to hold government posts. Under the new law, moreover, the military can offer security services to private companies such as the one that is building the canal. Finally and ominously, through this reform Ortega has autho-

rized the Department of Defense Information (DID), the former Army Directorate of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, to collect data on citizens.²⁸ Argentina took a similar step later in 2014.

In his seminal 1957 book *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel P. Hun-

All Latin American nations have a control over the internal activities of their armed forces that is limited at best.

tington distinguished between two different types of civilian supremacy over the military. The best type from the point of view of both democracy and security is “objective civilian control,” but this is possible only where there is a professional officer corps that refrains—systematically and as a matter of fundamental principle—from involvement in politics. Where this is not the case, Huntington labels the dominance of civilians over the military

as “subjective civilian control,” since the military is under the sway of a specific civilian group seeking to pursue its own particular interests.²⁹

As can be seen from its history, Latin America has had to get by with subjective rather than objective civilian control, and subjective control has never truly worked. Instead, we see a record of privileged relationships between chiefs of state and militaries that essentially act as praetorian guards. There is cooptation, seduction, extortion, or complicity, but no real institutionalized control.

The common definition of civilian control (as found in the writings of Richard Kohn, Peter Feaver, and Felipe Agüero, among others) describes it as a situation in which *no* decision or responsibility falls to the military that has not been expressly or implicitly delegated to it by civilian leaders. Civilian control means that all decisions of command—involving military strategy, what operations to mount and when, what tactics to employ, and how to manage the armed forces in peace and war—derive from civilian authority.³⁰ This definition encompasses the idea of the rule of law, the separation of powers (war must be declared by congress), and the subordination of military officers to political decision makers. In the armed forces of communist regimes or praetorian presidential governments, such well-institutionalized rules do not apply. Instead, military matters are managed arbitrarily. In this climate, the armed forces begin to act as a “player,” looking to resist decisions that they dislike and seeking self-sufficiency or even autonomy.

De facto autonomy under a de jure civilian-run government offers the armed forces the best of both worlds. There is no need for coups or threats of coups, since the military possesses ample grants of power from the national executive while at the same time enjoying the legitimacy that comes from the president’s democratically elected status. The armed forces are covered with honors and dignities bestowed by presi-

dents. Richard Kohn might have been commenting on this state of affairs when he warned in the *Journal of Democracy* back in 1997:

Nor should serving military personnel participate in any fashion in politics, not as members of parties, in elected office, or even in appointive office as members of a political administration at the local or national level. If officers belong to a political party, run for office, represent a particular group or constituency, publicly express their views (or even say how they voted), attack or defend the executive leadership—in short, behave like politicians—they cannot be trusted by voters or by other politicians to be neutral servants of the state and guardians of society.³¹

Even though the current regimes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela like to style themselves as being in some sense “revolutionary,” the militaries in those countries are not the offspring of a revolution and their officers have experienced no profound process of revolutionary socialization. In principle, therefore, they might change their orientation should different governments with different ideas about civil-military relations happen to come to power. But what if a new administration arrived in office seriously resolved to cut military privileges and benefits in major ways? Then we could well see a challenge to democracy. The military will always have more of the tools of coercion under its direct control than any other institution in society, so the prospect of a defiant or even openly rebellious military will always be something with which new authorities must reckon.

The military’s involvement in domestic politics can never be unproblematic for democracy. Although some suggest that military involvement lends stability to democracy in Latin America,³² reliance on personal relationships rather than institutionalized control leaves too much room for future military overreaching. A degree of military involvement in domestic affairs that might seem “democracy-stabilizing” today could tomorrow or the day after expand into something democracy-threatening, not only in relation to questions of military policy but also in a scenario where an incumbent government seeks military support against political opponents.

During the transition years, the problem was how to balance democracy with governability, and the upshot was that some countries (Chile, for example) kept reforms gradual and gentle in order to avoid provoking military unrest. Now things have changed and the problem is how to balance democracy with stability. The temptation is to seek stability via lower democratic performance. But to give in to this temptation is to risk not merely slowing but reversing the democratization process. As we look around the region, we see governments caught in the cross-currents, expanding benefits for the underprivileged and giving the historically marginalized a new voice and identity even as officials silence opposition, put fiercely tight reins on institutions, reject transparency

and accountability, and generally jeopardize the project of building a lasting democracy.

All Latin American nations have a control over the internal activities of their armed forces that is limited at best. All have experienced some type of military reaction to directives coming from civilian authorities. In all cases, there is a degree of civilian control but different forms of autonomy; the military has a robust presence in political and economic institutions, a strong influence in political decisions, or special attributions under the law, all of which represents deficits from the point of view of democratic consolidation. The armed forces of Latin America are not firmly under the control of civilian authorities. The soldiers still think that they represent the true national interest. For their part, moreover, civilian authorities do not consider military oversight a priority. There is a risk that we could see the rise of a new form of militarism in which the military's handling of domestic security gives it an overweening presence in political affairs.

The enduring political and socioeconomic participation of the military in the state pointedly reminds us that the armed forces need to be under civilian control. Democratic consolidation is impossible otherwise. Latin American militaries are used to enjoying political power and prestige as well as control over sections of the economy, the media, the educational system, and certain government posts at all levels. In some cases, these military prerogatives stem from the imprudence of political authorities who handed "temporary" powers to the military—seen as an agent of modernization and technological progress—without weighing the consequences. In certain countries, the military even enjoys autonomy in matters of budgetary allocation and its own internal organization and functional management.

What went wrong? Scholars can propose theories of civilian supremacy, but a theory of what civilian control should look like is not the same as a set of practical suggestions for getting from here to there. Do we grasp the complex processes that are taking place within Latin American political systems today? Do we need a fresh theory of civil-military relations because the old scholarly roadmaps can no longer tell us where we are or what we are seeing?

A few decades ago, the overriding concern in Latin America was with democratic transition. Today, it is with democratic consolidation and the improvement of democratic standards. Among these standards is the ideal of professional and apolitical military institutions. In Latin America, we are still waiting for these. Has democracy failed to deliver? Are we experiencing one of the effects of a crisis of political representation? Or it is a historical impossibility for Latin American states to attain high democratic standards, meaning that poorly performing democracies with problematic military institutions are the best that we can expect?

NOTES

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1. The classic scholarly work on the topic remains Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). Other influential books, particularly with regard to Latin America, include tomes by Felipe Agüero, David Pion-Berlin, J. Samuel Fitch, Wendy Hunter, Richard Kohn, Narcis Serra, Alfred C. Stepan, and Harold Trinkunas.

2. For a sense of why public security is such a worry in Latin America, see the *Homicide Monitor* maintained by the Brazil-based Igarapé Institute, available at <http://homicide.igarape.org.br>.

3. Founded by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004 as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, ALBA currently consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela.

4. For an account of one store takeover, carried out in the name of enforcing “fair” prices, see Girish Gupta, “Venezuelan Military Seizes Major Retail Chain,” *USA Today*, 9 November 2013.

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6. UN Development Programme, “Our Democracy in Latin America,” 2011, www.latinamerica.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/UNDP-OAS_Our_Democracy_in_Latin_America.pdf. The quote may be found at 164.

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11. David Gagne, “Panamá gastó 7% del PIB en seguridad: ¿Dan las cuentas?” *InSight Crime*, 17 December 2014.

12. U.S. Department of State, “2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” INCSR 2015, vol. 1, “Drug and Chemical Control,” March 2015, 143.

13. Christopher Looft, “Organized Crime Is Top Priority of Ecuador Military: Correa,” *InSight Crime*, 24 April 2012.

14. "Primer operativo policial militar atendió 689 casos," *La Razón* (Cochabamba), 18 March 2012.
15. Carlos Tapia, "Mayoría quiere que los militares salgan a combatir la inseguridad," *El País* (Montevideo), 16 June 2013.
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17. David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, "Democratization, Social Crisis, and the Impact of Military Domestic Roles in Latin America," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 33 (Summer 2005): 48; Jorge Battaglino, "Políticos y militares en los gobiernos de la nueva izquierda sudamericana," *Política y gobierno* 22, no. 1 (2015): 3–43.
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