

This article was downloaded by: [University of Konstanz]

On: 20 March 2014, At: 06:51

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954  
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,  
UK



## Contemporary Security Policy

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcsp20>

### South American Re-armament: From Balancing to Symbolizing Power

Rafael A. Duarte Villa & Brigitte Weiffen

Published online: 20 Mar 2014.

To cite this article: Rafael A. Duarte Villa & Brigitte Weiffen (2014) South American Re-armament: From Balancing to Symbolizing Power, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 35:1, 138-162

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.884342>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

# South American Re-armament: From Balancing to Symbolizing Power

RAFAEL A. DUARTE VILLA AND BRIGITTE WEIFFEN

---

*Abstract:* Since the year 2000, several South American countries strongly invested in armaments. At the same time, they increasingly resorted to diplomacy and cooperative institutions to maintain peace. This paper establishes a nexus between motivations for re-armament and recent debates on regional security governance and the emergence of regional powers. Most traditional theories have considered armament to be a function of either the perception of external threat or the availability of economic means. In contrast, this article contends that the rise in arms spending cannot be understood without taking into consideration: (a) the coexistence of a stable power balance, security community thinking and practices in regional security governance; and (b) the desire of emerging states to increase their regional or global roles. This analysis emphasizes non-conflict-driven external motives for military procurement as a new and vital determinant, largely neglected in previous research on the region's military spending. Case studies of three major South American spenders, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, underscore the significance of non-conflict-driven external factors in military procurement. Their experience shows how emergence of regional powers has the potential to offset the contradictions between conventional security logics, as the tendency of states to purchase arms for non-conflict-related reasons equally supports balance of power and security community thinking.

---

## Introduction

In recent years, several South American countries have notably increased their military spending. While total military expenditure in South America averaged US\$ 36.3 billion between 1991 and 2000, it already averaged US\$46.1 billion between 2001 and 2005, and increased steadily from 2005 onwards, reaching US\$67.7 billion in 2012.<sup>1</sup> Key regional actors such as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela are engaging in armament and strategic partnerships with external powers, namely France, the United States, and Russia. These developments could potentially militarize already existing historical, ideological and resource conflicts between neighbour states.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, the region is witnessing a new wave of regional integration and cooperation, even in the field of security and defence. A variety of bilateral and multi-lateral security initiatives – most prominently, the establishment of the South American Defence Council (*Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano*) under the umbrella of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) – reflect patterns of a nascent security community.

This article seeks to explain the heightened military expenditure and arms procurement in South America since the turn of the millennium. Most traditional theories have considered military spending to be a function of either external threat or economic capacity. Additionally, the literature on the role of the military in Latin America

has emphasized internal political motives such as countering domestic security challenges, national development goals, or the necessity to buy the armed forces' support for a civilian government by generous defence spending. In turn, this paper emphasizes the increasing importance of external non-conflict-related motives, where armament is used to bolster a country's international profile – a factor so far virtually absent from the debate on the determinants of defence spending.

Two conditions foster the emergence of those motives in South America. First, security governance in the region is aptly described as a combination of balance of power and security community discourses and practices. States still see military force as a legitimate tool to influence their relations with other states in the region, while at the same time using diplomacy and cooperative institutions to maintain peace. Second, Latin America is a region in transformation from a taker of global influence towards increasing international insertion. Latin American states liberate themselves from traditional North American and European interference and reinforce their Latin American or South American identity. Brazil as one of the BRICS countries is a regional power with global aspirations, while states like Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela become 'secondary regional powers'. The regional transformation entails both the renegotiation of power relationships, in accordance with balance of power thinking, and efforts to enhance regional integration and a regional security community.

Given those countervailing logics influencing South American foreign policies and international relations, re-armament in the region is not exclusively attributable to conflict. Regional and global political aspirations have surfaced as external motive in their own right, in particular for emerging powers that seek to expand their influence in the region and beyond. As a consequence of non-conflict-related external considerations armament is employed by South American countries as a symbol of status and a tool for insertion into the regional or global context.

To substantiate this claim, we will examine armament in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. While countries like Argentina and Peru are important actors in the region, their spending in absolute terms and their increase in spending is comparatively modest. In contrast, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, together with Colombia, stand out as those major South American countries that have experienced an extraordinary rise of military spending since the early 2000s. They are the main investors in direct arms purchases with ambitious projects that involve sophisticated military equipment. In the Colombian case a high amount and increase of military spending is easily explicable due to its internal armed conflict and the military cooperation with the United States, in particular through the Colombia Plan, which resulted in expansive military aid to support Colombia's war on drugs. We concentrate our analysis on Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, where the factors driving the increase in military spending are less obvious and warrant a closer exploration.

The article starts with an empirical assessment of defence expenditure and arms procurement in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. We then develop an analytical framework that differentiates between means and motives driving armament and pays particular attention to non-conflict-driven external motives. Subsequently, the framework is applied to Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela to explore to what extent

non-conflict-driven external motives have gained ground as determinants of re-armament in the three South American countries.

### **Re-armament in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela**

The coexistence of the logics of balance of power and security community is not a new phenomenon in the South American context. On the one hand, violence is prevalent in the region due to long periods of authoritarian rule and frequent military coups, intra-state conflict and a high incidence of criminal violence. Additionally, South America features a high number of rivalries resulting from disputed terrestrial and maritime border lines, from political-ideological divergence, from conflicts about resources, or from border-penetrating security threats.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, over the past century, there were only a handful of wars in the region and South Americans for the most part do not fear aggressions from their neighbours. Inter-state wars have seldom occurred, and there is a long-standing normative consensus on peaceful conflict management.<sup>4</sup> Thus, phases of heightened tensions and increased military armament alternated or even overlapped with phases of peace, cooperation, and trust building.

During the 1970s and 1980s, when they were military regimes, the South American governments made heavy investments in military equipment. But in the course of the transition to democracy and economic adjustment processes military budgets decreased and reached the lowest level in the 1990s.<sup>5</sup> According to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) Yearbooks, Latin America nowadays stands out as the region that spends less on defence than any other world region except Africa. However, a number of developments once again indicate a growing militarization of the region.

In 1997 US President Bill Clinton derogated the Presidential Directive 13 (PD-13), which had been issued by the Carter administration in 1977 to prohibit the sale of advanced weaponry to the military dictatorships that then ruled most of Latin America. In reaction to pressure from the American defence industry, Clinton's PD-34 once again authorized the sale of weapons to the region. The abolishment of the PD-13 was subject to criticism from politicians and arms control advocates in the United States who considered Latin American democracies unstable and feared that 'an influx of advanced weapons could set off an arms race in the region and rekindle traditional rivalries'.<sup>6</sup>

The SIPRI Yearbook 2011 states that South American military spending in 2010 was 5.8 per cent higher in real terms than in 2009, and 42 per cent higher than in 2000. Spending increased in seven of the ten South American countries for which data is available. As shown in [Table 1](#), Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela significantly increased their defence budgets in absolute terms since the turn of the millennium.<sup>7</sup> The total volume of arms transfers to South America during the 2006–2010 period rose by 150 per cent compared to the 2001–2005 period.<sup>8</sup> Especially the arms procurements of Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela have caught the attention of specialists. In 2008, SIPRI for the first time in the history of the SIPRI Yearbook devoted a separate

section to an analysis of arms transfers to South America where the cases of Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela took central stage.<sup>9</sup>

Brazil temporarily reduced its international impact as an importer of conventional weapons in 2003, when President Lula da Silva cut the military budget by 20 per cent in order to divert funds to social spending. From 2004 onwards, military expenditure rose again at an annual average of 6.9 per cent between 2004 and 2010.<sup>10</sup> Brazil initially bought second-hand arms, such as 12 Mirage 2000C fighter planes from France, which were delivered on three lots of four aircraft in 2006, 2007 and 2008, and nine F-5E/F from Saudi Arabia.<sup>11</sup> But in 2007, Brazil decided to modernize and upgrade its armed forces, backed by a strategic relationship with France. Most important was the agreement with France signed in September 2009 for the production of four diesel-powered submarines as well as the country's first nuclear-powered submarine. From 2007 onwards, the Brazilian Air Force pursued the FX2 project, a programme of modernizing its fleet of combat aircraft by the acquisition of 36 fighter jets to replace outmoded Mirages.<sup>12</sup> In 2008 the Air Force announced the three finalist companies,<sup>13</sup> and in December 2013, the Brazilian government concluded a protected decision-making process with an agreement to buy 36 Gripen-NG aircraft from the Swedish company Saab, with delivery expected to start in 2018. This purchase will boost Brazilian military investment over the next 15 years.<sup>14</sup> In a special section on regional powers, the SIPRI Yearbook 2011 pointed out that the bulk of the regional military build-up resulted from the increase in Brazil's spending.<sup>15</sup> The country's military expenditure accounts for around 55 per cent of the regional total. Brazil now features among the world's 15 major military spenders, ranking tenth in 2011 and eleventh in 2012.<sup>16</sup>

During the first half of the 2000s, Chile called attention when it decided to purchase 10 F-16 combat aircraft from the United States and bought several frigates from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Subsequently, the Chilean military ordered 12 Super Tucano planes from Brazil, 18 additional F-16 planes from the Netherlands, numerous German tanks, and 200 American Humvees from General Motors.<sup>17</sup> Observers worried how the Chilean military investments would affect its bilateral relations with Bolivia and Peru, with whom Chile is still involved in territorial disputes. The sustained dynamism of Chilean armament was reflected in the fact that it was the largest importer of conventional weapons in South America in 2006–2010 and the twelfth largest in the world. Between the periods 2001–2005 and 2006–2010, its arms imports increased by 67 per cent. However, Venezuela and Brazil experienced even steeper rises over the same time period: Venezuela's arms imports increased by 359 per cent, and Brazilian imports by 436 per cent.<sup>18</sup>

The country whose military build-up attracted the highest level of attention was Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. Between 2002 and 2007, Venezuela's military budget almost doubled. The country entered into a strategic partnership with Russia which included purchases worth US\$4 billion, such as Sukhoi fighter planes, tanks, short-range missiles, dozens of helicopters, and 100,000 AK-103 rifles, as well as a contract for a Kalashnikov rifle factory. Venezuela also acquired equipment from Spain and China.<sup>19</sup> As Table 1 illustrates, Venezuela's military expenditure rose rather in absolute terms than in relation to its GDP. According to

TABLE I  
MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN BRAZIL, CHILE, AND VENEZUELA

	1996–2000 (mean)	2001–2005 (mean)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<i>Absolute (local currency calendar year)*</i>									
Brazil	16895.8	28284.6	35686	39887	44841	51283	59819	61788	64795
Chile	964.2	1378.2	1978	2068	2375	2109	2402	2631	2668
Venezuela	784.6	2249.4	6436	6377	9286	8631	8683	10229	17200
<i>Absolute (US\$ million at constant 2011 prices)</i>									
Brazil	22692.4	26655.4	27441	29595	31488	34334	38127	36932	36751
Chile	3050.4	3712.6	4937	4944	5222	4569	5131	5440	5357
Venezuela	2541.0	2643.2	4940	4124	4569	3302	2574	2385	3316
<i>Relative (percentage of gross domestic product)</i>									
Brazil	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5
Chile	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1
Venezuela	1.5	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.8	1.0

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988–2012, [www.sipri.org/databases/milex](http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex).

Note: \*Brazil: million reais; Chile: billion pesos; Venezuela: million bolívares fuertes.

the most recent SIPRI estimates, Venezuela spent only 1.6 per cent of its GDP on defence at the peak of its military build-up in 2006, figures lower than Chile (2.4 per cent) or Colombia (3.3 per cent). However, SIPRI notes that the figures for Venezuela exclude an unknown amount of extra-budgetary funding from the National Development Fund FONDEN, created in 2005 and funded by contributions from the Central Bank and the state oil company PDVSA. According to Colgan,<sup>20</sup> official figures also fail to account for the costs of the Territorial Guard, created in 2004, which is a militia focusing on ‘asymmetrical warfare’ and guerrilla tactics, and ostensibly designed as a defence force against a major invader such as the United States. His research on the size of extra-budgetary arms purchases in Venezuela under President Chávez suggests that military expenditures were typically at least 20 to 70 per cent higher than the estimates provided by SIPRI and the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).<sup>21</sup>

In 2005, the US Defence Department criticized Venezuelan plans to buy Russian Kalashnikov rifles and expressed concerns that Chávez was becoming a destabilizing factor in South America.<sup>22</sup> Repeatedly, Venezuela was certified by the American government, through the Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act (AECA), as a country that is ‘not fully cooperative’ in the fight against terrorism. Pursuant to the certification, defence-related products and services coming from the United States may not be sold or licensed for export to Venezuela. Concerns continued under the Obama administration. In 2009 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that Venezuela’s recent arms acquisitions outpaced those of any other country in South America and raised questions about whether an arms race was looming in the region.<sup>23</sup>

The increase in South American military budgets also did not go unnoticed among think-tanks and research centres. The IISS pointed to the fact that the high military spending in the region was comparable only to the period of military



dictatorships. The Spanish Real Instituto Elcano worried about the potentially destabilizing effects of re-armament against the background of persistent rivalries: 'The famous arms race in Latin America, led by Venezuela, is no longer just talk'.<sup>24</sup> In turn, SIPRI experts, albeit confirming the exceptional increases in military spending in some countries of the region, mitigated the fears about an arms race in the sense of an action-reaction pattern and argued that the countries were simply replacing obsolete equipment.<sup>25</sup>

### Theorizing the Determinants of Re-armament

Our theoretical framework establishes a nexus between states' motivations for arms purchases and new thinking on regional security governance and rising powers. First, Adler and Greve have conceptualized 'balance of power' and 'security community' as different security systems of governance characterized by different mechanisms of conflict resolution and different ways of conceiving power.<sup>26</sup> These systems of rule might overlap or coexist in political discourse and practice. This applies to South America: While most military institutions in the region still adhere to balance of power thinking and practices, other parts of the policy-making bureaucracy, such as the diplomatic corps, have deeply internalized security community discourses and practices.<sup>27</sup> Second, recent research on rising powers focuses on contested leadership in the face of emerging regional and secondary powers. The onset of regional and global aspirations, such as Brazil's desire to increase its global role, Brazil's and Venezuela's competition for regional leadership, and Chile's wish to fortify its regional status, is a new situation for a region like South America where countries were always rule takers and are now emerging as international powers.<sup>28</sup> Third, the literature on determinants of defence spending has long accounted for the fact that armament is not only the result of external threats. Most studies focus on a range of economic, political and strategic reasons, and many scholars additionally divide the determinants of military expenditure into internal and external causes.<sup>29</sup> Yet, surprisingly few scholars explicitly tackle Latin American military spending.<sup>30</sup> An exception is Jorge Battaglini whose recent article identifies three main determinants of arms spending in South America: the expansive or non-expansive nature of the strategic assessment of defence, the availability of economic resources allocated by the defence budget; and the level of political attention to defence issues.<sup>31</sup>

The framework we employ to structure our case studies combines the three strands of literature. The emergence of new external motives, conditioned by the coexistence of different mechanisms of security governance and the rise of regional and secondary powers, is the linchpin of our analysis. Yet, we will also take into account more conventional explanations of military spending. An overview of the potential determinants is presented in [Figure 1](#).

The wealth of a country, resource revenues, or the availability of specific funds are facilitating conditions for investments in armament. Often enough, those means are more stable over time than the ups and downs of economic cycles might suggest, thanks to the existence of established practices or laws earmarking certain



Means	Motives	<i>Internal</i>		<i>External</i>
Economic growth			<i>Modes of security governance</i>	<i>Regional dynamics</i>
Resource revenues	<i>Conflict-driven</i>	Internal order	Balance of power	Geopolitical concerns
	<i>Non-conflict-driven</i>	Technological obsolescence Industrial leverage Military influence	Security community	Rising power aspirations

FIGURE 1  
DETERMINANTS OF ARMAMENT IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

resource revenues, a certain minimum amount or fraction of the budget for defence purposes.<sup>32</sup>

Internal motives can be subdivided into national development goals, national political goals, and bureaucratic politics goals.<sup>33</sup> National development goals include the objective need to modernize technologically obsolescent arms stocks, and the desire to develop, maintain and strengthen a domestic arms industry in order to secure employment, achieve independence from major suppliers, become immune to arms boycotts, become an arms exporter or foster science spinoffs to non-defence sectors. In countries affected by natural disasters such as hurricanes or volcanic eruptions, the armed forces are involved in disaster management and emergency aid. They might also have an important role in technology transfer, regional development and the creation of employment perspectives for young people.<sup>34</sup>

For the sake of national political goals, the military might be employed to secure internal order. Throughout the 20th century, Latin American armed forces devoted their attention to internal affairs and counterinsurgency rather than to external defence: 'The military function has become introverted in the Latin American republics; with few opportunities to fight for their countries, the soldiers remained preoccupied with internal politics and the search for personal and collective advantage'.<sup>35</sup> In countries facing internal conflict and guerrilla warfare, the military still plays a role in combating rebel groups, and it might also be deployed to fight organized crime.

Armament might also be influenced by (changes in) political regime type. Although democracies do not necessarily spend less on the military than autocracies, most autocratic regimes rely on repression to retain their grip on power, which is why transitions to democracy are commonly followed by a reduction in military influence

and expenditure. In the Latin American context, military budget cuts signal the establishment of civilian supremacy over the military.<sup>36</sup> After the transition from authoritarianism, those armed forces that enjoyed a higher standing at the time of the transition are more likely to possess reserved domains of authority and policy-making.<sup>37</sup> Often enough, the result is a 'protected democracy' where the armed forces act as guardians or tutelary powers and protect 'national security' against external as well as internal enemies.<sup>38</sup> Under these conditions, the persistence of a high level of military expenditure after democratization reflects the bureaucratic politics goal to appease and satisfy the military.

The principal external explanation of why nations arm is conflict. This, almost by definition, is what defence efforts are for: upholding national purposes against actual or potential aggression from other countries. Balance of power thinking is predicated on the notion of the international system as being composed of competing centres of power that are locked into the security dilemma, which might generate dynamics of arms races and wars.<sup>39</sup> An arms race exists if two or more parties perceive each other as adversaries, these parties are building up their arsenals at a fast pace, exceeding a certain quantitative threshold, and each party structures its respective military stance on the basis of its counterpart's past, present and potential behaviour so that there is a discernible action-reaction pattern.<sup>40</sup>

External motives in accordance with the balance of power logic were of utmost importance in South America under military dictatorship, when geopolitics went hand in hand with considerations of defensive strategy and power projection. Today, geopolitics still plays a role in the security thinking of the military sector and the political right. Especially in those countries with a record of militarized disputes around contested frontiers, the modernization of the armed forces might be motivated by these rivalries.<sup>41</sup> Traditional concepts of the enemy are easily invoked to legitimize armament, even if the alleged escalatory dynamics are confined to rhetoric and countries do not seriously consider resorting to violent means.

But conflict-driven conventional military armament may coexist with discourses and practices characteristic of the security community logic, such as the use of diplomatic initiatives and confidence-building measures as tools of rivalry mitigation, and a factual abstention from the use of force.<sup>42</sup> Building on the seminal work of Karl Deutsch, Adler and Barnett conceptualize security communities as transnational regions comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain the expectation that the members of the community will not fight each other physically and will resolve any conflictive issues by peaceful means.<sup>43</sup> The majority of civilian elites in South America's policy-making bureaucracies and diplomatic corps adhere to the logic of security community and rely on diplomacy and international law to resolve interstate disputes.<sup>44</sup>

The overlap of factors driving and constraining militarization does not only result from divergent elite preferences, but also from regional transformation. While the external objective of gaining influence in the world has been a traditional foreign policy goal for most of world history, the current emergence of regional and global aspirations is a new situation for South America. Rising powers seek to bolster their international profile by traditional hard power such as the size of population,

economic resources and the military, but also by soft power such as international institution-building, agenda-setting, and the mobilization of coalitions. Hence, the rise of regional powers reinforces the coexistence of balance of power and security community discourses and practices.

Non-conflict-driven armament has the potential to reconcile the divergent logics of balance of power and security community as well as the divergent implications of rising powers' aspirations. Just like a large territory and population, economic wealth, or the access to natural resources, military capacity is a manifestation of power and status. The relationship between military power and political impact on the international environment is well-established when analysing the ascension and decline of the two superpowers during and after the cold war,<sup>45</sup> but has not yet been applied to emerging regional powers. Military strength boosts a country's international profile even in circumstances where there seems to be no immediate danger of militarized conflict. It symbolizes status and the political leverage of a state in the regional or global context. The use of the military for extra-territorial tasks such as the participation in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations is a typical manifestation of this orientation since it often functions as a catalyst for greater international exposure for countries with externally oriented doctrines and as an opportunity for smaller states to project themselves on a global stage.<sup>46</sup>

From the point of view of balance of power thinking, the strategy of using the military externally for political purposes concurs with strategies of hard balancing and geopolitical aspirations. At the same time, from the point of view of the representatives of a rising power eager to influence their regional environment but adhering to the security community repertoire of practices, the new external strategy satisfies the strive for status and international insertion. In that sense, under the conditions of a region in transformation from takers towards makers of global influence, non-conflict-driven armament is a synthesis of the logics of balance of power and security community that accommodates the proponents of both logics.

### **The Determinants of Re-armament in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela**

The following analysis explores the place of external non-conflict-driven motives in relation to other determinants and constraints of armament. Our approach differs from Battaglini's recent study in its aim and research design. He combines three variables that are usually considered independently in the traditional literature in order to explain different levels of arms purchases across South America. In turn, we seek to find evidence supporting our claim that non-conflict-driven motives are an influential factor previous studies on determinants of military spending have missed, and which is particularly relevant for rising regional or secondary powers. We thus focus on countries characterized by high arms purchases and rising power aspirations.<sup>47</sup> Methodologically speaking, we submit our candidate-theory of an increasing relevance of non-conflict-driven motives to a plausibility probe by looking at their importance as a determinant of re-armament in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela.<sup>48</sup>

Figure 1 depicts our analytical framework that structures the case studies. They start with a review of economic means as a facilitating condition and internal

motives in order to make sure that none of those factors disproportionately influences armament in any of the cases.<sup>49</sup> The section on external motives looks at traditional balance of power issues, such as tensions and disputes with neighbour states, as well as 'new' aspects related to regional dynamics, such as the prevention of interference by external powers and the protection of natural resources as the base of ascending economic power. These are weighed against non-conflict-driven motives, such as attempts to mitigate rivalries by bilateral and multilateral mechanisms of conflict resolution and attempts to satisfy rising power aspirations by agenda setting on the international level and international institution-building.

### *Means*

The jump in military spending in South American countries in the first decade of the new millennium resulted from resource revenues and economic growth. A rise in commodity prices – especially copper, soya and oil – equally benefited Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. This was reflected in steady economic growth in the region, which averaged 5.25 per cent for the years 2004–2006, the highest rate recorded since the 1970s.<sup>50</sup> Growth remained on the same level in 2007, where Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela achieved growth rates of 6.1, 5.2 and 8.8 per cent, respectively.<sup>51</sup> Almost all major countries of the region saw a simultaneous improvement in macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, fiscal adjustment and reduction of public debt.

Brazil's economic performance in the past decade, with an average annual growth of 4.7 per cent in the years 2004–2007, has turned the country into the world's seventh largest economy today.<sup>52</sup> Brazil owes its current economic strength in part to a global boom in commodity prices in agriculture and natural resources. The country recovered quickly from the economic crisis, exceeding the pre-crisis rates with a GDP growth of 7.5 per cent in 2010, and is expected to become a major oil producer and exporter after the discovery of offshore oil fields. Recent growth rates have been lower, with 2.7 per cent in 2011 and 0.9 per cent in 2012.

Chile's consistently high level of military expenditure was enabled by the country's good economic performance, with an average annual growth rate of 5.2 per cent between 2004 and 2007, and its status as the world's leading exporter of copper. Due to the Copper Reserve Law, copper revenues grant the Chilean armed forces a steady source of funding for military equipment. Initially imposed in 1958, the law determines that the Chilean armed forces automatically receive 10 per cent of copper revenues. SIPRI reports that the state-run National Copper Corporation (CODELCO) transferred US\$7.4 billion to the military between 1990 and 2007, amounting to 21 per cent of the country's military budget.<sup>53</sup> According to IISS calculations, the Copper Law was responsible for a contribution to the military of almost US\$1 billion only in 2008.<sup>54</sup> Under this regulation, arms may be acquired simply because of the availability of funds rather than for clear security needs. The law has long been a bone of contention and a bill reforming military spending and removing the Copper Reserve Law was passed by the Chilean Congress in June 2012 and, as of December 2013, is under revision by the Senate.

In Venezuela, rising oil prices for several years contributed to an increase of the military budget. During the first four years of the Chávez presidency, the economy initially grew (1999–2001) and then contracted (2002–2003) mainly because of the turmoil caused by a coup attempt of 2002 and the general strike of 2002–2003. With a calmer political situation in 2004, annual GDP growth averaged 11.8 per cent between 2004 and 2007, and Venezuela started to benefit from rising petroleum prices. Revenues from petroleum exports in that time period accounted for about 37 per cent of the country's GDP and 88 per cent of total merchandise exports.<sup>55</sup> However, in 2009 and 2010 the Venezuelan economy shrank, and recent growth rates have been more moderate than during the 2000s.

### *Internal Motives*

This section explores to what extent internal considerations such as the political will to modernize equipment, the aim to develop a domestic arms industry, and the need to appease a politically influential military determine armament in the three countries. In the case of Brazil, one reason for buying new weapons was the need to reverse a series of defence budget cuts, most recently in 2003, and to upgrade the outdated technology of most of the armed forces', especially the air force's, equipment. In comparison to other South American countries, Brazil is better positioned to start a steady arms build-up supported by its own national defence industry.<sup>56</sup> Brazil's aim to restructure its domestic arms industry was articulated in its National Defence Strategy, published in 2008, as well as in its recent National Defence White Book.<sup>57</sup> Decisions on arms procurement are increasingly made with a view to the effects on the domestic industry. For example, a key rationale for the December 2013 decision to buy fighter airplanes from the Swedish company Saab is the expected technology transfer from Saab to the Brazilian manufacturer Embraer, given that the latter will take part in the assembling of the aircraft.<sup>58</sup> Led by companies like Embraer, which has recently re-entered the Top 100 arms producing and military services companies,<sup>59</sup> Brazil is becoming a global arms trader in its own right.

In addition to national development goals, the political influence of the military determines arms procurement. For most of the 20th century, military industrializers concerned with national defence capabilities created a military-industrial developmentalist coalition on behalf of the state.<sup>60</sup> As a consequence, Brazil's military was exceptionally well positioned to remain influential after the transfer of power to civilians in 1985. It retained numerous political prerogatives, including six cabinet positions. A civilian-led Ministry of Defence was established in 1999 only. Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution guarantees the central role of the military as the 'guardians' of the constitutional powers and of law and order.

In Chile it has also been argued that most of its acquisitions replace ageing systems. For example, the F-16 aircraft replaced Mirage combat aircraft, and recently purchased submarines replaced old equipment commissioned in 1976. Especially in the early phase after the transition, with Pinochet still in place as head of the army, military investment was strongly related to the concessions that the Chilean political class was willing (or compelled) to make to a very powerful and autonomous military that continued to be the ultimate guarantor of the political system. With military

prerogatives on the wane since the 2005 constitutional reform, significant sectors of Chilean armed forces now invoke internationalist motives such as the participation in multilateral operations to justify the need for a technologically modern, professional force.<sup>61</sup>

Comparable to the two other countries, the Venezuelan government pointed to the obsolescence of equipment when it justified the purchase of Russian weapons as a way to restore and modernize the inventory of the armed forces. One has to differentiate according to the type of acquisition, though. The submarines Venezuela had were indeed very old, and the modernization of aircraft and helicopters had suffered from the United States' refusal to sell spare parts. In contrast, Venezuela's motivation for installing a weapons factory to produce Russian Kalashnikov rifles in the country appears much more dubious. Arms purchases by Venezuela are also related to the political role of the military. The base of Chávez's political support was formed by a civil coalition of nationalist and leftist politicians and a strong military sector, which has been involved in central functions of civilian administration.<sup>62</sup> The armed forces have a strong lobby due to their role as heads of local governments, state enterprises and ministries. Arms purchases show that Chávez was sensitive to the military sector's demands for modernization and the replacement of out-dated weapons.<sup>63</sup>

### *External Motives*

This section explores to what extent non-conflict-related external objectives moderate, complement or replace traditional conflict-related concerns in the three South American countries.

*Brazil.* Although Brazil does not have open territorial issues with any of its neighbour states, Brazilian plans to modernize its military capabilities are not devoid of conflict-driven motives. During the first decade of the new millennium, observers pointed to the competition between Brazil and Venezuela for regional leadership and suggested that Brazil tried to modernize the inventory of its armed forces 'with an eye on developments in Venezuela'.<sup>64</sup> Following Venezuela's support for Bolivia's nationalization of its hydrocarbon industry in May 2006, some sectors in Venezuela pictured a hypothetical war scenario of Brazil seeking control of Bolivian gas fields, in which case Venezuela would be committed to defend the government of Evo Morales. In turn, Brazilian press outlets have called attention to the 'Venezuelan threat' due to the modernization of its air force. The purchase of sophisticated weapons by Venezuela provided the Brazilian high command with a justification to lobby for bigger budgets. They argued that in comparative perspective, the operational capabilities of the Brazilian Air Force were below those of Chile, Venezuela and even Peru.<sup>65</sup>

The Brazilian government denied that the modernization of its armed forces was related to concerns about the balance of power in the region and initiated confidence-building measures (CBM) in order to mitigate suspicions. Military exchanges with Andean neighbour countries have included joint operations and air exercises, such as COLBRA (Colombia/Brazil), VENBRA (Venezuela/Brazil), and PERBRA



(Peru/Brazil), which improved the knowledge exchange between the air forces of the Andean countries and Brazil and helped to standardize procedures between Andean and Brazilian militaries.<sup>66</sup>

In any case, the project of modernization of the Brazilian armed forces is much more than a reaction to the military investments of neighbouring countries. In line with the geopolitical concerns of a new regional power, Brazil is conducting a process of securitization of its natural resources—such as energy, water resources, the Amazonian rainforest, agricultural land, and the hydrocarbon resources in the pre-salt maritime zones in the South Atlantic. Brasilia considers defence investments vital to strengthen Brazil's borders and to protect the recently discovered offshore oil and gas reserves estimated to hold 10 billion barrels of oil. These reserves will reportedly take Brazil from the eleventh in the global oil-producer rankings to the world's fifth-largest producer or higher by 2020.<sup>67</sup> The turn to a very strong emphasis on the South Atlantic, both as a means of securitizing the pre-salt oilfields and of gaining international profile, pervades the National Defence White Book released in 2012.<sup>68</sup>

Brazilian defence policy has to be understood in the context of the country's broader foreign policy goals as a regional power with a significant role in global affairs. The White Book, rather than identifying concrete threats and enemies, outlines Brazil's new priorities in the 21st century and conceptualizes them in terms of capabilities. It examines the challenges in key strategic areas such as space, cybernetics, nuclear energy, and the defence of the Amazon region and offshore oil fields in the South Atlantic. The White Book supports Brazil's aspiration for great power status and argues that, despite its location in a peaceful region, the country has to be prepared to defend itself against potential conflicts.<sup>69</sup>

Yet, the very existence of a White Book is a crucial element in a confidence-building strategy clearly aligned with security community thinking and non-conflict motivations.<sup>70</sup> The projection of Brazil within the concert of nations and its participation in international decision-making is the main non-conflict-driven objective of Brazilian foreign and defence policy. For a long time, Brazil portrayed itself as the dynamic 'country of the future', but this rhetoric was not taken seriously by other major players. Only recently, in the face of Brazil's economic success and more assertive diplomacy, the country is perceived as an emerging nation in the new international scenery.<sup>71</sup> During President Lula da Silva's mandate (2002–2010) Brazil's foreign policy changed significantly towards a proactive role in its own neighbourhood and beyond, based on two goals: regional integration and multilateralism.<sup>72</sup>

While South America from a Brazilian perspective had for a long time been merely regarded as a *locus* for economic exchange, Lula's administration approached the region differently by putting an emphasis on security. The most important step was Brazil's proposal to create a Community of South American Nations, turned into the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008, and to equip this organization with the South American Defence Council.<sup>73</sup> The objectives of this entity are to promote the cooperation between UNASUR members in security issues, the coordination of defence policies, the exchange of military personnel, and the joint participation in UN peace operations.<sup>74</sup>



The focus on South American unity represents a significant shift in relation to the established security architecture in the Western Hemisphere. The inter-American security system, with the Organization of American States (OAS) as its centrepiece, was for a long time perceived as dominated by the United States.<sup>75</sup> Brazil views the continuing presence of the United States in some South American countries as an undue interference in the region. The South American Defence Council is therefore based on the idea that the region should develop a more autonomous agenda on security. Moreover, the Council's institutional deepening could help to defend the region against potential external interventions. Hence, Brazil's aim is to take over the leading position in the region from the United States.

Brazil has sought to expand its global presence by participating in UN peace operations. Already during the Cardoso administrations (1994–2002) Brazil joined UN peace missions in East Timor and Angola. The fact that Brazil took a leading role in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is particularly significant, considering that Brazil refused to send troops to Haiti in the early 1990s. Not only does its activism in the Haitian case underline Brazil's position as key actor in hemispheric security issues, but its participation also substantiates its long-standing claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.<sup>76</sup> Brazil has taken a number of further steps to establish itself as an actor on the global stage, such as its initiatives to found the G-20 and to strengthen South-South relations by the establishment of the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) Dialogue Forum and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) association.

*Chile.* The coexistence of balance of power and security community discourse and repertoires of practices is clearly visible in the Chilean case. While the long-standing rivalry between Chile and Argentina concerning the Beagle Channel and more than 20 other unresolved border issues was mitigated in the 1990s, Chile's relations with both Bolivia and Peru are still tense. Landlocked Bolivia has for 130 years made claims to Chilean territory that would enable sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Bolivians regard this territorial claim as compensation for their mineral-rich littoral department that was annexed by the Chilean military at the end of the 19th century. The Chilean-Peruvian maritime dispute over the sovereignty of an area at sea in the Pacific Ocean dates back to the late 19th century as well. While Chile insists that the sea border was demarcated by two treaties in the 1950s, Peru interprets those treaties as fishing pacts only and contends that the border issue remains unresolved. Mutual distrust persists in official documents issued by both states, and non-official conflict hypotheses can be traced in political and academic debates.<sup>77</sup>

Consequently, Chile's purchase of modern military equipment feeds suspicion and alarm in the neighbourhood. Political and academic sectors in Bolivia and Peru argued that the modernization of the Chilean armed forces widened the gap in terms of quality, sophistication and technology.<sup>78</sup> In reaction to the Chilean acquisition of fighter aircraft F-16 in the early 2000s, the Peruvian Defence Ministry warned that Chile was about to disrupt the military balance in the region and start an arms race, while the Chilean Air Force stated that the purchases were a regular replacement of outdated equipment.

In recent years, Chile, Bolivia and Peru oscillated between the resurgence of tensions and efforts to improve bilateral relations. Following the security community logic, Chilean diplomats and politicians engaged in appeasement and tried to relieve mutual suspicions by agreements on CBM. Bolivian-Chilean relations started to improve when the administration of Chilean President Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010) promised an outlet to the sea to the Bolivian government of Evo Morales (2006–present). A series of CBM was announced, including the destruction of landmines that Chile had spread along the Bolivian border during the Pinochet dictatorship and the participation of Bolivian soldiers in anti-mine trainings at Chilean military academies. Besides that, the CBM embraced mechanisms for bilateral consultation and cooperation in anti-drug efforts.<sup>79</sup> Relations became more strained again under the Chilean administration of President Sebastian Piñera (2010–2014). While Bolivia intensified its request for an outlet to the sea by bringing the issue to the OAS General Assembly and by instituting proceedings against Chile at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Piñera administration refused to elevate discussions on any pending issues with Bolivia to international organizations.<sup>80</sup>

In the case of Chile and Peru, tensions reignited during the governments of Ricardo Lagos in Chile (2000–2006) and Alejandro Toledo in Peru (2002–2006) when in 2005 the Peruvian Congress approved a law that extended the stated sea border in the contested waters. In contrast, under the governments of the Peruvian President Alan Garcia (2007–2011) and Chilean President Bachelet, both countries tried to revive a mechanism called ‘2+2 meeting’, an instrument of consultation, policy coordination and information exchange between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs whose activities had been suspended since the time of the governments of Lagos and Toledo.<sup>81</sup> In 2008, Peru brought the maritime dispute to the ICJ; the verdict, rendered on 27 January 2014, is considered a compromise between the demands of both countries.

Chilean armament is not only influenced by the trajectory of its rivalries, but also by its aspirations to be an important player in the region and beyond. Chilean governments in accordance with the military high command intend to transform Chile into a regional military power and to allow the Chilean military to become what is technically known as ‘NATO-standard’ forces,<sup>82</sup> a status that has not been achieved by any South American country until today. Additionally, Chile’s participation in UN peace operations is singled out as important motive for the modernization of the armed forces and investment in military equipment. Chile, which until 1990 had only participated in three peacekeeping missions, increased its participation to 15 by the end of the first decade of this century and is the only South American country to count, since 1996, with a national policy regulating its participation in peacekeeping operations.<sup>83</sup>

Concomitantly, Chile uses non-military means to bolster its international profile. Re-democratized Chile broke with the isolationist tendencies of the Pinochet dictatorship when it put renewed emphasis on international conflict management and spearheaded initiatives to form or reform multilateral institutions. At the OAS General Assembly meeting in Santiago in 1991, Chile promoted the renewal of the inter-American system and continued to be an agenda-setter in the adoption of a

democracy clause and the debate on confidence-building measures in the OAS framework. The country also has expanded its influence beyond the region, for example as a protagonist in the Community of Democracies and by the establishment of special links to Asia with its membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

*Venezuela.* Venezuela invokes a traditional defensive motive when the government relates the build-up to the strengthening of the security on its borders. Of particular concern are its borders with Colombia, with which Venezuela shares 2,000 km, and with Brazil, with which it has 2,219 km in common. The traditional source of tensions with Colombia is the maritime border in the Gulf of Venezuela, which has been disputed by Bogotá and Caracas since the 1830s. The discovery of oil reserves in the contested waters intensified the conflict during the 20th century.

Along the Colombian land border, there is a problem of infiltration by guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and criminal gangs. Some of the equipment purchased, such as 600 armoured vehicles from Russia, gave Venezuela the operational capacity to respond to the border transgressions by these groups.<sup>84</sup> Those purchases made Colombia feel uneasy. Due to the suspected 'revolutionary solidarity' of the Venezuelan government with the FARC guerrillas, Colombia feared that light weapons purchased by Venezuela, such as Kalashnikov fusils, might end up in the hands of Colombian insurgent groups.<sup>85</sup>

From the Colombian perspective, the Venezuelan purchase of the aircraft Sukhoi-30 from Russia shifted the regional military balance, and Colombian plans to replace its Israeli Kfir fighter jets might be related to the fact that the country does not yet have anything compared to the Sukhoi-30 in its stock. But although the increases in arms purchases in Colombia and Venezuela may point to an action-reaction-pattern, the bulk of Colombia's armament is attributable far more to its struggle with drug-funded leftist guerrilla groups than to any scenario of conflict with its neighbours, and even its disagreements with Venezuela are partly rooted in its internal conflict.<sup>86</sup>

In reaction to the increase in arms purchases by Venezuela in 2006 there were some efforts to reduce suspicions between Colombia and Venezuela, such as the formation of a high-level bilateral committee to strengthen security in the border region. However, due to recurrent tensions during the first decade of this century, Colombia and Venezuela have refrained from establishing permanent CBM, and the non-existence or fragility of international institutions repeatedly led to misunderstandings concerning reciprocal actions and intentions.<sup>87</sup>

Under the Chávez government, its strategic resources allowed Venezuela to grow into a regional power and to attempt to overturn international power relations through a new form of South-South cooperation.<sup>88</sup> Venezuela believes that its political leadership in South America is not only based on oil as a means to secure international loyalties, but also linked to the modernization of its military arsenal in order to improve its position in comparison with regional competitors such as Brazil. To this end, Venezuela entered into military and defence cooperation with Russia, a strategic partnership that is uncomfortable not only for Brazil, but also displeases the United States.

In line with its declared resistance to American imperialism in Latin America, the justification of armament most often referred to by the Venezuelan government was the need for defensive action against the danger of a US invasion. President Chávez was convinced that an 'asymmetrical war' may eventually happen if the United States decided to invade Venezuela using Colombia as military bridgehead. Chávez dramatized this scenario in 2007 when he announced the arrival of 5,000 Dragunov rifles with night vision telescope from Russia, intended to equip snipers that would come into action in a 'guerrilla war' if Venezuela was invaded by the United States.<sup>89</sup> Statements from the United States considering Venezuelan arms purchases a threat to Latin American regional stability and the Pentagon's decision to reactivate the US Navy's Fourth Fleet to patrol the waters of South America and the Caribbean indicate the militarization of American-Venezuelan relations.<sup>90</sup>

At the same time, Chávez expanded his political base in the region through 'petrodplomacy' and economic cooperation.<sup>91</sup> He established a number of new regional agreements and institutions, such as the PetroAmérica initiative to promote energy integration, the Bank of the South (Banco del Sur), or the television station TeleSUR. The most politically visible project is ALBA (*Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de Nuestra América*), founded in 2004, which sees itself as the solidarity-based integration alternative to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).<sup>92</sup>

### **Conclusion: Reconsidering Re-armament in South America**

As the above analysis has shown, an explanatory framework of armament in South America misses part of the picture when it concentrates on external threat or political and economic factors. Building on a theoretical heritage influenced by geopolitics and balance of power logics, conventional wisdom establishes a positive correlation between the increase of military capabilities and conflict-driven motives. However, a higher intensity of armament is not necessarily driven by external threat, but might reflect a complex set of conflict-related and non-conflict-related motives.

First, the availability of means resulting from economic growth and abundant resource revenues has facilitated investments in defence in all three countries. Second, internal political motives matter. Acquisitions were motivated by efforts to replace or upgrade military inventories in order to maintain existing capabilities or support the domestic arms industries. Brazil stands out as the only country in South America that has a substantial military industry, such as the aeronautics company Embraer, so that its armament is partly driven by the desire to boost its domestic arms industries. Moreover, although this factor has arguably become less important in Chile, the purpose of placating the military lies behind the arms purchases. Almost everywhere in the region, civilian control of the military remains far from complete. Where the military gave up power with its political standing more or less intact, where it is entrusted with development tasks, or where leftist leaders rule uneasily over a conservative officer corps, elected governments are willing to yield to the armed forces on questions like pay raises and arms procurement.

Armament can thus be a response to domestic demands independent of the existence of external threats.

Third, looking at the external motives, traditional concerns such territorial disputes are still relevant, as exemplified by Chile's strained relations with Peru and Bolivia and the Venezuelan-Colombian rivalry.<sup>93</sup> While confidence-building measures have played a positive role in offsetting the negative impact of arms acquisitions on inter-state relations in the past 20 years, levels of adoption and application remain uneven, with participation in CBM stronger in the Southern Cone than the Andean region.

Especially in Brazil and Venezuela, armament is also driven by 'new' geopolitical concerns closely related to their role as emerging regional powers. Both countries are affected by transnational threats originating from non-state actors, such as border transgressions of Colombian guerrilla groups, drug traffic, arms trade and other forms of organized crime. In its military purchases, Brazil has concentrated on combat and transport equipment, which reflects a doctrine oriented at securing control of its border regions and resources. Venezuela is the only country that explicitly voices the necessity to defend against external threats, namely the scenario of an American invasion. Apart from buying sophisticated equipment like the Sukhoi-30 aircraft, Venezuela followed its asymmetric warfare doctrine and focused on the equipment of civilian militias. However, the fear of American invasion blended Chávez's provocative foreign policy rhetoric with the goal of modernizing the military.

Fourth, our candidate-theory suggesting the increasing relevance of non-conflict-driven external motives, in particular the use of armament as an expression of rising power aspirations, receives support. Scholars have paid little attention to the defence policies of emerging countries. In the past, developing countries acted as of 'revisionist states' that expressed a general dissatisfaction with their position in the system. It was assumed that at some point they would attempt to alter their position in the international system through organized violence.<sup>94</sup> Contemporaneously, emerging powers on the regional or global level seem to play the role of 'soft revisionists'. Instead of using the military for traditional revisionist purposes, they employ military means along with economic and political means to pursue regional or global political goals.

This applies to Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela where armament is one more way to justify their ascension to a regional leadership position or to leverage their position in regional or global decision-making processes. Albeit to a different extent, all three states share the aim to establish themselves as important players on the regional or global level. For that purpose, they use military power as a representation of political importance and – with the exception of Venezuela – the participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations as a strategy of global insertion. Chile with its tradition of middle-power diplomacy has tried to reassert itself as an agenda-setter in multilateral institutions after its return to democracy. Brazil and Venezuela seek regional leadership in South America by the mobilization of coalitions and international institution building, with UNASUR and ALBA as the most politically visible projects. Both countries have also made an appearance on

the global level – Venezuela mainly by means of political provocation, whereas Brazil could bring to fruition several of its proposals to strengthen South-South cooperation. Due to its weight in terms of population, territory, natural resources, economic size and military forces, Brazil has the potential for great power status.

While there is still balance of power behaviour on the regional level – especially between Chile and Venezuela and its respective rivals as well as, to a lesser extent, between Brazil and Venezuela in their competition for regional leadership – the competition is political and not military. In a framework of non-conflict-driven strategic considerations, the new function of armament is to symbolize the rising power of emerging states and to foster their political insertion on the regional and global level.

There are a number of implications of the argument for South America and beyond. With a view to South America, the significance of these dynamics for future regional relations warrants further exploration. Although the South American regional security system has entered a new phase in which broader political objectives replace traditional military concerns, there is a potential danger in the phenomenon of non-conflict-driven armament. In line with the overlapping of regional mechanisms of security governance,<sup>95</sup> states maintain their ambiguous balancing act between rhetorical trust-building and conventional military armament. Due to power-driven calculus or remaining mutual mistrust, regional and global aspirations driving the increases in armament are not made explicit. Since most military capabilities can be used offensively, any kind of budget increases and arms purchases can be perceived as signalling aggressive intentions. Non-conflict-driven armament hence still goes along with classical problems of asymmetry of information and poor communication between foreign policy decision-makers, creating conditions for the resurgence of distrust. However, recent developments such as the establishment of the South American Defence Council indicate that the mixture of political discourses and practices may tilt towards more security community and less balance of power.

On a general level, this study suggests avenues for further research on the defence policies of emerging and developing countries. First, the exploration of the South American regional security context has shown that the correlation between military power and political impact on the international environment exists not only in developed countries, but might be replicated by rising powers in developing regions. Second, of particular interest in the analysis of external conditions motivating or constraining arms acquisitions is the argument that both non-conflict related (security community) and conflict-related (balance of power) logics can reside side-by-side within a region and even within individual countries. It would be worthwhile to investigate whether the overlap of modes of security governance is detectable in other world regions. Third, conventional wisdom expects to see those logics in constant contestation and, possibly, one of them prevailing over the other at some point. Yet, the emergence of regional powers has the potential to offset the contradictions between the two logics, as the resulting tendency of states to purchase arms for non-conflict-related reasons equally supports balance of power and security community thinking. Future research should investigate whether the confluence of those dynamics is unique to South America or can also be found in other places where leadership is contested in the face of rising regional powers.



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank four anonymous reviewers and the editors of *Contemporary Security Policy* for their helpful comments as well as Anne Lange and Nadine Petermann for research assistance. Brigitte Weiffen gratefully acknowledges a travel grant from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, which facilitated our cooperation.

## NOTES

1. Figures are in constant US\$ 2011 prices and exchange rates and were taken from the most recent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) *Military Expenditure Database, 1988-2012*, [www.sipri.org/databases/milex](http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex).
2. David R. Mares, *Latin America and the Illusion of Peace* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/Routledge, 2012).
3. Michael Colaresi, Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); David R. Mares, *Violent Peace. Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Mares, *Latin America and the Illusion of Peace* (note 2), chapter 1.
4. Arie M. Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American Experience, 1881-2001* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).
5. Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Wendy Hunter, 'Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: Present Trends, Future Prospects', in Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (eds), *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America* (Miami, FL: North-South Center Press, 1998), pp.299-322.
6. Steven Lee Myers, 'U.S. Lifts A Ban On Weapon Sales to Latin America', *The New York Times*, 2 August 1997, [www.nytimes.com/1997/08/02/world/us-lifts-a-ban-on-weapon-sales-to-latin-america.html](http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/02/world/us-lifts-a-ban-on-weapon-sales-to-latin-america.html). Numerous opinion pieces and policy papers likewise arrived at the conclusion that an arms race is occurring in South America. See Andrew Downie, 'The South American Arms Race?', *Time World*, 21 December 2007, [www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1697776,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1697776,00.html); Alex Sanchez, 'South American Arm Races Advance War Agendas', *The Cutting Edge News*, 19 October 2009, [www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=11717](http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=11717); Naomi Marstone and Benedict Mander, 'Fears Grow of South American Arms Race', *Financial Times*, 2 January 2010, [www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6aa072fe-f73d-11de-9fb5-00144feab49a.html](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6aa072fe-f73d-11de-9fb5-00144feab49a.html); João Fábio Bertonha, 'Uma corrida armamentista na América do Sul?' [An arms race in South America?], *Boletim Meridiano* 47, No. 73 (2006), pp.28-30; Carlos Malamud and Carlota García Encina, '¿Rearme o renovación del equipamiento militar en América Latina?' [Rearmament or renovation of military equipment in Latin America?], Documento de Trabajo No. 31, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2006, [www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/](http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/).
7. Some caveats are in order concerning the informative value of the most frequently used indicators of military expenditure, the total expenses in international currency and their relative shares of the GDP. For countries that experience substantial economic growth, using the GDP as denominator might suggest a decline or stagnation in defence spending when absolute numbers actually remain constant or even increase significantly and enable a surge in arms acquisitions. This problem applies to all three countries explored here (see Table 1). For Brazil and Venezuela, the increase is particularly pronounced when looking at military expenditure in local currency. However, as pointed out by Battagliano, 85 per cent of the defence budget of South American countries, on average, goes to operations and maintenance, two items that do not necessarily increase other states' threat perception. We thus follow his suggestion to rely not only on defence spending figures, but to take into account arms imports. See Jorge M. Battagliano, 'Determinants of Arms Spending in South America', *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2013), pp.71-103.
8. Paul Holtom, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Mark Bromley, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, 'Trends in International Arms Transfers', 2010, SIPRI Fact Sheet March 2011, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Solna, 2011.



9. Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley and Pieter D. Wezeman, 'International Arms Transfers', in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (ed.), *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.293–317.
10. Sam Perlo-Freeman, Julian Cooper, Olawale Ismail, Elisabeth Sköns and Carina Solmirano, 'Military Expenditure', in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (ed.), *SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.157–229.
11. Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2005/2006 [South American Military Power Ranking 2005-2006], *Military Power Review*, [www.militarypower.com.br/ranking.htm](http://www.militarypower.com.br/ranking.htm).
12. Perlo-Freeman et al., 'Military Expenditure' (note 10), pp.171–2; Rafael Duarte Villa, 'Corrida armamentista ou modernização de armamentos na América do Sul: estudo comparativo dos gastos militares' [Arms race or modernization of armament in South America: a comparative study of military expenditures], Observatório Político Sul-Americano, Rio de Janeiro, 2008, [www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/22070\\_Cached.pdf](http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/22070_Cached.pdf).
13. These companies were: the Swedish Saab (Gripen NG), the French Dassault (Rafale) and the American Boeing (Super Hornet). 'Brazil: Momentum builds for Defence Reform', *Stratfor*, 2 October 2008, [www.stratfor.com/analysis/brazil-momentum-builds-defense-reform](http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/brazil-momentum-builds-defense-reform). While the Air Force had a clear, tactically grounded preference for the Swedish Gripen, civilian defence policy-makers opted to pursue a strategic partnership with France with a view to technology transfer.
14. Maurício Moraes, 'Porque o Brasil precisa dos caças?' [Why does Brazil need fighter planes?], *BBC Brasil*, 19 December 2013.
15. Perlo-Freeman et al., 'Military Expenditure' (note 10), p.184.
16. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: Summary', Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Solna, 2012, [www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/files/SIPRIYB12Summary.pdf](http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/files/SIPRIYB12Summary.pdf); Sam Perlo-Freeman, Elisabeth Sköns, Carina Solmirano and Helén Wilandh, *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2012*, SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2013, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Solna, 2013; also see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2013* (London: Routledge, 2013), p.364.
17. See Sanchez, 'South American Arm Races' (note 6); and the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, [www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers](http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers).
18. Holtom et al., 'Trends in International Arms Transfers' (note 8).
19. Holtom et al., 'International Arms Transfers' (note 9), p.306.
20. Jeff Colgan, 'Venezuela and Military Expenditure Data', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2011), pp.547–56.
21. *Ibid.*
22. 'Venezuela nega interesse em corrida armamentista regional' [Venezuela denies interest in regional arms race], *Folha de São Paulo*, 1 April 2005.
23. Sanchez, 'South American Arm Races' (note 6).
24. Malamud and García, 'Rearme o renovación' (note 6).
25. Petter Stålenheim, Catalina Perdomo and Elisabeth Sköns, 'Military Expenditure', in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (ed.), *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.175–206; Holtom et al., 'International Arms Transfers' (note 9), p.304.
26. Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve, 'When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35, S1 (2009), pp.59–84. In a similar vein, Solingen identified two divergent 'grand strategies' along which government leaders define their states' relationship to the regional context: an 'internationalist grand strategy' where leaders prefer economic and security cooperation, and a 'national-statist grand strategy', where actors see more benefits in military competition. Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton, CA: Princeton University Press, 1998), chapter 2.
27. Daniel Flemes and Michael Radseck, 'Creating Multi-level Security Governance in South America', in Shaun Breslin and Stuart Croft (eds), *Comparative Regional Security Governance* (London/New York: Routledge, 2012), pp.154–80. Admittedly, this is a rough distinction. On the one hand, parts of the political elite may share the military's statist-nationalist grand strategy in line with balance of power thinking. On the other hand, over time significant cohorts within the military might turn into proponents of an internationalist grand strategy in line with the security community logic, as Kristina Mani has shown for the case of the Chilean military. See Kristina Mani, *Democratization and Military Transformation in Argentina and Chile. Rethinking Rivalry* (Boulder/London: First Forum Press/Lynne Rienner, 2011).

28. Andrew F. Cooper and Jorge Heine (eds), *Which way Latin America? Hemispheric Politics Meets Globalization* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009); Pía Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie (eds), *The Rise of Post-hegemonic Regionalism. The Case of Latin America* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012).
29. Robert E. Looney, 'Internal and External Factors in Effecting Third World Military Expenditures', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1989), pp.33–46; R.P. Smith, 'Models of Military Expenditure', *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1989), pp.345–59; Grant T. Hammond, *Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), pp.59–66; Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 1998); J. Paul Dunne and Sam Perlo-Freeman, 'The Demand for Military Spending in Developing Countries: A Dynamic Panel Analysis', *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 14, No. 6 (2003), pp.461–74; Miguel Ángel Alonso Neira and Antonio Martínez González, 'Los determinantes del gasto en defensa en la literatura académica de los últimos cincuenta años: una revisión de las principales aportaciones y modelos' [The determinants of defense spending in the academic literature of the last fifty years: a review of the main contributions and models], *Hacienda Pública Española / Revista de Economía Pública*, Vol. 187, No. 4 (2008), pp.109–37.
30. An explanation for this neglect might be the widespread perception that Latin America has reached a historical stage of limited or no military conflict. In fact, political leaders have avoided major war for most of the 20th century. As a result, both the political class and scholars have paid relatively little attention to defence policy. In addition, the international debate tends to ignore work on the topic written in Spanish and Portuguese, such as Malamud and García, 'Rearme o renovación' (note 6); Villa, 'Corrida armamentista' (note 12); Jorge M. Battaglini, 'Palabras mortales. ¿Rearme y carrera armamentista en América del Sur?' [Mortal words. Rearmament and arms race in South America?], *Nueva Sociedad*, No. 215 (2008), pp.23–34; Battaglini, 'Rearme y baja percepción de amenaza interestatal en Sudamérica. ¿Es posible tal coexistencia?' [Rearmament and low interstate threat perception in South America. Is such coexistence possible?], *Perfiles Latinoamericanos*, No. 35 (2010), pp.61–87.
31. Battaglini, 'Determinants of Arms Spending' (note 7).
32. Alonso and Martínez, 'Los determinantes del gasto' (note 29), p.129.
33. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this differentiation.
34. Brian S. MacDonald, *Military Spending in Developing Countries: How Much is too Much?* (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1997), pp.2–3.
35. Stanislaw Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1968), p.211; also see Alain Rouquié, *The Military and the State in Latin America* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989); Félix E. Martín, *Militarist Peace in South America. Conditions for War and Peace* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
36. J. Samuel Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp.166–7; Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil* (note 5).
37. J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions', in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds), *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp.57–104.
38. Brian Loveman, "'Protected Democracies" and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1994), pp.105–89.
39. Adler and Greve, 'When Security Community Meets Balance of Power' (note 26), pp.66–9.
40. Colin S. Gray, 'The Arms Race Phenomenon', *World Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1971), pp.39–79; Paul F. Diehl, 'Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1983), pp.205–12; Hammond, *Plowshares into Swords* (note 29); Buzan and Herring, *The Arms Dynamic* (note 29).
41. Mares, *Latin America and the Illusion of Peace* (note 2).
42. Adler and Greve, 'When Security Community Meets Balance of Power' (note 26), pp.69–72.
43. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities', in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.29–65; for the original definition of the term see Karl Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Jr. Lee, Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

44. David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, 'Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America', *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2007), pp.76–100; Flesch and Radseck, 'Creating Multi-level Security Governance' (note 27).
45. See for example Raymond John Vincent, 'Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Europe', Adelphi Paper No. 119, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1975; Lawrence Freedman, 'Military Power and Political Influence', *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1998), pp.763–80.
46. Kai Michael Kenkel, 'Stepping out of the Shadow: South America and Peace Operations', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17, No. 5 (2010), pp.584–97; Kai Michael Kenkel (ed.), *South America and Peace Operations: Coming of Age* (London/New York: Routledge, 2013); Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez, 'Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations', *Security Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2010), pp.160–95.
47. According to Battaglini, who does not take into account rising power dynamics, high arms spending in those countries is a consequence of an expansive nature of strategic assessment of defence, the availability of economic resources, and a high level of political attention to defence issues. Battaglini, 'Determinants of Arms Spending' (note 7).
48. Harry Eckstein, 'Case Study and Theory in Political Science', in Harry Eckstein, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1992), pp.117–73.
49. Among internal motives, we disregard regime type and internal conflict, as these factors do not vary across the countries and the time period we observe.
50. 'Latin America Enjoys Longest Sustained Growth in 30 years', *IMF Survey* Vol. 36, No. 7 (23 April 2007), [www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2007/042307.pdf](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2007/042307.pdf).
51. Growth rates mentioned in this section were retrieved from World Development Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.
52. Rank-ordering of GDP (current US\$) for 2012, *ibid*.
53. Sam Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail and Carina Solmirano, 'Military Expenditure', in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (ed.), *SIPRI Yearbook 2010. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.177–249.
54. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2008* (London: Routledge 2008), p.61.
55. World Development Indicators (note 51).
56. 'Brazil: Momentum Builds for Defence Reform' (note 13).
57. Brazilian Ministry of Defence, *National Strategy of Defense. Peace and Security for Brazil*, 2008, [www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia\\_defesa\\_nacional\\_ingles.pdf](http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf); Brazilian Ministry of Defence, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional* [National Defence White Book], 2012, [www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes07/lbdn.pdf](http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes07/lbdn.pdf).
58. Moraes, 'Porque o Brasil precisa dos caças?' (note 14).
59. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'SIPRI Yearbook 2012' (note 15), p.11.
60. Kristina Mani, 'Military Entrepreneurs: Patterns in Latin America', *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2011), pp.25–55.
61. On military prerogatives in post-Pinochet Chile, see Hunter, 'Civil-Military Relations' (note 5). On military transformation since the 1990s, see Mani, *Democratization and Military Transformation* (note 27), chapter 6.
62. Günther Maihold, 'Foreign Policy as Provocation. Rhetoric and Reality in Venezuela's External Relations under Hugo Chávez', SWP Research Paper 1/2009, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2009, [www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research\\_papers/2009\\_RP01\\_ilm\\_ks.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2009_RP01_ilm_ks.pdf).
63. Rafael Duarte Villa, 'A política externa venezuelana de Chávez para a América do Sul: entre a ideologização das identidades e as necessidades do pragmatismo' [Venezuelan foreign policy towards South America under Chávez: between ideological identities and the necessities of pragmatism], *Análise de Conjuntura* 10, Observatório Político Sul-Americano (OPSA), Rio de Janeiro, 2007, [www.opsa.com.br/](http://www.opsa.com.br/).
64. IISS, *Military Balance 2008* (note 54), p.62.
65. 'Brazil: Laying the Ground for Arms Drive', *Latin American Security & Strategic Review*, October 2007; 'Brazil: "No arms race, no response to Venezuela"', *Latin American Security & Strategic Review*, November 2007.
66. Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2005/2006 (note 11).

67. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2012* (London: Routledge, 2012), p.367; Mares, *Latin America and the Illusion of Peace* (note 2), p.37.
68. Brazilian Ministry of Defence, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional* (note 57).
69. *Ibid.*; IISS, *Military Balance 2013* (note 16), p.425.
70. We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
71. Daniel Flenes, 'A Visão Brasileira da Futura Ordem Global' [The Brazilian Perspective on the Future of the Global Order], *Contexto Internacional* Vol. 32, No. 2 (2010), pp.403–37; Andrew Hurrell, 'Brazil and the New Global Order', *Current History* Vol. 109, No. 724 (2010), pp.60–8; Andrés Malamud, 'A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy', *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2011), pp.1–24.
72. Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mónica Hirst, 'Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities', *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006), pp.21–40; Wolf Grabendorff, 'Brasil: de coloso regional a potencia global' [Brazil: from regional giant to global power], *Nueva Sociedad*, No. 226 (2010), pp.158–71; Rafael Duarte Villa and Manuela Trindade Viana, 'Security Issues during Lula's Administration: From the Reactive to the Assertive Approach', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* Vol. 53, special issue (2010), pp.91–114.
73. UNASUR represents all 12 sovereign South American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela).
74. On the emergence of a regional security community in the Southern Cone and the role that cooperation in peace operations plays in that process see Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, 'Regional Defense Integration and Peacekeeping Cooperation in the Southern Cone', in Kenkel, *South America and Peace Operations* (note 46), pp.64–81.
75. Brigitte Weiffen, 'Persistence and Change in Regional Security Institutions: Does the OAS still have a Project?', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2012), pp.360–83.
76. Grabendorff, 'Brasil: de coloso regional a potencia global' (note 72).
77. Farid Kahhat, 'Las relaciones entre Chile y Perú en el ámbito de la seguridad: entre la cooperación y la desconfianza' [Relations between Chile and Peru in the field of security: between cooperation and distrust], *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp.3–16.
78. Carlos Gutiérrez, 'Chile, Perú y Bolivia: entre el conflicto y la cooperación' [Chile, Peru and Bolivia: between conflict and cooperation], in Isidro Sepúlveda (ed.), *Seguridad humana y nuevas políticas de defensa en Iberoamérica* [Human security and new defense policies in Ibero-America] (Madrid: Instituto Universitario 'General Gutierrez Mellado', 2007), pp.291–321.
79. 'Rapprochement with Bolivia', *Latin American Security & Strategic Review*, September 2007; also see Leslie Wehner, 'From Rivalry to Mutual Trust: The Othering Process between Bolivia and Chile', Working Paper No. 135, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, 2010, [www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp135\\_wehner.pdf](http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp135_wehner.pdf).
80. Mares, *Latin America and the Illusion of Peace* (note 2), p.120.
81. 'Thawing Relations with Peru', *Latin American Security & Strategic Review*, September 2007.
82. Holtom et al. 2008, 'International Arms Transfers' (note 9), p.305.
83. Juan Ramírez M., 'Comentarios sobre el proyecto que modifica la Lei no. 19.067 y establece normas para la participación de tropas chilenas en operaciones de paz' [Comments on the draft amendment to Law No. 19,067 to establish rules for the participation of Chilean troops in peacekeeping operations], Aportes al Debate Parlamentario no. 1, Centro de Estudios Estratégicos, Santiago de Chile, 2007, [www.fes-seguridadregional.org/images/stories/docs/4099-001\\_g.pdf](http://www.fes-seguridadregional.org/images/stories/docs/4099-001_g.pdf); Juan Emilio Cheyre, 'UNPKO and the Latin American Forces', in Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson (eds), *Fixing Haiti: MIN-USTAH and beyond* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2011), pp.157–72. These actions are consistent with Mani's finding that the Chilean political class has managed to turn key sectors of the armed forces into stakeholders of a cooperative internationalist grand strategy. See Mani, *Democratization and Military Transformation* (note 27).
84. IISS, *Military Balance 2008* (note 54), p.60.
85. Layla I. Dawood A., 'Venezuela: a polémica compra de rifles de asalto rusos e o problema do tráfico de armamentos de pequeno porte' [Venezuela: the controversial purchase of Russian assault rifles and the problem of trafficking in small arms], *Conjuntura Internacional* Vol. 2, No. 10, 3 June 2005, [www.pucminas.br/conjuntura](http://www.pucminas.br/conjuntura); Mares, *Latin America and the Illusion of Peace* (note 2).
86. Adam Isacson, 'Why Latin America is Rearming', *Current History*, Vol. 110, No. 733 (2011), pp.62–7.
87. Mark Bromley and Catalina Perdomo, 'CBM en América Latina y el efecto de la adquisición de armas por parte de Venezuela' [CBM in Latin America and the effect of Venezuela's arms acquisitions], Documento de Trabajo No. 41, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2005, [www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/](http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/).

88. Maihold, 'Foreign Policy as Provocation' (note 62).
89. 'Russian Rifles for Snipers', *Latin American Security & Strategic Review*, September 2007.
90. 'Upgrading US Naval Attention to Latin America', *Latin American Security & Strategic Review*, May 2008; also see R. Guy Emerson, 'Radical Neglect? The "War on Terror" and Latin America', *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2010), pp.33–62.
91. Maihold, 'Foreign Policy as Provocation' (note 62).
92. As of December 2013, ALBA member states in South America are Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador; members from Central America and the Caribbean are Nicaragua, Cuba, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and Grenadines.
93. Mares, *Latin America and the Illusion of Peace* (note 2).
94. A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
95. Adler and Greve, 'When Security Community Meets Balance of Power' (note 26).