



# Stability abroad, instability at home? Changing UN peace operations and civil–military relations in Global South troop contributing countries

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## ABSTRACT

This article highlights the domestic effects of the ongoing changes in United Nations peacekeeping practice on troop contributing states from the Global South. It juxtaposes scholarship on stabilization, the specific motivations of Global South troop contributing countries, and in particular the effects on civilian control of armed forces of peacekeeping participation. It argues that the “diversionary peace” hypothesis—which posits beneficial effects on civilian control for peacekeeping—has not obtained, and that current developments in United Nations peace operations will negatively affect civil–military relations in postcolonial sending countries. The text suggests avenues for future inquiry. One is the notion that stabilization may lead to a net negative effect on civilian control in unconsolidated democracies. This is due to stabilization’s increased militarization, and its turn towards objectives that mimic the counterinsurgency mandates associated with military rule in the Global South, rather than a focus on the socioeconomic well-being of local populations.

**KEYWORDS** Peace operations; United Nations; stabilization; Global South; civilian control; democratization

The contributions to the present special section have identified several key current changes in UN (United Nations) peace operations. In the absence of competing sources of legitimacy in conflict resolution, they posit that UN peacekeeping will remain a key instrument in the global multilateral toolbox, albeit facing significant financial and geopolitical constraints in the short to medium term (Coleman & Williams, 2021; de Coning, 2021). With its survival assured but limited by economic constraints, the authors converge on three main tendencies affecting future blue helmet practice: the relative abandonment of liberal peacebuilding missions and the ensuing bifurcation into stabilization and “light footprint” missions;

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greater reliance on cooperation with regional organizations; and the move to enhance light-footprint missions with technology designed to substitute for physical presence (de Coning, 2021).

The present contribution shifts the focus from the changes in UN peace operations themselves to a subject that is treated as a recursive effect by much of the peacekeeping literature, but which has profound domestic repercussions, especially in the Global South. While the “Global South” is a notoriously malleable grouping, it is taken here to indicate states still shaped by the economic and political legacies of colonial rule.<sup>1</sup> It examines the effect of one of these three identified changes—the turn to stabilization missions—on the consolidation of democracy in troop contributing states (TCCs), particularly as it concerns civilian/democratic control over the armed forces. Many of the leading Global South TCCs of the past decade (among others Bangladesh, Brazil, Indonesia, Nepal, Nigeria, and Uruguay) (United Nations, 2020) are still in varying stages of consolidating democratic control over their armed forces, either through the formal establishment of civilian oversight institutions after periods of direct military rule, or through the internalization of commitment to democratic values.

This analysis seeks to highlight significant points of conceptual interaction between the literatures on the turn to stabilization and the interaction of peacekeeping and civil–military relations, in order to indicate potential avenues for future research that arise from the conclusions drawn in the further contributions to the special section. The central contention is that the “diversionary peace” hypothesis (Cunliffe, 2018; Sotomayor, 2010, 2014)—which posits that deploying as peacekeepers has beneficial effects on democratic control over the armed forces by civilian policymakers—has not obtained and that participation in UN peace operations, which increasingly have stabilization as their focus, risks having a negative effect on civil–military relations within TCCs.

Beyond the finding that the socialization effect of interaction with troops from consolidated democracies has not been consistently verified—indeed the reverse has been claimed (Cunliffe, 2018)—this is due to two factors. First, the association of stabilization missions with counterinsurgency objectives aligns with the types of internal missions often associated with military rule and authoritarianism in postcolonial states. Second, the robust use of force in these UN stabilization missions tends to strengthen momentum for military autonomy from civilian oversight. In other words, by participating in UN peace operations abroad, democratization dynamics at home are affected.

The article begins by outlining the bifurcated shift away from liberal peacebuilding to both stabilization and light-footprint missions. This is juxtaposed with considerations related to democratization and civilian control over the armed forces, subsumed under the rubric of the “diversionary peace.” The effects of the stabilization turn are then presented, highlighting normative

factors such as Southern emerging powers' involvement in the putatively waning liberal peacebuilding paradigm. The main argument—and focus for future research—concerns the failures of the “diversionary peace” thesis, illustrated briefly by Brazilian involvement in the *Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti* (MINUSTAH), the UN peace operation in Haiti. The article closes with a brief summary of what these trends might portend for Global South TCCs and UN peace operations themselves.

### **From peacebuilding to stabilization: Domestic effects on Global South contributors**

On the basis of lessons drawn primarily in Afghanistan (Karlsrud, 2015, p. 49, 2019)—an experience not shared by most Global South states—Western states have “uploaded” elements of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism doctrine into the mandates of UN peace operations (Karlsrud, 2019, p. 11; United Nations, 2000). This article argues that while stabilization is a practice that may not harbor risks for undue militarization in contexts of consolidated democratic control over the armed forces (as in Western armies), it can all the more strongly exacerbate setbacks in ongoing democratic transitions such as those in the Global South.

As will be shown, in increasing militarization and the use of force and moving the focus away from local populations' well-being, stabilization is less conducive to positive effects on civilian control and democratization than liberal peacebuilding. Rather than producing the demonstration effect that underlies socialization in the “diversionary” model, stabilization rather magnifies both positive and negative dynamics present in TCCs' patterns of civilian control over the armed forces. Where domestically the trend is toward increased civilian oversight, operations may accelerate this process; where democratization trends are regressive, stabilization missions can exercise greater potential than other peace operations to exacerbate this movement.

In inverting the analysis of changes to UN peace operations to effects within TCCs, two elements of stabilization mandates are key: the simultaneous winding-down of mandates' focus on socioeconomic aspects of local populations' wellbeing and increase in the use of force to protect civilians, and the creeping militarization inherent in a shift to missions inspired by counterinsurgency and counterterrorism doctrines.

### ***Shifting focus from local populations' well-being to counterinsurgency***

UN peacebuilding practice has been heavily criticized for its continued failure to implement a paradigm truly focused on local populations' needs across all levels of its activities, from everyday interactions (Autesserre,

2010, 2014) to the broad gamut of observations made by proponents of a hybrid peace model (summarized in Mac Ginty, 2011, pp. 41–42). There is significant merit to these critiques; however, the UN's ongoing heavy rhetorical placement of local populations at the center of its concern maintains considerable diplomatic drawing power, including as a way for contributing states to signal commitment to democracy and humanitarian objectives. This is particularly true of military establishments whose transition processes involve distancing themselves from precisely the types of counterinsurgency mandates that have arisen under the stabilization paradigm.

Stabilization mandates have led UN practice to focus more on protection of civilians—through military means—and the advancement of host governments' interests, to the detriment of implementing a long-term people-centric strategy to address the root causes of security challenges (Karlsrud, 2019, p. 3). This results in these mandates' reverting from the (albeit imperfect and often merely rhetorical) logic of people-based emancipation that grounds liberal peacebuilding, to a logic of control that favors host state interests (Mac Ginty, 2012, pp. 26–27) and has been shown to increase militarization in the African context (Gelot, 2017). Further, it entails an element of enforcing conformity to Western standards (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 28, 2019) which peacebuilding had to an extent overcome. Both of these elements run counter to the foreign policy motivations of many Southern TCCs, which prefer a people-based approach over the extensive use of force (Kenkel, 2013) and often embed their participation in peace operations in a rhetoric of contestation of Western global predominance (Harig & Kenkel, 2017; Kenkel, 2010; Kenkel & Destradi, 2019; Villa & Jenne, 2020).

The origins of the stabilization shift are more complex, however, than just one of a paradigm flowing from North to South. Particularly in Africa, in the face of factors such as conflict fragmentation and increased reliance by rebel groups on insurgent tactics, the African Union (AU) has been the one to push for an increased stabilization measures, most often as a precursor to more long-term peacebuilding efforts; examples include efforts by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union in Somalia.

However, as Curran and Hunt (2020) point out, stabilization can work at cross purposes with the goals of long-term peacebuilding. In this sense, the fact that regional states have led the drive for increased force in Africa, often in the face of lukewarm Western support, while returning agency to the Global South, does not cancel the association between stabilization missions and weakened civilian control over the armed forces. Rather it underscores the fact that support for stabilization magnifies (and reflects) already existing dynamics of civilian control over the armed forces. In keeping with Levin et al. (2016), participation in these missions can, for militaries with excessive autonomy from civilian oversight, serve to maintain the predominant role of repressive apparatuses at home.

### **Militarization of mandates**

A second factor, the militarization of mandates, is of primary relevance to the effect of the move to stabilization for Global South TCCs. The focus on counterinsurgency, as practiced by NATO in Afghanistan, has shifted the focus to security-oriented solutions in peace operations and privileged military interpretations of mandate language over civilian options (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 23, 27). The eroding primacy of civilian practical and discursive control over the use of force is already evident in the divergences of focus present in unofficial statements of the UN approach such as the Report of the Independent High-Level Panel on peace Operations (HIPPO Report) and the report written under the oversight of Brazilian general Alberto Santos Cruz, which champions elements associated with counterinsurgency doctrine (Curran & Hunt, 2020, pp. 53–54; Howard, 2019, pp. 546–547).

The subordination of other mission objectives to military objectives has resulted in reduced success in conflict resolution compared to classic liberal peacebuilding (Howard, 2019, p. 546). This finding highlights the link between the two factors listed here, as it has been argued to result from militarized approaches' jeopardization of missions' conflict resolution potential (Curran & Hunt, 2020, p. 3) as they move away from a focus on socioeconomic root causes. In this paradigm, complex political objectives can quickly end up subordinated to calculations of military utility (Curran & Hunt, 2020, p. 53).

Such a prioritization of the military component of operations not only fails to account for the power and ideological dynamics present in local political relations (and those between the interveners and the local population), but also subjugates humanitarian and development-related objectives typical of liberal peacebuilding missions to a militarized perspective (Mac Ginty, 2012). These power relations explicitly include engagement with a given conflict situation in terms not of its own dynamics, but of the drive to enforce conformity with Western security objectives. It is precisely this development that places in jeopardy the consolidation of democratic control over the armed forces in vulnerable participating militaries, as it negates the demonstration effect of civilian supremacy posited by the “diversionary peace.”

### **The “diversionary peace” and civil–military relations in the Global South**

The term “diversionary peace” combines elements of the “democratic peace-keeping hypothesis” codified by Sotomayor (2014), and Cunliffe's (2018) subsequent direct use of the term. In its essence, the “diversionary peace” is the contention that participation in peace operations serves to improve

the degree of democratic control over the armed forces by civilian authorities in states transitioning to democratic rule from various types of military government. This can occur through three main mechanisms: “entanglement,” or distraction from internal preoccupations by an important external mission; internal and external signaling of progress in democratization; and “socialization,” or the acceleration of that process by means of contact with models from consolidated democracies (Cunliffe, 2018, p. 222; Sotomayor, 2014, pp. 29–37).

Socialization is viewed as particularly important as an explicit means of improving civilian control over the armed forces in the form of democratic oversight, because it addresses reform of values (acceptance of civilian oversight) from within, rather than institutional reform driven by factors outside the military. The process is presumed to work by way of a demonstration effect whereby soldiers from democratizing states are familiarized with both international norms and effective patterns of civilian control over the armed forces through contact with colleagues from consolidated democracies. Albrecht (2020) has elaborated a similar notion of “professional ethos” (p. 8) based on the work of Loveman (1999), who claims that blue-helmet missions can make “young officers more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, and more resistant to calls for military ‘salvation’ via coup in times of crisis” (p. 267).

What unites these approaches is the notion that socialization brings about a qualitative improvement in civilian control over the armed forces. Sotomayor subsumes this under the notion of institutional reform (2014, pp. 3–4). If viewed uncritically this claim reflects a dated view of norm diffusion as occurring unilaterally from “advanced” Northern to “backward” Southern states. Indeed, empirical studies of peace operations demonstrate that socialization dynamics are more complex (Harig, 2020; Pingeot, 2018; Ruffa, 2017; and further below).

Entanglement, on the other hand, is encapsulated in the idea that militaries will desist from interfering in domestic politics in post-dictatorship periods if given a “non-contentious and unifying external mission” abroad (Sotomayor, 2010, p. 993). Capie (2016, pp. 11–12) has pointed this out as a motivation in Indonesia, and Albrecht (2020, p. 591) has shown, based on the case of Tunisia, that such deployment has had the further benefit of complicating the organization of coup attempts.

The following section will demonstrate how the changes to peace operations outlined in the previous contributions to the special section have had negative consequences in terms both of the applicability of the “diversionary peace” hypothesis and the utility of peace operations as an avenue for the normative aspirations of TCCs from the Global South.

## **Changing peace operations and domestic effects on Global South TCCs**

The abovementioned changes to UN peace operations will continue to have profound effects both on the nature of Global South TCCs' participation, and even more clearly on the effect of participation within these countries themselves. It is worth noting that contributions from Global South TCCs have increased in parallel to the turn to stabilization in UN peacekeeping. The focus in this section will be primarily on the effects of the move toward stabilization, and how this effects both the utility of peacekeeping as a means for Global South emerging powers to attain their foreign policy aims, and the nature of civil–military relations and democratization processes within them.

### ***Liberal peacebuilding as an emerging power niche***

Peace operations are favored as foreign policy tools by states in the Global South as they offer a way out of a fundamental dilemma, especially for emerging powers. Increased influence in global policymaking is often tied to the taking-on of more responsibility in the security sphere (Harig & Kenkel, 2017; Villa & Jenne, 2020, pp. 409–412), and established powers often predicate this proof on the extensive use of military force (Kenkel, 2010, 2012; Kenkel & Martins, 2016). In theory, liberal peacebuilding allows for these states—which are wary of the use of force, possess far more (often quite successful) development than military experience and capacities—a way to make a security-related impact using less force and a development-based, people-centered approach (Kenkel, 2013).

Thus, for some Global South states, it is precisely in the abandoned middle ground between stabilization and light-footprint missions—liberal peacebuilding—that their experiences and foreign policy objectives rest. Furthermore, the waning place of peacebuilding reduces the impact of an activity to whose development Global South states have made substantive contributions (Curran & Hunt, 2020, pp. 52–53; Richmond & Tellidis, 2014), as opposed to stabilization, whose interests are aligned to the West and whose origins are explicitly linked to colonial conflicts (MacDonald, 2013; Porch, 2011).

In practice, as will be shown, participation in stabilization has led some states—as in the case of Brazil—to clash with their own prior principles and use increased force, resulting in a militarizing feedback to domestic military missions such as public security (Cockayne, 2014; Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014; Moreno et al., 2012; Pingeot, 2018). The move away from liberal peacebuilding to stabilization significantly worsens this dilemma, by removing the overlap between these states' normative commitments and the mission objectives of UN peace operations.

### ***The “diversionary peace”***

An increasing body of empirical studies have shown that the “diversionary peace” hypothesis—particularly its socialization component—is off the mark (Adhikari, 2020; Cunliffe, 2018; Sotomayor, 2014). A more plausible proposition is that socialization processes in peacekeeping operations tend to reinforce dynamics already underway in troop-sending countries, in the case of both negative and positive tendencies.

Additionally, in the absence of clear and consensual definitions of key concepts such as stabilization (Curran & Hunt, 2020), rather than socializing towards UN practice, TCCs will fill this vacuum with operational and tactical dynamics characteristic of their domestic doctrines and levels of civilian control over the armed forces (Harig, 2020; Müller & Steinke, 2020; Ruffa, 2014, 2017). Importantly, this speaks directly to a problematic core assumption of the hypothesis—that once again positive norms (such as a certain form of democratic control over the armed forces) will flow to the underdeveloped states of the Global South. In practice, TCCs’ troops are socialized by all troops deployed in parallel, from both the Global North and South, and following both negative and positive patterns of civilian control over the armed forces.

Accordingly, Cunliffe (2018) has shown that socialization—as well as entanglement—not only failed to bring about stronger civilian control over the armed forces, but in fact increased military autonomy from civilian control over the armed forces in cases as disparate as Fiji, Bangladesh, and Gambia. Due to its associated prestige (a factor ironically highlighted by the diversionary hypothesis) peacekeeping in fact tends to increase military autonomy. As UN peace operations occupy a key place in foreign policy strategies, “civilian governments may be outperformed internationally by the activities undertaken by their military forces on the international stage, thereby relying on them for legitimacy” (Adhikari, 2020, p. 378).

In this situation, outward signaling of democratic virtues—as treated by Sotomayor (2014)—and especially the altruistic norms (rhetorically) associated with UN peace operations (Cunliffe, 2013, pp. 180–182) in fact create spaces that allow militaries to resist actual change (Adhikari, 2020, p. 375, 11; Sotomayor, 2010). In situations where prestige, economic independence through UN reimbursement surpluses (Brosig, 2017) and low civilian interest or competence on military issues (a “knowledge deficit” often itself due to lingering military clout over security policy) (González & Jenne, 2019; Villa & Jenne, 2020) coincide, this means participation in UN peace operations can in fact exacerbate significantly the erosion of civilian control over the armed forces over the military. Where economic dependence on UN reimbursements is highly determinant, however, there is in fact evidence that TCCs might conform to UN expectations of more robust civilian supremacy,



at least inasmuch as outright coups are concerned—though authoritarian moves are now largely more gradual (Lundgren, 2018).

Studies have shown to this be the case in Nepal (Adhikari, 2020; Levin et al., 2016; Sotomayor, 2010), Bangladesh (Cunliffe, 2018; Levin et al., 2016), Uruguay (González & Jenne, 2019), and Brazil (Harig, 2019; Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014; Moreno et al., 2012), as well as several African TCCs which have shown an instrumental pattern in using peacekeeping participation to abet undemocratic patterns of governance. Levin et al. (2016) suggest that this process might even be inverted, and that beyond the improvement in image posited by Sotomayor (2010, 2014) and Adhikari (2020), peacekeeping might be used to “whitewash” (Levin, 2020) human rights-abusing military establishments. Though stopping short of Levin et al.’s argument, Firsing (2014) has made similar arguments regarding Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Nigeria. Gowan (2015) has suggested that stabilization, when used to assist undemocratic regimes, can precisely create a negative socialization effect, leading militaries to legitimize the use of force in domestic settings upon their return.

This type of military autarchy is particularly deleterious in the increasing number of situations where militarization and backsliding in democratization processes in the Global South are gradual dynamics—often “by invitation” from civilians—rather than the violent, one-off coups of the past (Adhikari, 2020, pp. 373–374). This process can occur as civilian policymakers seek the prestige and financial incentive associated with peacekeeping participation, and militaries are able to present the violation of existing norms—such as limits on the use of force—as a necessary price to pay. In the case of some African militaries, Dwyer (2015) has argued that battle experience—likely to increase in a turn to stabilization—tends to increase militaries’ demands for prerogatives.

### ***Feedback circles: Brazil in Haiti***

Brazil is an indicative case for larger Global South TCCs which are consolidating democracies. In this former top-ten TCC, where direct military rule ended in 1985, the military retain significant formal and informal prerogatives in the democratic era, as well as an explicit claim to political influence. Similar processes are visible in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, as well as, at prior points on the consolidation timeline, major TCCs such as Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Indonesia. In this sense, the Brazilian experience in MINUSTAH is a clear case in which a UN peace operation served to exacerbate a feedback loop between domestic militarization and increased use of force in a stabilization-type mission. Initially part of a civilian-led emerging-power strategy aimed at permanent Security Council membership, participation in MINUSTAH ultimately increased both military autonomy

from civilian control over the armed forces and shifted parameters concerning the use of force both domestically and abroad in a bidirectional process. Brazilian Force Commanders ceded to US and French pressure for more robust action (Cockayne, 2014) and were involved in several controversial kinetic operations. Whereas there was originally a feedback of operational expertise flowing from urban public security forces in Brazil to the force in Haiti, this directionality was eventually inverted.

Despite qualms over the robust use of force, this type of mission in fact represented continuity with pacification missions typical of state formation in Brazil (Siman & Santos, 2018). The end result was militarization and a substantially increased use of force in public security in Rio de Janeiro, including direct domestic intervention by the armed forces (Harig, 2019; Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014; Müller & Steinke, 2020; Pinget, 2018; Schubert, 2019). In keeping with the negative finding regarding the “diversionary” hypothesis, the Brazilian military later attempted to loosen legal accountability regarding their domestic public security missions (Harig, 2019, pp. 11–12).

The Brazilian experience in Haiti is a crucial harbinger of militarization by invitation back home. Brazil’s military have enjoyed considerable autonomy from civilian oversight since redemocratization in 1988, and have dictated the political agenda regarding peacekeeping deployment to an extent not possible in a consolidated democracy. This is due more to civilian disinterest in military matters and military influence on the security vocabulary (Kenkel, 2006) than to a concerted military initiative to gain influence.

The socialization hypothesis has also failed to produce the predicted result in Brazil, as several former MINUSTAH Force Commanders currently participate as Ministers in the Cabinet of current president Jair Bolsonaro, and prominent individual drivers of significant militarization and opponents of human rights and minority protections. One Force Commander, Alberto Santos Cruz, was called upon not only to replicate the experiences gained in Congo, but to codify them by means of a report submitted to UN Department of Peace Operations (United Nations, 2017). Ultimately, the Report itself provides evidence of how all of these phenomena have crept into UN practice, in that it advocates further militarization and opens several departures from the paradigm of civil–military interaction proposed in the HIPPO Report (United Nations, 2015).

## **Future prospects**

This article brings together bodies of research on democratic control over the armed forces, peacekeeping, and stabilization, and has asked the question what do these changes in UN peace operations mean for TCCs in the Global South? If the changes posited by the authors of the special section

hold true, what consequences can be expected for Global South TCCs based on the analyses that have been cited here? How will these consequences feed into larger effects on UN peace operations themselves? Rather than to provide fixed predictions for the future, it outlines trends that emerge from the juxtaposition of these literatures as they pertain to the Global South, highlighting avenues for future research that emerge from the findings in the section's other contributions.

In this spirit, whereas liberal peacekeeping was deemed, in the “diversionary peace” literature, to have an—ultimately unproven—residual positive effect on participating states’ democratic control because of its focus on humanitarian ends and coupling of force with development means, stabilization does not share these benefits. Indeed, as a practice closely associated with the counterinsurgency doctrine that marked military rule in many Global South states, and its substitution of a people-centered approach with one focused on military-heavy state security interests, the very nature of this mandate type may be likely to exert a net negative effect on participating states’ democratic control.

The socialization aspect of the “diversionary peace” is similarly more complex. Rather than exercising a uniformly positive or negative effect, the literature shows that peace operations rather act as magnifiers of existing democratic control dynamics. In situations of relatively complete democratic control, where motivations for participation follow civilian lines, positive examples from democracies that are further along in their consolidation process may come to the fore. Where motivations are predominantly determined by military establishments, taking part in a UN peace operations may amplify democratic control lacunae.

The effects of peacekeeping practice on democratic control over the armed forces thus cannot be explained through a unidirectional approach: TCCs both influence mandate implementation through their existing patterns (Ruffa, 2014, 2017) and are in turn influenced by the patterns evinced by other TCCs. The overall outcome thus fluctuates based on the general level of establishment of democratic control among TCCs in a specific mission. This leads to the conclusion that where TCCs in a given mission predominantly have patterns of insufficient civilian oversight—as in the unconsolidated democracies more typical of the Global South—coupled with the above effect of mandate type, UN peace operations may have an even stronger negative domestic effect for TCCs. This pattern appears more likely to happen as neighboring states and regional powers—some of whom may be explicitly using peacekeeping participation to legitimate authoritarian measures at home—are called upon more frequently as the UN increases cooperation with regional organizations.

The case of Global South TCCs also shows that the interaction between democratic control and peacekeeping participation is not unidirectional,

particularly when viewed in North–South terms. Global South TCCs do not only act as recipients of pressure to engage in stabilization: They have also been strong drivers of its use in contexts such as Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo. Whether those African states who lead the drive for stabilization do so as a result of insufficient democratic oversight of the armed force is a hypothesis to be tested in future research; but it is clear that Northern states are not the only positive examples at the democratic control-stabilization nexus, nor are Southern states uniformly negative.

How can this affect UN peace operations as a whole, given that the vast majority of TCCs are now located in the Global South and possess varying degrees of vulnerability in their degree of democratic supremacy? I posit that where liberal peacebuilding gained credence as a positive factor for democratization under the “diversionary peace,” stabilization mandates by their nature will exercise a negative effect of similar magnitude to that posited—though not confirmed—in that hypothesis. Indeed, if TCCs’ domestic situations are not taken into account in contributor recruitment, stabilization missions, in particular those undertaken in partnership with regional organizations in the Global South, may risk becoming incubators for authoritarian tendencies rather than the locus for a positive demonstration effect.

The move to stabilization—and away from peacebuilding—could thus be assumed to produce divergent effects on TCCs with differing levels of democratic control. States, such as larger emerging powers, looking to project responsibility and a commitment to multilateralism, humanitarianism and democracy under policies directed by civilians may turn away from stabilization while militaries under less consolidated civilian oversight could detect avenues for undermining consolidation at home. Coupled with the adverse effect of new budget constraints on the financial opportunities offered by peace operations that motivate many Global South TCCs, this leaves a pessimistic picture for both UN peace operations and the majority of their contributors.

Peacekeeping is likely to remain the premier arrow in the multilateral conflict resolution quiver, and the majority of troops will continue, by the sheer force of populational mathematics, to come from the Global South. However, incentives for these states have weakened overall, and with the move to stabilization run the risk of favoring situation of authoritarian regression. UN action to counter this potential—such as democratic control benchmarks for TCCs, pre-deployment training programs concerning democratic control, and in-mission monitoring of domestic civilian oversight mechanisms—would be a welcome countermeasure to what otherwise could result in a heavy cost at home for some Global South TCCs.

## Note

1. The focus here is on the varying degrees of incompleteness in the consolidation of democracy, both in terms of institutional autonomy and of civilian control over the armed forces, as well as foreign policy preferences such as non-intervention and the non-use of force borne of experiences of repeated Western intervention.

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