
Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War

Sean W. Burges,¹ *Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Ottawa*

Abstract

Conventional approaches to hegemony emphasize elements of coercion and exclusion, characteristics that do not adequately explain the operation of the growing number of regional projects or the style of emerging-power foreign policy. This article develops the concept of consensual hegemony, explaining how a structure can be articulated, disseminated and maintained without relying on force to recruit the participation of other actors. The central idea is the construction of a structural vision, or hegemony, that specifically includes the nominally subordinate, engaging in a process of dialogue and interaction that causes the subordinate parties to appropriate and absorb the substance and requisites of the hegemony as their own. The utility of consensual hegemony as an analytical device, especially for the study of regionalism and emerging market power foreign policy, is outlined with reference to Brazil's post-Cold War foreign policy, demonstrating both how a consensual hegemony might be pursued and where the limits to its ideas-based nature lie.

Keywords: *Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, foreign policy, Antonio Gramsci, hegemony*

The concept that will be elaborated in these pages and then given an initial application to Brazil's post-Cold War foreign policy is consensual hegemony. Elements of leadership explicit in early discussions of hegemony and implicit in subsequent international relations and international political economy literature combine with the potential power of ideas to provide a method of understanding how a regionally predominant, but not dominant, state such as Brazil might seek to push a regional or international system in a given direction. Where realist, neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to hegemony privilege its coercive underpinnings, the consensual approach draws on Gramscian suggestions that a hegemony gains its strength through consent, not the latent threat of imposition. In this context Brazil emerges as an interesting illustrative case study because it highlights how a state with limited military and economic power capabilities might attempt to leverage its idea-generating capacity to construct a vision of the regional system and quietly obtain the active acquiescence of other regional states to a hegemonic project.

Consensual hegemony is particularly useful for explicating the dynamics behind consensus 'creation', something Brazilian diplomats highlight as one of their institutional strengths. It was also a critical part of regionalist strategies pursued by Itamaraty (the common shorthand name for Brazil's foreign ministry) during



the Cardoso years and globally during the Lula presidency. Embedded within the 'creation' of consensus is the notion that Itamaraty brought other countries to accept a position or participate in projects that might have been greeted with some scepticism, suggesting power or influence. The reality in Brazilian foreign policy is that power was rarely directly applied or explicitly visible; influence was instead sought by disseminating ideas or by attempting to create situations where it became implicitly too costly for other countries to deviate extensively from the Brazilian position. The coercive element is implicit, coming in the costs and lost opportunities attendant on exclusion from the project. Consensual hegemony – an oblique application of pressure or the advance creation of conditions that would make a future policy appear a self-interested move by other countries – comes into play here, allowing Itamaraty to mask consistent efforts to structure continental relations and organizations in a manner decidedly in Brazil's interests.

The argument is not that Brazil succeeded in creating a consensual hegemony, but that the concept is useful for understanding the leadership strategy of an emerging middle power state. A more important theoretical angle comes from Brazil's ultimate failure to form a stable consensual hegemony in South America, offering two valuable lessons for students of international relations and the foreign policy of developing areas. First, it establishes the limitations of ideas as a currency for the conduct of foreign policy. Second, and conversely, it demonstrates that the very attempt to form a consensual hegemony offers the leading state gains that can compensate for an ultimate failure in the larger project; the non-dominating nature of consensual hegemony allows for a series of shifts in the nature of regional relations that at least partially embeds the leading state's interests.

The article is divided into two main parts, shifting progressively from the intensely theoretical to the decidedly more empirical. In the first part the concept of consensual hegemony will be the focus with only general allusions to its manifestation in Brazilian foreign policy. The second part will reverse this pattern, surveying major events in Brazil's post-Cold War foreign policy to illustrate how consensual hegemony can be used to understand a country's regional interactions. There is no intention to offer a comprehensive treatment of Brazil's post-Cold War foreign policy in the limited space available here.² Rather, the main ambition is to establish consensual hegemony as a viable construct and then offer an initial application of the concept to the Brazilian case in order to provide a deeper theoretical basis for building on the existing literature examining the country's foreign policy.³ Attention will first be turned to hegemony, working through neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist and Gramscian approaches to the concept, before setting out the concept of consensual hegemony as an analytical tool for understanding Brazilian foreign policy. Reference to the literature on the new regionalism will be used as a segue into an outline of the ideas, economic and security aspects of the consensual hegemony project attributed to Brazil, highlighting how the pursuit of consensual hegemony offers rewards that compensate for a failure to attain it.

Traditional conceptions of hegemony

Brazilian diplomats are extremely uncomfortable with any linkage of their country to terms such as 'hegemon' or 'hegemony'. Much of this concern is grounded in the imprecision and vagueness that goes with the terms as well as their equation with notions of coercion and domination in much of international relations theory. Both Payne and Stein have pointed to the imprecision, noting that the term 'hegemony' is rather more assumed than explicated, subject to an inadequate scholarly conceptualization.⁴ This lexicographical imprecision is partially explained by neorealist treatment of the concept 'hegemon'. Most of these works trace the origins of 'hegemony' to a few key texts, chiefly Kindleberger's analysis of the Great Depression. Although the term 'hegemony' is not used, Kindleberger's book provides a foundation for the neorealists by presenting a concrete theoretical treatment of the role of leadership in the international economy before and during the Great Depression. The crucial point is Kindleberger's general thesis that:

the international economic and monetary system needs leadership, a country that is prepared, consciously or unconsciously, under some system of rules that it has internalized, to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system, and in particular to take on its support in adversity by accepting redundant commodities, maintaining a flow of investment capital, and discounting its paper.⁵

Kindleberger's focus is overwhelmingly on economic factors, concluding with five key functions a leader must assume, all of which involve various aspects of national and international economic regulation.⁶ As Payne notes, this analysis casts power in terms of the material resources necessary for a hegemon to write and enforce the rules of the international system. The implication that neorealist scholars draw from this is that leadership is effectively about domination, suggesting that a leading state must be militarily and economically more powerful than other states.⁷ This is not what Kindleberger was arguing. Indeed, he is clear that leadership and domination are not the same thing.⁸

The narrow view of mainstream neorealism on hegemony is thus immediately problematic for Brazil and its South American context. Krasner notes that a hegemonic system is 'one in which there is a single state that is much larger and more advanced than its trading partners'.⁹ It is a stretch to apply this definition to Brazil. Knorr is more specific: hegemony is 'coercive domination over formally independent units',¹⁰ a practice Brazil has studiously avoided. McKeown adds a twist to the suggestion of latent dominance in Krasner's reference: 'the hegemonic state is able to offer both bribes and threats'.¹¹ Brazil could do this with its smaller neighbours, and arguably has done so recently with Bolivia and Paraguay, but not with countries such as Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela. Common to all of these

approaches and central to Kindleberger's discussion of leadership is the concept of cost, something that until very recently Brazil has been manifestly unable to absorb in any substantive manner due to internal economic uncertainty. Whether a state is engaging in naked domination or assuming the 'undue share of the burdens of the system' described by Kindleberger, the hegemon – the state erecting the hegemony – must possess and expend power resources in order to maintain its position and pursue its foreign policy.¹²

The coercive focus remains in Gilpin's concern with the wars created by the rise and fall of hegemonic states. This preoccupation with dominance stands at the centre of the major theoretical application of hegemony in mainstream schools of international relations theory. The central hypothesis that Webb and Krasner identify in hegemonic stability theory is that 'international economic openness and stability is most likely when there is a single dominant state'.¹³ Snidal offers a blunter definition that distinguishes between order and disorder, with the former being provided by the coercive or benevolent leadership of a strongly dominant state.¹⁴ In both cases the centrality of a leading state begins to break down on a sub-regional basis in South America. While there is certainly a temptation to attribute this position to the influential US, such a reading is a bit thin and dramatically overlooks the internal political and economic dynamics that drove the military regime not only in Brazil, but also in Argentina, Chile and Paraguay. The dominating factor was not so much imposition from the US, but protection of elite interests and national integrity from the socialist or communist threat.¹⁵ Shared ideas and world views as espoused in Cardoso and Faletto's dependency theory provide a greater explanatory angle than disciplining suggestions of US external aggression and the threat, real or perceived, of invasion.¹⁶ The coercive aspect actually at play in hegemony is subtler than domination, coming from a need by the elite to support and follow the predominant hemispheric ideology if it is to retain access to the transnational networks necessary to maintain its privilege.

Although there are two main visions of how the hegemonic order is provided in mainstream international relations theory, in both instances the end goal is protection and advancement of the economic interests of the dominant state. Scholars such as Gilpin and Krasner take what might be termed a security or coercive approach to hegemony, arguing that the dominant state links conceptions of national security to the maintenance of a particular international economic order, forcing other states to subscribe to and participate in the maintenance of that order. By contrast the collected goods or benevolent conceptualization of Webb and Krasner as well as Snidal draw heavily on the suggestions of leadership set out by Kindleberger, arguing that it is the continued growth of the major actor and its ability to absorb costs, not necessarily sustained domination, that is central to the maintenance of the system. Collapse of the system comes from a decline in the capability or willingness of the major actor to continue providing the necessary public goods.

Still, a certain degree of coercion may be necessary to ensure that states stick to the rules of the system. The key is that coercion is not to the fore, and that when it is manifest, it is often neither direct nor physical in nature. For illustration one

need only look at the impact that a positive or negative IMF Article IV Consultation report has on a country's international financial standing. In a point that draws on this reality and echoes Hirschman's mercantilist argument about the commercial antecedents of World War Two,¹⁷ Krasner suggests that a hegemonic state desires an open economic system because it provides an opportunity to maximize the national interest through the exploitation of economic, political and military predominance.¹⁸ While this openness does offer benefits for all, as dependency theory suggests, the benefits are distributed in an asymmetrical manner,¹⁹ returning us again to the question of how a leading state can maintain the hegemonic system that serves its interests.

Although the neoliberal institutionalist Keohane counters Gilpin with the argument that survival of another civilizational war has become questionable in an age of nuclear weapons, he nevertheless recognizes that 'powerful states seek to construct international political economies that suit their interests and ideologies'.²⁰ Keohane offers a relative downplaying of domination, emphasizing the formation and elaboration of regimes as devices to entrench and recreate the conditions for a continuation of the hegemonic order.²¹ This point is very close to Strange's notion of structural power, which sees a dominant state locking its long-term interests into the very structure of the international system so that they remain protected when the inevitable systemic redistribution of power takes place.²² In a shift that opens space for consideration of Brazil in some kind of a hegemonic role, a hegemon in the sense of a domineering state is not strictly speaking critical for regime formation, but the presence of a dominant state does greatly facilitate the process by slicing through layers of competing national interests.²³

Drawing on Gramscian hegemony

In part the problem with neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to hegemony is that the theories seem to sideline the intrinsic nature and importance of hegemony as a structure with an 'ownership' that may embrace a range of countries that agree on a particular vision for the system. Kindleberger's distinction between domination and leadership is critical. Hegemony is considerably more complicated than is sometimes suggested by mainstream neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches.²⁴ Indeed, Kindleberger's emphasis on leadership points to the significance of ideas for hegemony, phrased in his terms as the elaboration of a particular vision for the international political economy. Ideas are not, of course, enough; a willingness to devote resources – intellectual, economic and security – towards the construction, implementation and dissemination of this vision is also needed. Significantly for the Brazilian case, this approach opens major space for a creative and coordinating actor to gather the support of other actors for the construction of a hegemony without having to possess a clear level of economic or military dominance.

The implications of Kindleberger's prioritization of leadership are not far from the Gramscian definition of hegemony offered by Fontana: 'the unity of knowledge and action, ethics and politics, where such a unity, through its proliferation and

concertization throughout society, becomes the way of life and the practice of the popular masses'.²⁵ This sentiment is aptly translated directly to the realm of international affairs by Cox, who sees hegemony as existing when:

the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading social classes but at the same time offer some measure of prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful.²⁶

At the heart of a Gramscian conception is a vision that frames the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist domination in terms of co-option and cooperation, not coercion. The argument is that if coercion must be exercised to maintain control, the relationship is one of the domination Kindleberger decried, not the hegemony or leadership he advocated.²⁷

The innovation offered by Cox lies in the importance accorded to the central actors, in this case the state. In the approaches advanced by such differing scholars as Keohane, Gilpin, Krasner and Pedersen ideas become a device used to constrain the actions of potential challengers, implying that a conceptualization of how the global system operates must be imposed on other states by the dominant power. Cox eschews this state-centric impositional analysis, positing that hegemony is not just an order amongst states, but a 'dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production'.²⁸ Hegemony is thus more than a concept applying solely to interstate political relations. It is an all-embracing system ordering economic, political and social relations within and between countries. While this overarching structure dictates the behaviour of states, it does not necessarily express one state's dominance at any particular given moment in time, but can instead be a structure created through a consensual agreement between multiple states led by a predominant state. It is this aspect that plays neatly into the Brazilian diplomatic tradition of leading by providing ideas, suggestions, draft negotiating texts and sustained, calm discussion of potentially contentious topics. Space is opened for predominant states such as Brazil to launch hegemonic projects on a regional basis or to use regional leadership as a lever to push on the global hegemony.

In the hands of Gramsci, and subsequently Cox, the concept of hegemony acquires a sense of power significantly more subtle than in the coercive suggestions outlined above. As Gramsci noted:

The fact of hegemony undoubtedly presupposes that the interests and strivings of the groups over which the hegemony will be exercised are taken account of, that a certain balance of compromises be formed, that, in other words, the leading group makes some sacrifices of an economico-corporative kind; but it is also undoubtedly that these sacrifices and compromises cannot concern essentials, since if the hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, it must have its foundations in the decisive function that the leading group exercises in the decisive sphere of economic activity.²⁹

Unlike the situation described by Keohane, a Gramscian conception of hegemony focuses more upon the very Brazilian diplomatic ideas of inclusion and co-option rather than imposition. Emphasis is placed squarely upon the construction of a consensual order where the dominant party or hegemon formulates a specific conceptualization for the shape of economic, political and social relations. Arrighi builds on this understanding, characterizing hegemony as an additional level of power that a dominant state accumulates when it is able to articulate and implement an ordering of the system that is perceived as being in the universal interest.³⁰

The construction of a hegemonic system is thus not the expression of dominance anathema to Brazilian diplomats. Instead, it effectively comes from the strength of Itamaraty, being the product of discussion and negotiation about how affairs should be ordered, bounded by the proviso that the fundamental economic interests of the dominant group will not be compromised, which draws in dependency theory notions of transnational class alliances and notions of implicit coercion through exclusion.³¹ The dominant group will go to the extent of making minor or tangential sacrifices, even in the economic realm, in order to co-opt the subordinate, creating a system of political economy which subtly, yet indelibly, commits the subaltern to preserving the hegemony for what at first glance may appear self-interested reasons.³² It is not the latent threat of coercion in the guise of domination that maintains the hegemony established by the dominant group, but the 'ethico-political' construct that causes the subaltern to identify its self-interest with the perpetuation of the existing hegemony.

Of course, there remains the question of how a potential leader such as Brazil can gain the active consent of the led. Femia usefully observes that hegemony is attained and maintained through a diffuse network of direct and indirect cognitive and institutional structures. It is the ability, seen in Brazil's repeated attempts at region formation, of the dominant to systematize and induce the subordinate to internalize an ideational approach to order that is the key to establishing hegemony.³³ A hegemon must articulate its project in such a manner that subordinate groups willingly embrace the core elements of the hegemonic order as being not only a shared set of interests, but also a legitimate ordering of economic, political and social relations.³⁴ The consequent psychological weight, conscious or subconscious, of the widespread perception of the hegemon's legitimacy creates an order undergirded by an agreement on shared values, priorities and objectives so strong that the hegemony is able to not only withstand assault from potentially disruptive elements, but also internalize and subsume divergent positions in a manner that causes dissent to strengthen, rather than weaken, the structure.³⁵

Towards a non-domineering hegemony

A significant advantage of drawing on Gramsci is that it allows hegemony to be disassociated from a specific actor, establishing hegemony instead as a type of order that includes the different actors and social groups within the system under examination. In simple terms the hegemon might be likened to the role Brazil frequently attempts

to adopt in multilateral discussions: the actor that formulates, organizes, implements and manages the hegemony – the leader – working to ensure that other actors are included in the project as active participants and cajoling those who are reluctant.

Here there is clearly room to return to something approaching the neorealist view. Pedersen's cooperative hegemony suggests that states make an assessment of the larger international situation and reach an agreement about long-term goals and priorities which they will seek to advance through cooperation. In effect, a new pattern of interstate interaction is deliberately constructed by the participating governments, whether it be an initiative by smaller states to control a dominant state, or an attempt by a larger state to prevent other countries from coming under the influence of a competing power.³⁶ An underlying suggestion in Pedersen's argument is that the sharing and discussion of ideas can replace Gilpin's reliance on overwhelming force as the basis for a regionally oriented hegemonic project. Although power-politics is not absent, especially in the suggestion that the larger state seeking to create a cooperative hegemony must absorb some of the associated costs, something more subtle appears to be at work.³⁷ Kindleberger's emphasis on the need for a system of rules to govern international relations combines with Wendt's argument that notions of order and anarchy in international relations are artificial social constructs,³⁸ pointing in a general direction towards the Gramscian idea of hegemony as an overarching project shared by the participating states that exists distinct from a hegemon. In this light it becomes possible to view the new regionalism – a central device in Brazil's post-Cold War foreign policy – as evidence that states prefer order to anarchy, and are willing, in neorealist terms, to needlessly subsume some elements of sovereignty and equality to a marginally more powerful state in order to ensure a stable body of rules and norms of conduct.

Consensual hegemony

While Pedersen's theory of cooperative hegemony provides a valuable contribution to understanding the formation and persistence of regional projects, it suffers from the same weakness as other mainstream approaches to hegemony. Detail on the shifts in power relations is not matched with a discussion of how the internal dynamics of the cooperative hegemony operate on an observable basis. In this respect the continued reliance on a latent sense of coercion and the persistent need for a leading state to absorb a significant quantity of the costs associated with the region leaves unanswered the question of how states such as Brazil that are unwilling to assume the highly visible costs of leadership might still instigate and lead a regional project.

Reflection on Gramsci's approach to hegemony opens space to reconsider how a cooperative hegemonic system might transmute into a consensual hegemony, which decidedly places even the suggestion of domination and coercion deep in the background. Resort to Gramsci allows hegemony to be disassociated from a specific actor, establishing it instead as a type of order that includes the different actors and social groups within the system under examination. The hegemon effectively

becomes the actor that formulates, organizes and manages the hegemony, working to ensure that other actors are included in the project as active participants and assisting in the implementation of the project. While it is possible to return to a neorealist view emphasizing the use of overt domination to establish hegemony, this thinking suggests repression as a regional organizing device, a strategy that would likely cause subaltern parties to look for an alternate order rather than consciously working to defend the basis of their explicit subordination. A more apt description of a hegemon is offered by Arrighi, who observes that, 'a dominant state exercises a hegemonic function if it leads the system of states in a desired direction, and in so doing, is perceived as pursuing a universal interest'.³⁹ If we recall Kindleberger, the critical verb deployed by Arrighi is 'to lead', which while imbuing the mixture of force and consent Cox sees in hegemony,⁴⁰ implies a privileging of ideas by emphasizing the creation of common positions and the articulation of a shared project rather than forcing compliance from others.

A blending of Kindleberger's 'collected goods' approach to hegemony with Gramscian thought makes it clear that the hegemon, or the framer of the hegemonic project, must be prepared and be in a position to provide some of the 'goods' necessary to initiate a hegemony. The deviation from the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches comes in the role that the leader must play after the hegemony is formed. In an extension of Pedersen's model, consensual hegemony sees the hegemonic project ultimately transcending the interests of a particular actor, evolving into a structure amenable to the core interests of the participating groups. While the hegemony will certainly advance some interests more readily and abundantly than others, particularly those of the state that initiated the project, ownership of a consensual hegemony quickly becomes diffuse.

This brings a return to Arrighi's point about the hegemon leading a system of states in a desired direction and opens space for the use of 'hegemonic' language to explain Brazilian foreign policy. The concentration is on the corralling and guiding of participating states towards a shared goal – a South American space in the Brazilian case – not the enforcement and imposition of an order. Gramsci's discussion of interaction between teacher and student makes clear that the relationship is more one of equals than one which perpetuates an interaction of dominant and subaltern. At first the teacher possesses knowledge, passing it on to the student. Gradually, as the student becomes more adept and embedded in the teacher's intellectual world, this relationship changes until the teacher is learning as much, if not more, than the student from the lessons.⁴¹

A similar argument may be applied to international political economy. A would-be consensual hegemon such as Brazil introduces an approach to organizing transnational economic, political and social relations, followed shortly thereafter by a discussion designed to include the aims and aspirations of potentially dissenting elements. While in the initial stages of this process the would-be consensual hegemon may be required to do the majority of the innovating, in later stages it is possible that other actors, having internalized and embraced the priorities and aspirations in question, may autonomously work to advance and entrench the nascent

hegemonic order. Emphasis is on inclusive approaches to leadership, encouraging active participation and contribution from nominally subordinate participants. The remaining coercive element shifts from sanctions for non-compliance to the implicit costs of non-participation or exclusion from the new order, which is in part the very logic that drove the revival of regionalism in the late 1980s.⁴²

In pure consensual hegemony subordination is to the collective project embracing the participating states. Moreover, the criticality of participation from other states acts as a brake on the forming state's ability to use the initial articulation of the hegemony as a device to boldly ensure that its interests are embedded within the structure to the exclusion of potentially competing priorities. While elements of relative capability and national power found in other approaches to hegemony remain important for the launch of the hegemonic project, the significant point about consensual hegemony for the study of international relations, and regionalism in particular, is that it is not dependent upon the potential dominance of one state. Indeed, consensual hegemony explicitly requires the active and willing engagement of other states, suggesting that potential leaders need not have the level of dominance seen in neorealist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches. The shared nature of constructing and maintaining the hegemony, the combining and intermingling of vested interests, means that the provision of 'goods' needed for perpetuation of a particular order can, to a certain extent, be collectivized.

The strength of the consensual hegemony thus comes to rest not just upon the capacity to create and maintain order, but also in the project's ability to aggregate and advance the interests of participating states. Hegemony and hegemon become separate entities: hegemony remains the constant, overarching structure, with the role of hegemon shifting between the embraced states depending on which participant is best able to coordinate and advance a specific aspect of the project.

Brazil as consensual hegemon

While it would be a stretch to claim that Itamaraty consciously and deliberately sought a hegemonic role in South America, the concept of consensual hegemony is very useful for characterizing and explaining the pattern of Brazil's continental relations. The challenge that Brazilian foreign policy makers faced at the end of the Cold War was how existing levels of autonomy and sovereignty could be maintained.⁴³ In addition to coping with changes caused by the end of the bipolar global order, the acceleration of globalization and US disengagement raised the prospect that Brazil would become an isolated actor in the South. Alternatives were needed to the traditional route of framing the country's international insertion either in terms of close approximation to the US or a version of third worldism. The solution that was eventually reached was to advance what amounts to a sub-regional consensual hegemony in the form of South America as a self-evident geopolitical and geo-economic space distinct from the more diffuse idea of Latin America.⁴⁴

Discussions of the new regionalism are clear that region formation was a strategy followed by states to prevent marginalization in the changing global political economy.⁴⁵ The problem for a country with limited economic resources such as Brazil is that successful region formation is greatly facilitated if one or two participating states are willing to absorb a substantial portion of the costs of forming the regional bloc,⁴⁶ something Brazil had demonstrated during the 1980s that it was both unable and unwilling to do.⁴⁷ A similar pattern emerged in Mercosur, the Common Market of the South comprised initially of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, as well as an expansion of that bloc into the Community of South American Nations (CASA), renamed UNASUR, or the Union Sudamericana, in 2007.⁴⁸ Matters reached a head in 2005 during an Arab–South American leaders summit hosted by Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Chile’s president Ricardo Lagos quietly absented himself from the proceedings soon after they began with the quiet observation that little of significance was likely to occur; Argentine president Nestor Kirchner stormed away from the meeting room with loud complaints about Brazil’s unwillingness to shoulder the costs of leading.⁴⁹

Rather than resorting to the sort of overt and direct economic and security pressure found in neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to hegemony as the basis for forming a South American space, an indirect and consensual approach was taken that drew on the interrelation of ideas, economic factors and overarching security concerns. The imperative was not to subsume other regional states to Brazilian will, but instead to cycle the region-forming process through Brazil and position the country’s propositions and prerogatives as the central unifying factor of a potential South American region. How Brazil went about this requires at least an outline understanding of the sub-components of hegemony. As Payne has noted, the closest that the international relations or international political economy literature comes to a vivisection of hegemony is Strange’s model of structural power,⁵⁰ which will be modified here to provide three main ‘parts’ to hegemony: ideas, economics and security.

The ‘ideas’ of the consensual hegemony

Because Brazil was either unwilling or unable to absorb the economic and security costs of creating a hegemony, a different currency was needed to draw the other 12 continental countries to the South American project. Itamaraty’s response was to extend its long-standing focus on sovereignty and autonomy to the continental level, wrapping it around core regional concerns. The focus was thus placed on the protection of democracy, the interpretation of liberal economics in a manner that would facilitate rapid economic growth, and regionalized responses to the challenges of globalization. These factors were woven together to present national development and democratic consolidation as being not only mutually interdependent, but also grounded in the regional and global context.⁵¹ Familiar arguments such as the asymmetric nature of North–South trade remained in place, but with a qualitatively different response. Where the traditional structuralist-inspired reaction had been to

seek a form of autarkic economic development through inward-looking regional development plans, initiatives that effectively collapsed into the protectionist policies of import-substitution from the 1960s to 1970s, the regionalist vision proposed by Brazil was grounded in the neostructuralist approach articulated in the 1990s by the Santiago-based UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.⁵²

A new interpretation of the world was spun, with notions of dependency and exploitation being replaced with concerns about the centripetal and centrifugal pressures of globalization.⁵³ In public policy terms the challenge was to ensure that the socio-economic fabric of society was not torn asunder either by global competitive pressures or by an inward-looking isolationist and nationalist response. The ideological foundation of the consensual hegemony that Itamaraty presented in response was to revive the regionalist movement in South America, but in a pragmatic manner by expanding the *Avança Brasil* programme to the whole of the continent. Borders were to become 'frontiers of cooperation', not zones of separation. The substance of this idea came at the 2000 Brasília Summit of South American Presidents, where the growth and economic structural sophistication precipitated by Mercosur was used as a precedent for establishing the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (www.iirsa.org). At the core of IIRSA lies a network of energy, transportation and ICT corridors linking the continent's economic centres. While the idea is to encourage enhanced interaction and growth along these corridors by planning and in some cases building the necessary infrastructure as a stimulus, the geography of South America also means that the resultant network of linkages will resemble a spider's web, with Brazil filling its centre.

Two ideas sit at the centre of regionalist projects such as Mercosur and IIRSA, each explicitly working to advance what Itamaraty sees and sells as Brazil's and the wider region's interests. The first can be condensed into a sense of collective economic security and market magnetism. Building a South American project, particularly through multilateral economic deals within South America, served two purposes. First, as will be discussed later, it reformed regional economic geography in a way that provided not only Brazilian, but also other regional, firms with sustainable markets for value-added products. Second, it reshaped North–South relations, allowing the participating countries to negotiate with Northern states on a more equal basis.⁵⁴ This was particularly important in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiating process where Brazil was able to form and sustain a coalition advancing a very different approach to hemispheric free trade than that advocated by the US.⁵⁵ The expanded markets created by the regional initiatives worked as a magnet to attract the FDI needed to revitalize regional industries, generate employment and bring new production technology and processes.⁵⁶ Both of these factors allowed for a more cushioned opening to the global economy. For its part Brazil not only used the allure of the internal Mercosur market as a lever to pursue a heterodox interpretation of liberal economic policies,⁵⁷ including the maintenance of a 35 per cent bloc common external tariff and the maintenance of state-owned and semi-privatized corporations, but also as a platform to internationalize its industries as a stepping stone to global competitiveness.

The second idea – multilateralism – ties the developmentalist ethos of the regionalist instruments back to the substance of consensual hegemony. In each case the regional tools used to push a collectivized response to international pressures took a multilateral form predicated on discussion and inclusion. Irrespective of Brazil's capacity to impose a particular interpretation or course of action through Mercosur, CASA or IIRSA, Itamaraty deliberately sought to dispel suggestions that it had a particularistic agenda by loudly pursuing a programme of consensus creation in South America. In the case of responses to FTAA proposals and the evolution of IIRSA the power Brazil exerted was through the proposition of the initial ideas and the subsequent guiding of discussions.⁵⁸ This pattern was later copied on the international stage, where Brazil positioned itself as one of the key actors in the WTO Doha round negotiations by leading the G20 group of developing countries with detailed, technical, ideas-based and inclusive position formation.⁵⁹

The result was an ideational package that offered subscribing countries enhanced international insertion into the global economy as well as overhauled physical infrastructure with easier funding through agencies such as the Inter-America Development Bank, Fonplata and, significantly, the Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES). For Brazil the costs were minor, consisting mostly of the coordination of multilateral meetings and sustained dialogue designed to inculcate a 'South America first' vision throughout the continent. On a traditional power analysis level the ideas aspect of the Brazilian consensual hegemony initiative can at best be categorized as a partial success. But the analysis changes if consideration is given to the advent of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas launched by Venezuela's Hugo Chávez. South America as an organizing construct and basis for a consensual hegemony did gain considerable traction, leading to a competition between Brazil and Venezuela during Lula's second presidential term to define what exactly South America was about and how it should operate.

The 'economics' of consensual hegemony

The significant thing about the ideational basis of the regionalist thrust at the heart of the Brazilian consensual hegemonic project was that it involved extremely little in the way of direct economic costs for Brazil. Guarantees and costly commitments were noticeable for their absence. Instead, regional groupings such as Mercosur and the attempt to build upon IIRSA with CASA and later UNASUR emphasized opportunities. Clearly, these options offered major contributions to Brazil's economic growth. For example, funding released by the BNDES for projects throughout South America came with the rider that much of the money must be spent on Brazilian goods and services, benefiting companies such as the São Paulo-based construction combine Odebrecht. But the inclusive element remained, with the proposed consensual hegemonic project also providing access to affordable financing, expertise and new technology that would not otherwise have been available.

The economic opportunities created also served to both strengthen and problematize the South American consensual hegemonic project. Brazil used the expanded

market of Mercosur to improve economies of scale and attract the expertise and new technology needed to internationalize the national economy in a global direction, resulting in record trade surpluses in 2004 and 2005. In contrast, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay responded to Mercosur by sending even more exports to Brazil.⁶⁰ The development choices made by these countries effectively propagated a self-generated dependency on the Brazilian market, which brought enormous economic shocks when the Brazilian real was devalued in January 1999, automatically inflating the price of goods from other bloc members by a factor of three.⁶¹

The concentration on the Brazilian market was at least tacitly encouraged by a long-standing Brazilian policy of reorienting specific aspects of the country's imports. From the mid-1980s a clear decision was made to redress a soaring trade surplus with Argentina by increasing wheat imports from that country. A similar phenomenon occurred in the energy sector, where a conscious decision was made to turn energy dependency into an economic lever by sourcing electricity, gas and oil from Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela.⁶² By the time energy self-sufficiency in terms of reserves had been achieved at the end of the Cardoso presidency, supply of the Brazilian market had become critical to the economies of Paraguay and Bolivia, the latter receiving 24 per cent of tax revenue and 18 per cent of GDP in 2005 solely from the activities of Brazil's massive state oil company Petrobras.⁶³ While less marked, the pressures that Argentine industrialists faced with each hiccup in the bilateral relationship with Brazil prompted sustained pressure in Buenos Aires to ease persistent discord in the wake of the 1999 real devaluation.⁶⁴

What gets overlooked in these macro-level statistics is the substance of the trade. Where exports to the world were dominated by primary products, the patterns of exchange pushed by Brazil's regionalist thrust created large flows of value-added products, with manufactured as a percentage of total exports to the continent often being two to three times higher than to global markets.⁶⁵ Itamaraty was effectively guiding a series of commercial fifth columns,⁶⁶ seeking to orient domestic interests in other South American countries towards Brazil and the continent as a method for bolstering the consensual project of South America as a distinct geopolitical and geoeconomic space. Growing economic stability in Brazil deepened this policy after 2001, with Brazilian FDI to the region growing steadily to include such major acquisitions as Argentine breweries and oil companies. More significant was the role of the BNDES EXIM export financing facility, which was combined with IIRSA infrastructure projects to provide financing for work throughout the continent.

Again, there are deep cracks in the suggestion that Brazilian attempts at reorienting continental economic activity to support the South American project were at best only partially successful. Mercosur, the trade bloc at the heart of Brazil's vision, is riven with internal disputes, long lists of exceptions, very vocal complaints from Paraguay and Uruguay about unfair treatment, and apparent moves by Uruguay to disengage from the grouping and follow Chile's model of unilateral opening. More troubling is the reality of the region's economic geography, which puts significant physical barriers between the widely separated centres of economic activity.⁶⁷ Yet these same disputes also point to a marked degree of success in creating the

economic basis of the consensual hegemony. After all, complaints about market access and trade restrictions as seen in South America stem from disruptions to trade flows. The importance of investment flows and financing as a device for building the consensual hegemony is further underlined by the emerging competition between Venezuela's state oil company PDVSA and Brazil's Petrobras for oil and gas investment opportunities throughout the region. Chávez's persistent attempts to invest in any corporate or financial opportunity in South America as part of his effort to give his statist ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) vision wider traction over the Brazilian market-based approach again points to a degree of solidity and substance in the notion of South America as a distinct geopolitical and geoeconomic space.

The 'security' of consensual hegemony

Aversion to the fiscal costs of underwriting the economics of the South American regional arrangements were also apparent on the security front. Fortunately for the consensual hegemonic project emanating from Itamaraty, the security challenges found in South America are very much of an internal nature; transnational armed conflict is a rarity in the continent. The pattern of Brazilian conduct in the security aspect of the consensual hegemony was largely one of forcefully defending the critical norms of democracy and sovereignty, mostly through strong words. Actions, particularly of the impositional variety, were in rather shorter supply, taking place only when a failure to intervene would actively retard or collapse Brazil's larger foreign policy goals.⁶⁸ In this respect the 1995 decision to arbitrate an end to the Ecuador–Peru war is justified because the persistence of armed interstate conflict within South America would have automatically precluded any notion of a viable continental region.⁶⁹ The 2004 decision to lead the UN mission in Haiti follows a similar logic. With the latest Haitian crisis taking place in the midst of UN Security Council reform discussions, Brazil was all but forced to take a leadership role in a hemispheric security crisis if its bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat were to retain any credibility.

The cases of the Ecuador–Peru war and UN intervention in Haiti stood out as exceptions. On the democratic preservation norm, a central requirement for membership in both Mercosur and CASA, decisive action was somewhat more tepid, reflecting an active desire to avoid the sense of domination and coercion central to mainstream approaches to hegemony. Indeed, whenever possible Brazil framed its actions and reactions through collective bodies such as the Rio Group, Mercosur, the OAS or CASA. In the 34 substantive democratic disruptions that took place in the Americas between 1990 and 2006, Brazilian reaction only approached substantive intervention in the case of Paraguay in 1996, when the country was threatened with isolation if it left the democratic path,⁷⁰ and Bolivia in 2004 and 2005, when Brazilian diplomats and presidential advisors constantly ferried between the two countries to ensure that the gas supply to Brazil was not cut off.⁷¹ The 2000 toppling of Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador was met with almost total silence, and the questionable

electoral procedures that returned Alberto Fujimori to office in Peru later that year were accepted as being broadly legitimate. Indeed, in the Peruvian case Brazil went so far as to actively block OAS attempts to censure the vote, arguing that it was an internal matter discrete to Peru and that an extra-regional body should not have the power to annul the ballot.⁷² Reaction to the 2002 coup against Hugo Chávez appeared forceful, but in reality amounted to little more than a call for the restoration of constitutional order,⁷³ a statement that was issued first through the Rio Group before being repeated by Cardoso and Brazil's diplomats.

An absence of active intervention by Brazil in support of democracy should not be confused with ambivalence to the survival of that form of governance. Brazil was strongly committed to the idea of democracy as being the only legitimate form of political organization, with the proviso that the institutional shape and operation of a democracy is a matter for internal political debate, not external imposition.⁷⁴ Indeed, democracy and the preservation of democratic forms were effectively positioned as the central security guarantees within the consensual hegemony of South America as a distinct geopolitical and geoeconomic space. By consistently and strongly demanding that sovereignty of democratic practices and wider national autonomy be respected in South America Itamaraty was able to achieve two things. First, it was able to provide an effective and sometimes troublesome brake on US activities in the area, particularly with respect to narco-trafficking and guerrilla activity. While the transnational nature of these issues was acknowledged, the solution was explicitly framed in terms of the need for bilateral and multilateral cooperation stemming from inclusive and respectful discussion. This made it clear that security operations were the preserve of national governments, not supranational organizations or extra-continental actors.⁷⁵ Second, the call for cooperation and a pooling of national capacities that would see each country deal with internal issues on its own meant that Brazil need not risk invoking nationalist responses from neighbouring countries in response to possible extra-territorial operations of Brazilian police and military forces. Moreover, Brazil would not have to pay for components of these cooperative ventures that took place outside the national territory.

Conclusion

At the core of the consensual hegemonic project was an attempt to precipitate a process of region formation in South America centred on Brazil, using the collected strengths of the continent's individual states as a platform to improve Brazilian and South American insertion into the international system, thereby offering some protection to national autonomy. The project was subtle in design and sweeping in scope, seeking to unite such seemingly disparate issues as trade, physical infrastructure integration, traditional security, democracy protection, new security issues and international cooperation. When viewed from a neorealist or neoliberal institutionalist perspective the consensual hegemonic project was definitely of limited success. It has been persistently criticized and attacked by South American leaders,

with Brazil's leading role in the venture at times coming in for particularly virulent attack. But when viewed through the Gramsci-informed lens of this article the interpretation changes. Brazil's role in the consensual hegemonic project attributed to Itamaraty has been consistently critiqued in terms of what exactly the structure of South America is in geopolitical and socioeconomic terms. More to the point, as of the writing of this article Venezuela's Chávez was engaged in a sustained effort to wrest directing control of the South American consensual hegemonic project away from Brazil, using oil-funded realist tactics and fiery rhetoric as his lever.

In theoretical terms the Brazilian example outlined here is significant because it gives credence to the suggestion set out in this article that a measure of hegemony can be created without domination. The concept of consensual hegemony advanced in this article minimizes the coercive aspects associated with domination, focusing instead on a Gramsci-inspired vision that privileges the creation of consensus through the constructive inclusion of potentially competing priorities and the shaping of common positive outcomes. At the heart of the consensual hegemony approach lies a lost element of disciplinary theory, namely a clear separation between the concepts 'hegemon' and 'hegemony', which creates a lexicographical slippage in the international relations and international political economy literature that has sometimes resulted in hegemony being equated with a specific domineering actor. By clearly identifying the hegemon as the actor that seeks to establish a particular order, or hegemony, it becomes possible to view a hegemonic project as an inclusive system that need not be predicated on the latent or explicit threat that one actor will exercise domineering force. The inclusive approach inherent in consensual hegemony opens new space for understanding how regionally important, but less-than-dominant, countries such as Brazil can effectively fashion foreign policies designed to advance national priorities on an international level by mobilizing region-wide collective action. Indeed, it suggests that regional and global systems can be created through the cooperation of a number of actors, with coordination of the project switching from actor to actor as circumstances require. Such an approach opens new space for understanding how emerging market countries are acting in the global system, something arguably already evident in the WTO Doha round negotiations, not just the South American case outlined here.

Notes

- 1 The author is grateful to Shaun Breslin, Jean Daudelin, Andrew Hurrell, Isabelle Palad, Nicola Phillips, Matias Spektor and the journal's anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier iterations of this article. Research for this article was partially supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
- 2 A more detailed accounting of Brazil's post-Cold War foreign policy can be found in Sean W. Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, forthcoming).
- 3 Raúl Bernal-Meza, 'A Política Exterior do Brasil: 1990–2002', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 45(1), 2002, pp. 36–71; Amado Luiz Cervo, 'Relações Internacionais do Brasil: Um Balanço da Era Cardoso', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 45(1), 2002, pp. 5–35; Thomas Guedes da Costa, *Brazil in the New Decade: Searching for a Future* (Washington, DC:

- Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000); Thomas Guedes da Costa, 'Strategies for Global Insertion: Brazil and its Regional Partners', in Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach (eds), *Latin America in the New International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Luiz Felipe Lampreia and Ademar Seabra da Cruz Junior, 'Brazil: Coping with Structural Constraints', in Justin L. Robertson and Maurice A. East (eds), *Diplomacy and Developing Nations: Post-Cold War Foreign Policy-Making Structures and Processes* (London: Routledge, 2005); Henrique Altemani de Oliveira, *Política Externa Brasileira* (São Paulo: Editora Saraiva, 2005); Leticia Pinheiro, *Política Externa Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2004); Paulo Fagundes Vizontini, *Relações Internacionais do Brasil: de Vargas a Lula* (São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2003).
- 4 Anthony Payne, 'US Hegemony and the Reconfiguration of the Caribbean', *Review of International Studies*, 20(2), 1996, pp. 150–4; Arthur A. Stein, 'The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order', *International Organization*, 38(2), 1984, p. 356.
 - 5 Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973/1989), p. 11.
 - 6 Kindleberger, *The World in Depression*, p. 289.
 - 7 Payne, 'US Hegemony and the Reconfiguration of the Caribbean', p. 151.
 - 8 Charles P. Kindleberger, 'Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides', *International Studies Quarterly*, 25(2), 1981, p. 242.
 - 9 Stephen D. Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', *World Politics*, 28(3), 1976, p. 322.
 - 10 Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 24.
 - 11 Timothy J. McKeown, 'Hegemonic Stability Theory and the 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe', *International Organization*, 37(1), 1983, p. 74.
 - 12 Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 24.
 - 13 Michael C. Webb and Stephen B. Krasner, 'Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment', *Review of International Studies*, 15, 1989, p. 183.
 - 14 Duncan Snidal, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory', *International Organization*, 39(4), 1985, p. 579.
 - 15 CIA, 'Probable Developments in Brazil', National Intelligence Estimate NIE-86 (4 December 1953); CIA, 'Short-Term Prospects for Brazil Under Goulart', Special National Intelligence Estimate 93-2-61 (7 December 1961); Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Andrew Nickson, 'Tyranny and Longevity: Stroessner's Paraguay', *Third World Quarterly*, 10(1), 1988, pp. 237–59.
 - 16 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. Marjory Mattingly Urquidí (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
 - 17 Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945).
 - 18 Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', p. 322.
 - 19 Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*; Cristóbal Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment* (London: Routledge, 1989).
 - 20 Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 9–10, 136.
 - 21 Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 178.
 - 22 Susan Strange, *States and Markets*, 2nd edn (London: Pinter, 1994).
 - 23 Robert O. Keohane, 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in the International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977', in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and Alexander L. George (eds), *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).
 - 24 Kindleberger, 'Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy'.
 - 25 Benedetto Fontana, *Hegemony and Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 5.
 - 26 Robert W. Cox, *Production Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of Modern History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 7.
 - 27 Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method', in Robert W. Cox with Timothy Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 127.
 - 28 Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations', p. 137.
 - 29 Antonio Gramsci, 'The Modern Prince', in Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings*, trans. Louis Marks (New York: International Publishers, 1957), pp. 154–5.

- 30 Giovanni Arrighi, 'The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism', in Stephen Gill (ed.), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 149–50.
- 31 Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependency and Development*; Kay, *Latin American Theories*.
- 32 Stephen Gill and David Law, *The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 77.
- 33 Joseph V. Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 24, 219.
- 34 Augelli and Murphy, 'Gramsci and International Relations', p. 130; Fontana, *Hegemony and Power*, pp. 20–1.
- 35 Gramsci, 'The Modern Prince', pp. 154–5; Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought*, pp. 37–9; Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations', pp. 127–9.
- 36 Thomas Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in Regional Integration', *Review of International Studies*, 28, 2002, pp. 684–5.
- 37 Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony', p. 695.
- 38 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, 46(2), 1992, pp. 391–425.
- 39 Arrighi, 'The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism', p. 150.
- 40 Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations', p. 127.
- 41 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), pp. 349–50.
- 42 Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), chapter 10.
- 43 Lampreia and Cruz, 'Brazil'. Itamaraty, Subsecretaria-Geral de Planejamento Político e Econômico, *Reflexões sobre a Política Externa Brasileira* (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão/Instituto de Pesquisas de Relações Internacionais), unpublished working document, 1993.
- 44 Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, *Celso Amorim (depoimento, 1997)* (Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2003); Celso Lafer, 'Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future', *Daedalus*, 129(2), 2000, pp. 207–38; Celso Lafer, *A Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a Política Externa Brasileira: Passado, Presente e Futuro* (São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, 2001).
- 45 Jean Grugel and Wil Hout, 'Regions, Regionalism and the South', in Jean Grugel and Wil Hout (eds), *Regionalism across the North–South Divide: State Strategies in the Semi-periphery* (London: Routledge, 1999); Samir Amin, 'Regionalization in Response to Polarizing Globalization', in Björn Hettne, András Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds), *Globalism and the New Regionalism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Marjan Svetlicic, 'Challenges of Globalisation and Regionalisation in the World Economy', *Global Society*, 10(2), 1996, pp. 107–23; Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, 'The New Wave of Regionalism', *International Organization*, 53(3), 1999, pp. 589–627.
- 46 Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- 47 Luigi Manzetti, 'Argentine–Brazilian Economic Integration: An Early Appraisal', *Latin American Research Review*, 25(3), 1990, pp. 109–40; Renato Baumann and Juan Carlos Lerda (eds), *Brasil-Argentina-Uruguai: A Integração em Debate* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1987).
- 48 Alcides Costa Va, *Cooperação, Integração e Processo Negociador: A Construção do Mercosul* (Brasília: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2002); Nicola Phillips, 'Regionalist Governance in the New Political Economy of Development: "Relaunching" the Mercosur', *Third World Quarterly*, 22(4), 2001, pp. 565–83; Jeffrey Cason, 'On the Road to Southern Cone Economic Integration', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 42(1), 2002, pp. 23–42; Sean W. Burges, 'Bounded by the Reality of Trade: Practical Limits to a South American Region', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 18(3), 2005, pp. 437–54.
- 49 Oxford Analytica, 17 May 2005.
- 50 Payne, 'US Hegemony and the Reconfiguration of the Caribbean'; Strange, *States and Markets*.
- 51 Roberto Abdenur, 'Política Externa e Desenvolvimento', *Política Externa*, 3(3), 1994, p. 51.
- 52 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'O Brasil e um novo America do Sul', *Valor Econômico*, 30 August 2000; José Antonio Ocampo and Juan Martin, *Globalization and Development: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
- 53 Rubens Antonio Barbosa, 'O Brasil e Suas Opções Internacionais: A Articulação Entre o Universal e o Regional', *Política Externa*, 3(3), 1994, pp. 101–16.

- 54 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'O Impacto da Globalização nos Países em Desenvolvimento: Riscos e Oportunidades', speech given at the Colegio de México, Mexico City, 20 February 1996; Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Mário Soares, *O Mundo em Português: Um Diálogo* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1998), pp. 257–63; Celso Lafer, 'Comércio Internacional, Multilateralismo e Regionalismo: Temas Emergentes e Novas Direções', *Política Externa*, 5(3), 1996, pp. 50–64.
- 55 Fernando Simas Magalhães, *Cúpula das Américas de 1994: Papel Negociador do Brasil, em Busca de uma Agenda Hemisférica* (Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco/Fundação Alexandre Gusmão/Centro de Estudos Estratégicos, 1999).
- 56 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'Speech by the President of the Republic, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, at the Opening Ceremony of the Sixth Economic Summit of Mercosur, Rio Palace Hotel – Rio de Janeiro', 2000; Gilson Schwartz, 'The Privatization Process and Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil: Results and Perspectives', *International Spectator*, 33(3), 1998, pp. 69–84.
- 57 Susan M. Cunningham, 'Made in Brazil: Cardoso's Critical Path from Dependency via Neoliberal Options and the Third Way in the 1990s', *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 67, 1999, pp. 75–86; Nicola Phillips, *The Southern Cone Model: The Political Economy of Regional Capitalist Development* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- 58 Sean W. Burges, 'Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America during the Cardoso Era, 1992–2002', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25(1), 2006, pp. 23–42.
- 59 Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie, 'The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO', *The World Economy*, 27(7), 1994, pp. 947–66; author interviews with WTO trade negotiators from various countries, Geneva, 17–20 April 2007.
- 60 M. Anaam Hashmi, 'Role of Mercosur in Regional Trade Growth', *Managerial Finance*, 26(1), 2000, pp. 41–52.
- 61 Phillips, 'Regionalist Governance in the New Political Economy of Development'; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 4 February 1999.
- 62 BNDES, *Petrobrás. Cadernos de Infra-Estrutura: Fatos – Estratégias*, no. 9 (Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, October 1998); Francisco Mauro Brasil de Holanda, *O Gás no Mercosul: Uma Perspectiva Brasileira* (Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco/FUNAG/Centro de Estudos Estratégicos, 2001).
- 63 *O Estado de São Paulo*, 14 January 2006.
- 64 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin American Report (FBIS-LAT) 1999-0609.
- 65 Sean W. Burges, 'Bounded by the Realities of Trade', p. 442.
- 66 Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*.
- 67 Burges, 'Bounded by the Realities of Trade'; John Luke Gallup, Alejandro Gaviria and Eduardo Lora (eds), *Is Geography Destiny? Lessons from Latin America* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
- 68 Jean Daudelin and Sean W. Burges, 'Brazil: How Realists Defend Democracy', in Thomas Legler, Sharon F. Lean and Dexter S. Boniface (eds), *Promoting Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).
- 69 Monica Herz and João Pontes Nogueira, *Ecuador vs. Peru: Peacemaking Amid Rivalry*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Luiz Felipe Lampreia, personal interview, Rio de Janeiro, 23 September 2002.
- 70 Arturo Valenzuela, 'Paraguay: The Coup That Didn't Happen', *Journal of Democracy*, 8(1), 1997, pp. 43–55.
- 71 *O Estado de São Paulo*, 17 May 2005, 8 June 2005; Mercopress, 2 December 2005.
- 72 Cynthia McClintock, 'The OAS in Peru: Room for Improvement', *Journal of Democracy*, 12(4), 2001, pp. 137–40.
- 73 Remarks by Lino Gutierrez, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, to the North–South Center Roundtable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 17 April 2002, available at: www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/9573.htm (accessed 25 November 2007).
- 74 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'Speech on the Occasion of the Official Visit to the Republic of Costa Rica', San José, Costa Rica, 4 April 2000.
- 75 Geraldo Magela da Cruz Qunitão, 'Audiência Pública do Ministro da Defesa na Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional do Senado Federal', 22 November 2000.