

TRAVERSING BOUNDARIES: A PUBLIC POLICY APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY

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THIS article traverses boundaries in two different senses: the conceptual division between foreign and other policy, and the political dividing line between the United States and Mexico. The ideas and frameworks used by scholars of public policy and foreign policy have remained separate even though complex interdependence has come to characterize world politics, and the line between domestic and international affairs has blurred (Hanreider 1970; Keohane and Nye 1977). Public policy scholars have mainly focused on domestic issues and rarely upon foreign policy. For their part, foreign policy scholars have noted and developed theories about the extent to which domestic politics has become mixed with international relations but have not generally utilized public policy categories and insights. This gap in analysis is unfortunate for the understanding of foreign policies with strong domestic implications. Among such policies are those related to bi-national problems arising between nations that share a boundary.

The two thousand mile long boundary between the United States and Mexico has a profound impact on U.S. policy toward Mexico which causes it to be different from U.S. policy concerning most other nations except, perhaps, Canada. United States/Mexico relations present an extreme example of complex interdependence, where multiple channels link societies, multiple issues exist that are not arranged in any clear or consistent hierarchy, and military force is not used as an instrument of foreign policy (Keohane and Nye 1977: 24-29).

Reflecting this multifaceted and complex relationship between the two countries, U.S. policy toward Mexico generally has lacked coherence and consistency (Bagley 1981). However, no conceptual framework yet exists to order and explain how and why a variety of policies arise. The large body of literature on border studies is especially rich in explaining social and political behavior, and in documenting the handling of specific issues through individual case studies. U.S./Mexico scholars have found it difficult, however, to derive general rules that explain the particulars of inconsistent U.S. policy.

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The purpose of this article is to link together the work done in the areas of domestic public policy and foreign policy, and to apply it to a case involving U.S./Mexico bi-national relations. By doing so policy-making theory can be advanced and U.S. policy toward Mexico can be better understood.

Employing central concepts in the study of public policy, this article presents a framework for explaining the domestic political process of making foreign policy, including the domestic actors involved and their relationships. The utility of this framework is illustrated by application to U.S. foreign policy toward Mexico in the specific case of smelter air pollution. To accomplish these tasks, it is useful to begin by reviewing the manner in which previous public policy and foreign policy scholars have conceptualized the process of foreign policy-making.

Public Policy

As a subfield in political science, public policy is concerned with the pattern of actions (or inaction) directed at social problems or goals, and considerable progress has been made in understanding policy content and processes. Public policy scholars have generally stressed the development of concepts that apply to policies with domestic goals and targets, and have treated policies directed at entities outside the nation as either beyond their purview or of peripheral interest. (See, for instance, Dror 1971; Jones 1977; Dye 1972; Wade 1972; Wildavsky 1979.) It is not clear why policy scholars have ignored foreign policy to such an extent. Many issues usually classified as international, such as tariffs, trade, defense, foreign debt management, and immigration, directly impact domestic goals and involve domestic as well as international interests and decisions. Admittedly, some foreign policy issues, for example U.S. military involvement in the Persian gulf or U.S. policy toward NATO, are so dominated by international concerns and institutions that existing public policy approaches and insights are not particularly useful. Setting aside such issues, the majority of foreign policy has a strong domestic dimension which public policy scholars could usefully address.

One of the most important contributions to public policy theory was made by Theodore Lowi (1964) who argued that policy could be treated as an independent variable, and that the perceived or anticipated impacts of policy determine the pattern of politics, including the actors involved and their relationships. Oddly, since Lowi's framework was first articulated in a review of a book about the politics of tariffs (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963), foreign policy was almost entirely set aside in Lowi's early work. Initially he identified three types of policy — distributive, redistributive, and regulatory — each of which could be associated with its own arena of power involving political structure, political process, elites, and group relations (1964: 689-90). In a footnote, Lowi remarked that foreign policy is a fourth category to which he was not extending analysis. He added, "Of course, those aspects of foreign and military policy that have direct domestic implications are included in my scheme" although no such issues were cited as examples (1964: 689).

Foreign policy was directly addressed by Lowi in 1967, and three types of foreign policy which were similar but not identical to domestic types were identified. The critical factors in Lowi's distinctions were whether there was a crisis and whether internal resources were involved. Non-crisis issues involving domestic resources, according to Lowi, are similar in their policy-making processes to domestic regulatory and distributive policy (Lowi 1967: 324). Lowi, however, did not develop a logically interrelated set of variables for analyzing foreign policy arenas similar to the one provided in 1964 for domestic arenas.

In 1972, Lowi added a fourth category called constituent policy to his 1964 classification scheme, and although this category was mainly residual, he described it as having particular relevance to foreign policy. Again in a footnote he remarked that some variation of foreign policy "can be captured in the fourth category, constituent or systems maintenance." He went on to say, "I have argued at length that the so-called foreign policy area actually breaks down into the four types captured in the paradigm. . . . And, as shown with different types of agricultural policy, the politics of each type of foreign policy will vary accordingly" (1972: 310). Examples of such different foreign policy types are not provided, however.

Other scholars building upon the Lowi paradigm have more explicitly treated foreign policy. For Meier (1987: 102), the constituent policy category includes policies that benefit the nation as a whole, such as those affecting national security issues and foreign affairs. Ripley (1985) identifies three types of foreign policy, two of which, strategic and crisis, he says, do not involve domestic interests. The third type, structural, involves the same sort of politics expected in domestic distributive politics. It should be noted that while Meier and Ripley include foreign policy in their frameworks, the predominant focus of their scholarship is upon domestic policies.

A research note by Zimmerman (1973) is the source of the most comprehensive framework thus far in public policy, facilitating both domestic and foreign policy analysis. Zimmerman adopts the Lowian typology, but disagrees with Lowi that the extent of domestic political impact distinguishes some types of foreign policy. He notes that all policies have a domestic impact, and that the key variable is whether that impact is symmetrical, that is, having similar impacts across different interests. Zimmerman says the pattern of politics will fit Lowi's domestic typology depending on whether the domestic impact is symmetrical or asymmetrical and whether there are tangible or intangible goods involved. Zimmerman's note was intended to be suggestive, an invitation for policy scholars to make further refinements and applications which so far have not taken place.

Foreign Policy

While in the past foreign policy scholarship tended to focus on the actions taken by executives in the international arena, currently the study of domestic influences on foreign policy is a growing field of study. A

wealth of analysis has been performed on the roles of particular domestic political institutions and forces in foreign policy-making, including Congress (Pastor 1980), bureaucracy (Rourke 1972), states (Duchacek 1984; Soldatos 1986), public opinion (Rosenau 1964; Cohen 1973; Mueller 1973; Milbrath 1967), and interest groups (Bauer et al. 1963; Trice 1976). The focus of these studies is on the institution or force — *not* on the policies they affect and how the various policies are differentially affected by them.

Some public policy concepts have found their way into the study of foreign policy. The contribution of Graham Allison's (1969) study of the Cuban missile crisis has been immense. Allison's models of decision-making were to some extent a brilliant creative synthesis drawing in part on the works of such important "public policy" scholars as Charles Lindblom (1959) and Aaron Wildavsky (1964). The bureaucratic politics model offered by Allison has come to challenge the unified actor model of foreign policy making, and has provided an attractive interpretative framework for many case studies of foreign policy making. For instance, it is employed by Blasier to explain U.S. policies toward revolutionary change in Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Cuba. Much more than pursuit of self-interest or ideology, U.S. policy toward Latin America was driven by domestic political considerations and intra-governmental bargaining which resulted in policy that varied over time as it responded to differing pressures and interests (Blasier 1985: 8).

The bureaucratic model employed by foreign policy scholars in analysis does what many public policy scholars try to do in their models. It develops clear linkages between processes (e.g., bargaining, compromising) and kinds of policies (e.g., "paperclip" policies, deferred action, lowest-common-denominator agreements, etc.) (Herman 1983: 278). However, Lowi's idea of categorizing kinds of policies according to the incidence of impacts has not found its way into studies employing the bureaucratic politics model.

Lowi's most significant theoretical insight, that prospective policies and their perceived impacts *cause* types of politics and policy-making processes, has influenced foreign policy literature to some extent. Several prominent foreign policy scholars have noted that domestic influences on foreign policy do vary with policy issues and have attempted to link types of policy processes to certain issue characteristics. The list of issue characteristics is often neither discriminating nor complete. James Rosenau (1967: 49) recognized the importance of making distinctions among types of foreign policy issues and hypothesized, "The more an issue encompasses a society's resources and relationships, the more it will be drawn into the society's domestic political system and the less will it be processed through the society's foreign political system. "The issue characteristics picked out by Barry Hughes (1978) provide somewhat more refinement. Among the dimensions of issues identified as important to domestic politics are the extent to which security is involved, the importance of economics, and the length of decision time (Hughes, 1978: 200-201).

Issue structure is an important variable determining the extent of complex interdependence between countries according to theory developed by Keohane and Nye (1977). Many bi-national issues are not hierarchically ordered so that the resolution of higher order questions predetermine those of lesser importance. Further, the balance of economic and military power may be irrelevant to these issues. On such issues policy-making processes and results will vary. In such a situation of complex interdependence, a nation like Mexico is able to negotiate successfully with the United States on some issues even though it is the weaker nation. Keohane and Nye do not try to theorize about the characteristics of issues themselves which promote or obstruct hierarchical ordering and linkage to force. Because they are primarily interested in international relations and not in analyzing domestic policy-making processes, they do not pursue the relationship between issue structure and particular patterns of domestic politics (Keohane and Nye 1977).

Traditionally, foreign policy scholars have centered their attention on the policy legitimization stage of the policy cycle, that is when agreements are forged and signed, and have slighted the stages coming before and after. With increased complex interdependence among nations, agenda setting on issues has come to be recognized as much more important (Keohane and Nye 1977: 32). Similarly, the politics of implementation is coming to be recognized as distinct. Lowenthal uses a bureaucratic model to explain the Alliance for Progress, and distinguishes the politics of inception, when a temporary reduction in business influence over policy making occurred, and implementation, when the long-term interest of government agencies and their constituencies were reasserted to subvert original intent (Lowenthal, 1973). Public policy conceptions of stages in the policy cycle are proving useful, although much remains to be done to more fully incorporate them and other public policy insights into the study of foreign policy.

A POLICY TYPOLOGY FOR ANALYZING DOMESTIC ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Issue Types

Lowi's (1964) insight that policy-making processes vary with the characteristics of the issue provides the conceptual starting point in the development of a framework. The anticipated impact of specific policies, with some individuals and groups gaining or losing more than others, causes interests to mobilize politically, and cleavages among interests follow the lines drawn by perceived policy impact. What actors become involved in attempting to influence policy and how these actors relate to one another is a function of the way issues are perceived. Foreign policies are no different from domestic issues in this regard, and anticipated impacts is the critical variable in the typology illustrated in Table 1.

Difference in anticipated policy impacts are a means to separate foreign policy heavily influenced by domestic interests from that which is not. Following Zimmerman's (1973) suggestion, the extent to which impacts are perceived as symmetrical is crucial. When impacts are symmetri-

TABLE 1
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE TYPOLOGY

<i>Distribution of Perceived Impacts</i>	<i>Degree of Domestic Political Impact</i>	<i>Appropriate Analytic Model</i>	<i>Locus of Leadership</i>	<i>Role of State Department</i>	<i>Role of Other Agencies</i>	<i>Role of State Government</i>	<i>Role of Congress</i>	<i>Means of Aggregating & Expressing Interest</i>
Undifferentiated (Crisis)	Low	Rational decision maker	President	Provide diplomatic information & expertise	Department of Defense—security, advice	None	Slight to none	Presidential authority as Chief Diplomat
Undifferentiated (Routine)	Low	Bureaucratic	Bureaucratic officials	Make & implement decision (primary agency)	Consult	None	None	Bureaucratic Hierarchy, Standard Operating Procedures
Differentiated (Geographically based)	High	Distributive politics	Locally based actors	Reflect foreign policy concerns	Conduit of states' interests	Principal actors—claimants	Reflect interest of states or districts	Areal representation; Bipartisan delegations
Differentiated (Economic sectors or interest groups)	High	Pluralist; Interest group conflict or group politics	Interest group leaders	Participant in interagency conflict	Formulators of policy; implementation role	Supplicants (to federal agencies) Role in implementation	Arena for interest group conflict	Competing interest group coalitions—coalition building
Differentiated (Ethnic groups; class; ideology)	High	Ideological; Partisan politics	Presidential parties	Expresses Presidential ideology	Participate in formulation & chief implementers	Slight	Arena for ideological conflict	Conflicting ideologies

cal, costs and benefits are distributed evenly across interests and individuals, and when impacts are asymmetrical, they are unevenly distributed. Where policy is perceived as symmetrical, the classic mode of foreign policy making in which domestic influences are largely absent occurs. This is the kind of foreign policy which has received the most attention from foreign policy scholars such as Rosenau (1967: 24), who remarked,

Foreign Policy deals with events and circumstances outside the system and, being in the environment, these events and circumstances can appear potentially threatening to members of the system. Whatever the differences among the members, they would seem to be minimal compared to the distinctions that set them all apart from the members of other systems that comprise the environment. Fellow system members thus come to be viewed as a "we" who are constantly endangered by a "them." Hence, proposals designed to ward off and manage "them" tap motives that are relatively unfettered by cross-cutting interests and therefore remain undiluted in intensity.

Even among symmetrical foreign policies there are differences in perceived impacts and the resulting policy-making process. The top two rows of Table 1 identify both crisis and routine matters of foreign relations as having symmetrical impact. Crisis sweeps aside whatever differences in domestic opinion may arise, and the President and his advisors are given a free rein in decision making. Often decision making is lifted out of the routines followed in the State Department and occurs in the White House. In contrast, routine diplomatic policy making is handled by standard operating procedures within the State Department, which is supposed to have the appropriate expertise, with little other domestic participation except for whatever special knowledge other federal agencies may have to bring to bear on the substance of policy.

Issues which do not have symmetrical impact can be differentiated on the basis of the kind of interests perceiving impact. Geographical location, as displayed in Row 3, provides one basis. Water policy related to transboundary rivers is an example of asymmetry based on differential geographic impact. The Colorado River Basin and Rio Grande Basin residents perceive a much larger stake in U.S./Mexico water accords than do the residents of other areas. The distributive nature of transboundary water politics has been well documented (Mumme 1984). Some, but not all, tariff bills are perceived as having mainly localized impacts reflecting the interests of industries and workers located in particular areas. When it is a matter of protecting the shoe industry in New England or textiles in the South, distributive politics occurs in setting tariffs. Other tariff issues divide interests along more general economic sectors, generating regulatory rather than distributive politics.

The geographic scope of the impact determines the locus of leadership and the role of state officials and Congress in policy making on matters with geographic asymmetry. Where interests are contained within state boundaries, state governments which reflect the interests of subnational geographic areas are likely to be principal actors. When some ge-

ographical areas gain and other lose, states continue to be important, but regional politics will be played out in Congress with legislators from the same states combining in bipartisan coalitions.

Differential impact upon interests or values provides the basis of the political arena displayed in row 4. Certain trade policies, such as the suspension of duty on some imported items, give economic advantages to particular domestic interests. Policies which divide business and labor, developers and environmentalists, consumers and producers, and so on fit this issue type. Interest groups will seek access to whatever federal agencies and members of Congress are sensitive to their interests, and policies are determined by the clash of interest group coalitions played out in Congress and other institutions.

Policies perceived as affecting certain ideological positions or class structures fit into the arena displayed in the last row of Table 1. The likely economic impacts of policies is of less concern in this type of policy than deference to certain overarching values or world views.

Policy Cycles

Public policy scholars have noted that the politics of each policy vary according to the stage or phase of the policy cycle. The application of the systems approach to political life suggests that policy making can be broken down into a number of separate activities with distinctive products and feedback loops (Dye 1987; Easton 1965; Ripley 1985). The interests and officials who participate in agenda setting have enormous influence since the important decisions, especially in relationships between the United States and weaker nations, are whether and when issues will be addressed. Participants in agenda setting may not be present when policies are actually legitimated but may re-emerge as important actors in implementation, or a different set of actors may take over the execution of policy. Consequently, the policy as applied may have little resemblance to the policy as written.

Table 2 portrays the stages of the policy process for foreign policy issues with differentiated impact and the sets of actors most likely to dominate each stage. Because of the constitutional requirement that foreign relations be conducted by the executive with the advice and consent of the Senate, the executive and Congress dominate the formal, legitimating stage of each policy type. Other actors involved vary considerably according to the type of domestic impact and stage of policy.

Different kinds of issues that have arisen in U.S. relations with Mexico help illustrate Table 2. On an issue with mainly localized geographic impact, such as pollution abatement in the San Diego-Tijuana area, local and state governments take the lead in promoting attention to the issue and exploring alternative solutions. Once an international agreement is reached by federal officials then state and local governments again play active roles in implementing those aspects of the agreement affecting their localities. The controversy over "maquiladoras" or "twin plants," that is factories which take advantage of cheap Mexican labor to assemble materials shipped from elsewhere into products returning to the U.S. duty

TABLE 2
ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE STAGES OF THE POLICY PROCESS FOR FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES WITH DIFFERENTIATED DOMESTIC IMPACTS

<i>How Policy Costs and Benefits are Differentiated</i>	<i>Agenda Setting</i>	<i>Formulation</i>	<i>Legitimation</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
Geographic area or site specific interest	State governments; Local governments	States; Congressional representatives	Executive; Congress	State governments; Local governments
Economic sectors; Interest groups	Economic and other interest groups	Federal agencies; Congressional representatives	Executive; Congress	State governments; Local governments; Federal agencies
Ethnic groups; Social classes; Ideological groups	Class or ethnic groups; Ideological groups; Executive; Political parties; Congress	Federal agencies; Presidential commissions; Executive office of President	Executive; Congress	Federal agencies

free, is illustrative of an issue with asymmetrical impact upon economic sectors. Business interests have sought the support of the Department of Commerce in promoting the operation of these plants. Opposing such efforts, labor organizations concerned about the loss of jobs in the U.S. have reacted by appealing to congressional representatives sensitive to labor interests. After these conflicting policy interests are resolved and an agreement reached by Congress and the executive branch, then implementation of the policy will be left to federal agencies in conjunction with state and local governments.

The policy cycle of issues with differential ideological or class impact, such as immigration or drugs, involves yet a different set of actors. Such issues often are the subject of presidential speeches urging action, and divisions may take place along party lines over legislation formulated in the White House or by special task forces in the executive branch. Ultimately agencies such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the Border Patrol will probably dominate implementation.

In summary, the framework portrayed in Tables 1 and 2 centers on two critical variables: types of interests affected by issues and stages of the policy process. In applying the framework, specific policy issues are first identified according to the domestic interests they affect (e.g., geographic area site specific interest; interest group coalitions; ideology or social class), and then these policy categories are related to patterns of actors and arenas that are characteristic of the policy processes for these issues. Thus, the framework indicates the domestic actors which are more likely to become involved on particular issues (Table 1) and at the different stages of the policy process (Table 2).

In order to test the framework effectively and gauge its usefulness, it should be applied to a range of specific issues of U.S. foreign policy that differentially affect domestic interests. In a preliminary test of the framework, our study here applies it to a particular policy-making case which provides a good example of how domestic interests are affected by foreign policy issues.

U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS: THE CASE OF TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION

A U.S.-Mexico Example

As already suggested, U.S. policies relating to Mexico provide an appropriate and useful example for testing the framework. The complex interdependence which characterizes the relationship between these two countries means that a wide variety of issues connect the countries through multiple formal and informal channels. Furthermore, a great many transboundary issues continue to emerge, most of which are not easily related to national security. As a result, the multitude of actions the U.S. takes toward Mexico involve various domestic interests and tend to be complex and contradictory. As Bagley (1981: 19) has noted:

The United States does not have a single, integrated Mexico policy but rather a weltering variety of changing and often contradictory policies made by a multiplicity of separate and uncoordinated departments, agen-

cies, commissions, and committees at the federal (executive and Congressional branches), state, regional and local levels. Moreover, these various decision making arenas frequently respond to, or are "colonized" by, different and competing constituencies that utilize their privileged access to pressure for policies favorable to their own special interests.

There is no dearth of writings on U.S./Mexico relations. In addition to studies of overall U.S./Mexico relations (Grayson 1984; Purcell 1981), there are those that concentrate on economic relations (Reynolds and Tello 1983; Clement and Green 1984), and specific policy areas such as immigration (Cornelius 1981; Weintraub and Ross 1980). A rich body of literature exists that focuses on U.S./Mexico relations arising directly from these countries' physical adjacency.¹ Studies on the U.S./Mexico border region examine a wide range of specific issues, including land use and development, structure of border communities, border economic relations and development, and social and political relations along the border. Among these border issues, transboundary environmental problems have received considerable attention (see, for example, Sepulveda and Utton 1984; Bath 1986; Jamail and Mumme 1984; Nalven 1984). There have also been some studies on the functioning of particular governmental organizations and institutions in the border region (Schmitt 1983; Chattan 1983).

The literature on U.S./Mexico relations mirrors the variety and disorder of the relations themselves. While there are a number of case studies of single policy areas, there are not many studies that compare relations in different policy areas. The use by authors of public policy concepts or theories is rare. No framework yet exists which attempts to impose some order on the confusing variety of political patterns encountered by analysts.

The policy framework displayed in Tables 1 and 2 suggests a number of propositions which can be tested in the example of U.S. relations with Mexico, such as the following:

Where a geographically based issues is at stake, such as those affecting land, natural resources or a site specific interest, state officials or congressional delegations, as representatives of areal interests, will be paramount actors. State governmental officials will dominate the agenda, blocking consideration of policies detrimental to state interests. The role of the State Department will be to guard, probably ineffectually, foreign policy interests. States and localities will also be key actors in implementation, and policies will be executed to serve state interests.

Where interests at stake cut across particular geographic areas, interest groups will be the key agenda setters on policy areas related to Mexico which they perceive as likely to affect them. Congress will serve as the crucial decision-making arena on such issues, and the impact upon domes-

¹ This literature includes at least two journals devoted specifically to the study of the border area, *The Borderlands Journal* and *Journal of Borderlands Studies*. Several other journals have devoted certain volumes entirely to border issues, such as *New Scholar* (1984, volume 9) and *Natural Resources Journal* (Fall 1986, volume 26, no.4).

tic interest will be the overriding concern. Federal agencies may take conflicting positions, with the State Department being one of the contenders. Domestic rather than foreign policy considerations motivate and shape presidential involvement in issues affecting relations with Mexico. Barring some improbable crisis or matter of strategic international importance, Presidents will assert leadership mainly when domestic ideological and partisan interests are at stake. While international posture such as a good neighbor policy or one to halt communism in Latin America may be important to the President, his position in relation to parties, classes and movements within the U.S. will more often be transcendent.

Transboundary Resources


Within the complex and extensive realm of U.S./Mexico bi-national relations transboundary resource issues offer an ideal set of cases through which to study the involvement of domestic actors in the foreign policy-making process. Along both sides of the U.S./Mexico border economic development and population growth are occurring at a rapid pace, leading to depletion of natural resources and contamination of shared air space and water sources. Because a disproportionate share of the negative consequences of such resource problems falls upon residents of border states, local and state public officials often have a stronger incentive to become involved in problem solving than do federal officials. Thus, as in the case of smelter pollution along the Arizona/Sonora border, an array of state public officials and local citizen and business groups become key participants in the policy-making process.

The "Grey Triangle" Smelter Pollution Case

The first step in applying the framework to the grey triangle smelter pollution case is to identify the issues involved and the distribution of the perceived impacts. The grey triangle case arose as a result of the planned expansion of copper smelter operations in Sonora, Mexico near the international border with Arizona. The expansion of operations at Cananea, Sonora and new smelter facilities at nearby Nacazori would add to the already high levels of sulfur dioxide emitted by the Phelps Dodge smelter at Douglas, Arizona (see Figure 1). The Douglas smelter had been operating on variances from the EPA since the mid-1970s due to its violation of emission standards established in the 1972 Clean Air Act. While the policy issue ultimately was defined as the need to control sulfur dioxide emissions at all three smelters in the Arizona/Sonora border region, it was originally seen in quite different terms by the U.S. copper industry. The grey triangle cases actually entails two policy issues, one involving economic protection of an industry based in mining states, and another concerning an industry/environmental conflict.

Public attention was first drawn to the proposed smelter expansion in Mexico by the U.S. copper industry which feared increased foreign competition in an already depressed world market. When domestic copper producers uncovered plans by the World Bank's International Financial Corporation (IFC), with the approval of the U.S. government, to provide *Compania Minera de Cananea* with a \$450 million financial pack-

The Copper Smelter Triangle



age for an expansion and renovation project, they became angry that the U.S. government would take actions so detrimental to a domestic industry. Officials from the World Bank, the U.S. Treasury, and the State Department supported the loans based on the view that this was a sound economic project which would assist Mexico in its economic development. They saw it as increasing Mexico's self-sufficiency and economic capabilities, not as threatening U.S. producers (Mumme 1984: 7-8).

The detrimental impact on the copper industry would fall mainly upon Western mining states, particularly Arizona. It was natural, therefore, for Congressman James McNulty, whose district included Douglas, to take the lead in constructing an alliance with other legislators from mining states and the United Mine Workers. McNulty and other congresspersons from mining states worked in Congress to halt the IFC package and to approve legislation beneficial to the domestic copper industry (Mumme 1984: 11). Congressional hearings were called in February and May 1983 in an attempt to publicize the issue and gain support for the economic protectionist measures advocated by the copper alliance.

As the issue was first construed, the perceived impacts were related to protecting a domestic industry which contributed substantially to the economic welfare of some states and congressional districts. The politics that evolved was not much different from that observed by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) in tariff legislation, the description of which became the basis for Lowi's distributive policy type in his review essay (1964). However, the copper industry and its friends ran into opposition in pressing their narrowly based interest. A transnational alliance of agencies and interests supported the IFC financial package, including the U.S. Treasury and State Department, the IFC, *Compania Minera de Cananea*, and U.S. engineering and supply firms that would benefit from the expansion of Mexican mining operations (Mumme 1984: 7-8).

In order to strengthen their basis of support, the U.S. mining industry protectionist forces chose to pursue a strategy that Cobb and Elder (1983: 110-29) term issue expansion. They drew attention to the fact that

not only was the economic welfare of mining communities threatened but also public health and environmental quality. The proposed mining facilities in Mexico would substantially increase air pollution in the border area, particularly since they would not be subject to the same strict pollution control requirements as U.S. smelters. The issue expansion strategy was designed to attract allies from environmental groups concerned with protecting public health and air quality along the border and in the scenic areas of Western states. Environmentalists were invited to testify at the May 1983 hearings in Tucson.

As it turned out, these hearings provided the forum the environmentalists had been seeking for years. Instead of concentrating on the increased pollution threat posed by the proposed Cananea expansion as McNulty and copper industry wanted, they drew attention to the combined threat to air quality that would be caused by the future operation of the expanded Cananea facility, the new Nacozari facility currently under construction, and the Douglas smelter already in operation (Kamp 1987). By linking the three smelters and focusing on the regional pollution problems they would cause, the environmentalists succeeded in redefining the policy issue along the lines of their concerns and not those of the copper alliance.

After May 1983 efforts continued in order to approve legislation beneficial to the domestic copper industry. Some success was achieved — the IFC financial package for the Cananea smelter was tabled and limited protectionist legislation was passed (Mumme 1984: 15-16). But public and governmental attention was diverted to the policy issue the environmentalists had been fighting for since the early 1970s — pressing for enforcement of Clean Air Act standards and thereby curbing the high levels of sulfur dioxide emissions being generated in the region.

Thus, from the Summer of 1983 through final approval in January 1987 of a bi-national agreement limiting sulfur dioxide emissions at the three border smelters, the policy issue involved the environmentalists, spearheaded by Richard Kamp of the Border Ecology Project, competing against the copper producers in the border area, in particular the Phelps Dodge operations at Douglas.

In August 1983, another key event occurred that helped facilitate the environmentalists' efforts. At their summit meeting in La Paz, Mexico, President Reagan and President De la Madrid signed the Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement (known as the La Paz agreement) which provided the inter-governmental mechanism for addressing the issue of air pollution on both sides of the border. Pursuant to this agreement representatives of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Mexican Secretariat of Urban Affairs and Ecology (SEDUE) have formed working groups to address the various transboundary pollution problems. Although this agreement neither established a detailed framework for addressing such bi-national issues nor dealt with specific policy content, it legitimized an arrangement that brought government officials together from the two nations to discuss these matters. Arizona and California state officials, congressional delegations, and environmen-

talists were the force behind the placing of environmental issues as a block on the summit agenda (Mumme 1986: 8). Once the agreement was in place these interests had a means to press for a bi-national agreement to address the environmental problems.

Beginning in August 1983 the environmentalists focused on the Air Working Group, established under the La Paz agreement, in their pursuit of a policy agreement to limit smelter emissions in the border region. From 1984 through 1986 meetings were held between U.S. and Mexican officials to discuss the smelter pollution issue. Any agreement had to be based on curbing emissions at all three smelters; Mexico would not agree to costly controls until the Phelps Dodge facility at Douglas also met emissions standards.

Arizona state governmental officials, through their authority to grant operating licenses, played a key role in pressuring the EPA to require compliance by the Phelps Dodge smelter at Douglas. The smelter could have operated on variances to the Clean Air Act until January 1988, but by requiring compliance by an earlier date a stricter bi-national agreement was successfully negotiated.

Finally, on January 14, 1987, the United States and Mexican governments signed the 4th Annex to the 1983 La Paz agreement. This Annex places limits on sulfur dioxide emissions at all present and future smelters in the border region (USIA 1987). Mexico agreed to have pollution control devices operational at the Nacozari plant by June 1988 and to limit emissions at Cananea if its operations are expanded. The U.S. government likewise agreed to curb emissions being generated on its side of the border, which was accomplished by the closure of the Phelps Dodge smelter at Douglas on January 15, 1987 (Ingram and Fiederlein 1988).

Application of the Framework to the Grey Triangle Case

The utility of a conceptual model such as the policy typology for analyzing the domestic aspects of foreign policy suggested here can be tested according to several criteria (Dye, 1987: 20). First, the model must fit reality as observed and help to simplify and clarify our understanding of events. Tables 3 and 4 apply the categories of the suggested typology to the Grey Triangle Smelter Case. While the particularities of the case vary somewhat from what the general model leads one to expect, the overall fit is excellent.

Focusing first upon the distribution of perceived impacts, the two rows of Table 3 identify the two phases of the grey triangle issue as differentially impacting interests. The type of domestic politics predicted on an issue of this sort is set out in the third and fourth columns of Table 1. When it was first defined as an economic protectionist issue, the issue had many of the characteristics of geographically based distributive politics. The copper industry worked through congressional representatives of districts where copper mining is located. The presence of pro-loan investors and exporters of technology and expertise prompted the involvement of government departments besides state, including Commerce and Interior.

TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF THE GREY TRIANGLE ON THE BASIS OF A FOREIGN POLICY TYPOLOGY

<i>Policy Issue</i>	<i>Distribution of Perceived Impacts (Locus of Impacts)</i>	<i>Appropriate Analytical Model</i>	<i>Locus of Leadership</i>	<i>Role of State Department</i>	<i>Role of Other Agencies</i>	<i>Role of State Government</i>	<i>Role of Congress</i>	<i>Means of Aggregating & Expressing Interest</i>
Economic protectionist measures to benefit copper industry	Differentiated (Mining industry and allies in western states)	Distributive politics	Copper industry leaders	Advocate of loan	Treasury & Commerce pro-loan; Interior opposed	Little involvement	Arena for protectionist legislation	Geographically based economic interest group through congressional representation
Curb smelter pollution on both sides of U.S./Mexico border	Differentiated (environmentalists vs. copper industry)	Pluralist; interest group politics	Local environmental interest group leaders	Facilitators of negotiations	EPA—prime formulator & implementor	Active in formulation & implementation	Slight	Competing interest group coalitions

TABLE 4
ACTORS IN THE POLICY PROCESS IN THE GREY TRIANGLE ISSUE

<i>Policy Issue</i>	<i>Distribution of Impacts</i>	<i>Agenda Setting Stage</i>	<i>Formulation Stage</i>	<i>Legitimation Stage</i>	<i>Implementation Stage</i>
Economic protectionist measures to benefit copper industry	Geographically based interest group (U.S. copper industry & labor)	Geographically based economic interest group (U.S. copper industry)	Bipartisan congressional delegation; federal agencies (treasury, state)	Congress; Executive	Federal agencies
Curb smelter pollution on both sides of U.S./Mexico border	Interest groups (environmentalists vs. U.S. & Mexican copper smelters)	Interest group (air quality environmentalists)	Federal agency (EPA)	Executive	State government (Arizona) & federal agencies (EPA & State Department)

Once the issue was redefined in terms of regulating smelter pollution on both sides of the U.S./Mexico border, the pattern of politics was classic pluralist, interest group conflict. The bottom row on Table 3 fits the fourth row on Table 1 quite closely.

Turning to a consideration of action at various stages of the policy process, Table 4 reports events as they occurred in the grey triangle case which can be compared with predictions set out in the top two rows of Table 2. The policy cycle predicted for pluralist, interest group conflict issues fits well with what happened to the border pollution construct of the issue. The economic protectionist construct fits less well the geographically based distributive policy cycle expected in the model.

Discrepancies between what was predicted in Tables 1 and 2 and what actually transpired as portrayed in Tables 3 and 4 occur in relation to the roles of state governments and of Congress at different policy stages. Copper mines are located in a number of Western states where they are quite important to local economies and represent an important constituency interest in some congressional districts. The influence of mining has waned in Western states, and, even in Arizona, where copper was once king, the welfare of the industry is not a highly salient concern. For this reason, the copper companies, working through congressional representatives rather than state governments, took the lead in agenda setting on protectionist legislation. While state governments were less active than the model would predict on the protection issue, states were more active than anticipated in the model on the pollution issue. It is logical to expect that divisions within Arizona between copper interests and environmentalists would so divide the state that it would not be important in the policy cycle. This occurred to some extent. When pollution first became the central focus, contending interest groups' pressures worked to neutralize state action. State government officials vacillated on their position until 1986 when Governor Babbit and the state health director took strong actions against Phelps Dodge and in favor of the environmentalists. Clearly, effective lobbying by environmentalists and the governor's presidential ambitions worked to make him more active on such issues than might normally be expected (Ingram and Fiederlein 1988).

The framework in Table 1 anticipated that on issues involving contending interest group coalitions Congress would serve as the main arena for determining policy content. However, because the environmental issue concerned the implementation of the provisions of the Clean Air Act and not the passage of new legislation, EPA was the active arena, and interest groups gravitated toward trying to influence EPA enforcement processes.

Besides fitting reality, conceptual frameworks can be evaluated according to the extent to which they identify the important variables and differentiate them from the unimportant. The advantages of a policy framework which comprehends the activity of numbers of political institutions and various stages of the policy cycle is demonstrated by the smelter triangle issue as illustrated in Tables 3 and 4. It is likely that important aspects of experience would have been lost had an institutional

approach been taken to analysis. An analysis that centered upon Congress in foreign policy-making, for instance, would have described the role of Congressman McNulty, but the key influence of interest group leaders would not have been apparent. Yet it was the influence of environmentalists in redefining the issue which eventually led to the ratification of an agreement between the U.S. and Mexico.

A more conventional approach to the study of foreign policy would have focused upon negotiations surrounding the La Paz Agreement and its subsequent Annex. An analysis which centered simply upon the formal legitimation phase of policy would give undue weight to the influence of the President and the State Department and would underemphasize the key role of interest groups and state officials in translating the broad and potentially empty language of La Paz into concrete policy.

Overall, it is fair to say that the framework provides a realistic and useful guide to unravelling the policy-making process on the grey triangle issue. Whether the framework would stand up so well in guiding the analysis of other cases has not yet been tested. Further, it may not be easy to identify the distribution of impacts on complex, multifaceted issues. As critics of Lowi's framework have suggested and the smelter pollution case illustrates, few policies precisely fit into particular categories. Impacts are seldom perceived in unidimensional terms (Greenberg et al. 1977; Ingram and Ullery 1980) and issues can be redefined to have different potential impacts. Even so, it is clear that in this case the framework was quite helpful in steering attention toward the range of actors and arenas of action actually influential in policy making, and helping to explain their involvement and activity.

CONCLUSION

In many important respects foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics. Internal political concerns are especially likely to predominate over international considerations when the policy issues at stake weigh heavily upon domestic political interests and institutions. Yet, the study of foreign policy making so far has been only partially informed by the insights of the students of domestic public policy.

This article has argued that the understandings that have come from public policy scholarship have not been sufficiently transferred to explanations of domestic influences upon foreign policy. Two important notions have tended to be overlooked: (1) policy-making processes vary with the nature of the issue and perceived impacts; (2) the influence of participants in policy making varies according to the different stages of the policy cycle. In general, foreign policy scholars have not sufficiently analyzed the impact of issue characteristics upon foreign policy-making processes. Further, they have tended to concentrate on the policy legitimation stage at the expense of the agenda setting and implementation phases.

Building upon public policy literature which has previously been applied mainly to the study of domestic politics, this paper constructed an

issue typology that identified which actors would be likely to become involved in different sorts of issues and at which stages of policy making and how they would interact. The basic reasoning of the typology was that issues with asymmetrical domestic impact will generate political activity aimed at influencing policy. Because formal executive-centered decision processes are likely to dominate the legitimization phase of foreign policy, the significant impact of domestic interests is likely to materialize at agenda setting, formulation, and implementation phases.

The realism and utility of the framework has been demonstrated in its application to a particular case concerning the grey triangle smelter controversy involving the United States and Mexico. The issue arose when a geographically based industry exploiting a natural resource acted through the area's congressional representative to defend itself from foreign competition. Later the issue was transformed into regulatory politics and a clash of industry and environmental interests. The helpfulness of the framework in this case is especially important because U.S. foreign policy toward Mexico has tended to be highly complex and particularistic. Analysts have had a difficult time finding general rules among the many conflicting and partial policies the U.S. pursues in relation to its Southern neighbor. That the framework appears to offer a means to order and explain U.S. policy toward Mexico should encourage further application of public policy concepts to foreign policy.

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