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Policy by the Way: When Policy is Incidental to Making Other Policies

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ABSTRACT

My aim is to explore an important feature of public policy that has been somewhat neglected: many policies are largely made by the way of making other policies. To examine this idea and tentatively explore some of its implications, I shall employ the notion of ‘policy by the way’. What I wish to convey with the help of this concept is the reality of many areas of concern which are touched by public policy entirely or primarily *by the way* of focusing on other areas of concern. The notion of ‘policy by the way’ is anticipated in some key concepts of policy research and policy analysis, but its specific features still seem to deserve more focused attention. I gradually build up the notion of policy by the way with the help of well-known contributions to the field and a few examples from Israel, albeit no claim is made that Israel is in any way representative of other western democracies. It is quite possible, however, that the reality of public policy as a byproduct, which I believe is universal, is more easily discerned due to the special politics of Israel, basically, a fragile coalition government with strong turf orientation and weak coordination.

While we are well aware of the fact that public policy making is a constrained enterprise, the notion of policy by the way teaches that public policy is as much a chief producer of constraints as their prime victim. Policy by the way is an analytic border case; a policy that is *entirely* the byproduct of other policies may not exist at all. Nor, except for very rare cases, such as a state of total war, is the opposite case, a single primary policy, empirically frequent. Most policies are either byproducts or primary to a degree, each contributing to the definition of the context within which different policies may co-occur. Each policy pursues certain goals, and in so doing each policy confines the pursuit

of other goals. This realization is as important for policy analysis that must assess beforehand the likely success of alternative courses of action, as for after-the-fact policy research seeking explanation. Given a high degree of inter-relatedness in public policy, it is reasonable to look for some of the crucial independent variables of policy success and failure not only in the attributes of a given policy, or those of the problem addressed, or in the politics that surrounds public policy making, or in implementation apparatus, but also in what other policies impose on it. Literally, what we normally call policy making, is better seen as policy taking. Policy makers wish to make policy (and in the process influence other policies), but inevitably end up adjusting to neighboring policies. Unlike the image of potency and influence that accompanies the notion of policy making, policy takers stand on the absorbing side of public policy and thus can hardly be held accountable to what takes place within their formal jurisdictional area. Not surprisingly, when policy fails, the political equivalent of NIMBY is NIMJA – Not In My Jurisdictional Area.

This lesson equally pertains to the question of policy change: to make significant changes in a policy that is largely the byproduct of other policies, one must be able to affect those other policies. The notion of policy by the way helps further to raise the question of the relative (imposing) power of policies, of whether some policy types (e.g. general rather than specifically targeted to a segment of the population or to a certain area; well established rather than new) are more likely to confine other policies. Finally, given the importance – in a crowded policy space – of the power to impose constraints, the budgetary process seems to lose its status as the principal arena for setting national priorities. The question of priority is not only which objectives should enjoy a greater share of available resources, but more importantly, which goals shall confine the pursuit of which other goals.

I. Policy Taking

Public policy making is a constrained enterprise; its primary purpose must be pursued within the confines of contextual goals (Wilson, 1989), and subject to political and other demands and restrictions. Owing in part to the forceful presence of constraints, public policy making is also a precarious venture: externalities and unanticipated consequences are as likely to follow as intended outcomes (Wildavsky, 1979). Unintended consequences are not necessarily bad. Well intended public policies occasionally turn into “fatal remedies” (Sieber, 1981), and sometimes contribute to resolving problems they never intended to contend with – what Lindblom and Cohen (1979, pp. 56–58) call epiphenomenal or

byproduct problem-solving. Furthermore, some desirable social states can only be byproducts of intentional action (Elster, 1983).

An important class of a policy's external effects consists of the effects that constrain other policies. Wildavsky refers to programs as occupants of a policy space: "When policy spaces were lightly filled, programs could be pursued on their own merits. . . . Today, however, policy spaces are dense; any major move sets off series of changes, many of which – because they are large and connected – inevitably transform any problem they were originally supposed to solve" (1979, pp. 70–71). Wildavsky is more specifically concerned with the proliferation of large programs that exert strong effects on each other, thus "increasing reciprocal relations and mutual causation". "An immediate effect of large programs amid this increased interdependence", he writes, "is that their consequences are more numerous, varied, and indirect, and thereby more difficult to predict" (1979, p. 64). Majone (1989, pp. 158–159) reserves the notion of policy space to denote "a set of policies that are so closely interrelated that it is not possible to make useful descriptions of or analytic statements about one of them without taking the other elements into account". Like Wildavsky, Majone (1989, p. 159) notes that "as the population of policies grows relative to the size of the policy space, individual policies necessarily become more interdependent. The consequences produced by one policy are increasingly likely to interfere with the working of other policies".

In the context of project design in underdeveloped countries, Hirschman (1967, p. 131) distinguishes between trait taking and trait making, a play on "price making" (by a monopoly) and "price taking" (by a firm in a competitive market). Trait taking refers to a "decision to accept some status quo traits as temporarily unchangeable characteristics of the environment that will mold the project". Trait making, on the other hand, has to do with "a decision to consider [other traits] as subject to and ready for the kind of changes that are required for making a success of the project". According to Hirschman, a project may be said to act at the same time as "trait maker" and as "trait taker". The decision which traits to take (accept) and which ones to make "is crucial to project design and success" (ibid).

Combining Wildavsky's notion of dense policy space with Hirschman's contribution, it would seem useful to conceive of policy taking, as opposed to the ordinary concept of policy making, which implicitly presumes control over the key variables that shape policy in a given area. Policy taking, in contrast, denotes the pursuit of a given set of policy objectives, which is primarily or entirely shaped by the pursuit of other objectives. I call the resulting policy – policy by the way (i.e.

the byproduct of policies that are made and implemented to pursue objectives other than those of the policy in question).

II. Policy as a Law Describing a Sequence

Policy can be understood as the sum of programs and decisions that have been actually implemented. The notion of implementation as evolution captures at once, the essence of the importance imparted in implementation as a quasi-autonomous process. The dictum here is: “when we act to implement policy, we change it” (Majone and Wildavsky, 1984, p. 177). Similarly, breaking away from the traditional top-down bias, Lipsky defines policy in terms of the decisions made and the actions undertaken by professionals at the street-level. In his view, the decisions professionals make in crowded offices, “the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively *become* the public policies they carry out” (1980, p. xii). The notion of policy as that which gets implemented reminds us that with or without a vision or a master plan, something gets implemented. Yet, policy is tautologically defined as the sum of whatever gets implemented, whether or not it is possible to detect any pattern in what has been done.

A second common perspective postulates the top-down view of policies as theories or hypotheses (Landau, 1973; Majone, 1980; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). This definition is more demanding of policy: not any aggregation of decisions, programs or actions can be considered a policy, only one which supposedly serves that policy’s goals. In this view, a meaningful description of a policy must include both ends and means. Like every normal hypothesis, a policy must have an if and a then. Since, furthermore, the relationship between means and ends is hypothetical, policies are really policy hypotheses that are (or can be) tested and reformulated in light of accumulated experience. But if policies are the equivalent of hypotheses, one is tempted to conclude that, in most areas there is no such thing as public policy, for every policy (as hypothesis) presumes ownership over the most powerful set of independent variables.

If a policy is the equivalent of a hypothesis, what are the ifs and thens of youth policy, urban transportation, or environmental protection policy? The ifs can be identified by simply compiling a list of all the major things – decisions, legislations, actions, intervention programs – government is engaged in doing, for example, in the case of Israeli youth policy, the list would include such programs and instruments as truant officers, preparation for military service, street-gang workers, vocational training, counselling for ‘girls in distress’, institutional care for delinquents, special educational programs for the gifted, subsidies

for youth movements, probation officers and so on. The hypothetically related then of youth policy must be broken down into many “thens”, each representing parochial objectives of many organizational units and sub-units. There is usually no over-arching institutional interest pursuing an overall vision of youth in society. It is the business of no government ministry nor of any comprehensive binding plan, to pose questions, or articulate visions concerning society’s bridge to the future. If there is such a thing as youth policy, it is certainly not a grand policy, i.e. “a comprehensive material policy setting forth the broad directives in respect to the contents of dealing with an issue area” (Dror, 1988, p. 102). Each ministry, and in the ministries each division, department, unit, and sub-unit, relates to a young individual or a group of individuals as one thing or another: a student, a potential dropout, a delinquent, a new immigrant, a drug addict, an over-achiever, a young worker, a soldier, a member of a “client” family. This is the inevitable result of the division of labor. But the overall tasks that have been divided must somehow be brought together in concept if not in practice. The bits and pieces of government intervention may be brought together, coordinated, without a coordinator and without a dominant common purpose (Lindblom, 1965). Yet the notion of policy as hypothesis requires that the bits and pieces of government intervention either anticipate, or be anticipated by an overall policy formulation.

Policy is an analytic category constructed by the analyst rather than a directly observable phenomenon. As Hecló (1972) pointed out, there is no unique set of decisions, actors, and institutions constituting policy and waiting to be discovered and described. Continuity in policy, writes Majone (1989, p. 150), is important for the analyst because “without some stability and consistency in actions and expectations it would be impossible to detect any pattern in a stream of apparently disconnected decisions and discrete pieces of legislation and administration”. This requirement can be clarified by drawing a parallel between the notion of policy and that of randomness. Given a sequence of numbers – such as 7, 8, 5, 39, 8, 1, 2, 56, 3, 9, 71, 1, 4, 19 . . ., how does one determine whether it is a random sequence? If the sequence has been generated by one or another statistically random device, we would be inclined to conclude that the sequence is random.

Another possible approach characterizes a sequence as random “if no law can be formulated in a human language . . . which describes the sequence”. (C. Alonzo, cited in Kaplan, 1963, p. 242) To better appreciate the contribution of this view for the purpose at hand, I suggest a third approach, which treats randomness as a continuous attribute of sequences¹ (Gell-Mann, 1994). Randomness is a matter of degree. In any given sequence of numbers it is equivalent to the amount of

information required to describe that sequence: the more information that is required to describe the sequence the more random it is. Thus, at one extreme, we shall find sequences whose description requires that we repeat exactly the whole sequence. And at the opposite extreme we shall find sequences which can be described with very little information, e.g. to find the next number always add 1 to the last.

The notion of policy in this view is the equivalent of the law formulated to describe any given sequence of numbers, except that instead of numbers we have in mind programs, decisions, projects, core principles, statutes. In this rational reconstruction, policy denotes more order than randomness, or chance. When no pattern can be discovered and all acts are unpredictable – i.e. when chaos prevails – all conceivable decisions and actions, all intervention programs are equally rational; there can be no rational course of action (Downs, 1957, pp. 10–11). This notion of policy bears resemblance to what (among other attributes) Popper (1963, p. 36) would like to see in a theory: “Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is”. A policy in this sense deserves the name only to the extent that one can anticipate what will *not* be done under that policy’s banner.

To the extent that a certain policy cannot be described at all, save when all that is done under its banner must be mentioned, our inclination would be to conclude that the policy in question hardly deserves the name, except in the tautological sense that the sum of whatever takes place must be a policy. Any given sequence of decisions and programs is supposedly a policy only to the extent that it represents some degree of coherence. A meaningful description of a policy is one depicting, or anticipating the sequence of intervention programs, decisions, or actions undertaken within the framework of that policy. What is done within the framework of any given policy must somehow fit in the sequence. Policy by the way would thus appear as a policy whose sequence, comprised of decisions, projects, actions, statutes, directives, intervention programs, appears highly random, but this is due to the fact that the different, seemingly erratic acts actually fit in other sequences. Each program or action, each constituent in a byproduct policy R makes more sense when considered together with actions that belong to another policy A, B, or C, than as a constituent of R. In short, different constituents of a byproduct policy are better explained and anticipated by sequences of other policies. Thus, for example, youth working groups in military camps, a component of youth policy, makes more sense if considered in the light of military manpower requirements than as a means to enhance the employability of the under-

educated. Truant officers are likewise better understood as one constituent in a sequence of educational programs, street-corner workers as a component in crime prevention efforts, and youth probation officers as a constituent of the criminal justice system.

III. Policies: Primary and By The Way

Policies that are primarily targeted to specific segments of the population, (e.g. youth, children, aged, immigrants, minorities, guest workers), or to specific areas or regions (e.g. poor neighbourhoods, development towns, front-line settlements, the city of Jerusalem), would seem particularly vulnerable to the influence of general government policies (e.g. defense, transportation, housing, economy, health, education). Because people and areas have many needs, any specific policy immediately confronts general policies that pertain to the entire population, or to the country as a whole. The general policy cannot be presumed to favor one group or area over the other, it is one of the exacting tasks of general policies to maintain an overall policy perspective while catering to different and conflicting demands. Moreover, such general policies are more likely to have been institutionalized long before the claims of specific groups or areas conquered a place on the policy agenda. Early occupants of a policy space, Wildavsky (1979, p. 66) suggests, are fortunate because "newcomers will be forced to adjust to these existing programs". The very fact that a certain demand or idea is a newcomer to the policy field increases the likelihood that it will be more taking than making, that the policy pursuing it will be affected by other policies. This likelihood is further increased if the new policy is not general but pertains to a specific group or area.

Take, for example, the absorption of immigrants. New immigrants in Israel seek government support that will enable them to find affordable housing, jobs, medical services, a school for their children, an opportunity to learn a new language, and interim financial support until they can manage on their own. Except for temporary financial support, all these formally recognized needs belong to well-established government agencies specializing in different domains. The Immigration Absorption Ministry, presumably in charge of absorption policy, does not command the economy nor health, housing, welfare or education. Instead, the Ministry is largely a policy taking agency. In some secondary matters, such as counseling, immediate relief or placement in vocational programs, it sets its own operation. But it must take as given, and can only hope to marginally influence, the products of a multitude of policies and programs that aim at a different set of objectives (e.g. fiscal and monetary policy, housing, health, education, welfare). The pursuit

of this latter set of objectives together shapes what might be called de-facto absorption policy.

Does it matter if coordination efforts pertain to 15 thousand new immigrants a year, as opposed to a hundred thousand? To some, so long as Israel is not only an immigrant absorbing country, but considers itself the homeland of all Jews, absorption efforts must not suffer due to the pursuit of more general goals. This view gained support particularly when large numbers of immigrants arrived, or with increased discontent with the accomplishments of the Ministry for Immigration Absorption. Ever since the establishment of this Ministry in 1968, one discerns a tension between two concepts: that of a policy-making ministry, and that of a policy taking, or coordinating ministry. In 1976, a public commission recommended to abolish the ministry and to establish instead a national authority that will assume overall responsibility. The same issue came up again in 1989, when it seemed that the predicted wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union required a different operational code: "We are in a state of emergency. We must break working procedures, shorten processes and procedures, and stop worrying about turf" (Minister of Justice Meridor, *Haaretz*, May 14, 1990). The State Comptroller (1992, p. 18), likewise, argued that "the present administrative structure ill serves immigrant absorption and represents a waste of resources", and proposed "to establish a single agency for immigrant absorption without further delay". In less than five years, from January 1990 to August 1994, more than 500,000 immigrants arrived in Israel, adding more than 10 per cent to its population, as compared to an average of some 15,000 a year throughout the 1980s. Despite the drastic increase in the number of immigrants, the underlying structure of the ministry as "policy taking" remained intact, while cardinal responsibilities and powers were granted to an ad hoc inter-ministerial committee.

The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (1990: 49) explicitly recognizes the power of existing general policies, in its report on *Immigrant Policy*. Unlike Israel, in most western countries immigrants are seen as almost by definition would be minorities, who may require special consideration and targeted programs for a long period of time, not just preliminary intervention that would (hopefully) lead to assimilation. According to the Netherlands report, "To a significant extent, the problems facing immigrants are accentuations of those facing society in general. This means that policies specifically tailored to the immigrant community . . . will necessarily remain confined to the treatment of symptoms [. . .]. The scope of 'solutions' is limited by the conditions created by the government's general policies [. . .]. The effectiveness of policies specifically targeted on selected minority groups

depends not just on the soundness of those policies but also on the circumstances in which they have to be implemented and the general policies in those sectors.”

On neighborhoods, consider Project Renewal, an attempted policy innovation of the late 1970s in Israel. Before the launching of Project Renewal, Israeli public policy toward distressed neighborhoods can be clearly characterized as policy by the way. Poor neighborhoods did not appear as such on the policy agenda; they did not serve as the “organizing idea” (Fesler, 1949) for government intervention. There was life in the neighborhoods before 1978 – children went to school, troubled families went to see the social worker – but each public service in the neighborhood led a life of its own in accordance with its specific mission and national or municipal guidelines. Except for academics, no one posed the question of how the actions of each agency related to the more general vision of overall neighborhood well being. Given the extreme concentration of formal powers at the national level, little coordination could take place in local government.

Project Renewal was not intended to do more of the same but to introduce a new policy where the *neighborhood* as such is the rehabilitation target. The idea has thus been to coordinate and subordinate all family-oriented services and programs to a common set of guidelines (Dery, 1984). In short, it sought to make neighborhood rehabilitation the primary target of policy rather than the byproduct of national and municipal policies in such areas as education, welfare, housing, employment, urban and community development, or drug abuse. In so doing, concerns such as those pertaining to youth, the family, or to new immigrants, must become secondary. In other words, the main idea was to rehabilitate the neighborhood even if it may entail sacrifices of other cherished values, e.g. in the case of youth, programs designed to encourage high achievers to stay in the neighborhood rather than seek better opportunities elsewhere. However, very early in the life of Project Renewal the cabinet decided that the project would be implemented through existing ministries rather than via an independent agency. The neighborhood as the target of renewal has thus become one of several rival organizing ideas competing for influence in project neighborhoods.

IV. Almost Everything is a Byproduct, to a Degree

“Power is the essence of politics, and the essence of power lies in restricting the choices available to others” (Goodin, 1982, p. 71). For the issue of quality of life in America “was nowhere raised as a policy

question” Lindblom and Cohen (1979, p. 57) tell us “until recently, we ‘solved’ the problem of maintaining the quality of life in America largely by letting its quality emerge from decisions on countless specific matters such as, for example, highway construction, zoning, care of the aged, public education, and economic growth”. But note that public policy in such areas as highway construction, housing, zoning, care for the aged, or education, are likewise heavily influenced if not entirely shaped by other specific programs and larger policy concerns (e.g. defense policy, economic growth, environmental protection). These programs may, in turn, be themselves constrained and influenced by other policies. To think comprehensively about education, writes Cremin (1976, p. 59) “we must consider policies with respect to a wide variety of institutions that educate, not only schools and colleges, but libraries, museums, day-care centers, radio and television centers, offices, factories, and farms”.

If everything is a byproduct, it might be objected, nothing is. But this incidental feature of public policy is a matter of degree. Except for such rare cases as a state of total war, the question is not whether, but to what extent a certain policy is the by-product of other policies. A state with one value (e.g. survival) has one policy. All contextual goals in that state are suspended, and all available resources are means to one end. A state that is crowded with values, primary goals as well as contextual goals, must determine priorities. The notion of policy by the way reminds us that “setting national priorities” is not entirely or mainly a budgetary exercise. The question is not only which national goals should enjoy a greater share of available resources, but more importantly, which goals shall confine the pursuit of other goals. “Autonomy is valued at least as much as resources”, writes Wilson (1989, p. 195), rejecting the view of bureaucrats as budget maximisers. Moreover, in crowded policy spaces the quest for autonomy is a zero-sum game. When the Ministry of Environmental Quality in Israel was recently granted the power to authorize all construction work, its cause was advanced to an extent that no conceivable budgetary increase could match. And as its autonomy increased, that of neighboring ministries (e.g. Tourism, Housing, and Transportation) declined. He who possesses the power to sign permits, rules.

To the extent that a certain policy is better understood as a byproduct of other policies, it becomes clear that the task of changing that policy is necessarily entangled with changing a multitude of policies that no one can or should control. One may seek, for example, to convert youth policy into a primary policy. It might be argued that the life chances of youth, primarily as skilled and sophisticated workers who match the needs of a modern competitive economy, must not be left

to chance, nor to the whims of policies that are made with an eye to other concerns. But the notion of policy by the way suggests that the conversion of a byproduct into a primary policy entails subordination of prevalent values and well shielded conventions and practices to a new set of values.

The military service of young Israelis signifies at once the influence of non-youth objectives and the powerful obstacles that need be removed if one wanted to convert a byproduct policy into a primary policy. The Israel Defense Forces is the single largest employer of youth. Depending on what are believed to be the country's security needs, the military determines who and how many young boys and girls will be recruited for military service and who will be discharged. This alone exerts influence on the young more than most deliberate efforts. Soldiers are placed, trained and employed so as to maximize their contribution to the military, not in preparation for the economy in which they will subsequently be active for the rest of their lives. Young soldiers are often required to perform tasks (fighting or policing) with critical educational ramifications. Consider also the decisive effect that the military service has on the social mobility of youth, of those advancing in the hierarchy and those who bear the stain of the unfit (see Gal, undated). To this one must also add the forceful effect that the military has on Arab youth, most of whom are exempt from service. A less dramatic example is the current attempt to put the policy agenda "health-behavior in school aged children" (Harel, Kanny and Rahav, 1997). Again, as already witnessed on the Canadian scene (Jonston, 1996), this newly conceived effort must come to terms with the more traditional youth-related programs.

It is especially important to bear in mind such obstacles in light of the tendency to bypass the need to resolve genuine value conflicts that require compromise (see Schelling, 1984, pp. 6–9) through administrative means. Autonomous administrative agencies – would-be super-coordinators or single-issue czars, such as the Administration for Road Safety or the authority for the War on Drug Abuse – are good examples. Introducing the Authority for the War on Drug Abuse Bill on March 1, 1988, Prime Minister Shamir outlined the distinct responsibilities and contributions of the different ministries dealing with drug abuse – Education, Police, Justice, Health, Labor and Welfare, and those of the Ministry of Defense. One of the central questions dealt with in the work of the commission that led to this proposal, the Prime Minister said, "was whether the Authority will be only a coordinating body, or whether it will also operate independently under some circumstances". The "solution" brought for Knesset approval was rather vague, combining an emphasis on coordination roles and allowing for unspecified

Authority initiatives. Despite the ambiguous language, the Prime Minister pledged that this Authority “will shape policy for prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, punishment and law enforcement. . .”. But as Hirschman (1967, p. 155) notes, “The establishment of the autonomous agency meets with far fewer difficulties than its successful operation”.

The case of the Administration for Road Safety is even more revealing. It was established in 1981 to coordinate the efforts of a large number of ministries, agencies and institutions whose decisions and actions have a bearing on traffic accidents (e.g. Transportation, Police, Education, Housing, Finance, local authorities, the National Commission for Accident Prevention, the military, an Inter-Ministerial Committee of Road Safety and more). The State Comptroller *Annual Report* for 1987 maintained that the Administration “failed to coordinate and direct the actions necessary to fight traffic accidents” (p. 506). The Administration furthermore “did not succeed in fulfilling its mission in coordinating the various ministries, and in setting priorities and influencing resource allocation to the subject” (p. 537). Ten years later, this Administration has become another unit to be coordinated by a larger yet administrative body: the National Authority for the War on Traffic Accidents.

V. Conclusion

Building on the notion of “crowded policy space” (Wildavsky, 1979; Majone, 1989), this paper introduced the concept of policy by the way, defined as a policy that is entirely or primarily made by the way of making other policies. An important class of a policy’s external effects consists of those that constrain other policies. It follows that some crucial independent variables of policy success and failure, and of policy change, are likely to be found not in the policy in question, but in the policies surrounding it. A positive theory of policy making and policy change would therefore seek to identify the variables – policy attributes, policy types, or circumstances – that are likely to produce policy by the way, or policies that are highly susceptible to the influence of other policies. For example, given the power of incumbent policies, we may hypothesize that the very fact that a certain measure is a newcomer increases the likelihood that it will be affected by other policies. At least in the short run, that policy will be more taking than making, more byproduct than primary. We may further hypothesize that this likelihood is enhanced if new claims also pertain to a specific segment of the population or to a distinct area. We further appreciate that the freedom to pursue objectives, and to use resources, is as important as

the availability of resources. As policies pursue their objectives they encroach on the freedom of neighboring policies. It would thus seem important to consider where and how confining decisions are made, not only who gets what in the way of resources.

In a crowded policy space, the task of changing a policy by the way is necessarily entangled with changing a multitude of policies. We are thus led to expect more resistance to change than change, more additions to existing policies than policy transformations (Cuban and Tyack, 1995). Yet, new policies and programs do enter the scene and sometimes, as is the case with protecting the environment, even manage to limit the pursuit of rival goals. How does a policy by the way become a primary policy; what strategies are used; what new policy instruments facilitate the bypassing of old constraints? Assessing the relative strengths of alternative courses of action to be injected into a crowded policy space, it would seem advisable to consider explicitly the likely impact of neighboring policies. How crowded is the policy space in which we propose to intervene? What sort of policies inhabit this space, how may each policy affect the different alternatives, and what is the likelihood of affecting those policies? Given the attributes of a given policy space, is it advisable to design alternatives that might be injected into a more hospitable policy space?

NOTES

1. I thank M. Magidor for this suggestion.

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