ANNUAL REVIEWS

Annual Review of Political Science

Corrupting International Organizations

James Raymond Vreeland

Woodrow Wilson School and Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544, USA; email: jrv@princeton.edu

Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 2019. 22:205–22

The *Annual Review of Political Science* is online at polisci.annualreviews.org

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-071031

Keywords

International Monetary Fund, IMF, World Bank, United Nations, vote buying, human rights

Abstract

As the world turns against international institutions, this article reviews evidence of the corrupting of global organizations. The review focuses on three international organizations that emerged from World War II: the Bretton Woods institutions [the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank] and the United Nations (UN). The article explores evidence of major shareholders (mainly the United States) using the Bretton Woods institutions to funnel money and other favors to strategically preferred countries. Then the review discusses vote buying across a range of issues debated at the UN and finally turns to dark scholarship on the use of UN human rights institutions by autocratic states as a veil to violate those very rights. The article concludes that government pursuit of strategic objectives may be a necessary part of global cooperation, but scholarship should continue to delve into the micro foundations underlying the macro evidence presented here to better inform reformers on how to limit corrupting influences.

INTRODUCTION

Backlash against globalization has brought isolationist forces to power in key Western countries. International organizations stand as one of their many targets. Asian governments, though for different reasons, have largely turned their backs on the major Western financial institution—the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—disillusioned by how the organization managed the East Asian financial crisis. Asia and the West join governments from throughout Latin America and Africa, which have for generations viewed the institution, as well as the World Bank, with skepticism.

It is not the first time the world has witnessed a retreat from global cooperation. Just as President Donald Trump declared an "America first" foreign policy at his 2017 inauguration, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced at his first inauguration, "Our international trade relations, though vastly important, are…secondary…to the establishment of a sound national economy. I favor as a practical policy the putting of first things first" (see **https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-8**). But Roosevelt also vowed in that speech to "spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic readjustment." Some years later, a new set of institutions embodied Roosevelt's promised effort. In 1944, the world founded the IMF and the World Bank to prevent the beggar-thy-neighbor policies that preceded the Great Depression. The following year, the United Nations was established to provide a forum to prevent a repetition of the atrocities of World War II.

It is tempting to laud these cooperative efforts, focusing on their achievements, while dismissing critiques. Critics come from across the political spectrum, and they do not agree on how to improve global cooperation. But when international organizations act in ways contrary to their mandates, it invites skepticism regardless of political stripes. As Johnson (2011) has shown, when governments abuse their power over an international organization, public trust in the organization declines (see also Gartzke & Naoi 2011). Moreover, Lall (2017) suggests that insulating international organizations from political pressure improves their performance. Yet the global organizations that emerged from World War II do face political pressure, which systematically results in outcomes unbecoming of the spirit of their mandates (Downs et al. 1996). These patterns are backed by rigorous social science and lend merit to critical views.

This article reviews a body of research showing where governments arguably misuse the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) and the United Nations. The article first considers how powerful democracies have manipulated these institutions to favor strategically important developing countries, which trade political support for money. Then the article discusses ways in which repressive autocracies have exploited UN human rights treaties for nefarious goals. Leaders under distinct domestic institutions have exploited international organizations—though in different ways.

The purpose of this exercise is to better understand how some forms of international cooperation play out through international organizations. The article concludes that perfection should not become the enemy of good. We may need to accept that governments pursue self-interests through international organizations. Still, scholars can consider how to improve existing institutions with a better understanding of the mechanisms driving the corruption of international organizations.

Note that there are rich literatures on each of these international organizations and a vibrant literature on international cooperation more broadly. Space constraints require a narrow focus here. This review centers on bad news, where political favors are bought for money and where the uses of treaties go directly against their stated purposes. These institutions are by no means completely corrupted. Their staffs are filled with well-intentioned public servants who strive to achieve their official duties. Yet these institutions remain subject to politics, which systematically pushes them to pursue certain duplicitous ends. This article reviews such evidence.

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

The IMF was founded mainly to facilitate fixed exchange rates across the developed world. But it soon began working to resolve the balance of payments and debt problems of developing countries. When the developed world abandoned fixed exchange rates in the 1970s, the IMF began exclusively funding developing countries (that is, until the 2008 global financial crisis returned the IMF to its roots, bailing out euro countries). The evolving goals have provoked Babb & Buira (2005) to remark that the IMF engages in "mission creep."

The IMF often becomes involved in developing countries through economic reform programs, which include a loan plus economic-policy conditions attached to loan disbursements. IMF resources come from the organization's 189 members, which provide deposits (called quotas). The benefit of access to IMF loans for recipient countries may seem obvious, but what incentivizes individual creditor countries to contribute resources? The answer is power. The more money a country provides, the larger the vote share a government exercises on the board of governors and the executive board.

Yet countries do not simply get to choose how much money to provide the IMF. This would alter the institution's balance of power, and so an 85% majority vote is required (the United States currently controls 16.5% of the votes; see **https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx**). Officially, the quotas are derived from a formula based on economic variables, but politics plays a decisive role (see Woods 2005). For over a decade, there was a demand for reform to bring the vote shares of emerging-market countries in line with economic reality. (China had only the sixth largest share, and Brazil's share was smaller than Belgium's.) In January 2016, the reforms went forward after the US Congress acquiesced (see **https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr1625a**). But from 1971 until 2016, the top five members of the IMF were the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

Have these governments used their political control to pressure the IMF to pursue political goals outside its mandate? A mass of scholarly evidence suggests this to be the case. Examples abound throughout history (see, e.g., Stiles 1990).

Thacker's (1999) groundbreaking study presents the first systematic evidence. He shows that a country's realignment with the United States—as measured by changes in voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on key votes identified as important by the US government—increases the probability of receiving an IMF loan. Many other studies corroborate this basic finding that voting in-line with the United States correlates with better treatment from the IMF (Oatley & Yackee 2004, Barro & Lee 2005, Andersen et al. 2006b, Dreher & Jensen 2007). (On why UNGA voting behavior changes, see Mattes et al. 2015.)

Much of the literature relies on foreign aid flows to measure the political importance of a recipient country. Reynaud & Vauday (2009) take a broad approach, including several variables and using factor analysis to estimate political importance to the United States. They include oil and gas supplies, measures of nuclear capacity, US and UN military presence, and geographic importance. Their geopolitical index is correlated with IMF nonconcessional lending. US informal influence may also come from other sources. Nelson (2017) shows that governments with officials who hold economics degrees from US universities receive better treatment from the IMF.

It appears then that the United States may exploit the IMF to funnel money to its favored countries. Of course, IMF loans come with strings attached called conditionality. Continued loan disbursements may require governments to follow painful austerity policies, so it is not obvious that IMF programs represent a reward. Stone's major studies expose another dimension of potential laxity in IMF lending: looser conditionality.

Stone (2002) shows that, in Eastern Europe, countries strategically important to the United States—as measured by foreign aid appropriations—receive shorter punishment periods for noncompliance with conditionality. Stone (2004) considers the same for Africa, similarly showing that strategic importance—again measured by foreign aid, as well as by UNGA voting profiles and membership in British and French postcolonial institutions—reduces the duration of punishment for noncompliance. Using a global data set, Stone (2011) shows evidence of US informal influence over loan size and conditionality. Stone (2008) points out that the scope of conditionality is narrower for macroeconomically vulnerable countries (as measured by trade and debt) that are strategically important to the United States (as measured by US foreign aid). The fact that the finding applies only to countries with macroeconomic vulnerability suggests that expending political capital to favor strategically important countries is costly (see also Chapman et al. 2017).

Caraway et al. (2012) study conditionality in more detail. They report, "Although U.S. allies tend to receive fewer loan conditions, they receive relatively more intrusive labor market reform conditions, all else equal" (Caraway et al. 2012, p. 50). But this finding only holds for conditions laid out in government letters of intent to the IMF; it does not hold for arrangement letters, "essentially the contract for the loan" (Caraway et al. 2012, p. 41). Their data set represents an important innovation as they code for specific policy conditions and consider both letters of intent (like most of the literature) and arrangement letters (a breakthrough in the literature). They also emphasize the importance of domestic politics impacting the policy recommendations of the IMF staff. (For in-depth work on the thinking of IMF staff, see Chwieroth 2010).

Woo & Murdie (2017) present further evidence that countries close to the United States receive different treatment than other countries, but not always in ways that help the government: If a government close to the United States has a poor human rights record, the country is less likely to receive an IMF loan. Along with favoritism, governments close to the United States also receive scrutiny.

Favoritism, however, may extend beyond loans and conditions. Dreher et al. (2008a) consider the effect of national elections on inflation forecasts. Compared to countries that do not often vote with the United States at the UNGA, countries voting in-line with the United States receive lower inflation forecasts as elections approach. Such favorable forecasts could benefit incumbents before an election (see also Lang & Presbitero 2018).

Momani's (2004) study examines the case of Egypt to better document the causal mechanism by which the United States influences the IMF. She compares IMF arrangements in 1987 and 1991, when the United States was concerned with a peaceful and stable ally in the Middle East, with arrangements in 1993 and 1996, during a period of relative political stability in the country. In the latter cases, when the United States prioritized Egypt less, the executive board endorsed the policies advocated by the IMF staff. In the former cases, US influence butted up against the recommendations of IMF staff, and the final arrangements reflected US preferences. The article presents detailed interview evidence of IMF staff highlighting the influence of the United States.

What preferences drive the United States? A study by Broz & Hawes (2006) explores the micro foundations of domestic political support in the United States for the IMF. They examine Congressional roll-call votes on US quota increases to finance the IMF. Their evidence shows that more conservative members of Congress tend to oppose financing the international institution. Controlling for this factor, however, legislators coming from higher-education districts are more likely to vote for IMF financing. They contend that highly skilled individuals in the United States benefit from global financial stability provided through IMF bailouts. Legislators representing these winners from globalization support the IMF, whereas legislators representing the losers do not.

Broz & Hawes (2006) also show that legislators who receive more campaign contributions from banks that specialize in wholesale and international banking are more likely to vote in favor of supporting the IMF. They contend that these banks "comprise a key constituency for the IMF and lobby [Congress] on its behalf" (Broz & Hawes 2006, p. 77).

A pair of important studies by Gould (2003, 2006) reveal how banks can benefit from IMF bailouts. She examines the inclusion of bank-friendly conditions in IMF arrangements. She identifies bank-friendly conditions as those that "specify that a country must pay back a commercial bank creditor as a condition of its Fund loan" (Gould 2006, p. 147). These conditions are more likely to be included in IMF programs when the bailout relies on banks to "supplement the Fund's loan to borrowers" (Gould 2003, p. 552). In addition to quantitative evidence, she presents examples, such as a 1983 IMF loan to Ghana that was funneled directly to a commercial bank creditor in London (Gould 2003, p. 564). The money went directly from Washington to London, never touching Ghanaian soil.

Most studies on the political control of the IMF focus on the United States, but some early studies presented evidence of British and French influence [and there is fascinating evidence of vote buying on the International Whaling Commission by Japan (Strand & Tuman 2012, Dippel 2015)]. In a landmark study, Copelovitch (2010) considers the power of the top five members of the organization. He points out that other powerful countries—Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—also have influence. To measure preference intensity, Copelovitch averages the level of interest across the powerful members, and he measures the variation of preferences to account for preference heterogeneity (for similar work on interest coalitions in the European Union, see Schneider & Tobin 2013).

Copelovitch finds the largest IMF loans go to countries where powerful countries have homogenously high bank exposure. The powerful countries all favor a large bailout to defend the financial positions of their banks. Where there is heterogeneity across the powerful countries (so that one or more has less finance at stake), IMF loans are smaller. The powerful countries can thus serve as a check on one another's financial interests. (On competition for election to the executive board, see Lawrimore & Vreeland 2018.)

Lipscy's (2003) excellent study of the United States versus Japan in the 1995 Mexican financial crisis and the 1997 East Asian financial crisis shows what happens when the top two countries at the IMF disagree and preferences are intense. In the Mexican case, the United States preferred a large bailout because a prolonged economic crisis in Mexico could have hurt President Clinton's reelection chances in 1996. Japan preferred a smaller bailout due to concerns about moral hazard. But when the financial risks were reversed in the East Asian crisis, Japan wanted a large bailout while the United States cautioned against moral hazard. In both cases, the US position prevailed.

Note that while this stylized review focuses on the international factors pressuring the Fund, in many cases, the executive board follows the staff's recommendations, and it is domestic politics in recipient countries that leads programs astray. Focusing on Eastern Europe and Latin America, Pop-Eleches (2008) shows that the IMF pays closer attention and provides more favorable treatment to economically and politically important countries—and that the treatment by the IMF then interacts with domestic factors. (See also Beazer & Woo 2016. For a recent study of the reverse—how domestic politics impact international outcomes—see Cho 2018.)

Because the domestic politics of recipient countries and the interests of the IMF's major shareholders can coincide, identifying the causal impact of international factors is not straightforward. A key to resolving this methodological problem is an exogenous source of variation in political importance. Dreher et al. (2009a) offer membership on the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC). Patterns of election to the UNSC are idiosyncratic and bear no direct relationship to participation in IMF programs (Dreher et al. 2014). To win election, governments typically have the endorsement of their region (although governments can self-nominate and write-ins are allowed) and then must receive a two-thirds majority of votes in the UNGA. Elected members serve two years, during which they may vote on matters of extreme importance to the United States, and then they face exogenous term limits. This quasi-experimental setting facilitates causal identification of the effect of political importance on IMF program participation. Dreher et al. (2009b) show that members of the UNSC are more likely than other countries to participate in IMF arrangements. They also present evidence that UNSC membership is associated with fewer policy conditions included in these arrangements.

In sum, the scholarly literature has presented evidence that the IMF's major shareholders use the organization to provide funding to governments for reasons that lie outside the official mandate of the institution. Scholars have measured the interests of the major shareholders in terms of both foreign policy goals (such as securing support for action against security threats) and economic interests (such as bailing out banks important to their domestic economies). Measures of foreign policy interest include colonial history, voting patterns at the UNGA, and temporary membership on the UNSC. The last measure provides for solid causal identification, since UNSC membership is quasi-random with respect to participation in IMF programs. Measures of economic interest include trade and bank exposure. The latter measure provides strong micro foundations, as scholars have looked at the actions of banks themselves and at US legislators who receive contributions from international banks.

THE WORLD BANK

The original purpose of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which, along with the International Development Association or IDA, eventually became the central organizations of the World Bank) centered on rebuilding Europe after World War II (Helleiner 2010, p. 30). Helleiner refers to Kapur et al.'s (1997, p. 68) impressive history of the institution: "Development arrived almost by accident and played a bit role at Bretton Woods, but it got on the books, becoming part of the Bank's name and official purpose." Like the IMF, the World Bank experienced mission creep away from rebuilding Europe and toward underdeveloped countries. Eventually the goal was prominently carved in stone at headquarters: "Our dream is a world free of poverty" (see **http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview**). Cynics view with irony the permanence: "[T]he words are firmly affixed to the wall, as if this is always to remain a dream" and never become a reality (Marshall 2008, p. 167). Taking a nuanced view, Weaver (2008) shows how institutional pressures on the Bank staff often stand in opposition to its bureaucratic goals, resulting in apparent hypocrisy. Some critics of the World Bank highlight that if the people at the institution succeeded in this mission, they would be out of a job. Vaubel (1996) has proposed indeed that the World Bank concerns itself more with providing loans, which must be repaid with interest, than with promoting development. In his skeptical view, international bureaucracies seek to maximize "power, prestige and amenities" (Vaubel 1996, p. 195).

Still, political control of the World Bank belongs to its members. The organization's executive board nearly mirrors that of the IMF. All members provide capital subscriptions—larger economies provide more resources and have more political control in return (Lipscy 2017).[1] Many

[1] Lipscy (2017) shows that, compared to the IMF, the World Bank has better adapted to changing economic-power dynamics because, unlike the Fund, the Bank faces competition from alternative development organizations, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. See also Lipscy & Lee (2019).

studies have questioned whether this political control leads the World Bank to deviate from its stated purpose.

In a seminal study, Frey & Schneider (1986, pp. 226–29) propose four models that might explain World Bank's lending behavior: (*a*) a "needs-model," where the World Bank provides credit to countries most in need; (*b*) a "deserts-model," where credit goes to countries most deserving in terms of responsible past policies; (*c*) a "benevolence-model," where World Bank bureaucrats benevolently push governments to undertake painful but necessary economic reforms; and (*d*) a "politico-economic-model," where the bureaucracy serves the strategic interests of the World Bank's most powerful members. They conclude from their data analysis that "the politico-economic-model is best suited to explain World Bank behavior" (Frey & Schneider 1986, p. 226). They stress, for example, that World Bank lending correlates with developing-country purchases of exports from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries, although not with exports from Germany, Japan, or Italy (p. 233).

Fleck & Kilby (2006) build on these results, presenting evidence that the World Bank deviates from its stated objectives to cater to governments of developing countries favored by the United States, as measured by (*a*) US exports purchased by the developing country, (*b*) US commercial financial flows into the country, and (*c*) the amount of US bilateral aid the developing country receives. Andersen et al. (2006a) similarly suggest that US political interests impact World Bank lending practices. They show that lending to the world's poorest countries through IDA correlates with voting in-line with the United States at the UNGA. Morrison (2011) shows that favoritism existed mainly during the Cold War, and Kersting & Kilby (2018) show that favoritism is mainly found when the US government is divided (suggesting that the executive branch uses the multilateral channel to work around Congress).

The United States may also pressure the World Bank to help friendly governments facing elections. Kersting & Kilby (2016) show that when governments that vote in-line with the United States at the UNGA face an upcoming election, World Bank investment project loans disburse faster. Disbursements slow in the run-up to elections for governments not aligned with the United States.

Many have questioned whether the above findings are spurious or result from endogeneity. Entering into an arrangement with the World Bank represents a joint decision by the international organization and the recipient government. The factors driving these decisions may correlate with the variables intended to measure US interests. Countries that purchase US exports or those that vote in-line with the United States at the UNGA may have governments that prefer the economic policies that the World Bank espouses.

To find an exogenous measure of political importance to the United States, Dreher et al. (2009b) again consider elected membership on the UNSC. Countries that eventually win election to the UNSC are, prior to election, no more likely than other countries to receive World Bank projects (Dreher et al. 2014). Once elected, however, members of the UNSC become more likely than other countries to receive such projects. The evidence suggests that the Bank's major shareholders trade loans for favorable votes. UNSC members receive an 87% increase in disbursements from the World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Vreeland & Dreher 2014, p. 162). African countries serving on the UNSC receive a 68% increase in disbursements from IDA (Vreeland & Dreher 2014, p. 163). The African angle is noteworthy because this region exhibits the most idiosyncratic pattern of election to the UNSC (on the European Union, see Mikulaschek 2018).

Using an alternative measure of political importance, Kaja & Werker (2010) reveal a plausible mechanism by which political favoritism influences World Bank loans. They show that when a developing country serves as a member of the World Bank's executive board, loan commitments from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development more than double (although they find no similar effect for the IDA). They suggest that the effect is driven by the "informal rules and norms in the boardroom" (Kaja & Werker 2010, p. 171). Morrison (2013) shows that reforms introduced in 1989 have reduced this influence of executive board membership.

Looking at project-level data, Malik & Stone (2018) fail to find consistent evidence of geopolitical influences but instead present evidence of the influence of Fortune 500 multinational corporations headquartered in the United States and Japan. In countries where these multinationals are heavily invested and where they are affiliated with project contractors, loans disburse faster.

A crucial question is whether these political pressures have any deleterious effects. Dreher et al. (2013) provide some optimism here. Again, using UNSC membership as a proxy for political importance, they consider the ex post performance ratings of World Bank projects. They find that political motivations have a detrimental effect only when the country already faces excessive short-term debt or debt service. Still there are many other metrics of performance where scholarship suggests that the World Bank has fallen short. Abouharb & Cingranelli (2007) show that the Bretton Woods institutions have failed to promote human rights and that their structural adjustment programs have hurt human development.

Scholarship on the Bretton Woods institutions thus reveals that powerful countries use the resources of these organizations, which are intended to address macroeconomic imbalances and economic development, to pay off favored countries. To measure political proximity, the literature has often relied on UN voting. While the evidence on the negative effects of such deals is mixed, the fact that IMF and World Bank money goes to countries with specific voting behavior at the UN implies that the votes are bought and sold.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND BUYING VOTES

The United Nations was founded on lofty principles "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights…, to establish conditions under which justice…can be maintained…, [and] to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" [Charter of the United Nations 1945: Preamble (**https://www.icj-cij.org/en/charter-of-the-united-nations#preamble**)]. Presumably in pursuit of these goals, the UNGA has voted on thousands of resolutions concerning a wide range of international affairs, from the recognition of sovereign states to the condemnation of states' actions.

In her seminal article using data from the earliest days of voting, Ball (1951) laid out a framework analyzing UNGA bloc voting, lobbying for votes, and logrolling on issues ranging from Franco Spain and Italian Colonies to Palestine Partition and the Internationalization of Jerusalem. Since then, interest in UNGA votes has exploded. Bailey et al. (2017) report 75 articles published between 1998 and 2012 using UN votes to measure state preferences. Efforts to quantify patterns of voting are plentiful; the data set of Bailey et al. (2017) represents the current state of the art.

Just as scholars have used UNGA voting to measure proximity to the major shareholders of the IMF and World Bank, many other studies similarly use UNGA voting as an independent variable to explain various international outcomes, including foreign aid (e.g., Wang 1999) and international law (e.g., Koremenos 2005).

Causality may run the other way: Dreher & Sturm (2012) consider UNGA voting as the dependent variable. They show that when governments receive nonconcessional IMF and World Bank loans they become more likely to vote in line with G7 countries. Analyzing patterns of foreign aid, Dreher et al. (2008b) present evidence that the United States uses budget support and grants to induce governments to vote the US preference on UNGA resolutions.

A related study presents major findings on how competition between the United States and China plays out through economic ties to the developing world. Flores-Macías & Kreps (2013) show that when states in Latin America and Africa trade more with China, they become increasingly likely to converge with China on foreign policy issues, as measured by UNGA voting patterns. For a study of the competition of votes between the West and the East during the Cold War, see Woo & Chung (2017). They contend that the United States funneled additional foreign aid not to politically proximate countries but rather to swing votes, buying them away from the Soviets.

Some scholars have emphasized the interaction of international vote buying with domestic politics. Lai & Morey (2006) argue that autocracies are more willing to sell their votes because they can use foreign aid to provide private goods to the elites whose support helps autocrats to survive in office (see also Smith 2016). By contrast, Carter & Stone (2015) claim that vote buying is more effective among democracies because arrangements are more credible.

In these studies of UNGA voting, endogeneity is a problem. Flores-Macías & Kreps (2013, p. 364) note that UNGA voting might reflect "some proclivity towards or against liberal norms," which could directly impact choice of trading partners (see also Häge & Hug 2016 and Potrafke 2009). Flores-Macías & Kreps (2013) use a two staged least-squares approach, instrumenting lagged energy production for trade. Lagged energy production, which tracks with economic activity, is correlated with trading activities but presumably is not directly related to UNGA voting.

Such instrumental variables are notoriously difficult to find and are always open to critique. In a game-changing study, Kuziemko & Werker (2006) tackle this issue by shifting the focus from the UNGA to the UNSC. As noted by Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2010, p. 681), "UNSC membership offers a quasi-natural experiment." More than 80% of elections to the UNSC are uncontested; regions nominate clean slates (Vreeland & Dreher 2014, p. 94). The nomination process appears to follow idiosyncratic patterns, although most regions tend to nominate more populous and more economically dominant countries. Africa is the exception; the region has committed to a rarely broken norm of rotation across countries (88% of nominations for sub-Saharan African seats are uncontested). Hence, African membership on the UNSC represents the closest-to-random variation in UNSC membership. Moreover, all elected members are subject to exogenous two-year term limits.

Furthermore, Kuziemko & Werker (2006, p. 905) make a good case that votes at the UNSC are valuable, noting that it has the power to "authorize multilateral sanctions and military action." The importance of UNSC votes in international affairs—and domestic politics—has been shown by several studies (e.g., Voeten 2005, Hurd 2008, Chapman 2011).

Kuziemko & Werker (2006) present evidence of bribery. They find that countries elected to the UNSC experience a 59% increase in US foreign aid and an 8% increase in UN aid (mainly from UNICEF). The finding is strongest during years when the UNSC addresses matters of US concern (as measured by *New York Times* coverage). Vreeland & Dreher (2014) present a similar effect of UNSC membership on Japanese and German foreign aid.

Vreeland & Dreher (2014) also explore the effect of UNSC membership on African Development Bank lending patterns. Analysis of the African Development Bank has unique methodological value. When it was founded, only African countries were invited as members—so there was no direct Western influence. In 1982, the bank invited Western governments to join. Along with Western resources came Western political influence. So, we have an institution observed with and without Western influence and a quasi-random treatment variable in UNSC membership. An increase in loans from the African Development Bank is found for UNSC membership only in the post-1982 period, when Western governments exerted direct influence over the institution's executive board.

Reynolds & Winters (2016) methodologically innovate the study of the effects of elected UNSC membership by introducing a constrained permutations approach to generate placebo UNSC membership histories. The approach reduces the chances of producing false-positive results (see Reynolds & Winters 2016, pp. 2 and 7). They mostly confirm the findings in the literature—in some cases with less precision (e.g., US and UNICEF aid flows) and in other cases with more precision (e.g., Japanese and German aid flows) (see Reynolds & Winters 2016, p. 4). In addition to the mass of quantitative evidence, scholars have also presented qualitative examples of powerful governments pressuring countries on how to vote at the UNSC [see, for example, Voeten (2001, p. 850), Eldar (2008, pp. 17–18), Thompson (2009), and Chapman (2011, p. 13)].

A key question remains: Are there harmful effects from trading finance for political favors? Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2010, p. 674) study these effects (measured over a four-year period, beginning with the election year of the UNSC member) on economic growth, democracy, press freedoms, and security alignment with the United States. They find pernicious consequences. Growth over a four-year period for nonmembers is 8.7%, but it is 3.5% during UNSC membership. The effect is mainly driven by African authoritarian countries (Vreeland & Dreher 2014, pp. 214–18). Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2010, p. 674) further show, however, that UNSC membership also undermines democracy and reduces press freedoms. They argue that the aid going to UNSC members subsidizes bad economic policies and props up bad governments (see also Nooruddin & Vreeland 2010). They further interpret these results as evidence of bribery. As a test, they examine the effect of UNSC membership on the formation and breakup of formal military alliances. They find that UNSC members increase their alignment with the United States (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010, p. 674).

Bashir & Lim (2013) offer an alternative mechanism for the findings. Noting that the effects appear to hold even for UNSC members that do not receive increased levels of foreign aid, they suggest that "membership may enable deleterious state policy through a lessened fear of international sanction" (Bashir & Lim 2013, p. 509). However, Dreher et al. (2018, p. 268) look directly at the effect of foreign aid on growth and find that "the effect of aid on growth is significantly lower when aid was committed during a country's tenure on the UNSC." The finding holds when they restrict the sample to Africa, where, again, strict rotation norms generate a quasi-experimental setting (see also Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2013).

In sum, governments trade money for political influence. This is not surprising. The negative effects for development and democratic rule are disappointing, however. More disappointing is that the negative development outcomes from bribing votes emerge from an institution founded with the goal to "promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."

THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Another goal of the UN at its founding was to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights," and it is in the area of human rights that the institution may have gone the furthest off the rails. Vote buying is commonplace corruption; exploiting human rights institutions as a veil to violate those very rights, as some studies contend, represents a gross distortion.

To be sure, there is considerable disagreement in the literature on the UN's human rights achievements. Simmons (2009) emphasizes the importance of the UN human rights treaties: They constitute an international legal infrastructure that goes against the long-standing presumption of sovereignty regarding the treatment of a government's own citizens. Critics draw attention to where this infrastructure has fallen short. For a recent overview of the complex international human rights regime, see Von Stein (2018). Also, Hafner-Burton (2012) presents a thorough and balanced presentation of what scholarship has learned about international human rights legal regimes. Here, I present the dark side of this literature, focusing on the biggest disappointments.

The UN established the Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in 1946, and 60 years later they shut it down. The *New York Times* referred to it as the "shame of the UN" (Hug & Lukács 2014, p. 85). There are various reasons.

Consider who won election to the body. Edwards et al. (2008, p. 391) find that "states with particularly good and particularly poor" human rights records were the most likely to be selected by the UNGA to serve on the commission. The prediction of whether the best or the worst won election depends on regional dynamics (region also influences how countries vote on human rights resolutions—see Boockmann & Dreher 2011). In regions with many democracies, countries with poor human rights records were unlikely to be selected. But in more autocratic regions, selected governments were likely to be practicing extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment (Edwards et al. 2008, pp. 395 and 398).

Edwards et al. (2008, p. 394) contend that the worst-offending governments sought election precisely to "project a positive image internationally despite the fact that their domestic behavior had not changed." Membership also appears to have provided some degree of political cover for human rights violations (see also Hathaway 2002). Kent (1995) details fascinating tactics used by China to pressure countries on how to vote on various human rights resolutions. Hug & Lukács (2014, pp. 85–86) report that the UNCHR was politicized, lacked professionalism, and became a "blot on the reputation" of the UN.

An early assessment of the UNCHR replacement body—the UN Human Rights Council, which has made negligible changes to membership criteria—does not suggest that much has changed (Hug & Lukács 2014, pp. 86–87). Hug & Lukács (2014) show that a country's own human rights record as well as its level of democracy are major determinants of how that country votes on human rights resolutions. Resolutions become a way for countries with good and bad records, respectively, to shame one another. They conclude, "Countries with poor human rights records vote systematically differently from those that do not engage in torture" (Hug & Lukács 2014, p. 103). (For an alternative perspective, contending that after the end of the Cold War, the UNCHR targeted countries appropriately based on their human rights records, see Lebovic & Voeten 2006.)

The stark contrast between democratic and autocratic governments with respect to their human rights practices and their interaction with UN human rights efforts plays out in the patterns of which countries adopt UN human rights treaties—and their effects. Consider the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (or the CAT), where scholarship has reached its bleakest conclusions.

In her path-breaking work, Hathaway (2002, 2003, 2007) reveals that democratic and autocratic countries exhibit remarkably distinct patterns of ratifying the CAT with respect to the level of torture reported (see also Landman 2005). Democracies behave how one might expect. Most of them practice relatively low levels of torture (although see Davenport 2007), and they are more likely to sign and ratify the CAT when torture is low. When torture rates under democracy go up (such as during a civil war), democratic governments are less likely to enter into the CAT. Under autocracy, we observe the opposite pattern. Autocratic governments with the lowest levels of torture reported are the least likely to ratify the CAT. As torture rates go up, autocratic governments actually become more likely to ratify.

Hathaway (2003) explains that a major part of the explanation for this pattern is the different cost of compliance across regimes. Most democracies have domestic institutions upholding human rights, so the costs are relatively low. (Chapman & Chaudoin 2013 similarly argue that compliance costs explain International Criminal Court ratification; for a contrasting argument, see Simmons

& Danner 2010.) Goodliffe & Hawkins (2006) build on the cost-of-commitment approach, noting that countries with stronger civil rights are more likely to ratify. They also reveal that regional variation in norms explains much of the pattern of CAT adoption (see also Lutz & Sikkink 2000).

The pattern for autocracies invites cynicism, and scholars have attempted to unravel the autocratic mystery (on democracy, see Neumayer 2005). Hathaway (2007, p. 597) points out that autocracies with particularly poor human rights records may seek reputational gains. She contends that the worst abusers of human rights are the most in need of improving their reputation on the international stage. As torture rates go up, so does the need for political cover. Nielsen & Simmons (2015) challenge the notion that states adopt human rights treaties for international benefits. They find no evidence of material benefits and suggest scholars consider domestic politics explanations. After all, the apparent propensity of high-torture autocracies to adopt the CAT might be spurious. Closed autocracies may effectively rule through fear, reducing their need to commit torture; more liberal autocracies that invite dissent through legal political parties ironically practice more torture as citizens cross ambiguous political lines. These multiparty autocracies also face domestic political pressure, however, and this pressure makes them more likely to adopt the CAT (Vreeland 2008). Still, Kahn-Nisser (2018) shows that the CAT's committee gives more positive reviews in its official reports to governments that vote with the United States in the UNGA. So there may be international incentives beyond the domestic factors shaping participation.

Conrad (2014) shows that the effect of multiple political parties on entering into the CAT depends on the strength of the domestic judiciary (see also Moustafa 2003 and Powell & Staton 2009). In autocracies with a strong, independent judiciary, political parties do not pressure the government to adopt the CAT, presumably because there are more credible protections against human rights violations through the strong domestic institutions. Conrad & Ritter (2013) show more generally that the effect of the CAT on reducing torture depends on how leaders view the distinct threats of public unrest and the judiciary. Public unrest tempts leaders to repress, but an independent judiciary could rule against the government for doing so. Conrad & Ritter (2013) contend that leaders with a lot to lose in domestic conflict (politically secure leaders) fear more from public unrest and therefore engage in systemic torture, whereas leaders on their way out of office do not repress public dissent to avoid potential judicial consequences. Interestingly, obligation to the CAT constrains the former, but not the latter.

Hollyer & Rosendorff (2011) present evidence that rates of torture decrease under highly secure autocrats who adopt the CAT, and they propose a sinister theory as to why. They stress the radical implications of the treaty's universal jurisdiction, which criminalizes torture by public officials regardless of where it is committed (Hollyer & Rosendorff 2011, p. 279). Universal jurisdiction has been used in a handful of cases where one state brings formal charges against the public officials of other countries for crimes of torture—after the public officials have left power (see also Goodliffe & Hawkins 2006, p. 360). If a dictator ratifies the CAT, he increases the chances that he will face prosecution by another government for crimes of torture if he falls from power. With this dynamic in mind, Hollyer & Rosendorff (2011) directly challenge the view that governments enter into international agreements with the intention to comply. These authors contend that governments enter into the CAT to credibly signal the precise opposite: They intend to implement as much torture as necessary.

Their logic goes as follows. Hollyer & Rosendorff (2011) suggest that certain dictators use the CAT to credibly signal their strong resolve to stay in power. Citizens observe that their government commits torture and that their leader signs a treaty that could send him to prison for committing torture if he were ever to fall from power. Citizens reason that their leader must have strong resolve to stay in power. Indeed, a weak leader (with low resolve) would not sign, knowing that his precarious leadership could soon end. Such weak leaders would only open the possibility of prosecution for crimes of torture if they were to sign the CAT and then fall from power. Citizens reach the conclusion that only a strong leader—confident in his ability to survive in power—would sign the CAT. Hollyer & Rosendorff (2011) present evidence that dictators who sign the CAT survive longer in power and face lower levels of opposition because citizens live in credible fear of their strong resolve to stay in power, paradoxically signaled by their signing the CAT. [Conrad & Ritter (2019) present an optimistic interpretation: The CAT seems to influence only the worst states because other states have less room for improvement.]

Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui (2005) also study the CAT as well as all six of the core UN human rights treaties, which, respectively, cover (*a*) racial discrimination; (*b*) economic, social, and cultural rights; (*c*) civil and political rights; (*d*) discrimination against women; (*e*) torture; and (*f*) rights of the child. They find "radical decoupling" of policies and practices, wherein at times "treaties have an effect opposite to what [is] intended" (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui 2005 p. 1383). Although optimistic that the treaties have helped engender global human rights norms, Hafner-Burton et al. (2008, p. 136) argue that repressive states are "especially eager" to enter into these treaties as a low-cost way to appear to adhere to these norms (see also Hafner-Burton 2013). But for these states, adopting the treaties may be "a matter of window dressing" (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui 2005, p. 1373). Studying the 22 most important human rights agreements (as defined by Simmons 2009), Hollyer & Rosendorff (2012) show that, among autocracies, these treaties have, at best, a small effect on human rights measures. They further find that the worst offenders are more likely to join these treaties and that autocratic leaders who accede survive longer in office than those that do not—so democratization is delayed.

CONCLUSION

Governments exploit international organizations in myriad ways to further strategic goals. Although the literature shows that autocratic leaders have exploited international organizations as cover for human rights violations, this review also documents ways in which democracies—notably the United States—have harnessed the power of international institutions to achieve their own strategic goals. This review opens with the observation that Western democracies are turning away from the institutions they founded following World War II. It is thus perhaps ironic that the West, which has surreptitiously benefited from international institutions, should join the charge against them.

Yet these countries are not monoliths. As the larger international political economy literature explains, there are winners and losers from globalization. The work of Broz & Hawes (2006) and Gould (2003, 2006) shows that constituencies that win from promoting a globalized economy show different levels of support for international organizations than constituents who lose.

With the losers from globalization coming to power in many places, they bring the full range of criticisms against these institutions to the fore. Critics come from across the spectrum, with some arguing that the financial assistance of international organizations subsidizes bad policies and bad governments, and others contending that policies advocated by international organizations have harmful effects. Some opponents are simply wary of international entanglements. When governments use international organizations for purposes outside their official mandates, or, worse, when they violate the high-minded principles for which the organizations stand, these organizations become easy targets of all sorts of skeptics.

Supporters counter that international organizations also do good. Many scholars point out that, even if international organizations face political pressure from their members, they are still less politicized than an individual government because they answer to multiple governments, which can check each other's influence. The multilateral organization has less at stake in the political outcomes than any specific government engaged in international affairs (see, e.g., Rodrik 1996, Abbott & Snidal 1998, Milner 2006, Dietrich 2013, Bermeo 2018). Still, survey-experiment evidence suggests that people perceive little difference between bilateral and multilateral efforts (Findley et al. 2017). It is possible that the distorted uses of international organizations, reported here, have created too much cynicism for people to seek out nuances.

Nevertheless, one should not let perfect institutions become the enemy of good institutions. Multilateralism might require some degree of misuse of organizations by members to satisfy the participation constraint. Such a view need not deter researchers from trying to understand why and how governments use their international organizations for shady purposes. Indeed, we can put reformers in a stronger position with more information on where institutions might go wrong.

The problem with much of the research on the misuse of international organizations is that the data-driven work tends to focus on macro-level correlations, with micro work focusing on specific cases. Although casual observers are not typically surprised to learn that strategic politics corrupt the stated purposes of international organizations, insiders who work at these institutions do genuinely react with disbelief at some of the correlations the literature has documented. I suspect that this is because the arrangements that governments make when trading favors are executed through circuitous paths. Additional systematic research at the micro level is needed to map out the paths by which international organizations are corrupted.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For excellent suggestions, the author thanks Courtenay Conrad, Axel Dreher, Emilie Hafner-Burton, James Hollyer, Christopher Kilby, Stephanie Rickard, Emily Ritter, Peter Rosendorff, Randall Stone, and the anonymous reviewer.

LITERATURE CITED

Abbott KW, Snidal D. 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 42(1):3–32

Abouharb MR, Cingranelli D. 2007. *Human Rights and Structural Adjustment*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press

Andersen TB, Hansen H, Markussen T. 2006a. US politics and World Bank IDA-lending. *J. Dev. Stud.* 42(5):772–94

Andersen TB, Harr T, Tarp F. 2006b. On US politics and IMF lending. *Eur. Econ. Rev.* 50(7):1843–62

Babb S, Buira A. 2005. Mission creep, mission push and discretion: the case of IMF conditionality. In *The IMF and the World Bank at Sixty*, ed. A Buira, pp. 59–84. London: Anthem

Bailey MA, Strezhnev A, Voeten E. 2017. Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 61(2):430–56

Ball MM. 1951. Bloc voting in the General Assembly. *Int. Organ.* 5(1):3–31

Barro RJ, Lee JW. 2005. IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects? *J. Monet. Econ.* 52(7):1245–69

Bashir OS, Lim DJ. 2013. Misplaced blame: foreign aid and the consequences of UN Security Council membership. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 57(3):509–23

Beazer QH, Woo B. 2016. IMF conditionality, government partisanship, and the progress of economic reforms. *Am. J. Political Sci.* 60(2):304–21

Bermeo S. 2018. *Targeted Development: Industrialized Country Strategy in a Globalizing World*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press
Boockmann B, Dreher A. 2011. Do human rights offenders oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations? *Public Choice* 146(3–4):443–67
Broz JL, Hawes MB. 2006. U.S. domestic politics and International Monetary fund policy. In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, ed. DG Hawkins, DA Lake, DL Nielson, MJ Tierney, pp. 77–106. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Bueno de Mesquita B, Smith A. 2010. The pernicious consequences of UN Security Council Membership. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 54(5):667–86
Bueno de Mesquita B, Smith A. 2013. Aid: Blame it all on "easy money." *J. Confl. Resolut.* 57(3):524–37
Caraway TL, Rickard SJ, Anner MS. 2012. International negotiations and domestic politics: the case of IMF labor market conditionality. *Int. Organ.* 66(1):27–61
Carter DB, Stone RW. 2015. Democracy and multilateralism: the case of vote buying in the UN General Assembly. *Int. Organ.* 69(1):1–33
Chapman T, Fang S, Li X, Stone RW. 2017. Mixed signals: IMF lending and capital markets. *Br. J. Political Sci.* 47(2):329–49
Chapman TL. 2011. *Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Chapman TL, Chaudoin S. 2013. Ratification patterns and the international criminal court. *Int. Stud. Q.* 57(2):400–9
Cho HJ. 2018. *Institutions, Partisanship and Credibility in Global Financial Markets*. New York: Routledge
Chwieroth JM. 2010. *Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Conrad CR. 2014. Divergent incentives for dictators: domestic institutions and (international promises not to) torture. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 58(1):34–67
Conrad CR, Ritter EH. 2013. Treaties, tenure, and torture: the conflicting domestic effects of international law. *J. Politics* 75(2):397–409
Conrad CR, Ritter EH. 2019. *Contentious Compliance: Dissent and Repression under International Human Rights Law*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. In press
Copelovitch MS. 2010. *The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, Bonds, and Bailouts*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Davenport C. 2007. *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Dietrich S. 2013. Bypass or engage? Explaining donor delivery tactics in aid allocation. *Int. Stud. Q.* 57(4):698–712
Dippel C. 2015. Foreign aid and voting in international organizations: evidence from the IWC. *J. Public Econ.* 132:1–12
Downs GW, Rocke DM, Barsoom PN. 1996. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? *Int. Organ.* 50(3):379–406
Dreher A, Eichenauer VZ, Gehring K. 2018. Geopolitics, aid, and growth: the impact of UN Security Council membership on the effectiveness of aid. *World Bank Econ. Rev.* 32(2):268–86
Dreher A, Gould M, Rablen MD, Vreeland JR. 2014. The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council. *Public Choice* 158(1–2):51–83
Dreher A, Jensen NM. 2007. Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of US interests on International Monetary Fund conditions. *J. Law Econ.* 50(1):105–24
Dreher A, Klasen S, Vreeland JR, Werker E. 2013. The costs of favoritism: Is politically driven aid less effective? *Econ. Dev. Cult. Change* 62(1):157–91
Dreher A, Marchesi S, Vreeland JR. 2008a. The political economy of IMF forecasts. *Public Choice* 137(1–2):145–71
Dreher A, Nunnenkamp P, Thiele R. 2008b. Does US aid buy UN General Assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis. *Public Choice* 136(1–2):139–64
Dreher A, Sturm JE. 2012. Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly? *Public Choice* 151(1–2):363–97

Dreher A, Sturm JE, Vreeland JR. 2009a. Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. *Eur. Econ. Rev.* 53(7):742–57

Dreher A, Sturm JE, Vreeland JR. 2009b. Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? *J. Dev. Econ.* 88(1):1–18

Edwards MS, Scott KM, Allen SH, Irvin K. 2008. Sins of commission? Understanding membership patterns on the United Nations Human Rights Commission. *Political Res. Q.* 61(3):390–402

Eldar O. 2008. Vote-trading in international institutions. *Eur. J. Int. Law* 19(1):3–41

Findley MG, Milner HV, Nielson DL. 2017. The choice among aid donors: the effects of multilateral versus bilateral aid on recipient behavioral support. *Rev. Int. Organ.* 12(2):307–34

Fleck RK, Kilby C. 2006. World Bank independence: a model and statistical analysis of US influence. *Rev. Dev. Econ.* 10(2):224–40

Flores-Macías GA, Kreps SE. 2013. The foreign policy consequences of trade: China's commercial relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992–2006. *J. Politics* 75(2):357–71

Frey BS, Schneider F. 1986. Competing models of international lending activity. *J. Dev. Econ.* 20(2):225–45

Gartzke E, Naoi M. 2011. Multilateralism and democracy: a dissent regarding Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik. *Int. Organ.* 65(3):589–98

Goodliffe J, Hawkins DG. 2006. Explaining commitment: states and the convention against torture. *J. Politics* 68(2):358–71

Gould ER. 2003. Money talks: supplementary financiers and International Monetary Fund conditionality. *Int. Organ.* 57(3):551–86

Gould ER. 2006. *Money Talks: The International Monetary Fund, Conditionality, and Supplementary Financiers*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press

Hafner-Burton EM. 2012. International regimes for human rights. *Annu. Rev. Political Sci.* 15:265–86

Hafner-Burton EM. 2013. *Making Human Rights a Reality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

Hafner-Burton EM, Tsutsui K. 2005. Human rights in a globalizing world: the paradox of empty promises. *Am. J. Sociol.* 110(5):1373–411

Hafner-Burton EM, Tsutsui K, Meyer JW. 2008. International human rights law and the politics of legitimation: repressive states and human rights treaties. *Int. Sociol.* 23(1):115–41

Häge F, Hug S. 2016. Consensus decisions and similarity measures in international organizations. *Int. Interact.* 42(3):503–29

Hathaway OA. 2002. Do human rights treaties make a difference? *Yale Law J.* 111(8):1935–2042

Hathaway OA. 2003. The cost of commitment. *Stanford Law Rev.* 1(1):1821–62

Hathaway OA. 2007. Why do countries commit to human rights treaties? *J. Confl. Resolut.* 51(4):588–621

Helleiner E. 2010. Global governance meets development. In *Global Governance, Poverty and Inequality*, ed. J Clapp, R Wilkinson, pp. 27–45. London: Routledge

Hollyer JR, Rosendorff BP. 2011. Why do authoritarian regimes sign the convention against torture? Signaling, domestic politics and non-compliance. *Q. J. Political Sci.* 6(3–4):275–327

Hollyer JR, Rosendorff BP. 2012. Do human rights agreements prolong the tenure of autocratic ratifiers? *J. Int. Law Politics* 44(3):791–811

Hug S, Lukács R. 2014. Preferences or blocs? Voting in the United Nations human rights council. *Rev. Int. Organ.* 9(1):83–106

Hurd I. 2008. *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

Johnson T. 2011. Guilt by association: the link between states' influence and the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations. *Rev. Int. Organ.* 6(1):57–84

Kahn-Nisser S. 2018. When the targets are members and donors: analyzing inter-governmental organizations' human rights shaming. *Rev. Int. Organ.* In press. **https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9317-4**

Kaja A, Werker E. 2010. Corporate governance at the World Bank and the dilemma of global governance. *World Bank Econ. Rev.* 24(2):171–98

Kapur D, Lewis J, Webb R. 1997. *The World Bank: Its First Half Century*. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst.

Kent AE. 1995. China and the international human rights regime: a case study of multilateral monitoring, 1989–1994. *Hum. Rights Q.* 17(1):1–47

Kersting EK, Kilby C. 2016. With a little help from my friends: global electioneering and World Bank lending. *J. Dev. Econ.* 121:153–65

Kersting EK, Kilby C. 2018. Do domestic politics shape US influence in the World Bank? *Rev. Int. Organ.* In press

Koremenos B. 2005. Contracting around international uncertainty. *Am. Political Sci. Rev.* 99(4):549–65

Kuziemko I, Werker E. 2006. How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. *J. Political Econ.* 114(5):905–30

Lai B, Morey DS. 2006. Impact of regime type on the influence of US foreign aid. *Foreign Policy Anal.* 2(4):385–404

Lall R. 2017. Beyond institutional design: explaining the performance of international organizations. *Int. Organ.* 71(2):245–80

Landman T. 2005. *Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study*. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press

Lang VF, Presbitero AF. 2018. Room for discretion? Biased decision-making in international financial institutions. *J. Dev. Econ.* 130(1):1–16

Lawrimore T, Vreeland JR. 2018. Aid as a building bloc: Australia and the Bretton Woods Institutions. *Aust. J. Political Sci.* 53(4):463–79

Lebovic JH, Voeten E. 2006. The politics of shame: the condemnation of country human rights practices in the UNCHR. *Int. Stud. Q.* 50(4):861–88

Lipscy PY. 2003. Japan's Asian Monetary Fund proposal. *Stanford J. East Asian Aff.* 3(1):93–104

Lipscy PY. 2017. *Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press

Lipscy PY, Lee HNK. 2019. The IMF as a biased global insurance mechanism: asymmetrical moral hazard, reserve accumulation, and financial crises. *Int. Organ.* 73(1):35–64

Lutz EL, Sikkink K. 2000. International human rights law and practice in Latin America. *Int. Organ.* 54(3):633–59

Malik R, Stone RW. 2018. Corporate influence in World Bank lending. *J. Politics* 80(1):103–18

Marshall K. 2008. *The World Bank: From Reconstruction to Development to Equity*. New York: Routledge

Mattes M, Leeds BA, Carroll R. 2015. Leadership turnover and foreign policy change: societal interests, domestic institutions, and voting in the United Nations. *Int. Stud. Q.* 59(2):280–90

Mikulaschek C. 2018. Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries' temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget? *Rev. Int. Organ.* 13(4):491–518

Milner HV. 2006. Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems. In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, ed. D Hawkins, DA Lake, D Nielson, MJ Tierney, pp. 107–39. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press

Momani B. 2004. American politicization of the International Monetary Fund. *Rev. Int. Political Econ.* 11(5):880–904

Morrison KM. 2011. As the World Bank turns: determinants of IDA lending in the Cold War and after. *Bus. Politics* 13(2):1–27

Morrison KM. 2013. Membership no longer has its privileges: the declining informal influence of board members on IDA lending. *Rev. Int. Organ.* 8(2):291–312

Moustafa T. 2003. Law versus the state: the judicialization of politics in Egypt. *Law Soc. Inq.* 28(4):883–930

Nelson SC. 2017. *The Currency of Confidence: How Economic Beliefs Shape the IMF's Relationship with Its Borrowers*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press

Neumayer E. 2005. Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? *J. Confl. Resolut.* 49(6):925–53

Nielsen R, Simmons B. 2015. Rewards for ratification: payoffs for participating in the international human rights regime? *Int. Stud. Q.* 59(2):197–208

Nooruddin I, Vreeland JR. 2010. The effect of IMF programs on public wages and salaries. In *Global Governance, Poverty and Inequality*, ed. J Clapp, R Wilkinson, pp. 90–111. London: Routledge

Oatley T, Yackee J. 2004. American interests and IMF lending. *Int. Politics* 41(3):415–29

Pop-Eleches G. 2008. *From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

Potrafke N. 2009. Does government ideology influence political alignment with the US? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly. *Rev. Int. Organ.* 4(3):245–68

Powell EJ, Staton JK. 2009. Domestic judicial institutions and human rights treaty violation. *Int. Stud. Q.* 53(1):149–74

Reynaud J, Vauday J. 2009. Geopolitics and international organizations: an empirical study on IMF facilities. *J. Dev. Econ.* 89(1):139–62

Reynolds EM, Winters MS. 2016. Foreign aid funnel? A placebo-based assessment of aid flows to non-permanent United Nations Security Council members. *Res. Politics* 3(1):1–9

Rodrik D. 1996. Why is there multilateral lending? In *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995*, ed. M Bruno, B Pleskovic, pp. 167–206. Washington, DC: World Bank

Schneider CJ, Tobin JL. 2013. Interest coalitions and multilateral aid allocation in the European Union. *Int. Stud. Q.* 57(1):103–14

Simmons BA. 2009. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press

Simmons BA, Danner A. 2010. Credible commitments and the International Criminal Court. *Int. Organ.* 64(2):225–56

Smith A. 2016. Leader turnover, institutions, and voting at the UN General Assembly. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 60(1):143–63

Stiles KW. 1990. IMF conditionality: coercion or compromise? *World Dev*. 18(7):959–74

Stone RW. 2002. *Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

Stone RW. 2004. The political economy of IMF lending in Africa. *Am. Political Sci. Rev.* 98(4):577–91

Stone RW. 2008. The scope of IMF conditionality. *Int. Organ.* 62(4):589–620

Stone RW. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press

Strand JR, Tuman JP. 2012. Foreign aid and voting behavior in an international organization: the case of Japan and the International Whaling Commission. *Foreign Policy Anal*. 8(4):409–30

Thacker SC. 1999. The high politics of IMF lending. *World Politics* 52(1):38–75

Thompson A. 2009. *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press

Vaubel R. 1996. Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank: a comparison of the evidence. *World Econ*. 19(2):195–210

Voeten E. 2001. Outside options and the logic of Security Council action. *Am. Political Sci. Rev.* 95(4):845–58

Voeten E. 2005. The political origins of the UN Security Council's ability to legitimize the use of force. *Int. Organ.* 59(3):527–57

Von Stein J. 2018. Exploring the universe of UN human rights agreements. *J. Confl. Resolut.* 62(4):871–99

Vreeland JR. 2008. Political institutions and human rights: Why dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. *Int. Organ.* 62(1):65–101

Vreeland JR, Dreher A. 2014. *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press

Wang TY. 1999. U.S. foreign aid and UN voting: an analysis of important issues. *Int. Stud. Q.* 43(1):199–210

Weaver C. 2008. *Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press

Woo B, Chung E. 2017. Aid for vote? United Nations General Assembly voting and American aid allocation. *Political Stud*. 66(4):1002–26

Woo B, Murdie A. 2017. International organizations and naming and shaming: Does the International Monetary Fund care about the human rights reputation of its client? *Political Stud*. 65(4):767–85

Woods N. 2005. Making the IMF and the World Bank more accountable. In *Reforming the Governance of the IMF and the World Bank*, ed. A Buira, pp. 149–70. London: Anthem

Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 22, 2019

Contents

Errata

An online log of corrections to *Annual Review of Political Science* articles may be found at http://www.annualreviews.org/errata/polisci