The post-cold war era presented security challenges that at one level are a continuation of the cold war era; at another level, these phenomena manifested in new forms. Whether the issues of economics and trade, transfer of technologies, challenges of intervention, or humanitarian crisis, the countries of the South (previously pejoratively labelled "Third World" or "developing" countries) have continued to address these challenges within the framework of their capabilities and concerns. The volume explores defence diplomacies, national security challenges and strategies, dynamics of diplomatic manoeuvres and strategic resource management of Latin American, southern African and Asian countries.

This path-breaking work is a fresh addition to the comparative literature on defence and security studies that links concepts and cases, giving voice to scholars related to the Global South and not to the Western powers. Emphasising history, political economy, the military, (human) security and politics, contributors to this innovative volume demonstrate 'how the past reappears because it is a hidden present', to paraphrase novelist Octavio Paz. A *capita selecta* of case studies and dialogue engendered thereby hold much promise for academic researchers, theorists, expert practitioners, security and political practitioners, policymakers and students. Apart from comparative potential, the analyses reflect a purposeful blend of theory, history and substance — indeed a worthy and valuable venture in current times.
Abstract
This chapter examines Brazil’s policies for the protection of its strategic resources. The new agenda on security and defence is reshaping the Armed Forces missions at the domestic level (which includes support for natural disasters and constabulary missions), and at international level, characterised by asymmetric conflicts and non-traditional threats, such as international terrorism, and arms, human and drug trafficking. The transnational character of these threats has been boosting the countries to search for shared resolutions. In this context, the process of horizontalisation of diplomacy and the increasing involvement of the military in non-coercive activities has raised questions regarding the limits placed on the armed forces in the international arena, and has shed light on the prospect of using the military apparatus as a peaceful instrument of foreign policy. Discussing how these issues materialised in Brazilian defence policies, and how the defence sector is acting to provide national development and protection to the national strategic resources through deterrence and cooperation, are the central themes of this chapter. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first session present Brazil’s defence documents and show the country’s main objectives in this field, as well as the role of defence diplomacy in achieving them. The second section describes the main defence diplomacy activities developed by Brazil in South America, while the third section details the strategic projects that the country has been developing in order to guarantee its sovereignty, national treasures and territorial integrity. For this chapter, we consulted academic literature on Brazilian defence policy and the governmental documents related to the subject.

Introduction
The complementary relationship between diplomacy and war, as described from a realist point of view by Aron (1962), has returned to the centre of academic debate in recent decades. The horizontalisation of diplomacy and the increasing involvement of the military in non-coercive activities has raised questions about the limits placed on the armed forces in the international arena, while also shedding light on the use of military apparatus as a peaceful instrument of foreign policy.

Parag Khanna (2011) postulates that diplomacy has never been more important, yet its scope, agents and modus operandi differ greatly from those advocated by the authors
of classical realism during the Cold War. Ministries of foreign affairs no longer have the monopoly on diplomatic activities, as members of other ministries and representatives of subnational governments, as well as organised sectors of civil society, develop and negotiate their agendas in the international arena without interfering with states’ foreign policy. The systematisation of this practice has minimised the negative image that the concept of paradiplomacy inspired.

The end of the East-West conflict also had significant consequences for the military apparatus. Since the 1990s, there has been an increase in participation by the armed forces in cooperative activities (humanitarian aid, natural disaster support, exchanges in teaching and technical-professional areas, support for security and development activities, etc.) at both the international and regional level, and as part of bilateral agreements. The process of diplomatic decentralisation, coupled with the expansion of the military’s non-coercive activities, has ignited the debate on diplomatic actions carried out by the defence sector.

Some authors frame this phenomenon in the context of the transformations that the United States (US) and Western European armed forces underwent after the end of the Cold War. Farrell, Rynning, and Teriff (2013) show that the armies of the US, the United Kingdom (UK), and France were generally restructured as expeditionary forces between the early 1990s and the late 2000s. In the case of the UK and France, this restructuring involved the development of a new doctrine that would enable forces to operate in a more dispersed and holistic, and less lethal way to achieve strategic objectives. Meanwhile, Cottee and Forster (2004) note that since the 1990s, NATO countries have conducted military exercises with their former enemies, and the US has established bilateral military cooperation relations with China and India, and initiated understandings in the defence field with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union (AU), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

According to the constructivist perspective on international relations, defence diplomacy seeks to mitigate the behaviour of the state through a focus on conflict and war. The main difference between this perspective and the realist view is the use of cooperation, or cooperative and non-coercive military power. In this way, defence diplomacy is part of a wider diplomatic context, related to the construction of the image of both the Armed Forces and of the country itself, and can be considered an extension of the country’s public diplomacy. It is essentially a set of activities and initiatives that are followed by the armed forces, in conjunction with regular diplomacy, particularly with reference to the foreign armed forces in peacetime (Singh, 2011).

According to the constructivist view, the objective of defence diplomacy is the achievement of security and external defence. In the context of global and regional strategic engagement,
this creates sustainable cooperative relationships by building trust and facilitating conflict prevention, introducing transparency in defence relations, reinforcing perceptions of common interest, changing the fixed mindset of partners, and improving cooperation in other areas (Muthana, 2011:3).

As will be shown in this chapter, Brazil fits into the constructivist perspective, as its defence diplomacy seeks cooperation as a means of creating trust and integration. This position was made explicit in the documents produced by the Defence sector from the 1990s and constitutes a central part of the objectives set out in the National Defence Policy (PND). In its turn, the National Defence Strategy (END) states that Brazil will promote neither hegemony nor domination, as the Brazilian people are not willing to exert their power on other nations, preferring to grow without coercing others (Brazil, 2008).

This statement, besides reinforcing the Brazilian tradition of peaceful coexistence with its neighbours, makes explicit another fundamental principle of Brazil’s foreign policy, which is its desire to become a major power. The military have played an important role in this, and since the founding of the Superior War College (ESG in Portuguese) in 1949, they have supported the idea that the Brazilian government needs to articulate the political, economic, social and military sectors in order to guarantee the security and development of the country.

Golbery do Couto e Silva, one of the main exponents of Brazilian geopolitical thought and founder of ESG, saw Brazil as an underdeveloped country, incapable of achieving the same level of technology as developed countries. In order to overcome this, the author suggested that Brazil accept the tutelage of a great power that could give it the technology and capital necessary to develop economically. Couto e Silva believed that Brazil should become the “privileged satellite” of the US in Latin America which, in the author’s view, would bring mutual benefits: the US would receive raw materials, while Brazil would gain technology and the know-how to generate a robust production system to enable it to export to other underdeveloped countries. Since then, the idea that security and development are linked has crystallised in the imagination of Brazil’s foreign and defence policymakers.

Since the 1970s, Brazil has abandoned the idea that automatic alignment with the US is the best way to become a power, and instead has sought strategic autonomy in concert with other developing countries. After the redemocratisation of the country in the 1980s, the process of Brazilian approximation with other South American countries in the political and military fields intensified (Marques, 2003). Along with this, the idea that Brazil would grow without using coercion over others arose in its defence diplomacy in a more articulated way during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso presidency (1994-2002).
This chapter will discuss Brazil’s policies of deterrence and cooperation for the protection of its strategic resources, and is divided into three sections: the first section discusses Brazil’s defence documents, showing the country’s main objectives in this field, as well as the role of defence diplomacy in achieving these goals. The second section describes the main defence diplomacy activities developed by Brazil in South America, while the third section details the country’s strategies for guaranteeing its sovereignty, national treasures and territorial integrity.

Brazil’s defence documents

Although Brazil does not have a National Security Strategy, it does have documents in the Defence sector that guide policy and strategy in this area, namely: the National Defence Policy, the National Defence Strategy, and the White Paper on National Defence. In 1996, during Cardoso’s presidency, the first Brazilian defence document was enacted to provide a conceptual and normative description of Brazil’s place in the international system (Cepik & Bertol 2016).

The National Defence Policy (PDN), ‘which is aimed at threats from abroad, has as its primary purpose to establish the objectives for the defence of the Nation’s capabilities at every level and every sphere of power, with the involvement of the military and the civilian sectors’ (Brazil, 1998:5). In addition, the PDN follows the principles of Brazilian foreign policy in the search for a ‘peaceful resolution of disputes, with the resort to the use of force only for self-defence’ (Brazil, 1998:9). As we can see, the main legal framework for national defence focuses on external threats, respecting the sovereignty of other peoples, and using force only as a last resort for self-defence.

In 1999, the organisational structure of the Armed Forces was modified (Brazil, 1999). Prior to this, the Armed Forces were headed by the Ministers of State of the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces. On 10 June 1999, with the creation of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), a new architecture for the national defence sector was established.¹ The MOD is a key institution for consolidating the political direction of the military (Oliveira, 2005), and its creation meant it was necessary to reformulate the National Defence Policy; however, this would only happen in 2005.

The new version of the PND maintained its main purpose, with a slight difference, that the National Defence Policy ‘aimed mainly towards external threats is the conditioning document of the highest level of defense planning’ (Brazil, 2005:2). By stating that the PND was aimed mainly towards external threats, the Brazilian government sought to align its defence policy with the United Nation’s (UN) extended concept of security, and to regulate the traditional internal role of the Brazilian Armed Forces in reducing internal
vulnerabilities. Because the PND is the highest level of defence planning, the MOD was able to review and prioritise the documents being formulated by the three branches of the Brazilian Armed Forces.

Another important milestone was the first National Defence Strategy (END in Portuguese), published in 2008 (Brazil, 2008). The END was designed by an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the MOD and coordinated by the Minister-in-Chief of the Secretary for Strategic Affairs, and consisting of the Minister of Planning, Budget and Management; the Minister of Finance; and the Minister of Science and Technology, assisted by the Navy, Army and Air Force Commanders.

Despite the absence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the committee that prepared the END, and some discrepancies between their normative propositions, pointed out by analysts, the PND and the END can be seen as related stages in the evolution of Brazilian defence policy (Oliveira, 2007; Cepik & Bertol, 2016). The END focuses on middle- and long-term strategic actions, and aims to modernise the national defence structure through three primary processes: reorganisation of the Armed Forces, the restructuring of the Brazilian defence industry, and the troop requirements policy for the Armed Forces (Brazil, 2008). As one aspect of the END, each of the Armed Forces were responsible for drawing up their Equipment and Deployment Plans, redefining their territorial structures, and developing new procurement programmes for materials, equipment and armaments (Brazil, 2008).

In 2010, Complementary Law 136 (Brazil, 2010) was passed, resulting in the restructuring of the MOD with the creation of the Armed Forces Joint Staff. Its primary mission is to promote the concept of unity amongst the service branches in order to optimise military resources for national defence and border security, as well as rescue and humanitarian operations. The creation of this new structure within the MOD placed the Chief of the Joint Staff at the same hierarchical level as the Commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces (Navy, Army and Air Force), all of whom, together with the MOD, comprise the Military Defence Council, the highest level adviser to the President of the Republic regarding the use of military resources (Brazil, 2012b).

The new legislation extended policing power to the Navy and the Air Force (Brazil, 2010), enabling the three branches of the Armed Forces to act in support of the Public Security Forces and in the frontier areas. Another important factor defined in Complementary Law 136 was the determination that, from 2012 onwards, the three main documents of the Defence sector would be reviewed and approved by the National Congress every four years.
Complementary Law 136 also stipulated that the PND and END be updated in 2012 (Brazil 2008, 2012c), the year in which the National Defence White Paper (LBDN in Portuguese) was drawn up, a document about defence-related activities in Brazil. In addition to providing internal and external transparency on how the Brazilian Armed Forces are used, the LBDN helped deepen society’s pool of knowledge on the military field (Brazil, 2012b).

According to this new legal framework, the strategic projects of the three branches of the Armed Forces had a new impetus, along with the defence industry, which received fiscal incentives through the new legislation that defined terms such as ‘Defence Material, Strategic Material, Defence System and Strategic Defence Company’, enabling a resurgence of the defence industrial base (Brazil, 2012a, 2013a, 2013b).

In 2016, 20 years after the first Brazilian defence document, the PND, END and LBDN were updated and forwarded to the National Congress for consideration. The National Defence Objectives (ODN in Portuguese) have remained relatively stable in all PND versions, regardless of the political party spectrum of the Brazilian government, and the constant ministerial changes. It is worth noting that Brazil had 11 Defence Ministers during the 19 years of existence of the Ministry. The stability of NDOs over the years can be observed in Table 1.1.

### TABLE 1.1 Comparison of national defence objectives in PND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee sovereignty, preserve territorial integrity, heritage, interests</td>
<td>Guarantee sovereignty, national treasures, territorial integrity</td>
<td>Guarantee sovereignty, national treasures, territorial integrity</td>
<td>Guarantee sovereignty, national treasures, territorial integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee rule and democratic institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain national cohesion and unity</td>
<td>Contribute to preservation of cohesion and national unity</td>
<td>Contribute to preservation of cohesion and national unity</td>
<td>Contribute to preservation of cohesion and national unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote regional stability</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contribute to regional stability</td>
<td>Contribute to regional stability, international peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>Contribute to maintenance of peace and international security</td>
<td>Contribute to international peace and security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect individuals, goods, resources that are Brazilian/under Brazilian jurisdiction</td>
<td>Defend national interests, Brazilian citizens’ assets and resources abroad</td>
<td>Defend national interests, Brazilian citizens’ assets and resources abroad</td>
<td>Protect individuals, goods, resources and national interests abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve and maintain Brazilian interests abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give Brazil significant role in international affairs, greater role in international decision-making process</td>
<td>Participation of Brazil in community of nations, and broader role in international decision-making processes</td>
<td>Intensify Brazil’s participation in community of nations, and international decisions</td>
<td>Increase Brazil’s participation in community of nations and role in international decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


[https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/01](https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/01)
The slight changes in the ODN reflect the domestic and international political context in which the different versions of the PND were drafted. In the 1996 version, there was explicit reference to the commitment of the Brazilian Armed Forces to the maintenance of democratic institutions. This objective is not included in later versions of the PND and has been replaced by the promotion of regional stability and commitment to international peace and security.

In the 2012 version, one objective was removed and five were added to the PND, raising the total ODN to eleven. Elaborated after the publication of the first END (2008), and concurrent with the public debate that guided the preparation of the LBDN, the 2012 PND explained in more detail all the contexts in which the need to structure the defence sector was conceived.

In the 2016 version, the documents sought a more integrated vision with other sectors of government, and adopted a more simplified structure, as explained by ODN. In line with Chancellor Celso Amorim’s thesis that Brazil should adopt a grand strategy combining foreign policy and defence policy (Amorim, 2015), the PND established national defence capabilities that should be sought by the various sectors of the government structure. These national capabilities will result in the military capabilities that will guide the processes of transformation of the Armed Forces, especially those processes directed to the strategic projects of each branch. The projection of national power is another point...
detailed in the 2014 PND, as for the first time the document highlights the need to set up expeditionary forces to support the country’s commitments to international organisations, and conventions, treaties and agreements of which Brazil is a signatory (Brazil, 2016b).

South-South relations are well-defined in the defence documents, particularly the PND, when establishing as priority areas of Defence interest, ‘the Brazilian strategic environment, which includes South America, the South Atlantic, the countries of the coast’ (Brazil, 2016b:6), emphasising ‘integration with South American countries’ and ‘seeking to maintain the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation’ (Brazil, 2016b:11).

The regional level also remains a main focus of the defence sector in the END, as can be seen in the strategies for achieving the ODN of contributing to regional stability and to international peace and security. The END states that, in order to promote regional integration, it must ‘encourage the development of a South American identity’ and ‘intensify strategic partnerships, cooperation and military exchange with the Armed Forces from Union of South American Nations countries (UNASUL in Portuguese)’ (Brazil, 2016b:39).

Brazil’s defence diplomacy

The Brazilian military has played a prominent role in South America, especially in foreign policy and international relations. According to Garcia (1997), the connection between the military and international politics was more profound during the Military Regime (1964-1984), but there were historical antecedents of the military, and particularly the Army, playing a role in politics. In contrast, greater participation in domestic affairs increased interest in foreign policy, since domestic decisions reflected the country’s international participation options and vice versa (Garcia, 1997:21).

Felix Martin (2001) extends this hypothesis to all countries in South America. According to the author, the interconnection between military participation in domestic affairs and perceptions of the regional security environment explains the external-peace/internal-violence paradox in South America. From this perspective, the decrease in South American military campaigns since the end of the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-1935) is rooted in an evolutionary social process, where the militaries developed common socioeconomic values, beliefs, principles, and objectives. This fostered the Brazilian armed force’s increasing identification with the interests, progress and success of the transnational and national dimensions of other military institutions in the region. The increasingly transnational identity of the militaries transformed their traditional missions, as protectors of the state from external threats, to national political players and guardians of the state from internal political foes in their respective polities (Martin, 2001).
The lack of military campaigns between South American nations since the 20th century has contributed to increased cooperation between the armed forces of the region, especially since the 1990s when the process of regional integration in the Southern Cone of South America intensified due to the economic and political agreements that arose from the institutionalisation of the Southern Common Market (MERCUSUL in Portuguese).

The sense of transnational identity and solidarity constructed between militaries during state-building processes also played an important role in this matter. An illustrative example of this is the cooperation between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear field, a case where the attempt at reconciliation between two authoritarian rivals came before political democratisation or social and economic interdependence. These countries started inching towards a stable peace under the scrutiny of the military dictators in charge, and while the international press was reporting that Argentina and Brazil were moving towards nuclear weaponisation due to mutual suspicion, officials were actually engaging in quiet diplomatic attempts to establish the terms of a bilateral nuclear engagement (Mallea, Spektor & Wheeler, 2015).

Under democratic regimes, Brazil and Argentina have adopted mechanisms of transparency and mutual trust, benefiting from what was already practised by the military in terms of exchanges and cooperation. In the Brazilian case, this helped the MOD to achieve the ODN of contributing to regional stability and to international peace and security.

This sense of transnational identity and shared perception of security and defence issues in South America also helps to explain why the Brazilian proposal to create a Defence Council within UNASUL was so well-received by the other countries in the organisation. In a set of interviews carried out in 2009 with military members of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) countries, one year after Colombia bombed a camp of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Ecuador, one could see that this diplomatic incident had not changed the decision of the Amazonian countries to cooperate in matters involving protection of the region’s natural resources. In this sense, it is interesting to note that the perception that the natural treasures of the Amazon are coveted by the rich countries of the North is shared by the militaries of all the ACTO countries, regardless of the degree of exchange that these countries have with the armed forces of the United States (the case of Colombia is remarkable), the United Kingdom (which maintains close cooperation with Guyana and Suriname) or Russia (which seeks to replace the United States as the main military reference in Venezuela) (Marques, 2010).

This shared perception is expressed in the first version of the END (Brazil, 2008). The document emphasises that the country will reject any attempt at external imposition on its decisions regarding the preservation, development and defence of the Amazon region.
It will not allow organisations or individuals to serve as instruments for foreign interests, political or economic, that are aiming to weaken Brazilian sovereignty (Brazil, 2008). This served as a primary motivation for the increase in Brazilian defence diplomacy in the Amazon region in the last decade.

The Guidelines for the Activities of the Brazilian Army in the International Area (DAEBAI in Portuguese), published in 2013, convey what Brazil and its Army consider defence diplomacy activities: (1) permanent missions abroad with diplomatic representatives, military organisations of education or instruction, international organisations, commissions and others; (2) permanent missions of foreign military personnel in Brazil in the military sector; (3) conferences and meetings, bilateral or multilateral, with the participation of Army representatives in Brazil or abroad; (4) courses, internships and visits, both by Brazilian military officers abroad and by foreign authorities and military personnel in Brazil, in order to deal with matters of interest to the Army; (5) cooperation and military exchanges of various natures; (6) exercises with foreign troops in Brazil and abroad; (7) participation in peace missions; (8) participation in humanitarian missions in Brazil and abroad; (9) sales and purchase of Defence Materials (PRODE in Portuguese), its components and raw materials; (10) signature of agreements, covenants, additive terms, technical arrangements, letters of intent and related documents; and (11) other occasional missions (Brazil, 2013c:13-14).

According to DAEBAI, these activities would aim to: (a) maintain a regular dialogue on bilateral and multilateral issues of mutual interest in the fields of defence, fostering cooperation, integration and mutual trust with the armies of other countries; (b) contribute to maintaining a stable global order through participation in humanitarian aid and peace operations under the aegis of international and regional organisations; (c) support and contribute to the structural consolidation efforts of the armies of friendly countries; (d) facilitate the achievement of a legal framework that regulates the development, within the Defence environment, of bilateral and multilateral relations; and (e) strengthen the national defence industry in order to reduce technological dependency and overcome unilateral restrictions on access to sensitive technologies (Brazil, 2013c:20-21).

Based on this framework, the tables below show the international agreements involving military diplomacy signed between Brazil and other South American countries during the Cardoso and Lula presidencies.
## TABLE 1.2 Summary of Brazil’s international agreements on defence issues with South American countries from 2003 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bilateral agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Argentina | - Memorandum of Understanding on Consultation and Coordination between the MOD and MRE of the two countries, as well as follow-up on defence issues of mutual interest (1997)  
- Joint Declaration agreeing to develop Cooperative and Mutual Support Activities in areas of Human Resources, Logistics, Operational Training, Technical Assistance and other (2001) |
| Colombia | - No defence agreement was signed in the period |
| Chile | - Creation Statement of Bilateral Defence Working Group (2000) |
| Ecuador | - Declaration of Peace Agreement between Ecuador and Peru by the Armed Forces of the Guaranteeing Countries (1996)  
| Guyana | - No defence agreement was signed in the period |
- Plan for Provision and Support to MOMEP (1998)  
- Action Plan Brazil-Peru (1999) |
| Uruguay | - Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2010) |
- Joint Declaration Agreeing to Develop Cooperation and Mutual Support Activities in Areas of Common Interest (2000) |

**SOURCE:** Landim (2015)

## TABLE 1.3 Summary of Brazil’s international agreements with South American countries from 2003 to 2010 in defence issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bilateral agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Argentina | - Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Defence Fields (2005)  
- Adjustment to Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation in the Military Technology Area GAUCHO Vehicle (2005)  
- Brazil-Argentina Joint Declaration (2008)  
- Supplementary Protocol to the Cooperation Agreement (2008) |
| Bolivia | - Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2007) |
| Colombia | - Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2008)  
- Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Combating the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Accessories, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (2008) |
<p>| Chile | - Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2007) |
| Ecuador | - Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2007) |
| Guyana | - Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2009) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bilateral agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Paraguay | • Memorandum of Understanding for the sending of a Marine Squad to the Brazilian Armed Forces (2006)  
• Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2007)  
• Technical arrangement relating to Cooperation in the Maintenance of Military Armoured Vehicles (2007)  
• Joint Statement creating the 2 + 2 Mechanism for Strategic Consultation and Evaluation involving the MD and MRE of the two countries (2007) |
| Peru    | • Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Protection and Surveillance of the Amazon (2003)  
• Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2006)  
• Statement creating MRE + MD Consultation Mechanism (2006)  
• Declaration of Cooperation on Protection and Surveillance of the Amazon (2006) |
| Suriname | • Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2008) |
| Uruguay | • Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Defence (2010) |
| Venezuela | • No defence agreement was signed in the period |

SOURCE: Landim (2015)

Under Cardoso’s administration, Brazil signed security and defence agreements with all South American countries, except Colombia and Guyana. However, according to Landim (2015), even without these agreements, the Brazilian Army maintained its international activities, carrying out various acts of military diplomacy. It is noteworthy that during Cardoso’s administration, the MOD was still embryonic and service branches still managed their own priorities, even in matters affecting the international area (Marques, 2004).

Similarly, under Lula’s administration, the Brazilian government also concluded security and defence agreements with all the countries of South America, except Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela. However, regardless of agreements signed at the governmental level, the Army maintained its diplomatic links with all South American armies, including Venezuela’s, whose absolute numbers in terms of exchanges and vacancies for courses and internships in the military were behind only Paraguay, Peru and Ecuador (Landim, 2015). Under Lula’s government, the MOD became stronger and began to jointly lead projects of the three service branches. This is well-illustrated by the MOD’s initiative, through Minister Nelson Jobim, of creating the South American Defence Council of UNASUL.

Another important aspect is that Brazil’s defence diplomacy in the region is predominantly through activities that do not require many resources or investments, such as exchanges, meetings and education, even though South America has been a priority for foreign policy in both Cardoso and Lula’s governments. Despite this, Brazil’s defence diplomacy has supported continued cooperation between the armed forces of the region, and thus its “good neighbour policy”, contributing to the increase of mutual trust amongst South American countries.
Dilma Rousseff’s administration has continued the defence diplomacy initiatives of its predecessors, and some indicators relating to the Army have drawn particular attention.

**TABLE 1.4** Summary of Brazilian Army’s international activities with South American countries from 2011 to 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Courses, internship exchanges</th>
<th>Conferences, meetings</th>
<th>Visits</th>
<th>Operations, exercises, manoeuvres, events</th>
<th>Permanent missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Adapted by Marques and Maia Neto from data provided by Brazilian Army Staff

Throughout Rousseff’s administration, there has been a significant increase in participation by the Army in international activities in South America, in spite of the economic and political crisis that Brazil has been undergoing since 2015. Compared with data from previous periods, the Army increased its presence in several countries in the region, particularly Colombia and Peru. Since the peace agreements in Colombia between the government and FARC, the Colombian Army has been studying the structures of the Brazilian Army, which is considered to be a model for the reorganisation of the armed forces in a country.

If Brazil’s defence relationship with South American countries has been improving in recent years, Venezuela is the exception to this trend. The Brazilian Army has significantly reduced the number of its military personnel in that country, and sent a single colonel to attend a course there during 2017. In contrast, Venezuela has increased the number of Venezuelan military personnel attending courses in Brazil. The impeachment of Rousseff and the worsening political crisis in Venezuela have contributed to a growing gap between the two countries, culminating in the cancellation of scheduled bilateral meetings.
The strategic projects of Brazilian armed forces

Since the enactment of the END in 2008, three strategic areas for the defence sector have been outlined: nuclear (coordinated by the Navy); cybernetic (managed by the Army); and space (under the responsibility of the Air Force). The priority in these areas is to seek a growing nationalisation of the scientific-technological field, and the development of civilian and military human resources (Brazil, 2016a).

Together with the above-mentioned strategic sectors, and seeking to support the medium- and long-term strategic goals in the END (Brazil, 2008, 2012c, 2016b), the military has laid out plans to enable the Armed Forces to meet the defence challenges that may arise from the development of the country. The services’ strategic projects have sought to re-establish their operational capabilities, as well as reduce the technological gap with developed countries. Through the Defence Deployment and Equipment Plan (PAED in Portuguese), the MOD seeks to consolidate these projects, support the Forces’ demands for equipment, and enable them to act within the national territory.

With a focus on the Defence – Development nexus, the projects were developed not only to support the services’ needs, but also to increase the defence industrial base, either through new legislation to regulate defence products and fiscal incentives to the sector, or by the nationalisation of the technology used in these products.

All three services have projects that aim at Obtaining Full Operational Capacity (OCOP in Portuguese), that is, they seek to revitalise the existing structure by ‘recovering the strategic and operational levels of subsistence supplies, stewardship, fuels and lubricants, ammunition and supplies, critical parts and spares’ (Brazil, 2016a:146).

Several projects already existed before the implementation of the END. However, it was from these guidelines that the strategic repositioning of these and subsequent projects occurred, allowing the country to develop capacities for defence of its sovereignty and its interests in a manner more integrated and aligned with the ONDs. The 2016 END defines the term ‘national defence capabilities’, which in turn supports the elaboration of a new PAED, with possible revisions of the current strategic plans of the Armed Forces. The main projects of the Forces are explained in the National Defence White Paper:

**Navy**

- Construction of Naval Power Nucleus, which aims to expand the operational capacity of the Navy. This includes the Submarine Development Programme (PROSUB in Portuguese), whose objective is the construction of four new conventional submarines and one nuclear-propelled submarine, in addition to a shipyard and submarine base to support these units, and the acquisition of surface means (PROSUPER-1) to develop the ability in Brazil to design and build five escort vessels, five ocean patrol vessels, and one logistical support vessel.
Brazil’s National Defence Strategy, Defence Diplomacy and Management of Strategic Resources

- Naval Nuclear Programme (PNM in Portuguese), which initially aimed to dominate the nuclear fuel production cycle achieved in 2012. The PNM is now seeking the construction of a prototype pressurised water reactor, as the basis for the reactor in the first Brazilian Submarine with Nuclear Propulsion (SNBR). The PNM and the PROSUB are closely linked, with the success of the PROSUB depending on the development of the nuclear propulsion system through the Naval Nuclear Programme.

- The Blue Amazon Management System (SisGAAz in Portuguese), a system that will allow monitoring and control of the Brazilian jurisdictional waters, increased efficiency in inspection and search and rescue operations in the Blue Amazon, and more efficient interagency operations (Federal Police, Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources, etc.).

**Army**

- The Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON) is based on border monitoring, control, mobility and presence. It will allow the Army to monitor national borders and promptly respond to any aggression or threat. The system will contribute to unified socioeconomic initiatives which promote the sustainable development of the country’s border regions. The system will be interlinked with similar systems of the other Armed Forces, of the MOD, and of other federal agencies.

- The Guarani Project covers the implementation of the New Family of Armoured Wheeled Vehicles (NFBR in Portuguese) of the Brazilian Army. The Project intends to provide mechanised units with new armoured vehicles which incorporate the most recent trends and technological developments. The Project calls for the acquisition of 2,044 Brazilian-designed Guarani armoured personnel carriers over a period of 20 year.

- ASTROS 2020, a defence system that aims to provide the Army with elevated fire support capacity through the national development of a missile with a range of up to 300 km. The Army will have two groups of missile and rocket launchers.

**Air Force**

- Recovery of Operational Capacity, a process of performance evaluation and selection of alternatives to replace, modernise, develop or revitalise aircraft and their systems, in order to strengthen and maintain the operational capacity of the Air Force. This project involves training and instruction of pilots, replenishment of weapons stocks, and technological upgrading of aircraft including: the fighters AMX and F-5 (projects A-1M and F5-M), maritime patrol P-95 (Project P-3-BR), transportation and refueling (projects KC-130 and C-95M), reconnaissance (Project R-99), and airborne early warning and control (Project E-99).
Reinforcing the integration of the aerospace and defence industry with the MOD. It also aims to contribute to the competitiveness of products offered by that sector in internal and foreign markets. This project is nationally oriented, and the development and production of a National Aircraft for Transportation and Refueling (KC-390) is therefore noteworthy.

The Space Systems Strategic Programme, which aims to develop and acquire the means to launch space platforms, and the construction of the relevant infrastructure. An important phase was the launch of the 2016 Geostationary Defence and Strategic Communications Satellite (SGDC in Portuguese), which will allow access to broadband internet throughout the country, as well as encrypted communications throughout South America.

Since the 2008 version of END, the Brazilian defence sector has strived to create an integrated monitoring and control system, including airspace, boundaries, jurisdictional waters and, with the launch of the SGDC the Portuguese acronym for its Geostationary Defence and Strategic Communications Satellite System), the space environment. To this end, structures are being created to enable this integration in the medium- and long-term.

With this focus on system integration, the Strategic Space Systems Programme will provide infrastructure for the operation of several strategic projects, amongst them the systems that focus on monitoring and control, such as SISGAAz, SISFRON (the Portuguese acronym for the Border Monitoring System), the Brazilian Aerospace Defence System (SISDABRA in Portuguese), and the Amazon Protection System (SIPAM in Portuguese). This will enable national system integration, serving to support both the defence of the territory and aspects such as public security, and fight against transnational crimes (Brazil, 2016a:60).

Strategic projects are the most visible face of national defence objectives and their respective strategies, enabling the integration of the Defence–Development nexus, which is the main scope of defence documents.

Final remarks

Brazil’s National Defence Strategy is aligned with the country’s development and the place it intends to occupy in the international arena. Since the 1970s, Brazil has pursued strategic autonomy and, in order to achieve this objective, has sought to intensify cooperation with the countries within its strategic environment, encompassing the countries of South America and coast of the South Atlantic.

Since Cardoso’s presidency, Brazil’s diplomatic actions concerning defence cooperation have been conducted by the MOD in accordance with the principles advocated by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The military has an essential role in this process and, as has been outlined in this chapter, has aimed to establish a cooperative relationship with their counterparts since the beginning of the 20th century.

Establishing cooperative relations with South American Armed Forces at the regional level allows Brazil to peacefully project power and secure support for the achievement of its main national defence objectives: sovereignty, national treasures, and territorial integrity. These cooperative relationships also contribute to national development, as Brazil assumes that South American countries represent an important market for their defence materials. Therefore, the country has attempted to regionalise some of its strategic projects, such as SIPAM, SISFRON and the SGDC.

Finally, it is important to note the stability and continuity of Brazil’s defence diplomacy efforts in South America, from the presidencies of Cardoso to Rousseff. Throughout this period, Brazil played a fundamental role as mediator of conflicts and inducer of integration processes in the region. The recent diplomatic impasse between Brazil and Venezuela is a new stage in the decades-old dynamics established between the militaries of the two countries, and will require the attention of analysts in the coming years. Nevertheless, based on the normative documents that guide the activities of the Armed Forces, defence diplomacy will continue to play a central role in Brazil’s defence strategy.
Notes

1. According to President Cardoso, the creation of the Ministry of Defence in Brazil had as main objective to rationalise the preparation and the use of the Brazilian Armed Forces, through a greater strategic and operational integration of the three branches of the Armed Forces (Marques, 2004).

2. Law 12,598 of 21 March 2012, established that:
   - Defence Material (PRODE) is any goods, service, work or information, including weapons, ammunition, means of transport and communications, uniforms and materials for individual and collective use in the defence activities, with the exception of those that are assigned for administrative use;
   - Strategic Materials (PED) are all defence products that are of strategic importance for national defence, due to their technological content, scarcity or indispensability;
   - Defence System (SD) is the interrelated or interactive set of PRODE that serves a specific purpose; and
   - Strategic Defence Company (EED) is any legal entity accredited by the Ministry of Defence. These companies will have access to special tax schemes and funding for programmes, projects and activities related to national defence goods and defence strategic products, in accordance with law (Brazil, 2012a).

3. The defence ministers were (in this order): Elcio Álvares (from the Liberal Front Party), Geraldo Magela da Cruz Quintão (no party affiliation), José Viegas Filho (diplomat), José Alencar Gomes da Silva (from the Liberal Party), Francisco Waldir Pires de Sousa (from the Workers’ Party), Nelson Azevedo Jobim (from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party), Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (diplomat affiliated to the Workers’ Party), Jaques Wagner (from the Workers’ Party), José Aldo Rebelo Figueiredo (from the Communist Party of Brazil), Raul Belens Jungmann Pinto (from the Popular Socialist Party) and Joaquim de Silva e Luna (retired military).

4. Brazil’s jurisdictional waters are the South Atlantic region over which Brazil has territorial rights and other exploration and control prerogatives is the country’s jurisdictional waters. These waters have recently been named the Blue Amazon, and are roughly equal, in geographic area, to the Brazilian Amazon (Brazil, 2012b:21).
References


