

OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

# GOVERNANCE

*Edited by*

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and the Free University of Berlin*

**OXFORD**  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

# GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, INTERNATIONAL ORDER, AND WORLD ORDER

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## INTRODUCTION: ASSESSING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

This chapter explores the concept of global governance by looking at its analytical, theoretical, and normative implications. I present two major arguments. First, in an age of globalization there is an increasing need for global governance, as, in the previous period of “complex independence,” as depicted by Keohane and Nye (1977), there was a functional need for international regimes and other international institutions to manage complex independence. Second, global governance should be understood alongside a possible continuum of governance ranging from international order (Bull’s “anarchical society”) to world government. Along that continuum, there are different ways of assessing and examining global governance, so it might take several institutional forms and denominations, including world order, “new medievalism,” and cosmopolitanism. Moreover, these theoretical and social constructs can coexist simultaneously since they do not necessarily contradict, but rather complement, each other.

The first argument refers to the fact that economic globalization and global problems demand the establishment or creation of new political mechanisms that transcend the state system in order to cope with the complexities of our world. Thus, global governance mechanisms are necessary in order to manage the new world order of economic and environmental globalization and global challenges. As James Rosenau pointed out cogently, “Reinforced by the collapse of time and distance, the weaknesses of states, the vast movements of people and the ever greater complexities of modern life, the question

of how to infuse a modicum of order, a measure of effective authority and a potential for improving the human condition into the course of events looms as increasingly urgent” (Rosenau 2002: 70–71). Hence, we should address questions such as: What do we mean by governance on a global scale (“global governance”)? How is the world governed, in the absence of a world government, to produce norms, codes of conduct, and regulatory surveillance, and compliance mechanisms? How is that different, if at all, from “international regimes” (see Rosenau 1992: 1; Duggett 2005: xi; Weiss and Thakur 2010: 1; and Hurrell 2007: 1)? The section on “Defining global governance” spells out the first argument and attempts to answer those questions.

The second argument implies that in order to make sense of global governance we should pay attention to the larger context of both the discipline of international relations (IR) and especially of its real-world context. In the absence of world government, the concept of global governance provides us with a proper theoretical terminology to describe and analyze the *complex* of systems of rule-making, political coordination, and problem-solving that transcends states and societies, constructing new political realities and reconstructing old ones. Global governance does that by describing the structures and processes of governing beyond the state where there is no single supreme supranational political authority (Held and McGrew 2002: 8). Yet, as the phenomena and processes of globalization still remain ambiguous and ill-defined, there is a great confusion in the IR literature regarding the possible meanings, dynamics, and scope of global governance. In this context, the possible relationships among global governance and different types of international and world order might clarify the relevance, and limitations, of the concept of “global governance.” Thus, we should address questions such as: What is the relationship among global governance, international order, and world order? How is the world organized politically? How should it be organized? What forms of political organizations are required to meet the challenges faced by humankind in the twenty-first century? The section on “The continuum of global governance” illustrates this second argument. Finally, in the section on “The limitations of global government” I wrap up the two main arguments of this chapter.

Any discussion of global governance in the context of IR should start with an understanding of the significant changes that have taken place in the international society and system. Three major developments are relevant: first, the end of the Cold War; second, the complex processes of economic, political, and cultural globalization; and third, the possible relocation of political authority away from the nation-state and international organizations (IGOs) in the direction of private, non-state actors, including multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as participants and components of an emerging transnational civil society (see Yunker 2005: 202; Hewson and Sinclair 1999: 3–4; and Ruggie 2010: xvii).

Economic and environmental globalization has not occurred in a political vacuum. There has also been a concomitant shift in the nature and form of political organizations, with a re-articulation of political authority occurring in many and multiple possible directions through a dense web of networks and linkages: supranational, international

(through the enhancement of international organizations and institutions), transnational, and subnational, as well as public, private, and public-private partnerships. Thus, the idea of global governance is of growing concern among scholars and practitioners alike, with regard to the political dimensions of globalization and of global change (although one can question cause and effect relations in this context). This *global governance complex* embraces states, international institutions, transnational networks, and agencies (both public and private) that function, with variable effect and effectiveness, to promote, regulate, and manage the common affairs of humanity (see Held and McGrew 2002: 1, 5; Selby 2003: 4; Wilkinson 2005: 6; and Duffield 2001: 44).

## DEFINING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

### Global governance in the international relations literature: old wine in new bottles?

The term "global governance" was apparently introduced in the late 1980s, in the context of the *international regimes* literature, which had a significant impact on scholarly thinking. At the time of the emergence of the neoliberal institutional paradigm, the emphasis was upon the possibility of nation-states cooperating under anarchy, by establishing international institutions. A related theme in the literature dealt with enhancing the capacity of international governance to address problems of global concern ("global problems"); first and foremost through the action of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN). The concept of global governance came into wide public usage in the early 1990s with the establishment of the United Nations Commission on Global Governance (UNCGG) in 1992 and the publication of such seminal works as *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (1992) edited by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (see Wilkinson 2005: 4–5; Hewson and Sinclair 1999: 11–12; Weiss and Thakur 2010: 30; and Yunker 2005: 202).

The concept of "global governance" initially overlapped with that of "international regimes," "international institutions," "multilateralism," and "international governance." Yet contemporary usage in the early twenty-first century refers, in the literature of IR, to a qualitative change embedded in the demand of political globalization to cope with the challenges of economic globalization and global problems (such as environmental degradation or nuclear proliferation). The result has been a movement from government to "governance," and a concomitant transformation from IR to "global politics."

As for the concept of "governance," as suggested by Rhodes and by Zürn in their respective chapters in this book (Chapters 3 and 5), respectively), the reference is to the rise of political authority in the framework of institutions different from the nation-state, which help in the process of governing. Adding "governance" to the "global" we can then spell out alternative definitions, as follows.

### *Alternative definitions of global governance in international relations literature*

James Rosenau, a pioneer intellectual in the field of global governance, refers to the concept as the need for a *new ontology* to make sense of world politics (Rosenau 1999: 288–289). This "new ontology" is built on the premise that the world is nowadays comprised of spheres of authority that are not necessarily consistent with the division of territorial space that is the traditional international order of sovereign states. Rosenau, who coined the original term of *fragmentation* to point out the simultaneous forces of integration and disintegration that shape our world, defines global governance as "a summary term for a highly complex and widely disparate activities that may culminate in a modicum of worldwide coherence or that may collapse into pervasive disarray. In the event of either outcome, it would still be global governance in the sense that the sum of efforts by widely disaggregated goal-seeking entities will have supplemented, perhaps even supplanted, states as the primary sources of governance on a global scale" (Rosenau 1999: 294; see also Rosenau 2005: 45–46). The mechanisms and rules of global governance are then created by the actions and agreements of key actors and institutions involved in the global system, including state and non-state entities (see O'Brien et al. 2000: 125).

According to the UNCGG (1995), governance "is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest" (CGG 1995: 2). At the *global level*, "governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, MNCs, and the global capital market" (CGG 1995: 3). In this encompassing definition, the process of global governance includes a broad range of actors, both public and private. Private firms, associations of firms, non-governmental organizations and associations of NGOs all engage in it, often in association and in unison with governmental bodies, to create (global) governance without government (Keohane and Nye 2000: 12).

Similarly, according to Weiss and Thakur, global governance is "the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate trans-border relations among citizens, society, markets, and the state in the international arena—the wielders and objects of international public power. Even in the absence of an overarching central authority, existing collective arrangements bring more predictability, stability, and order to trans-boundary problems than we might expect" (Weiss and Thakur 2010: 6). In this sense, global governance is conceived as a system of rules and norms that ensures order on a voluntary, purposive way. Unlike the first definition by Rosenau, this definition, like the UNCGG's one, still emphasizes the paramount role of the states and international institutions composed of states, such as the UN.

For John Ruggie, governance "refers to the workings of the system of authoritative rules, norms, institutions, and practices by means of which any collectively manages its common affairs" (Ruggie 2010: xv). In the specific case of global governance, Ruggie follows Rosenau by referring to "global governance as an instance of governance in the absence of government." Furthermore, Ruggie draws the important distinction between "politics" and "governance" (despite their close relationship); whereas politics always refers to the competition in the pursuit of particular interests, governance is always about producing public goods (Ruggie 2010: xv; see also Ziirn, Chapter 5, this volume).

To sum up, all those definitions share the concern of global governance with the possible (or potential) regulation of the global sphere, the multiplicity of spheres of authority, and the nature of actors and institutions, both public and private, involved in the regulative process and the production of public global goods. We view the concept as under the slogan of "governance without government" or as a kind of intermediary stage between the management of global problems through traditional interstate politics and the operation of a world government (see Hakovirta 2004a: 14). In other words, as I specify below, global governance can be located in a continuum ranging from international order to world government.

## DYNAMICS AND TYPES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

To describe and analyze the dynamics of global governance is a daunting task, since there is no single model or form of global governance, nor is there a single structure or set of structures. In fact, global governance is a broad, dynamic, and complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly in flux. The emerging complex of global governance encompasses a rich mixture of actors, institutions, and processes that take place on at least at three different levels: supranational (MNCs, IGOs, and NGOs); national (firms, central governments of nation-states, and civil society); and subnational (local firms, local governments, and local civil society) (see Keohane and Nye 2000: 12–13; see also CGG 1995: 4; Woods 2002: 26; and Rosenau 2002: 76–77).

A number of dynamics of global governance have contributed to the erosion and diminution of state capabilities. At the same time, one can argue the other way around; namely, that the erosion of state capacities contributed to the enhancement of global governance. In any case, one of the most relevant dynamics of global governance has been the shifting balance between hierarchical and network forms of organization, and between vertical and horizontal flows of authority. Associated with this relocation of authority from the public to the private we can discern an important shift in the principal modalities of global rule-making and implementation. Thus, although much of the formal modalities of global governance are still dominated by the interaction among states (traditional IR) and by international institutions such as the UN, we can trace the formulation and implementation of global public policy within an expanding web of political networks that involve non-state actors as well, as in the Global Compact

agreement that involves MNCs, or the Kimberley Process that involves both states and non-state actors (see Held and McGrew 2002: 11; and Risse 2009).

Following Rosenau (2002) and Risse (2009), for analytical purposes we can establish a typology of six forms of global governance, according to three categories: formal structures (hierarchical); informal structures (nonhierarchical); and mixed formal and informal structures (such as public-private networks and partnerships). The directional flows of authority may be unidirectional (either vertical, top-down or bottom-up; or horizontal, nonhierarchical). Alternatively, the direction can follow multiple flows of authority transmission, both vertical and horizontal. The actors involved might include governments, transnational corporations (TNCs), IGOs, NGOs, business alliances, and public-private, and private-private partnerships. While traditional IR are best typified in Table 48.1 by cell # 1, global governance is best typified in the hybrid of mixed formal and informal structures and multidirectional flows of authority in cell # 6. We should add that all the six cells in Table 48.1 represent different forms and ways of global governance. This typology is summarized in the table (adapted from Rosenau 2002 and Risse 2009).

From the reading of the table we can get a better understanding of the multi-level character of global governance as well as the multiplicity of the relevant political actors and institutions. Furthermore, we should locate the complex processes of global governance within an imaginary continuum running from the traditional form of inter-

Table 48.1 A typology of global governance

	Unidirectional: vertical or horizontal flows of authority	Multidirectional: vertical and horizontal flows of authority
Formal structures	<p><i>Top-down (hierarchical):</i> [Cell # 1] Governments of nation-states and supranational institutions (IGOs); TNCs (corporate hierarchies); contracting out and outsourcing</p>	<p><i>Network governance:</i> [Cell # 2] Governments of nation-states; international institutions (IGOs); NGOs; business alliances; contracting out and outsourcing</p>
Informal structures	<p><i>Bottom-up governance:</i> [Cell # 3] Impact of civil society and networks of advocacy; NGOs and INGOs; positive incentives and bargaining</p>	<p><i>Side-by-side governance:</i> [Cell # 4] NGOs and INGOs; governments; positive incentives and bargaining; international regimes; private interest government/private regimes; private-private partnerships</p>
Mixed formal and informal structures	<p><i>Market-type governance:</i> [Cell # 5] Governments of nation-states; IGOs; elites; markets; mass publics; TNCs; public-private networks and partnerships</p>	<p><i>Web/network governance:</i> [Cell # 6] Governments of nation-states; IGOs; elites; mass publics; TNCs; NGOs; INGOs; networks of advocacy; civil society</p>



national order (the Westphalian system of sovereign states) all the way to the utopian ideal of a world government. This leads to the discussion of the second main argument in this chapter.

## THE DIFFERENT PHASES (AND FACES) OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: FROM INTERNATIONAL ORDER TO WORLD GOVERNMENT

There is a long tradition in the discipline of IR of studying the future of international politics by imagining alternative "institutional designs" of alternative world orders as objects of interest in themselves (see Hakovirta 2004b: 47). In this sense, global governance should be located along a continuum of the changing architecture of world politics in terms of governance, as the newest, most sophisticated, but also ambiguous, classification of "world order." Since global governance aims at providing public goods in the global realm, "governance is order plus intentionality" (Rosenau 1992: 5).

The continuum offered in this chapter is an analytical prism. Within the two extremes of "international order" and "world government" we might find the different phases (and faces) of global governance. Thus, in reality, we might find hybrid modes of global orders, as is reflected in Table 48.1, above, which describe the typology of global governance. In other words, as the concept and reality of global governance are ambiguous and encompassing, they might include different typologies, configurations, and forms. Consequently, all six cells depicted in Table 48.1 can be accommodated in these different phases.

In this continuum, we start discussing the idea of a pluralist and limited society of sovereign states, as formulated by Bull in his seminal work on the international society as an *anarchical society* as a form of *international order*. This international society might evolve into a *world or global society*, due to the impact of *globalization*. Moreover, we no longer refer to an international order, but rather to *world order*, encompassing a larger number and character of actors, not just nation-states, but first and foremost human beings themselves embedded in a *global society*. Furthermore, the world order under globalization leads us to the metaphor (again coined by Bull back in 1977) of *new medievalism*. Finally, at the right end of the continuum, and propelled by a cosmopolitan ideology, we might approximate the liberal ideal of a *world government*. As we learned previously in the chapter, the concept of *global governance* might correspond to any of those phases. This argument is summarized in Figure 48.1.

There is an interesting parallel between the stages of Figure 48.1 and the typologies of global governance of Table 48.1 above. Thus, cells # 1 and # 2 roughly correspond to the definition of "international order." Similarly, cells # 3 and # 4 parallel the concepts of "world society" and "world order," while "new medievalism" is best reflected in cells # 5 and # 6. We do not have a good example of "world government," which ideally might reflect a diagonal direction from cell # 1 to cell # 6.




FIGURE 48.1 The continuum of global governance.

At the first phase of the continuum, the initial form of global governance takes the form of a pluralist and limited society of sovereign states, which embodies the idea of *international order* within an *anarchical international society* (see Bull 1977). There is an interesting parallel or analogy between the idea of an "anarchical international society" and the concept of "global governance." Both concepts suggest the feasibility of a peaceful, progressive, benign, and well-ordered international regime in the absence of a unifying governmental, supranational entity (despite the connotation of the society being "anarchic"). Similarly, both ideas are imperfect, voluntaristic, lacking a real government, and aiming at the regulation of norms and the creation of common expectations (see Hurrell 2007: 3; and Yunker 2005: 213).

At a second phase in the continuum, with the impact of globalization, international society might evolve into a *world or global society*. As a result of the dynamics of globalization, which imply more than just increased interstate interdependence but rather the de-territorialization of IR, world entities other than states are, nowadays, crucial components of contemporary society, which is global rather than international, though it is far from being universal (see Keohane 2005: 123).

Moreover, moving into the direction of world government, it is obvious that globalization implies that we cannot still refer to an international order, but rather to a *world order*. By "world order" Bull meant "those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind [humankind] as a whole." Thus, world order is a wider category of order than the international order. It takes as its units of order not just nation-states, but rather individual human beings, and assesses the degree of order on the basis of the delivery of certain kinds of public goods (such as security, human rights, basic needs, or justice) for humanity as a whole (Bull 1977: 20; Clark 2005: 730; see also Whitman 2005: 27; Hakovirta 2004a: 15; and Rosenau 1992: 5).

World order can mean alternative "architectural" designs that include the international order itself (such as the ephemeral unipolar structure of the international system), but since they include humanity as a whole they might as well refer to processes of globalization, transcending the traditional structure of the state system. For instance, there are several scenarios of world order that have been discussed in the IR literature and for policy purposes, such as (1) neo-medievalism and the overlapping of authority and identity; (2) the North-South divide; (3) Huntington's "clash of civilizations"; and (4) Kaplan's "coming anarchy" (see Huntington 1996; Kaplan 2006; and Clark 2005).

It is important to notice that the concern with "global governance" since the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the advent of the contemporary age of globalization,

has replaced an earlier exploration of what was called "world order studies," which several scholars criticized as too static and top-down (Weiss and Thakur 2010: 29). In the early 1960s, the utopian World Order Models Project (WOMP) initiated by Richard Falk and others, adapted the world federalist idea to suit a postcolonial setting, and toward the direction of a potential world government (see Falk 1999: 7). While not directly critical of world order studies, many contemporary scholars (including Falk himself) prefer to use the term "global governance" and "global democracy" in a conscious effort to expand the epistemic community of academics and practitioners who embrace the key assumptions and principles of world order (see Tehranian and Reed 1999: 62). As a matter of fact, global governance incorporates the same *problématique* of world order, heading in the direction of distancing or deviance from world anarchy and chaos (see Hakovirta 2004a: 14). Thus, the concept here becomes more normative than analytic, or at least it carries a strong normative bias.

One possible manifestation of world order, as epitomized by global governance in still another phase (and face) is the idea of *new medievalism*. In 1977, Bull coined the term to refer to a "modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organization that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages. In that system no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and a given segment of the Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals beneath, and with the Pope and (in Germany and Italy) the Holy Roman Emperor above" (Bull 1977: 254).

Thus, neo-medievalism encompasses an ideal political order in which individuals are governed by a number of overlapping authorities and identities. Bull spoke of a "new medievalism" to connote the fragmentation of authority reminiscent of the pre-Westphalian era, although he did not believe that other political actors were yet strong enough to offer a serious challenge to the nation-state in global politics. More than thirty years later, the image of "neo-medievalism" and the overlapping of political authority and identities have become more and more relevant to make sense of our current world order and as a depiction of global governance. Thus, the relocation and delegation of political authority among the several layers of global governance, as depicted in Table 48.1 above, resembles the complexity of competing and overlapping jurisdictions and spheres of political action and responsibility that characterized medieval Europe (see Held and McGrew 2002: 10; and Linklater 2005).

If new medievalism is a form of global governance, the logical end of the continuum should lead us into the cosmopolitan ideal of world government. In (political) theory, we could imagine a world government that would arise "as the consequence of a social contract among states, and thus it would be a universal republic or cosmopolis founded upon some form of consent or consensus" (Bull 1977: 253). And yet, since we do not really have a universal global society, cosmopolitan democracy is very unlikely, if not impossible to fulfill on a global scale. Thus, the concept of global governance implicitly assumes that a world government, while idyllic in theory, might be disastrous in practice, as well as morally wrong, by infringing the self-determination and freedom of both the nation-states, and the liberties of individuals (see Keohane 2005: 124; Yunker 2005: 203; and Bull 1977: 253).

## CONCLUSIONS: THE LIMITATIONS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Global governance is a fascinating and useful concept to make sense of our complex world, the challenges we face, and the various institutions that can deal with globalization, given the impracticality and/or undesirability of a world government. Yet, it is far from being perfect, and there are several problems and limitations that should be pointed out in the concluding section of this chapter, at the theoretical, practical, and ethical levels.

On *theoretical grounds*, there are at least two embedded biases in the mainstream literature and analysis of global governance. First, in general terms, the concept of global governance starts with several neoliberal institutionalist premises, similarly to the previous literature on international regimes, although it somehow transcends them. Those premises refer to the possibility of cooperation under anarchy, and the feasibility of international institutions (mainly IGOs). Second, many of the approaches toward global governance tend to be mainstream, and state-centric, and downplay the possibilities of conflict and resistance to globalization and to political governance (see Selby 2003: 4-7; Gilpin 2002: 238; Duffield 2001; and Tehranian and Reed 1999: 76). At the same time, some critical writers reject the basic premises of the state as the main political unit, downgrading its relevance in the discourse of global governance, in opposition to IR theory (see Mitrani 2010; Held and McGrew 2002).

On *practical grounds*, realist critics like Robert Gilpin, following in Bull's footsteps, point out the *political limitations* inherent in the translation of global governance from theory to praxis: How can change and peaceful change be achieved? What are the goals of global governance? How can the provision of public (global) goods in the world arena be reconciled with the lingering realities of power politics? Who are "we the people" among the myriad of actors involved in the dynamic process? (see Gilpin 2002: 247; Keohane and Nye 2000: 32-33; and Ruggie 2010: xix).

Conversely, advocates of world government criticize the realities of global governance as being inefficient, insufficient, and anemic. They object the "benign" recommendations of the UNGG (1995) and ask themselves, "Within the present world structure, how can 'citizens' movements' or NGOs possibly participate with superpower nation-states or multinational corporations in something called 'consensual democratic global governance?'" (Martin 1999: 14). From this standpoint, the idea and reality of global governance is a strained compromise that is subservient to the realities of traditional power politics (see also Held and McGrew 2002: 13). Hence, attempts to impose policy features on it are anchored in an explicit normative bias.

Finally, on *ethical grounds*, the concept of global governance does not pay enough attention to the ethical and moral connotations of world order and of globalization (see Murphy 2005: 90; and Franceschet 2009). There are several paradigmatic moral visions of the politics of global governance, including an *ethics of reform*, which attempt to "civilize



globalization" and suggest a social-democratic compromise (see Sandbrook 2003); an *ethics of responsible governance*, geared toward the provision of adequate governance on a global basis; an *ethics of cosmopolitan community*, which crowns a logic of world order for humanity as a whole as trumping any particular interests of given actors or groups; and another site of politics, power, and domination (see Franceschet 2009).

There are two major normative themes concerned with the dynamics and realities of global governance. First, there is the issue of democratizing global governance and overcoming the inherent problem of "democratic deficit," making global governance accountable (to whom?) Second, there is the issue of promoting global distributive justice and overcoming poverty and inequality, while keeping a modicum of order in world politics (see Held and McGrew 2002: 14; Falk 2005: 106, 118; and Dower 2004: 116). With all the imperfections and limitations of both the theoretical concept and the realities it should reflect, global governance remains an essential and indispensable ingredient to make sense of our world. If world government is an unfeasible ideal, while the anarchy (or *laissez-faire*) of the markets is a recipe for financial global crises, then we have to promise on an intermediate solution, ranging between international order and world government. Thirty years ago the realities (not the theory) of complex interdependence demanded the creation of functional international institutions (including international regimes) to cope with it. Nowadays and similarly, in our post-Cold War age of economic globalization and global issues we have to explain and understand that set of political practices, actors, and institutions, both public and private, which improve coordination, provide global public goods, and compete and coexist with the still vibrant and vivid nation-states (themselves major agents of global governance) in providing a political equivalent and response to the functional demands of globalization. It is not just a "new world order" as proclaimed by George Bush twenty years ago; it is actually a new world of actors, networks, alliances, and overlapping authorities and identities, messy but vital, under the umbrella concept of "global governance." And our job remains to make sense of it, both in analytical and in normative terms.

## NOTE

\* I would like to thank David Levi-Faur, Claudia Kedar, Mor Mirrani, and Nilgun Onder for their comments on and insights into previous versions of this chapter.

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## CHAPTER 49

# GOVERNANCE IN AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD

THOMAS RISSE

In the twenty-first century, it is increasingly clear that conventional modes of political steering by the nation-states and international intergovernmental organizations (IOs) are not living up to global challenges such as environmental issues, humanitarian catastrophes, and new security threats.<sup>1</sup> This is one of the reasons why governance has become such a central topic of research within the social sciences, focusing in particular on non-state actors who participate in rule-making and implementation. Yet the governance discourse remains centered on an "ideal type" of modern statehood—with full internal and external sovereignty, a legitimate monopoly on the use of force, and checks and balances that constrain political rule and authority. Similarly, most of the "global governance" debate in international relations, while focusing on "governance without government" and the rise of private authority in world politics (e.g. Cutler, Hafler, and Porter 1999; O'Brien et al. 2000; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Grande and Pauly 2005), is based on the assumption that functioning states are capable of implementing and enforcing global norms and rules. Even the discourse on failed, failing, and fragile states centers on state-building as the main remedy for establishing or restoring political and social order (see, e.g. Rotberg 2003, 2004; Schneckenner 2004).

From a global as well as a historical perspective, however, the modern and consolidated nation-state with a full monopoly over the means of violence and the capacity to effectively enforce central decisions is rather exceptional. Outside the developed Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) world, we find areas of "limited statehood," from developing and transition countries to failing and failed states, in today's conflict zones and—historically—in colonial societies. Areas of limited statehood lack the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions and/or a monopoly on the use of force.