The Dialogical Mind

Dialogue has become a central theoretical concept in human and social sciences as well as in professions such as education, health and psychotherapy. This 'dialogical turn' emphasises the importance of social relations and interaction to our behaviour and how we make sense of the world; hence, the *Dialogical Mind* is the mind in interaction with others – with individuals, groups, institutions and cultures in historical perspectives. Through a combination of rigorous theoretical work and empirical investigation, Marková presents an ethics of dialogicality as an alternative to the narrow perspective of individualism and cognitivism that has traditionally dominated the field of social psychology. The dialogical perspective, which focuses on interdependencies among the Self and Others, offers a powerful theoretical basis to comprehend, analyse and discuss complex social issues. Marková considers the implications of dialogical epistemology both in daily life and in professional practices involving problems of communication, care and therapy.

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The Dialogical Mind

Common Sense and Ethics

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For Iša, Pavel and Sacha

Nechápu vesmír jako pevné body hvězd, ale jako víření kosmických těles, hmotu pak jako víření atomů a jako vztahy sil. V obrazech se snažím vyjádřit vnitřní dynamickou skutečnost kolem nás, nejsou tedy něco abstraktního a nereálného, i když tak snad povrchnímu pozorovateli na první pohled připadají.

[I do not conceive the universe as fixed points of stars but rather as a swirling of cosmic bodies, with mass consisting of a swirling of atoms and the interrelationship of forces. In my paintings I try to express the inner dynamic reality around us. My paintings are therefore not of something abstract or unreal even if at first glance they might appear thus to a superficial observer.]

Jan Špála, about his painting *Dobrodružství poznávání* [*The adventure of knowing*] 1968.

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Preface and acknowledgements

Throughout my career as a social scientist my primary interest has been the study of thinking and its manifestation in language. Before arriving in the United Kingdom from Czechoslovakia in 1967, I worked in the field of cognitive psychology. In accord with the philosophical and cultural heritage of Central European scholars like Herder, Humboldt and Hegel, and Russian psychologists like Vygotsky and Rubinstein, I considered thought and language as social phenomena. When I arrived in the United Kingdom, I discovered that language and thinking were primarily studied as capacities of the individual. Thus, I thought – a different country means a different culture – I was in the wrong field. I should not be in cognitive but in social psychology. I therefore applied for a position as a lecturer in social psychology at the University of Stirling, United Kingdom. I then realised that in social psychology, too, the individual was the primary interest of study; explorations of social phenomena were derived from the capacities of the individual. I did not understand why social psychology conceived the individual as the basis for the study of thinking and speaking, and I involved myself in a life-long struggle to comprehend this question. In the book on *Paradigms, Thought and Language* (1982), I contrasted Cartesian and Hegelian epistemologies and their reflections in the psychology of thought, language and action. This study only partially solved my problem: social psychology followed the Cartesian rather than the Hegelian way of thought. During the 1980s two important socially orientated approaches came to the fore: Western scholarship discovered Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogism and, approximately at the same time, Serge Moscovici's theory of social representations provided an approach in social psychology that was based on the interdependence between the Self and Other(s) or the Ego–Alter[1]. These two approaches seemed to provide a theoretical foundation for the development of a social – or a dialogical – approach for the study of

[1] The Self–Other(s) or the Ego–Alter are fundamental theoretical constructs in this book. Therefore, throughout this book, whenever I use these terms in capitals, I am referring to the interdependent relations between the Self and Other(s) or the Ego and Alter. If these terms appear in quotations in which capitals were not used, I stick to the original small letters. Equally I use small letters if I do not refer to these terms as theoretical constructs.

thought, language and action. After a long reflection I have attempted to clarify and develop links between these two approaches and I have discussed these issues in *Dialogicality and Social Representations* (2003a). The end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and the study of problems involving people with communication disabilities, led me to examine empirically, together with my colleagues, dialogical and ethical features of daily thinking. These issues form the basis for my main argument in *The Dialogical Mind: Common Sense and Ethics*. Epistemology of daily thought, language and action does not stem from 'neutral' information processing of the individual but from the ethics of dialogicality. With hindsight, I see that in my three books I have intuitively followed the same problem: a continuous struggle to understand the interdependence between the Self and Others in thought, language and action in their historical and cultural perspectives.

I learnt a great deal about dialogicality from my colleagues involved with the care of, and research into, congenital deafblindness. I would like to thank the following persons in the working group for the Deafblind International Network on Communication and Congenital Deafblindness: Marlene Daelman, Paul Hart, Marleen Janssen, Flemming Ask Larsen, Anne Nafstad, Inger Rødbroe, Jacques Souriau and Ton Visser. In addition, Franck Bearteu and Gunnar Vege as well as other students provided very interesting insights into deafblindness. I thank *Signo Kompetansesenter* in Oslo for giving me permission to reprint photographs (Figures 7.1 and 7.2) and to refer to materials based on the DVD *Traces*. I also thank Ingerid's family for permission to use materials from Gunnar Vege's research. Gunnar Vege gave me permission to reprint long quotations from his MSc thesis; he also drew my attention to an issue I missed.

A study group on common sense initiated by Martin Bauer and myself at the London School of Economics and Political Science has provided opportunities for discussions of common sense and science with Jorge Jesuino, Helene Joffe, Sandra Jovchelovitch, Nikos Kalampalikis, Cliodhna O'Connor, Chris Tennant and others.

I presented some aspects of this book at conferences in London, Zurich, San Paulo, Evora, Louvain, Neuchâtel, Naples and Helsinki, and in lectures to postgraduate students at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

I wish to thank Dr I. S. Marková for reading twice the whole text; she drew my attention to theoretical inconsistencies, structural imbalances and lack of clarity; she corrected my English and provided some references. Of course, any remaining errors are my own responsibility. I am also grateful to Alex Gillespie, who read the whole manuscript and suggested typographical changes and corrections. I discussed many issues with Per Linell, who drew my attention to issues in the book that could be misunderstood.

I started working on this book during the period of my Emeritus Fellowship awarded by the Leverhulme Trust, and I wish to acknowledge the Trust's generous support to enable me to complete my empirical studies on trust and responsibility.

Since 2007 I have been a Visiting Professor in the Department of Social Psychology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. I thank the successive Heads of the Department for their support: Sandra Jovchelovitch, Saadi Lahlou and Cathy Campbell. I greatly benefitted from the friendly and inspirational atmosphere of all my colleagues and postgraduate students.

I am thankful to the Kodl gallery in Prague for permission to reproduce the painting of Jan Špála *Dobrodružství poznávání* [*The adventure of knowing*] which I bought from the gallery.

Figure 1.1 was designed by Cliodhna O'Connor for her research and is reprinted with her permission. Figure 4.5, the Toblerone model, was originally published in Bauer, M. W. and Gaskell, G. (1999) 'Towards a paradigm for research on social representations', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 29: 163–186. Copyright © 1999 by John Wiley and Sons, Inc. Reprinted by permission of John Wiley and Sons, Inc. Figures 4.6 and 5.1 are reprinted from Zittoun, T. (2014a), 'Trusting for learning', pp. 134 and 145, in P. Linell and I. Marková, (2014) (eds.). *Dialogical Approaches to Trust in Communication*. Charlotte: Information Age Publishers. Copyright © 2014 by Information Age Publishing, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Information Age Publishing, Inc. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 are reprinted by permission of 123RF.

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Introduction

I.1 A dialogical turn

Dialogue has become a central concept in various theoretical perspectives in human and social sciences as well as in professional practices such as education, health, therapies and counselling, among others. Since the concept of dialogue dominates the discourse in these fields, they usually call themselves 'dialogical'. Some scholars have even suggested that we are witnessing a 'dialogical turn' not only in human and social sciences but in society at large. The main presupposition of dialogical perspectives is that the mind of the Self and the minds of Others are interdependent in and through sense-making and sense-creating of social realities, in interpretations of their past, experiencing the present and imagining the future. Such multifaceted social realities are situated in history and culture, and dialogical approaches study them in diverse fashions. Some approaches focus on the development of peaceful relations among humans, their intersubjective understanding and aspirations for harmonious relations in daily life, politics and professions; others explore clashes among participants and groups, and strategies in which they negotiate their positions. Still others are inspired by the new media, such as the various Internet genres. All these forms of communication express heterogeneous voices and ideas – all contributing to the appeal of the 'dialogical turn'. This appeal is being helped by tremendous technological advances that enable the high-quality recording of voices, making videos of interactions and the digitalisation of recorded and video data. These advances also contribute to refining investigations in conversation analysis, in various kinds of discourse analyses, studies of interviews, narratives and focus groups, among others. Moreover, translations into many languages of Lev Vygotsky's studies of language and thinking, and of Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogism, have inspired international interest in dialogical approaches.

I.2 What are dialogical approaches?

All approaches that, today, call themselves 'dialogical' place emphasis on language *as* dialogue (rather than as a system of signs), conversation and

communication (rather than as a transmission of information), and they foreground interaction between the Self and Others. Beyond this, they are widely divergent. They originate from numerous theoretical traditions, and they direct attention to a range of distinct issues. To my mind, among these, the most significant approach is based on 'existential dialogism' and the 'dialogical principle'. It derives from the tradition of neo-Kantian philosophy that was instigated by Christianity, Hegelian philosophy and Judaism (e.g. Buber, 1923/1962; Cohen, 1907/1977; Rosenstock-Huessy, 1924; Rosenzweig, 1921/1971). According to this approach, the 'dialogical principle' is established and maintained through speech and communication. It expresses life experiences of people, their emotions and concerns, as well as creates their sense of social reality.

Other dialogical approaches stem from ancient Socratic and Platonic dialogues (e.g. Hart and Tejera, 1997). Bernard Williams (1985) expands on the thesis of Socrates that through dialogue humans are guided towards rational and ethical living. Still other dialogical ideas make appeals to phenomenology and hermeneutics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They emphasise the role of daily experience, multivoicedness of language in dialogue, the study of the Self, ethics and interpretations in examining socially shared knowledge. Dialogical approaches have been also inspired by pragmatism, for example, by William James's focus on the Self–Other relations, and by George Herbert Mead's conversation of gestures and intersubjectivity. Habermas's (1981/1984; 1981/1987) communicative rationality and communicative action, too, motivates dialogical perspectives (e.g. Jovchelovitch, 2007).

Considering the range of traditions from which dialogical approaches originate, it is not surprising that scholars have developed diverse views as to which of these should, and which should not, be called 'dialogical'. While some researchers take a broad perspective, others restrict dialogism to specialised positions. For example, in *Rethinking Language, Mind, and the World Dialogically* Per Linell (2009, p. xxix, also pp. 8, 420) explicitly states that he takes an ecumenical approach in relation to dialogical theories. His perspective includes several related, as well as not so closely related, approaches to language, cognition and communication. These comprise phenomenology, pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, various kinds of discourse approaches and sociocultural theories; some of these refer, while others do not refer, to dialogical approaches. Despite this broad range, Per Linell argues that these outlooks share certain views on activities and processes of sense-making and sense-creating. This in itself justifies linking together scholars ranging from Vygotsky and Mead to Merleau-Ponty and Gibson, among many others, even if they do not focus primarily on social interaction. Since dialogism has a strongly empirical basis, Linell maintains that approaches such as conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, sociocultural semiotics, among others, have a great deal to

offer to dialogism. What matters here is the division between monologism and dialogism. Linell characterises monologism as information processing theories of cognition, which conceive communication as transfer of messages from sender to receiver. Monologism further includes conceptions of language as consisting of static signs and fixed meanings, while contexts are viewed as external to language and language use, thinking and communication (Linell, 2009, p. 36). Providing a deep analysis of these issues, Linell's perspective implies that if a theory cannot be characterised as monological in the terms he proposes, it can offer, both theoretically and empirically, something to dialogical approaches.

At the other pole of this wide concept of dialogism are contemporary approaches in the French dialogical linguistics, building on and developing Bakhtin's ideas. Applying a dialogical approach in grammar, these dialogical linguists analyse utterances and discourse. For example, they make a linguistic distinction between locutor and enunciator (Bres, 1998; 1999; Bres and Verine, 2002; Salazar Orvig, 2005; Vion, 1998; 2001), that is, between the one who utters 'I' and the one who presents the point of view of others, respectively. Through the use of various grammatical structures such as modalisations, positioning, deontic concepts and other means, speakers can take distance from, or closeness to, what they are actually stating (Salazar Orvig, 2005; Salazar Orvig and Grossen, 2008). But even within these linguistically based approaches there are vast differences. For example, while Bres and his colleagues stick to the grammatical analysis of utterances, Salazar Orvig and Grossen combine dialogical linguistics with the analysis of social psychological phenomena such as trust (e.g. Grossen and Salazar Orvig, 2014), and with therapeutic and clinical practices (Grossen and Salazar Orvig, 2011).

I.3 Dialogical approaches as an alternative to the study of the human mind

The wide conception of the 'dialogical turn' encompassing a broad range of dialogical approaches and epistemologies can be seen as a response to at least two powerful tendencies.

First, we may consider the 'dialogical turn' as an alternative to the narrow perspective of individualism and cognitivism dominating many areas of the human and social sciences and attempting to imitate natural sciences. This perspective has been developing over two or three centuries, but in the aftermath of the Second World War it has become even more pronounced. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, p. 3) observes in *Truth and Method* that as the natural sciences, human sciences became concerned with establishing similar and regular patterns in human behaviour that would conform to rigid laws and thus allow predictions of behaviour. The inductive method became the chosen method for the study of

many domains of human sciences: 'One only has to think of social psychology' (Gadamer, 1975, p. 4). This approach also assumes that social phenomena should be treated as ahistorical and a cultural. Studies of society, just like studies of nature, must be repeatable; repeatability defines their scientific reliability. Above all, confidence in the power of science has been related to the view that on its historical journey, humankind will shake off irrational ways of thinking, myth and superstitious beliefs, and will progress towards rationality: logos will substitute mythos (Chapter 1). The British philosopher Bertrand Russell expressed his confidence in the power of sciences by stating that, one day, they will develop 'a mathematics of human behaviour as precise as the mathematics of machines' (Russell, 1956, p. 142).

The second tendency that seems to have encouraged the 'dialogical turn' has been the reaction against the technological dominance invading all areas of human life. It places emphasis on efficiency, markets and money, and on quantification of phenomena such as life-satisfaction, feelings of injustice or trusting others. Within this trend, technological advancements in neuroscience, physiology and medical sciences have brought about a powerful influence on technicisation and bureaucratisation of social and human sciences. Anonymity of numbers, hiding behind the façade of precision and giving bureaucratisation a scientific appearance, has become offensive to those who insist on the uniqueness and wholeness of humans.

In contrast to perspectives fragmenting individuals into elements and studying detached cognition, 'neutral' and 'objective' knowledge, dialogical approaches focus on interaction and interdependencies among the Self and Others, and on their engaged experience, knowledge and communication in ordinary life.

I.4 The dialogical mind

The perspective taken in *The Dialogical Mind: Common Sense and Ethics* endorses the general contention of dialogical approaches foregrounding the interaction between the Self and Others as a point of departure. More than that, the dialogical perspective presented in this book presupposes that the nature of the Self–Other interdependence is ethical and that ethics is embedded in common-sense thinking and socially shared knowledge. Let us explain.

A large amount of literature on common sense refers to the opposition between common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge, vigorously defending and disputing the merits and drawbacks of one versus the other. Common sense, we shall see, can involve different kinds of daily knowledge, which can be concerned with physical, biological and social phenomena. My focus in this book is not primarily on the opposition between common sense and science; instead, I emphasise common sense as a dialogical sense,

that is, common sense as a vital feature of social interaction and communication underlain by the ethics of the Self–Other. I have argued elsewhere that the Self–Other interdependence is the basic *thema* of common sense in social interaction (Marková, 2003a). Originally, *thema* and *themata* were defined as historically based preconceptions in science, as dyadic oppositions such as atoms versus continua, analysis versus synthesis or simplicity versus complexity (Holton, 1975). Holton argued that such dyadic oppositions in science explain the formation of traditions in specific schools of thought in physics. However, not only scientific thinking but also daily thinking is underlain by dyadic oppositions. Humans understand their relationships as well as daily events as good or bad, moral or immoral, just or unjust, and so forth. Such *themata* are historically and culturally established as the basis of common sense. They can be implicit in daily thinking and perpetuate themselves in and through socialisation across traditions and cultures (for a discussion of *themata* see Marková, 2003a; Moscovici and Vignaux, 1994/2000). During socialisation the child learns quite naturally to distinguish between moral and immoral conduct, whom to trust and whom not to trust. In human societies, such *themata* are part of implicitly adopted common sense; they appear vital for survival and for the extension of life. For example, it is essential to humanity that people treat each other with dignity, that they have choices with respect to their activities, style of life, that they distinguish between what is good for them and what to avoid. This assumption, to which I shall keep returning throughout the book, contrasts common sense embedded in dialogical thinking with thinking that is founded solely on the mental capacities of the individual. Those who adopt this latter perspective, usually attribute thinking of the individual with the capacity for being 'objective' or 'rational'.

Ethics and morality are fundamental concepts of philosophies, human and social sciences as well as of professional and daily life. Often used interchangeably, ethics and morality mostly refer to an individual's duties to think and act morally. These duties are commonly derived from universal imperatives that apply to all humans capable of rational thinking. These universal imperatives are normative and prescriptive. They are customarily related to the idea that humans are equipped with the inborn intuitive capacity to directly apprehend what is good and what is morally reprehensible, and to what ought and ought not to be done in a given situation. In Western philosophies, ideas focusing on universal rationality have been maintained throughout history from ancient Greek philosophy to Immanuel Kant and to contemporary intuitive ethics and morality. In other words, according to this position, each human is born with the capacity to apprehend basic moral imperatives due to his/her *individual rationality*.

While acknowledging that each individual is capable of ethical and moral judgement, I presuppose that this capacity does not arise in the mind of a sole

individual due to his/her innate cognitive rationality, but that the nature of this capacity is dialogical. It has been acquired throughout the historical and cultural development of human species *as* humans. Therefore, ethics discussed in this book is not based on *individual rationality,* but on *dialogical rationality.* It is of vital importance to acknowledge that when referring to individual and dialogical rationality we are dealing with two different forms of thought which determine the kinds of questions we pose about humans and their mental capacities. The concepts of individual rationality and of dialogical rationality have fundamental implications for questions about the nature of language, thinking and knowing, about the individual and social action, and about ethics and morality.

The concept of dialogically based ethics has been firmly established both in theoretical and empirical studies. Philosophically and theoretically, the ethics based on the interdependence between the Self and Other(s) as an ontological (existential) point of departure can be traced to the eighteenth-century philosopher Giambattista Vico (Chapter 2) and then to the ethical thought of German dialogical philosophies (Chapter 4). Empirically, during the last sixty years there has been an abundance of psychological studies into the very early life of infants on face recognition, imitation, communication, interactional rhythm and recognition of voices by neonates. These studies provide evidence for rich capacities for social interaction with which the neonate is endowed at birth. Research literature has shown that infants relate to a human face immediately after birth. In his classic study on pattern recognition in infants Fantz (1963) stated that although the mechanism underlying infants' preferences for faces over other objects is not known, this fact should facilitate the development of social responsiveness, because 'what is responded to must first be attended to' (Fantz, 1963, p. 297; see also a comprehensive review on the selective attention to faces in infants by Otsuka, 2014).

A response to a human face is not 'disengaged', 'neutral' or 'objective' but the human face obliges the Self and Other to get involved in a dialogical action (see Part II of this book). A dialogical action arising from the dialogical capacities of the mind to engage with the Other ranges from unconscious social activities transmitted by tradition and common sense to self-reflective social interactions. It affirms that humans act in order to promote what they consider as good, just and worthwhile, even if what some consider as good, just and worthwhile, others judge as misery, injustice, worthlessness and even terror. Whatever the meaning of good, just and worthwhile, ethics based on the dialogical capacities of the mind and on dialogical action is about the fulfilment of living (Taylor, 2011). It was Paul Ricoeur who emphasised the idea of ethics as 'good life'. He argued for the priority of ethics, that is, of the Self's search for the 'good life' with Others and with institutions based on justice, over what is habitually called normative morality. Normative morality, while indispensable

in social life, must be subsumed under ethics (Ricoeur, 1990/1992; see Chapter 5 of this book). Ethics based on the Self–Other(s) interdependence permeates all daily thinking, communicating and acting and it is therefore of major interest to social psychology. Ethics of the Self–Other interdependence contradicts the neutral and objectivist cognitive perspective and of information processing. This is why ethical relations provide the central concept for the dialogical mind and, equally importantly, for the dialogically based professional practices.

Part I

‘Superior’ and ‘inferior’ thinking and knowing

Throughout the history of humankind, from Plato to Einstein and beyond, we can trace two kinds of thinking and knowing: aristocratic and plebeian, or elitist and popular, logos and mythos, rationality and irrationality, episteme and doxa, scientific and unscientific, among others. The first term in each of these pairs of notions refers to a ‘superior’, and the second refers to an ‘inferior’ knowing (Moscovici, 2011). These modes of thought have been known since ancient Greece. Although there are vast variations in the meanings attached to these pairs of words and epistemologies, we can, nevertheless, make the following, rather simple observation. Much of the scholarly literature on this subject matter has considered the former mode of thinking and knowing as more esteemed in comparison with the latter mode. This evaluation is associated with the assumption that on its historical journey humankind progresses from mythos, irrationality and non-scientific thinking to logos, rationality and scientific thinking. Such an idea has been seductive for centuries and many attempts have been made to show that the human mind, through instruction and learning, gradually frees itself from ‘inferior’ modes of thinking and knowing. As one may expect, not everybody has agreed with this view. For some scholars, these two modes of thinking and knowing fulfil similar roles, both trying to understand essential questions about the nature of the world (e.g. Aristotle, 1998; Jacob, 1981/1982), although by using different strategies. Other researchers have suggested that any sharp division between ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ thinking lacks a basis. Albert Einstein claimed that such a separation is an illusion. In his remarks on the British philosopher Bertrand Russell, Einstein referred to two kinds of illusion. The first one is an aristocratic illusion; it is the belief in an unlimited power of thought. The second is a plebeian naive realism; it is the belief in the power of sensory perception, which deems that things are exactly what they appear to be when we perceive them through our senses (Einstein, 1944, p. 281). The latter illusion is common in the daily life of people, but it is also the starting point of natural sciences. Still other scholars have argued that it is a fiction to assume that the human mind on its historical journey proceeds from irrationality to rationality. Instead, these scholars have provided

evidence showing that humans never cast off mythical thinking and irrationality (Chapter 1).

Despite vastly diverse views of professionals and lay citizens on these two kinds of thinking and knowing, the belief in their reality has not diminished. Both kinds of thinking and knowing and their various combinations are present in the ways our life experiences are organised and the means by which knowledge is acquired. The view that scientific thinking, whatever it may mean, is 'superior' to all other kinds of thinking not only endures but dominates most areas of contemporary life, including education, politics, economy as well as human and social sciences.

Human and social sciences came to their being in the late eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century, when they gradually separated themselves from philosophy and natural sciences. They created new disciplines like anthropology, sociology and psychology and their sub-disciplines. Scholarly fields never emerge in a vacuum but are part of the social, political and economic conditions of the time. Treatises of the history of new breakup disciplines like anthropology and sociology refer to the political climate, in particular in Germany and surrounding Central European countries. Since the eighteenth century, debates for and against the formation of modern nations took place, and studies of their languages, communities and their histories, as well as the collective spirit of people, were widely discussed (e.g. Diriwächter, 2012; Jahoda, 1982; 2007; Klautke, 2010). Interests in these issues were subsumed under names like the 'spirit of the folk', 'social psychology' and 'Völkerpsychologie', among others. One of the leaders of these movements, Johann Gottfried von Herder promoted the idea of Volkgeist ('spirit of the folk') and Volk poetry, and of beliefs and myths in diverse cultures. He argued that Volk poetry was the only true poetry that epitomised the standard of a language (Herder, 1877–1913/1967, IX, p. 529). According to Herder, each nation must be understood on its own premises; thus, the conduct of peoples should be explained in terms of their cultures rather than through imposing criteria of other times and other nations. One needs to empathise with other nations' perspectives in order to understand them. Herder presupposed that languages are forms of self-expression of peoples and that they develop in intimate relations with the feeling of nationality. Thus, Herder expressed the perspective that had been already advanced half a century earlier by Giambatistta Vico (see Chapter 2).

The beginnings of social anthropology, social psychology and ethnology were intermingled (Jahoda, 1982), and they pre-dated Wilhelm Wundt's ten volumes of *Völkerpsychologie*, published during the years 1900–1920. Wundt is known as the father of experimental psychology, although he was emphatic that his *Völkerpsychologie*, often translated as 'social psychology' (Greenwood, 2004), was an important counterpart of experimental psychology. He recognised that

experimental psychology could not study complex mental products of communities like languages, and myths and customs, which require a historical and comparative analysis. Such phenomena are dependent on social community, and 'this whole department of psychological investigation is designated as social psychology, and distinguished from individual, or as it may be called because of its predominating method, experimental psychology' (quoted by Greenwood, 2004, p. 45, from Wundt, 1897/1902, p. 23). Social aspects of cognition, emotion and behaviour of the individual had to be studied at supra-individual levels. That was possible only in and through anthropology conceived as a historical-comparative study and a diachronic study of languages, myths and customs (Greenwood, 2004). So, in its beginnings social psychology included the study of languages, mythological ideas and laws of custom, in other words 'the more complicated psychical processes' (Wundt, 1897/1902, p. 10; quoted in Greenwood, 2004, p. 50) that were nested in social community and could be studied by observation. Yet it is also worth recalling that the association between social psychology and anthropology did not last and that very soon after Wundt had published his views social psychology followed the road of general psychology as a natural science. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, general psychology became a relatively well-developed discipline studying mental and behavioural characteristics and processes of the individual. Already at that time some scholars were critical of psychology in promoting individualism and in supposing that the individual obtains knowledge on the basis of having sensations and cognitions produced in his/her mind. One of the most persistent critics of individualism in humanities and social sciences was James Mark Baldwin. One wonders why this assiduous challenger of positivism and individualism, who paved the groundwork and creatively contributed to developmental and social psychology, so rarely features in studies of the history of these disciplines. At the end of the nineteenth century, Baldwin (1897) argued in his book on *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* that the discipline of social psychology did not exist because there was no principle of 'socius', that is, the dialectic relationship between the Ego and Alter. He pursued this idea in all his writings, insisting that theories which ignore the social origin of knowledge 'have to be laid away in the attic where old intellectual furniture is stored' (Baldwin, 1910, p. 78; Marková, 1990). Baldwin was not the only one who fought for the principle of 'socius'. Similarly, John Dewey (1917) argued for the establishment of social psychology, which he saw as particularly important in the field of education. He thought that education was in need of reform and insisted that educational institutions should break with past habits. Despite these observations and criticisms, in its attempt to achieve the status of a rational scientific discipline, the position of social psychology has remained ambivalent, continuously hovering between the

individualism of general psychology on the one hand and socially orientated disciplines of anthropology and sociology on the other (de Bie et al., 1954; Moscovici and Marková, 2006).

Part I of this book shows that history tends to repeat itself and that political, religious and ideological decisions largely determine the direction of sciences and humanities. The compromises and silences of scientists on account of fear of persecution and punishment, whether by the Church, the State, the Party or the modern bureaucrats, have persisted and continue to determine what is and what is not acceptable as 'science'. What perhaps is new is the speed with which bureaucratisation and the construction of Weber's 'iron cage' of rationalisation legitimises activities for which one can find little or no reasonable justification.

Chapter 1, 'From mythos and irrationality towards logos and rationality', shows that since ancient Greece the division between mythos and logos has been creating controversies. While many authors argued that humankind follows the unidirectional road from mythos to logos, others were sceptical. Although science had a profound effect on public education, it also contributed to the creation of new myths. The mixture of myth and science does not characterise only the thinking of ordinary citizens and scientific popularisers; scientists too, whether with or without awareness, are prone to propagating 'scientific myths'. Just like the opposition between mythos and logos, the broadly based distinction between irrational and rational thinking has persisted throughout European history until today. Irrationality has nearly always had a negative connotation; therefore, social sciences have tried either to augment their rationality or to bring about different meanings of rationality.

Chapter 2, 'Towards Giambattista Vico's common sense', traces historical roots of common sense from Aristotle through the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Ideas associated with the scientific revolution gave rise to new perspectives in arts, artisanships and technology, all these influencing the emergence of social sciences. The chapter focuses on the work of the Italian scholar Giambattista Vico, who, in many respects, can be viewed as a precursor to the idea of the dialogical mind. For Vico, human beings humanise nature by acting on it, by establishing communities, social institutions, traditions and political organisations. It is common sense that forms the basis of historicity. From his critique of the Cartesian method, Vico developed a modern conception of common sense based on *verum factum*, the logic of imagination, language and ethics.

Chapter 3, 'Common sense in humanities and social sciences', discusses some ideas of common sense after Vico as they were thematised in social sciences, philosophy and social psychology. Some scholars argue that there are firm boundaries between science and common sense, while others view common sense and science as a continuum. Social psychology oscillates between

polarised positions. On the one hand, social psychology cannot avoid studying citizens' daily thinking, attitudes expressed in ordinary language, acting and feeling – therefore, it must pay at least some attention to common sense. On the other hand, from its origin, social psychology has aspired to achieve the status of a science, and therefore the study of common sense is a kind of embarrassment. Therefore, social psychology seeks a rupture between science and common sense and so to widen the epistemic gap between them. Serge Moscovici's theory of social representations is the only social psychological theory that is explicitly based on common sense and socially shared knowledge.

1 From mythos and irrationality towards logos and rationality

1.1 Mythos and logos

Already in ancient Greece it was recognised that there were two distinct ways of thinking and acquiring knowledge. One was 'mythos', which relied upon narrative (fabula) and folk knowledge, and the other was 'logos', which referred to logical and rational analysis of the phenomena in question. From the very beginning the distinction between mythos and logos created controversies. Geoffrey Lloyd (1990) argued that the dispute between mythos and logos was not based on sound analysis of these two kinds of mental processes but that it was a battlefield in which contestants defended their philosophical territories and confronted their political rivals. According to Cassirer (1946), the first philosopher who attacked mythical conceptions was the historian Thucydides, who, despite knowing that the lack of fabula and romance in his writing would detract the attention of readers, nevertheless proclaimed that he desired to present exact historical knowledge. Rationality and methodical procedures characterised Greek thought in all domains of knowing, ranging from the cosmos to the study of nature and self-knowledge.

When we come to Plato, we find that he attributed a higher degree of reality to non-material and abstract ideas acquired through rational thought than to knowing the world through sensations and experience. According to Plato, mythos – or muthos – was always subjected to logos (e.g. Halliwell, 2000). Analysing Plato's citations from numerous poets, Halliwell (2000) finds that imaginative or fictive status or muthoi (mythos) in poetic texts and in Platonic dialogues was always subsumed under logoi (logos). It meant that assertions in Platonic dialogues had to be appraised in terms of truth and falsity, although it was well acknowledged that truth and falsity were difficult to separate. Yet other scholars, like Dodds (1951), argued in considerable detail that even in Plato's thinking we can find cross-fertilisation of rationalism and magical-religious ideas of shamanistic culture and of the occult nature of the Self. Plato strongly argued against images and imagination. For him, imagination was no more than imitation of ideal or true forms, as he explains in the *Republic* (Plato, 1991, pp. 283–284). Referring to poets, and specifically to Homer, Plato

called him an imitator who copied images of virtue, but he could never reach the truth of God. Equally, a painter makes images of things about which he knows nothing and he is admired by those who know even less than he does. Poets and painters make images, but they know nothing of real existences, only of appearances.

In contrast to Plato, Aristotle thought that widely held beliefs, theories, stories and opinions of the public (endoxa) carried rational insights, even if some of them belonged to mythos rather than to logos. While he took a polemic approach to mythologies, Aristotle recognised the significance of myth (Johansen, 1999) and acknowledged that myth had the same explanatory intentions as had science and that therefore one cannot simply reject mythologies as irrational. Concerning imagination, Aristotle placed it between the capacity to perceive and the capacity to think and stated that therefore imagination could facilitate the transformation of sensory impressions into thoughts.

A casual inspection of the literature on the history of ideas shows that the belief that 'mythic imagining and logical thinking are contraries' (Nestle, 1942, p. 1) has always been widespread. In his influential book on ancient Greek thinking entitled *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, Nestle characterised mythical imagining as involuntary and as based on unconscious processes. Throughout the history of thought, this idea has been commonly accepted (cf. Cassirer, 1946, p. 282). Nestle thought that, in contrast to mythos, logical thinking is conscious and conceptual. Giving numerous examples from ancient Greece, Nestle pointed to evidence that humans, on their road towards logos, have gradually replaced mythical thinking by rational reasoning.

1.1.1 Merging logos and mythos

Not everybody has been convinced by the idea of the unidirectional road from mythos to logos. For example, the question mark in the title of the volume *From Myth to Reason?* (Buxton, 1999) expresses some scepticism with respect to this view; indeed, Buxton describes such a road as full of problems. And there have been many others who have likewise raised doubts concerning the idea of the path from mythos to logos, both in ancient Greece and in contemporary societies. Tracing the history of Greek philosophy, as well as referring to modernity,[1] Guthrie (1962, p. 2) criticises the contemporary preoccupation

[1] The term 'modernity' has become a catchword the meaning of which is usually assumed and therefore rarely ever explained. Charles Taylor's (2002, p. 91) comprehensive definition refers to the post-Mediaeval period in Europe and it captures a 'historically unprecedented amalgam of new practices and institutional forms (science, technology, industrial production, urbanization), of new ways of living (individualism, secularization, instrumental rationality), and of new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution)'. Moreover, Taylor argues that we need to speak about multiple modernities to capture developments in non-Western cultures.

with rationality, arguing that the philosophical vocabulary is often no more than a superficial mask hiding unconscious and irrational modes of thought. He warns that the danger begins when humans believe that they have left behind all mythical thinking and they rely solely on scientific methods based on observation and logical inference: '[t]he unconscious retention of inherited and irrational modes of thought, cloaked in the vocabulary of reason, then becomes an obstacle, rather than aid, to the pursuit of truth'. Equally, Glenn Most (1999) argues that despite rationalisation in the history of humankind, the path from mythos to logos is often complemented by that from logos to mythos.

The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, as well as the trends that followed, was marked by the conviction that the development of sciences would dispel the irrational thinking of the public. The growth of the sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries influenced literature, art and public imagination (Levine, 1993). Sciences had a profound effect on public education, but they did not eradicate myth. Indeed, there is evidence that the creation, invention and reinvention of myths in modernity form a powerful force in human thought and that the scientific progress itself often contributes to the creation of myths. Gillian Beer (1993) specifically refers to the discoveries in solar physics and their influence on Victorian society, noting that the public reinvented old myths about the forthcoming death of the sun. Physical sciences also influenced the general public indirectly, through the media of art and literature. Scientific findings encouraged the poetic imagination of Coleridge, Yeats, and Emerson and subsequently stirred the phantasy of the public (Beer, 1993). The discovery of X-rays at the end of the nineteenth century inspired artists' and the public's fantasies about the invisible and extrasensory world and stimulated ideas of the occult, like images of immortality or of the imminent death of the universe (Marková, 2003a). In this vein, Virginia Woolf was preoccupied with the persistent question 'what is meant by reality?' She tried to answer this by using ideas derived from the theory of relativity and quantum physics.

A recent volume on *Mythical Thinking and Social Representations*, which relates ideas from anthropology and the theory of social representations (Paredes and Jodelet, 2009), shows that mythical thinking continues to be present in daily life. It permeates everyday reasoning and daily practices, in which ancient myths about gods and humans, justice and injustice, and 'we' and 'them' have been reactivated, and myths have been transformed into the search for contemporary cultural and political identities. The authors of this volume show that the formation and transformation of myths also facilitate understanding and interpretations of events or objects in social life and in social relations.

The mixture of myth and reason, however, is not only a feature of the thinking of ordinary citizens and scientific popularisers; scientists too, whether

with or without awareness, are prone to propagate 'scientific myths'. In his article on 'The psychology of scientific myths', Moscovici (1992) provides evidence that one and the same scientist may produce both a scientific discovery and a myth. Moscovici refers to cases such as the death of the universe, the Big Bang, the right and left hemispheres and to some evolutionary misconceptions, among others. While science rejects making compromises and attributes them to social thought as its exclusive feature, scientific myths 'are neither pseudo-sciences whose unreality is unmasked at a given time, nor false sciences which entangle the link of thought to reality' (Moscovici, 1992, p. 5). Rather, they are 'cognitive operators' that aim at transforming incompatible pieces of knowledge into one another.

The French Nobel Prize biologist François Jacob argues that fixing boundaries between myth and science would be a hopeless task. He shows (Jacob, 1981/1982, pp. 9–10) that during the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was religion that made space for science. Specifically, Jacob suggests that the structure of the Judeo-Christian myth made possible the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century due to similarities in these two domains in their search for coherence. Just like the monastic doctrine was based on the idea of the orderly universe that was created and governed by God, the budding modern science searched for order and coherence of the universe guided by natural laws (Jacob, 1981/1982, p. 10). Therefore, according to Jacob, scientific reasoning and myth fulfil, at least in some respects, similar functions: both are products of imagination, representations of the world and of the powers that rule it. Both science and myth fixed boundaries of what they considered as possible (Jacob, 1981/1982, p. 9). Yet, Jacob argues, while both scientific and mythical thinking begin by inventing a possible world, they run along diverse paths.

Mythical thinking preserves the idea of the coherence of the world: it aims at explaining fundamental questions of the creation of the universe, and the origin of the matter, among others. In contrast to scientific thinking, mythical thinking fits reality to its own scheme (Jacob, 1981/1982, p. 12). It has a moral content; its meaning tallies with social values; and it remains connected with people's everyday experience. The human mind searches for stability in understanding the world around it, and it seeks single and satisfactory explanations. Mythical explanations serve this purpose.

In contrast, science systematically explores details of a particular phenomenon in order to explain it 'objectively'. In its attempt to confront the possible and actual, science creates many possible worlds, and so it fragments itself into small pieces. Using new instruments, it uncovers phenomena that could not have been seen previously. When, in the nineteenth century, science diversified and became fragmented into sub-specialities, it created a problem for the public understanding of science, because single and coherent explanations were no

longer possible. As modern science became a science of singular phenomena, of discontinuities and instabilities, the concept of omniscience based on the unity of universe disappeared. The physicist James Clerk Maxwell, discussing questions of determinism and free will, and of predictions and contingencies, commented that the intelligent public must learn to cope with diversity in both human nature and science. It must be led 'to the study of the singularities and instabilities, rather than the continuities and stabilities of things' and must no longer assume that 'the physical science of the future is a mere magnified image of that of the past' (Campbell and Garnett, 1982, p. 444).

Today's world, perhaps even more than ever, is accompanied by staging new images and by inventing new myths in politics, economy and education. Visual images in the press, television, posters and photographs are powerful means of the creation of myth by associating objects with frightful ideas. Our own research during the HIV/AIDS epidemic has shown that dentists, appearing in a 'space suit' during dental treatments, reinforced patients' fears of HIV/AIDS spreading into the community (Marková, 1992; Wilkie, 2011). And of course, the same happens with the contemporary fear of Ebola. Joffe's (2008; 2011) research has shown the impact of visual images on changes of social representations of health and risk by creating fear and anxiety of newly emerging and re-emerging diseases. Staged photographs capture public images about genetic engineering. For example, the press has encouraged the creation of public images by presenting pictures of tomatoes being injected with 'genes' that make them grow bigger (Wagner, Kronberger and Seifert, 2002). Wagner and Hayes (2005, p. 181) comment that metaphors of this kind recall ideas of inoculation and injections of foreign materials into human bodies that have been transported from medicine and chemistry. An associated belief of infection that passes from one organism to another evokes the myth of 'Frankenstein foods'.

These examples make it obvious that the two opposite explanations of phenomena in terms of either science or myth are not separated by any fixed boundaries. Instead, they provide accounts in which reason and myth, or logos and mythos, merge together in ways that are difficult to disentangle from one another. Even an attempt to create fixed boundaries between them could amount to a myth, because the criteria for what is and what is not science provide no guarantee for any true separation. Instead, in science, education, politics and technology – indeed in all human enterprises of our modern world – science and non-science inspire the merging of logos and mythos and their mutual transformations. Importantly, neither scientific discoveries nor political changes diffuse themselves into daily knowledge as simplified versions of science or of historical and political facts; instead, such transformations are accompanied by the creation of new 'figurative schemes' (Jesuino, 2008; Moscovici, 1961; 1976/2008) and by the invention of rich narratives.

In order to make this point more concrete, let us consider two examples of a complex merging of logos and mythos in recent history and in contemporary science. The first example revolutionised human thought and action and promised Heaven on Earth but failed to deliver even the slightest form of anticipated outcomes. The second example attempts to scientify complex human social phenomena by reducing them to physiology or by localising them in brain cells.

1.1.2 Logos and mythos in Marxism and Nazism

While proclaiming its fundamental allegiance to universal reason, Marxism–Leninism as an ideology in practice disseminated the greatest myths in the recent history of humankind (Marková, 2012; 2013). Mythical characteristics of Marxism–Leninism as applied in the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc have been of considerable interest to philosophers (e.g. Morin, 1959; Tucker, 1967). Mysteries of ceremonial confessions have puzzled politicians and historians (e.g. Abramovitch, 1962; Conquest, 1990; Halfin, 2003; 2009; Souvarine, 1939; among many others). On the one hand, Lenin claimed that science could not be accepted as a ready-made dogma. According to him, the nature of Marxism was scientific and therefore it should be critically evaluated. At the same time, and quite paradoxically, any doubts about the correctness of the Communist Party line would threaten the unity of the Marxist thinking. Therefore, we arrive at an absurdity: co-existence of the mystique of the Party and of the Marxist scientific thought. Yet the paradoxical or contradictory nature of this co-existence has not been questioned by revolutionary Bolsheviks. The mystique and incontestable faith in the Party was accepted from the very beginning of the Marxist movement in the Soviet Union. Among numerous examples of faithful Bolsheviks, let us mention Leon Trotsky, who, in 1924, expressed his view of the Party and its accompanying ethics. Knowing about the undemocratic ways of electing Party members, Trotsky retracted any possible criticism by professing a total faith in the Party: 'None of us desires or is able to dispute the will of the Party. Clearly, the Party is always right [. . .] We can only be right with and by the Party, for history has provided no other way of being in the right' (Souvarine, 1939, p. 362). Arthur Koestler's (1940/2005) book *Darkness at Noon* reflects the author's own experiences with the Soviet revolution and political trials. The fictive main hero of the book Rubashov, in whose personality Koestler encapsulates views of numerous persons of his acquaintance who perished in the Stalinist trials, states his faith in the Party: 'The Party can never be mistaken [. . .] You and I can make a mistake. Not the Party. The Party, comrade, is more than you and I and a thousand others like you and I. The Party is the embodiment of the revolutionary idea in history' (Koestler, 1940/2005, p. 40).

1.1.2.1 The State religion Analysing the sacralisation of politics in totalitarian regimes like Nazism and Bolshevism, Gentile (2000, p. 40) maintains that Nazist political authorities explicitly appealed to irrationality as a political force, emphasising the necessity of the 'primacy of faith' and the 'primacy of the myth'. While Bolshevism never proclaimed that it was a State religion and continued to emphasise its atheistic and scientific nature, Gentile observes that in the eyes of foreign visitors Bolshevism was recognised as having all the signs of a State religion not because of the cult of Lenin but because of the ways in which the regime practised politics. After his visit to the Soviet Union in 1920, the British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1920, p. 8) declared that 'Bolshevism is not merely a political doctrine; it is also a religion, with elaborate dogmas and inspired scriptures'. Russell explained in some detail what he meant. There are different religions and Russell thought that Bolshevism was more similar to Mohammedan religion, which is practical and social, than to Christianity or Buddhism, which are mystical and contemplative.

Following his visit to the Soviet Union in 1925, the British economist John Maynard Keynes (1925/1931; 1926/1931) wrote two articles summarising his impressions on the Soviet economy and politics. In the first of the two articles (1925/1931, pp. 297–298) he asked, 'What is the Communist faith?' and explained that 'Like other new religions, Leninism derives its power not from the multitudes but from a small number of enthusiastic converts whose zeal and intolerance makes each one the equal in strength of a hundred indifferentists.' A long paragraph follows, in which each sentence starts with 'Like other new religions . . .'; each sentence describes Leninism in specific epithets, like being colourless, persecuting without justice, unscrupulous and so on.

1.1.2.2 Nikolai Berdyaev on the Russian soul Among the first analysts of the mixture of science and religion in the Soviet form of Marxism was the Russian religious and political philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev (1931). He focused on the dichotomy between a strong emphasis on the Marxist science – or the 'proletarian science' (see Chapter 3) – and at the same time on the use of symbolism, ceremonies and rituals that arose from the Orthodox Church. The fundamental feature of the Russian intellectual and literary history was Nihilism, which, in its Russian form, preoccupied itself with human suffering and injustice. Nihilism was steered by the consciousness of guilt, contrition, feelings of offence from others, and of oppression and serfdom, and it called for a total restructuring of the society. As Berdyaev notes, these feelings became incarnated in the works of Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and Turgenev, among others. All this paved the way to the intermingling of religious issues with social ones and to a specific form of the idea of Russian socialism which, Berdyaev comments, 'was not a political but a religious question' (Berdyaev, 1931, p. 6). Socialism,

therefore, became the dominant religious faith of Russian intelligentsia and it also affected intelligentsia's moral judgements. Berdyaev (1931, p. 6) explains: 'The Russians' interpretation of Saint Simon, Proudhon and Karl Marx was a religious one; they took to materialism also in the same religious spirit.'

Here we come to another issue in Russian history: the relation between religion and science. As Berdyaev maintains, while in the West the separation of science and religion was a major problem, in Russia this was not an important issue. Being troubled by the conviction that religion supported injustice and social untruth, Russian intellectuals transformed the concept of science by adapting it to social feelings. Nihilism and atheism in science became 'an object of religious faith and idolatry, and . . . this only confirms the fact that it is not a question of mere objective science' (Berdyaev, 1931, p. 11). And thus, for Russian Marxists, the mixture of logos and mythos was not viewed as being inconsistent. While normally science and reason are subjected to doubt, reflection and uncertainty, and so enabling the creation of new knowledge and change, 'in Russian Nihilism science was never a wholly objective research; it became an idol, an object of religious faith' (Berdyaev, 1931, p. 19).

Although Marxism called itself a scientific theory, Berdyaev argues that it became a religious symbolism. The irrational gained power and the image that masses are irrational was widely exploited and encouraged by the regime. Religions thrive on symbolism, miracles, magic and myth; these phenomena are transmitted through reading biblical texts and through oral diffusion. The State religion was diffused to masses of citizens above all through ceremonies, public gatherings, songs and marches and the cult of personalities of Lenin and Stalin. The dogma was perpetually restated in various forms of written and visual communication using vocabulary and images with emotional and passionate meanings.

1.1.2.3 Mixing of myth and science as a strategy of totalitarian regimes It was in the name of science that the emphasis on the primacy of faith and myth became the main strategies of both grandiose totalitarian systems of the twentieth century, Nazism and Communism. The anthropologist Ruth Benedict drew attention to the mixing of science and myth, that is, the study of race and racism, which she compared to a religion. She stated about racism: 'Like any belief, which goes beyond scientific knowledge, it can be judged only by its fruits, its votaries and its ulterior purposes' (Benedict, 1942, p. 97; see also Moscovici, 2011). In his life-work, Eric Voegelin (1933/1997) has shown that throughout the history of humankind, race theories have always played an important role in politics. Ernst Cassirer (1946), too, in his historical treatment of *The Myth of the State* showed that contemporary political myths like racism have their long past but that, in Germany after the First World War, the threat of

a complete economic and political collapse formed the basic nourishment for racism. He commented that while myth had been usually described as an unconscious process of imagination, racism in Germany was a planned strategy using the magical power of language and charging words with new meanings and creating new rituals. Just like Marxism attributed a scientific status to the myth of the Communist Party, its leaders and the concept of class, the Nazi Party attributed a scientific status to the faith in 'superiority' of one race over another. Voegelin commented that Nazism manufactured, quite arbitrarily, the idea of 'superior' characteristics that were granted to the 'Nordic race'. Among these were 'creative mental powers, high intelligence, outstanding character traits, steadiness of will and caring foresight, self-control, pursuit of objective goals over the long term as well as a talent for technology and mastering of nature, love for the sea . . . aristocratic reserve, honesty, sincerity' (Voegelin, 1933/1997, p. 85).

In aiming at the restructuring of society and transforming the world, both totalitarian systems, that is, Nazism and Communism, used politics, daily life, culture and all forms of art to these ends. Communist ideology promised to end the injustice between the rich and the poor; it created the myth of the construction of 'a new man' that was the necessary condition for the glorious vision of Heaven on Earth. Nazism, in contrast, created the myth of a 'pure race' and the vision of a nation and of national consciousness. In analysing these issues, Voegelin (1933/1997, p. 149) refers to the German philosopher of the nineteenth century Fridrich von Schelling, who studied the origin of myth in the creation of community. Schelling thought that myth does not arise within a people but that, instead, a people emerge from its myth: 'A people's or nation's ground of being . . . and its unity is its myth' (Voegelin, 1933/1997, p. 149). Voegelin comments that it is myth that determines the history of a nation by creating 'a community of consciousness', 'a common world perspective' and 'a shared mythology'. The resources that create such mixtures of logos and mythos usually do not require any reflection or analysis on the part of the devotee; commitment to the dogma and to the leaders creating the dogma seems to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for the construction of myths.

1.1.3 Mixing of science and myth to explain human social phenomena

1.1.3.1 Social science married to neuroscience The Decade of the Brain initiated by the American President George Bush in 1990 has inspired a tremendous increase of interest and funding of brain sciences and various brain projects. This has also contributed to technological expansions in computer simulation of the brain and techniques of neuroimaging. These developments have had a high impact on social psychology, which started

seeing itself as one of the sciences that would make significant contributions to the understanding of complex social phenomena and social activities through brain functional behaviour. The main aim of functional brain imaging is focused on the identification of specific regions/neuronal systems in the brain and their temporal relationships with the performance of well-designed tasks. The end result is a detailed picture of the processing architecture of brain networks. Such scientific programmes have fuelled the imagination of social psychologists. One of the first topics that drew the attention of social psychologists to study brain activities was political behaviour. A special issue on social neuroscience and political psychology in the journal of *Political Psychology*, published in 2003, attempted to fulfil these aims. Social neuroscientists Albertson and Brehm (2003, p. 766) maintain that they did not study 'political *attitudes* in the brain so much as what kinds of political stimuli activate which *systems*' in people who are and who are not politically sophisticated.

Some dialogical researchers did not lag behind. For example, Lewis (2002, p. 178) speculates 'how a dialogical self might actually be housed in a dialogical brain'. Lewis attempts to model an internal monologue, hypothesising that it forms the basis of a dialogical Self. The model assumes a link between an attention system in the orbitofrontal cortex and between associated affective and premotor systems in the brain. Any internal monologue has a dialogical character because I-positions await responses from others; from a neural perspective, the brain has the capacity to switch rapidly between subjective positions, and this is supposed to be similar to dialogical exchanges. This means, Lewis (2002, p. 187) concludes, that 'the vitality and creativity of internal dialogues can be squared with the constraints of biological realism'.

Prejudice and discrimination have become important topics of study in social neuroscience and they have had a profound effect on media reports (O'Connor and Joffe, 2014; 2015; O'Connor, Rees and Joffe, 2012). In her article 'On prejudice & the brain', Fiske (2007) argues that learning about unconscious prejudices which culture puts in the human brain opens up the road towards reducing them. How can a social psychologist reduce prejudices? First, one needs to understand how prejudices reveal themselves: 'Within a moment of observing the photograph of an apparently homeless man, people's brains set off a sequence of reactions characteristic of disgust and avoidance' (Fiske, 2007, p. 157). The psychologist can correlate impulses in the brain with certain prejudices, and getting information about this is the first step to reducing prejudice: 'If we recognize prejudice's subtle yet inexorable pressures, we can learn to moderate even unconscious prejudice . . . And this is the substance of social science married to neuroscience' (Fiske, 2007, p. 159). Ideas like these capture the attention of the media and of institutions struggling for racial

equality, as well as of institutions providing funds for social neuroscience. They also capture the imagination of social psychologists struggling for their share of the pot of gold.

It is hardly surprising that mass media jump up at these sensational findings and contribute their own insights. In her perceptive study, Cliodhna O'Connor (2014) provides some examples that inspired the media and appeared on newspapers' websites. They show the diversity of topics motivated by brain research.

O'Connor (2014) considers two main patterns in the headlines she selected (see Figure 1.1). One of them attempts to provide the public with topical issues of neuroscience, for example whether there is something wrong with the brain of the Norwegian murderer Breivik. The other attempts to explain why a particular category of people differs from another one; for example, it speculates about the neurobiological traits of criminals, politicians, etc. And such speculations take us back to the ideas of nineteenth-century psychiatrist Lombroso, who studied the biological and genetic traits of criminals and anatomically defined properties of the cranium.



Figure 1.1 Neurosciences in the media

1.1.3.2 Trust reduced to the effect of oxytocin Another historical reminder is the search for biological and physiological correlates of social behaviour which goes back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (e.g. Marañon, 1924; Riddle, 1925). In the 1960s, this search was revived by the Schachter and Singer experiment (e.g. Schachter and Singer, 1962) that explored the relation between physiological arousal by drugs and emotions (for a review, see Shapiro

and Crider, 1969). More recently, extensive explorations of physiological and neurophysiological correlates of emotions, empathy, sympathy, motivation and of many other social phenomena have been described and reviewed in the handbook of van Lange (2006). Highly prestigious journals including *Nature* and *Scientific American* bring forward sensational news that researchers have begun to uncover how the human brain determines changes in social phenomena like trust, justice, influence or generosity. In his recent explorations, the neuroeconomist Paul Zak treats trust as a transparent phenomenon not requiring any further analysis. Using an experimental task of 'the trust game' in a series of studies, Zak (see, e.g., 2008) and his colleagues (e.g. Morhenn et al., 2008) have shown that oxytocin (the substance that is produced in the body of pregnant women), when administered through a nasal spray, plays a major role in increasing one's trust of others and cooperating with them. Zak's article in *Scientific American* (2008, p. 88) is introduced by a persuasive claim: 'Our inclination to trust a stranger stems in large part from exposure to a small molecule known for an entirely different task: inducing labor.' Although Zak conducted his studies with an experimentally based 'trust game', the article in the *Scientific American* begins with a generalised claim about trusting strangers. In the same article, a number of other papers are advertised, such as 'Neuroendocrine perspectives on social attachment and love'; 'How love evolved from sex and gave birth to intelligence and human nature'; 'Oxytocin increases trust in humans'; 'Oxytocin is associated with human trustworthiness'; and 'Oxytocin increases generosity in humans'. These overgeneralisations, for which there is no evidence, have inspired many young researchers to conduct studies about the effect of oxytocin on co-operation and trust. The media accept sensational reports that trust/distrust can be manipulated by administering oxytocin through a nasal spray, and this tempts young scholars and the general public to endorse such news as 'truth'. Oxytocin has even obtained the name a 'love hormone', and disputes about its efficacy and magic continue to fill pages on the Internet as a joke, myth or serious attempt to solve problems of infidelity.

In view of these simplifications, let us remind ourselves of an enormous amount of literature on trust/distrust in politics, religion and diverse sociocultural conditions. Chapter 5 is devoted to the exploration of the heterogeneous and multifaceted nature of epistemic trust/distrust in inter-personal and inter-group relations, as well as in associated phenomena such as faith and solidarity, and in conflicts and negotiations.

1.1.3.3 Mixing social constructs invented by humans with biological/physiological matters Brain research makes vast advances and it attracts enormous financial support all over the world, and it is not surprising that social neuroscientists attempt to make their mark in these developments. Yet both

sensational reports in the media and researchers in social neuroscience tend to ignore some fundamental points.

One was noted by the already mentioned François Jacob (1981/1982, pp. 22–24). He argued that scientists, in their effort to find universal explanations and coherence, sometimes slip into myth by going too far, trying to use a single theory to explicate a variety of phenomena; as a result, they explain nothing. Among a number of cases that Jacob presents is sociobiology, which, nowadays, just as in the middle of the nineteenth century, attempts to localise morality in ethological and evolutionary considerations and to explain ethical beliefs from evolutionary codes. In rejecting this belief, Jacob comments that nobody has yet attempted to find an evolutionary explanation for poetry, physics or mathematics. However, we need to admit that Jacob was a little behind his time. Today, we have scholarly articles on neuroanatomical correlates of religiosity and spirituality, on aesthetic preferences for paintings, on fluid intelligence, on extroversion and introversion, among many others. All these papers are published in journals with 'high-impact factors', such as *Cerebral Cortex, Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropsychology, The American Journal of Medical Association – Psychiatry*, and others. The studies that localise these complex phenomena in the brain ignore one fundamental issue. Concepts such as 'prejudice', 'discrimination', 'trust', 'justice', 'co-operation', 'aesthetic preferences', 'extraversion', 'religiosity' and others do not refer to biological, brain or physiological matters that can be localised in the biological/brain tissue by technological means. While 'disgust and avoidance' might possibly have some biological correlates in the brain tissue, 'prejudice' and 'discrimination', 'religiosity' and so on, are social constructs that have been invented by humans to account for human relationships, values, cultural and semantic preferences. They have been created by humans through specific historical and cultural processes and transmitted in communication; they have specific meanings in diverse languages and cultures. Trust, for example, has been widely explored in human and social sciences in relation to spirituality, co-operation, solidarity, faith, beliefs and confidence. However, none of the papers on brain functional imaging mentions any possible differences between physiological/biological matters and language that refer to such complex social constructs they pretend to localise.

1.2 Irrationality and rationality

Mythos and logos are associated with another pair of notions: irrationality and rationality. From the early beginnings of philosophy in ancient Greece, myth was viewed as pictorial, symbolic, lacking in scrutiny and therefore was characterised as irrational. Scientific thought (or rather pre-scientific thought in ancient Greece), by contrast, was supposed to be systematic, logical and

rational (Morgan, 2004). However, as we have noted, mythos and logos are often intertwined; therefore, irrationality and rationality underlying mythos and logos, too, are intermingled. Yet, despite some interchangeability between these pairs, that is, mythos and logos, and irrationality and rationality, there are differences in connotations.

First, while mythos has not been always evaluated negatively and has sometimes been considered as complementary to logos, one can hardly ever find contexts in which irrationality would be judged positively. To say about someone that he/she is irrational always amounts to condemnation, or at least it implies the devaluation of that person's thought or behaviour. In other words, irrational thought and behaviour are always 'inferior', while rational thought and behaviour are 'superior'.

Second, despite the fact that mythos and logos intermingle, and that the former is associated with irrationality and the latter with rationality, there is, nevertheless, at least some agreement as to the criteria that make these forms of thought different from one another. In contrast, the notions 'rationality' and 'irrationality' are used in so many contradictory and heterogeneous ways that it is hardly possible to determine principles that would separate one from the other.

Forms of rational and irrational thought and behaviour pertain to individuals, as well as groups, masses and even societies. Notions of 'irrationality' and 'rationality' are used both in daily language and in the human and social sciences. One even describes scholarly disciplines as rational and irrational (e.g. Zafirovski, 2005). What some people call 'rational', others may call 'irrational'. And yet despite heterogeneous and even incompatible usages, 'irrational' is bad, while 'rational' is good. Let us consider some of the issues accompanying these heterogeneities.

1.2.1 Rationalities and irrationalities in humans

Since Aristotle, scholars have been providing different answers to the question whether humans are, or are not, rational. Some scholars presuppose that humans are born with the capacity for rationality and that, therefore, rationality is a norm. For example, for René Descartes (1637/1955), individual rationality is based on the possibility of thinking and doubting, which constitutes the proof of human existence. If humans do not behave rationally, it is because they are driven to irrationality by others and by 'example and custom' (Descartes, 1637/1955, p. 9). Carl Rogers's (1961, pp. 194–195) person-centred therapy, too, is based on the idea that humans are basically rational. He argues that the tendency towards rational thought is a fundamental feature of personality, and he does not sympathise with the view that humans are irrational. Rationality rises in favourable psychosocial conditions; destructive, anti-social and immature behaviour may

arise in situations in which an individual is defensive and fearful (Rogers, 1961, p. 27).

In contrast, Sigmund Freud (1960) claimed that humans are basically driven by irrational tendencies seated in the 'id', which they cannot control. Although the 'ego' has some degree of rationality, it has to struggle with both the irrational 'id' and irrational demands of the 'superego' (Ziegler, 2002, p. 82). Stuart Sutherland (1992) systematically explored the widespread forms of, and reasons for, irrationality among people. He discussed diverse forms of irrationality among ordinary citizens, medical professionals, judges, engineers and others; he referred to follies and irrationalities studied by social psychologists, for example, obedience to authority or in-group and out-group conformities like stereotypes. Sutherland was careful to make a distinction between acting irrationally and making mistakes. According to him, irrationality is intentional and a deliberate act. An error, on the other hand, is acting on the basis of insufficient knowledge. For example, someone with minimal knowledge of astronomy would not rationally climb a tree to reach the moon, whereas a child might try to do that; however, that would not count as an irrational action because the child lacks the relevant knowledge. Sutherland described multiple causes of irrationality, ranging from social and emotional causes to cognitive ones, such as making false inferences, ignoring and distorting evidence, among many others. In general, his catalogue of irrationalities does not have any theoretical basis; it is purely empirical and he acknowledges that what he calls irrationalities would not be acceptable to all readers.

Gustav Ichheiser (1968), an astute and largely forgotten social psychologist, drew attention to the difficulty of making a distinction between rational and irrational thought. In his article on six meanings of rationality and irrationality, he emphasised that while the distinction between these two terms is valid, it presupposes that cold rationality is 'superior' to impulsive intuition. However, it is impulsive intuition and not cold rationality that instigates generous actions, spontaneous help like acting on the spur of the moment to save someone's life, and even to sacrifice one's own. Should one call such behaviour irrational? From the point of view of someone who argues that it is rational to act on the basis of self-interest, acting on behalf of the other would clearly be irrational.

The most common use of the notion 'irrationality' in ordinary language, Ichheiser claims, is expressive-exclamatory. It amounts to no more than a disapproval of the action, goal or motive of another person. As Ichheiser notes, this use of the word 'irrational' is rhetorical rather than designative-logical. Individuals attribute rationality to themselves, while irrationality comes from others. This conviction is already expressed in Descartes' glorification of thinking of the individual and in rejecting 'example and custom' (Descartes, 1637/1955, p. 9). It is others who darken the individual's reason; common agreement never provides us with any certainty, which can come only

from the thinking Self. Ernst Gellner (1998, p. 3) characterised this view by saying that '[W]e discover truth alone, we err in groups'. The pathological effect of groups, the work of the collectivity and of crowds, where rational individuals turn themselves into irrational beings, preoccupied social scientists like Le Bon, Ortega y Gasset or McDougall. Being captivated by unreason in crowds, by influences of charismatic leaders, mass hypnosis and the collective unconscious and impulsiveness of the mob, the individual loses his/her capacity to make judgements and to think rationally.

Gustav Ichheiser (1968) finds that Sigmund Freud and Max Weber were inheritors of both rationalism and irrationalism. As regards Sigmund Freud, Ichheiser notes, he is a follower of rationalistic Enlightenment as well as a successor of irrational philosophers like Schopenhauer. As for Max Weber (1968), who developed one of the most elaborated versions of a formal rationalistic system of economy and social organisation, he argued that ascetic Protestantism led to the rational effort to achieve economic prosperity. At the same time, Weber was convinced that rationalism also involved unavoidable elements of irrationality due to the conflict of different rationalities in modern culture (Gronow, 1988). Accordingly, the rationalistic system of economy cannot escape irrationality.

Ichheiser further notes that societies tend to esteem certain activities, goals, aspirations and values as more or less rational. The present society worships above all 'material welfare, technological progress and enlightened "self-interest"' (Ichheiser, 1968, p. 100), while other preferences and values are considered as less rational or even irrational. Ichheiser's diagnosis corresponds to the way in which Ernest Gellner (1992, pp. 136–137) characterises rationality as methodically augmenting cognitive and financial capital and turning profits into pleasure, power or status. This Weberian outlook on achieving economic prosperity in and through rationalisation contrasts with Ichheiser's (1968, p. 100) 'higher, deeper, subtle, intangible, purely cultural-spiritual values' which in modern society have come to be evaluated as not quite rational.

This little catalogue of irrationalities serves no more than as an example of a range of meanings of 'irrationality', and it should not be considered as exhaustive. We can conclude that like many other human attributes, for example 'trust' and 'distrust', 'morality' and 'immorality' and so 'rationality' and 'irrationality' are relational terms; this means that one is defined in terms of the other. When making a judgement about an action as rational, one is also making a judgement as to what is considered irrational.

1.2.2 Rationalities and irrationalities in human and social sciences

In the Mediaeval ages and Renaissance, practices that could be called irrational, such as astrology, magic and alchemy, flourished all over Europe and were

intermingled with the pre-scientific activities of the time. One can hardly expect they would suddenly disappear with the rise of modern science and technological advances in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even scientists of the seventeenth century, like Johannes Kepler or Galileo Galilei, were involved in what, today, would be called irrational enterprises, such as astrology. But the historian John North remarked on Kepler that 'had he not been an astrologer he would very probably have failed to produce his planetary astronomy in the form we have it' (North, 2008, p. 345). Both Tycho Brahe and Isaac Newton were interested in alchemy. Commenting on Newton's achievements, Keynes (1947, p. 27) noted that 'Newton was not the first of the age of reason. He was the last of the magicians [. . .] the last great mind which looked out on the visible and intellectual world with the same eyes as those who began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less than 10,000 years ago.'

Nevertheless, in his treatise of *Mystery and Philosophy*, Michael Foster (1957, p. 53) observes that in contrast to the Greek pre-science, modern science 'does not end in wonder but in the expansion of wonder'. Natural sciences not only progressed in making scientific discoveries in physics, chemistry or biology but also developed terminology in a univocal language. Science has become universally communicable in the scientific community; it established new methods, and postulated a limited number of laws and concepts, thus enhancing its general comprehension (Campbell, 2007, p. 10).

Since the seventeenth century, Blaise Pascal's (1670/1995) concepts of the 'spirit of geometry' (*l'esprit de geometrie*) and the 'spirit of finesse' (*l'esprit de finesse*) instigated new ideas, leading to two kinds of scholarship. The former, *l'esprit de geometrie*, inspired the development of scientific knowledge and required a rational, systematic and rigorous thought. The latter, *l'esprit de finesse*, referred to intuitive and creative features of the mind. Later on *l'esprit de finesse* became associated with irrationality.

The Age of Reason or Enlightenment of the eighteenth century pursued the belief in the growth of universal rationality and the logical capacities of humans. The rapidly developing science, ruled by Blaise Pascal's 'spirit of geometry', based on the mechanistic principles of Newtonian physics, became the leading power of rational thought and technological innovations. It enabled advancements in astronomy, chemistry and biology. Despite being intermingled with astrology and alchemy in their beginnings, natural sciences in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, nevertheless, started their careers as 'rational' disciplines aiming to discover the truth about the world and the universe.

In contrast, social sciences originated in the eighteenth century. Their beginnings can be traced to the study of social phenomena such as nationalism, religion, myth and beliefs, communities and thus to Pascal's notion of intuition, or the spirit of finesse. Therefore, as Serge Moscovici (1988/1993) remarks,

social sciences commenced their scientific careers as 'irrational' disciplines. Richard Shweder (1991) made a similar comment saying that when the Enlightenment established natural sciences like biology and physics as objective and real disciplines, social sciences were considered as soft and unreal, using jargon rather than scientific terminology. Referring specifically to anthropology, Shweder maintains that notions such as society, custom and tradition were already humiliated by exposure to the Enlightenment. Therefore, social sciences started off with a significant disadvantage as 'inferior' disciplines.

In Central Europe, the Romantic movements provoked debates about national languages, communities and the formation of new nations. In Germany, these ideas were closely related to the philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*) and to the movement called 'expressionism' (Berlin, 2000b; Marková, 1982; Taylor, 1975; 1989), where they nourished perspectives of development, change, historical and cultural interests and human agency. They presented alternatives to rationalism and to the mechanistic philosophy of the Enlightenment.

Among the followers of Pascal, the nineteenth-century French philosopher Bergson (1907/1998) took up the dichotomy between *l'esprit de geometrie* and *l'esprit de finesse* and developed it further as the distinction between intellect and intuition. Bergson was a critic of mechanistic philosophy and of materialism; his philosophy was based on the concept of creative evolution and the uniqueness of human experience. While he characterised intelligence as the individual's capacity to think or act with a goal, he referred to intuition as the experience of entering directly into a thing, or into oneself. It was based on imagination, memory, emotions and creative impulse.

Natural sciences on the whole do not discuss whether they are rational or irrational disciplines. In contrast, in human and social sciences we can observe a split concerning the question as to whether, and to what extent, social sciences are or are not rational disciplines. Sociologist Milan Zafirovski (2005) observes that economists and rational choice theorists regard sociology as a science of the irrational, lacking a conception of rationality. Zafirovski defends rationalism (rationalism is good, irrationalism is bad) in sociology, focusing on its conceptual and methodological pluralism. His historical review gives support to the existence of the split within social sciences in terms of the divergence between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, and between universalistic and relativistic approaches. In fact, many contemporary scholars (e.g. Gellner, 1998; Hollis and Lukes, 1982; Jarvie, 1984; Shweder and LeVine, 1984; Wilson, 1970) refer to this split often associating it with the distinction between *Gesellschaft* as a rationalistic approach based on the concept of society and *Gemeinshaft* as an irrational approach based on the concept of community (cf. Tönnies, 1887/1957).

The breach between the Enlightenment and Romanticism was also encouraged by Max Weber, who rejected Romantic movements, which were

seeking refuge in simple forms of life in the past. It was the modernity of the Enlightenment that placed emphasis on rationality which, Weber claimed, brought about the possibility for people to live freely as they do in an advanced society (Weber, 1968). This is why he called the Enlightenment 'the Ages of the Rights of Man'.

1.2.2.1 The growth of universal rationality The universalistic meaning of rationality has become pronounced during the last three centuries. Immanuel Kant (1784/1996) – in his well-known piece on 'An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?' – claimed that 'enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority' (Kant, 1784/1996, p. 17). Kant characterised the Age of Enlightenment, in which he lived, as a period during which new possibilities were open to the individual and to the general public. Each individual has the ability to use his or her own understanding without being directed by others. Kant believed that the spirit of freedom was expanding through education, political tolerance and freedom of speech and that the general public should be encouraged to use its rational capacities to speak its own mind.

The ethos of the Enlightenment to eradicate irrational thinking has influenced social sciences, various systems of thought, beliefs and ideology, including the nineteenth-century scientific Marxism. Building largely on the values of the Enlightenment, Marxism firmly adopted the rationalistic outlook with respect to theories of historical and dialectical materialism, economy and politics. Historical materialism was particularly relevant to sociology and social psychology. It was defined as a science describing and analysing gradual stages through which society passes on its way towards a prosperous future. This journey would be accomplished in a communist society and – at 'the end of history' – it would be the final triumph of communism over capitalism.

But how can humankind achieve universal rationality? Although the ethos of the Enlightenment embraced the conviction that everybody is born with a capacity for rational thought, it was also obvious that people differed with respect to their ability to think and conduct themselves rationally. Thomas Carlyle considered that people in most societies can achieve rational and purposeful conduct only under the guidance of charismatic leaders. This view became internalised in scientific Marxism. Lenin played the role of a charismatic leader and he carefully read and internalised the view of Carlyle (Service, 2000, p. 202). His revolutionary spirit incited masses. Although Lenin appreciated the importance of the initiative of masses, he argued that it was necessary to combat their spontaneity, maintaining that the masses needed the guidance of the Party (Lenin, 1913/1977). In order to bring about universal rationality, one has first to fulfil a sub-goal: to teach the

masses materialism and rationality in order to substitute unscientific thinking by scientific reasoning. Lenin believed that Russian people had been for many centuries mystical and irrational. They were influenced above all by the Orthodox Church. According to Marx and Lenin, all forms of religion were irrational and dogmatic. In his 'Contribution to critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*', Marx (1843/1970, p. 131) expressed this conviction particularly clearly: 'Religion is opium of the people.' Therefore, it was essential to uproot religion and to guide the masses towards rational thought. As Serge Moscovici noted, this perspective implied that only intellectuals are capable of rational thinking but ordinary people are not (*le peuple ne pense pas*; Chapter 3; Moscovici and Marková, 2000, p. 228) and that, therefore, their thinking is deficient.

The belief that humankind progresses in an upward continuum was also assumed by Charles Darwin, who thought that humans differ from animals in degree but not in kind. In discussing these issues, he claimed that there are no fundamental differences between non-human and human species: the difference is quantitative and the gap 'is filled up by numberless gradations ... Differences of this kind between the highest men of the highest races and the lowest savages, are connected by the finest gradations' (Darwin, 1859/1874, p. 157). Ingold (2004, p. 210) explains that Darwin conceived evolution in terms of humans growing out of nature, with the mind gradually liberating itself from innate dispositions. Ancestors of people became humans gradually, rising from primitive savages. And so Charles Darwin presented the phylogenetic development of species as a continuous progression towards perfection.

Despite the fact that scientific disciplines protect their territories and originality of their ideas and findings, they cannot avoid being influenced by other scientific fields. And so we find that the idea of an upward continuous advancement towards rationality has also pervaded the sociocultural development of the human mind, first in sociology and subsequently in social and developmental psychology.

The sociologist Emile Durkheim made no claims about biological and social evolution. For him, the point of departure was society, its institutions and the system of relations that binds members of society together. Durkheim's ambition was to develop a sociological theory of knowledge. Collective representations, through which humans learn to know the world, are outcomes of myths and beliefs, as well as of the established norms and rituals. They become, in and through socio-historical development, progressively more scientific and therefore more rational. This means that collective representations in primitive religions gradually transform, in the course of historical process, into modern scientific representations (Moscovici, 1998, p. 423). According to this view, representations are social facts; they constitute social reality, and as Durkheim (1895/1982, p. 34) put it, 'social life was made up entirely of representations'.

While according to Durkheim the growth of rationality was a continuous process, for his contemporary, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, the historical development of knowledge was discontinuous and it involved different kinds of logic. Consequently, 'superior' and 'inferior' thinking and knowing could not be so easily bridged. According to Lévy-Bruhl, what was conceived rational from the point of view of one culture was not necessarily viewed as rational by another culture. This perspective implied that the logic of one culture differed from that of another culture and so it undermined the idea of mental unity of humankind. Moreover, Lévy-Bruhl's books on *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inferieures* (1910/1926) (translated less expressively into English as *How Natives Think*) and *La mentalité primitive* (1922/1923) (*Primitive Mentality*) entailed the idea of 'superiority' of Western 'rationality' and 'inferiority' of non-Western 'irrationality'.

Developmental psychologists like Piaget, Vygotsky and Luria integrated the ideas of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl into their own work. Piaget and Vygotsky, in their studies on child development, were looking for clues of primitive mentality in children, although each of these scholars adopted different strategies (Moscovici, 1998). Here it is sufficient to point out that Piaget, in contrast to Vygotsky, followed the line of Durkheim and viewed child development as a continuous line from pre-logical to logical thinking. Piaget's concepts of adaptation and accommodation account for the development in terms of stages. These are hierarchically organised and result from the restructuring of cognitive elements and so producing higher and more logical stages. This perspective is also indicated in the titles of works like *The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence* (Inhelder and Piaget, 1955/1958) or *The Early Growth of Logic in the Child* (Inhelder and Piaget, 1959/1964). Just like Durkheim viewed the sociocultural development of mankind as a continuous development of rationality, so Piaget viewed child development as a gradual and continuous development of logic.

The question of universal rationality, its growth in individuals, societies and cultures, has been widely discussed since the Second World War. It still continues to be a subject matter of debates, although changing in contents due to the intermingling of social scientific issues and political agendas. Probably, the main issue guiding these debates has been the question of how to maintain the concept of the unique mind given the diversities of human lifestyles, views, understanding and practices. Ethical questions and ensuing problems of ethnic groups and of multiculturalism (e.g. Donnelly, 2007; Shweder, Minow and Markus 2002) continue to dominate disputes concerning universal rationality versus cultural relativism.

1.2.2.2 Rationality reconceptualised In contrast to researchers who struggle to maintain universal rationality and cultural relativism as separate concepts,

while at the same time searching for possible relations between them, others propose a total reconceptualisation of rationality, grounding it in alternative epistemologies.

Shweder (1990, pp. 33–35), who is critical of universalism based on fixed and abstract ideas of the psychic unity of humankind, proposes a dialectic concept of 'thinking through others'. This concept includes intentionality, reconstruction of the Self and Others in and through transformation of beliefs, desires, and practices and thereby encouraging 'an open-ended self-reflexive dialogic turn of mind'. According to Shweder, cultural psychology explores dyadic relations between the Self and Others, subject and object, psyche and culture, figure and ground, practitioner and practice, among others. These dyads are dynamically and dialectically interconnected because they make up each other (Shweder, 1990, p. 1).

Like phenomenologists (Chapters 3 and 4), Shweder insists that humans are intentional and intentionality is the essential feature of the sociocultural environment. The intentional world is real, factual and forceful, but it exists only if it is inhabited by people who have emotions, beliefs, desires and who represent the world around them.

Roy Harris (2009), too, rejects the existing conceptions of rationality, arguing that they are a continuation of Aristotle's static and rigid syllogistic philosophy. He maintains that human rationality is a product of sign-making and that sign-making is not a unique process but involves an integration of human activities that take place in daily human communication. All meanings in circulation are profoundly contextualised and thus Harris's integrational approach embraces various levels and modes of semiosis, ranging from oral, written, gestural to others. In integrational semiology, rationality is central to the creative process of sign-making and is connected with social relations and with social organisation of communities (Harris, 2009, p. 170).

Finally, Rosa and Valsiner (2007) reconceptualise rationality in terms of human agency, intentionality and ethics. Cultures are no longer isolated in their geographical ghettos. The contemporary world of societies is opened to other cultures; it is the world of uncertainties which moves cultures and individuals in different directions. These movements require making choices based on evaluations of possible consequences for the Self and Others. In such situations, the authors argue, humans are constantly pushed towards making judgements between ethical and unethical acts and towards choosing actions to confront the ambiguities of life. It would be totally inadequate to conceive of reason as the private domain of the individual. Rather, reason must be negotiated in the world of ambiguities and uncertainties where individuals, groups and cultures have become interdependent and interfering with one another (Rosa and Valsiner, 2007, p. 697). In these confrontations, interdependence between humans and their sociocultural environments transcends not only

individual rationality but also a particular cultural rationality; rationality, ethics and actions cannot be disentangled.

These proposed alternatives to universalism and relativism by Shweder, Harris, and Rosa and Valsiner suggest a fundamental ontological and epistemological rethinking of rationality. Individuals and cultures are interdependent processes that can be understood only in terms of one another. Rationality and irrationality can be judged only in terms of this interdependence.

1.3 Science impinging upon religion

We noted in the Introduction to this book that for Albert Einstein the division between 'inferior' and 'superior' thinking was an illusion. However, Einstein went much further than that. Gerald Holton's (2003) essay on 'Einstein's third paradise' takes us through Einstein's relations with science and religion throughout his life. Einstein's first paradise was religion. Having rejected this, he attained his second paradise in science. By his middle age, Einstein found his third paradise in the fusion between scientific and religious feelings when he abandoned the boundaries between them. And so he stated: 'I maintain that the cosmic religious feeling is the strongest and noblest motive for scientific research' (Einstein, 1954, p. 39). This fusion of science and religion without boundaries and barriers, together with the removal of boundaries between life and politics, was an expression of Einstein's search for coherence. Strongly influenced by Spinoza's philosophy and ethics uniting God and Nature, Einstein pointed to a plausible source for his specific formulations: 'Those individuals to whom we owe the great creative achievements of science were all of them imbued with a truly religious conviction that this universe of ours is something perfect, and susceptible through the rational striving for knowledge' (Einstein, 1954, p. 52). Like Spinoza, for Einstein religion was not based on an anthropomorphic conception of God but on rationality and unity underlying everything in nature (Holton, 2003, p. 33).

We may turn to the founder of cybernetics Norbert Wiener (1964), who, too, explored frontiers at which science impinges upon religion. His aim was to explore knowledge as intertwined with communication, control systems, ethics and the normative side of religion. In his essays Wiener takes us through the history of human efforts to produce a Golem, an anthropomorphic existence perhaps best known as the Golem of Prague, of the Rabbi Loew. Humans have always attempted to create their own images whether in producing golems or machines. Creative activity leads humans to construct machines that not only learn but also reproduce themselves. This is where science impinges upon ethical questions of the relations between them.

The humility of deeply reflective scientists like Einstein or Wiener thus sharply contrasts with the views of some contemporary cognitive psychologists

who reverse the order of the natural development of the brain and the creation of a Golem (a computer). For them, it is the Golem which comes first, and the human brain which created the Golem comes second. In other words, a cognitive psychologist may express her excitement by saying (or writing) that she can understand the brain, and even the mind (a cognitive psychologist often uses a term 'mind/brain'), as a kind of a computer (a Golem).

Finally, we may note that for the topmost scientists of the twentieth century, it may not be the search for the truth that comes first but the search for beauty. For example, Zee (2007) refers to Einstein's search for beauty in equations because they appeal to his aesthetic sense: the truth will come later. Zee maintains throughout his book that despite general beliefs that physics is a precise and predictive science, it is aesthetics that drives contemporary physics in its search for symmetry and simplicity which physicists find in Nature and its designs.

1.4 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I referred to attempts to separate, in different historical and cultural periods, 'inferior' and 'superior' thinking and knowing, and to difficulties in maintaining such a separation or even in fixing boundaries between them. Some scholars, such as Aristotle and Jacob, argued that scientific and mythical reasoning fulfil, at least to some degree, similar functions: they both aim at explaining fundamental questions about the universe, origin of matter and life; they are both based on imagination, representations of the world; and they explore powers that rule it.

Although the categories of mythos and logos have created controversies since ancient Greece, they have been maintained throughout centuries, together with the conviction that on its road towards progress humankind will shed off irrational beliefs and myths. However, today, the mixture of myth and science still characterises the thinking of ordinary citizens, scientific popularisers and political ideologists. It may even permeate thinking of scientists who, whether with or without awareness, are prone to propagating 'scientific myths'. But search for coherence takes different paths; for scientists like Einstein or Wiener, boundaries between different kinds of knowing like science, religion, ethics and aesthetics are not rigid but totally fluid and open towards creative and imaginative thought.

2 Towards Giambattista Vico's common sense

Another pair of terms referring to 'superior' and 'inferior' thinking and knowing is science versus common sense. Casual inspection of an enormous amount of literature on common sense in its historical, philosophical and social scientific perspectives shows that common sense has been a concept of enduring importance and interest. Some past meanings of common sense have little to do with meanings as they are understood today, while others have remained in use over centuries either in daily speech or in specialist languages. For example, Aristotle's meaning of common sense referred to a specific perceptual capacity that integrates together all five senses of perception in living organisms, that is, in humans and animals (Gregoric, 2007, p. vii). Aristotelian assumptions of common sense based on sensation still prevail in some relatively recent approaches, for example, in Meyerson (1908/1930). Other common-sense perceptual approaches, for example, phenomenology (Chapter 3), are no longer based on Aristotelian assumptions. Likewise, notions referring to common sense have kept changing throughout history, and meanings of the term 'common sense' in different languages are manifold.

2.1 Vicissitudes of common sense

The contemporary term 'common sense' in English is used in different contexts and it serves different purposes. For example, the linguist Noam Chomsky, in his extensive discussions of common sense, focuses on boundaries between two kinds of faculties located in the human brain. First, the 'science-forming faculty' (Chomsky, 2000, p. 22) underlies the understanding and construction of scientific concepts. The other faculty in the brain produces concepts of common sense, and these enter into ordinary language of daily speech, and into systems of beliefs. Although Chomsky poses the question about the sharpness of the distinction between these two faculties, he nevertheless assumes that they are real, and he views them as totally independent. He believes that with increasing understanding and sharpening of concepts in naturalistic investigations, the 'distorting residues of common-sense understanding' (Chomsky, 2000, p. 23) will be finally eliminated. Equally, according

to him, this process of sharpening concepts will increase the gap between scientific language and ordinary language. Scientific language will increase the understanding of concepts like the 'hydrogen atom', and so it will distance itself from common-sense words and their understanding, such as 'a desk', 'London' or 'heavens' (Chomsky, 2000, p. 24). In contrast, other approaches view common sense as an analogue of scientific thinking (e.g. Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997; Gruber, 1974). According to these latter approaches, cognitive and creative processes that underlie scientific and common-sense thinking develop from the same intellectual resources. Both scientific and common-sense thinking are subjected to pressures from society if they do not conform to conventional patterns of thought; they must cope with these pressures in order to preserve and endorse their originality.

If we turn to the notion of 'common sense' as it is used in everyday talk, politics or economics, we find that it is not usually defined, but assumed to be self-evident. Van Holthoon and Olson (1987, p. 1) remark that common sense is like sanity; we recognise it immediately without reflection and cannot be without it, although no amount of explanation makes clear what it stands for. But what does it mean for something to be 'self-evident'? The authors indicate that one can recognise and make judgements about something as self-evident either on the basis of *perception* or on the basis of *knowledge* or *experience* that is required to cope with daily problems. Van Holthoon (1987, p. 99) suggests that the capacity to make *judgements of self-evident events* on the basis of perception is transcultural. It means that this capacity is not affected by any cultural, political or religious variations. All people own the capacity of making judgements of self-evident events on the basis of perception although they differ with respect to the degree to which they possess this capacity. In contrast, making judgements on the basis of knowledge or experience is not easy to specify because the body of knowledge that humans have is not stable over time. What belongs to the body of common knowledge today will surely change together with the growth of understanding and with political and social circumstances. Such changes are bound to affect what is and what is not meant by common sense.

Self-evidence can also refer to certain uniformities in life that produce similar experiences in all humans (e.g. Husserl, 1936/1970; Lindenberg, 1987; Vico, 1744/1948). These experiences could be

- of a physical nature, for example, experiences of the weather, tide, weight, qualities of materials such as hardness, softness or resistance
- of a biological nature such as birth, growth and death, pain, the need for food, sleep and rest
- uniformities produced in and through dialogical interactions and relationships, such as the fear of unknown others and the love of family and of friends. Different cultures reflect on such uniformities in their specific ways and have numerous words to express regularities of life experiences and of relationships.

Such physical, biological and dialogical uniformities and regularities are sensed as repetitions and relative constancies; they are passed on from parents to children over generations. Although they may change over time, they provide substantial resources of common-sense knowledge. Considering these physical, biological and dialogical uniformities and the 'underlying agreements' (see later pages, Vico, 1744/1948, § 145) resulting from them, it is nevertheless difficult to distinguish between common sense as judgement based on perception and common sense as judgement based on knowledge. For example, I can make a judgement on the basis of my *knowledge* that something is dangerous, for example, an approaching car, just as I can make a judgement about it on the basis of *perceiving or recognising* that as a danger. Authors who appeal to the distinction between judgement of perceived events and of knowledge of those events are well aware of the problem (e.g. Gadamer, 1975; van Holthoon, 1987; van Holthoon and Olson, 1987).

Historically, the perspective on common sense as a sensorial capacity was carried over from the Aristotelian philosophy into the Mediaeval ages. According to this perspective, common sense was tied to evidence obtained by the senses. However, interesting views on common sense were advanced in the thirteenth century by the highly significant scholastic theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas (2002). Although Aquinas, like Aristotle, adopted common sense as a sensorial capacity, he placed emphasis on judgement and made common sense almost synonymous with reasoning (van Holthoon, 1987, p. 101).

2.1.1 Common sense as a purely sensorial capacity

Yet common sense as a purely sensorial capacity was not eliminated. In the seventeenth century, the philosopher René Descartes spoke about common sense in two ways. First, Descartes considered that *bon sens* or reason was an innate capacity of all humans to produce ideas when senses were suitably stimulated by the external world. Such ideas are those that make universal knowledge possible, for example, the idea of God, mind, body or triangle. These are clear and distinct ideas that enable humans to make sound judgements. Descartes (1637/1955) expressed this view in the first sentences of his *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences* where he appealed to *bon sens*: 'Good sense is of all things in the world the most equally distributed, for everybody thinks himself so abundantly provided . . .' (Descartes, 1637/1955, p. 81). In addition to clear and distinct ideas that are innate and guided by *bon sens* or reason, Descartes also spoke about ideas that come to humans from external objects through the senses (adventitious ideas) or which the mind constructs from simpler ideas (factitious ideas) (Descartes, 1641/1955, pp. 160–161; 1641/1970, pp. 22–23; Marková,

1982). If I understand this correctly, these two latter kinds of ideas, that is, adventitious and factitious, belong to what Descartes referred to as *sens commun*, and it is these ideas that often deceive us. Thus although he was critical of Aristotelian philosophy, Descartes adopted the Aristotelian view that common sense (*sens commun*) comes from senses. However, Descartes distrusted sensorial evidence because he believed that senses sometimes deceived him; it was apparent to him that we evaluate qualities like weight or colour only in relation to the way we sense them. For example, we sense something as heavy in relation to something that is lighter; however, the same thing can be sensed as light in relation to something that is perceived as heavier. Therefore, he thought that it was 'wiser not to trust entirely to any thing by which we have once been deceived' (Descartes, 1641/1955, p. 145). Since common sense (*sens commun*) is based on evidence of the senses, it cannot be taken as a criterion of truth.

2.1.2 The scientific revolution and common sense

Accounts of the scientific revolution in early European modernity, which began in the Renaissance and culminated in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, usually emphasise the development of sciences such as physics, mathematics, astronomy, medicine and physiology. But the scientific revolution was accompanied by equally significant developments in other spheres of life. It may be even argued that other spheres of activities in Mediaeval life and the early Renaissance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries such as arts, skilled crafts and budding technological advancements provided conditions for the scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This process of transformation of European thought from pre-modern to modern lasted several centuries. Today, one can hardly appreciate the significance of these changes with respect to their influence on the human mind; they involved multiple transformations in human activities as well as cultural and scientific conversions, which completely changed the relations of humans to the world and to the universe (Jacob, 1981/1982, p. 9).

Perhaps the most fundamental transformation in the human mind was the realisation that there is no single knowledge and truth, but that there are many different kinds of knowledge. The appreciation of this fact revolutionised not only scientific developments but it transformed the arts and influenced technology (e.g. Elkins, 1992; Moscovici, 1977; Panofsky, 1924/1968). At the same time new philosophical worldviews were created, and all this had a profound effect on the diversification of knowledge in various spheres of life. Jacob (1981/1982, p. 9) characterised these changes as follows: prayer transformed into action, chronicles into history, tale into novel, monophony into polyphony, and myth into science. These

developments also prepared ground for the emergence of new conceptions of common sense.

2.1.2.1 Perspective as a symbolic form Today, we do not question the idea that we live in a multi-dimensional and infinite world and it does not occur to us that it could be otherwise. And yet, among the major factors that contributed to the understanding that there are different kinds of knowledge and representations of the world was the Renaissance discovery of perspective as a 'symbolic form', as the art historian Erwin Panofsky (1991) calls it. The term 'symbolic form' comes from Panofsky's friend, the philosopher Ernst Cassirer. When applied to perspective, it means that perspective is a signifying system. As Panofsky (1991, p. 72) explains, perspective does not mirror reality, but transforms it into appearance or phenomenon and therefore, humans may interpret it in diverse ways according to their choices.

Why did perspective obtain such an important significance? Perspective in ancient and Mediaeval art was concrete and corporeal, 'tangible and visible', with three-dimensional objects placed in an aggregate space next to one another. Panofsky explains that while in the Aristotelian and Scholastic worldview the Earth was the centre of the cosmos limited by the celestial sphere, the Renaissance concept of perspective was symbolic. It was based on the idea of space as infinite and systematic, that is, it appreciated linear perspectives in terms of height, depth and width. However, Panofsky (1991, p. 65) insists, the discovery of modern perspective was not just a matter of artistic style. Rather, it must be viewed as 'a concrete expression of a contemporary advance in epistemology of natural philosophy'; it is a worldview.

Comprehension of the fact that one can view reality from different perspectives took place over several centuries. Perspectives transformed the aggregate space of people and objects into an extended space that 'outgrew divine omnipotence' (Panofsky, 1991, p. 66). Visits to museums clearly show the difference between Mediaeval and Renaissance paintings, and make us realise the profound psychological effects they created. On the one hand, perspectives in Renaissance paintings created illusions of a distance and closeness between humans and objects, and these were amplified by the effect of light and darkness. In addition, perspective gave humans a possibility to choose their interpretation of the painting with respect to distancing and abolishing distance (Panofsky, 1991, p. 67). In other words, perspectivity gave humans the freedom of choice on how to posit themselves as agents. This also led to more diversified knowledge. Multiple perspectives of phenomena became comparable and could be adapted to various uses and purposes (Elkins, 1992). This revolutionary discovery showed that the world could be viewed and conceived from different points of view and that, therefore, there were various ways of thinking and knowing.

These developments had political, cultural and scientific significance. For example, the discovery of perspective opened for the arts specific questions about methods that artists should be using in representing reality. The discovery of perspectives was originally a mathematical and geometrical achievement, but its influence in the Renaissance was such that it turned, at least for a while, art into science (Elkins, 1992; Panofsky, 1991). Thus for artists the question arose as to whether they should work like scientists and represent nature in a correct geometrical way by carefully imitating and painting nature accurately. Or should they go beyond nature and conceive, imagine and create new representations? How should reality be depicted? Should art refine or idealise nature (Panofsky, 1924/1968, p. 48)?

The fashion of 'scientification' of the arts led some scholars to instigate the protest against imposing rules in arts (Panofsky, 1924/1968, p. 73). The sixteenth-century Italian philosopher and astronomer Giordano Bruno thought that it was the artist who should decide how nature should be represented. He argued against the tyranny of rules brought from sciences and from mathematics into arts. Rules should be abandoned because they turned un-rationable arts into 'a rationally organized cosmos' (Panofsky, 1924/1968, p. 79). The protest against rules led to championing the idea of perpendicular style and expressive movement (Panofsky, 1924/1968, p. 80). Controversies between the views about the correct representations of reality by imitation as opposed to representations created according to the artist's choice led to lasting disputes in painting.

While scientific thinking aimed to free itself from irrational phenomena such as astrology, magic, alchemy and mystery (Chapter 1), the emerging sciences were nevertheless unwittingly dependent on societal and artistic endeavours. In his essay on the physicist Galileo, Panofsky (1956) raised the question of the mutual influence of art and science. Galileo insisted upon a clear and distinct separation of artistic imagination and scientific attitudes, as well as upon 'a separation of quantity from qualities, of science from religion, magic, mysticism and art' (Panofsky, 1956, p. 5). Nevertheless, Panofsky shows that Galileo's implicit aesthetic attitudes influenced his scientific perspective without his being aware of it. For example, Galileo rejected Kepler's ideas of elliptic movement of planets because elliptic movement contradicted Galileo's aesthetic concept of symmetry and beauty.

2.1.2.2 Technology as common sense In writing about the history of science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Alexandre Koyré (1948) suggested that just as science in ancient Greece was pre-scientific, it was also pre-technological. The Greek pre-scientific 'science' was rigid; it used mathematical, geometrical and physical concepts, but these were not applicable to the dynamic world of daily life. Koyré pointed out that 'in nature there are no

circles, ellipses or direct lines; it would be ridiculous to measure exactly natural beings like horses, dogs or elephants'. He insisted that their dimensions are not strictly determined; 'everywhere is to be found a margin of error', of 'play', of 'more or less' and of 'nearly' (Koyré, 1948, p. 807). Koyré claimed that technical and scientific thinking in ancient Greece belonged to two separate systems of thought. Technical knowledge referred to daily activities and to concrete life situations. Aristotle's practical wisdom (endoxa) was evaluative, judgemental and ethical. But due to its rigidity, scientific thinking in ancient Greece prevented any transformation of technology into science and vice versa and so these two kinds of activity remained separate in ancient Greece. What was missing, were ideas, not scientific concepts. The Greek common-sense techniques were not of course entirely stable and they absorbed some elements of scientific thinking, but these carried no practical implications.

Koyré observed that during the scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, just like in ancient Greece, technological designing and scientific thinking were originally independent modes of thought. Technological thinking had its own logic and in many respects this logic, again, was a reflection of Aristotle's (1998) practical wisdom that brought into focus the pluralities of thinking and the existence of different kinds of knowledge. However, while in ancient Greece science and technology remained independent, in the seventeenth century they absorbed each other's elements (Koyré, 1948, p. 809). Specifically, science gripped common-sense elements, developed them and adapted them to new knowledge and practical needs. For example, the history of chronometry shows that the transformation of technological knowledge into scientific knowledge enabled the construction of precise instruments to measure time (Koyré, 1948, pp. 822–823). Common sense and scientific knowing were now enriching one another.

In the sixteenth century changes in science and technology took place all over Europe. Emphasis was placed on making things, on artisanship and discoveries. The post-medieval English philosopher Francis Bacon argued that intellect and abstract thinking do not provide humans with certainty. Instead, he suggested that nature should be understood and interpreted by practical innovations and discoveries through careful and methodical study. Bacon drew attention to the practical utilities of gunpowder, silk, magnet, sugar or print – which, he noted, were splendid discoveries. Nature conceals many wonderful things; they are 'lying at our feet, and we step over them without seeing them' (Bacon, 1620/2007, book 1, aphorism 110). His emphasis on observation, empirical method, on discoveries and his vision of the world in which humans invent and construct, led Bacon to conclude that the human senses are not the measure of things. Senses as well as the mind reflect the perceiver and not the world. He argued that the human intellect deforms things. It is 'like a distorting mirror, which receives light-rays irregularly and

so mixes its own nature with the nature of things, which it distorts' (Bacon, 1620/2007, book 1, aphorism 41). Since the mind has such misleading effects, Bacon highlighted, instead, the role of invention, practical and empirical knowing and the advancement of learning. He was not a scientist and his work and his writings were full of mistakes and contradictions (see e.g. Durant, 1933). Nevertheless, Bacon had a tremendous influence on European thought. The Royal Society of London, which was founded in 1660, more than three decades after his death, was influenced by Bacon's vision of new science and by his ideas of discovery, knowledge and the advancement of learning.

Bacon's thoughts became very influential during the French Enlightenment. Voltaire and in particular the creators of *Encyclopedia*, d'Alembert and Diderot celebrated the immortal Chancellor Bacon as an extraordinary genius. In the *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia*, they regarded him as the most important and the most universal philosopher of his time (d'Alembert, 1751/1995). Among other things, the Encyclopaedists were inspired by Bacon's division of sciences, by the immense catalogue of things that, as Bacon suggested, remained to be discovered. He also invited scholars to study and perfect the arts. By arts, Bacon, just like others of his time, meant any activity which involved techniques or required skills. The Encyclopaedists declared that in developing their tree of knowledge they were guided principally by Chancellor Bacon's encyclopaedic tree (d'Alembert, 1751/1995, p. 76). Bacon's emphasis on invention, practical and empirical knowing was very different from Cartesian scepticism. Bacon distrusted scepticism, emphasised doing things and experiencing events. His ideas had a great impact on diverse philosophies such as positivism and pragmatism (Chapter 3). Above all, he had influence on Giambattista Vico, the scholar of common sense.

2.2 Giambattista Vico's common sense

2.2.1 Vico and Shaftesbury

In the early eighteenth century we find two significant scholars writing about common sense: Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) in Italy and the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671–1713) in England.

Giambatistta Vico was building partly on the ideas of Francis Bacon. He originated a new orientation in science and philosophy, and specifically, he proposed a novel perspective on common-sense thinking. He explicitly stated that he was extending Francis Bacon's method of the study of natural sciences to human sciences, in particular 'carrying it over from the institutions of nature . . . to the civil institutions of mankind' (Vico, 1744/1948, §§ 163 and 359).

Giambattista Vico was a professor of rhetoric and law in Naples where he lived throughout his life. Rhetoric, for him, was essential in teaching law. He

thought that the task of legal education was to teach students to speak well in the law courts. Vico drew a great deal on Greek and Roman traditions of jurisprudence. Adopting to some extent the Stoic meaning of common sense, Vico viewed 'common sense' as a rhetorical and social term. The notion of 'rhetoric' had for Vico a different meaning than it has today. Like Cicero, for Vico, common sense was inseparable from moral conduct, and it was accompanied by rhetorical speaking and thinking (Bayer, 2008, p. 1139). In her analysis of Vico's common sense in rhetoric Bayer reminds us that rhetoric in ancient Greece, as well as in Vico's conception, was a feature of civil wisdom; justice was a universal concept, and the law and public court speeches aimed at achieving self-knowledge (Bayer, 2008, p. 1154). Since justice was considered to be an ultimate and universal virtue, it was tied to wisdom as the knowledge of human and divine matters. In contrast, today, rhetoric is conceived as the power of words to persuade and appeal to emotions. Since contemporary society is concerned with preserving law and order, rhetoric has become an instrument of social order. Therefore, while the concept of justice in ancient law and in Vico's conception was a universal and stood above any society or conditions, social justice as practised today is not a universal. It is a claim to the right or rights of particular persons or classes (Bayer, 2008, p. 1154). This is why both Vico's 'universal justice' and rhetoric essentially differ from today's concepts of 'social justice' and rhetoric. They serve different purposes.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, moved from England to Naples in 1711 because his health had declined and the Italian weather suited him. He already had contacts with a number of Neapolitan intellectuals (on Shaftesbury, see the study by Billig, 2008). Shaftesbury (1711/1999) published his main book titled *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* in 1711, but the important chapter on *sensus communis* had already been published in 1709. He died in Naples in 1713 and was buried there. Although both Vico and Shaftesbury made revolutionary advancements in the study of common sense, they did not refer to one another; however, the scholars of the period have little doubt that Vico and Shaftesbury met, or, at least, that they knew of one another. Shaftesbury's common sense, too, was a rhetorical and social notion derived from Stoic philosophy. It was concerned with acting in a decent manner and with the sense of public spirit, so that society could function well. As the argument goes, Shaftesbury was interested in common sense before Vico and Vico could have been influenced by him (e.g. Billig, 2008, pp. 94–95). The main similarity between their perspectives is the focus on the social nature of common sense and the role of language. Shaftesbury's social approach stemmed from the critique of John Locke's individualistic and mechanistic philosophy; Vico's approach was motivated by a vigorous critique of René Descartes. For both Vico and Shaftesbury, poetic language, metaphor and irony strongly contrasted with the logistic approach to language.

Shaftesbury (1711/1999, pp. 29–69) entitled his piece on common sense *Sensus communis, an essay on the freedom of wit and humour in a letter to a friend*. Vico sent his *New Science* to his friend under the title *The Principles of Humanity*, although the broadly based title *Principles of New Science of Giambattista Vico Concerning the Common Nature of Nations* (Verene, 1981, p. 127; also Vico, 1744/1948, § 1096) explained more fully his intentions. Shaftesbury's psychology was holistic, social, sceptical and rhetorical (Billig, 2008, p. 74). His interests, apart from common sense, were history, moral sense and aesthetics. Vico's psychology, too, involved all these features, although he called it the science of humanity. His main concepts were *verum factum*, common sense, imagination, cultural history and social knowledge.

Shaftesbury's work was very influential throughout the eighteenth century. In contrast, Vico's work was hardly noticed during his life and it was forgotten after his death. Many scholars commented that during his life Vico was largely misunderstood. His main work, *The New Science* (1744/1948), not only made very little impact when it was published, but it was ignored nearly by everybody to whom Vico sent it. He was deeply disappointed and felt dejected, but despite that, his book filled him 'with a certain heroic spirit', as he stated in his autobiography (Vico, 1963, p. 15).

Vico's work was resurrected in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to the profound scholarship of Michelet (1827), Croce (1913), Collingwood (1930/1965), Berlin (1976; 1985; 2000a), Grassi (1976), Verene (1981), Pompa (1990a; 1990b), and Mali (2012), among many others. Diverse interpretations of his texts have led to disputes among Vico's scholars (see e.g. Berlin, 1985 versus Zagorin, 1985). Today, Vico's work enjoys tremendous interest among human and social scientists including some social psychologists, who mainly refer to Vico's contribution in the field of language and communication (e.g. Hermans and Kempen, 1993; Lana, 1979; Rosnow, 1978; Shotter, 1986; 1991; 2007).

2.2.2 Vico and Descartes: common sense, truth and certainty

For Descartes and Vico, common sense, that is, Descartes' *bon sens* and Vico's *sensus communis*, is distributed among all people, yet, clearly, these two scholars differ with respect to the underlying epistemologies of common sense and therefore with respect to their meanings of common sense. Cartesian *bon sens* is an innate cognitive capacity of humans to reason and to perceive clear and distinct ideas.

2.2.2.1 Common sense arises from action in creating history While not rejecting the importance of perception in the formation of common sense, according to Vico, common sense arises in and through the process in which

humans have created their own history (Vico, 1744/1948). He linked common sense with *ingenium* (see later), imagination and action. Vico characterised common sense as 'judgement without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the whole human race' (Vico, 1744/1948, § 142). He argued that it originates from people who are unknown to each other, but because humans produce 'uniform ideas' based on 'underlying agreements', there must be a common ground of truth in them. This recalls the suggestion discussed earlier that certain uniformities in life, for example, physical, biological or social, produce similar experiences in all humans. These uniform and regularly repeated experiences become fixed in the human mind and in activities; stabilised over generations, they provide resources for common-sense knowledge. Therefore, common sense is not a set of consciously formed empirical beliefs or intellectual concerns. Neither does the ground of truth come from the innate cognitive capacity of the individual. Instead it comes from humans who share common uniformities in life over generations. But sharing common uniformities is not a passive experiencing of regularities and repetitions: common uniformities arise from actively created 'underlying agreements'. Human beings create their common senses by humanising nature in and through actions, by establishing communities, social institutions, traditions and political organisations. Vico also conceived that ethical and moral norms are part of 'underlying agreements' of common sense of communities and nations (Vico, 1744/1948, § 145). They are transmitted over generations in and through language and communication. Communication need not be verbal; symbolic gestures are understood by members of the community because they grasp, as Vico often repeats, their 'needs and utilities'. The construction of laws, rules and customs and the development of institutions are greatly accelerated by language serving the needs and utilities of communities.

'Underlying agreements' are specific to each nation which follows its own rules. They give rise to specific ways of acting and transmit these throughout history. As a result, common sense becomes routinised. 'Underlying agreements' that underlie common sense have therefore meanings only if they are considered in the historical analysis of ideas in which humans have created themselves. Common sense steers unconscious and conscious activities, interactions and the use of language in communities. Nations speak diverse languages and make different choices and judgements to satisfy their needs and utilities (Vico, 1744/1948, § 145).

In sum, common sense is inextricably linked with action. It serves peoples' needs and utilities; people are agents who satisfy their needs by inventing tools and creating symbols. Vico's historical approach, showing that in creating their history humans also change their consciousness and attain knowledge of themselves, became important to Karl Marx who referred to Vico's views in *Das Kapital*.

2.2.2.2 Certainty and truth Vico took a critical view of Descartes' method of the search for truth and of his concept of rationality. Above all, he objected to Descartes' concept of certainty. Descartes' method was based on doubting everything except the individual's Cogito; the individual's capacity for thinking in terms of clear and distinct ideas was the only certainty humans had. Vico argued that Descartes' notion of certainty is dubious: it is highly subjective, because it comes only from the analytical power of the individual (Vico, 1709/1965). In other words, Descartes derived the logically grounded theory of knowledge from a psychological basis; therefore, Vico thought that Descartes' clear and distinct ideas were no more than sheer speculation. They appear to be real, but they are mental constructions and therefore, they are arbitrary and unreal. The world in which humans live is complex; it does not consist of lines, numbers and algebraic signs. Grandiose words like 'demonstration', 'self-evidence' and 'demonstrated truths' that denigrate probable phenomena have nothing to do with the complex human world (Vico, 1972, p. 458).

While Vico's *sensus communis* does involve perception, it is not a purely perceptual capacity. As already pointed out, for Vico, perception, human needs and utilities are interdependent and their relation is a process and product of history. Humans make their choices in an insecure world and so their choices, too, are unsure. What makes them dependable is common sense. Common sense is vital to Vico's distinction between *certain* and *true* phenomena. While for Descartes absolute certainty and absolute truth lie with the individual's thinking, which is the only source of indubitable truth, for Vico, absolute truth lies with human action – with *verum factum*. Vico fully explained his concept of *verum factum* in his early book *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* (Vico, 1710/2010). The proof that something is true lies entirely in the fact that humans make it. And humans can make something because they imagine how that thing may look. So, *verum factum* goes far beyond perception: it is imaginative and inventive. This is where Vico comes to the idea of common sense. Humans do not passively digest underlying agreements; rather, they form common sense foundations by triggering the capacity to make and invent things and to acquire knowledge of the world in and through action. Perhaps it is here that we find the echo of technological advancements in the scientific revolution as well as of Bacon's emphasis on practice and inventions. For Latins, Vico says, *verum*, the true, and *factum*, the made, are exchangeable or convertible. After all, as Aliotta (Gianturco, 1990, p. xliii) commented, this principle had proven extremely important in Vico's time in school education, where learners should search for truth actively in constructing knowledge, rather than passively adopting knowledge from what is given to them by teachers. Vico insists on the distinction between truth and certainty and elaborates it in his main writings as follows.

Truth (*verum*) concerns only human actions. Only what humans create, for example, laws, mathematics, customs, language, and their own history, can be

referred to as the truth. For example, take mathematics or geometry. The principles of mathematics or geometry are universally true because they are inventions of humans: 'We are able to demonstrate geometrical propositions because we create them' (Vico, 1709/1965, p. 23). Equally in the *New Science* (1744/1948, § 349) Vico states that geometry was the first indubitable principle that humankind has created. Geometry subsequently modified the human mind. Vico even suggested that human actions followed patterns of geometry; when making geometrical patterns out of elements, the human mind makes them real. However, in contrast to Euclidean, Cartesian and analytic geometry (Vico, 1709/1965), Vico's geometry is concerned with very complex human affairs like the world of nations and history. Such complex phenomena are created and recreated by people, and people refer to them neither in terms of 'points, lines, surfaces, nor figures' (Vico, 1744/1948, § 349). By making truth the subject matter of human action, Vico placed it under human control. Truth is the reality of living in the social world and Vico calls it 'the eternal and never-failing light' that is beyond all questions (Vico, 1744/1948, § 331). Truth arises from actions and from the principles developed in civil society.

In contrast to the study of affairs that humans create, Vico thought that by studying physical phenomena, humans cannot achieve truth because they have no power to create such phenomena; nature and physical phenomena do not arise from human actions. Physical phenomena were created by God and so humans can understand them only to a limited degree. For Vico, physical science was not capable of ever reaching the truth (*verum*), but could only reach a specific level of certainty (*certum*), that is, it could reach some probability of truth. As Vico stated, if it were possible for humans to provide demonstrations of propositions in physics, it would be also possible to create them out of nothing (Vico, 1709/1965, p. 23). However, this was not possible in Vico's time and this is why, for him, *certum* only referred to probability, but not to the truth.

2.2.3 Ingenuity and imagination

In his analysis of Vico's thoughts Grassi (1976, p. 560) emphasises that Vico's idea of common sense has nothing to do with the deductive capacities put forward by rationalists, or with philosophical and metaphysical concerns. Instead it is related to the historically established interdependencies of human requirements, that is, to needs and utilities, which Vico calls 'the two origins of the natural law of nations' (Vico, 1744/1948, § 141). Nations are guided by the 'underlying agreements' which respect the natural law. Ingenuity (*ingenium*) and imagination are two capacities of common sense that enable humans to go beyond sensory experiences (Vico, 1710/2010, p. 98). As Pompa (Vico, 1982, pp. 69–70) explains, there is no single English word that would capture Vico's

meaning of *ingenium* and the term is translated sometimes as 'genius', or as 'wit' or 'inventiveness': 'Imagination is the eye of "ingenium", judgment is the eye of understanding'. *Ingenium* may refer to invention, to construction or arguments, capacity to synthetise and link together different things, among others.

In and through *ingenium* and imagination, humans uncover common elements in diverse things and transfer them from one thing to another. In order to accomplish these transformations, humans think metaphorically and imaginatively (Grassi, 1976, pp. 562–563). We may add here that this perspective fundamentally contrasts with much of the current research in social psychology, where empirical data collection is not based on what humans imagine, but on how they process information, and what they explicitly say or do. In such cases, the basis of social psychological 'science' is an overtly observable machine-like behaviour of experimental subjects.

Ingenium and imagination also differentiate traditional logic and Vico's logic of imagination (Grassi, 1976). In traditional logic, universals were studied by means of the process of abstraction through which objects are classified and subclassified into categories on the basis of common properties. In opposing the rationalistic concept of logical universals, Vico proposed the concept of 'imaginative universals' (Vico, 1744/1948). By these he meant poetic and pictorial inventions which can connect things that are remote from one another. This is possible precisely because of the human faculties of *ingenium* and imagination. These capacities have their roots in common sense (Vico, 1744/1948, § 809). If and when the original inventive and imaginative relation of humans with reality is lost and if humans rely solely on abstract thought and a rationalistic analysis of the world, they turn themselves into manipulative beings characterised by the barbarism of reflection (see below; Vico, 1744/1948, § 1106).

2.2.4 Vico's social knowledge

Vico's ideas about truth (*verum*) and certainty (*certum*) led to his revolutionary point of view regarding the difference between natural and human sciences. According to Vico (1710/2010), natural and human sciences are parts of two different universes and one cannot apply one and the same method to the study of the natural world and to the world of humans. It is necessary that each is studied by methods, which are appropriate and specific for each of them.

Here again, Vico starts from criticism of Descartes' universal scientific method of the search for truth. However, Descartes did not apply his scientific methods to the study of sense perception, history, myth and other phenomena that concerned human nature. Such phenomena, for him, were not worthy of any serious study. He made this clear in a number of his writings and above all

in his *Discourse on the Method* (Descartes, 1637/1955, p. 84) where he emphasised that whilst history, fables, and travel stimulated imagination they could not be treated seriously.

Vico did not argue against science as such; he proposed a new conception of science that was applicable to the study of human society. As already noted above, Vico maintained that the physicist, because he did not create the world, could not assign nature to physical things and therefore, he could not reach the truth about them. It was God who created nature and assigned qualities to things, and he only understood them because he made them. The human mind, however, is outside these things and it can never collect more than their traces (Vico, 1710/2010, p. 23). Therefore, full understanding of nature is outside the realm of human possibilities. Since humans cannot create nature, and yet they aim to understand it, they dissect it like anatomists. And Vico expands on this image by referring to dissecting a human being into body and soul, and the soul into intellect and will (Vico, 1710/2010, p. 21) without being able to understand the unity of being. Vico's perspective on scientific exploration of his time evokes that of Wilhelm Humboldt a hundred years later. Humboldt, in a similar manner claimed that language is a living body and cannot be therefore dissected like a cadaver by the knife of an anatomist (Humboldt, 1999, p. 48). Vico insisted that humans make their own world, history and language, and by doing this, they model God's creation. And in this context Vico (1710/2010, p. 25) repeats once again that humans, and not nature, create lines, points and define surfaces. This is why they understand that the word 'point' signifies something that has no parts.

Berlin (2000a, p. 22) claims that Vico 'virtually created a new field of social knowledge' and he insists that Vico's application of *verum factum* to history is beyond any doubt his own invention (although some scholars attribute the originality of *verum factum* to others, for example, to Sanchez; see Faur, 1987; Zagorin, 1985). Berlin saw Vico's contribution to the field of social knowledge as eminently relevant to the study of the human mind, diversities of culture and human history, and so embracing various human and social sciences. One would hope to include social psychology among them, which Berlin did not do, presumably because our discipline has chosen a different way, attaching itself to general psychology and information processing.

We can conclude that by supposing that natural and human sciences belong to two different universes Vico in effect separated *Naturwissenschaften* (natural sciences) from *Geisteswissenschaften* (human sciences), the perspective that was proposed much later by Wilhelm Dilthey in the nineteenth century. Since natural and human sciences are of fundamentally different kinds, concepts and methods that are applicable to the former cannot be extended to the latter. In contrast to natural sciences, human sciences study human creativity

and imagination. Humans uncover and make their world in and through reflection and self-reflection.

2.2.5 Vico's cultural history

Vico's historical thinking has been understood in two ways. Some scholars characterised Vico as the creator of a new discipline of cultural history (e.g. Berlin, 1976; 1985; 2000a; Mali, 2012). Others characterised Vico as a preserver of the old pre-Cartesian perspective, that is, of the Christian doctrine and the Renaissance humanism (Kelley, 1970). This latter characterisation of Vico's place in history reminds one that he was not just a critic of the Cartesian ahistorical perspective, but that he maintained and converted Renaissance ideas of historicism. The Renaissance emphasised historicism as part of the idea of agency, of actors who viewed themselves in and through history. However, Vico (1710/2010, p. 17) went much further than the Renaissance by relating human history to cultural history.

In his recent book on Vico's legacy in modern cultural history Mali (2012) stresses that scholars on Vico have largely ignored his contribution to cultural history, although there are some notable exceptions. Mali focuses on the work of the French historian Jules Michelet, the German literary scholar Erich Auerbach, the Irish novelist James Joyce and the British philosopher Isaiah Berlin who, in their own ways valued Vico's original role in creating the discipline of cultural history. Michelet appreciated Vico's contribution to the study of the nation and nationalism; Auerbach esteemed Vico's modernism; Joyce referred to Vico's historicism and Berlin valued Vico's pluralistic perspective.

Analysing the roots of Vico's historicism, Kelley (1970) draws attention to two scholarly inventions of the Renaissance and post-Renaissance: to mathematics that became the new logos, and to the study of history that became the new mythos. Vico was a contributor to the latter and he viewed myths and fables as a part of creating self-knowledge. What is important about Vico's historicism is the emphasis on imagination, reinterpretation of the past and seeing it through new eyes. He emphasised a historically developing desire for self-understanding and for understanding others. This emphasis on self- and other-understanding reappeared later in German Romanticism and in particular in the work of Johann Wolfgang Herder, who is often called the founder of nationalism. Herder referred to the difficulty of taking the role of other people and particularly of other nations, and to the ability of empathising with them (Marková, 1982). More recently, George Herbert Mead's concept of taking the role or the position of the other (Mead, 1934) became fundamentally important in the analysis of communication. Vico (1744/1948, e.g. §§ 125, 127 and 331) based his analysis of taking the position of the other on the notion of conceit. He

spoke about two kinds of conceits resulting from the ahistorical evaluation of others. First is the conceit of nations, which means that each nation develops its own image of being better than other nations and so it distorts historical reality. The second conceit is that of scholars and it is even more important. If historians are not familiar with the point of view which they evaluate, they tend to take as a criterion of judgement their own nation; equally, they have a tendency to believe that contemporary knowledge is all that can be known and so they take an ahistorical perspective when evaluating others. Vico thought that it was surprising that philosophers spent so much energy in trying to explain the world of nature which, he believed, would remain largely unknowable because it was created by God (see above). In contrast, philosophers have neglected the study of the history of civilisations and nations despite the fact that this is precisely where they could learn, since the social world is the world that humans have created (Vico, 1744/1948, § 331).

2.2.6 Language as a key to cultural history

A fundamental feature of Vico's cultural history is the primary role he attributes to language, which is essential to his epistemology. In contrast to the view that regards language as biological and cognitive or as arising from natural causes, for Vico, language emerges and develops in the course of human existence in and through imagination. Imagination is such an important power in Vico's thought that he argues that in early historical languages, the first language was the language of imagination. Common sense manifests itself through metaphor, through the transfer of meaning from one word to another, and through myth. Vico views myth as a systematic way of seeing, understanding and reacting to the world; it is created in and through language (Vico, 1744/1948, § 779). In fables humans describe their world in language. Fables are products of collective imagining and true histories of custom (Vico, 1744/1948, § 7). These ideas reappear, again, later in the eighteenth century in the perspectives on the social nature of language by German romanticists like Herder, Hamann and Humboldt. Vico's pre-Humboldian and pre-Bakhtinian approach to language is also apparent in his view that language is infinitely open and that every culture has its originality. No single language is fully translatable into another one without residue because categories in one language differ from another; they comprise different realities.

Vico believed that the first language was metaphoric. In and through using metaphors language is capable of uncovering common elements in diverse things and in this way a metaphor emphasises the power of language. For example, Vico asserted that expressions referring to a variety of objects were formed by metaphors related to the human body. Some poetic phrases like 'the blood boils in my heart' (Vico, 1744/1948, § 460) are based on the association

of ideas that come from a natural and eternal experience common to all mankind. Equally, when people cannot scientifically explain properties of objects, they use analogies, like 'the magnet has an occult sympathy for the iron' (Vico, 1744/1948, § 377) or the 'magnet loves the iron' (Vico, 1744/1948, § 180). Vico argued that language was representative from its very beginnings, whether in the form of poetry, or hieroglyphs or signs of whatever kinds. It used diverse and rich means in order to express 'vivid representations, images, similes, comparisons, metaphors, circumlocutions' (Vico, 1744/1948, § 456) as well as phrases and descriptions to explain things by their natural properties. In other words, language enables humans to carry out infinite activities and therefore, *verum factum* referred not only to making things, but also to making things with language.

Vico's cultural history, focusing on ways of life of different nations, cultures and societies, and on their heterogeneity, too, is underlain by language. Nations develop their specific languages and this is what affects their *ingenium*. Vico expresses his conviction of the primacy of language over *ingenium* when he refers to the contemporary debate concerning 'the genius of language' that took place between Italian and French writers. In the often repeated quote Vico claims that it is 'genius that is a product of language, not language of genius' (Vico, 1709/1965, p. 40). In this claim he clearly states that it is language that shapes *ingenium* in the formation of images and knowledge. Different languages affect *ingenium* in various ways. This is why such tremendous differences can be identified between the French and Italian. In French we can recognise the subtlety of the intellectual power of abstract analysis that is stripped of images and is reduced to pure deduction and rationality. Italian language, on the other hand, is directed towards evoking images and paying attention to metaphors. Vico argued that the *ingenium* of Italians also led to superiority in arts, paintings, architecture and music.

Just like truth arises from human action (*verum factum*), so it arises from the inventive power of language. It is in and through language that humans have created the world in which they live, as well as their own history. The power of language likens humans to God. Vico specifically considers the power of naming, through which the social nature of language becomes transparent. God creates things but a man creates names. To name something or someone, one needs others to recognise it. Otherwise there would be no point in naming. Naming is for the Self as well as for Others: it is a collective activity. Naming creates the social reality of humans. For example, when Vico studied the need to establish the assurance of ownership, he related it to the invention of names (Vico, 1744/1948, § 483). Giving a name to something meant to relate that thing to oneself. It was like drawing up the boundaries between what is mine and what is not mine. Only if others accept the name I suggest for a particular thing, its meaning becomes a common property on which the community can act.

The development of language takes the same route as the transformation of mankind: it is the transformation of innovation and creativity. Reflection develops in and through this process and gives shape to various language modalities like irony. Irony could develop only when people mastered reflection and were able to attribute a different meaning to a word from the familiar one (Vico, 1744/1948, §§ 145 and 408). This in turn changed the structure of thought.

Using today's ideas, we can interpret Vico's perspective as dialogical. He viewed ethical dispositions in terms of understanding notions like obligation, justice, making choices and so on. They make sense as relations between the Self and the Other. The Self can demand justice only to the extent that the Other understands the meaning of justice – or because the Self lives in a State where institutions protect justice. If the Other (whether an individual or the State) does not share the Self's meaning of justice, there is no way his/her demands will be heard. This perspective was developed later on by the philosophers Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Chapter 4), and afterwards by George Herbert Mead in his criticism of John Locke's individualism (Marková, 2003a).

2.2.7 Ethical nature of common sense

For Vico, ethics was a fundamental feature of *sensus communis*. He rejected an approach to ethics as an objectified moral science based on rules and propositions. In his book on the study of methods (Vico, 1709/1965, p. 33) he stated that educational methods placed too much emphasis on the natural sciences and on the intellectual development of the person, and disregarded ethics which, in fact, deals with essential social and political issues, with virtues and vices, and patterns of behaviour. He described in detail what he thought were the differences between science and common sense, the latter, in contrast to the former, being of ethical nature, and interdependent with language, *ingenium* and imagination. Vico (1709/1965, pp. 46–47) argued against the systematisation of rules in ethics and he pointed out that in real life, human conduct depends on sound judgement and therefore, nothing is more meaningless than the treatment of ethics as a general and objective science.

Vico saw the ethical nature of common sense in history and community. We have noted above that for him, common sense was a socially shared but not reflected upon, habitual way of thinking, communicating and acting. It guides humans in everyday reality; it enables them to cope with obstacles, and to make instantaneous judgements and evaluations of situations. Since common sense is 'judgement without reflection', Vico's powerful analysis of reflection, and specifically, of 'the barbarism of reflection', deserves more than a passing reference. In his historical approach to the study of ethics he

maintains that original communities lived in the 'barbarism of sense' (Vico, 1744/1948, § 1106) by which he meant the primitive simplicity of first people, their piety and faith. However, over the course of time, people developed the 'barbarism of reflection' and 'premeditated malice'. This is a historical stage when human beings, in and through reflection, started to think only of their private interests rather than about the interests of their communities. Despite superficial socialising with others, the individual lives in a deep loneliness of spirit and 'under soft words and embraces, plots against the life and fortune of friends and intimates' (Vico, 1744/1948, § 1106). The barbarism of reflection, we could say, today refers not only to hypocritical behaviours but also to the attempts to rationally justify irrational scientific theories like racism and Nazism (see Chapter 1).

2.3 Common sense after Vico

Modern philosophy during and after Vico's time largely followed the tradition that strictly distinguished 'superior' and 'inferior' thinking. We can read in the seventeenth century Baruch Spinoza's masterpiece on *Ethics* (1677/1967) that 'reasoning' and 'intuition' are adequate forms of knowing because they lead to the discovery of the true natures of things. 'Imagination', in contrast, Spinoza named 'common sense' (Spinoza, 1677/1967, p. 254), and he treated it as the lowest kind of intellectual activity that does no more than manufactures false and fictitious ideas.

The eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant conceived common sense in two ways. First, he treated common sense as an uncultured or vulgar form of thinking used in daily language (e.g. Kant, 1790/2000, 5:238, 5:293). For this form of common sense Kant used the German term *gemeine Menschenverstand*. The other form of common sense was *sensus communis* and Kant considered it as a necessary condition of judgement. His view on this form of common sense, or *sensus communis*, is laid bare in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (Kant, 1790/2000). Kant's exposition of *sensus communis* is in harmony with his philosophical system which examines the nature of understanding, reason and the limits of knowledge. Kant considered *sensus communis* as an *a priori* capacity for understanding, cognition and judgement of what is moral and immoral, what is beautiful and what allows reflective discriminations. Cognitions and judgements, together with the individual's inner conviction of moral accountability, must be universally communicable and these mental processes presuppose the capacity of *sensus communis* (Kant, 1790/2000, 5:239). All humans are capable of using *sensus communis* in the same way. Kant lived at a time when sciences like chemistry and physics were developing rapidly. For Kant, there was no conflict between *sensus communis* and science; since *sensus communis* is a capacity for judgement,

reflection and reason (Kant, 1790/2000, 5:293–294), it makes contributions to science, although only at an elementary level.

While Kant viewed *sensus communis* as a necessary condition of judgement, the German philosopher Hegel, an admirer of Spinoza's philosophy, took over Spinoza's three-partite classification of intellectual activities, and named them 'common sense', 'science' and 'philosophy' (Walsh, 1946), leaving common sense at the bottom of the hierarchy. Hegel's viewpoint enabled Geoffrey Mure, in his *Introduction to Hegel* (1940, pp. 1–2) to state that '[c]ommon sense is a rudimentary thinking'. It is something between sense-perception and imagination. It is no more than a thin abstraction from reality.

2.3.1 The Scottish School of Common Sense

The Scottish School of Common Sense was established as part of the Scottish Enlightenment in the early eighteenth century. Michael Billig (2008) claims that there is a direct route from the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury to the Scottish School of Common Sense, in particular through the predecessors of Thomas Reid. Reid is often called the founder of the Scottish School. Despite the fact that he hardly ever left Scotland, Thomas Reid was well familiar with the philosophical, theological, and scientific ideas of his time, and he responded to them in his books. He corresponded with many important contemporary figures, like the philosopher David Hume. Reid's ideas on common sense are best expressed in his book on *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (1764/1801), although the philosophy and the defence of common sense are incorporated into most of his writings.

2.3.1.1 Thomas Reid versus *Giambattista Vico* The name of Giambattista Vico is not mentioned by the Scottish Common Sense philosophers, but some of their ideas recall those of Vico. Reid's criticism of the theory of ideas and of scepticism, as well as his ideas about language, and his emphasis on practice, are particularly reminiscent of Vico's views. Equally, however, differences between Vico's and Reid's ideas of common sense are quite significant. Reid was above all interested in the inductive methodology of Francis Bacon, and he also adopted Bacon's criticism of Aristotle's syllogistic logic (Reid, 1764/1801, p. 128). Science must be practical, and the human mind should be studied by methods which are appropriate to natural science or natural philosophy (Reid, 1764/1801, p. 44). In contrast, Vico suggested that the methods for the study of the human mind must differ from those that are pertinent to natural science. This difference between the perspectives of Reid and Vico is given by their divergent epistemological positions regarding common sense.

For Reid, common sense comes above all from the senses, although the operations of the senses also include judgements of phenomena (Reid,

1764/1801, p. 135). For example, pain is not only a sensation but also the belief that I have pain; perception of a tree is not only a simple apprehension of the tree but it also involves the belief or judgement that the tree exists, that it has properties like shape, size, and so on. These perceptions and judgements are part of the natural provision of understanding. They guide us in everyday life where the pure faculty of reasoning would leave us in the dark (Reid, 1764/1801, p. 135). In contrast, according to Vico, common sense comes from the capacity of humans to create their world in history and culture, and to relate experiences from senses to needs and utilities. Therefore, common sense goes far beyond pure sensory experience. While Vico was critical of Descartes' method, Reid attacked John Locke's theory of ideas and Hume's scepticism.

2.3.1.2 Common sense comes from 'the first principles' In *An Inquiry* Reid presents his epistemology of common sense which he combines with explorations of language. He analyses at length each of the five senses, their relations with language, and the ways in which senses are employed in obtaining knowledge about the world. Again and again he argues that common sense is essential to our natural constitution; it is the first principle that we must take for granted. Our minds are directly related to the external world and we directly experience the world around us; generally, our common sense guides us correctly in our experience. As this is part of our natural constitution against which we can do nothing (Reid, 1764/1801, p. 44), it is irresistible. Therefore, the testimony of common sense must be presupposed; it comes from 'the first principles' and reason can neither make nor destroy these. The first principles are axioms or definitions from which the mind starts. Reid argues his points by presenting a number of examples: a mathematician cannot prove the truth of his axioms, because they are taken for granted as the points of departure; equally, we cannot prove the existence of our minds, thoughts or sensations, because their existence is presupposed; a witness cannot prove anything without taking for granted his memory; and, finally, a natural philosopher takes for granted the uniformity of nature in order to prove something (Reid, 1764/1801, p. 44). All such beliefs come 'from the mint of nature'. While a sceptic is inclined to trust reason and distrust perception of objects, Reid argues that the faculty of reason and of perception comes from the same workshop and from the same craftsman (Reid, 1764/1801, p. 102) and neither of them has more credibility than the other.

The philosophy of Thomas Reid and his book on *An Inquiry* was very influential both in the United Kingdom and abroad, particularly in post-revolutionary France and in North America. Common sense philosophy became a prominent feature both in positivism and in pragmatism. In the United Kingdom, Reid's common sense ideas influenced the moral philosophy of Henry Sidgwick and G. E. Moore.

2.4 Conclusion

Just like fashions, ideas rise to summits and subsequently fall. Alternatively, they travel with humans in time changing their guises in new socio-historical circumstances so that we no longer recognise their original features. In his introductory remarks to *Vico and Contemporary thought* (Tagliacozzo, Mooney and Verene, 1980) Tagliacozzo warns about the way in which contemporary scholars refer to Vico. He emphasises that Vico's ideas had no influence until the nineteenth century and therefore, it is misleading and 'possibly unfair' to call him a 'forerunner' of contemporary disciplines. It would be more appropriate, Tagliacozzo argues, to call Vico 'a pioneer of things to come' (Tagliacozzo, 1980, p. 3). There are of course parallels between Vico's ideas and contemporary scholarship, Tagliacozzo notes, but such resemblances could be purely coincidental. While Tagliacozzo acknowledges the indirect influence of Vico on future generations of scholars, he remarks that this reminds one of a game of Chinese whispers when ideas get distorted as they are passed on. If one insists on a direct influence of Vico, there is the danger that his original ideas would be distorted and this would damage the understanding of Vico's original work. Specifically, Tagliacozzo refers to similarities between some views of Humboldt's linguistics and of Piaget's ideas on developmental psychology.

The question is not whether a contemporary scholar misinterprets this or that aspect of Vico's ideas. If we find traces of his ideas in the creators idea of the dialogical mind ranging from Herder, Hamann, Humboldt, through to Cassirer, Bakhtin and Moscovici among others, this shows the originality and foresight of Vico's oeuvre as a whole. It shows that already in the early eighteenth century he anticipated the Zeitgeist of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and in particular, the fact that natural and human sciences are of a different kind.

3 Common sense in humanities and social sciences

New political movements and the economic expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries favoured advances in technology, industry and practical skills. They gave rise to novel ideologies and philosophies both in Europe and in North America. The expanding industry, which emphasised practical skills and inductive methods, suggested much earlier by Francis Bacon, created a fertile soil for the development of new ideas on common-sense thinking. Among those, ideas proposed by the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, and in some cases even by Giambattista Vico (Chapter 2), came to the fore. They became absorbed into, and were transformed by, new movements, and so they contributed to the emergence of schools of thought that accentuated common-sense approaches.

3.1 Common sense and science in France

In nineteenth-century France, it was above all the philosopher Victor Cousin who stimulated interest in the Scottish philosophy of Enlightenment, and more specifically, the common-sense philosophy of Thomas Reid. In his large book on *Philosophie écossaise* (Scottish Philosophy) (1857), he devoted two chapters to the Irish–Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson, two chapters to Adam Smith, six chapters to Thomas Reid and one chapter jointly to James Beattie and Adam Ferguson. Cousin held Thomas Reid in high esteem. He called him a genius of powerful originality (Cousin, 1857, p. ii) who studied common sense in depth and brought it to the fore. His admiration for Reid was expressed in extreme terms: 'Reid is common sense itself . . . Common sense is to us the only legitimate point of departure and the constant and inviolable rule of science. Reid never errs; his method is true, his general principles are incontestable' (Cousin, 1853/1883, p. 347). Cousin's common-sense philosophy formed part of the opposition against abstract philosophy and logicism which, at that time, dominated school education. It had a significant impact on French primary education and governmental educational policies.

In the aftermath of the French Revolution, France was in the middle of political and economic changes. One of the new political and social movements

was initiated by Comte de Saint-Simon, a utopian socialist who believed in the evolution of humanity which was to be achieved by industrialisation and by changes in the structure of society and religion. He thought that the moral crisis in the Church and in post-Revolution France could be resolved by constructing a theoretical system that would bring together different kinds of knowledge. This would have practical consequences for the improvement of the social position of labourers. In addition to aiming at unified knowledge, Saint-Simon had a vision of a united Europe. He planned to establish the Anglo-French Baconian Society, which would base its work on observed facts rather than on abstract speculations, and would involve industrialists, scientists and artists (Pickering, 1993, p. 92). Saint-Simon was a mentor of the founder of philosophical positivism Auguste Comte, who worked as his secretary for several years. Comte shared many of Saint-Simon's ideas; he adopted the Baconian conception that scientific principles must be grounded in observation and empirical data. Equally important, from René Descartes Comte learnt the value of rationalism; the scientist must progress from principles to facts and the unity of method leads to the unity of sciences (Pickering, 1993; 2009a; 2009b). Comte thought that his classification of sciences, which took into account the order in which sciences had developed in history, would bring together different kinds of knowledge and unite them into a coherent framework. He aimed to show the historical progression of sciences, and he proposed a theory of three stages: theological, metaphysical and positive, according to which human society advances towards truth and knowledge. Comte was an admirer of Giambattista Vico, but he claimed that he read Vico's *New Science* and his theory of sociocultural development of humankind only after he had written his *The Course of Positive Philosophy* (Pickering, 2009a, p. 297). Comte was a defendant of common sense, noting that common-sense knowing was in accord with his own theoretical system. In arguing that traditional religion should be transformed into humanistic religion based on morality, he focused on *la morale* as the source from which the unity of society should be established. *La morale* was the final science in Comte's system of classification; it was based on biology and sociology. This led Gordon Allport to suggest in his review of the history of social psychology (1954/1968, p. 7) that '[i]f it were possible to designate a single deliberate "founder" of social psychology as a science, we should have to nominate Comte for this honor'. Auguste Comte profoundly influenced the development of social sciences, although Pickering (2009b) notes that many individuals, due to Comte's controversial ideas, were reluctant to admit his influence. Some scholars were attracted by specific aspects of his theory without accepting wholesale his philosophy and ideas about morality, religion and politics. For example, Karl Marx, like Comte, aimed to develop a scientifically based social science, but he did not accept other features of Comte's theories, such as the

evolutionary perspective of sciences and the reform of religion. Another example is Emile Durkheim (1895/1982), who explicitly accepted Comte's positivism in relation to the study of social facts. Durkheim notes in the first preface to his *The Rules of Sociological Method* that his own positivism is a consequence of scientific rationalism, but that 'it must not be confused with the positive metaphysics of Comte and Spencer' (Durkheim, 1895/1982, p. 33). However, except for John Stuart Mill, hardly anybody followed Comte's sympathetic perspective of common sense. Social scientists like Marx or Durkheim followed the route that privileged the 'superior' knowledge of science.

3.2 Rupture or continuum?

Towards the end of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth century, European philosophy of science was torn between two contradictory movements. One stemmed from the ideas ensuing from Kantian questions around the limits of knowledge and judgement and from the vitalistic features of *Naturphilosophie*. The other movement was based on mechanistic views about Nature and narrow positivism in science. Disputes between vitalistic and mechanistic conceptions inspired the emergence of new movements. In particular, critique of positivism and technicisation inspired holism, pragmatism and phenomenology. These movements also brought to attention the question of differences and relations between science and common sense. Defendants and critiques of common sense expressed their views in two main ways. One treated common sense in terms of a complete epistemological rupture from science, while the other regarded common sense and science to be on an epistemological continuum.

3.2.1 Epistemological rupture between common sense and science

The perspective that made a total epistemological split between common sense and science was particularly significant in the French philosophical and sociological tradition, from Durkheim up to the structuralists after the Second World War (on these issues see, e.g. Broady, 1997; Fruteau De Laclos, 2009; Keucheyan, 2003). This tradition claimed that common sense systematically produced false claims about social reality.

According to Durkheim, common sense and collective representations have nothing to share. Durkheim thought that, just like science, collective representations are products of rational thought. This, however, cannot be said about common sense and common experience, which are based on sheer empiricism. While Durkheim viewed collective representations and social reality as being in a transparent and direct relation, empiricism of common

experience intervened between humans and things and so concealed reality (Durkheim, 1895/1982, p. 61). Collective representations of course may be theoretically false, but they are construed rationally and therefore they have nothing to do with common sense which is no more than empiricism. The growth of rationality throughout its historical development is for Durkheim the guiding principle. As he explains elsewhere, 'we can cope satisfactorily with the things of the tangible world' by evolving representations; for example, 'the wind as a breath, the sun as a flat disc' and so on. Durkheim does not consider such images as common sense but as primitive representations. They are sufficient 'truths' in everyday life, but the scientist 'divests himself of this so-called truth and replaces these false but useful notions with others' (Durkheim, 1979, p. 89). Collective representations constitute reality as it exists for humankind at the time, and science gradually tears the veil and accounts for things as they really are – or at least accounts for them more adequately. As Jones (2000, p. 39) clarifies: for Durkheim, 'the significance of representation is the obverse of the common-sense meaning, and concerns the relationship between knowledge and its objects'. Representations do not double social reality; they simply are that reality. Durkheim shows that in the socio-historical process, the less adequate representations turn into more scientific ones and become interiorised by lay persons. But interestingly, while less adequate social representations, in the socio-historical process, turn into more scientific ones, this has nothing to do with common sense which is an 'inferior' and vulgar kind of thinking based on arbitrary and irrational images.

Keucheyan (2003) suggests that Durkheim's position with respect to common sense influenced Gaston Bachelard (1993) who argued that true knowledge of the social world could not be obtained through common sense because of an 'epistemological rupture', which totally separates these two kinds of thinking and knowing. In developing his conception of the 'epistemological rupture' Bachelard contradicted Comte's idea of the evolutionary stages of human knowledge. Bachelard formulated a perspective claiming that traditional forms of thought and common sense are obstacles to scientific progress and that, therefore, any scholarly argument must make a total break between these two forms of thought. Bachelard was critical of Bergsonian and Meyersonian (see Section 3.2.2.1) approaches based on the continuity between common sense and scientific knowledge. In his chapters on common sense and scientific knowledge, Bachelard (1949, pp. 102–118; 1963, pp. 205–224) presented numerous examples from physics and chemistry, vehemently arguing for a fundamental epistemological break between these two kinds of knowledge. Later on Thomas Kuhn (1962), in developing his conception of paradigm shifts in science, used Bachelard's concept of epistemological rupture, as well as Alexandre Koyré's ideas on scientific revolutions.

The French structuralist anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss took a different tack. Rather than separating 'superior' scientific and 'inferior' non-scientific thinking, he referred to 'two distinct modes of scientific thought' (Lévi-Strauss, 1962/1966, p. 15) and he argued that they are based on different strategies. One strategy, which Lévi-Strauss calls 'tinkering' (*bricolage*), refers to myth and rites. Mythical thought is a kind of intellectual *bricolage*. The *bricoleur* can adapt to a number of different tasks, can make connections among them and so he/she can achieve brilliant results. The other strategy is that of an engineer or scientist who works using concepts as guiding scientific principles in developing tools and working with materials. In *La pensée sauvage* Lévi-Strauss (1962/1966) elaborates much more on the work of the *bricoleur* than on that of the engineer, arguing that *bricolage* is orientated towards the natural world and is guided by logic – as if to show that *bricolage* is not an 'inferior' kind of scientific thought. However, when it comes to scientific anthropology, both strategies, that is, *bricolage* and engineering, are studied by the strictly scientific approach of structuralism. Morris (1987, p. 279) claims that Lévi-Strauss attempted to avoid a sharp dichotomy between science and 'untamed' thinking for a number of reasons. He did not wish to imply that preliterate people were illogical; following Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss thought that both religion and science are concerned with intellectual understanding and that there are fundamental similarities between science and magico-religious thinking. Lévi-Strauss also acknowledged the richness of different forms of thinking in daily life. He claimed that myths operate in the human mind without awareness (Lévi-Strauss, 1970, p. 12) both in the general public as well as in the great myth-makers in natural and social science. However, according to him, rational transparency cannot be achieved in any society, whether real or imagined (Lévi-Strauss, 2009, p. 35). Societies have their pasts, habits and customs, and these are formed by irrational means.

Influenced by Durkheim's and Bachelard's epistemological rupture between science and common sense, and by Lévi-Strauss's structuralism, Pierre Bourdieu, too, distanced himself from common sense over a large part of his career. He thought that in social science, just like in natural science, it is fundamental to distinguish between what is true and what is false and to that extent, he viewed common sense as an obstacle to true social science. Social science must be based on objective and quantitatively based scientific methodology (Bourdieu et al., 1973/1991). According to Bourdieu, practical 'spontaneous consciousness' of ordinary citizens lacks reflection, and therefore, it is no more than what Marx called 'a false consciousness' (see Hamel, 1997). Towards the end of his career Bourdieu softened his view on common sense; he no longer referred to it as a false consciousness, but as a routine knowledge directly related to social practice (Bourdieu, 1993/1999; Hamel, 1997).

3.2.2 *From common sense to science*

The alternative position views common sense and science on a continuum or as kinds of knowledge that should be harmonised with one another. Here again, there are several perspectives concerning this question, among which pragmatism and phenomenology are particularly significant.

3.2.2.1 Pragmatism and beyond Pragmatism as a philosophical movement was established in the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century. Its emergence was influenced by Francis Bacon and the Scottish Common Sense philosophy, which entered pragmatism directly through Thomas Reid and John Stuart Mill. In addition, pragmatism was also inspired by the German romantic *Naturphilosophie* and by philosophers like Hume, Kant, and Hegel. Pragmatism was not a unified philosophy. Its different trends were concerned with questions such as how to make ideas understandable, how to make them practically relevant, how to distinguish between clear and obscure concepts and how to resolve metaphysical disputes arising from these questions. Examples of metaphysical disputes, such as whether the world is one or whether there are many worlds, whether something is material or spiritual, whether there is free will or determinism, were brought to the fore by William James (1907). Each of these disputed ideas could be good or bad for the world and, James says, such disagreements were never ending. He suggested that such problems can be settled by 'the pragmatic method', which interprets each notion by following the possible practical consequences that it might have. In his lecture on 'What pragmatism means' James asks whether it makes any difference if one uses one notion rather than an other: 'If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right' (James, 1907, p. 18).

It was because of their concern with practical problems that the main representatives of pragmatism, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, were all sympathetic to common-sense thinking, although quite often they also expressed their suspicion of common sense.

William James was well acquainted with the Scottish School of Common Sense and common sense was one of the central concepts in his oeuvre. However, while he adopted the general laws of the Scottish School, he reinterpreted common sense in his own way. His reinterpretation of common sense was informed by scientific knowledge that had not been available to the Scottish School, like the Darwinian and post-Darwinian ideas (e.g. Gregor Mendel, Ernst Haeckel) of evolution. Importantly, for William James, common sense was only one kind of thinking among others, like science and critical philosophy (James, 1907, pp. 72–73). This tripartite vision of thinking recalls

that of Spinoza's and Hegel's classification of thought mentioned in the latter part of Chapter 2 (see pp. 58–59). However, in contrast to these philosophers, James did not view common sense as 'inferior' to other kinds of thinking because, he argued, it is impossible to conclude that one kind of thinking is truer than the other. They are all natural kinds of thinking and they are better or worse for different purposes. All these kinds of thinking, while true for specific purposes, may also conflict with one another in some ways; all theories arising from them are instrumental: they are mental adaptations to reality. Yet although all forms of thinking are fundamental to different spheres of life, James nevertheless remained suspicious of common-sense explanations. He suggested that categories of common sense, despite their universal penetration into language and daily life, might be no more than extraordinarily successful hypotheses. They might have been discovered by single individuals, universally adopted and transmitted from generation to generation, simply because they had proved useful in daily practices and therefore they lasted forever (James, 1907, p. 74).

Charles Sanders Peirce, who coined the term 'pragmaticism', proposed that common sense, which results from the experience of mankind transmitted in and through traditions, is much more trustworthy than abstract rationalistic reasoning (Peirce, 1931–1958, 4.540). Peirce maintained that although pragmaticism was not a philosophy, it was consistent with the English philosophy, and more specifically with the Scottish Common Sense School (Peirce, 8.207). He posited 'old Scotch philosophers' against German logicians. In particular, Peirce emphasised Reid's principles of common sense as 'the instinctive result of human experience' which weighted more than scientific results (Peirce, 5.523). Critical of the Cartesian method and intuition, Peirce rejected the term 'intuition' as rationalistic and he argued, instead, that knowledge is constructed on the basis of instinct (see e.g. Jones, 1976). Common sense is the safest guide in life (Peirce, 4.658) and it implies faith in instinct and imagination. It is based on ordinary life experience and therefore, it is a reservoir of practical truth. Good judgement of common sense is transmitted from father to son, which ensures its growth, improvement and modification. The authority of common sense is 'so weighty that special experience can hardly attain sufficient strength to overthrow it' (Peirce, 6.574). Peirce appealed to common sense throughout his whole career, defending, doubting and questioning its merits. In the last decade of his life he defined his position as 'critical commonsensism'. He outlined six 'distinctive characters' of this position, indicating his agreements and disagreements with the Scottish Common Sense philosophers, and providing support to everyday realism of objects of perception (Peirce, 5.439–5.452).

Throughout his career, John Dewey was preoccupied with the relation between science and common sense, and in particular with the question of how to integrate these two kinds of activities. This problem surfaced at various

stages of his work, ranging from *The Quest for Certainty, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (Dewey, 1929) to one of his last pieces 'Common sense and science: their respective frames of reference' (Dewey, 1948). For Dewey, both science and common sense are transactions: they both must be conceived as interactions between human agents and their environment. Knowledge, whether common sense or scientific, is not a system of facts but an expression of this interaction between organism and environment. Dewey viewed common sense as a valid area of knowledge providing guidance in everyday life. Common sense enables the grasp of reality, and tests the validity of philosophical and scientific approaches. Dewey's problem was to find a method that would integrate knowledge of common-sense objects and scientific objects, and scientific judgements and value judgements (Kennedy, 1954, p. 315). However, while acknowledging the value and necessity of common sense, Dewey also argued that because of the inadequacies of common sense, humans favoured scientific knowledge and its development.

Having been influenced by pragmatist scholars, the English philosopher Alfred North Whitehead continued their tradition of insisting that philosophy should be relevant to practical purposes, and that science is rooted in common sense. Whitehead conceived nature as holistic, this position being reminiscent of the German romantic *Naturphilosophie* of the nineteenth century. He insisted (Whitehead, 1919, p. vii) that he was concerned only with nature as an object of perceptual knowledge and not conjectures about the knower and the known. Thus he wished to separate his natural philosophy from metaphysical speculations.

Whitehead called his approach 'a process philosophy', and this was best expressed in his *Process and Reality* (Whitehead, 1929/1979), which placed emphasis on the process of change and on becoming. Science arises from the refinement, corrections and adaptations of common sense. In discussing ways in which different fields of inquiry searched for conciliation with one another, he referred to the constant interaction between specialism and common sense (e.g. Whitehead, 1929/1979, p. 17). By the welding of imagination and common sense, philosophy can play a part in specialist sciences. In this way philosophy could contribute to the systematisation of civilised thought and delve into the infinite possibilities offered by nature.

The French philosopher Emile Meyerson, too, held the view that science is a prolongation of common sense. Processes of common sense arise from sensations, and they form an ontological basis for science (Meyerson, 1908/1930, p. 354; 1931, p. 84). The difference between science and common sense is that concepts of common sense are produced unconsciously. Otherwise, the processes of common sense are analogous to scientific processes and common sense is an integral part of science. The more quickly common sense modifies, the more quickly science develops (Meyerson, 1931, p. 162). Fruteau De

Laclos (2011, pp. 9–11) maintains that Meyerson was indifferent to 'truth' and 'falsity' and that, therefore, his approach based on continuity between common sense and scientific knowledge did not fit within the French definition of epistemology. As already noted, French epistemology was largely based on the 'epistemological rupture' between common sense and science.

3.2.2.2 Phenomenology Phenomenology has probably developed the most influential attempt to harmonise common sense and science. Phenomenology was founded by Edmund Husserl, although he was not the first one to use the term 'phenomenology'. After all, one of Hegel's (1807/1977) most important books was called the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, but despite some overlap (see Chapter 4), Husserl gave phenomenology a new meaning. His perspective had an immediate impact on a number of scholars. It became an important philosophical and psychological movement after the Second World War, in particular in France, Germany and in the United States (Spiegelberg, 1971).

Phenomenology is a philosophical and psychological movement which is concerned with structures of consciousness. Human consciousness is intentional: it is directed towards objects, or one can say that consciousness is always the consciousness of something, whether of objects, persons or the life-world. Most phenomenologists, though not all, describe the subjective experience of phenomena (or objects) from the point of view of the first person. The approach of phenomenology is holistic. It attempts to capture life-world as it appears to each human individual in and through different structures of consciousness or contents of experience. In his chapter on Husserl's common sense Barry Smith (1995) guides us through the complexities of Husserl's thought and his terminology. Smith takes as the point of departure Husserl's concept of the structures of perceptual experience of the life-world as presented in his earlier work. This is important in the context of the present book. Husserl's idea of the primacy of perception was taken over by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Serge Moscovici, while influenced by phenomenology in his own work, substituted the idea of the primacy of perception by the primacy of social representations (Moscovici and Marková, 2000). However, although Husserl placed emphasis on perceptual experience of the world in which we live, his ideas concerning the structures of consciousness or contents of experience included other mental capacities like imagination, judgement, desire, emotion volition, action, awareness of the self etc., as well as practical and social activities (Smith, 1995).

Husserl rarely used the notion of common sense. Instead, he spoke about 'life-world', 'common surrounding world' and 'natural attitude' (Smith, 1995, p. 395), which all involved experience of our subjective world (Husserl, 1913/1962). It is the world which individuals perceive, which appears to them directly as a world of objects they use, the space in which they live, in which they form relations with others and in which they work. Apart from being the

world of objects, common sense is also the world of people's relations as they take place in a community; therefore, it forms the basis of institutions (Smith, 1995). As it is passed down from generation to generation, common sense is remarkably stable.

So how does Husserl view the transition from common sense to science? Above all, he considers common sense to be holistic and all the capacities of the mind like perception, judgement, thought, etc. as well as actions, to be interdependent. The ways, in which common sense transforms into scientific thinking, depend on the kind of activities in which the individual is involved, for example, whether in building bridges, cooking or doing something else (Smith, 1995, p. 417). Following from this, the capacities of the mind that are directed towards objects are intertwined with these objects in relational networks; as features of these capacities change during the individual's activities, so features of objects that are part of these dynamic networks change too. This relational perspective based on the individual's orientation towards the object of which the individual is conscious is underlain by intentionality (Husserl, 1936/1970, p. 85). The nature of the individual's intentionality is such that the perception of objects is both as 'having-something-itself *[Selbsthaben]* and at the same time having-something-in-advance *[Vor-haben]*, meaning-something-in-advance *[Vor-meinen]'* (Husserl, 1936/1970, p. 51). This indicates that perception is not only orientated towards the present but also towards the future. Common sense objects manifest regularities: they behave typically and are predictable. However, Husserl adds to this that predictions of the life-world or common sense are arbitrary, or 'artless'. This is what distinguishes common sense from science where predictions are methodical. According to Husserl (1936/1970, p. 51), everything in human life rests on prediction or, as he puts it, on induction. Science emerged from pre-scientific everyday sense-experience in the mathematisation of nature in Galilean physics. In and through methodical objectification of pre-given intuitions, physics arrived at general laws of nature and mathematical formulae (Husserl, 1936/1970, pp. 37–43). Scientific prediction, Husserl notes, 'infinitely surpasses the accomplishment of everyday prediction' (Husserl, 1936/1970, p. 51).

In contrast to common sense, the world of science continuously changes and develops. Barry Smith (1995, pp. 418–419) explains the difference between the world of physicalistic objects of science and the world of common sense by presenting their contrasts: physicalistic things are ruled by causality while common sense, in addition to causality, is intentional and motivated; the world of physicalistic things, in contrast to the world of common sense, is not concerned with values, beauty, usefulness, the Church, the State and with anything that is practical. Sciences built up their theories logically from a few foundational concepts and axioms (Smith, 1995, p. 418) which unambiguously determine the whole domain of research. Common-sense knowledge uses

a large number of vague rather than exact concepts. They are concepts of the here-and-now, which humans apprehend by sensory intuition. These concepts are related to one another as holistically dependent networks, rather than as systematically and hierarchically arranged systems. They cannot be fully explored or grasped by laws or axioms.

The causality of nature as conceived by the natural sciences goes hand in hand with the exact prediction. In contrast to this, common-sense causality cannot be determined and therefore exact predictions are not applicable. Physicalistic sciences are deprived of intuitive and affective richness; physical objects have no individuality. In contrast, human sciences are dependent 'on the world of common sense – on acts and on the "normal" surrounding world of persons, objects for use, etc.' (Smith, 1995, p. 426).

Husserl's ideas on common sense and science were taken up in phenomenological sociology, in particular by Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann. For Schütz (1953) and for Luckmann (1987), all knowledge is constructed, whether scientific or common sense; there are no simple facts in social reality, but humans interpret (construct, represent) all phenomena they experience. According to Schütz's perspective, all scientific constructs supersede common-sense constructs, whether in natural or in social sciences (Schütz, 1953, p. 3). However, the character of constructs in these two domains is different. Schütz argues that while constructs in natural sciences are chosen by the researcher on the basis of their relevance, constructs in social sciences are already pre-interpreted by the common sense of humans who live in their social reality. In contrasting science with common sense, Luckmann (1987), like Husserl, refers to science as specialist knowledge while common sense pertains to general knowledge of everyday life. In posing the question about the functions of common sense and specialised knowledge Luckmann (1987, pp. 193–194) maintains that common-sense knowledge must cope with all subjectively relevant daily situations and must orientate the individual towards the management of all problems of daily life. In contrast, specialised knowledge constructs abstract realities and neglects the subjective aspects of the individual's life.

3.3 Common sense in social psychology

Just like in philosophy and social sciences, so in social psychology, there have been defendants and adversaries of common-sense thinking. Interest in common sense became apparent in psychology during the 1970s and 1980s. Van Holthoon and Olson (1987, p. 11) commented that psychology and social psychology had inherited from the Enlightenment the perspective that 'common sense is vulgar or primitive and that the function of education was to eradicate or at least improve common sense'. However, the authors believed that developments in psychology during the 1980s started to view common

sense more positively, giving it a more central role. Unfortunately, the authors' optimism was not upheld. Disputes about common sense soon reappeared and have persisted ever since. Just as in philosophy and social science, different positions on epistemological rupture and continuity between common sense and science dominate the disputes. Radu Bogdan (1991), in his edited volume on *Mind and Common Sense*, selected essays of authors who are sympathetic or opposed to common sense as well as of those who take a more or less neutral position but who suggest, nevertheless, that common sense should be studied empirically. All of the researchers pose questions, such as whether common sense is a body of analytic knowledge, or a strategy, a practice or a theory.

Due to the heterogeneous nature of social psychology, disputes about science and common sense take different forms. On the one hand, since the subject matter of social psychology is the study and understanding of mental processes and behaviour of humans, a focus on common sense is unavoidable, because it forms a considerable part of thoughts, activities and communication in daily life. On the other hand, social psychology, since its origin, has aspired to achieve a scientific status. Therefore, the study of common-sense thinking and behaviour has been causing uneasiness, since focusing on common sense does not make the discipline 'scientific'. True, common sense can be 'scientified' (see Section 3.3.1) but – does this improve the image of our discipline? There is a dilemma: If a discipline aims to be a science, and if subjects of that discipline are humans whose thinking and actions are embedded in common sense, what role could – or should – common sense play in that discipline?

3.3.1 The 'scientified' common sense

We have noted that phenomenological sociology starts from common sense in order to construct scientific concepts (Luckmann, 1987). Social psychology, likewise, applies common-sense thinking and acting as a point of departure for building scientific concepts. For example, in order to develop his scientific constructs, Kurt Lewin used common-sense concepts like 'field', 'atmosphere' or 'force' in his studies of the field, action research and group dynamics (Lewin, 1939/1951). He argued that in order to construct a scientific concept of the 'field', one needs to use a combination of common-sense concepts, as well as precisely defined equations (Lewin, 1943).

Fritz Heider's (1958) common-sense theory of social perception and interpersonal relations claims that people do not formulate explicitly their naïve ideas about mechanical laws of physics but use them in life in handling objects and dealing with daily situations. Likewise, they do not explicitly verbalise their naïve ideas about interpersonal interactions and relations but use them to guide their activities and expectations of others' behaviours. Heider noted that psychologists use common-sense thinking without analysing it and making it

explicit. He thought that it was paradoxical that the natural, intuitive and common-sense capacity of humans to grasp social relations had not been studied in any scientific manner. He argued that the study of common-sense psychology is valuable for the scientific understanding of social perception in two ways. First, common-sense psychology guides our behaviour towards other people and predicts their future activities with respect to our selves. Therefore, common-sense psychology needs to be taken seriously, whether or not our beliefs will prove to be correct. It is our beliefs that explain our actions and expectations. Second, Heider commented on the mistrust of many psychologists towards ordinary behaviours and unreflected upon responses, and on their suspicion of the chaotic and distorted perspectives of 'non-science'. In contrast to the mistrust of his colleagues, Heider defended the perspective that scientific psychology has to learn a lot from common-sense psychology and should not ignore it. Just as common sense contains wrong ideas, it also carries many truths and therefore, it is of value to scientific psychology. He notes that if one looks at the history of science, one also finds many wrong ideas, contradictions and errors which, in time, become corrected. In other words, common sense will lead social psychologists to science.

Jan Smedslund's work on the structure of common sense represents another attempt to revive common sense in psychology (Smedslund, 1997). Smedslund follows Heider's ideas on common sense, but he develops them into an original conception, which he calls 'the psychologic'. The aim of the psychologic is to construct a conceptual framework for scientific psychology. This framework uses folk psychology as a point of departure. Smedslund (1999a) argues that the empiricist tradition in psychology views common sense in terms of predictions and explanations given by lay persons, and in testing and comparing them with those used in scientific theories. This procedure distances itself from common sense, because it views it merely as a prescientific point of departure for academic and professional psychology. Smedslund proposes, instead, that common-sense psychology is based on consensually self-evident propositions, that is, on propositions that everybody takes for granted and everybody believes that others take them for granted. These self-evident propositions are characterised by semantic constraints that exist in all languages. Smedslund (1999a, p. 4) explains that 'the psychologic' is concerned with the understanding of the implicit calculus that is built into ordinary language (Smedslund, 1999b), enabling language users to predict and understand actions of each other.

Smedslund's conception of 'the psychologic' inspired comments and critiques from the empiricists as well as from adversaries of empiricism. Not surprisingly, the former reject Smedslund's project arguing that scientific psychology does not need to study folk narratives. Fletcher and Copeland (1999, p. 25) emphasise the 'primacy of science and scientific method' over

untutored common sense or folk psychology. What particularly perplexes experimentalists is Smedslund's emphasis on natural language as a guarantee of what can be regarded as reality. Zimmer and Engelkamp (1999) argue that although, among other things, language is a tool of communication of subjective experiences, and although logical analysis of concepts is helpful in the analysis of psychological phenomena, nevertheless, it is the empirical methods that are fundamental for psychological discoveries.

The anti-empiricists, while praising Smedslund's originality, are nonetheless critical of his formalistic framework, which, as Shotter (1999) argues, forces us to live in our maps rather than in our cities. Valsiner (1999), while critical of Smedslund's axiomatic focus on 'the psychologic' because it neglects a historical and developmental perspective, shares with him the critique of pseudo-empiricism in psychology. Harré (1999, p. 38) appreciates Smedslund's earlier work on semantics, but is critical of the formalistic treatment of meanings in ordinary language.

Attempts to 'scientify' common sense have brought once again into focus the issues from the past: on the one hand, these attempts have invigorated arguments of those who are convinced that psychological science should be concerned with impersonal causes and objective processes. On the other hand, they have also revived questions about common sense in scientific psychology.

3.3.2 Testing common sense

In contrast to Kurt Lewin, Fritz Heider and Jan Smedslund, for whom common-sense thinking serves as a basis for developing scientific constructs, some researchers continue to explore the existence of common sense empirically. For example, in contemporary social psychology, there are a number of studies investigating the common sense hypothesis that people evaluate their own group higher than they evaluate other groups. Yet one might ask whether and why this particular 'hypothesis' requires 'testing'. The eminent anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1942, pp. 98–99), who wrote about the prehistory of racism noted, 'The formula "I belong to the Elect" has a far longer history than has modern racism. These are fighting words among the simplest naked savages. Among them this formula is an integral part of their whole life-experience, which is, from our point of view incredibly limited.' And she continued saying that those not belonging to the members' own group could be chased like animals: 'they were not people with whom my own tribe had common cause' (Benedict, 1942, p. 99). Benedict of course is not the only anthropologist who drew attention to what has become a common-sense assumption in the history of mankind, namely that my clan, my family, or my group, is superior to other clans, families or groups. Studies of the history of trust (e.g. Seligman, 1997) point to the same issues. Analysing historical antecedents of trust, Seligman

shows that in pre-modern societies, clan membership was essential for the preservation of solidarity, while strangers were mistrusted. If experimental social psychologists were aware of anthropology and history, they would realise that testing this hypothesis in the laboratory is a futile exercise given what is already known about group relations.

The fact that today so many social psychologists test common sense suggests that common sense has attained some importance. Making common-sense predictions, proposing hypotheses about common sense and using new terminology will supposedly provide social psychology with a scientific cloak. For example, the 'contact hypothesis' states that prejudice against 'out-groups' can be reduced by increased social contact among members of groups and so it can diminish 'dehumanisation' or 'infra-humanisation'. Grim et al. (2004, p. 244) comment that the 'hypothesis is simple and accords with common sense; it is understandable that it underlies a number of social policies, its most famous association being the desegregation of U.S. public schools.' These authors further observe that social psychological support for the contact hypothesis comes from laboratories, surveys and field studies. A variety of research findings attempt to explain this common-sense hypothesis, its ethical implications and mechanisms including neural processing underlying face recognition of own and other race groups (Phelps and Thomas, 2003). Interestingly, these studies, while acknowledging that common-sense thinking guides everybody's life conduct, nevertheless, follow the trend of translating common sense into scientific knowledge by using 'scientific methods'. They presuppose that while common sense is an arbitrary form of thinking, the researcher, using 'scientific procedures', may turn it into a systematic and scientific form of thinking.

Perhaps one of the clearest expositions of the anti common-sense perspective is the account of one of the leading social psychologists in the United States, John Cacioppo (2004). He starts from the claim that the theory in personality and social psychology is based on the systematic data collection and repeatability of results and indeed that this 'distinguishes scientific theory from pseudoscience and religion'. A strong empirical basis and testing unique predictions characterise 'the towering theories in the field' (Cacioppo, 2004, p. 114). From this position Cacioppo arrives at the claim that common sense, which lacks in systematic analysis and confirmatory reasoning, cannot form the foundation of a scientific theory about everyday life. And moreover, what is valued is 'a theory that makes nonobvious predictions, that illuminates flaws in social reasoning and interactions, that illustrates *not only the inadequacy but the idiocy of common sense*' (Cacioppo, 2004, p. 116, my emphasis).

Cacioppo and other experimentalists treat common sense as a theory of social behaviour. And as a theory of social behaviour, Cacioppo (2004) argues that common sense is inadequate. Specifically, he states that common-sense beliefs 'might serve as data, to be evaluated based on variations across

theoretically specified conditions, but are not theoretical statements about underlying mechanisms' (Cacioppo, 2004, p. 116). But this is a category mistake. Common sense is not a theory of social behaviour, whether adequate or inadequate. Common sense is a way of talking, thinking and acting by means of which humans express their social and dialogical nature. It is an implicit way in and through which humans make sense, create sense and understand social phenomena that form the social reality in which they live. Of course, the researcher may inquire about the epistemological nature of common sense – which is a totally different enterprise than treating it as an empirical subject to be tested.

3.4 Common sense in the theory of social representations

The theory of social representations that Serge Moscovici originally developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s in *La psychanalyse: son image et son public* (1961) is probably the only social psychological theory that is explicitly based on the epistemology of common sense and other forms of 'natural thinking', communicating, knowing and acting. Having had personal experience of racism and discrimination, as well as of social and political problems in Romania, Moscovici thought that social psychology was a discipline that had the potential to find solutions to those big political, economic and industrial problems and to contribute to making desirable changes in society. This belief was already apparent in his early publications. In the Preface to the 1st edition of his book *La psychanalyse: son image et son public* (1961) Moscovici explicitly argued that social psychology occupies a unique position among the social sciences, and specifically, between sociology and social anthropology. In order to illustrate this point, he discussed the problem of social knowledge, which reflects the strategic position of our discipline. He referred in this context to the visions of social psychology as expressed by two very different social scientists: the French sociologist Emile Durkheim and the Russian Marxist and a political philosopher Georgi Plekhanov. Despite their tremendous political and philosophical differences, these two scholars had something in common: both were concerned with the study of social knowledge. While Durkheim examined social knowledge in the realm of sociology, Plekhanov drew attention to possible contributions of social psychology to the field of political knowledge. From their different positions, Durkheim's anti-Marxist and Plekhanov's Marxist, they thought that the strategic position of social psychology was given by its potential to act in response to contemporary political, historical and social phenomena.

Social psychology, therefore, should not be concerned with armchair problems. Early in his career, Moscovici (1970) viewed social psychology as a discipline in movement. He was far away from conceiving social psychology

as a structured science with plans, genealogy and selected authors who gave the discipline precise directions. He thought that it would be a mistake to see social psychology as a specialty that was trying to reduce uncertainties and insecurities within its field. He was convinced that social psychology had its specificity and autonomy as a social area of interest. It was doubly orientated with respect to several kinds of dyadic micro-social and macro-social relations in tension (Faucheux and Moscovici, 1962) such as individuals and groups, personality and culture, psychology and sociology, among others. As a hybrid discipline in continuous movement, social psychology has to cope with tensions produced by these dyadic relations. Indeed, the study of these tensions constitutes the challenge and specificity of social psychology. Moscovici pursued these tensions during his career attempting to build social psychology as an international social science through UNESCO (Moscovici and Marková, 2006), in his theoretical and empirical work, and in particular in the theories of social representations and of minority innovations. The study of these tensions also dominated his work in the ecological movement and in the history and philosophy of science.

3.4.1 Common sense in psychoanalysis

Serge Moscovici (1961) created the theory of social representations in his classic book on *La psychanalyse: son image et son public*. Here he explored ways by which ideas of psychoanalysis as a professional treatment of mental problems diffused into everyday conversation and understanding of lay people and into ideologies like religion and politics. These ideas also infiltrated the mass media reports in diffusing them to the public, they transformed meanings of psychoanalysis into new ones. Originally, Moscovici intended to study lay ideas about the transformation of physics or mathematics into daily discourse, and he even carried out some preliminary research using these disciplines, but it came to nothing. Neither physics nor mathematics were of much interest to the general public and therefore these disciplines were not much discussed outside the scientific and professional contexts. In contrast, in the early 1950s psychoanalysis penetrated into French society, was widely talked about and was highly controversial. It was one of the typical topics of conversations in cafés, and it was argued about in newspapers. Psychoanalysis was debated and criticised both by the Catholic Church and by the Communist Party, which were influential institutions at the time.

Most importantly, Moscovici (2003) was aware that psychoanalysis had considerable affinities with common-sense thinking and that, therefore, lay people had their own views about it. Freud was successful in attracting the general public because he used common-sense and lay notions like 'dreams' and 'myths'; his theory was part of folk psychology and of daily thinking

(Moscovici, 2003). Moscovici observed that lay people were interested in this topic because they perceived similarities between Freud's psychoanalysis and various kinds of their daily experiences. For example, they perceived resemblances between a religious confession and a psychoanalytic interview; or between their attempts to forget unpleasant experiences and the therapist's insight into their problems (Moscovici, 1961; 1976/2008). More generally, in the early 1950s, discourses of the public in France were saturated with images, views and lay knowledge of psychoanalysis and all this made psychoanalysis a highly suitable topic for the study of social representations.

3.4.2 How to rehabilitate common sense: the proletarian and bourgeois science

Although Moscovici was in his youth attracted by Marxism, he opposed the Marxist-Leninist point of view according to which ordinary people cannot think rationally and scientifically. His aim was to rehabilitate common sense (Jovchelovitch, 2008) and other forms of practical daily thinking. He strongly argued against the Marxist-Leninist view that *le peuple ne pense pas* ('people do not think') (Moscovici and Marková, 2000, p. 228). This argument was based on an ideological issue of the time. Psychoanalysis was considered by the Communist Press in France as a 'bourgeois science', and as a symptom of the American cultural invasion (Lecourt, 1977, p. 290). The label 'bourgeois' was part of the Communist ideology that distinguished between 'bourgeois science' and 'proletarian science'. The most important case of this ideological endeavour was the case of the Soviet geneticist Trofim Lysenko who rejected Mendelian genetics and substituted this with an unjustified invention in which he argued that features which plants acquired during their lives could be transmitted to future generations of those same species. This would enable humans to control agriculture and increase crops. Lysenko's 'science' denounced biology as it was generally practised. Another representative of this new science was Olga Lepeshinskaya who, too, rejected genetics and claimed that life can originate from non-cell matter. This issue became a political affair and Lysenko's 'science' obtained a new title, the 'proletarian science'. These terms, the 'bourgeois' and the 'proletarian' sciences were applied not only to genetics and biology but also to various sciences like physics, mathematics, chemistry; psychoanalysis became a bourgeois science. It would be difficult to explain, today, what the distinction between 'proletarian' and 'bourgeois' science meant; indeed, it was difficult to explain it at the time when it was proposed! The distinction was considered by its proponents to be part of a 'class struggle', and it was a Party matter (Lecourt, 1977, p. 24f).

However, there was an inconsistency in these political arguments. On the one hand, it was believed that only a proletariat could rationally evaluate science.

Yet in order to construct the 'proletarian science', reorganise working relations, rationalise, centralise and plan the direction of labour, the proletariat needed guidance from the enlightened Marxist intellectuals! Thus the belief in rationality of the proletariat contradicted with the ideology that the proletariat needed to be guided in their thought. In other words, ordinary people were conceived as both rational and irrational: this led Moscovici to focus on common sense and natural thinking of ordinary people.

The question of the 'proletarian science' was never resolved; in the Soviet bloc it slowly disappeared after the collapse of Stalinism; in France it gradually vanished together with the decline of the dominance of the Communist Party.

3.4.3 Making ethical choices

From his early years shaped by the Second World War, Nazism and Stalinism, Serge Moscovici focused on the study of ethical choices, values and social norms as central to the meaning of humanity. As he reveals in his autobiography *Chronique des années égarées* (Moscovici, 1997), in his early youth he found inspiration in Nietzsche's philosophical thoughts, in Pascal's (1670/1995) *Pensées* and in Spinoza's (1677/1967) *Ethics*. In his autobiography Moscovici scrutinised passions that, throughout the history of mankind, tore apart communities as well as brought them together. Within broad historical and cultural contexts he pondered about ethical values guiding beliefs in justice, the search for progress and the desire of humans for immortality. Bearing on this autobiographical portrayal, there are several sources of ideas concerning ethics, both personal and scientific, but all of them converging together.

When Moscovici became acquainted with Durkheim's writings, he focused on the fact that ethics was omnipresent in all social phenomena, and that it was conceptualised in different manners, whether in sacred, or in profane spheres. While developing his ideas about social representations of psychoanalysis, in contrast to Durkheim, Moscovici viewed ethics as interaction; it was dynamic and it was permeated with ideas about the driving forces of human invention and innovation. He brought into the foreground intellectual polemics concerning values and ethical standards of different modes of thinking, such as scientific, religious and public. Nevertheless, his theory of social representations is not a theory of morality or ethics. Instead, the theory places emphasis on humans as ethical beings, as beings who pursue passions and make ethical choices. Making ethical choices is a fundamental feature of the epistemology of common sense (Chapter 4). It is the capacity that makes our species human beings. Making evaluation and judgements of events and of other people is indispensable in all interactions in daily living. Moscovici pursued ideas of values, ethics and morality in all major areas of his studies like social

representations, innovation of minorities and ecological writings. In *La psychanalyse* we find ethical concerns in relation to all main agents involved in the study, that is, the lay participants, the press, the psychoanalysts, the Church and the Communist Party. This does not mean that the capacity to make ethical choices places emphasis on the goodness of human nature. Humans make ethical choices that they may justify solely on the basis of self-interest and of egocentric judgements.

3.4.4 Common sense in social representations

Analysing forms of 'natural thinking', knowing and acting, in *La psychanalyse*, Moscovici (1961; 1976/2008) included common sense among these forms without specifying the meaning of common sense. He contrasted, at that time, 'natural thinking' with the abstract thought of formal logic, the latter serving as a model of correct or standard thinking in psychology. 'Natural thinking', Moscovici argued, involves pluralities of daily thought in their diverse and even contradictory modes, all coexisting together. Humans use all these forms of 'natural thinking' in order to transform one kind of thought into another, and above all, to transform scientific knowledge into practical daily knowledge.

As Moscovici's views developed over time (Jesuino, 2008; 2012), common-sense thinking became the major component of the theory of social representations. He then distinguished two forms of common-sense knowledge (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983). One form, which he called 'first-hand knowledge', is 'a corpus of knowledge, based on tradition and consensus, spontaneously produced by the members of a group' (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p. 105). This 'first-hand knowledge' gave rise to, and nurtured, the development of science. Common sense as 'first-hand knowledge' comprises images, daily language and metaphors: 'things are named, individuals are classified, spontaneous conjectures are made in the course of action or ordinary communication', accepted by 'everyone' (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p. 103). This 'first-hand knowledge' is 'naïve', pure and innocent – it is not yet corrupted by education, professions or philosophical speculations. This conception of common sense, based on spontaneous knowing of 'everyone', on ordinary language, metaphors and images, recalls the perspective of Vico (Chapter 2). Unlike many French scholars Moscovici promoted the perspective of a continuous development from common sense to science. He viewed science as a distillation and refinement of common sense (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p. 104), finding support for this view in the philosopher of science Pierre Duhem.

But Moscovici also speaks about 'second-hand common-sense knowledge', or 'the new common sense' by which he means a newly built consensus arising from the transformation of scientific knowledge into common sense. This transformation results from contemporary mass communication, the public

understanding of science and the diffusion of science by instruction and through the media. All these modern means of communication contribute to the formation of 'the new common sense'. Science has become a new religion and it continuously feeds into the new common sense. The two kinds of common sense, old and new, fuse together and produce an enriched form of knowledge, which include both unreflected and reflected experiences of reality.

The old and new common sense perpetuate the historical bifurcation between 'superior' and 'inferior' knowledge: 'Several labels have been used to describe it – logic and myth; "domestic" and "savage" thought (Lévi-Strauss, 1962/1966); "logical and pre-logical mentality" (Lévy-Bruhl, 1922/1923); "critical" and "automatic" thought (Moscovici, 1981; 1982) – but the nature of these opposites remains the same' (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p. 102). It was probably due to his preoccupation between 'the standard and the non-standard thinking' that Moscovici discussed common sense primarily in opposition to science. He commented that social psychologists have rarely ever debated 'philosophia plebeia' or took any account of it (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983, p. 102).

3.4.5 The individual and the social

The question of common sense in social representations is fundamentally related to Moscovici's life-long question: What is social psychology (e.g. Moscovici, 1970; 2003)? And even more precisely: what is 'social' in social psychology (Moscovici, 1972/2000)? He thought that in contrast to other social sciences, social psychology has avoided the quest concerning the meaning of 'social'. In political economy and history, Karl Marx made understandable what was 'social' in his theories. 'Social' referred to social classes and Marx defined well their historical role, although he did not pay much attention to what was 'individual'. Antonio Gramsci, following Marx, emphasised social-psychological, cognitive and linguistic features of popular beliefs. Sociologists like Max Weber or Talcott Parsons also made it clear what was 'social' in their theories. Max Weber's theory of social stratification is based on social class, social status and political Party. Talcott Parsons developed a cultural theory of society based on the structure of action. Sigmund Freud, on his part, made it evident what he meant by the 'individual' when he postulated the 'id', 'ego' and 'superego'. He also clarified what was 'social' in therapeutic practices and in his theory of culture. But, Moscovici puzzled, what was 'social' in social psychology? There was no theory about that. Equally, he thought that there was no concept of the 'individual' in social psychology. Moscovici directly addressed the question of the relation between the 'individual' and 'social' in 1972 in his chapter on 'Society and theory in social psychology' (Moscovici, 1972/2000) when he referred to 'taxonomic social psychology'. In taxonomic social psychology, the relations between the 'individual' and 'social' amount to

aggregates rather than to interactions. The studies in taxonomic social psychology categorise individuals, (e.g. males and females, young and old people, Catholics and Protestants), and measure degrees and aspects of their characteristics, for example, prejudice, trust, attitudes, opinions and so on. Who are the individuals in such studies? The individuals are undifferentiated and undefined entities without history, without culture and without face (Moscovici, 1972/2000, pp. 106–109). They are not conceived as persons but as categories, and the purpose of research is to study correlations between categories and the variables attributed to them. 'Social' here means that these variables are to be found in different degrees in any individual who belongs to this or that category. This way of thinking justifies the use of inductive techniques in the study of attitudes, intelligence, motives and other capacities. Elegantly performed experiments and careful statistical analyses ignore that humans live in societies and are differentiated from one another in many ways; they ignore that humans develop and change, experience their cultures and that they communicate. The theory of knowledge, on which such studies are based, does not tell us what it means to be 'individual' or 'social'; 'the individual' is an entity characterised by the number one; 'the social' are entities (e.g. group, society) branded by a number higher than one; those who are supposedly members of a group belong to the 'in-group'. Those who do not belong to it are members of the 'out-group'. However, Moscovici argued that society is not made of individuals. The fact that two to three individuals think together does not make a society.

Moreover, what is meant by interaction in taxonomic social psychology? Statistical techniques explore interaction between categories and variables in order to learn whether there is a statistical relation between them. So conceived statistical interaction is external to categories and variables, because statistical manipulations do not alter the nature either of categories or of variables. The presence of interaction only informs the researcher about the existence or non-existence of statistical relations. For example, the researcher may wish to find out whether there is a statistical interaction between the variable of trust and the category of age. If a statistical interaction is found, researchers can explore relations between further sub-categories (e.g. people younger than twenty years) and other variables (e.g. co-operation), criss- and cross-variate them and build a more complex picture of relations under study. This, again, contributes nothing to the concept of 'individual' or 'social'. Moscovici said to himself: if you do not have a concept of the social, what, then, is social psychology?

In his enduring search to answer what is 'social' and 'individual', Serge Moscovici postulated that one cannot conceptualise the social and individual as two separate entities. Instead, the Self and Other(s) (or the Ego and the Alter) are mutually interdependent in and through communication. The Ego and the

Alter jointly generate their social reality – objects of knowledge, beliefs or images. Here we already have the basis of the triangular interaction the Ego–Alter–Object in the theory of social representations and the theory of innovation of minorities (Moscovici, 1970; 1972/2000). This triangular relationship refers to the ways in which humans make and create sense, and understand social phenomena that form the social reality in which they live. These ways of understanding are culturally bound and transmitted from generation to generation; they are habitual and unreflected, as well as innovative and reflected ways of thinking, speaking and acting. The Ego–Alter–Object became the conceptual means of Moscovici's interactional epistemology[1] based on common sense. The way Moscovici conceptualised the relation between the 'individual' and 'social' forms the basis of his interactional epistemology of common sense which is highly relevant to Part II of this book.

3.5 Conclusion

In his editorial in the journal *Public Understanding of Science*, dedicated to studying relations between science and society, Martin Bauer (2009) refers to three types of attitudes to common sense apparent in the articles published in the journal. To my mind, these types summarise well the issues discussed in this chapter. One type of attitude is in the 'tradition of debunking' common sense. Common sense is viewed as 'the place of superstitions, half-knowledge, complete and utter ignorance, misunderstanding and mumbo-jumbo, and virulent memes that give rise to antiscience' (Bauer, 2009, p. 379). This type seems to correspond to the epistemological rupture between science and common sense. The second kind of attitude attempts to repair deluded or ignorant common sense and makes it the 'target of interventions'. Such contributions highlight public images and attempt to change people's views in order to promote science and new technology, in particular among the young. This type appears to correspond to the idea of continuity between common sense and science and to the perspective of scientification of common sense. Finally, the third kind of attitude views common sense as a resource of knowledge; it is embedded in tradition and culture and it manifests itself in and through social representations enriching and innovating the understanding of social phenomena. This attitude is embodied in the theory of social representations and heterogeneous forms of knowledge (on pluralities of knowledge see

[1] When I refer to Moscovici's epistemology, I call it 'interactional epistemology' because his point of departure was interaction between the Ego–Alter rather than duality of the Ego and the Alter. When I refer to my dialogical approach, I use the term 'dialogical epistemology' (cf. Part II of this book). There is no fundamental difference between Moscovici's and my concepts of the Ego–Alter and the Ego–Alter–Object. In building on these concepts I am further developing their dialogical qualities and suggest their theoretical and practical implications.

Jovchelovitch, 2002; 2007). Rather than being reduced to a narrowly conceived rationality, or concerned with elements of phenomena, with stable relations and statistical interactions, knowledge arising from natural thinking involves forms of knowing based on heuristic thinking, judgements, evaluations, passions, language and communication (Howarth, 2006; Voelklein and Howarth, 2005) and imagination (de Rosa, 2014). These ways of understanding are culturally bound and transmitted from generation to generation; they are habitual and unreflected, as well as innovative and reflected upon ways of thinking, speaking and acting.

Conclusion to Part I

Part I of this book provides abundant examples of two kinds of thinking and knowing that, throughout European history, have been known as logos and mythos, rationality and irrationality, and science and common sense, among many other dichotomic expressions. The former term within these dichotomies refers to a more valued kind of thinking and knowing than the latter term. This evaluation has been associated with the belief that throughout history, humankind progresses from mythos, irrationality and non-scientific thinking to logos, rationality and scientific thinking.

Criteria to distinguish 'superior' and 'inferior' forms of thought. We have seen that efforts to fix criteria between logos and mythos, rationality and irrationality, and science and common sense have not led to general agreements among those interested in this issue. For example, logos, rationality and science have been usually thought to be systematic and conscious, while mythos, irrationality and common sense have been considered to be unsystematic and often unconscious activities. But even the concept of systematicity, apparently separating science and non-science, did not lead to agreement among scholars. The philosopher Hoyningen-Huene (2013, p. ix) explicates and defends the systematicity of science as the demarcation criterion: 'The criterion aims at articulating and explicating the difference between science on the one hand and pseudoscience and metaphysics on the other.' Underscoring the systematicity of science as the central point of his attention, the author compares his position with other alternatives.

But some scientists confess that their work is guided not by a systematic and rational exploration of ideas, but by intuition or instinct and even by illusory dreams. Inconsistencies and incoherencies – or apparent inconsistencies and incoherencies – are frequent features of scientists' thought. Throughout his entire work, the well-known mathematician George Pólya asserts that scientific discoveries are often guided by heuristics or '*ars inveniendi*' (Pólya, 1945, p. 112). Inspired by Descartes, Leibniz and Bolzano, he claims that because the purpose of heuristic reasoning is to discover something, it is not precise and

final, but provisional and plausible; it would be wrong to set rigorous proofs of heuristics. In a chapter on 'Two incidents', Pólya (1984, pp. 165–168) illustrates an occurrence in his creative process by referring to vivid mathematical dreams that he used to have as a young man. Although these dreams were illusory, in one case a proof that he saw in a dream was confirmed to be conclusive. Such mathematical dreams occurred less often as he grew older but when, after a long interruption, he had a mathematical dream, he reproduced notes in the morning to find that the expression he saw in the dream was correct. For him, mathematics has two faces. When it is presented in a finished form, it appears as a purely demonstrative science. In reality, however, the creative work of the mathematician resembles the creative work of the naturalist: observation, analogy, and conjectural generalisations, or mere guesses: 'a mathematical theorem must be guessed before it is proved. The idea of a demonstration must be guessed before the details are carried through' (Pólya, 1984, p. 512).

Albert Einstein, too, comments that the scientist cannot afford to carry out his striving for systematic epistemology too far. While he accepts the importance of epistemological analysis, the facts of experience of external conditions prevent him from fidelity to a single epistemology. Talking about himself, Einstein states that such a scientist

> therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist: he appears as *realist* insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of the acts of perception; as *idealist* insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is empirically given); as *positivist* insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified *only* to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences. He may even appear as *Platonist* or *Pythagorean* insofar as he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his research. (Einstein, 1949, pp. 683–684)

Einstein was convinced that scientific concepts are not extracted by logical abstraction. Concepts are free inventions of the human mind: '[s]cience forces us to create new ideas, new theories. Their aim is to break down the wall of contradictions which frequently blocks the way of scientific progress' (Einstein and Infeld, 1938/1961, p. 264). The growth of science is characterised by paradoxes, by the postulation of new problems and by invention.

Giambattista Vico's common sense. It was the growth of science and technology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that brought explicitly to attention the relationship between science and common sense. Critique of the Cartesian method and of certainty based on the Cogito of the individual led Giambattista Vico to develop a broad epistemological basis of common sense

founded on *verum factum*, ethics, language, imagination, *ingenium*, social knowledge, cultural history, and innovation and creativity. Ignored during his lifetime, Vico's work was rediscovered in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It has become recognised as an essential heritage of human and social sciences and, specifically, as a rich resource of ideas of the concept of the dialogical mind.

Science and common sense. Throughout history and up to the present, the relation between science and common sense takes several forms, for example:

- If science is systematic, neutral and objective, and common sense is unsystematic, based on emotions and imagination, then these different kinds of knowing cannot be harmonised. There is an epistemological rupture between them. Common sense and science have nothing in common: and even more, common sense is 'an idiocy' from which humankind should be diverted. I discussed examples of this attitude in the history of French social science and in contemporary experimental social psychology.
- According to another perspective common sense and science form a continuum: pre-scientific concepts of common sense and of sense-experience transform, in and through the progress in science, into scientific concepts. As science and technology modify one another, so faulty and ignorant common sense becomes 'scientified' or it complements scientific progress in practical interventions. The position of pragmatism, phenomenology and of some social psychological approaches corroborate this attitude.
- The third kind of perspective regards common sense as being embedded in history, tradition and culture. All humans have the capacity to make judgements of self-evident events which refer to certain uniform experiences in life, producing similar experiences. Some of these uniform physical and biological experiences – or common sense experiences – can be associated with the emergence of natural sciences, for example, experience of weather, tide or qualities of materials. Uniformities of social, interactional and dialogical nature are associated with moral and ethical judgements about humans. They have led to common-sense relational concepts such as good/bad, pleasant/unpleasant, trustworthy/fraudulent, among others. The interdependence between the Self–Others in its historical and cultural embededness has become the basis of the theory of social representations. As a theory of social knowledge, the theory of social representations is based on the epistemological unit the Self–Other–Object.

Common sense and other forms of socially shared knowledge. Throughout Part I of this book I referred both to common sense and to socially shared knowledge without making explicit the difference between these concepts. As Thomas Luckman (1987, pp. 181–182) noted, although common sense is the core of general knowledge in all societies, not everything is common sense knowledge. Rather, there are numerous forms of socially shared knowledge, common sense being one of them. In discussing 'inferior' and 'superior' knowledge throughout Part I we have seen that common sense has been usually considered as an *unconscious and unsystematic* form of thinking and knowing and so contrasted with scientific thinking and knowing that has been supposedly *conscious and systematic*. Yet in addition to historically and culturally established *unconscious common sense*, multiple forms of 'natural thinking' and socially shared knowledge too, are both *unconscious and conscious*. Among these could be communicative routines, learned skills, acquired mechanisms, and so on. Likewise, social representations involve both the forms of thinking that are automatised and unconscious routines and the forms of thinking that are conscious and reflexive. These different forms, for example, routinised versus reflexive, and unquestionned common sense versus diverse kinds of socially shared knowledge, are usually in tension in the process of formation and change of social representations. It is important that the future research devotes more attention to this largely neglected issue which clearly has both theoretical and practical implications.

Towards dialogical epistemology of daily life and professional practices. Concerns of human and social sciences with daily thinking and activities of individuals, groups and communities do not fit into formalistic thought, neutral transmission of information and universalistic perspectives. Humans communicate, create and dismantle institutions, evaluate and judge events, as well as their own and Others' conduct. Despite that, some branches of human and social sciences give up the study of thinking, experiences and actions of ordinary life. They believe that cultural and social constructs can be substituted by simple formalistic or biological and neuroanatomical explanations and so provide them with scientific respectability. This phenomenon is not new and similar 'scientific' attempts can be traced to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In his book on the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel (1899/2007) made frequent references to historical events showing that they were repetitions of the earlier epochs or unhistorical replications of the same majestic ruins reviving the past periods of decline. As Hegel insisted, the reappearance of past despotisms

is accompanied by repeated myths related to these despotisms. Mixing science and myth can be tracked down to past political regimes and it can be found in contemporary biological and neuroanatomical explanations of complex social phenomena.

Let us conclude the discussion of 'superior' and 'inferior' thinking by restating that in their daily living, humans draw on common sense and on forms of natural thinking and knowing: they communicate and act. These capacities underlie their sense-making and sense-creating, coping with their experience and inventing new ideas. Let us insist that these are good enough reasons why the study of these capacities should be the central focus of the human and social sciences, including social psychology. These capacities develop, and are maintained in and through dialogical interaction during historical and cultural processes.

Part II

Dialogicality as epistemology of daily life and of professional practices

The dialogical mind is the mind in interaction with others, that is, with individuals, groups, institutions, cultures, and with the past, present and future. This basic claim is not specific to dialogicality as epistemology of daily life but it is the basic presupposition of interactional epistemologies. Here I am using the term 'interactional epistemologies' in opposition to 'non-interactional epistemologies'. This opposition is based on the ways these epistemologies treat the relation between two kinds of entities, that is, the knower (subject) and the known (object of knowledge). This fundamental distinction is important both theoretically and methodologically (Chapter 7).

Non-interactional epistemologies presuppose two kinds of entities, that is, knowers (subjects, individuals) and the external and 'objective' world (objects) that are strictly independent from one another (Marková, 2003a). This presupposition has traditionally, at least since the seventeenth century, concerned the following question: how does the individual knower acquire knowledge of the external world? Over several centuries various attempts have been made to provide answers to the fundamental problem of knowledge, including the doubt of Descartes, Lockean mental representations, Kantian things-in-themselves, and so on. Non-interactional epistemologies assume that the individual acquires knowledge about the external world through unbiased observation and the recording of facts (e.g. Hempel, 1966; Popper, 1979; Musgrave, 1993).

In interactional epistemologies, subjects or entities (e.g. knowers, individuals, elements, organisms) and objects that environ them (e.g. the known, contexts, *Umwelt*, environments) form irreducible ontological, that is, existential, units. This implies that it would be meaningless to pose questions about the former component, for example, the organism, without considering at the same time the latter, for example, its environment: in contrast to non-interactional epistemologies, in interactional epistemologies the two components are interdependent in and through interaction. Other than that, each interactional epistemology has its own specific features.

II.1 Some examples of interactional epistemologies

- Interdependence between organisms and their biological and social realities, both transforming one another in the process of mutual co-development, was already emphasised in German Romanticism and *Naturphilosophie* of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Marková, 1982). These movements considered Nature in holistic terms and they highlighted processes of change; they focused on the interaction between natural phenomena and their environments.
- The idea of the ontological interdependence between organism and environment was already well developed in pragmatism (Chapter 3). John Dewey and George Herbert Mead argued that the environment and living agents form interdependent wholes. Organism and environment determine each other and their existence is mutually dependent on one another; one component of the dyad creates the other and therefore one is suitable for the other. For example, something can be a food for one species while a poison for another. When we come to humans, not only are humans sensitive to their biological environment but they are sensitive to their symbolic environment. Symbolic capacities of the Self and Others co-determine societies and their institutions. Humans create their institutions as common responses to specific problems, and in turn, they challenge institutions when they no longer serve their needs and interests.
- Gestalt psychology, likewise, is interactionist and holistic. Figure-ground patterns could be understood only as a whole and could not be conceived as separate figures and the separate grounds. Albert Einstein acknowledged the epistemological value of Gestalt psychology because, according to him, it was congenial with relativity theory (Miller, 1975, p. 75). The holistic conceptions of quantum physics, relativity theory and Gestalt psychology all rejected the idea that the whole is made from parts added together. Equally, the interactional epistemology of the physicist Niels Bohr (1949; 1955) permeates his studies across several domains. Above all, Bohr's innovative concept of complementarity is not just a scientific concept but it is an epistemology of life (Marková, 2014b; Rosenfeld, 1963/1979, p. 535). Complementarity is applicable to various spheres of life, while conditions for its description differ from one domain to another. Domains such as psychology, biology and anthropology all study complementary relations between the phenomena of their interest under different conditions of observation and description. Since each domain has its specific characteristics, there is no possibility of reducing one domain to another one, for example, one cannot reduce psychology to biology or physiology.
- In his interactional epistemology of evolutionary biology, Jacob von Uexküll proposed the concept of *Umwelt*, that is, of environment (Chang, 2009;

Uexküll, 1934/1957; Valsiner and Lescak, 2009). This concept stipulates that each organism or subject (animal, human) selects stimuli which are significant for its existence in its surroundings (Objects), in order to construct its *Umwelt*. Relations between the subject and object form a functional cycle (Uexküll, 1934/1957, pp. 10–11). The concept of *Umwelt* implies that all animals, ranging from the simplest to the most complex, are uniquely fitted into their exclusive worlds which are specific to them and to nobody else. This principle applies equally to non-human species as well as to humans. Humans, however, live in symbolic and cultural environments (Wagoner, 2010; Zittoun, 2010) and have the capacity to extensively pre-plan and predict their futures (Valsiner and Lescak, 2009, p. 47). Uexküll's theory became very influential in the study of signs, meanings and semiotics.

- Phenomenology (Chapter 3) provides yet another example of interactional and holistic epistemology. It describes the experience of humans in their life-worlds and it attempts to capture relevant objects in and through different structures of consciousness and their contents. Human consciousness is intentional and it directs humans towards objects and persons in the life-world.

This small catalogue of examples of interactional epistemologies shows that interaction as ontology pertains to different domains such as physics, biology, human and social sciences; these domains mutually influence and enrich each other. On the one hand, the principle of the unique relation between the subject and object is shared by all interactional epistemologies, whatever their specificities. On the other hand, each of these interactional epistemologies has its particular features. For example, some of them, such as, Uexküll's *Umwelt*, apply to all biological species including humans. All species are viewed as constructing their semiotic *Umwelten* in the process of evolution. Some interactional epistemologies, such as phenomenology, the Gestalt school or *Umwelt*, prioritise sensation and/or perception over other capacities in the process of construction of their holistic living patterns.

II.2 Dialogical epistemology

Dialogicality as epistemology of daily life and of professional practices is one of the interactional epistemologies; it enables one to study and to develop theories on human thinking, acquisition of forms of social knowledge and of social interactions. The unbreakable existential unit underlying dialogicality comprises the Self and Other(s) (or the Ego–Alter). 'Others' could be other humans or human creations such as institutions, historically and culturally established traditions, morals, customs, and so on. While it could be argued that the Self does not directly communicate with institutions or traditions, the Selves interact with Others, such as parents, groups, who transmit traditions, and with representatives of institutions.

The Self interprets norms and rules, selects specific meanings and attempts to change them. To that extent the Self and the institutionally and traditionally established Others form an interdependent relationship.

Here I come to the crucial point. Part II of this book is concerned with common sense arising in and through dialogical interactions and the interdependence of the Self–Other. Therefore, I am not concerned here with common sense arising in and through physical and biological uniformities (see Chapter 2, pp. 71–72). I consider the Self–Other interdependence as the basic *thema* of common sense (see p. 5). Common sense is a dialogical sense which is historically established in and through the ethical nature of the Self–Other. The ethics of common sense also infuses other forms of socially shared knowledge.

It is from the interdependence of the Self–Other(s) (or the Ego–Alter) that all fundamental features of dialogical epistemology are derived. Some of these features form the very foundations of dialogical epistemology, and I shall refer to them as *axioms*. All *axioms* have their origins in *themata*, that is, in dyadic oppositions rooted in the common sense of dialogical interactions. *Axioms* are presuppositions that define dialogical epistemology; one cannot speak about dialogical epistemology without the acceptance of these *axioms*. Without claiming that they are necessarily exhaustive, I shall discuss the following *dialogical axioms*, all of them derived from the philosophies of dialogism (Chapter 4):

- the Ego–Alter as an irreducible ethical and *ontological* unit
- the Ego–Alter–Object as an irreducible ethical and *epistemological* unit
- the Ego–Alter and the Ego–Alter–Object as being interdependent in terms of dialogical thinking (imagination, multivoicedness or heteroglossia, intersubjectivity, the search for social recognition, trust and responsibility), dialogical communication and dialogical action.

However, in their attempts to solve concrete problems, researchers and professionals do not rely solely on *dialogical axioms*. In the study of concrete problems, more specific concepts are required. For example, a professional may wish to explore the *resilience* of people with deafblindness, *social representations of authority* in schools or *patients' satisfaction* with a particular health service practice. I regard resilience, authority or satisfaction as *dialogical concepts*. In other words, while these concepts are not axioms, they are derived from, or could be considered as extensions of, *dialogical axioms*. For instance, in order to understand the meaning of resilience in a specific problem, the researcher considers the quality of the Self–Other(s) interdependence, features of collaborative intersubjective thinking and so on. Or in order to understand the meaning of authority, the dialogical researcher builds on axioms such as trust, responsibility, intersubjectivity and so on. Part II of this book is concerned above all with *dialogical axioms* as foundations of dialogical epistemology. However, it

will also refer to specific *dialogical concepts* when considering concrete research and professional problems.

Chapter 4*, The ethics of the Ego–Alter–Object relations* discusses the Ego–Alter and the Ego–Alter–Object as axioms of dialogical epistemology. Starting from the historical roots of the Self–Other interdependencies within the dialogical philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this chapter focuses on the pluralities of intersubjectivity, the search for social recognition, and on imagination. The interaction between the Ego and Alter always refers to something, that is, to phenomena, objects or events creating the triangular relations the Ego–Alter–Object. The Object of knowledge and the consumerist Object of desire are contrasted and, consequently, ethics in relation to these two kinds of objects follows different routes.

Epistemic trust is an axiom of dialogical epistemology (Chapter 5). It refers to the ethical relation between the Ego–Alter and has deep roots in daily life. Epistemic trust makes sense only in relation to its opposite, whether distrust, mistrust, doubt, risk or danger. This chapter discusses epistemic trust focusing on authority and positions of trust, on communicative contracts of secrets and non-disclosure, the hermeneutics of trust and the hermeneutics of suspicion. It shows some examples of complex relations of trust/distrust, such as the dialogicality of confession.

Chapter 6 is concerned with *Epistemic responsibility*, which, too, is derived from the ethical nature of the Ego–Alter relations. Like other axioms it is relational and takes on different forms. Examples of Bakhtin and Levinas show that epistemic responsibility ranges from symmetrical relations between the Ego–Alter to asymmetrical relations where the Self is totally responsible for the Other. Among contemporary challenges to responsibility that have a profound influence on the dialogical mind in daily life is the bureaucratisation of institutions such as health services and universities. Bureaucratisation distorts the Self–Other(s) relations, and separates the Self from institutions. It creates a paradox of sacrifice.

Chapter 7, *The dialogical mind in professional practices*, focuses on the uniqueness and integration of the Self–Other(s) in communication between professionals and clients/patients. Specifically, examples from different kinds of therapy, and communication involving people with cerebral palsy and deaf-blindness show that the participants co-construct meanings, express intentions and convey different forms of epistemic trust and epistemic responsibility. The uniqueness of the Self–Other(s) interdependence suggests that the study of single cases is the most appropriate method to be applied in dialogical professional practices.

4 Ethics of the Ego–Alter–Object relations

4.1 The hidden roots of intersubjectivity

4.1.1 Fichte and Hegel

The focus on the individual, which has been an important feature of European philosophy since the Renaissance, and which was clearly formulated by the Descartes' Cogito, reached its pinnacle in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century. Rationality and cognitive capacities of the Self were the centres of attention, and neither Kant nor other philosophers of the Enlightenment raised any questions about the Other. As far as Descartes was concerned, other people misled the individual and drew him/her towards irrationality. When we come to Immanuel Kant, he believed that humans have no access to reality as it is. The human mind has access only to appearances of reality, but not to things as they are in themselves. While Kant was concerned with the problem of how humans acquire knowledge, he did not pose the question as to whether one human mind has any influence on another mind. That was not the issue on which he built up his philosophy.

However, important scientific and social changes took place during the eighteenth century and the problem of the Other could no longer be ignored. Above all, advancements in natural sciences like physics, chemistry and biology created new problems for philosophy, which Immanuel Kant well recognised. Among these was the question: how does one understand the functioning of two forces that work in opposite directions such as those in magnetism and electricity? These forces posit one another, and it is impossible to separate them: one cannot have the positive pole of a magnet or electricity without the negative one. Immanuel Kant, who tried philosophically to cope with the problem of knowledge, mental representations and ethics could not solve the problem of such antinomies, and he kept returning to them throughout his career.

But during Kant's time, not only were the natural sciences moving quickly ahead but the social sciences and humanities were also coming onto the scene. With the emergence of European nationalism, with the growing interest in

languages, communication and different cultures, new questions came to the fore and it became obvious that the focus on the individual was insufficient to cope with these complex social issues. Kant's views concerning knowledge and mental representations started being questioned. Are representations of reality indeed constituted by a single mind or do representations express collectively shared experiences? Among Kant's critics was the French philosopher Charles Renouvier who argued that the notion of representations makes sense only to the extent that representations are socially shared. Later on, Emile Durkheim's concept of collective representations was inspired by Renouvier's arguments against individual representations (Marková, 2003a; Paoletti, 2000).

Yet another problem was Kantian ethics. Arguing against Kant's ethical formalism, according to which moral law applies to all people in the same way, the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte opened up the question of ethics along totally different lines by bringing in the concept of the Other. Fichte did not accept Kant's perspective that ethics should be derived from causal laws of nature and instead he argued that human existence is ethical because humans are intersubjectively bound social beings. Fichte introduced into philosophy an important form of social or dialogical thinking based on the concept of social recognition (*Anerkennung*). His commentators (Neuhouser, 2000; Williams, 1992) note that social recognition and intersubjectivity meant to Fichte one and the same thing, and that, for him, intersubjectivity was an ethical issue. Williams (1992, p. 62) remarks on Fichte's overall contribution to the study of intersubjectivity: 'Intersubjectivity is not fundamentally a theoretical problem, or a conceptual problem. It is a problem of ethical action.' This, Williams suggests, 'is perhaps Fichte's most original contribution' to social science and philosophy, because rather than being solely a form of thinking, intersubjectivity/social recognition arises from action or praxis. Indeed, Fichte made a strong connection between consciousness, social recognition (or intersubjectivity) and social praxis: social recognition or intersubjectivity, according to Fichte's position, is grounded in consciousness, and consciousness is entrenched in social praxis.

Fichte is one of the scholars whose significant contribution to the humanities and social psychology has been largely ignored, at least in the Anglo-American scholarship. And yet his study of intersubjectivity is of lasting importance not only because he developed the concept of intersubjectivity and its relation to self-consciousness and praxis but intersubjectivity, for him, was part of a broad network of related human phenomena such as freedom, will and, above all, ethics.

But Fichte was not just preaching social praxis. His emphasis on intersubjectivity came from the practical problems he tried to solve. Specifically, he developed the concept of intersubjectivity in order to make sense of the meaning of the 'natural right' of humans. What does it mean to say that humans have

the Right to this or that? In order to answer this question, Fichte developed the argument that the Self and the Other are interdependent and that one cannot exist without the other. To understand how 'natural right' comes about, we need the concept of the Self. And to become the Self, the individual requires the existence of other humans and of the community. Therefore, in Fichte's conception, the Self is defined through the Other and this implies the meaning of intersubjectivity: one can be a free being only in and through interaction with others: 'The human being ... becomes a human being only among human beings' (Fichte, 2000, p. 37). Moreover, 'only free, reciprocal interaction by means of concepts and in accordance with concepts, only the giving and receiving of knowledge, is the distinctive character of humanity', and this is what marks humans as human beings (Fichte, 2000, p. 38). All this entails that relationships to other free subjects are essential for one's own subjectivity. Fichte repeatedly insisted on the point that one needs to be socially recognised by Others and that, reciprocally, one must recognise Others in order to be a free being (Fichte, 2000, pp. 39, 48). However, in order to be free, the Self must also recognise the possibilities and limits of freedom. The principle of having Right presupposes that individuals must restrict their own freedom and their actions in order to accommodate the freedom and actions of Others. Rights could not exist if humans disobeyed this principle (Fichte, 2000, p. 102). Here we have a form of dialogical thinking based on intersubjectivity and social recognition and on reciprocity of the Self and Others. This kind of reciprocity which is the foundation of Fichte's ethics of intersubjectivity totally overturned the meaning of Kantian morality: ethics is a mutually recognised relation between the Self and Others who acknowledge and act upon their reciprocity.

In his youth Fichte was a Kantian philosopher and he developed his ideas on the Self and Others only later in life. It was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who took Fichte's ideas on social recognition much further. In contrast to Fichte, Hegel was a social philosopher from early on. He was only eight years junior to Fichte, but he associated himself with the younger generation which was captivated by the revolutionary ideas opposing the rationalism of the Enlightenment. The German movement of the youth known as *Sturm und Drang* (Storm and Stress) was strongly influenced by the French revolution and its new ideas, as well as by the suffering it brought about. This movement of the German youth conceived humans as 'expressive unities' of reason and sentiment or 'reason and heart' (Taylor, 1975, p. 59).

Such influences, as well as the ideas of Hegel's predecessors such as Spinoza, Rousseau, Herder and Schelling, among others, led Hegel directly to view humans as social and self- and other-conscious beings. Human self-consciousness and the relations of the Self and Others became some of the central tenets expressed in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807/1977). He (Hegel, 1807/1977, p. 110) proclaimed the mutuality of interdependent

self-consciousnesses. According to him, one self-consciousness exists only for another self-consciousness: 'Only so is it in fact self-consciousness . . . "I" that is "We" and "We" that is "I".'

Thus when Hegel became inspired by Fichte's concept of recognition, he had already developed his ideas of the Self and Other, of ethics underlying these relations and the necessity of mutual recognition of freedom. Like Fichte, Hegel developed the concept of social recognition as part of a large project of social philosophy and this, throughout his whole life, played an important role (Williams, 1992, p. 73). Hegel's (1807/1977) parable, the Master and the Slave, is most often given as an example of the struggle for social recognition. The Slave works hard to gain recognition by his Master whom he views as being superior in power and status. Therefore, in principle, for the Slave, recognition is possible if he tries hard, and he can find satisfaction in being appreciated by his superior. In contrast, the Master considers the Slave as inferior. Consequently, recognition from someone who is below him, cannot lead to intersubjective satisfaction. Recognition requires a recognised reciprocity of partners and this is what makes them free beings. As for Fichte, so for Hegel, freedom both presupposes and requires recognition: this is the meaning of Hegel's 'I' that is 'We'. Granting the other person freedom means that you give him/her freedom to act, to choose, to judge and to make decisions: this is an ethical requirement of social recognition, and as we shall see later, of epistemic responsibility (Chapter 6). By implication this also means receiving freedom. You do not recognise the Other if you treat him/her as a possession, as a thing. This dialogical point was later on expressed by Martin Buber (1923/1962): you should treat the Other as 'you', not as 'it'.

Thus we can conclude that for both Fichte and Hegel, three concepts, all of them most significant for dialogical thinking, are inextricably intertwined: freedom, ethics and social recognition/intersubjectivity (Williams, 1997, p. 6).

4.1.2 Intersubjectivities as pluralities

Although the case of the interpersonal relation between Hegel's Master and Slave is the most commonly referred to example of social recognition/intersubjectivity, and although intersubjectivity is largely conceived in contemporary social psychology in terms of face-to-face interaction, we need to go beyond this rather narrow conception.

4.1.2.1 Levels or forms of intersubjectivity? Throughout his life Hegel explored the subject of the Ego–Alter interdependence in its pluralities through diverse forms and contexts, in each case with reference to ethics. A number of scholars have referred to these forms as 'levels' of Hegel's intersubjectivity (for a detailed discussion of this issue, Williams, 1997). Unfortunately, the term

'level' is confusing. It suggests the idea of hierarchically established levels of intersubjectivity ranging from interpersonal, to societal and to even more global. For example, in his analysis of Hegel's intersubjectivity, Ludwig Siep (1979) distinguished two levels (see Williams, 1997, pp. 19–22). The first level of intersubjectivity, a face-to-face situation, includes relations of love, friendship and family. The second level concerns the 'I' and 'We', in relation to the Self and institutions. With respect to the latter, non-recognition of the Self by institutions results in the Self's alienation, to which Karl Marx paid such significant attention. Other scholars distinguished three levels of intersubjectivity/social recognition (e.g. Williams, 1992; 1997; Honneth, 1992[1]). In fact, this is how Hegel organised his chapters in *Philosophy of Right* (1821/2001). He first discussed intersubjectivity in interpersonal relations of love, marriage and friendship. He then analysed social recognition involving relations between individuals or families, on the one hand, and institutions, on the other hand. Third, he spoke about social recognition and intersubjectivity in the relation of citizens to the State. Just as a family looks after its members, so the State should extend ethical concerns to its citizens.

We must be careful when using the term 'levels' with respect to Hegel's forms of intersubjectivity. The Self–Other interdependence in Hegel's dialectic does not proceed as a linear hierarchical development from face-to-face interaction to more global forms of intersubjectivity, but as a 'circle returning within itself' (Marková, 1982, pp. 178–180). Different forms of the Self–Other interdependence coexist at the same time: the child interacts in the family just as he/she relates with peers, with strangers on the Internet, and with members of his/her community. Some of these relationships are temporarily in the foreground, others in the background, but they mutually affect each other and transform themselves into new forms of intersubjectivity. This is why Hegel talks about a dialectic 'circle returning within itself'. While the term 'levels' might be useful for analytical purposes and organising materials, it certainly does not imply the linear hierarchical development from face-to-face interaction to more global forms of relationships. Such understanding would totally misinterpret Hegel's concept. Let us recall, as an example, the idea of belongingness to clans in early societies (Chapter 3) with reference to Benedict (1942) and Seligman (1997). These authors emphasised that pre-modern societies organised themselves into trusted communities like families, groups and clans (rather than into strictly interpersonal units) which excluded strangers. George Herbert Mead (1915), too, promoted the idea of interdependence between the individual and community, maintaining that from the very beginning people lived in organised groups: 'Had Locke had the acquaintance of our

[1] In his book on the struggle for social recognition, Honneth (1992) develops Hegel's levels of intersubjectivity in social psychological terms, particularly with reference to George Herbert Mead.

anthropologists with primitive groups, he would have recognised that his pre-contract men would have possessed an organised group of social habits out of which indeed governmental institutions were to arise . . .' (Mead, 1915, p. 148). Without having evidence about life in early societies one cannot assume that close interpersonal interactions were developed first and that later on people organised themselves into groups. Rather, one can suggest that various forms of interactions develop simultaneously, through 'the circle returning within itself', in and through deepening as well as breaking relationships of different kinds, rather than through a linear hierarchy. The term 'level', suggesting a hierarchical development from interpersonal to community and institutional relations does not capture the idea of Hegel's dialectic.

4.1.2.2 Intersubjectivity as a common will Hegel's broadly based forms of intersubjectivity are related to a network of other human faculties which are significant in daily practices. In *Philosophy of Right* he examines relations between the will and freedom in relation to rights, and specifically, to the right of ownership. Ownership is a particularly good example of the primacy of the Self–Other interdependence in relation to objects of possession. Let us explain.

Hegel considers freedom as the essential feature of the will and of thinking. It is through the will that thinking transforms itself into action and so for Hegel, the distinction between the thought and the will forms the difference between a theoretical and practical activity. For Hegel, it is the will that directs human actions in the life-world. In comparing Hegel's and Husserl's phenomenology, Williams (1992, p. 95) notes that although their phenomenologies differ in terminology and perspectives on specific issues, in both cases the two philosophers diagnosed crises in European politics, ethics and religion, and they both raised questions about the significance of science. Most importantly, they both tried to overcome dogmatism in philosophy and they both emphasised the importance of the phenomenology of the life-world.

Hegel examines the will in relation to freedom and morality with respect to rights, and specifically, with respect to property as a Right.[2] He goes over and over these relations, examining them from different perspectives in order to arrive at the meaning of possession, property and contract, which means that 'I hold a property through a common will' (Hegel, 1821/2001, p. 77). If the common will – or an institution – recognises my possession, it means that it is legitimately my private property, to which only I have the right, and others do not. If someone trespasses, it becomes a crime, and the institution will protect my right by punishing the perpetrator. Civil societies not only generate abstract rights and their protection but also have to deal with inequalities, poverty and

[2] Here we have an echo of Fichte's concept of Right (mentioned earlier). We find the same example in George Herbert Mead's (1915) analysis of the right to property.

other evils created in society. Thus, Hegel points out, when we speak about rights, we do not mean just civil rights but also morality and ethics in the course of the world history (Hegel, 1821/2001, p. 51). Here we see that Hegel not only developed the concept of intersubjectivity and social recognition: he brought into philosophy historicism and dialectic. His concept of social recognition or intersubjectivity develops in its pluralities throughout a dynamic and historical process.

4.1.3 Intersubjectivity in the Marburg Neo-Kantian School

Ethics conceived by Fichte and Hegel as the relation between the Ego–Alter took a new turn in the early years of the twentieth century in the Marburg Neo-Kantian School and specifically in the work of the philosopher Hermann Cohen. Like Fichte and Hegel, Cohen claimed that the Self arises only because it contrasts itself with the Other. For Cohen, mutual reciprocity of the Self and Other is embedded in the communication of concepts. A concept, for him, is not only an answer to something, it is also a question (Gibbs, 1992, pp. 85–86). According to this view, concepts are embedded in the reciprocal actions of questions and answers. This shows, therefore, that Cohen considered concepts to be dialogical. In his work we note the coinciding nature of the dialogical thinking and communication.

Just like Fichte and Hegel, Cohen rejected Kantian ethics which was derived from causal laws of natural objects. He argued that if ethics is 'merely a branch of natural science, then it is not ethics at all' (Gibbs, 1992, p. 185). In Cohen's (1907/1977) perspective, while the relation between the Self–Other is mutual, the priority is given to the Other. This new turn in ethics introduced an asymmetric relation of responsibility between the Ego–Alter. Cohen's ethics presupposes the existential and unconditional freedom of the Other, and responsibilities of the Self towards the Other (Gibbs, 1992, pp. 178, 185). This perspective was developed even further by another Neo-Kantian philosopher Franz Rosenzweig (1921/1971) who maintained that the Self is bound in responsibility not only with respect to a single Other but also to a third party, which in fact includes all Others. It was Rosenzweig who emphasised that the obligation of the Self towards the Other starts in face-to-face interaction, giving the human face the most important significance. The face designates the obligation of the Self to the Other even before any words are spoken. The significance of the human face and of language is then elaborated to its extreme in the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas (Chapter 6).

The Self's responsiveness and obligation to be sensitive to the Other is, though in a different way, also the basis of Bakhtin's dialogical thinking and communication. Bakhtin (1984a) shows the obligation of the Self to the Other in his deeply penetrative studies of dialogue in Dostoyevsky's novels. This

obligation is achieved in and through heteroglossia, that is, speaking in different language styles, simply because there are different Others and different imaginations of Others, to which each Self responds in a unique way. Like Cohen (cf. Gibbs, 1992, p. 15), Bakhtin places the utmost importance on the capacity of the Self to respond – or to the Self's responsivity to the Other. However, in contrast to Cohen, Bakhtin does not insist on an asymmetric relation between the Self and Other.

4.1.4 The social-psychological significance of the philosophies of dialogism

As we have seen, dialogism can be traced to two sources, even if these are not strictly separable from one another. One source originates in German Romanticism (although it had predecessors in Vico and Shaftesbury, see Chapter 2), and in particular in Fichte and Hegel. The other source, though inspired by Hegel, comes from the Marburg Neo-Kantian School in which there was a strong influence of Judaism.[3] This included, above all, scholars such as Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Martin Buber, followed by Emmanuel Levinas. These two sources of dialogism gave rise to a multitude of ideas concerning the nature of responsibility, multivoicedness, taking the role of the other, the emphasis on internal dialogue and others. Both sources have provided the foundation for what, today, we call dialogical approaches in their diverse forms. Scholars who drew on one or the other source or even both sources, have developed diverse ideas with respect to their goals of studies.

There is a great deal of evidence that scholars such as William James, George Herbert Mead, Lev Vygotsky, James Mark Baldwin and Mikhail Bakhtin were well familiar with the dialogical philosophies based on the ontology of the Ego–Alter. One can even surmise that these philosophies were more important to their work than the influences of their contemporaries. For example, Hegel's impact can be seen in the work of George Herbert Mead (Marková, 1982; for an extensive analysis of Hegel's influence on Mead, see Honneth, 1992). We can see that Mead, like Hegel, conceived intersubjectivity in its different forms: in face-to-face interaction as interpersonal intersubjectivity, for example, as the conversation of gestures; in relations between the individual and institutions, such as in an explanation of rights; and in relations between the State and internationalism. Mead expressed this last form of intersubjectivity, for example, when claiming that 'no nation would come to consciousness as a nation

[3] Zittoun (2014b, p. 100) notes that 'the inherent dialogicality of humans, as an epistemic and ethical stance' goes back to Talmud and that this is rarely mentioned in the literature on dialogism.

except within an international society' (Mead, 2011, p. 287). We can find ideas relating to different forms of intersubjectivity also in other scholars of American pragmatism who were influenced by Hegelian thought and by the common-sense ideas of John Stuart Mill (Chapter 3).

Mikhail Bakhtin, on the other hand, was not keen on Hegelian dialectics which he found abstract and he accused Hegel of monologism. He was well acquainted with Hermann Cohen's work and with the work of others associated with the Marburg Neo-Kantian School. Accordingly, Bakhtin's concept of intersubjectivity places emphasis on trust and responsibility in communication, which forbids living with an 'alibi' (Bakhtin, 1993; Chapters 5 and 6). Bakhtin introduced the term 'non-alibi in being' by which he meant that one cannot escape responsibility for acting by pretending to have been elsewhere, and by creating ambiguity around oneself.

Not surprisingly, contemporary students of dialogism often comment on similarities between the views of the Self, Other, intersubjectivity and dialogue in the works of William James, George Herbert Mead, Lev Vygotsky, James Mark Baldwin and Mikhail Bakhtin. They compare and contrast their perspectives, wondering whether those scholars personally met one another, whether they knew of one another's work, and who might have influenced whom. It seems reasonable to raise questions about their similarities and differences. But any attempts to answer these questions without paying attention to historical issues from which these similarities and differences arise would be little more than trivial exercises. This is why some researchers warn against making quick leaps in these comparisons noting that despite considerable similarities, there are also substantial differences such as between Bakhtin's dialogism and the pragmatists' concepts of the Self and dialogue (e.g. Taylor, 1991; Barresi, 2002). For example, Matusov (2011) speaks about irreconcilable differences between Vygotsky and Bakhtin, precisely because Vygotsky was Hegelian and Marxian while Bakhtin was inspired by the Neo-Kantian Marburg School. In contrast to Vygotsky, Bakhtin based his work on heteroglossia and divergences between the Self and Other.

As Matusov (2011) points out, such comparisons among scholars make good sense if we adopt a broad perspective that separates these dialogical thinkers from those who study information-processing approaches. In relation to such wide contrasts such as dialogism and information processing, the differences between, say, James and Bakhtin, seem to be trivial. On the other hand, although there may not be basic contradictions between James and Bakhtin, these scholars deal with different issues leading them to study different kinds of problems. Superficial and terminological similarities could be misleading and of questionable help to dialogically orientated professionals (Chapter 7).

Let us remind ourselves that the philosophies of dialogism studied the Self and Other(s) (the Ego–Alter) not only as an interpersonal interaction but also as

societal interactions involving rights, justice, values, ethics, community, family and international relations. These philosophies treated social recognition/intersubjectivity, freedom and ethics in a holistic manner as inextricably related forms of dialogical thinking.

Intersubjectivity has become a well-established subject of contemporary studies in social sciences (Coelho and Figueiredo, 2003; Gillespie and Cornish, 2010). Gillespie and Cornish note that at least six different meanings of intersubjectivity are in circulation. Most of these meanings refer to relations of agreement between participants, cognitive sharing and mutual understanding. The authors carefully review current methodological approaches in the study of intersubjectivity ranging from self-reports, observations, the analysis of talk and ethnographic engagement, and clarify their benefits and drawbacks; and they offer their own dialogical approach based on addressivity, multivoicedness of utterances and context.

It appears to me that Gillespie and Cornish's (2010) review of current methodological approaches shows two things. First, intersubjectivity is being studied as an isolated phenomenon which somehow appears in the data if the researcher asks appropriate questions about convergence and divergence of perspectives, or about taking the role of the other. Second, in contemporary psychology, intersubjectivity is largely studied in terms of cognitive approaches, shared beliefs or behavioural responses. This contemporary cognitive and behavioural basis sharply contrasts with the perspectives of dialogical philosophies. As noted earlier, in the latter, intersubjectivity is strongly connected with social praxis: it is entrenched in ethical action, in the relations of freedom, the will and in the engagement in responsibility between the Ego–Alter.

4.2 Ego–Alter and Ego–Alter–Object as axioms of dialogical epistemology

Having explored the pluralities of intersubjectivity and social recognition[4] as forms of dialogical thinking in the philosophies of dialogism and their

[4] The ontological interdependence of the Ego–Alter and some features of the epistemological interdependence of the Ego–Alter–Object were discussed in my previous book *Dialogicality and Social Representations* (Marková, 2003a). I am repeating them here for completeness because they form the basis of further discussion in this book.

In all my previous publications (e.g. Marková, 2003a; 2003b; in press) I always conceived intersubjectivity and social recognition not as identical but as mutually interdependent phenomena, with intersubjectivity directed at the understanding between the Ego–Alter, and social recognition as a strife for mutual acknowledgement of the Ego–Alter. Since in concrete life situations these two phenomena are always in tension, I shall continue referring to these phenomena as mutually interrelated but not as identical in the sense of Fichte and Hegel. This terminological difference, however, is of no substance. After all, Fichte and Hegel did not use the term 'intersubjectivity' when they spoke about social recognition, but the concept of intersubjectivity clearly was present in their work, as Williams (1992; 1997) and Neuhouser (2000) noted.

reflections in social psychology, before proceeding any further, we must draw attention to another form of dialogical thinking: to dialogical imagination.

Imagination has no role to play in the formal-logical and rationalistic perspectives of thinking. These perspectives, which assume that thinking and reasoning should be correct from the point of view of formal logic, study problem-solving in well-defined tasks such as syllogisms, anagrams and other kinds of tasks in which successful outcomes depend on the use of exact rules or specific algorithms (Marková, 2003a). Imagination would be a major obstacle to 'correct' solutions of such tasks. While these procedures may have their use in psychology, they assume a very narrow concept of thinking. We have already noted that throughout the history of scholarship, imagination was denigrated by some scholars, for example, by Plato (Chapter 1), and in modernity, it was above all positivism that argued for the eradication of imagination, calling it mystical and irrational (on this topic, see e.g. LeGouis, 1997).

In contrast, Albert Einstein argued that science is created on the basis of imagination, invention and intuition. All concepts are human creations and thinking would not be thinking if it were not imaginative. He even claimed that 'imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited to all we know and understand, while imagination embraces the entire world and all there ever will be to know and understand' (Einstein, 1931/2009, p. 97).

We may recall that Vico's conception of common-sense thinking was based on *ingenium*, imagination and action. Vico (1744/1948) characterised imagination as the competence of humans to select features and symbols of past and present knowledge and to experience, recreate and synthesise them, as well as transform them into new ideas of the past, present and future. When orientated towards the future, imagination may involve the intention to turn an idea into reality, or it may express joy or fear that an imagined event might or might not happen. When it is orientated towards the past, imagination may involve reconstruction of past events (e.g. Arruda, 2014; Kalampalikis, 2007; Wertsch and Batiashvili, 2012).

Charles Taylor (2002, p. 106) insists that when he speaks about the social imaginary, he does not refer to a social theory. Indeed, there are important and multiple differences between the social imaginary and a social theory. Taylor explains that in using the term 'imaginary', he is talking 'about the way ordinary people "imagine" their social surroundings', about how they visualise their existence together with others, what they expect from one another, what underlies these expectations and how these are pursued in stories and narratives. Moreover, he views the social imaginary as 'common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy' (Taylor, 2002, p. 106). In making common understanding and common practices the centre of modernity, Taylor links these social phenomena to a new moral order of society manifesting itself in the market economy, the public

sphere and the self-governing of people. In and through the social imaginary these new fields have developed as self-reflective and other-reflective social practices. In their attempts to understand the Self and Others, modern humans construct their images about one another; even the Slave in Hegel's parable (see Section 4.1.1; also Section 4.2.1.2) was imagining how to attain recognition from his Master! Imagination is vital to interpersonal relations. Speakers complement their partial knowledge by imagining what the Other could be like and what to expect from him/her. Words often convey images that are moving and changing over time and thus imagination has an important symbolic and spiritual role. Selves imagine what it would be like to be the Other (Gillespie, 2005; 2006; Mead, 1934). Dialogical imagination, therefore, is an axiom of dialogical epistemology to which we shall keep returning throughout Part II of this book.

4.2.1 Ethical nature of the Ego–Alter as an irreducible ontological unit

We can now turn attention to some features of the Ego–Alter as an irreducible dialogical ontological unit. Irreducibility of this unit stipulates that it cannot be decomposed either into the sole Ego or into the sole Alter. The Self is defined through the Other like a dynamic Gestalt. The two components come to their existence together as a unit. For example, a baby and his/her unique milieu become a joint unit when the baby is born. True, the biological and social milieu pre-existed the birth of that baby. Nations, cultural institutions, languages, habits and so on all predate the existence of any single person. However, when the particular baby is born (the Ego), he/she enters into interaction with specific features of the social and cultural milieu (the Alter), and the two components together form a dynamic ontological unit. The family, for example, the mother, the father and the existing children in that family, predate the arrival of a new baby. But with the birth of the new baby, the new ontological unit arises: the new baby and the family that pre-existed, come into their joint being together and this transforms the structure of the pre-existing family: the baby becomes a sibling to the older children in the family; he/she has rights that should be respected, and he/she learns to regard the rights of others. Such relations and many others are unique with respect to that specific baby and his/her family.

Let us persevere with this example and conceptualise it in terms of different forms – or pluralities – of intersubjectivity. We can consider that the baby (Ego) and his/her family (Alter) create an ontological unit as an intersubjective face-to-face relation. However, this unit can be reconsidered with respect to another form of intersubjectivity: in that case the family, including the newborn baby can be regarded as the Ego in a particular community, or in relation to a particular institution, which would then stand for the Alter. In yet another form of intersubjectivity, both the family and the community (or institution)



Figure 4.1 Multiple relations of the Ego–Alter

could be conceived as the Ego in relation to the State or to a particular historical or cultural situation, which would stand for the Alter. And of course there could be other kinds of the Ego–Alter relationships all pointing to pluralities of intersubjectivities, as Figure 4.1 indicates. Whatever forms the Ego–Alter takes, these forms are embedded in concrete sociocultural conditions and they live, develop and change accordingly.

The catalogue of the Ego–Alter relations would be incomplete without mentioning the Ego–Inner Alter relationships. Although all forms of dialogical or 'natural thinking' involve imagination, the Ego and the Inner Alter relationship (e.g. Bakhtin, 1984a; Marková, 2006; Grossen and Salazar Orvig, 2011; Zittoun, 2014a; 2014b) is entirely based on imaginative thinking. Due to the Self's reflective capacity to imagine thoughts, actions and interactions of Others, the Self has the capacity of imagining communication with different Others who are not physically present. For example, in and through inner speech the Self can imagine communication with absent parents, peers, reference groups or even with the 'collective Other'. The inner dialogue may take multiple and multifaceted forms; for example, it may involve an argument about commitments and loyalties to a social group to which the Self belongs. Inner dialogue could involve a conflict between the Self's own norms and those of the group; it could take specific linguistic and speech forms. Inner dialogue can also take place together with external dialogue. For example, the Self may,

in his/her inner dialogue, express distrust of his/her partner but externally he/she may attempt to communicate trust.

With her focus on inner dialogue and semiotic mediation, Zittoun (2014b) proposes a semiotic approach to dialogicality focusing on cultural markers in discourse. Zittoun's research is based on an example of a young woman's diary showing the ways in which the woman transforms herself as she moves in and through different environments during the Second World War. Zittoun considers the woman's diary as a complex dialogical object addressed to her fiancé. The diary forms an inner dialogue, and Zittoun analyses the woman's flows of thinking, her imaginations and capacity for reinventing herself over time. The young woman's inner dialogue is both restrained by the events of the War and enriched by her experiences with different Others. Zittoun (2014b, p. 105) concludes that inner dialogues depend on real dialogues with social others: 'The experience of being acknowledged and recognised by others is a precondition for the development of inner thinking'. Figure 4.1 shows the axiom of the ontology of the Ego–Alter in its pluralities.

Let us now ask: in what sense does the interdependence[5] of the Ego and Alter capture the ethical nature of intersubjectivity, social recognition and imagination? Let us suggest an answer to this question in two ways: first, as the ethics of mutuality, and second, as the ethics of autonomy.

4.2.1.1 Ethics of the mutuality of the Ego–Alter Already in his early works like *Art and Answerability* (Bakhtin, 1919/1990) and *Towards the Philosophy of the Act* (Bakhtin, 1993) Mikhail Bakhtin adopted the ontology of dialogism arguing that the integrity of the Self arises in and through the development of the Self's ethical obligations with respect to Others. In dialogical interaction there is no possibility of the Self's escape from responding to the Other. Even no response is a response. There is no possibility of remaining 'neutral'. In interaction humans evaluate one another taking into account others' and their own perspectives; they watch for Others' reflections of their own images and they create images of Others on the basis of their life experiences; they anticipate Others' actions and they act on the basis of these anticipations (Bakhtin, 1919/1990, pp. 15–16). Activity, therefore is never neutral, but is ethical.

But how should we understand Bakhtin's notion of activity? It is not an activity of a 'speaking *individuum'* (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 270, Bakhtin's emphasis)

[5] There is a growing interest in social sciences in the study of 'otherness', 'alterity', 'autrui', etc.; the 'other' is referred to in various ways such as 'strange', 'alien', 'different from me', 'same as me', 'mystery', 'known unknown', etc. These terms already indicate that not only the 'Other' and 'Others' are in the centre of interest but also that there is an enormous number of ways in which the 'otherness' can be theorised about and brought into practice (see e.g. Gillespie; 2006; Jovchelovitch, 2007; Rochat, 2009; Simão and Valsiner, 2007; Zittoun et al., 2013).

but of the speaker expecting a response from the addressee: it is a living social interaction. All activity is 'living' in its environment and Bakhtin overused the adjective 'living' to make his point. For example, in *Discourse in the Novel* (Bakhtin, 1981), there is a 'living discourse' (pp. 259, 279), a 'living heteroglossia' (p. 272), a 'living, tension-filled interaction' (p. 279), a 'living rejoinder' (p. 279), a 'living conversation' (p. 280), 'living experiences' (p. 286), a 'living concrete environment' (p. 288) – and one could continue listing Bakhtin's 'living' adjectives. Relations between the Selves, Others and Objects are interactive. In discussing dialogical interactions Bakhtin rejected the idea of a passive relation between the Self and the Object of knowledge, according to which the Object of knowledge is externally pre-given as, say, in the theory of John Locke. Instead, Bakhtin argued that the relation between the Self and an Object in the external world is productive and creative. As he said, it is our relationship to the Object that determines an Object and its structure, it is not the other way round (Bakhtin, 1919/1990, p. 5).

We can follow Charles Taylor (1991) in his argument that the full integration of the Self and Other in a dialogical action is filled with a 'radical reflexivity', that is, the capacity to reflect both on oneself, for example, on one's health and also on one's subjective experience and, importantly, on one's own thoughts. Radical reflexivity contrasts with the classic notion of co-ordination of movements, such as, for example, when one person throws the ball and the other person catches it. While the latter kind of action is based on joint intentionality and joint attention (e.g. Tomasello, 2014), such action is no more than an 'exchange' of gestures based on perspective-taking or taking the attitude of the other. Humans constitute themselves in dialogue that is multivoiced and not monological. Under no circumstances can a single-voiced exchange of gestures or of co-operative actions do justice 'to the dialogical nature of the self' (Taylor, 1991, p. 314). In and through radical reflexivity humans constitute their own Selves and other Selves not as neutral and disengaged but as ethical.

The accent on the 'living' activity and on interaction is also fundamental to the dialogical ontology of Hans-Georg Gadamer. According to Gadamer, language forms the basis of human existence. His dialogical ontology was most strongly emphasised in his frequently repeated claim about the 'being that can be understood is language' (e.g. Gadamer, 1975, p. 474; also 2007a, p. 162). And it is the living dialogue that always stands behind our understanding of texts, works of art and traditions. Living language underlies hermeneutics, that is, the theory and practice of interpretation. Understanding and interpretation of language can be achieved only through living in culture, history and tradition, and in the socially shared thinking and communication with others. Language is vital for sustaining the community (Gadamer, 2007a, pp. 157–158).

In a number of his essays Gadamer pays a great deal of attention to the structure of conversation because it is here that the relation between the Self

and Others comes to the fore; it is based on questions and answers (Gadamer, 2007d, p. 392). Conversation, to him, provides a special kind of interdependence between the Self and Other, because asking questions requires answers and so this implies ethical obligations of the dialogical participants. Gadamer argues that the art of conversation consists in balancing asking questions and providing answers. This means, he argues, that every statement 'has to be seen as a response to a question, and that the only way to understand a statement is to get hold of the question to which its statement is an answer' (Gadamer, 2007c, p. 241). In posing questions the participant structures the conversation; the participant, who poses questions, has the privilege of giving direction to the content of the topic. Questions open the space for the Other, and so they give the Other an opportunity for developing the content of speech. This openness also renders possible the unpredictability of a response (Gadamer, 2007d, p. 382). One could say that openness also allows for the possibility of infinity in conversation as well as for the creation of possible meanings (see also Bakhtin, 1984a; 1984b; Levinas, 1961/1969). Just as an interpersonal dialogue is potentially infinite, so does an internal dialogue, that is, an imagined dialogue with Others or with the Self, provide for continuous creativity of the dialogical mind in experiencing the world (Gadamer, 1975, p. 493).

Ragnar Rommetveit's concept of the ethics of mutuality in interaction, too, constitutes the foundation of dialogue. The speaker and listener respond to one another on each other's premises and this activity arises from the participants' 'shared ontological pre-conditions' (Rommetveit, 1974, p. 74). Rommetveit speaks about the mutual obligations of participants in terms of contracts. Contracts refer to the taken-for-granted expectations of the speaker that the listener will respond to his/her message. Mutual interactions, therefore, are not surprising. They are implicitly expected. It would be a lack of response that would astonish participants in communication. Contracts intersubjectively bind speakers to fulfil normative, socially and institutionally established practices.

4.2.1.2 Ethics of the autonomy of the Ego–Alter The ethics of mutual interdependence of the Ego–Alter is inextricably interrelated with the mutuality of acknowledging each other's freedom. This means that each party treats the Other as an autonomous being who thinks, makes decisions and acts according to his/her own will – or as we shall see later – treats the Other as being epistemically responsible (Chapter 6). The Self and Other enrich one another in and through their own ways of thinking or speaking in their own styles (Holton, 1973, p. 118) and in presenting their own perspectives. This may involve tension and conflict arising from the presentation of controversial points of view, but the struggle of diverse points of view facilitates the continuation of the dynamics of the Self and Other. One cannot talk about social recognition if any coercion, rather than negotiation, takes place. This has a number of implications.

Intense interpersonal relations such as love or intimate friendship may lead to the wish of one or both parties to totally identify with the Other. Psychoanalytic schools (e.g. Freud, 1922) have described in considerable detail many cases of identification between a young child and parent, and the pathological consequences arising from complicated cases of attempted identification. Desires of the Self to identify or fuse with the Other have been described not only in psychoanalysis but such desires have inspired literature and arts since antiquity. Moreover, one can also recall descriptions of horrific cases of identification of prisoners with their guards both in real life and in psychological experiments (e.g. Haney, Banks and Zimbardo, 1973).

In contrast, the dialogical philosophies, starting with Hegel, through Cohen and Bakhtin, insisted on the requirement of autonomy of the Ego and Alter as a vital feature of social recognition. The Self transforms through interaction with the Other and this itself is an argument against identification or fusing with the Other. Cohen's ethics required the plurality of perspectives and the key point is that the Self and Other 'cannot collapse into each other' (Gibbs, 1992, p. 86). In discussing the development of the self-concept and reflecting on Self–Other perspectives, Bakhtin speaks directly against the idea of fusing: 'What would I have to gain if another were to fuse with me? . . . let him rather remain outside me' (Bakhtin, 1979/1986, p. 78).[6] If we follow Bakhtin further, for him, dialogical relations are not engaged solely in the search for intersubjectivity conceived as a peaceful contemplation. Instead, cognitions and affects are in tension; they clash, judge and evaluate one another (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 314). According to Bakhtin, oppositions coincide in the world of becoming, in which there are no hard boundaries between objects, words or cultures.

4.2.1.3 Imagination in the struggle for social recognition Although humans usually search for independence and wish to present themselves as self-reliant individuals, they can achieve such feelings of self-determination only in and through interaction with Others. For Mikhail Bakhtin, dialogical imagination in the struggle for the Self's self-reliance is an acutely social capacity that is directed at other humans and therefore it is a way into the depths of the human mind. Bakhtin's analysis of imagination in Dostoyevsky's novels shows the hero's discourse to be totally gripped by anticipation of the response from his/her dialogical co-author. Anticipation of rejection by, or sympathy from, the Other takes control over the hero's words, their expressions and their internal polemic. One example of Bakhtin's (1984a) analysis of dialogical imagination comes from Dostoyevsky's novel *Notes from the Underground*,

[6] For more on this issue see Marková (2003a, pp. 103–104); for a broader discussion of subject-other isolation, fusion, separation and on the implications of these, see Simão and Valsiner (2007, pp. 394–396).

where Bakhtin's analysis takes place on several levels. To start with, the hero internally imagines the dialogue with Others and their responses to him. He then tells them what they imagine. Finally, he tells them that their imagination (which is his own imagination of their thoughts) does not matter to him. The hero continues to reveal his imaginations of the Others' responses in order to reject them. These anticipations, Bakhtin points out, form a vicious circle. The hero would like to be independent from Others' judgements of himself, but he cannot get his independence because 'he *fears* that the other might think that he *fears* that other's opinion . . . with his refutation, he confirms precisely what he wishes to refute, and he knows it' (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 229).

Dialogical imagination is even more focused in Bakhtin's analysis of Dostoyevsky's confessors. These anti-heroes, who committed crimes against humanity, need the Other to confess in order to relieve their conscience. But these confessions are complex dialogical phenomena. The confessor necessitates the Other not only to tell his/her sins but he/she also demands acknowledgement from the Other that he/she, who is the sinner, is a worthy human being. One of the strategies of coping is the confessor's simultaneous use of openings with multiple possibilities of interpretation. For example, saying 'I am a sick man . . . I am a spiteful man. I am an unpleasant man' (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 228) may give an impression that the confessor states a final truth with a transparent meaning. However, dialogically speaking, an utterance can never stand on its own: it is always directed at the Other. It requires and anticipates a response from the Other and so the utterance 'I am a sick man' could only have a fictive final meaning; instead, it awaits either acceptance or refutation of its meaning from the recipient.

In confessing a crime, Dostoyevsky's anti-heroes often present themselves as nasty as possible, exaggerating their crimes to the extreme, making their discourse cynically objective in the hope that the recipient will deny the confessor's guilt: 'I am no longer the hero to you now that I tried to appear before, but simply a nasty person, a scoundrel [. . .] I am very glad that you see through me. Is it nasty for you to hear my foul moans? Well, let it be nasty' (Bakhtin, 1984a, pp. 231–232). By condemning himself and repenting, the confessor could be trying to indirectly provoke the listener to rejecting the confessor's guilt and instead, to praise and acknowledge him/her as a worthy human being. At the same time, however, the confessor leaves open the possibility for the case that the listener might agree with his/her self-condemnation. Dostoyevsky's characters, who confess to a crime, concurrently despise and reject those who agree with their condemnation. Such extreme and acute dialogicality shows an extraordinary dependence on, and orientation of the Self towards the Other, and at the same time, an intense animosity and rejection of the Other's evaluation and judgement, should it prove to be undesirable. The 'radical reflexivity' involved in the deep personal meaning

of a confession attaches weight to the participants' collaboration and mutual understanding.

Bakhtin presented extreme and very vivid forms of imagination which may not reach such intensity in daily discourse. Nevertheless, daily discourse does not escape Bakhtin's insights, because it is filled with the Self's and Other's justifications and evaluations, with their ethical stands, problems of integrity and with anxiety and fear of non-recognition by Others. Such issues arise in the context of the contemporary upsurge of social networking where humans voluntarily expose themselves to the evaluation of Others, and very often, to that of unknown Others. The Internet self-displays of intimate and private matters have been widely described and studied by communication scholars and practitioners. Nationally and internationally, policies protecting children and young people from risks of networking have been introduced and are being constantly monitored. However, dialogical scholars need to address a number of theoretical questions concerning social networking because they have important practical implications. For example, what roles do broad social, political and cultural contexts play in self-displays of intimate affairs of the Self? In what ways do opportunities given by technological advancements alter interactions and interdependencies between and within different forms of the Self–Other? What strategies does the Self employ in his/her struggle for social recognition? Are narcissistic self-displays indications of a monological turn?

4.2.2 Ethical nature of the Ego–Alter–Object as an irreducible epistemological unit

If life is lived as an activity, and if to live means to satisfy one's needs and utilities as Vico stated, or to gratify one's desires as Hegel expressed it, then human interactions, too, must be concerned with needs, utilities and desires. The Self–Other(s) interaction is directed at Objects. This is how from the *ontological or existential* unit the Self–Other(s) (Ego–Alter) we arrive at the *epistemological* (i.e. knowledge-based, belief-based, imagination-based) unit, the Self–Other(s)–Object (the Ego–Alter–Object). The Ego and Alter act upon Objects in order to get to know them, to create and destroy them; humans imagine Objects, they desire them, they desire Objects of Others and so on.

There have been two kinds of objections raised against the unit the Ego–Alter–Object. First, it has been argued that the triadic relation is too narrow and does not include culture (e.g. Linell, 2009). Such argument does not appreciate the ontological nature of the Ego–Alter interdependence which takes on different forms of dynamic existence. Forms of the Ego–Alter interdependence range from interpersonal, intergroup and institutional, to community-based, culture-based, State-based and otherwise (see Figure 4.1).

Another kind of objection comes from the contemporary studies of 'interobjectivity'. Some researchers claim that the study of interobjectivity has priority over intersubjectivity (e.g. Moghaddam, 2003; 2010; Gammut, Daanen and Sartawi, 2010). However, intersubjectivity is a feature of the Self–Other interdependence as an ontological perspective of dialogical epistemology. This perspective explains why intersubjectivity in social and cultural psychology must always precede any analysis of 'interobjectivity', and not the other way round. If the Self and Other create one another, this also means that any relations of humans to Objects must be secondary, because they are products of the Self–Other intersubjectivity. The concept of interobjectivity in social and cultural psychology makes sense if and only if the researcher specifies the intersubjective conditions within which interobjective relations take place (see Section 4.2.2.1).

4.2.2.1 Asymmetric relations between the Ego–Alter–Object The irreducible status of the dialogical triad does not imply that the relations between the three components are equal, for example, that the Self is equally committed to Others and to the Object. In most cases relations within the triad are unequal; they are asymmetric. Asymmetries create tension and dynamic transformations within the dialogical triad Ego–Alter–Object. Although the Object is constructed jointly by the Ego–Alter, humans have different motives, desires, intentions and goals; depending on these, they may be committed explicitly at some times more to Objects in their life-world and at other times to Others. For example, studies of the majority influence show the pressure on the Self to compromise and stick with Others' 'truth' rather than to maintain his/her independent position (Asch, 1951; 1956). Or the Self could desire a reward whatever it may cost and be committed more to the Object than to loyalty to other people.

Let us now focus on dynamics and tension created by asymmetries in the dialogical triangle with reference to two kinds of Object. The first kind of Object maintains the continuation of our familiar triadic relation in the Ego–Alter–Object (or representation) in Moscovici's conception (Chapter 3; Marková, 2003a), in which the Object refers either to scientific knowledge or to commonly shared knowledge (representation). The second kind refers to an Object I have not yet mentioned. It is an Object that does not refer to knowledge (scientific or commonly shared) but to a Thing that a human might desire in order to satisfy his/her craving for material or symbolic goals. This latter kind of Object therefore distorts our epistemological Ego–Alter–Object triangle. This was brought to attention by the anthropologist Louis Dumont. The discussion of these two kinds of Objects and their role in the dialogical triangle will also provide the basis for Chapters 5 and 6 on epistemic trust and epistemic responsibility.



Figure 4.2 The strength of commitment of the Ego–Alter–Object

4.2.2.2 Asymmetric commitment of the Self to the Other and to the Object of knowledge Let us represent a schema of different commitments within the dialogical triangle Ego–Alter–Object. In Figure 4.2, a strong commitment is expressed by full arrows while a weak commitment is represented by dashed arrows. In the left-hand side of Figure 4.2 we can see a schematic presentation of a weak commitment between the Ego and Alter and a strong commitment between the Ego and Object. The right-hand side represents a weak commitment between the Ego and Object and a strong commitment between the Ego and Alter.

Let us consider some concrete examples to illustrate these different kinds of commitment.

Concerning the strong commitment to the Object of knowledge, what first may come to mind, could be cases of scientists who during the course of European history pursued their ideas in societies in which the religious dogma dictated what was allowed to be the 'truth' and 'correct beliefs'. Moreover, these scientists' own ideas went, in many cases, against their own religious convictions and so they struggled not only with the external pressure but also with their own religious beliefs. Fear of persecution drove the philosopher Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century to regret that his personal troubles and fourteen years of imprisonment were caused by his 'love of science' (Brooks, 1933, p. 155). In 1600, Giordano Bruno was burnt to death for his cosmological beliefs that went far beyond Copernicus's heliocentric views. Thirty years after that, Galileo Galilei submitted himself to the powerful Alter of the inquisition under the threat of torture and death at the stake like Bruno. At the age of seventy he renounced his conviction that the earth rotates round the Sun: 'I Galileo, being in my seventieth year, being a prisoner and on my knees . . . abjure, curse and detest the error and the

heresy of the movement of the earth' (quoted by Guillen, 1995, p. 38). While this saved his life, he was kept under home arrest until he died eight years later. At the same time during the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, the mathematician and astronomer Johannes Kepler found it difficult to resolve the conflict between his personal knowledge (the Ego) and the religious dogma (the Alter) with respect to the movement of planets (the Object). He finally coped with the problem by upholding his own discovery while accommodating a part of the religious dogma. Even in the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin feared persecution for his ideas on evolution, and at the same time he experienced conflicts with his own religious beliefs. In deepening his knowledge and amassing an increasing evidence for his theory of evolution, he gradually departed from the generally accepted doctrine of God as the creator of the organic world (Marková, 2003a, p. 2).

Let us now consider a different kind of example, the case where commitment of the Ego to the Alter is much stronger than that of the Ego to the Object of knowledge. Such a situation can be represented by the mystique of and incontestable faith in the Communist Party (the Other) of revolutionary Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s (Chapter 1). Numerous cases of the absolute faith held in the Party disregarding any critical analysis of the Object of its strategies, are documented in historical treatises of the Soviet Union as well as those described in novels. Expressions of faith in the Party as an incarnation of history were quite common particularly in the early history of the Soviet regime. For example, in 1935 Nikolai Bukharin, very soon after he had denounced Stalin's 'insane ambition' (Conquest, 1990, p. 112), was asked why those who opposed Stalin, nevertheless, had surrendered to him. His response to this was simple: 'You don't understand . . . It is not him we trust but the man in whom the Party has reposed its confidence. It just so happened that he has become a sort of symbol of the Party . . .' (Abramovitch, 1962, p. 416). In 1936, one year before his arrest, Bukharin again expressed his faith in the Party. He talked about the difficulties of adjusting to the political situation. However, 'one is saved by a faith that development is always going forward. If one leans out of the stream, one is ejected completely . . . the stream goes through the most difficult places . . . And the people grow, become stronger in it, and they build a new society' (Conquest, 1990, p. 112).

Arthur Koestler's (1940/2005) *Darkness in Noon* makes this point even more clearly. The hero of this novel, Rubashov, talks about the historical role of the Party; history, according to him, makes no mistakes. It flows without error towards its goal: 'At every bend in her course she leaves the mud which she carries and the corpses of the drowned. History knows her way. She makes no mistakes. He who has not absolute faith in History does not belong in the Party's ranks' (Koestler, 1940/2005, p. 41).

Lastly, let us mention the effect of the powerful Other on the Self using the mass media as an example. Studies of social representations of illnesses show that even if individuals have a good medical knowledge about the transmission of the HIV virus (Marková and Wilkie, 1987), their behaviour towards those infected by the virus may be, nevertheless, guided more strongly by their real or imagined Ego–Alter relations. Our research in the 1980s during the HIV/AIDS epidemic has shown that patients with haemophilia, and in particular those with severe haemophilia, had good knowledge of HIV/AIDS. By good knowledge we meant knowledge about the cause of HIV infection, spread of HIV, Self- and Other-protection and various medical issues that were known at the time (Marková, 1992). Nevertheless, our research has shown that patients' conduct was guided not by their knowledge of HIV, but by their images of Others' representations of haemophilia and HIV/AIDS – and these representations had a direct effect on their interactions with Others. Our respondents explained that their own emotions as well as the attitudes of other people and the publicity portrayed by the mass media increased their feelings of being at risk of HIV/AIDS (Marková et al., 1990).

Pedrinho Guareschi (2006) analyses the power of the mass media in Brazil which, disrespecting the diversity of humans, tends to homogenise their effect on multitudes of people. He reminds that the media do not provide listeners with any opportunity to respond to messages portrayed on television screens or broadcasted by the radio. Voices of Others do not count in this 'communication' – and therefore, communication of the media is non-dialogical. Democracy and ethics require that humans listen and respond to one another and that this mutuality counts as ethical conscience. Guareschi raises a fundamental question for the media; listeners should not be prevented from responding; in the construction of citizenship and democracy it is important that the mass media change their present practices in Brazil. They should acknowledge that humans are dialogical and unique beings. He insists that only those who participate with their voices can be fully acknowledged as human beings. In order to recognise the Other as a human means you enter with him/her into a dialogue. Guareschi concludes that dialogicality counts as the morality of existence.

Finally, let us note that the Self's commitment to knowledge and to Others is not of a 'yes' or 'no' kind, but that it may range from high to low commitment. Referring to such cases, Moscovici (1993) distinguished between resistible and irresistible beliefs. Resistible beliefs concern phenomena about which we learn from Others through instruction, for example, 'the Earth is not flat' or 'some illnesses are caused by viruses'. Such beliefs can be changed through new learning, and humans can suspend or abandon them when necessary. When such beliefs become 'untrue' due to new knowledge, the Ego can transform them as required into new 'true' beliefs. In this case we can say that humans

possess rational beliefs or knowledge just like they possess other kinds of things. If they do not need them, either because they are no longer relevant or because they are replaced by new beliefs, humans can dispose of them. Moscovici calls them 'resistible', because the mind can accept, reject or resist them in one way or another. However, it is the other kind of beliefs, the 'irresistible' ones, which are not in our possession. On the contrary, they possess us: they 'are like perceptual illusions: we are not at liberty to dismiss them, to have them or correct them if need be' (Moscovici, 1993, p. 50). For example, collective memories, ceremonies or political convictions could be so deeply grounded in our thoughts, whether consciously or unconsciously, that we cannot dismiss them by means of rational arguments; they are independent of reasoning. It has been well documented that political convictions are connected with creating myths. The collapse of the Soviet bloc which resulted in the re-emergence of post-Soviet republics was marked by reinventing the past, by creating new symbols, and by the return of old myths. For example, Baltic States, in designing their new banknotes, chose symbols that represented preferred values of these newly created free nations (Mathias, 2008). Distinctive collective memories that were concealed over long periods of time functioned like irresistible beliefs. They were not publicly verbalised during the Soviet regime, but the collapse of the Soviet bloc brought them to the fore, just like the national flags that were hidden in citizens' homes, and the national songs that were buried in citizens' memories. Symbolic figures became portrayed on new banknotes expressing and reinterpreting old narratives.

Wertsch and Batiashvili (2012) show how collective memories invigorate selective interpretations and reinterpretations of the nation's past and justify citizens' actions and images of the future. The authors portray Georgian narratives of the past that widely differ from those of Russian tales. Georgians search for the meaning of their nation that stems from the past myths and that continues in their struggle to protect their sovereign territory in South Ossetia. In contrast, Russians understand their past as a series of unjustified invasions of their territories, whether in the Middle Ages by Teutons or much later on by Napoleon and Hitler. Recall of the past can give rise to contemporary conflicts through narrative templates and deep memories that these templates mediate. Such publicly shared myths in Georgia, on the one hand, and in Russia, on the other, accompanied by powerful images of the past, cannot be easily reconciled.

These examples show that in daily thinking different kinds of knowing and imagining interact with one another, and that communication is never 'neutral' information processing, but is always evaluative and judgemental. It is filled with tensions in understanding and emotions, in trust and distrust, and in taking and avoiding responsibility.

4.2.2.3 Asymmetric commitment of the Self to the Other and to the Object of desire In the epistemological triangle the Self and Other mutually construct, though asymmetrically, the Object of knowledge. Priorities given to the Object of knowledge or to the Other rise and fall in relation to social, historical and personal circumstances of the Self.

The anthropologist Louis Dumont (1977; 1986) explored the triangular relations between the Ego–Alter–Object in a different way. Dumont's point of departure was the study of the concept of the individual and of the phenomenon of individualism throughout history starting with Judaeo-Christian heritage up to the present. He put forward an idea that there are two perspectives in societies, individualism and holism. Individualism that existed in traditional Christian societies was subordinated to holism. By this Dumont meant that relations between people were more highly valued than relations between people and things. The expanding market during the last three centuries gave rise to a new discipline of economics in which money obtained a new meaning: the developing businesses transformed the traditional form of individualism. Economics developed as a new discipline associated with marketing, and it produced a modern kind of individualism, which is driven by the relations between the Self and the Thing. In many cases the desire for a Thing as a material or symbolic object has replaced the Object of knowledge in the triangular relation of the Ego–Alter–Object. And although the modern individual cannot get rid of the Ego–Alter interdependence, he/she is behaving as if that were possible, or at least, he/she is subordinating the Ego–Alter relations to those of the Ego–Thing. Dumont argues that a non-social individual, proclaiming his/her autonomy, freedom and the choice of personal values, is a feature of modern society, characterised by economic growth, technology and greed. The growth of economy and of technology has become the driving force between the Self and Thing as a new morality. Imagination that in the epistemological triangle of Ego–Alter–Object was directed at knowledge, innovation and interpersonal relations, has now become fixed on Things as values. In these cases, the epistemological triangle has been replaced by a consumerist triangle. The consumerist triangle may give an impression that interobjectivity has priority over intersubjectivity. Yet a Thing as Object of desire has a symbolic value and a symbolic value is a social value. A Thing becomes an Object of desire not because of its intrinsic value but because it is a value for Others (Marková, 1982). Analysing the nature of desires, Kojève (1969) maintained that desiring Objects that Others have, that is, social desires, plays such a vital role in human life because they have a symbolic value:

> Thus an object perfectly useless from the biological point of view (such as a medal, or the enemy's flag) can be desired because it is the object of others' desires. Such a Desire can only be a human Desire, and human reality, as distinguished from animal reality, is created only by action that satisfies such Desires: human history is the history of desired Desires. (Kojève, 1969, p. 6)



Figure 4.3 The Ego–Alter–Thing of desire

Figure 4.3 represents a schema of the consumerist triangle in which the Object of knowledge is replaced by the Thing of desire. The strong commitment to the Thing of desire is represented by full arrows between the Self and the Thing of desire. Equally, there is a strong commitment between the Alter and the Thing of desire, indicating that the Thing of desire has a social and symbolic value. However, the relation between the Ego–Alter shows a weak commitment – or at least a weaker commitment than that between the Ego–Thing of desire – and is represented by a dashed arrow. Although humans probably always desired Objects of Others not only because of their material value but because of their symbolic value, the greed for Objects of desires facilitated by technological advancements has established consumerism as a new virtue.

A Russian-American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin goes even further. In characterising our age as the age of crisis (Sorokin, 1992), he draws attention to the contemporary Western sensate culture with its inner and irreconcilable contradictions and he condemns its numerous dualisms. For example, while this culture proclaims equality, in practice it generates inequalities of all kinds; it stimulates wishes and desires for a better life but at the same time it impedes its satisfaction; it emphasises social security but in practice progressively destroys security for all: 'Our culture condemns egotisms of all kinds and boasts of the socialization and humanization of everything and everybody; in reality, it displays the unbridled greed, cruelty and egotism of individuals as well as of groups . . .' (Sorokin, 1992, p. 197). This culture of sensate imagination is preoccupied with bodily pleasures whether sex, fashionable objects and visible symbols, which stand for the 'real world'.

Sorokin refers to an enormous richness and heterogeneity of styles, all of which encourage relations of humans to things, to the latest best-sellers and to fashions. Although it is reasonable to argue that Sorokin's diagnosis does not apply to everybody, we may admit that the consumerist perspective has become a strong feature of modern culture, which we find in different domains of life, such as health care, education, business or politics (on these issues see also Bauman, 1989; Minogue, 2010, among many other critics of modern consumerist culture).

4.2.2.4 The Alter as an imaginary desire Having discussed the consumerist triangle, let us focus on another distortion of the epistemological triangle. This is based on the Self's imagined interaction with the imagined Other. The ethics of mutual interdependence of the Ego–Alter discussed earlier presupposes the acknowledgement of each party's freedom in thinking, decision-making and acting. In contrast to this presupposition, the desire for fusing, merging or identifying of the Self with the Other has been known since the beginnings of humankind; it symbolises the search for oneness, the search for the unity with nature, the cosmos and gods. It has been rooted in emotions and in the primordial and instinctive human experience of the world. I noted elsewhere that we can view it as an extreme form of the Ego–Alter interaction, in which the Ego loses his/her capacity for agency in attempting to universalise oneself through the Other (Marková, 2008a, p. 43). Unconscious search for belongingness has become incorporated into theories of the unconscious mind (Freud, 1922; Whyte, 1962).

When it was observed during the 1950s that, due to the effect of the mass media, the idea of fusing of the Self with the Other became a widespread public phenomenon, this drew attention of the social sciences. It was noticed and commented upon that the public was forming close imagery relationships with characters in soap operas, television actors, sport figures or singers. The phenomenon has been coined 'parasocial interaction', and a significant amount of the literature has been devoted to this topic. The public's imagined interactions with heroes of these genres and imagined participations in heroes' actions and events have been extensively described (e.g. Gilles, 2002; Hartman and Goldhoorn, 2011; Horton and Wohl, 1956). The new digitised social media and Internet games encourage even more the imaginary communications of individuals searching for self-fulfilment, the escape from loneliness and qualms of daily life (Figure 4.4).

Viewing this phenomenon from the perspective of the dialogical mind, one can suggest that just like in the cases of desires for Objects, so the Self's imaginations of being in contact with the admired Others can be conceived as the attempts of the dialogical mind to interact and to belong to someone or something. The imagined interaction with the important and admired



Figure 4.4 Parasocial communication in the new media

Others may enhance the Self's esteem and the feeling of being socially recognised.

4.3 From dialogical axioms to dialogical concepts

The triangle Ego–Alter–Object is one of the axioms of dialogical epistemology, and due to its dynamic nature it is infinitely open or unfinalisable (Chapters 5–7). Therefore it allows for integrating further dialogical concepts depending on researchers' or professionals' interests and problems they intend to explore. Alex Gillespie once aptly stated (personal communication) that the epistemological triangle can be viewed like a miniature Christmas tree, on which, depending on the object of study, one can dangle other dialogical concepts.

For example, Bauer and Gaskell (1999) expand the Ego–Alter–Object triangle by focusing on the time dimension in the construction of common-sense meanings. The authors represent the triangle as an elongated construct which captures the past, present and future of common-sense meanings. The elongated triangle has become known as the Toblerone model, like the well-known Swiss chocolate (Figure 4.5).

The authors further point out that the Toblerone model has a particular importance for the study of social groups. Groups grow and subdivide; in such subdivided groups there is a variety of coexisting triangular dynamic structures competing, cooperating or being in conflict with one another. Consequently,



Figure 4.5 Toblerone model of the Ego–Alter–Object

different kinds of common sense dominate in different subgroups at the same time, and may follow different paths over time (see also Jovchelovitch, 2007; 2008).

In her exploration of learning as a social process, and focusing specifically on epistemic trust (Chapter 5) in education, Zittoun (2014a) argues that the didactic triangle the Learner–Other–Object of knowledge that was developed by Houssaye (2000) requires further development and extension. Specifically, and with her focus on semiotic mediation, Zittoun maintains that in addition to interacting with the teacher about the Object of knowledge, the Learner is also engaged in an inner dialogue with him-/herself about the Object of knowledge. It is necessary to distinguish between what the Learner already knows about the Object of knowledge and between the Object of knowledge to which he/she is exposed (Figure 4.6).Therefore, the Learner's inner dialogue with the Object proceeds along two lines.

One line of the inner dialogue arises from the Learner's previous knowledge and experience, that is, from the 'personal culture', drawing on memory, past experiences and associations. The other line of the inner dialogue arises from formal modes of learning to which the Learner is exposed, that is, from what is socially and culturally acknowledged as knowledge. As Zittoun maintains, the process of knowing involves internalisation, reorganisation of previous knowledge and the construction of new knowledge. The Learner establishes relations with the Object of knowledge in and through choosing cultural and intellectual elements with which he/she is confronted. This is why Zittoun's semiotic mediation (Figure 4.6) necessitates expanding the original didactic Learner–Other–Object triangle into a prism, in which the Object is captivated by the 'personal culture' (i.e. sense of cultural element for person) and by the socially and culturally (i.e. cultural element = formal mode of learning) acknowledged lines of thought.

The examples of the Toblerone model and of the semiotic prism show that in order to solve concrete problems, Bauer and Gaskell, and Zittoun expanded the



Figure 4.6 The semiotic prism

dialogical axiom Ego–Alter–Object by developing dialogical concepts of time dimension of common sense and of semiotic mediation, respectively.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has been concerned with axioms and concepts of dialogical epistemology derived from the Ego–Alter interdependence. This interdependence is always about something, that is, about objects or events, or about reflections on the Self's and the Other(s)' thoughts, imaginations and actions. I have referred to triangular relations between the Ego–Alter–Object in two ways. First, following Serge Moscovici's ideas, there is a triangular relation between the Ego–Alter–Object of knowledge. Second, following the ideas of the anthropologist Louis Dumont, I have introduced the consumerist triadic relation the Ego–Alter–Thing of desire. Ethics in these two kinds of triangle follows different routes. In the former case, ethical relations between the Ego–Alter stem directly from intersubjectivity and the search for social recognition as the primary ontological relations. In the latter case, the ethical relations between the Ego–Alter are masked by the apparent priority given to the relation between the Self and the Thing of desire. In this case, the Ego's search for social recognition, which superficially appears as craving for the Thing of desire, is in fact the desire for the desire of the Other's desire. In other words, obtaining Objects of Others provides the Self with a social status and thus, with illusory social recognition.

5 Epistemic trust

Epistemic trust[1] (and epistemic distrust) in dialogical epistemology is rooted in the ontological relation between the Self and Others. It takes two mutually interrelated forms.

First, it refers to the participants' trust that they live in a temporarily shared social world comprising a common ground for understanding and interpretation of their social reality. There could be no communication, social knowledge, beliefs and joint actions if the participants did not implicitly take for granted that they share a common ground for understanding and interpretation of their social reality.

Second, epistemic trust refers to the capacity and readiness of Selves and Others to learn, share and accept knowledge, experience, ethical evaluations or otherwise from one another. Humans accept and reject epistemic authority, they negotiate their epistemic trusts/distrusts and they push their dialogical interactions to the limits of their mutual reliance.

5.1 Epistemic trust as a common ground of understanding

Trust and mutual understanding are largely shared implicitly. Unless the dialogical participants have reasons for thinking otherwise, they presuppose that they

[1] 'Trust' and 'epistemic trust' have heterogeneous and multifaceted meanings. The notion 'epistemic trust' is not specific to dialogical epistemology and it has been used in human and social sciences for some time. Inevitably, it has acquired different meanings according to the rationale for researchers' objectives in their respective domains. Some meanings are derived from analytic philosophy, others from phenomenology or from problems arising in testimonies; some are based on the cognition of the individual, some refer to epistemic trust of others. For example, Daukas (2006) is concerned with the question of epistemic trustworthiness of an agent. She analyses preconditions that an agent must fulfil in order to be worthy of trust by the other; this has implications for the relations between moral character and social practices. According to Allwood (2014) epistemic trust is a strong simplifier and facilitator in communication; the individual relies on the optimal behaviour of the trusted and on what is trusted, and so this helps humans to comprehend the world. Wilholt (2013) is preoccupied with epistemic trust among scientists in relation to one another's work. Some of these meanings show similarities with epistemic trust in dialogical epistemology, others are totally divergent. However, while these issues are of some interest, I shall not discuss them in this book.

live in a temporarily shared social world. In communication, their mutual trust could be expressed in and through implicit and cryptic messages containing elliptic speech or no speech at all. Such messages, while fully understandable to the dialogical participants themselves, might be hardly comprehensible to outsiders. Rommetveit (1974) provides numerous examples of the intersubjectively established Ego–Alter interactions, which imply the participants' spontaneous trust in the interpretations of their joint actions. For example, putting up a tent by two people involves coordinated complementary activities accompanied by single words such as 'up', 'tighten', 'to the left', to which the participants instinctively attend. Unprompted trust and intuitive anticipations of one another's intentions result in synchronised joint actions. Participants usually do not attend to details of co-ordinated interactions and do not notice the complexity of such spontaneous engagements with one another. Only in difficult dialogical communication, for example, in communication in which participants cannot synchronise their interactions due to, say, cerebral palsy or deafblindness, they become aware of the dialogical subtlety that they normally take for granted (e.g. Collins and Marková, 1995, pp. 239–240; Nafstad, 2015). Shotter (2007) notes, that we cannot acquire understanding of spontaneous dialogical interactions by reading books or manuals. If we attempt to do that, we only become aware that reflective learning does not teach us how to imitate spontaneous interactions. This is something we intuitively learn very early in life. If the child does not acquire these social skills, he or she is treated as having abnormal (pathological) features, whether autistic or otherwise. What we call '*intimacy* . . . is in fact a mark of our increasing sensitivity to the dialogical structure of our interpersonal relations' (Shotter, 2007, p. 205). This interactive sensitivity, which has developed in human history and culture, has become a feature of common sense and of trust in the socially shared social world. This does not mean, however, that interactive sensitivity is uniform across human societies. The dialogical mind displays heterogeneous features of trust, distrust, responsibility and of the attempts to renounce responsibility. These features take on different forms depending on the unique characteristics of individuals and groups and on situations in which interactions take place.

Epistemic trust as a common ground for understanding of the temporarily shared social world takes on pre-reflective and reflective forms, although these may co-exist and mutually interact with one another. Such forms may take place in micro-social and macro-social relations, in a family, among friends and strangers, and among lay persons and institutions (Marková, Linell and Gillespie, 2008).

5.1.1 From pre-reflective to reflective micro-social epistemic trust

Social, philosophical and socio-biological approaches in psychology and in child development suggest that trust forms the ontological basis of human

communication. Researchers studying ontogenetic development of the child (e.g. Stern, 1985; Trevarthen, 1992) have continuously attempted to provide empirical evidence for the innate predisposition of interactional reciprocity. They have argued that the newborn baby is equipped with readiness to take communicative initiatives, to respond and to engage in interaction with the other person. They have referred to such openness of the baby towards others using various terms, such as 'innate intersubjectivity' (Trevarthen, 1998), the 'virtual other' (Bråten, 1998), the 'innate basis of the theory of mind' (e.g. Carruthers, Laurence and Stich, 2005) and the 'nature–nurture–culture equation' (Tomasello, Kruger and Ratner, 1993). Erikson (1968, p. 82) refers to this openness of the baby towards others as 'basic trust', that is, the first mark of mental life, which emerges prior to any feelings of autonomy and initiative. Although at this very early stage in life one cannot, either theoretically or empirically, distinguish between trust and other socio-communicative capacities of the baby, these capacities seem to be linked to repetitive physiological and somatic experiences, and to the synchrony and rhythm of biological functions such as breathing and heart beat. These somatic experiences of synchrony and rhythm are essential for early interaction between the carer and baby (e.g. Brazelton and Cramer, 2002; Feldman et al., 2011; Fonagy and Target, 1997). Since at this stage of life infants are engaged primarily in interaction with their carers, we can speak here about micro-social relations (Marková, Linell and Gillespie, 2008). Rommetveit (1974, p. 86) notes that the carer assumes intersubjectivity long before it is observable. By taking intersubjectivity for granted the carer contributes to its achievement. Microanalyses of interactions between the baby and parent show how the regulation of interactions and sensitivity to the mental and physical state of the Other is accomplished (Beebe, Lachmann and Jaffe, 1997; Brazelton and Cramer, 2002; Tronick, 1989). Face-to-face affective exchanges play a crucial role in the child learning to predict activities of the Other and they facilitate the development of the child's transformation from a pre-reflective mental state to a reflective one.

Fonagy and his colleagues (e.g. Fonagy and Target, 1997) have taken on a challenging task to explain how the pre-reflective experience of mental states of the baby transforms into reflective experience. Following other researchers, they suggest that body-related experiences establish the boundaries between the physical Self and the world around the child; at the same time parents come to recognise the intentional states of the child. Fonagy and Allison (2014) argue that secure attachment between the baby and caretaker forms a significant basis for the formation of epistemic trust. The authors define epistemic trust as 'an individual's willingness to consider new knowledge from another person as trustworthy, generalisable, and relevant to the self' (Fonagy and Allison, 2014, p. 373).They note that from the evolutionary perspective, attachment is older than epistemic trust, but these two processes

become closely interwoven in the child's development. 'Mentalising' (see also Chapter 7) of the child by the caretaker relies on the attachment relationship, and thus mentalising is dependent on the extent to which the child's subjective experiences are 'adequately mirrored by a trusted other' (Fonagy and Allison, 2014, p. 372). Therefore, being recognised as an agent and as a subject is essential for the development of epistemic trust (see also Nafstad, 2015; Chapter 7). In this way the secure attachment transmits culture and knowledge across generations. Fonagy and Allison draw attention to the research evidence concerning the relations between secure attachment and the ability to generate epistemic trust. Secure attachment and epistemic trust of Others generate trust of the Self and vice versa: in contrast, lack of attachment creates epistemic hypervigilance and orientates the child towards mistrust not only of the Other but also of the Self and the Self's own experience.

Conceptualisation of 'mentalisation' by Fonagy and his colleagues seems to fit with Erikson's (1968) claim that trusting Others implies trusting the Self and trusting the trust of the Other. There are practical consequences of mutual trusting. For example, educational institutions transmit traditions and moral values, and so provide the scaffolding to support the trust of parents and child. Of course, there could also be a mismatch between the child's and parental ethical values, on the one hand, and the educational system on the other, leading to partial or total distrust and insecurity. Primary forms of trust and distrust also involve primary forms of responsivity or pre-morality of the baby. Linell and Rommetveit (1998) explore the infant's capacity for spontaneous and immediate responsivity to the feelings and intentions of another person, which they call pre-morality. This elementary pre-reflective responsivity, according to the authors, is a developmental precursor of the conscious and representational mental capacity to attend to the other person. Like Rommetveit (1974), Fonagy and Target (1997, p. 688) note that parents' ability to infer correctly intentionality in the child contributes to the emergence of reflective functions, which is important for the development of richness and diversity of inner experience.

5.1.2 From pre-reflective to reflective macro-social epistemic trust

While pre-reflective micro-social trust and intersubjectivity seem to originate from the ontogenetic capacities which characterise human species, one can suggest that pre-reflective macro-social trust is historically and culturally established. We can recall the perspective of Giambattista Vico (1748/1948) according to whom the entire human race shares the capacity for making immediate judgements without reflection. Recognising someone as a human carries presuppositions about his/her mental, emotional and social capacities. Even if the potential communicative partners do not speak the same language,

they have a variety of communicative possibilities for recognising others as humans through gestures, sounds, body language and expression of emotions. For Vico, the capacity of making immediate judgements about others is a feature of common sense and ethics.

Historically and culturally, intersubjective relations led to the establishment of institutions (Chapter 4). Discussing the development of economic ties in society, Georg Simmel (1978) drew on the power of *a priori* unconscious experiences of humans that have accumulated during historical development, and gradually turned into conscious calculations. But conscious calculations would not be sufficient to maintain the harmony that is necessary for coping with the complexity of emerging economic systems. Without trust that humans invest into credits and exchange of money, economic systems could not function. Most relationships are not based upon what we know with certainty about one another, but on what we expect or believe (Simmel, 1978, pp. 178–179). Georg Simmel assumed that the existential or ontological pre-reflective trust in macro-social relations in groups, institutions or society was 'one of the most important synthetic forces within society' (Simmel, 1950, p. 318).

How did Simmel view the transition of instantaneous and pre-conceptual forms of trust into conceptual and reflective ones? Simmel (1950) considered two interrelated issues in relation to this question: social differentiation and the relation between knowledge and trust (Marková, Linell and Gillespie, 2008). The first issue was related to Simmel's emphasis on the capacity of humans to make distinctions between the Self and Others. For example, individuals make distinctions between their own and Others' mental states, emotions, perspectives and so on. The capacity to make distinctions has grown and developed in the course of the historical process of the division of labour. In the Mediaeval culture, individuals were part of kinship groups and local communities. Their roles were fixed by the status into which they were born and they fulfilled expectations of these roles and the rules attached to them. However, over time, social groups, communities and institutions have increasingly diversified. Human relations have become 'objectified' and impersonal. Disengagement in human relations and the growing differentiation and division of labour had fundamental implications for the concept of trust. While in pre-modern societies trust referred to the totality of the individual (see also Hosking, 2014; Seligman, 1997), with the growing objectification of culture it became impossible to have full knowledge of one another. Modernisation has led to fragmentation of roles and of individuals. Consequently, trust in modern days relates to fragments of human personality and specific competencies which concern particular tasks, for example, financial transactions, services of various kinds, or economic exchanges, but not to the totality of a person (see also discussion of Dumont's analysis of modern individualism and consumerism, Chapter 4).

And thus while interaction and interdependencies between individuals and communities are based on spontaneous and pre-reflective trust in their origin, with the 'objectification of culture' (Simmel, 1950, p. 319) they become solidified. They turn into reflective institutions with laws and rules and organise the life of society.

The second issue in Simmel's analysis concerns the relation between trust and knowledge. Even if the Self knows Others well, he/she cannot know them in their totality. Each individual is unique in terms of life experience, personal characteristics, motives, intentions, and otherwise. Humans are open systems and cannot acquire complete knowledge of one another. Knowledge is situated within boundaries, and beyond its boundaries we rely upon trust in its heterogeneous forms. For example, trust is a vital characteristic of interaction, of language and communication, the content of speech, and so on. Moreover, we may trust the Other with respect to certain professional activities, but not with respect to personal integrity. We keep secrets about personal life, such as about belonging to social groups, about having interpersonal relations, and so on. We make a difference between intimate relations between friends and strangers. Modernity has created a new meaning of 'a stranger' (Simmel, 1950). No longer is 'a stranger' someone who comes from abroad and whom one previously has not seen, but instead it is someone, who is present on a daily basis, and with whom one deals all the time in his or her specific roles. Such a person is 'a stranger' because he or she is known to the Self only in his or her specific role, for example, as an accountant, as a policeman or a nurse, in order to make transactions or provide services, and not otherwise. Social differentiation has also led to the formation of social groups, associations and institutions in which people remain anonymous in their totality and are known to one another only in their specific functions. Knowing and not knowing Others as they developed throughout history created a space for different epistemic forms of trust and distrust. Trusting close friends, family, may still involve trusting the whole person even if it does not involve trusting what he/she may say or do in a specific situation (Marková, Linell and Gillespie, 2008). In contrast, distrust of strangers involves fragmentation of them as persons and believing or disbelieving some things they do or say. Bearing on these points, Moran (2005) and Faulkner (2007) make observations with respect to two kinds of epistemic phenomena: trusting a person is not the same as trusting the content of what he/she says (about different kinds of trust see also Linell and Marková, 2014a, Marková and Gillespie, 2008; 2012). Moran (2005) and Faulkner (2007) imply that trusting a person involves a deep and enduring relation, which need not be affected by distrusting that person's words or deeds. For example, I may continue trusting a person as a friend despite knowing that he/she is not telling the truth with respect to an issue in question. On the other hand, I may distrust someone as a person, yet believe what he/she says or does on a particular

occasion. Thus I may distrust a bank manager as a person but I may trust his/her statement concerning a specific issue. Different kinds of epistemic trust are important in accounts of testimony (Moran, 2005) while the genealogy of epistemic trust/distrust reveals differences in relation to friends and strangers (Faulkner, 2007).

5.1.3 Hermeneutics of trust and hermeneutics of suspicion

Epistemic trust as the common ground for understanding is largely rooted in language, communication, daily actions and life practices, engaging the Self–Others in interpretations of meanings and experiences. Complex relations between these phenomena were the subjects of study of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur and Mikhail Bakhtin, who each presented these interdependent relations in unique ways (see also Linell and Marková, 2014b).

For Gadamer, hermeneutics (i.e. the theory and practice of interpretation) was based on trusting language; he thought of language as a form of lived experience which enables the understanding of the world (Gadamer, 2007b, p. 272). However, Gadamer did not dismiss the tension between trust and taking risk in dialogue and he referred to several ways in which the Self exposes him-/herself to risks in dialogue.

Above all, there is the tension due to the opposition between language as a source of mutualities between people, and at the same time, as a source of unsurmountable barriers, which leads to several risks. It is the openness of the dialogical engagement with the world and with Others that presents the Self with challenges. Since meanings of words are never rigid and fixed, Gadamer argues, there are numerous possibilities of interpretation of speech, which expose the Self to doubts about how Others will interpret the Self's words (Gadamer, 2007a, p. 163). Thus, saying something in front of the Other, listening to one's own voice and becoming aware of one's own biases could make one anxious even before the Other person responds. Dialogical experience does not limit itself to exchanges of contributions and to arguments and counter-arguments, but the meaning of what one says modifies itself in one's engagement with the Other. And even if one assigns specific meanings to one's words or explicates one's assertions, will the Other really understand? Even if one genuinely speaks one's own mind, the meaning of one's words changes throughout discourse; the sheer presence of the Other already changes what one says. The Self lays bare in front of Others his/her prejudices and thus risks the Others' evaluation and possible denigration of the Self (Gadamer, 2007a, pp. 163–164).

In addition, Gadamer poses basic questions that every speaker faces: on the one hand, there is the commonality of shared meaning which the participants

build up in conversation, and on the other hand, speakers and listeners are in many ways impenetrable. How do these opposite features make communication possible? With these complexities in mind, Gadamer asks what, finally, is the nature of language: 'Is it a bridge built of things that are the same for each self over which one communicates with the other over the flowing stream of otherness? Or is it a barrier that limits our giving up of our selves . . . and that cuts us off from the possibility of ever completely expressing ourselves and communicating with others?' (Gadamer, 2007a, p. 164). Gadamer concludes that if the nature of language is communicability of perspectives, then we must assume that building bridges between the Self and the Other is fundamental to this process (see also Voloshinov, 1929/1973, p. 86). This does not mean, however, that one can trust all speech and all texts. There is a difference between genuine and non-genuine texts. The latter texts take forms of anti-texts (e.g. jokes, irony), pseudotexts (e.g. rhetorical fillers, texts empty of content) and pre-texts, which hide the true meaning (e.g. ideological expressions, neurotic masking of the meaning) (Gadamer, 2007a, pp. 176–178). Gadamer concludes that these instances are examples of what the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (see next paragraph) calls the 'hermeneutics of suspicion'. Nevertheless, in Gadamer's view these are exceptional cases and it would be a mistake to privilege such instances that distort communication and treat them as typical in ordinary situations of textual interpretation. He thinks that all forms of interpretation are forms of overcoming an awareness of suspicion (Gadamer, 1984).

Paul Ricoeur, like Gadamer, presupposed that language forms the essence of humanity. But in contrast to Gadamer, for whom language is above all the means of dialogical communication, Ricoeur's point of departure is the individual's capacity for reflection and self-consciousness. Self-reflection is the basic function of language. Ricoeur was critical of Descartes' perspective, according to which the immediate consciousness provides the certainty of knowledge. Descartes considers the Cogito, that is, 'I think therefore I am', as certainty, says Ricouer, but this certainty does not constitute true self-knowledge (Ricoeur, 1969/1974, p. 101); it is only the first step towards it. In order to become true self-knowledge, this immediate truth must be mediated by the means that objectify it like 'the ideas, actions, works, institutions and monuments' (Ricoeur, 1969/1974, p. 43). Only in and through the process of self-reflection can the individual interpret and understand language. In contrast to Descartes, Ricoeur rejects the idea of self-consciousness as something direct and immediate. Direct and immediate self-consciousness is no more than a 'false consciousness' (Ricoeur, 1969/1974, p. 148) or 'illusory Cogito' (Ricoeur, 1969/1974, p. 243). It hides behind unconscious and symbolically constituted cultural traditions and concrete events. Symbols have multiple meanings and therefore, Ricoeur argues that language expresses something

else than what it means, and therefore, it is equivocal (Ricoeur, 1965/1970, p. 7). This is why Ricoeur introduces the notion of the 'hermeneutics of suspicion'. He explains (Ricoeur, 1969/1974, pp. 18, 148–150) that it was Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, who were suspicious of the illusions of the immediate consciousness and became aware of its tricks. These three masters posited, each of them in their own ways, the idea of 'false consciousness'. Freud conceived it through the unconscious, and he attempted to teach the patient to reinterpret his/her problems and so to achieve cure. Marx posited the 'false consciousness' as a means of establishing economic exploitation. He thought that people should reinterpret the realities of their ordinary life in and through their practices so as to reveal hidden social contradictions. Nietzsche's idea of 'false consciousness' was derived from untrue knowledge. Nietzsche suggested that people must rediscover their powers rather than passively accept the ideology of religion.

These three examples show that for Ricouer, consciousness is doubly orientated. First, it appears as immediate, as a 'false consciousness'; and second, it must correct itself through the reflective process in order to arrive at proper understanding.

Rather than insisting on a sharp distinction between Gadamer's and Ricoeur's perspectives (e.g. Gonzalez, 2006), let us contend that the two concepts, the hermeneutics of trust and the hermeneutics of suspicion, were posited as specific solutions to specific problems rather than as generalised perspectives of these two scholars. Gadamer's hermeneutics of trust is above all an ethical concept. As Dostal (2002, p. 32) comments, '[t]he ethic of this hermeneutic is an ethic of respect and trust that calls for solidarity'. Gadamer's ethics is based on dialogical openness towards the Other, towards tradition and history. One cannot understand the Other or history on one's own premises but on the basis of genuine hermeneutic acknowledgement that the Other has his/her own autonomy and that history has to be interpreted on its own bases (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 359–361). Here we have an echo of the idea that rejects fusing of the Self with the Other (Chapter 4) and which, instead, calls for the dialogical necessity of treating the Other as autonomous.

As for Ricoeur, although he used the term 'hermeneutics of suspicion' (Ricoeur, 1965/1970, 1969/1974) only in his early work (Kaplan, 2008, pp. 198–200; Scott-Baumann, 2009), he never rejected the concept on which the hermeneutics of suspicion is based. This concept was part of Ricoeur's lifelong project opposing the Cartesian Cogito of the immediacy of the consciousness. He explained his position in the book *Oneself as Another* (Ricoeur, 1990/1992), where he insisted that the concept of the 'I' in the Cartesian 'I think therefore I am' is totally different from that of the Self. According to Ricoeur, the Self is the centre of reflection of the Self's own selfhood, and of the

Self's temporality which arises only in and through Others. He clarifies both issues in *Oneself as Another*. Concerning the meaning of selfhood, Ricoeur states that the title of his book elucidates this position: '*Oneself as Another* suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian terms' (Ricoeur, 1990/1992, p. 3). For Ricoeur, the dialectic of movement between opposites is a returning feature of his thought; the unfolding of the dialectic between the Self and Other, which is vital to his hermeneutics, is one of many examples of his dialectical thinking. For example, in his earlier work Ricoeur dialectically contrasted the hermeneutics of suspicion with faith. He explained that faith is not an immediate consciousness, that is, a 'false consciousness', but that reflective faith arises in and through contemplation and criticism (Ricoeur, 1965/1970, p. 28).

Concerning the other feature in the title *Oneself as Another*, that is, temporality, Ricoeur proposed that by having the capacity of reflection upon one's own Self, the Self's identity is constituted through the dialectic of two components. He called the first one '*idem*-identity', that is, the Self's permanence in time. The second component is the capacity of the Self to change, that is, to be an agent. This second component Ricoeur calls '*ipse*-identity', and it provides the Self with the experience of temporality or narrativity. These two kinds of the Self's identity, sameness ('idem') and selfhood ('ipse'), are in dialectical opposition (Ricoeur, 1990/1992, pp. 18, 21). According to Ricoeur's conception, the selfhood is always related to the Other and human agency is most fully developed in ethics and morality. Here we see again that human agency is not 'neutral'; it is ethical. It is evaluative of the Self and of Others and it is responsive to Others (Ricoeur, 1990/1992, pp. 165–168). Ricoeur introduces here the idea of ethics as 'good life'. Although in moral philosophy, the two notions 'morality' and 'ethics' are often, though not always, used in an undifferentiated manner, Ricoeur makes an important distinction between these notions. He establishes the priority of ethics, that is, the Self's aim of achieving the 'good life' with Others and with truthful institutions (Ricoeur, 1990/1992, p. 172), over the normative concept of obligations, that is, over prescriptions about what 'ought' to be done. Ethical action involves humans in searching for what they think is good and worthwhile for them, and in avoiding what they think will harm them. Therefore, humans are engaged with their world in and through a wide domain of the dialectic of acting and suffering. The Self attests the trust that he/she has power to speak, to do things, to recognise oneself in one's narrative and to undergo various experiences including suffering. Ethics of the Self is the ethics of ordinary life by means of which the Self aspires to increase the fullness of being, relieving suffering and fostering prosperity.

Humans make decisions about life-important issues that involve trust and distrust; they imagine good and bad things and they take and avoid responsibilities. In their search for what they think is good for them, mutual recognition of one another plays a major role not only in ordinary life, but also in politics and economy (Ricoeur, 2004/2005). Yet let us recall that the concept of 'good life' is relational and that, as noted at the beginning of this book, what some consider as good, just and worthwhile, others may call misery, injustice, and even terror.

Ricoeur's perspective on ethics in terms of the mutuality of the Self-Other recognition corroborates that of Giambattista Vico (see Chapter 2), for whom ethics was a fundamental feature of common sense based on the uniqueness of humans, and not on systematised rules of a general and objective science of morality. Ricoeur does not reject morality based on norms and obligations; indeed, morality constitutes a legitimate and indispensable part in the actualisation of ethical aims. However, according to Ricoeur's hypothesis, ethics has priority over morality and morality is thus subsumed under ethics (Ricoeur, 1990/1992, p. 170).

If we turn to Mikhail Bakhtin, regardless his preoccupations with contradictions (e.g. Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 176) in language, and notwithstanding his insistence on dialogical heterogeneities, Bakhtin trusted language totally (Emerson, 2002). Despite living in an unjust world of the Soviet regime that offered Bakhtin no reasonableness and no rewards, for Bakhtin, the individual could live by his/her ideals and even make these ideals realistic and practical. Although events in the external world were unjust, could not be trusted, and provided no benefit for the individual, each individual could choose 'a coherent *response* to an event. In a word, it is this individual freedom over the response that the ideal facilitates' (Emerson, 2002, p. 23). Since Bakhtin had no faith in the insecure world in which he lived, dialogical competencies such as trust and responsibility were crucial for his existence.

Epistemic trust as a common ground for understanding and interpretation in all forms that are discussed in this section is presented as a dialogical or dialectic movement[2] transforming relations between Selves and Others in their search for intersubjectivity and for social recognition. This dialogical or dialectic movement is based on the implicit presupposition of the Self and Other that they live in a shared social world which underlies their ethical aspirations for good and worthwhile living in and through life practices.

[2] I discussed the differences between dialogicality and dialectic in *Dialogicality and Social Representations* (2003a). In the present context this difference is not important because both in dialectic and dialogicality the focus is on the dynamic of passing through and overcoming oppositions between contradictory poles rather than on conceptual differences between these two processes.

5.2 Asymmetries and negotiation of epistemic trust and distrust

In many situations dialogical participants are explicitly aware of their differences with respect to their common ground for understanding, including asymmetries of knowledge, experience, social status and otherwise. In such situations, in order to diminish differences in knowledge and experience and to expand the common ground for understanding, epistemic trust manifests itself as willingness of humans to learn from one another. Alternatively, humans may negotiate their epistemic trust/distrust on the basis of available evidence in order to establish the common ground for cooperation. They may also totally reject epistemic trust in one another. In discussing these issues we shall turn again to the dialogical triad Ego–Alter-Object (see Chapter 4), and we shall expand upon the assertion that relations between these three components are asymmetric. Specifically, our focus will be on asymmetries of the forms of epistemic trusts and distrusts and their transformations. In the first part of this section we shall consider epistemic relations between the Ego and the Alter in terms of epistemic authority; in the second part we shall turn to strategies involved in negotiation of epistemic trust/distrust.

5.2.1 Epistemic authority

Learning from others is a dialogically rational and efficient manner of acquiring knowledge. Lay citizens do not make, on the whole, like top scientists, for example, Darwin, Einstein or Comenius, essential discoveries and inventions about nature and society. Instead, they learn from experts, teachers, the media or from 'ordinary Others' such as peers, parents, or from traditions transmitted over generations. We can say that in a dialogical relation, epistemic trust of the 'Other' is a substitute for the Self's lack of capacity to discover and comprehend knowledge and experience of natural and social phenomena on his/her own. Epistemic trust goes far beyond the willingness of individuals to accept knowledge from Others. It has obtained an institutional function in various domains of life such as education, management, politics, religion and in other situations, where experts are placed in 'the position of trust' and expected to function as reliable sources of knowledge in their specific fields. This also means that epistemic trust is intermingled with beliefs, ideological priorities of institutions and with values of particular groups and therefore, its role in learning is ambiguous. For example, in education the teacher is in the position of trust and is assumed to transmit the best possible knowledge, uncontaminated by his/her personal or ideological preferences, to students and trainees. Max Weber went as far as to argue that the educator must present a value-free knowledge and confer facts only (Weber, 1919/1946, p. 151). He claimed that prophets can make their speeches in the streets. Objective science must

distinguish between value judgements and empirical knowledge; it should aim at facts and truths, and must be value-neutral. In contrast to Weber, Hannah Arendt (1977a) argued that it is the task of educators to transmit values and traditions as well as to encourage in children innovation and new ideas (see also Gordon, 1999). More recently, Zagzebski (2012) notes that while organisations or professional bodies are sometimes referred to as 'epistemic authority,' this notion has been disappearing in recent years due to the emphasis on egalitarianism and freedom of the individual. In the domains of beliefs and morality, Zagzebski comments, 'epistemic authority' has never been given much attention, because it has been assumed that self-reliance of the individual does not need authority.

The concept of epistemic trust therefore indicates that we are dealing with a highly controversial and disputed issue in politics, education, law, professional interactions, as well as in daily life. None of these issues refer to 'neutral' interactions based on the transmission of information between the Ego–Alter, but they are imbued with ethical problems that cannot be easily resolved.

5.2.1.1 Epistemic authority as a dialogical relation The treatise of the Russian-French philosopher Alexandre Kojève, titled *The Notion of Authority* (La notion de l'autorité) (2004/2014) was written in 1942, but the text was found posthumously on the shelves of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and was published in Paris in 2004. Kojève started his book by stating that although there was much literature on authority, the problem and notion of authority had been very little researched. He noted that while studies of authority had been concerned with the question of genesis and transfer of authority, there was little focus on the nature of this phenomenon. Kojève insisted that authority, which is a symbolic relation, is a specifically human phenomenon. The concept of authority, he argued, contrasts with that of power, which refers to a relation of physical or social violence. We find the struggle for power both in animals and humans. In contrast, authority emerges in human history and is not part of biological evolution; authority exists in all cultures, societies and in their institutions, for example, in governments of States, in religious establishments, and in all hierarchically structured organisations.

The concept of authority goes back to ancient Rome, where *auctoritas* referred to a person with a high personal prestige and mysterious power to influence and attract others. It was strictly separated from *potestas*, that is, from power that implied coercion and even violence. Not surprisingly, throughout history, meanings of authority and of power have kept changing and today, both authority and power refer to a variety of heterogeneous phenomena. The Oxford English Dictionary defines authority in two basic ways. First, authority is a 'power or right to enforce obedience' which includes legal or moral

supremacy, the governing body or a body exercising power in a particular sphere. Second, authority refers to 'power to influence action, opinion, belief', which would include a book, the might to guide others, or a person whose opinion should be accepted as trustworthy. Thus we see that these 'authoritative' definitions refer to 'authority' in terms of power. This contrasts not only with the ancient Roman meaning of these phenomena but also with the opinion of some eminent scholars such as Alexandre Kojève or Hannah Arendt.

According to Kojève (2004/2014), if someone acts with authority, he/she has gained a voluntary respect from others. Authority is the relationship in which an individual, group or institution has a *symbolic influence* over another individual or group; therefore, it is a *relational concept* expressing interdependence between the Self and Others – and this is why it is a fundamentally human, social and historical phenomenon (Kojève, 2004/2014, p. 48). Like charisma, authority is changeable and perishable. Kojève proposes four distinct philosophical theories of authorities. One is represented by God or Father in theology; another one by Justice in Plato; the third is based on Aristotle's Wisdom or Knowledge; and the final theory refers to Hegel's parable of Master versus Slave. Each of these philosophical theories is based on a different kind of epistemic authority which Kojève applies to politics, morality and psychology.

Taking a historical and philosophical perspective in his study of authority, Kojève (2004/2014) argued that authoritarian systems of rules and constraints representing 'authoritarian morality' encourage, what he called, 'a servile morality'. By servile morality Kojève meant the behaviour of individuals or collectives, who voluntarily subjugate themselves to authority which they serve. This means that rather than having a voluntary respect, subjugation is due to servility of the Slave obeying the authority of the Master, such as in Hegel's Master–Slave parable (Kojève, 2004/2014, p. 91). And of course the subjugated individual hopes to be rewarded for his/her servility.

Like Kojève, Hannah Arendt (1977a) insists that authority must not be confused with power. Although both power and authority are hierarchical relations, someone with authority cannot use external means of coercion; using force implies that authority has failed (Arendt, 1977a; Kojève, 2004/2014). Nevertheless, in reality, power and authority often intermingle with one another, and it may be difficult to view them empirically as separate phenomena. For example, the Self may become deeply involved with authority, such as with a political, religious, or ideological leader, who may profoundly influence the Self's convictions, passions and actions. The authority may captivate others by the strength of ideas that it represents or by the fascination of his/her personality. Referring to this issue, Moscovici (1988/1993, pp. 225–228) suggested that we need to distinguish Mosaic and totemic leaders. The charisma of a Mosaic leader stems from spreading the belief

and doctrine. Examples of such leaders are Moses, Socrates, Gandhi, Marx or Lenin. These leaders enchant their followers by the passion of conviction; they propagate their ideas for the sake of these ideas rather than for the sake of their own personalities. Thus we may say that these leaders influence masses by the authority of their ideas. The second kind of leader, the totemic leader, is represented by persons such as Stalin, Hitler, Napoleon or Mao. The doctrine that these leaders spread is attached to them as individuals and they build a cult around their personalities. Their charisma is tied to them as individuals and they represent the symbol or the totem. Totemic leaders present themselves as 'personal saviours of the masses' (Moscovici, 1988/1993, p. 226). These leaders have the political and the State power to destroy their opponents. They also create myth around themselves by claims that they can lead masses out of crisis, arousing, at the same time, collective emotions that are accompanied effectively by songs, marches and dances. Despite making a theoretical distinction between Mosaic and totemic leaders, in practice, authority and power can hardly be separated. Hypnotised by the authority of a charismatic leader, the Self or the group may also view such leader as powerful. In individuals', groups' and masses' attempts to intersubjectively share experiences with the leader and to identify with him/her, both authority and power become intermingled. In practice, both charisma and power may instigate group belongingness and social identification, which may imply that the Self includes Others as part of his/her own Self. In this case the Self considers him/herself as representing, or as belonging to, the group or organisation in question (De Cremer and van Knippenberg, 2002). Such intersubjective attempts to identify oneself with the authority and power can lead humans on the road towards obedience and to renouncing their agency and responsibility on the one hand, or to fanatic radicalisation, and the loss of control over one's judgement on the other hand.

But whether or not authority and power can be clearly differentiated in practice, it is important to bear in mind that conceptually, they concern diverse relations between the Self and Others. Power represents the Self–Other relations as *I* versus *It*, in which the Self exercises his/her force over the Other, manipulating him/her and thus degrading the Other to a thing, to *It.* In contrast, epistemic authority is a dialogical and symbolic relation between the *I* and *You.* It is voluntary and it is based on the Self's recognition of the Other's supremacy, which could be intellectual, moral and otherwise.

5.2.1.2 The crisis of epistemic authority Since the time that Kojève wrote his treatise, the amount of literature on authority has increased enormously focusing on the examination of authority as a legal, political, historical and educational phenomenon (e.g. Arendt, 1977a; Gordon, 1999; Nisbet, 1966; Sennett, 1980; Wynne 1985). Ever since the late nineteen sixties and seventies,

the scrutiny of the State establishments and private institutions led to protests in various social strata against the old order of 'authority', which was often conceived as a one-sided power, rather than as a voluntary recognition of mutual trust. The growing democratisation of institutions in the post-War world and liberalisation, for example, in education, politics, health and therapeutic services, has encouraged the idea of an independent Self placing emphasis on the rights of individuals and minority groups. This has been accompanied by the demand for granting voices to citizens and for enabling them to make their choices and decisions about matters that concerned them. All this has undermined the status of the existing authorities and placed emphasis on the rights of independent individuals and minority groups. Relations of hierarchy in various spheres of social life have crumbled and have become substituted by demands for equality and for autonomy of humans. The idea that all humans are born with the capacity for rational thought and judgement seems to have contributed to abandoning the epistemic authorities of experts, for example, teachers, judges, policemen or politicians (Zagzebski, 2012).

The relations between the Self and Others have become particularly strongly visible in professional services that were traditionally hierarchical, such as teacher-pupil and doctor-patient. Trust in professionals and scientists has eroded as suspicions concerning the hiding of knowledge about biological risks, economy problems or 'new deaths' such as HIV/AIDS or mad-cow disease (Lambert, 2005) became widespread. Control and formalised accountability became viewed as a necessary contribution to democracy, as a confidence-raising measure (e.g. Anderson and Dedrick, 1990), and as a bureaucratic solution to the 'legitimation crisis' (Habermas, 1975). Suspicion in advanced economic systems created the 'audit society' threatening to turn into a 'closed society' (Power, 1999), although it is not known whether auditing actually restores trust among professionals and clients (Power, 2000). Suspicions of authority, for example, in doctor–patient communication and in therapies, encouraged patients to make their own informed choices about the kind of treatment they might wish to receive and the kind of medication to which they will or will not consent. Such revolutionary transformations have become apparent in all social relations that have been historically hierarchical, such as those between parents and children, between professionals and trainees and between experts and lay persons. The struggle for social recognition was taken into the streets, and has acquired a specific form: it was not a call for recognition of the Slave by Masters; it was turned into a claim that there are no Slaves and no Masters and that everybody is equal. Masters cannot be trusted with epistemic authority because everybody was born equal and this also applies to epistemic issues.

5.2.1.3 Epistemic trust in contemporary education In an ideal case of socio-cultural learning, the authority of the educator originates from his/her expertise and capacity to transmit knowledge or justified beliefs in a dynamic process mutually affecting all components of the dialogical triad, the Ego–Alter–Object. A person with authority has the epistemic trust of those to whom he/she delivers knowledge or justified beliefs. In a dialogical relation, epistemic trust of the 'Other' is a substitute for the Self's lack of capacity to discover natural and social phenomena on his/her own. In an ideal case of the dialogical process of learning, the student reasons about phenomena he/she learns and submits them to criticism and arguments. The teacher with authority recognises his/her responsibility to students and conceives him-/herself to be in 'the position of trust'. The teacher transmits knowledge and the student accepts his/her authority as a Master, to use Kojève's term, leaving space for the student's reasoning and new ideas. We can refer to the process of learning from Others as the *dialogical rationality* (Introduction, p. 6), that is, a process of reasoning based on the epistemic trust of the Other; it is culturally embedded and in learning it takes place in and through joint activities, language and communication. More than that, the student can become deeply involved with the teacher as a political, religious, or other kind of authority (e.g. religious or ideological leaders), which may profoundly affect the student's beliefs, convictions and passions. In such cases the Ego–Alter interpersonal relations can become prioritised by the student over the Ego–Object learning relations. No doubt this leads to ethical and moral questions because authority represents a major force that can be both beneficial and detrimental to the student.

Analysing questions of epistemic trust in education, Zittoun (2014a) shows that epistemic trust is closely related to interpersonal trust. This idea well fits with that of the ontological interdependence between the Ego–Alter which, as we discussed earlier, involves interaction based on the search for intersubjectivity and for social recognition. Pupils enter school as young and as less experienced than their teachers and they need to trust that teachers have commitments towards them. In order to trust their teachers, pupils must see that teachers are dedicated to them and care about them; and equally, teachers must see their students as intending to learn and having epistemic trust in them. Therefore it is important that the teacher displays trust in his/her students' capacities and that students perceive the teacher's trust. If the teacher has epistemic trust of students, he/she may manifest it by offering them some choice or autonomy. He/she may attempt to form interpersonal relations by telling students of his/her own passions and interests, and openly expressing the belief in students' innovation and creativity. Therefore the teaching-learning process requires interpersonal trust, which makes this process ready for the development of epistemic trust which, Zittoun (2014a, p. 125) notes, 'might require a leap of faith'. Interpersonal trust facilitates the student's engagement



Figure 5.1 Trust in teaching–learning interactions

with the unknown, with reconsidering past knowledge and submitting it to a critique. Therefore, the trusts of the learner and of the teacher are mutually dependent (Figure 5.1).

Zittoun maintains that in this process two intersubjective dynamics take place. First, there is a symmetrical line which expresses an interpersonal relationship between both participants. Only if the symmetrical line develops, can also the second process take place. This latter process is represented by the horizontal line of an asymmetric relationship of learning, that is, by the epistemic trust. If the teacher externalises trust in her students inviting reciprocity and granting students autonomy, this supports the teacher's position as an expert. In contrast, Zittoun points out that in cases where interpersonal relations between the teacher and students do not develop, no reciprocity of epistemic relationships takes place.

But as Zittoun (2014a, p. 132) notes the situation in 'democratic schools' is paradoxical. While praising symmetrical relations between teachers and pupils, the school 'puts students in a situation of asymmetry *de facto* – teachers have the power of the institutions and master knowledge; yet at the same time it is usually expected that students will develop an independent and critical form of thinking'. This paradox should not cause difficulties if it were possible to clearly distinguish epistemic authority and power, and to define the features of learning-teaching processes that call for symmetrical and asymmetrical interactions and for rights and responsibilities of teachers and learners.

The problem is that the distinction between epistemic authority and power is difficult to make and this has become a source of major disputes since the second half of the twentieth century (for a review of studies concerning this issue see Pace and Hemmings, 2007). A number of researchers have argued that teachers and students should share authority because not only students learn from teachers but equally, teachers learn from students, in particular about

social justice. Moreover, it is contended that if education is run in a non-authoritarian manner, this will provide a basis for a non-authoritarian society of the future (Oyler, 1996). New models of 'progressive professions' maintain that sharing authority should improve co-operation with students and the building of trust, which is essential for any organisations in which people develop knowledge and understanding. Students should be granted some choice about what they want to learn (Hurn, 1985) and this would enable the development of their intellectual and moral autonomy. Teachers should be encouraged to eradicate hierarchical systems in classrooms, to deconstruct authority and introduce participatory interactions (Pace and Hemmings, 2007). While all this may sound progressive, in practice, a number of problems occur. How can an expert teacher or professional treat a pupil, who is in the class to learn, as equal in experience, knowledge, social sensitivity and other issues? Pace and Hemmings (2007, pp. 14–15) comment that research on the abolition of authority showed that teachers, '[r]ather than giving direct commands or asserting professional expertise', 'relied on their personal influence and prestige, acknowledged their vulnerabilities, and used other appeals for cooperation in the hopes of forging closer bonds with students'. This resulted in highly fragile and even unconvincing interpersonal relations, in which teachers attempted to make themselves charming, interesting, and trying to create an atmosphere of intimacy (Swidler, 1979). Minogue (2010, p. 99) puts it as follows: 'In the worst cases the teacher tries to be a "pal". Indeed, the full development of the democratic telos is to standardise all relationships as those of a "pal" liberating the child from authorities and hierarchical relations.'

One can also consider cases of students who, for one reason or other, do not accept the educator as an epistemic authority. For example, students from a 'working class' background may reject the epistemic authority of a 'middle class' teacher who, in the students' view, knows nothing about life outside the school; women students may reject the male teacher; students from ethnic minorities may not approve of a teacher from the dominant majority, and so on. Such cases are often discussed by the media, professionals, parents, or teachers themselves (e.g., Arendt, 1977b; Minogue, 2010).

Arendt (1977b, p. 190) commented, however, that it was adults, rather than pupils, who abolished authority. In her view it is absurd to treat children as an oppressed minority by the adult majority and she notes that by discarding authority, 'the adults refuse to assume responsibility for the world into which they have brought the children'. Arendt's argument can be understood along the following lines. By treating pupils as epistemically equal to adults, the teacher deprives them of experiencing epistemic authority. Epistemic authority is a voluntary dialogical relation between the Self and Other based on the respect of the teacher, from who the pupil is willing to learn. Consequently, depriving pupils of epistemic authority means denying them the opportunity of

learning from someone, who is more knowledgeable and more experienced, than themselves. Learning from epistemic authority contributes to a relative certainty and stability required in meaningful daily life. If pupils do not experience and do not learn this, then, when they become adults, they will be unable to transfer such experience and knowledge to the future generation. They will not know what it means to be in the role of epistemic authority, and to have 'responsibility for the world', both of which come with maturity, knowledge and experience.

5.2.1.4 Beyond epistemic authority: social networking through the Internet

The fast changing world of technological advancements brings about still more challenges to adults' roles regarding epistemic authority and 'responsibility for the world'. During the last two decades an expansion in the use of the Internet and social networking has become a new resource of information and of opportunities for creating relationships. These new means of communication through sites such as MySpace, Facebook and many others have transformed family lives, roles of peer groups and the meaning of friendships (e.g. Lister et al., 2009). These means not only provide different ideas for learning, self-development and self-display, but they offer adventures and risks for children and young people. Social networking competes with the established forms of learning and socialising and in many respects, its new forms have taken over the roles of epistemic authority and trust. Social networking also creates a new language. It describes social relationships by referring to people building 'their "profile", make it "public" or "private", they "comment" or "message" their "top friends" on their "wall", they "block" or "add" people to their network' (Livingstone, 2008, p. 394).

The new media have given rise to numerous academic and popular journals, reviewing and describing positive and dangerous features of these technological developments, their societal influences in general, and in relation to young people specifically. Among the most important questions are those that concern the balancing of features which constitute self-actualisation and those that are harmful and hazardous. Some researchers and professionals emphasise new opportunities for sociability, creativity, self-expression, gaining confidence and developing identity (e.g. Baym, 2006). They draw attention to the emergence of novel possibilities for the Self to display information about him/herself, although this is often governed by the intention to present a façade of the Self in order to impress the peer group. In making decisions about which aspects of the Self could be revealed and concealed, whom to trust, what emotions to express, how to establish reciprocity and how to continuously re-present oneself (Livingstone, 2008), users carefully monitor their interactions. Yet such decisions are subject to constraints of accepted norms of the peer group and the Self must fit his/her display within these.

Other researchers and practitioners express anxieties about the narcissistic nature of self-expressions and the focus on the 'I'. Narcissism has been profusely commented upon by writers and the media, and it has been described as an epidemic of our time, such as obesity, drug-addiction and alcoholism. Following a number of others, Twenge and Campbell (2009) discuss the culture of growing self-admiration, claims of entitlements, and of supermodels that dominate the public discourse and the media. These authors argue that this culture, based on self-centredness, self-esteem, self-promotion and other forms of self-love, is accompanied by a moving away from accepting personal responsibility, and by making claims for a total freedom disregarding Others. Twenge and Campbell focus, among other issues, on narcissism thriving on displays of Internet networks. Although the authors acknowledge positive features of Internet social networking, they draw attention to the shallowness of Internet 'friendships'. These are often based on 'numbers' rather than on deep emotional attachments, and so they facilitate superficial relations among narcissistic individuals (Twenge and Campbell, 2009, pp. 111–112).

All these and many other concerns raise issues for the dialogical mind. Does the emphasis on self-expression mean that narcissism on the Internet turns humans into monological individuals and that dialogism has no longer place in contemporary society? We can suggest that what superficially looks like a total absorption of the individual in his/her Self could be viewed as an acute search of that individual to find home and security with Others. From the dialogical perspective the Self cannot find satisfaction in pretending to have a total freedom on his/her own, and in admiring one's face in the mirror without calling Others. The display of the 'I-for-myself' (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 27), such as self-centredness, self-promotion and self-love accompanied by the claims of entitlements and personal freedom is characterised by ignoring 'I-for-Others' and 'Others-for-me', and so by rejecting personal responsibility for Others (Chapter 6). We can suggest that such self-centredness could be understood as an expression of an unhappy dialogical mind struggling for recognition and life-satisfaction. We may also raise the question as to whether this narcissistic self-promotion on the Internet is becoming a norm in various kinds of interactions in the contemporary world of uncertainties, information overload and technological advancements. Let us recall the forms of interdependencies between the Self-Others in terms of the Hegelian 'circle returning within itself' (Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2.1) in which freedom, ethics, social recognition and intersubjectivity are mutually acknowledged by both parties. However, the 'I-for-myself' which excludes the 'I-for-Others' is not a circle returning within itself but a vicious circle which, in the end does not lead to the satisfaction of the Self. The self-display of the blogger can have a meaning for the Self only if it is seen and acknowledged by Others. The blog about the Self would be

pointless if the author placed his/her creation into the drawer. The blog must be seen and admired by Others.

5.2.1.5 Breaking down the dialogical triangle in education: Objects as imaginary desires Education takes place in specific historical, political and economic conditions and in addition to learning, these conditions offer teachers and students opportunities for promotion, material advancement or they create desires to obtain certain imagined things. Let us transpose Louis Dumont's (Chapter 4) argument about consumerism into the context of contemporary education. In such a case the process of learning will be driven not only by aims to attain knowledge but by desires to reach other goals in the world of fast changes and ever increasing feelings of insecurity. Only ideally, education aims at dialogical learning. In contemporary practice, the orientation towards careers, publications, productivity, and quick payoffs (e.g. Laney, 1991; Thompson, 1991) does not encourage solely the relations of the Ego–Alter–Object of knowledge. Instead, like in Dumont's analysis of consumerism, education often promotes the relations of the Ego–Alter–Thing of desire. The dialogical epistemological triad breaks down, and we find that a student orientates him-/herself towards other imaginary goals (Figure 5.2). These have nothing to do with dialogical learning, but with satisfying desires or with attempting to reduce uncertainties and anxiety. These goals may be orientated to questions such as: Can I get a job at the end? Shall I become rich? Shall I progress in my career? While such questions are not surprising, once they become the only questions in the process of education, epistemic trust of the Other no longer exists. Most often, the student faces a mixture of goals, both epistemic and consumerist.



Figure 5.2 Dialogical triangle broken

The breakdown of the dialogical triad may apply not only to the student but also to the teacher. The teacher may attempt to involve him-/herself in inauthentic communication with the student, whether attempting to deconstruct authority as discussed earlier, or trying to obtain financial means for whatever 'research' is in fashion, which will lead to his/her personal promotion, and otherwise. There could even be a mutual language game and pretend communication between educator and student. For example, both the educator and student may play the servile game of professing the importance of journals with 'high impact factors' or of quoting pieces of work they do not respect, but which will keep them in the club playing these games. At worst, they might even interiorise these games and believe their own inauthentic communication rather than admit the incoherence of their communication and activities. Epistemic trust plays no role in these games; it is a game based on distrust which, nevertheless, secures careers and promotions. This means that both the teacher and student might submit themselves to servility knowing that the other party is servile. In such non-communication or pretend communication, dialogicality is reduced to the mutual recognition that both parties know that nobody presents an authentic message and that all parties live an 'alibi in being' (Bakhtin, 1993). And this, too, may become a feature of the 'new common sense' (Chapter 3), socially shared knowledge and joint action.

5.2.2 Negotiating epistemic trust

The dynamics of trust and distrust permeates daily life, thinking and communication, showing itself as a tension between opposite poles: trust as comprehended through distrust and suspicion, and authentic speech as understood in opposition to pretence. Humans express and communicate these dynamics through speech, as well as non-verbally through their bodies and gestures. Situations of daily conflict often require negotiation of epistemic trust and distrust, in which the opposing parties might be relatively equal in terms of their capabilities and therefore, their strategies require treating one another as *I-You* rather than as *I-It.* Being mutually aware of their capacities, both parties could push the opponent to the very limit of negotiation. On the other hand, opposing parties of unequal capabilities use strategies that alternatively mix the relations of *I-You* with those of *I-It.*

Gillespie (2012) explored the dynamics of epistemic trust in the conflict of the Cuban Missile Crisis during the Cold War in 1962. This brought into focus the transformations of trust/distrust between the American President John Kennedy and his advisors on the one hand and the leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev and his Politburo on the other hand. The study is based on the analysis of the White House transcripts of communication messages between these two opposing powers. Gillespie shows a subtle interplay of

activities that are characterised by the piling up of nuclear weapons as a sign of distrust, and at the same time by mutual knowledge that the destruction by both powers would be reciprocal. In order to play the game, a certain amount of epistemic trust in the shared social ground and rational activities had to prevail, so that no party would start the war. In and through communication by written messages such as telegrams, and letters, as well as by telephones, both parties became highly reflective about the possible intentions and moves of the Other. They continued to present themselves as rational and reasonable partners in a very dangerous dialogical game. While distrust and fear made each party cautious, they nevertheless made all possible efforts to conquer each other by pushing the situation to the very brink: 'Brinkmanship was described by John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower's Secretary of State as "the ability to get to the verge without getting into the war"' (Gillespie, 2012, p. 146). Brinkmanship is a strategy of a highly reflective dialogicality. It requires a considerable degree of intersubjective evaluation of intentions and movements, as well as the awareness of possible disastrous consequences, should mistakes be made in the mutual evaluations of risks. In terms of intersubjectivity as conceptualised by the dialogical philosophies, brinkmanship requires a relative equality of free human beings struggling to overpower one another without provoking war or physical violence. Gillespie comments that in reflective dialogicality, which is functional in strategies of distrust, each party trusts 'that the other when pushed to the brink will be rational enough to back down rather than let catastrophic consequences follow' (Gillespie, 2012, p. 148). In conflicts of this kind the Self does not underestimate the Other because that would have disastrous consequences. Instead, participants' imaginative taking the role of the other enables them to continue the game until the moment arrives that both parties recognise as endgame.

In contrast to the case of Gillespie, in which the partners in interactional conflict are in a relatively equal position of their capabilities and can push one another to the very brink, other situations involve the negotiation of trust and distrust in conditions of clearly unequal capacities, for example, between institutions and lay persons or clients. Linell and Keselman (2012) explored the case of negotiation of trust/distrust in interviews involving asylum seekers in Sweden. These concerned caseworkers representing the Swedish migration authority whose communication was interpreted on-line, and the asylum applicants, who were unaccompanied minors arriving in Sweden from Russia or other former Soviet Republics. Several issues were at stake:

- the applicants were illegally smuggled to Sweden, and they were involved in petty crimes, such as stealing alcohol
- the authorities aimed at the fair implementation of an immigration policy
- the investigative interviews had both legal-administrative purposes as well as psychological and humanitarian considerations.

The researchers identified a number of ambiguities and misunderstandings by all involved parties. Like Gillespie's study, Linell and Keselman's research highlighted a great deal of mutual distrust manifested among participants. The defendant asylum seeker is someone accused of stealing and lying, that is, of carrying out morally indefensible acts which the defendant does not deny. This provides the caseworker with reasons to treat the youngster's actions as reprehensible. At the same time the caseworker claims that he/she acts in the best interests of the defendant. As the authors maintain, trust involves the mutual taking of each other's perspectives which is difficult to maintain, because the parties' discourses are based on different rationalities and frames of reference. For example, the defendant outlines that it is his poverty that leads him to steal as this enables him to get money for winter clothing. The caseworker however cannot adopt the perspective that one commits offences and lies about that. Socially reprehensible acts deprive the Self of being treated by the Other as an equal being in making judgements. In these cases, epistemic distrust rose out of contradictory accounts and misunderstandings about the roles, rights and responsibilities of the involved parties.

Aronsson and Osvaldsson (2014) explored lexicon and grammatical structures legitimising as well as undermining the construction of blame during staff and parent meetings in a residential home for young people in Sweden, and an adolescent resident girl with 'problems'. Focusing on epistemic distrust which was revealed through the production of blame narratives, the authors have shown how, through the use of 'veiled stances' and indirect language games the participants expressed trust and distrust evaluating one another. For example, by the choice of verbs and tenses, single events were transformed into habitual conduct, and events in the past were extended into the present. Value leakages in speech revealed specific moral orders of the institution neglecting the perspective of the adolescent. The authors showed that these discursive patterns were constructed into forms of blame and distrust. Nevertheless, as in the previous cases, distrust can be constructed and reflected upon, only if it is based upon a certain degree of trust.

5.3 Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored two basic and mutually overlapping forms of epistemic trust/distrust. One form concerns the participants' presupposition, or the lack of it that they live in a temporarily shared social world comprising a common ground for understanding and interpretation of their social reality. The other form refers to the capacity and readiness of participants (or the lack of it) to learn and accept knowledge and experience from one another. Let us consider the most important characteristics of these two forms.

5.3.1 *From interpersonal to epistemic trust*

We have seen that epistemic trust/distrust is directly derived from the Ego–Alter interdependence as an ethical and ontological relation. When established, epistemic trust is implicitly taken for granted, and it forms the common ground for understanding and interpretation of the social reality, of socially shared knowledge, language and communication, common values, and intentions to aim at 'good life'. Epistemic trust is historically and culturally embedded and it ranges from micro-social to macro-social forms.

Synchrony and rhythm in interpersonal interactions between the carer and the baby are vital for the development of interpersonal trust. By regulating their interactions, sensitive carers facilitate the development of intersubjective relations before these are observable, and so they contribute to their actual achievement. Pre-reflective interactional trust and secure attachment between the baby and carer develop into reflective epistemic forms of trust, that is, of trust in the Object of knowledge. This point has been further developed with reference to the educational context. The well-established interpersonal trust between the teacher and learner is necessary for epistemic trust in order to achieve the goals of education.

Humans are unique open systems and knowledge about one another is always incomplete. In their attempt to maintain and further develop intersubjective relations and social recognition, they strive to expand the boundaries of knowledge by relying upon epistemic trust/distrust, and by using their capacities of imagining and anticipating thoughts, language, communication and actions of others. Sense-making and sense-creating in language and communication are heterogeneous processes open to numerous interpretations. Philosophical analyses of trust and suspicion by Gadamer, Ricoeur and Bakhtin draw attention to problems arising from the difficulties of interpretation of language and, particularly, to questions arising for the dialogical epistemology of everyday life.

5.3.2 *Epistemic trust as a relation of dependence and autonomy*

Epistemic trust/distrust is a relational concept and the openness to the Other manifests itself as the capacity to learn from, to negotiate with, or to reject epistemic trust of the Other. Learning from the epistemic authority is a dialogically rational way of acquiring knowledge and experience, which is a substitute for the Self's lack of capacity to discover natural and social phenomena on his/her own. Institutions such as education, religions or organisations of various kinds place experts into positions of epistemic trust. Since knowledge serves a variety of purposes, in practice it is intermingled with beliefs, ideological priorities of institutions and with values of particular

groups and therefore, the role of knowledge in learning turns ambiguous. The concept of epistemic authority has become controversial and has been disputed in politics, education, law, professional interactions, as well as in daily life. Internet social networking presents an alternative to the traditional epistemic authority. Scholars in media communication study both innovative (formation of identity, self-actualisation) and harmful (risks, narcissistic self-displays) features of media networking. Due to uncertainty and distrust in modern education, the dialogical triangle Ego–Alter–Object often manifests itself as a consumerist triangle, in which epistemic authority plays no role or only a very small role. With her profound interest in political and social phenomena, Hannah Arendt (1977a) pointed out that one should no longer ask what authority is, but what authority was, because authority has disappeared from the modern world. According to her, tradition, religion and authority are three concepts that are interconnected. Of these, authority, more than others, secures stability. Although she viewed the crisis of authority to be political in its origin, it has spread into other domains; it transformed family relations and child-rearing practices. The question of epistemic trust has become a societal issue.

5.3.3 *I-You* and *I-It*

Negotiations of trust/distrust often take the form of the struggle for social recognition in which the opposing parties insist on being regarded as *I-You*, and refuse to be treated as *I-It.* If the opponents are relatively equal in their capacities to exercise power, as was the case in Gillespie's (2012) study, they may attempt to push the trust/distrust game to the very limit. But we may recall that Dostoyevsky's confessors, analysed by Bakhtin (1984a), displayed similar kinds of strategies to those of brinkmanship. On the one hand, it might appear that the confessor and the person, who accepts the confession, are in highly asymmetric situations. Superficially, the confessor's voluntary display of his/her sins could be viewed as a communicative act based on the epistemic trust of his/her dialogical encounter in alleviating the weight of the confessor's guilt. In reality, however, Dostoyevsky's confessor not only left open the possibilities for the Other's rejoinder but he/she induced the Other to treat the Self not as a criminal but as an equal and socially recognised human being, that is, as *I-You.* Just like the politician in Gillespie's case, Dostoyevsky's anti-hero goes to the very limit of his/her discourse to be accepted as an equal partner and he/she rejects any degradation to *I-It* relations.

6 Epistemic responsibility

6.1 Responsibility

We may assume that the attribution of responsibility to the Self and Others, such as praising and blaming, judging actions and interactions as good or bad among other kinds of evaluations, are fundamental features of humanity. Aristotle's (1998) *Nicomachean Ethics* was probably the first philosophical treatment of responsibility as part of his views on morality. We have seen that in the dialogical philosophies of the nineteenth century (Chapter 4), the idea of responsibility has been linked to concepts of freedom, will, the person and selfhood. When accompanied by different adjectives, such as 'causal', 'intentional', 'legal', 'political' and 'moral', the concept of responsibility displays its heterogeneous nature and multifaceted meanings. In the broader context of social science, discourses about responsibilities have become regular topics of modernity. They show tremendous variability in their dynamic interdependencies with societal phenomena of which they are part.

Discourses about responsibility are closely related to those about human rights, particularly to the rights of minorities, alongside calls against discrimination of minorities. But further than that, the 'rights mania' has been viewed as a phenomenon of the twentieth century (e.g. Donahue, 1990) continuing into the present one. Consequently, balancing rights and responsibilities (O'Neill, 2002) has become an important requirement of civil society and democracy, and this question has attracted public discussions. For example, how does one distribute obligations and duties between citizens and institutions? How can responsibilities of individuals, groups, collectives and associations be maintained in equilibrium with the demand for rights?

Yet rights and responsibilities are not always in opposition. Indeed, having and accepting responsibilities can be viewed as one of the basic human rights. This perspective was expressed in Czechoslovakia in the historical document published in January 1977 and known as Charta 77. Charta 77 presented itself as a non-political and free 'open community of people of different convictions, beliefs and professions who are all united by the will, both individually and collectively, to observe that civil and human rights . . . are respected' (Charta

77, p. 12). One such basic right was responsibility, and Charta 77 insisted that this deeply moral requirement must be attended to at both the individual and collective levels.

Lack of responsibility of citizens in the past Soviet bloc led them to acquire a mental state of 'learned helplessness' (Seligman, 1975). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the leading Russian psychologists Andrei Brushlinski (1994) noted a general tendency of individuals not to feel responsible for their actions. He thought that as a phenomenon that had been carried over from the past Communist regime and controlled both personal and collective lives, it gave individuals so few responsibilities that they interiorised an attitude of learnt helplessness. One can recall in this context that a number of dissidents in the past Soviet Union were attributed with diminished personal responsibility. A psychiatric hospital during the Soviet regime became a place of sequestration of dissidents (e.g. Grigorenko, 1982; Medvedev Z. A. and Medvedev R. A., 1971) when, due to international pressure, it became too embarrassing for the Soviet regime to keep dissidents in prison. Treating dissidents as mentally ill rather than as criminals seemed to be, at least for a while, a more acceptable manner of depriving them of personal freedom.

In the aftermath of the two totalitarian regimes in Europe, Nazism in 1945 and Communism in 1989, the question of responsibility turned into an important issue in public discourse. Not only did it refer to contemporary and future responsibilities during the transition towards democracy but it also became a burning question of coping with and understanding the past. How should those be judged, who overtly or secretly supported the ancien régime, and were responsible for the persecution and suffering of others? How should one counter-balance revenge versus forgiveness, and accusations versus benevolence?

In social psychology, Fritz Heider (1958) conceived responsibility as a feature of common sense, and particularly of what he called 'a naïve analysis of action'. He postulated five stages in common-sense analysis of responsibility according to which the degree of responsibility for a particular event could be attributed in various degrees to the human agent and to his/her environment. Some of these stages parallel Piaget's and Kohlberg's study of the development of morality in children as they pass from the stage of external responsibility based on the judgement of damage they caused, to that of internal responsibility based on their intentions. Heider's proposals were important because they formulated responsibility in terms of the interdependence between the person and his/her environment. His naïve analysis of action included the question of 'what ought to be done', that is, of obligations and duties, which are not dictated by a specific other, but by the 'superpersonal objective order' (Heider, 1958, p. 219). Heider's concept of 'the superpersonal objective order', which could be viewed as a parallel to George Herbert Mead's 'generalized other' (1934), required humans to achieve congruence between personal desires and objective order, and

between justice and happiness. This would maintain and further extend the 'supra-individual reality of value' (Heider, 1958, p. 228). According to Heider, the purpose of acting in order to maintain the 'objective order' was to achieve harmony essential to life. For example, he viewed acting 'beyond the call of duty' as acting for the objective order. Heider's overall conception of action is based on the interdependence between personal sentiments, desires and wishes, on the one hand, and environmental forces, on the other.

Moral philosophy over centuries has been concerned with the systematic analyses of right and wrong conduct, of justice, crime and benevolence. These analyses tend to separate what 'ought' and 'ought not' to be done, and they defend criteria for what 'ought' and 'ought not' to be done against other possibilities. In this sense, moral philosophy has been normative. From the epistemological point of view, like science, moral philosophy has involved analyses of disengaged, rigorous and homogeneous reasoning (Taylor, 2011, p. 6).

Examples of the concepts of responsibility that I have just discussed show that responsibility refers to legal, philosophical, political, economic and personal meanings; they treat responsibility as a capacity based on reason; they question whether an act in question should be classified as a crime or whether it results from a mental disturbance; and whether diminished or augmented responsibility could be due to external factors such as the environment, or to internal factors such as fear. Such examples hardly ever refer to responsibility in social relations. As the philosopher John Lucas (1995, pp. 235–236) explains, 'It seems incongruous to talk about responsibility in person relations. Responsibility is a cool virtue, giving reasons for what one has done, and taking care that what one is going to do is rationally defensible. Personal relations, on the other hand, are warm and emotional . . . whereas responsibility, being concerned with reasons, deals with general features of the case, not the unique particularity of the individual person'.

In contrast to this perspective of responsibility as a cool and rational virtue of the individual, I shall explore the dialogically based epistemic responsibility, which is derived from the ethical nature of the Ego–Alter relations.

6.2 Epistemic responsibility in dialogical epistemology

Just like epistemic trust, epistemic responsibility is a feature of the Ego–Alter interdependence.[1] I have borrowed the notion of epistemic responsibility from

[1] The concept of epistemic responsibility (or 'virtue epistemology', or 'intellectual epistemology') in philosophy and in the legal system is used with respect to holding beliefs and judging events and their coherence. Greco and Turri (2013) use the adjectives 'epistemic', 'cognitive' and 'intellectual' synonymously. The field of epistemic responsibility is very broad and these authors identify the nature and scope of intellectual virtues, questions that should be addressed, and

Ragnar Rommetveit (1991a; 1991b). Rommetveit coined this term in order to signal a protest against the traditional separation of epistemology from ethics in rationalistic and analytically based philosophy. He defines epistemic responsibility as 'responsibility for making sense of the spoken about state of affairs and bringing it into language' (Rommetveit, 1990, p. 98). He considers human communication as socially embedded in different settings requiring the Self to treat the Other as the *I-You* rather than as the *I-It*, using the term of Martin Buber (1923/1962). Rommetveit elaborated this notion in analysing Ibsen's play *A Doll's House* showing Nora's search for social recognition, first in her father's house and then in the house of her husband. Being treated as no more than a plaything in a doll's house, that is as *I-It*, both by her father and then by her husband, Nora finally realised the meaning of freedom and of social recognition of which she had been deprived. Rommetveit (1991b, p. 210) uses the following example from the third act of *A Doll's House* to show that by treating Nora as a doll or as a plaything, her husband Norvald Helmer deprived her of epistemic responsibility.

NORA: *(shakes her head). You never loved me. You only thought how nice it was to be in love with me.*
HELMER: *But Nora, what's this you are saying?*
NORA: *It's right, you know, Torvald. At home, Daddy used to tell me what he thought, then I thought the same. And if I thought differently, I kept quiet about it, because he wouldn't have liked it. He used to call me his baby doll, and he played with me as I used to play with my dolls. Then I came to live in your house . . .*
HELMER: *What way is that to talk about our marriage?*
NORA: *(imperturbably) What I mean is: I passed out of Daddy's hands into yours . . .*

Only humans are epistemically responsible, and treating them as unequal and inferior reduces them to Things. Such treatment transforms the relation between the *I-You* to that of *I-It*. Intersubjectivity and the search for social recognition have no place in the latter. But let us recall another meaning of epistemic responsibility, the one involved in Hannah Arendt's concept of 'responsibility for the world' (Chapter 5) in the context of education. At first sight, Hannah Arendt's concept differs from Rommetveit's epistemic responsibility in an essential way. Rommetveit's epistemic responsibility is direct. It is based on the dialogical presupposition that the modern marriage requires the husband and wife to treat one another as epistemically equal and therefore their epistemic responsibility is mutual. In the relation of epistemic equality the concept of epistemic authority plays no role.

methods to be used. Although some of these issues could be relevant to epistemic responsibility in dialogical epistemology, I shall refer to epistemic responsibility only in dialogical situations of the Ego–Alter interdependence.

In contrast, Hannah Arendt's (1977b, p. 190) concept of 'responsibility for the world' is derived from the importance of epistemic authority of the teacher who has more knowledge and more experience than the pupil. While the teacher must treat the pupil as *I-You*, the pupil should not be treated as having the same epistemic responsibility in terms of knowledge and experience as the teacher. Paradoxically, by being treated as epistemically equal to the teacher in terms of knowledge and experience, the pupil, when he/she becomes adult, will be deprived of epistemic responsibility for the world (Chapter 5). These two examples, Rommetveit's and Arendt's, show that like other dialogical axioms, epistemic responsibility is relational and its concrete content is derived from the nature of the Self-Other.

The term 'epistemic responsibility' was not used by dialogical scholars who were related to the Marburg School, such as Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin and Emmanuel Levinas. However, this concept was clearly present in their philosophy and in particular in their perspectives on dialogue, which they conceived as an ethical phenomenon based on trust and/or responsibility of the Self and Other. While these scholars presupposed the interdependence between the Self and Other (the Ego–Alter), they differed with respect to the conceptualisation of trust and responsibility. Ethical requirements of some of them placed responsibility asymmetrically on the Self (Cohen, 1907/1977; Levinas, 1961/1969; Rosenzweig, 1921/1971). In contrast, for Bakhtin, the Self always had the choice in what ways to respond to the Other. The Self's choice was at least partly determined by the response of the Other, and to that extent it could be said that their relation was relatively symmetrical.

Most importantly, the philosophical perspectives of Bakhtin and Levinas are not abstract conceptualisations of epistemic responsibility. They both highlight the vital importance of human agency in ethics of everyday life, but they place very different ethical requirements on the Self and Other.

6.3 Mikhail Bakhtin on dialogical responsibility

The Self's responsibility (answerability) preoccupied Bakhtin from the beginning of his career. Responsibility for him was not a cognitive capacity of the individual but a faculty infiltrating three domains of culture, that is, of art, science and daily life (Bakhtin, 1919/1990, pp. 1–3). The concept of responsibility cross-fertilises individuals' lived experience,[2] scientific innovations and

[2] In my view, Bakhtin's appeal to the living world is sometimes over-interpreted as being too closely associated with Husserl's life-world (e.g. Eskin, 2000; also Bernard-Donals, 1994). While certainly Bakhtin's 'living concrete environment' (Bakhtin, e.g. 1981, p. 288) and Husserl's (1913/1962) 'life-world' belong to interactional epistemologies, they are based on

artistic creations. Bakhtin viewed these domains as integrated in and through responsibilities of the Self and Other. In these three domains of culture, responsibility underlies the ethical requirement for creating two features of the Self: *uniqueness* and *integrity.*

6.3.1 The uniqueness and integrity of the Self

Bakhtin's concept of the uniqueness of the Self, like that of Hermann Cohen (Gibbs, 1992, p. 18; see also Chapter 5), formed the basis of intersubjectivity and of ethics. To be unique, the Self requires the Other in his/her life project of the formation of selfhood. It is because of this unique relationship that ethics cannot be understood by references to general rules. Bakhtin was critical of Kantian universal ethics, as well as of the approaches to ethics conceived as abstract and formal principles, and as systems of rules that were remote from daily life.[3] Bakhtin (1993, p. 12) referred to such abstract formal principles and rules as 'theoreticism'. He renamed them later as 'monologism' (Morson and Emerson, 1990, p. 28). Monologism was underlain by timeless laws ignoring history and culture (Bakhtin, 1981). In contrast, ethics based on the Self-Other interdependence is a cultural and historical phenomenon embedded in communication. Heterogeneities in language, communication and ordinary life are infinitely open or unfinalisable (*nezavershenost*). Through communicative heterogeneities the unique Self expresses freedom, innovation and creativity.

The second feature of ethical responsibility of the Self, that is, integrity, follows from the uniqueness, and particularly, from freedom of expression. The Self has always the choice to answer in an intelligible way to any state of affairs, whether coherent or incoherent. The Self's responsibility for communication and for his/her deeds does not allow pretension or simulation of non-responsibility. And yet, in many communication situations speakers behave as if that were possible. Already in his early writings Bakhtin (1993) introduced the concept of the 'alibi in being' and he repeatedly insisted that the Self, despite attempts to excuse him-/herself for actions or for inauthentic communication, cannot find an 'alibi in being' (e.g. Bakhtin, 1993, p. 42). 'Alibistic' existence deprives the speaker of the Self as the dialogical being.

different presuppositions. Bakhtin's dialogical epistemology is based on the Ego–Alter interdependence, while Husserl's point of departure is the sensory experience of the individual.

[3] The similarity between Vico's and Bakhtin's approaches to ethics as a unique historical and cultural achievement is striking. This raises the question whether Bakhtin was familiar with Vico's work. In his note on 'Did Bakhtin read Vico?' Monas (1990, pp. 156–157) suggests that although there is no possibility either to prove or to disprove this, it is likely that Bakhtin was familiar with Vico's work because he read in several languages including Italian and was a passionate reader. Monas refers in his text to Bakhtin's and Vico's preoccupation with language.

6.3.2 *The Self's attempts to renounce responsibility*

Morson and Emerson (1989, pp. 16–21; 1990, pp. 179–184) extracted from Bakhtin several mutually overlapping ways, in which humans attempt to renounce their responsibility. Perhaps the most significant are those which can be depicted from Bakhtin's analyses of Dostoyevsky's novels, and specifically, from internal dialogues of Dostoyevsky's anti-heroes. Bakhtin focused in these internal dialogues on the Self's formation of images of Others, and on the impressions by which the Self attempts to deceive Others. Bakhtin used the term 'pretender' (*samozvanets* = self-namer) to characterise a person who tried to renounce his identity and pretend to be someone else.[4]

Another form of renounced responsibility is to live an unreal life that is ritualised. This is not totally disconnected from the former case but here Bakhtin (1993) speaks directly about representatives of political or religious powers who presuppose that they are actually entitled to perform particular acts. Therefore, while in the former case the individual renounces responsibility, in this case, he/she assumes responsibility for performing political or religious acts as rituals. For example, Lenin's State religion used symbolism, coercive propaganda, ceremonies, public gatherings, songs and marches, and the cult of personalities of their leaders who were enthralled by their own power (Marková, 2013). Aiming at restructuring the society, Leninism attempted to transform the human mind and create 'a new man'. This aim was in direct contradiction to Bakhtin's focus on life as lived experience rather than as a ritual. Bakhtin (1993, p. 52) explains that humility is essential for engagement with the Other person and for being personally answerable. In contrast, performing ritual acts turns humans into impostors.

Finally, the individual can renounce responsibility by creating a self-image of the Self. Bakhtin is preoccupied with this issue in *Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity* (1990). Like the previous cases of avoiding responsibility, so this case, too, is concerned with the deformation of the uniqueness of the Self–Other interdependence. Such interdependence is distorted if one, such as Narcissus, contemplates one's own reflection either in water or in the mirror (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 27). The Self creates images and a world of fantasies about oneself, and totally ignores that the Self lives in the real world of, and with, Others. In this case the Self is a pretender living in the dream of glory, becoming a pure 'I-for-myself' ignoring 'I-for Others' and 'Others-for-me' (Chapter 5).

[4] In Russian history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one example of a 'samozvanets' was the 'false Dimitri' in the Russian tsar family. Among Dostoyevsky's characters, perhaps the most impressive pretender was the anti-hero of the novel *Demons*, a mysterious person Stavrogin. Stavrogin, overridden by guilt for his past crimes, confessed them to other persons although he despised them and did not accept their judgement. However, he could not cope with his guilt without dialogical encounters with others despite the fact that these encounters were for him fearful (Bakhtin, 1984a, pp. 243–245).

6.4 Emmanuel Levinas's responsibility for the Other

Throughout this book I have emphasised that in dialogical epistemology, the Ego–Alter forms an irreducible ethical ontological unit. However, when we turn to the dialogical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, further clarifications are necessary; Levinas's perspective takes us to the ultimate limits of dialogicality obliging humans to adopt an infinite responsibility for Others.

6.4.1 Ethics as the first principle of human existence

In his essay 'Is ontology fundamental?' Levinas (1951/1996) expresses his critique of Western philosophy throughout its history, from Aristotle to phenomenology and existentialism. In his view, Western philosophy has preoccupied itself with relations between humans and objects, with facts existing in the external world and with the search for objective 'truth' together with activities and engagement in the world, rather than with commitments to and relations with other humans (see also Levinas, 1961/1969; 1974/1998). In his critique of this philosophy Levinas presents a perspective, according to which it is not ontology in the sense of Western philosophy, but it is ethics, which is primary in human thought. All forms of human thinking and acting, according to Levinas, are subordinated to ethics. How should one understand this perspective?

Western philosophy, Levinas (1951/1996) claims, is based on the ontological relation of the Self and the world of Objects and Others. This relation requires the capacity to reflect and understand phenomena in order to make judgements, evaluations and qualifications of one kind or another. But the relation between humans is not primarily based on qualification and comprehension, Levinas argues, but on invocation: humans invoke one another, or call one another. The Self relates to the Other by speaking. For Levinas, speaking to the Other – a dialogue – is an ethical relation. To do otherwise, Levinas insists, is to reduce the Other to an Object.

It is from this perspective that Levinas arrives at responsibility as a fundamentally asymmetric concept. The Self and Other are not equally answerable for their deeds. It is the Self who is always responsible not only for his/her own deeds but also for the deeds of Others. Like Cohen (1907/1977), for Levinas ethics starts and finishes with the responsibility of the Self for the Other; this is what locates the Self in the world. Levinas, however, goes much further than any of his predecessors in the Marburg School (Chapter 4). The ethical engagement with Others is *infinitely* asymmetrical and non-reciprocal. The primacy of this asymmetrical ethics demands that the Self is responsible for the Other even over his/her own existence (Levinas, 1974/1978, pp. 75–76). The Self has no right to question what the Other requires from him/her: obligations and generosity to Others are unlimited. This infinite responsibility means not only that

the Self is responsible for Others and for their freedom but that the Self is also responsible for the responsibility of Others (Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 117).

Because ethics is the first principle of existence, it does not even raise the question of whether we should care for Others or whether we have a duty to do so. Humans do not choose to be responsible but responsibility for Others precedes their own existence (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 114). This is why the question of whether one ought to do something or not, which was raised, for example, by Heider or by Bakhtin, is not Levinas's question at all. This extreme position with respect to asymmetry of responsibility also explains why, for Levinas, trust is a redundant concept. Levinas is not at all concerned with trust and he even states that because the Self has a total commitment to the responsibility for Others, trust is no more than an idle issue (Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 120). The Self is always responsible for Others whether trusting them or not.

The relation of the Self and the Other, and responsibility of the Self for the Other, is highlighted above all in discourse. The ethics of dialogue preconditions dialogue in the everyday sense of the word, that is, it precedes the exchange of mutual dialogical contributions. In face-to-face dialogue the Self cannot escape responsibility, because the human face is a speaking face (Levinas, 1961/1969, e.g. p. 195), relating the participants in and through speech and communication. Levinas states that the human face has the force of immediacy; such an immediate relation is not reflective but it is an unreflective sensibility. Unreflected sensibility is prior to any rational reflection: 'it is not a blind reason and folly. It is prior to reason' (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 138). The face is not something to observe but it is something that commands the individual to engage with it (Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 97). As Levinas puts it, 'a face obsesses and shows itself'; it holds the individual a hostage, because he/she must respond to a human face (Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 158). Elsewhere Levinas concludes that 'face to face is a final and irreducible relation'. It is a unique relation and therefore it makes possible the plurality of society (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 291).

This perspective raises questions about what Levinas meant by demanding so much from humans who experience injustice, wars, violence, distrust and irresponsible activities from Others. To readers of Levinas's texts, his ideas of ethics and responsibility may appear as defying common sense in placing such an extreme and one-sided responsibility on the Self. How can the Self literally accept responsibility for the evil caused by Others, for the terrible crimes of wars and terrorism? Some readers challenged Levinas's ethics. For example, if the face absolutely commands that one does not kill and does not brutalise the Other, how can one explain atrocities of wars and terrorism (Wright, Hughes and Ainley, 1988, p. 175)? Does it mean, these authors ask, that humans either do not recognise the commandment, or that, despite its recognition, they disobey the command?

Levinas's response to these arduous questions is strictly dialogical. It is based on the distinction between power and authority (on this distinction, see Chapter 5). The biological world is ruled by a struggle for life and the struggle for life is without ethics. For Levinas, ethics firmly separates the natural struggle for life guided by force or physical power, and the life of humans guided by the authority of the human face: 'The face is not a force. It is an authority. Authority is often without force' (Levinas in Wright, Hughes and Ainley, 1988, p. 169). It would mean, therefore, that brutality does not recognise the commandment. Acting by force does not involve ethics. Ethics arrives only with the emergence of humans and 'the beginning of language is the face' (see Levinas in Wright, Hughes and Ainley, 1988, p. 169). Levinas insists that language does not start with signs or with words. Language is the fact of being addressed, of being spoken to (Levinas in Wright, Hughes and Ainley, 1988, p. 170). With the appearance of humans, the struggle for one's own life totally transforms: the emergence of ethics makes the life of the Other(s) more important than one's own life.

6.4.2 In the name of Justice

Bernstein (2002, p. 253) interprets Levinas's entire philosophical perspective as an ethical response to evil and to theodicy, that is, to the question of how can humans reconcile themselves to the existence of evil. This is a significant and dialogically motivated issue of solidarity with those who are submitted to 'useless suffering'. Referring to the Holocaust under Hitler and to Stalinist totalitarianism, Levinas condemns the diabolical horror which, in the twentieth century, was deliberately imposed. There were no limits to this horror set by reason; 'reason' was totally alienated from all ethics (Levinas, 1988, p. 162).

Did Levinas think that this horror was the end of morality? Levinas insisted that it was not. It is the paradox of morality that even after Auschwitz we do not conclude that moral law no longer exists. On the contrary, he remarks that the suffering of the Other is unpardonable for the Self and that it calls the Self to pay attention to such cruelties and to get engaged with the suffering of the Other. For him, the problem of evil brings about the significance of Justice. One must resist and struggle with evil (Levinas, 1998, p. 105). This brings up an intriguing question of how one can relate Justice to the infinite responsibility for the Other. Levinas explains that his answer to this relationship is given in his idea of the 'asymmetry of intersubjectivity'. It is the Self's concern for the one who suffers that brings forth Justice. The Self is responsible for the sufferer in the sense that he/she must act against evil in the name of Justice. It is the order of Justice, Levinas argues, that sets limits to the Self's responsibility. Ethics directs the Self to the defence of the Other, which surpasses the threat that concerns the Self (Levinas, 1998, p. 105).

This brings out a deeper meaning of Levinas's claim that the Self is infinitely responsible for the Other. There are Others who are perpetrators and there are Others who are victims. The Self is responsible for both kinds of Others, but in different ways. The Self must act against perpetrators in the name of Justice and the Self must get engaged with the suffering of Others.

Most of the time, however, humans do value their own life more than that of the Other(s) and look after themselves rather than after Others. Yet despite that, humans admire saintliness, that is, sacrificing the Self's own life for that of the Other(s). As Levinas (see Levinas in Wright, Hughes and Ainley, 1988, p. 173) states, saintliness is not an accomplishment: it is a value. Humans celebrate those who sacrifice their lives in order to save Others, whether in wars, terrorist attacks, earthquakes, rescuing illegal immigrants from drowning, and from other disasters. Public ceremonies of remembrance, awards for bravery, monuments to unknown soldiers etc. all testify to the celebration of this value. As an example, one can recall here remembrances, all over Europe, during the year 2014, of the heroes of the First World War. The spectacular installation of 888,246 ceramic poppies at the Tower of London represented all British military deaths during the 1914–1918 Great War (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 Tower of London with the display of 888,246 ceramic poppies

Figure 6.2 *Je suis Charlie*

More recent events, such as the terrorist attacks in Paris in early January 2015 too, inspired a unified response of citizens in France and in many parts of the world. An attack on 7th January 2015 on the satirical weekly, Charlie Hebdo, which publishes cartoons, jokes and critical reports on all kinds of religious and political issues, as well as an attack on a Kosher supermarket engaged citizens in a monumental unified response to evil. Hundreds of thousands of people rallied in Paris in support of free speech and to identify themselves with the victims of the attack and with the spirit of Charlie Hebdo (Figure 6.2). Not only did citizens identify with the victims of these attacks by wearing and displaying the label *Je suis Charlie* ('I am Charlie') but also by wearing labels like *pour le respet d'autre* ('for the respect of the other'). The phrase *Je suis Charlie* recalls Levinas's 'I is an other' (Levinas, 1968/1996, p. 92) which he adopts from Rimbaud's poem but gives it a new meaning, that of the Self's responsibility for the Other.

6.4.3 Responsibility of bystanders

Raising the question about an asymmetrical and non-reciprocal responsibility for the Other, Bernstein (2002, p. 258) remarks that when we are confronted with the extraordinary horrors of the twentieth century – and we need to add,

with those of the twenty-first century – there is a tendency to make a division between the actions of the perpetrators and the suffering victims. We rarely focus attention on the responsibility of bystanders, of observers witnessing these horrors but doing nothing to prevent them or to bring the 'executioners' (Levinas, 1998, p. 105) to Justice. How often do we hear 'I do not want to get involved' or how often does fear prevent us from acting on behalf of others? Passive bystanders have no problem in justifying their inactivity and excusing themselves. Bernstein (2002, p. 259) poses a question about what would happen if 'not only during the Nazi period, but in other instances such as the genocide that took place in Rwanda, if so-called bystanders had anticipated and responded to the suffering of their fellow human beings'. Excellent examples of resistance to the Nazi were Bulgaria and Denmark during the War. Both countries were expected, like everywhere in Europe, to carry out the Nazi order and deport Jews to extermination camps. In Bulgaria, public disobedience prevented any actions to be taken against the Jews and Eichmann's plan was totally aborted (Todorov (1999/2001, p. 56). The Danish Jews were rescued by the collective resistance of citizens and the Danish resistance movement. The physicist Niels Bohr made a personal appeal to the Swedish king to provide asylum to Danish Jews (e.g. Asserud, 2005, p. 14).

Lois Shepherd (2003) contrasts two responses of the Self to the suffering of Others: compassion, on the one hand, and the radical responsibility of Levinas, on the other hand. Compassion, which is based on taking the perspective of the Other and on imagining injustice and suffering of the Other may seem, at first sight, to be a right and proper response. It is an ethical response based on equality of perspectives between the Self and Other: 'I imagine how you feel and I know that you have the capacity to imagine how I feel.' But Shepherd maintains that compassion has a number of weaknesses. Above all, apart from imagining how the Other feels, it does not oblige the Self to do something to alleviate suffering. Therefore, compassion is not enough because it could be a passive response. In contrast, Levinas's approach to ethics, based on asymmetrical responsibility, proposes an alternative, which Shepherd calls an 'ethics of radical responsibility'. This ethics recognises the Other not as an object of suffering but as someone with whom the Self gets actively engaged. Both action and inaction have important implications for Others, and for society as a whole.

However, Levinas does not provide guidance on how 'useless suffering' could be prevented. He refers to his conception of ethics in terms of orienting the Self towards action, although, as Shepherd comments, Levinas says little about using his approach in practical matters or in legal contexts.

6.5 Clashes of epistemic responsibilities

In ordinary life one often encounters situations in which epistemic responsibility between the Self and Other is not clearly defined. The Self may face situations in which two or more kinds of responsibility clash with one another due to the fact that the Self is confronted with commitments to different Others or that even the commitment to the same Other requires taking actions which are in conflict.

In social psychology, clashes between contradicting epistemic responsibilities were exemplified in the well-known Milgram's (1974) experiments on obedience to authority, in which subjects faced conflicting demands from opposing authorities. One demand came from the experimenter who asked for the subject's commitment to administering an electric shock to another human being in the name of the authority of science. The other demand came from the authority of the subject's conscience and compassion; in ordinary life the subject would not hurt another human, particularly if the person was screaming in pain. Milgram's experiments showed that the majority of subjects, under an order from the authority of science, carried out acts that would be unthinkable under normal circumstances. Milgram wanted to show that humans, under orders from higher quarters, are liable to accomplish acts against humanity. He thought that his experiments imitated the conduct of the Nazi executioners who excused themselves as acting on the basis of orders from higher quarters in order to torture and exterminate prisoners.

Milgram brought to attention the clash between the Self's commitment to interiorised social values (conscience, compassion, care), on the one hand, and the demands of external authority or power (science, institution, political regime), on the other. Clashes of epistemic responsibilities are part of daily living and they could pose an enormous pressure on the dialogical mind because of their ethical implications for the Self–Other relations.

6.5.1 Being a dissident

Totalitarian regimes present extreme cases of life-threatening clashes between epistemic responsibilities by attempting to obtain the citizens' co-operation by promulgating public distrust, uncertainty and fear. An example of such situations were years of 'normalisation' in Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the brutal invasion of the country in 1968 by the armies of the Soviet bloc. The invasion took place in order to destroy the attempts of citizens to reform the stagnating socialist regime and change it into socialism 'with a human face'. The regime of 'normalisation' crushed the resistance of the majority of citizens. To survive the situation the majority acted overtly in accord with the

regime. Passivity, adaptation and compromises were the main ways of muddling through the situation. Adopting the attitude that any attempt to change the political situation would be in vain, and would only make their lives unbearable, the majority avoided responsibility for themselves and others.

For a minority of dissidents, responsibility for 'living in truth' and responsibility for the welfare of their families were in conflict. As they decided that their responsibility for 'living in truth' was their priority, they pursued it despite the danger for themselves and their families. Václav Havel (1983/1999), the dissident and a later President of Czechoslovakia and of the Czech Republic, declared in the title of one of his essays that for dissidents, responsibility was a fate. One of the main dissidents of that period, a historian Jaroslav Mezník (2005) describes his relations with his daughter in a book about his life during Communism. He had divorced his wife and his daughter was living with her. Despite not living with him, his daughter was not even allowed to attend the secondary education of her choice. Her life was ruined by her father's dissident activity and because of that she was not on speaking terms with him for many years.

The Czech philosopher and dissident Jan Patočka, who died as a consequence of long interrogation by the Communist police, was one of the initiators of the protest movement Charta 77. Patočka called for the active protest of citizens. He argued that the sense of the Charta 77 was the right of living in truth and that this was the responsibility of each individual. Truth was not simply a 'theoretical question' which could be attained by 'objective methods' and which could be used by a person or institution (Patočka, 1977a/1990; 1977b/1990). In its deepest sense, truth is an inner struggle of the individual for his/her freedom of expression: it is a matter of authenticity. Patočka posed the question: by defending the Charta 77, are we going to make the situation of society worse? 'Let us respond openly', he argued, 'so far any submission has never ever led to improvement but only to deterioration of the situation. The greater the fear and servility, the more the powerful dares and will dare' to combat its opponents [my translation] (Patočka, 1977b/1990, p. 39). Despite persecution and the discomfort that it brought about (e.g. see Havel, 1985–1986/1999; Mezník, 2005; Moscovici, 1979; Šimečka, 1984; Vaculík, 1983) dissidents continued in their effort of living in truth. Much of the dissident literature comments on dissidents' relations with families, friends and acquaintances, on their isolation and the marginalised status they created for themselves by being dissidents. The only reward for that was the preservation of their dignity and integrity. In the dissidents' activities we can find a mixture of Bakhtin's perspective that there can be no 'alibi in being' as well as Levinas's perspective of taking responsibility for Others in defending freedom. The majority of Others, however, swung between different responsibilities according to circumstances and the daily problems with which they had to cope.

6.5.2 *Exploring responsibility for past crime*

In our research on social representations of rights and responsibilities we carried out focus groups with young people in which we asked them to evaluate the responsibility of someone who, by collaborating with the Communist establishment, caused persecution of a number of fellow prisoners. The incident was based on a real case in Communist Czechoslovakia during the 1950s (Marková, 2008b; Orfali and Marková, 2002). The subject of 'responsibilities' for crimes during Communism and the question concerning justice and punishment of those who supported and sustained the totalitarian regime was still an important issue in public discourse during the late 1990s. It was debated and argued about on the radio, in newspapers and on television. We carried out the study in the years 1999–2000 when the media were preoccupied with accusing and excusing those who had supported the ancien régime. Many citizens sought revenge for their past suffering. Focus group discussions with young participants revealed that among them were those whose parents and grandparents were not allowed, during totalitarianism, to carry out their proper jobs or were punished and marginalised in various ways. In other words, collaboration with totalitarianism for the young Czechs was part of oral history, which involved their own families.

Some of our participants' parents either passively accepted the dominance of the regime or compromised themselves. After the fall of Communism they often were obliged to explain to their children why they had been members of the Party, and why some people had resisted the pressure more than they had. Parents of other participants actively resisted the power of the regime both during totalitarianism and/or later on, during 'normalisation'. Experiences of their parents were reflected in our participants' responses. Some attempted to understand and defend the collaborative behaviour of their parents and of others; it was 'the horrible regime' that made citizens collaborate. Other young people adopted the dissidents' uncompromising perspective. Concerning the latter, the participants gave examples of their parents and grandparents who, having had a university or professional education, were forced to work as poorly paid labourers as punishment for resisting the regime. These participants had no sympathy for the 'traitor' who was the anti-hero of our focus groups. Yet, distinct meanings of responsibility were not strictly separated in their discussions. Instead, they conflicted and merged into one another, and formed the basis for thematising different kinds of responsibilities. The majority of participants did not have clearly formulated opinions on the subject matter. Instead, while defending their positions, they raised questions, expressed doubts and took reflective stances in thematising responsibility. They expressed self-reflected doubts in raising the question 'what would I have done?'

VĚRA: *but he [the traitor] has children and he has his fellow prisoner – so, he is closer to you?*

PETR: *I have discussed [with my grandfather] these matters with him many times. There are people who have a lot of dignity and strong character. Simply, they sacrifice all to what they believe in . . .*

JITKA: *'If pressed, do you save your life or life of your co-prisoners?'*

PETR: *'If pressed, do you prefer your own family or your co-prisoners?'*

ANNA: *It seems to me that all this is seeking an alibi. I think . . . that it is as . . . I myself do not know what I would have done. I do not want to say that I would have rushed into collaboration with KGB.*

PETR: *The devil knows how we would have behaved. Like you, I also hope that differently, but how do you know?*

JIRKA: *When I imagine myself in such a situation at that time, I would also take the easiest way – true – I would not inform against my pals . . .*

Another theme raised by our participants was the membership in the Communist Party. It was well known that many people had become members of the Party not because of their convictions but as a passport to secure them and their families advantages and a more comfortable life. Was that the right or the wrong thing to do?

HELENA: *There were many people who became communists only to save themselves . . .*

JAN: *Only because of that, to be allowed to go to University, that I would take it as an extenuating circumstance . . . it was forbidden to intelligent people to get to University so they became communists. My father was like that – so I take it as an extenuating circumstance.*

EVA: *No! One does not enter the Party only in order to obtain some advantages, isn't it? You must totally agree with the Party in order to become a member, isn't that so?*

All focus groups invoked a moral conflict: was the traitor's behaviour justifiable considering that his choice was between his family and his fellow prisoners?

MARIE: *I know that it is the question of moral responsibility or the question of morality with respect to oneself.*

JAN: *It is about morality but not only about that. This is not ambiguous for people who lived through that regime and who know what it was. But we, who are all about eighteen years old, we do not know what it was . . . .*

EVA: *It IS the question of morality.*

The case discussed in focused groups presented a moral dilemma for which there was no solution available in terms of general truths. The participants took reflective attitudes on the whole case, raising questions, for example: What have the media done about the case? What did the ancien régime mean to their

parents and grandparents? The participants pointed out that they, themselves, did not experience Communism, but that their parents and grandparents suffered both during Nazism and Communism. Are there any circumstances that allow the individual to kill another human being?

In discussing these dilemmas, the participants simultaneously expressed different kinds of dialogical relations, such as

- the reference groups (e.g. 'But we, who are all about eighteen years old, we do not know what it was.')
- moralities (e.g. 'It is the question of moral responsibility or the question of morality with respect to oneself.')
- individual and collective memories (e.g. 'My grandfather was a lawyer – He has studied Law at Charles University – and he worked as a miner during nineteen fifties; he had to move home eight times.')
- commitments (e.g. 'If I lived in the camp only because my father did not become a member of the Party, I would consider my dead father to be an ideal person, the best one who has ever lived.')
- loyalties (e.g. 'And clearly, each of us would betray someone who one does not know and cause his death rather than the death of one's own child, own wife and own family.').

These comments and reflections recall, on the one hand, Bakhtin's and Levinas's concerns about the Self–Other responsibilities, but in daily experience of concrete and unique events; on the other hand, many other concerns form part of the participants' thoughts and reflections. For example, the ferocity of the regime can wipe out dissident and protest movements. One may remember the so-called Heidrichiada, the period of dreadful persecutions of thousands of Czech and Moravian people in 1941, after the assassination attempt on the Nazi Reinhard Heidrich, the Acting Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. In the aftermath of Heidrich's death brutal reprisals took place and any resistance was crushed. During the most extreme Communist totalitarianism in the 1950s and early 1960s, to be a dissident meant death and therefore, at that time any direct actions against the regime were exceptional. Dissidents could display a direct protest only during 'normalisation' when, while acutely suppressing freedom, the regime no longer punished dissidents by sentencing them to death.

Cristian Tileagă (2014) explored how epistemic responsibility was displayed in public confessions of past Communist informers. His study takes us to Romania where, like in other countries of the Soviet bloc, spying on others and public distrust were fundamental features of daily life and social order. Tileagă studied public confessions of those who, during the past Communist totalitarianism, had been informers for the Romanian Communist Secret Police. After the collapse of Communism, collaborators with the previous regime were publicly accused of complicity and their names were openly

displayed on posters, in newspapers and in books. Public confessions by informers were one way of reckoning with the past. Using the approach of ethnomethodology and discursive psychology, Tileagă studied both confessions and public commentaries, focusing on the relationships between constructions of moralities, identities and trust/distrust of these confessors.

It is interesting to note differences between the strategies of Bakhtin's and Tileagă's confessors. First, in contrast to Bakhtin's analyses (Chapters 4 and 5), the confessors in Tileagă's studies moderated, rather than maximised, their crimes. They used words such as 'sometimes' in order to relativise their involvement, or used 'never' to avoid damage to their moral identity, and so on. For example: 'I informed on them sometimes, with death in my soul, but I never betrayed them: I have not been an agent provocateur, I have not received missions of any kind, I have not been promised and there have not been advantages created for me ... during all this time, I remained hostile to the Securitate and the party-state' (Tileagă, 2014, pp. 57–58).

Second, while Dostoyevsky's anti-heroes felt the weight of their guilt and shame and voluntarily confessed their crimes to the Other, it is unlikely that Tileagă's confessors would have ever come out if it were not for the collapse of the regime that forced them to admit their guilt. The extreme and acute Bakhtinian dialogicality, and the search for social recognition, both seem to be missing in post-Communist confessors. Tileagă's confessors, who minimised or metaphorised their guilt, could hardly hope to gain any degree of social recognition because they had been part of the inexcusable regime for which they had worked. All they could hope for was to negotiate the amount of their guilt and responsibility in order to minimise the moral judgement made by the public.

6.6 Contemporary challenges to epistemic responsibility: two examples

Clashes of responsibilities take place in all living conditions, whether totalitarian or non-totalitarian. In democracies, commitments to opposing epistemic responsibilities do not express themselves in such extreme forms as in totalitarian regimes. Instead, they often emerge without being noticed because they present themselves in terms of progress, efficient management or scientific evidence.

Critiques of contemporary democracies emphasise the horrendous impact that bureaucratisation has on daily life. They argue that the bureaucracy in democracies itself forms a sufficient power that turns humans into Objects and conceives them in purely technical and ethically neutral terms (e.g. Bauman, 1989, p. 101; Minogue, 2010). These critiques recall Max Weber (1920) who, in the early years of the twentieth century, predicted the emergence of a technocratic individual through rationalisation. While Weber was pessimistic



Figure 6.3 Bureaucrat-It-effective system

about the power of rationalisation and bureaucratisation which imposes on society the 'iron cage' and 'mechanistic petrification', and which results in disenchantment of society, he nevertheless accepted the criteria of rationalistic impartiality.

This process of rationalisation does not show any apparent signs of violence but slowly, due to technological advancements and bureaucratisation, it separates institutions from people who originally designed them for their service. All is meant well: rationalisation and efficacy will improve citizens' lives. The technological advancements provide extensive possibilities for relatively easy measurements of the elements of social phenomena and this allows for quantifiable outcomes. These advancements create an image of preciseness and they give a scientific status to domains that employ such measurements. They also furnish arguments that quantifiable data serve as criteria of efficient scientific work. In their attempts to be evaluated as scientific, social and human sciences, as well as health, education and social care institutions and services have adopted these measures, often without questioning their appropriateness in their domains. Weberian rationalisation and bureaucratisation of institutions have achieved an incomprehensible stage of anonymity. In order to fulfil bureaucratic tasks, it is not necessary to see a person behind rules. Reducing life-satisfaction to categories and numbers and to quantitative measures has become part of daily living. Employees, clients or patients fill in simple questionnaires to indicate how much they like or dislike this or that. These well-meant procedures have an important consequence. All that institutions require is to obtain feedback to see whether they are doing well. Such standard procedures deprive the Self of his/her dialogical features of uniqueness and integrity (see earlier). Using these standardised procedures does not allow the Self to respond in a unique way to his/her unique environment (see Figure 6.3). By being deprived of his/her uniqueness, the Self is deprived of

epistemic responsibility, that is, of 'responsibility for making sense of the spoken about state of affairs and bringing it into language' (Rommetveit, 1990, p. 98; see this Chapter, p. 157). Figure 6.3 shows that the loss of uniqueness and integrity in the Self–Other communication implies yet another kind of triangularity. In this triangularity, the Self is represented as a bureaucrat; the Other, rather than being *You*, is treated as *It* because the *You* is deprived of any possibility to respond to the quantitative measure in a unique way. The Object in this kind of 'communication' is an 'effective system'.

6.6.1 The case of the Mid-Staffordshire hospital

Bureaucratisation gets rid of dialogicality in the name of devices such as 'neutrality', 'information processing', 'professionalism' and 'efficiency'. The focus on these devices is guided by financial and managerial criteria, while ethical criteria of uniqueness and integrity of the Self may irrelevant. Let us take as an example an incident that was publicised in 2013 in the United Kingdom. An extremely high number of patients who died over several years in the Mid-Staffordshire hospital, as well as dissatisfaction of patients, critiques of relatives and of some members of hospital staff, led to the public inquiry. The case of the Mid-Staffordshire hospital was openly discussed and the hospital staff was accused of gross negligence causing suffering of many patients and resulting in unnecessary deaths. After many months of investigations, two main kinds of response, though often overlapping, could be noticed in discourses about the Mid-Staffordshire case. The first response, portrayed by reports and commentaries publicised by the media, focused predominantly on reporting cruelty or neglect of staff. The focus of these reports was on demands to punish the responsible staff. It was argued that bad doctors and bad nurses should be imprisoned for negligence for up to five years (Figure 6.4). In order to avoid similar incidents, health chiefs urged the Government to make sure that there were legally enforceable staffing levels in hospitals, and that substandard care, cruelty or neglect should be punished. Professionalism should take a more central role so that people can flag up the way forward. The staff needs to work in a safe system in order to care for patients properly. A new criminal offence of wilful neglect should be introduced, and a new care certificate should ensure that healthcare assistants and social care support workers have the right training and skills. It is noticeable in these recommendations that the emphasis is placed on duties, avoidance of criminal offence and punishment of wilful neglect of patients. Such recommendations are to be expected from the bureaucratised and rationalised system based on rules and regulations that has become ingrained in human relations. It is conspicuous that the used terminology focuses on 'professionalism', 'effective system' and 'criminal charges'.

Express. Home of the Daily and Sunday Express.

David Cameron: Bad doctors and nurses will face jail
DOCTORS and nurses who 'wilfully neglect' patients will face up to five years in prison, it was announced last night.
By: Greg Heffer
Published: Sat, November 16, 2013

Prime Minister David Cameron is promising tough action [REUTERS]
David Cameron said NHS workers who mistreated and abused patients would face 'the full force of the law', under the creation of the new criminal offence.
The Prime Minister revealed one of the recommendations from a review of patient safety, set up following the Mid Staffs scandal.

Figure 6.4 The case of the Mid-Staffordshire hospital

The second kind of response was in the forefront of reports that were prepared by Robert Francis (2013) (Queen's Counsel), who chaired the public inquiry of the case. Francis referred to the negative culture that developed in the hospital and that tolerated poor standards and disengaged managerial and leadership responsibilities. He concluded that this failure was partly due to the staff's focusing on reaching monetary targets rather than on giving care to patients. Methods of evaluation of the service did not favour patients' welfare and avoided any responsibility for the high standards. Francis recommends developing a common culture that puts patients first and that ensures transparency and safety, reporting of complaints, a statutory duty of candour on providers and professional duty of candour on individuals. He also emphasises the role of compassion and commitment from staff.

I have referred (Section 6.4.3) to Lois Shepherd's (2003) views on compassion. Although Shepherd considered compassion as inferior to Levinas's radical responsibility for the Other because it does not necessarily lead to acting on behalf of the Other, compassion could be nevertheless the beginning for instituting changes in a bureaucratic system. Compassion, based on taking the perspective of the Other, compels the Self's imagination of suffering of the Other. Imagining how the Other feels brings back intersubjectivity of the Self–Other ethics and responsibility for the Other: if I imagine how I would feel if I were in your situation, I would more likely engage with you as a person. In that case, bureaucratic rules and criminal charges would become redundant.

On a similar line of thought, the lack of dialogical imagination is associated not only with the dehumanising of Others by reducing interaction among

humans to rules and 'effective systems' but also with atrocities against humanity ranging from individual to collective murders. Unfortunately, this is what we are facing all the time in a bureaucratised world. In his book on *Poetic of Imagining*, Richard Kearney (1998, p. 232) refers to postmodern fiction in which the murderer admits his unforgivable crime of not imagining what it was for the victim to take away her life. The murderer comments on what was his real crime: 'Yes, that failure of imagination is my real crime, the one that made the others possible ... I could kill her because for me she was not alive.' On human destruction on an unprecedented scale, Richard Kearney comments on Claudio Magris's book *Danube*, where he speaks about the lack of imagination by the Nazis and about the Holocaust. Specifically, with reference to Eichmann he notes that 'his lack of imagination had prevented him from seeing the faces, the features, the expressions of real people behind the statistical lists of victims' (Kearney, 1998, pp. 232–233).

6.6.2 The transformation of academic institutions into businesses

A philosopher and political scientist Leonidas Donskis (Bauman and Donskis, 2013, p. 136) notes that the saddest thing for universities is that they have accepted to be modelled on businesses and that they have 'endorsed a logic of quick results and achievements' attempting to react to changes in market, politics and public opinions. He predicts that if this development continues, in a short time the humanities, that have not already been deformed and demolished, will exist only in the few elite universities, because 'creators of academic junk food will sacrifice the humanities in favour of programmes (such as business, management, economics, law, political science, social work and nursing) that are in great demand (and valued precisely because they're in great demand)' (Bauman and Donskis, 2013, p. 137). Donskis's prediction seems to be corroborated by the recent decision of AQA (Assessment and Qualification Alliance) Examination Board to axe the subject of anthropology in secondary schools at A-level in England, apparently, due to lack of interest by students. In response to this decision the daily newspaper *The Observer* published an article titled 'This is cultural barbarism' and the former director of the Royal Anthropological Institute commented that 'the reasons given ... are largely those of market and costs' (Boffey, 2015).

In accord with Donskis's views, in the United Kingdom, academic departments compete for getting research grants in any area that comes into fashion, and academic promotions are rewards not for the quality of research but for bringing money to the shrinking academic departments. Yet academics, teachers and young scholars keep submitting themselves to these new rules. This voluntary submission is indeed striking, though not surprising. It is striking that academics are ready to accept arbitrary and bureaucratic decisions, for

example, of the so-called 'impact factors' as criteria of scientific prestige. Equally, it is striking that rather than opposing these humiliating practices in which the bureaucrat decides what is worthwhile and scientific, the academics search for strategies of survival, and it is these strategies that maintain the existing regime. It was commented on numerous occasions that the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, such as Nazism and Stalinism, were maintained by the silence of majorities. Today, silences of academics sustain the existing system as fear has become part of their lives in seeking promotions. If senior academics support the system, what should young people do? Senior academic bureaucrats interiorise commitments to their activities – otherwise they would have to admit to themselves that they are hypocrites or pretenders. The Internet bombards people with information they do not request, for example, how many times someone looked at your papers, how many times your paper was quoted and so on. These means of control and enforcement induce anxiety, preclude innovation that is 'risky' and they oblige professionals and researchers 'to follow the crowd' and to conform to the arbitrary and temporarily established vogues, however trivial they may be.

Fashions of thoughtless imitation in social psychology led a Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman (2012) to issue an open letter to those who, over the last two decades, have studied the phenomenon of so-called 'social priming'. Experiments on social priming have been trying to discover how subtle cues, linked by arbitrary assumptions, can unconsciously influence our thoughts or behaviour. For example, students were presented with words which characterise old age, such as 'wrinkles', and following this, the researcher observed these students walking more slowly down the stairs. Or students were given descriptions of a famous professor and afterwards they performed better on tests of intelligence. Humans tend to imitate one another. Such experiments have been endlessly repeated by young scholars using various kinds of arbitrary stimuli attempting to find associations between them yet, if replicated by someone else, such findings were hardly ever confirmed. In his open letter Kahneman (2012) writes that there is a 'train wreck looming' for the field, due to a 'storm of doubt' about these results. These doubts were also related to the exposure of fraudulent Dutch social psychologists using these priming techniques in their work. Such studies are published in journals with 'high impact factors' and students, anxious about their careers and promotions, fall into these traps. Although questions were raised as to why Kahneman chose the priming effect studies rather than other studies which, too, may raise a 'storm of doubt', one may view this problem as representing the contemporary situation in which imitation and mindlessness control the academic scene.

But how can one cope with a situation in which young people are rewarded for publishing in high impact factor journals whatever their 'research' is about, because that will lead to their academic promotions, although their conscience

may warn them against such compromises? Again, the clash of epistemic responsibilities dominates their lives and they may well decide 'to sacrifice' their conscience in order to get an immediate reward.

The dissident Czech philosopher Jan Patočka (1973a/1989) reminds us that from ancient times humans have practised sacrifice. In ancient cultures and ancient religions, humans, animals or artefacts were sacrificed in order to appease the gods; the suffering of Jesus Christ has been represented as one of the fundamental sacrifices for the redemption of humanity. Patočka observed that a sacrifice in the true sense of the word presupposes a commitment to something of a higher order, whether a god, an idea, truth or self-integrity. He argued that a person makes a sacrifice for something where there is an order of being, such as human versus object, or symbolic values versus things of material desires. In discussing the dangers of technicisation in science Patočka drew attention to the following paradox. On the one hand, in a technicised or bureaucratised 'iron cage' institution, academics or professionals who are acting according to their conscience, or by taking responsibility for their actions, possibly sacrifice financial or other material rewards. Bureaucracy has power to prevent promotions for non-compliance of a free thinker, as well as to bestow promotions for compliance with rules. In making a sacrifice by acting with conscience, one voluntarily gives something away (career, money), but by doing so, one gains: one enriches one's experience and preserves self-respect and integrity. On the other hand, by submitting oneself to bureaucratic rules as instruments that only pretend to be scientific is not a sacrifice because the submission does not lead to any spiritual gain, only to material gains, which are usually transient and unsatisfactory in the long run. In these cases the experts, researchers and teachers sacrifice themselves, or in the terminology of Patočka, they become sacrificial victims[5] to these practices by becoming instruments of bureaucracy themselves. This could have at least two implications. First, if individuals have not totally lost ethical values, then gaining material profits may be felt as a loss because they feel frustration, anger, self-disrespect, guilt or shame or they search for excuses. They are aware they have become instruments of this escalation of external power and are fully conscious of the internal conflict they have created for themselves. Another possibility is that individuals have closed themselves to any spiritual values, and at least in the short term enjoy material profit for which they betrayed their conscience. But following Patočka, a sacrifice for a cause where there is no order in being, is not a sacrifice. If people submit themselves to power without protest, they do not make a sacrifice, but they are victims.

[5] About the pun of the term 'sacrificial victim' see the translator's note (Patočka, 1973a/1989, p. 339).

In his paper 'On the principle of scientific conscience', Patočka (1973b), reflects on the role of science in society and on the responsibility of the scientist. He emphasises that in contrast to the past, even up to the nineteenth century, today, science influences the life of everybody. As science and technology became vibrant productive forces, Patočka (1973a/1989, p. 159) maintains, this development 'also generated an unheard-of assault on science from outside, also without a precedent in history'. The assault on sciences in the past was in principle based on the rejection of unorthodox and dangerous ideas by religions and by the moralistic ideologies of the time. In contrast, the contemporary assault that Patočka (1973a/1989, p. 159) considered without a precedent is an external control of science which comes from politics and economics 'both of which are only served by ideology'. Patočka wrote his paper in the early 1970s and he recalled the situation where science in Communist Czechoslovakia was submitted to ideological control. Specifically, Lysenko's biology and Stalin's linguistics during the period of 'proletarian science' (Chapter 3) made scientists totally powerless and disposable. But, he notes, '[p]articularly treacherous is that form of external control which takes place in the name of and under the protective heading of "scientific management"' (Patočka, 1973b, p. 159). He explains that scientific management may produce either 'scientific bureaucrats' or 'practicing scientists'. Scientific bureaucrats, he notes, may be very talented and more successful than practicing scientists. They may enjoy the fruits of benevolence from those whom they serve, but the manifest success does not guarantee the scientific conscience. In contrast, practising scientists are aware of 'the *indivisibility* of the principle of scientific conscience' which is also 'the basis for scientific *individuality'* (Patočka 1973b, p. 160, his emphasis). With a view of getting away from the bureaucratisation of science in general, he advises, 'In order to demonstrate, protect, and develop scientific conscience, scientists have to associate' (Patočka, 1973b, 161). His call for scientific conscience and solidarity is a call for epistemic responsibility which, as we know, is responsibility for the Self and Others in and through the uniqueness of communication as *I-You*.

6.7 Conclusion

Epistemic responsibility is derived from the ethical nature of the Ego–Alter relations and is one of the axioms of dialogical epistemology of daily living. Like other dialogical axioms, it is relational. This is exemplified by Rommetveit's and Arendt's cases, which show that both the assumed epistemic equality and inequality between the Self and Other can entail epistemic responsibility or its denial. This is due to the nature of relational concepts derived from axioms of dialogical epistemology. Relational concepts are parts of holistic networks, in which oppositions, e. g. equality and inequality

acquire different meanings in relation to other concepts in that network. Arendt's case is particularly interesting because the paradoxical effect of equality between teachers and pupils with respect to epistemic responsibility can be shown only over time, and in relation to another concept, that is, epistemic authority.

Examples of Bakhtin and Levinas illustrate that epistemic responsibility takes on different forms ranging from symmetrical relations between the Ego–Alter to asymmetrical relations where the Self is conceived as being totally responsible for the Other. According to Bakhtin's perspective the Ego cannot escape responsibility for communication without losing the features underlying ethics, that is, uniqueness and integrity. These features follow from the dialogical relations in human activities that have developed through history and culture. In Levinas's perspective the Self's responsibility for the Other is unlimited and unquestionable: it is the primary principle of human existence. Bakhtin's and Levinas's cases are ideals that many of us might find difficult to follow in a world of injustice and evil. Most importantly, both perspectives are calls for action. According to Bakhtin, taking action means taking responsibility for what the Self is doing with respect to the Other. In Levinas's case, responsibility for the Other takes the form of the Self's action in the face of injustice. If my neighbour is committing an evil act against Others, then I am responsible if I do not act on behalf of Others and of Justice.

Among contemporary challenges to epistemic responsibility that affect the dialogical mind in daily life is bureaucratisation that has stealthily penetrated institutions such as health services and universities. An assault on sciences by bureaucratisation, Patočka noted, is also an assault on the principle of scientific conscience, which must be resisted by establishing scientific solidarity among practising scientists. Patočka calls for conscience and epistemic responsibility of scientists and professionals.

7 The dialogical mind in professional practices

Throughout this book I have emphasised that dialogical epistemology is an epistemology of everyday life. Over the years during which I have been thinking about the dialogical mind, I have collaborated with professionals and researchers concerned with therapy and care of people with mental health and communication problems. As a result, I have arrived at axioms and concepts of dialogical epistemology both through theoretical work and through engagement with practical problems. In view of this, in this last chapter I shall raise two questions. First, what are the implications of dialogical epistemology for dialogical professional practices, and more specifically, for those that are concerned with problems of communication, care and therapy? And secondly, what are the methodological implications of dialogical epistemology?

7.1 The Ego–Alter interdependence in dialogical professional practices

In non-problematic communication, dialogical features like co-construction of meanings, heterogeneity, multivoicedness, unfinalisability of messages and others are adopted largely implicitly and become routinely implemented. The Self and Other take these features for granted as part of their mutually shared social environment (Chapter 5). Therefore, unless specific communicative problems arise, the participants have no reason to bring up any questions about these dialogically shared features. In contrast, in a discourse involving people with communication difficulties, the participants often become explicitly aware of these dialogical features because they cannot be routinely applied. Communication difficulties lead to the disruption of communicative synchrony and to misunderstandings. Since professional practices like psychotherapies, counselling, training, learning–teaching and so on are all based on communication (e.g. dialogue, interview, confession, etc.), the negotiation and interpretation of dialogical features present a challenge. Both professionals and clients or patients have to cope with misinterpretations leading to disagreements, with emotional and

fear-producing situations which can be loaded, simultaneously, with mutual trust and distrust and with various kinds of communicative errors. These situations require dialogical sensitivity on the part of professionals to negotiate problems with patients and family members, to establish trustful relations and to cope with conflicts and tensions. Listening to and understanding patients and clients require the capacity to interpret what is said and what is not said, as well as to comprehend reasons why certain things are said and not said. The participants have to cope with unfinalised processes, each of them being a unique case requiring a specific dialogical relation. Here we consider some cases.

7.1.1 The Ego–Alter interdependence in congenital deafblindness

Communication involving people with congenital deafblindness (CDB) presents an extreme case of difficulties that the dialogical mind encounters. The British national charity for deafblind people *Sense* defines CDB as a condition of 'any child who is born with a sight and hearing impairment or develops sight and hearing loss before they have developed language in their early years' (www.sense.org.uk/content/congenital-deafblindness). It is important to emphasise that CDB refers to the condition that is present in the child before he/she acquires language and this is why CDB differs in fundamental ways from acquired deafness, blindness and deafblindness.

The French philosopher Denis Diderot (1749/1916) in his extensive letter on the blind and the congenitally blind posed intriguing questions about life without sight and about the features of the mind and other senses by means of which the individual compensates for blindness. Diderot was a philosopher of rationalism during the period of Enlightenment, and he was aware of the importance of commonly held signs and symbols underlying language and communication. Humans share signs that are recognised by eyes in alphabets; there are also commonly held signs recognised by ears in articulating sounds. However, there are no common signs recognised by touch, and therefore, there can be no communication between 'us' and those who are born deaf, blind and mute: 'They grow, but they remain in a condition of mental imbecility' (Diderot, 1749/1916, p. 89). Diderot admits that perhaps the deaf, blind and mute could be trained if someone communicated with them from infancy by some means. But 'to train and question one born blind would be an occupation worthy of the combined talents of Newton, Descartes and Leibniz' (Diderot, 1749/1916, p. 118).

As a philosopher of rationalism and Enlightenment, Diderot considered a deafblind person simply as an individual who was in need of training. At that time it did not occur to him that communication is not a one-sided training but

that it is a dialogical process involving both parties.[1] This is why training of such an individual would be an enormous achievement. And yet, contemporary professionals involved in the care and communication of people with CDB have succeeded not just in training but in dialogical communication. The foremost challenge for a child with CDB and his/her carers is to use senses like touch, smell, taste and body awareness as the dialogical resources in communication (Souriau, 2000; 2001; 2015). Since people with CDB have the same needs as everybody else, in order to meet their needs, the development of communication has been the main priority for carers and services (Janssen and Rødbroe, 2007; Rødbroe and Janssen, 2006; Souriau, Rødbroe and Janssen, 2008; 2009). Having been aware of the Self–Other interdependence as a vital dialogical resource, professionals, carers and researchers working in the field of CDB have been among the first to have methodically explored the nature of the dialogical mind. The terminology which they systematically use, for example, 'co-construction', 'co-creating communication', 'co-production', 'co-presence', 'co-development' and possibly some other 'co-', indicates their supreme dialogical concerns.

7.1.1.1 Life as a 'hyper-dialogue' Dialogue, which forms the vital feature of life in CDB (Nafstad, 2015), cannot be viewed as a single episode that takes place here-and-now, but it must be viewed as a slice in life that has its past, present and future. Every moment in dialogue brings about past experiences and previous dialogues and interactions. This has led Jacques Souriau (2013) to maintain that each single conversation is part of a 'hyper-dialogue', that is, a part of conversations that take place throughout the whole life, recalling memories of the past, co-constructing present experiences and imagining the future. The term 'hyper-dialogue' refers to the very dialogicality and historicity of the human life, that is, to the fact that the present encounter draws on the previous one and that it anticipates the future encounter. Despite their communicative difficulties, persons with CDB construct hyper-dialogue throughout their entire lives. This historical perspective of dialogicality enables humans to be aware of continuities and changes over time and to construct their Selves (Ricoeur, 1990/1992; Souriau, 2013).

Therefore, Souriau suggests that a 'hyper-dialogue' is not a metaphor, but that it directly touches the vital social reality of persons with CDB: it is through the continuity of dialogical interactions that persons with CDB co-construct their concepts of the Self (see also Berteau, 2010). As in communication

[1] Jacques Souriau drew to my attention that more than thirty years later Diderot wrote an addition to his letter in which he acknowledged his earlier errors concerning his views on the mental capacities of blind people. Instead, he then described with admiration mental capacities of a blind young woman who 'with wonderful memory, and strength of mind as wonderful, what progress she would have made in science if she had had a longer life' (Diderot, 1749/1916, p. 157).

involving people with vision, hearing and speech, so in communication involving people with CDB, dialogical experiences are brought into conversations both implicitly and explicitly. Nevertheless, in the case of people with CDB, in order to establish communication, all dialogical experiences, implicit and explicit, must be explicitly acknowledged, negotiated and agreed upon by both parties (Berteau, 2010).

In his exploration of the Ego–Alter interdependencies and socially shared knowledge in conversations between carers and persons with CDB, Berteau (2010) focuses on different kinds of dialogical tension. He discusses them as complements or oppositions involving three main dyadic relations: implicit versus explicit knowledge; educational versus dialogical learning; and attachment versus trust.

The opposition between implicit and explicit knowledge in conversations involving people with CDB can create tension due to the difficulties of both parties to recognise elements which are and are not tacitly shared, and which are intended to be shared, thematised and topicalised. The second kind of opposition concerns educational and dialogical learning. Beartau observes tension arising from the discrepancy between different scenarios in the mind of the person with CDB and that of the carer. If the carer monologically follows his/her own teaching scenario in terms of 'imperative and declarative communication' without listening to the person with CDB, the participants do not achieve the educational goal. Through his analysis Berteau arrived at the third dialogical opposition – the one between attachment trust and dialogical trust. Only reciprocity in the Self–Other interactions can establish the attachment trust (on attachment and trust, see earlier, Fonagy and Allison, 2014). In order to develop dialogical trust, Self–Other interactions must allow people with CDB to express their agency. As Nafstad (2015, p. 31) explains, to trust the Other implies the belief that the Other adopts the listening attitude with respect to the Self and that listening will be sustained despite the difficulty in predicting the intended meaning. She connects dialogical trust with the Self's feeling of being 'worthy of being listened to' and with the sense of dignity. This means that the Self must experience that he/she is acknowledged by the Other, is worthy of the attention of the Other and is uplifted by that attention (Nafstad, 2015, pp. 31–32). This also implies that trust as the search for dignity and social recognition facilitates dialogical relations and strengthens the Self's belief that he/she is treated with dignity. In contrast, if such acknowledgement is not forthcoming, dialogue turns into a monologue and is associated with distrust and uncertainty.

None of these dyadic relations discussed by Berteau and Nafstad remain stable during the course of conversation involving people with CDB, but they are constantly reorganised and adapted to new situations as the topic of conversation develops and changes. Berteau shows that ongoing reframing of

dialogical thinking is an essential feature of communication involving people with CDB. For example, he observes how the expression 'mum' in a conversation is reframed in another conversation into 'family moving house' in which 'mum' becomes part of the moving event. Berteau suggests that ongoing reframings contribute to the construction of a hyper-dialogue.

7.1.1.2 The uniqueness of tactile dialogues The *uniqueness* (Chapter 6) of each individual manifests itself exceptionally strongly in people with CDB (Souriau, 2001; 2015). They are affected by the condition to different degrees (some people may have residual vision and hearing); they may have other conditions (e.g. autism and learning difficulties), and just like everybody else, they will have specific personality features. In every situation, each individual experiences CDB differently and is affected by it in different ways. Rødbroe and Janssen (2006) highlight that carers and services must focus above all on the fact that they are concerned with the individual who has the disability, rather than with the disability as such: 'Recognition of his or her uniqueness is essential when deafblindness is considered' (Rødbroe and Janssen, 2006, p. 10). The authors emphasise that visual and hearing impairment is the only thing that is common to deafblind people: in everything else they are unique. Therefore, the ways in which people with CDB create meanings together with their carers through repetitions, the ways in which they acquire knowledge and co-create narratives, are achieved uniquely.

While meanings in spoken or sign language are commonly understood because they belong to a shared symbolic system, meanings based on tactile communication of people with CDB are unique to each Self–Other dyad. Communication of people with CDB is built on their capacities to use tactile and motor experiences, and to co-construct, together with their carers, symbols and concepts in and through replaying events in which these symbols and concepts were used previously (Souriau, 2013; 2015).

Tactile dialogues, in which the Self and Other mutually reciprocate gestures and signs, become shared in the process of negotiation (Nafstad, 2015). The following example of tactile communication of a person who is totally deaf and totally blind is discussed by Rødbroe and Janssen (2006). Kirsten, a forty-eight-year-old woman, expresses herself by gestures that originated from her bodily experiences. After negotiation over a long time, the carer understands that Kirsten does not want to make tea but 'hot chocolate', which is made from chocolate broken into pieces and cooked in hot milk. Comprehension is facilitated by the fact that Kirsten moves in her familiar environment and the carer understands, from former experience, Kirsten's idiosyncratic gestures like a 'saucepan' and 'breaking the chocolate'. In this case, the mutual understanding of the gestures of Kirsten and the carer (the Ego–Alter) mediates the Object: 'I BREAK CHOCOLATE/COOK MILK' (Rødbroe and Janssen, 2006,

pp. 75–76). As Nafstad (2015, p. 34) maintains, the triangular relationship between the Ego–Alter–Object 'co-produces and co-creates knowledge about objects, and therefore co-creates objects as social realities'.

One of the problems in the Self–Other communication is to understand that people with CDB, just like everybody else, experience tension arising from the search for intersubjectivity and the struggle for social recognition (Nafstad, 2015). This issue is particularly important because communication can involve only gestures of touching, and it may also involve very long gaps between joint constructions of dialogical contributions. People with CDB communicate with a constant risk that when they speak using their unique tactile gestures they have co-created with their carers and that are specific to each individual, they may not be understood by other carers. Although people with CDB develop resilience when they encounter such problems in communication, it is equally important that in order to succeed in transmitting their messages, the Other is prepared to listen and to follow the communicative gestures of the speaker. As already noted, dialogical trust of people with CDB depends on the listening attitude of the Other which acknowledges the speaker as an agent with dignity.

7.1.1.3 Co-presence as a prerequisite for mutuality When Gunnar Vege (2009) completed his study entitled '*Co-presence is a Gift: Co-presence as a Prerequisite for a Sustained and Shared Here and Now*' he had already worked, for twenty-five years, as a professional teacher of people with CDB. One of his students was a Norwegian woman Ingerid, who was twenty-one years old at the time of completing his study. Vege had already worked with her for ten years. Ingerid was born totally blind due to Rubella and she had only little residual hearing, which, Vege noted, had for her no functional value. The aim of his study was to examine the extent to which the carer contributes to the development of sustained communication. Specifically, Vege used the term 'co-presence' of the participants as a prerequisite for mutuality of their communicative connection and sustained attention to one another. Most importantly, participants may be physically co-present yet each could be closed in their own monological worlds. In contrast, Vege's definition of co-presence does not refer to spacial co-presence of the participants but to dialogical co-presence of the Self–Other.Vege defines 'co-presence' as follows:

> Co-presence is an attitude, it is a state of mental, bodily and emotional awareness of co-existing in each other's presence. It is being engaged emotionally and psychologically, in a way that involves the actual other in here-and-now. It is an active state of attention that offers the individual who is CDB perceptible signs of attentiveness, which consist of expressions that have an emotional effect on the other. (Vege, 2009, p. 7)

Vege's definition shows that 'co-presence' is a complex concept involving a number of competencies on the part of both participants, enabling an utmost

dialogical togetherness in a clinical encounter. Specifically, Gunnar Vege has brought to my attention (personal communication) that four competencies are essential to establish a dialogical togetherness: shared attention, communicative intentions, sustained experience of perspectives and a capacity of building and sharing tension. All these competencies jointly contribute to the development of the narrative structure of the shared life story of both participants.

Awareness of co-presence can be a particular challenge for carers if the person with CDB suddenly stops responding in the middle of a conversation. This however may not indicate withdrawal of attention but a transition from external to internal dialogue on the part of the person with CDB. As Nafstad (2015) notes, the carer faces the problem of understanding that a person with CDB may take a temporary dialogical position of a thinker. This position is indicated when the person does not direct his/her gestures at the listener but at the Self. This temporary directing of attention towards the Self may indicate that he/she is engaging in making sense of his/her own position within the dialogue (Nafstad, 2015; Nafstad and Rødbroe, 2013). The challenge for the carer is to recognise, acknowledge and respect that the person with CDB is engaged in thinking, that is, in making sense of, or positioning him-/herself within the space of the here-and-now. The person with CDB may subsequently wish to make known to the listener some aspects of his/her thoughts. Accordingly, he/she may then be ready to take the position of the speaker in an external dialogue, requiring the partner to shift to the position of the listener or follower of his/her utterance (Nafstad, 2015).

The exploration of the transition between external and internal dialogue was one of the features of Gunnar Vege's (2009) research. Much of the discussion below is based on the DVD video made for this purpose (Vege et al., 2007). His particular interest was focused on moments of Ingerid's hesitation when she was thinking and made a gesture or a sign. Vege maintained that these moments showed that Ingerid's attention shifted away from external dialogical interaction towards an inner dialogue. He analysed this sequence in two parts, from 00:00 till 01:04 (one minute and four seconds). It consisted of two narrative micro-structures, each leading to moments of internal dialogues. Figure 7.1 shows moments when Ingerid stopped responding and her face showed a disengaged attitude:

> (00:13): 'Turning her head a bit away from Gunnar again, as hesitating, thinking . . .'
>
> (00:55): 'Her head is turning away, freezing her head position a moment, as hesitating, thinking'

Figure 7.1 shows the video-transcription of the narrative that takes places from 00:00 till 01:04. We can summarise Vege's detailed analysis as follows:



Figure 7.1 Dynamic relations between external dialogues and internal dialogues

Vege invites Ingerid to go out. Ingerid eagerly responds to the invitation. Vege, in guiding Ingerid's hands to reach for the rucksack, structured the beginning of the narrative sequence. He describes what happened:

> When reaching the rucksack Ingerid explores the rucksack in a tactile manner and then (00:13) she moves her head away from the partner, and freezes the position of her head. Her facial expression looks concentrated, she seems to hesitate, think. What cause Ingerid think [*sic*]? A main aspect is that this scenario, just entered, is based on her tactile bodily experienced perspective of the world. The partners share expressions in a tactile dialogical manner, through touch, movements and bodily emotional expressions. And the contextual elements are based on her previous life-experiences. (Vege, 2009, p. 70)

The rucksack is a contextual artefact that Ingerid already knows because it was used previously during outings with Gunnar Vege and it always contained some food, usually an orange. At 00:17 Ingerid's

> right hand leaves the hand of her partner, expresses a gesture with an 'orange shaped hand' towards her cheek, and then smiles and laughs. It is possible, by observation of her facial expressions, to suppose that the thinking process has a kind of a narrative structure. It looks like the thinking is progressing towards an emotional state, a kind of tension. (Vege, 2009, p. 70)

Vege observes Ingerid's response. He comments on her expression to assure her that he is attentive to her, and adds, using touch gestures 'LIKE-YESTERDAY' (00:22). Ingerid attends to Vege, who directs his body towards the rucksack and signs to Ingerid: 'FIRST-FEEL-OPEN-THE LID . . . COME – COME' (00:29 and 00:33). Gunnar Vege described this situation:

When he has signed 'OPEN-THE LID', slowly and distinctly, her under lip moves outwards. His movements towards and the touch of the rucksack are performed more as questions than as a start of 'opening the rucksack'. When touching the sack, he does not open the top immediately. He starts to put focus on the next natural action to share; opening the first buckle of the top. The partner pulls on the buckle as a question and Ingerid smiles as both an expression showing that she understands his intention and agrees. Her partner shares every small action by the use of tactile bodily expressions in a distinct sequential manner. (Vege, 2009, p. 71)

Opening of the first buckle slows down the mutual action and creates an irregular rhythm, which seems to affect Ingerid (00:51) as she moves

her right hand to the next buckle, and the other hand is 'glued' to the partner's acting left hand. Simultaneously she moves her head downwards and then further to the right, away from her partner, like hesitating, thinking again. Her partner focuses on moving to the second buckle. He stops and asks her what to do with this one. It seems like she is able to reflect, and still be mentally aware of her partner's action. She answers 'OPEN' by pulling on the buckle, and again freezes her head position a bit. Then she both smiles and expresses the 'orange shaped hand'-gesture towards her cheek (01:02). This internal dialogue seems to consist of the same progression as the first one; from an intense state of concentration towards a kind of a state of tension, and then when smiling and expressing a gesture. The different elements in this inner dialogue again might be supposed to be experienced in a kind of a narrative structure. (Vege, 2009, p. 71)

Vege maintains that the whole sequence shows joint attention of both partners, correct attribution of the intentions of dialogical contributions, and builds up the dialogical tension.

The video also captures Ingerid smiling. Sometimes she smiles momentarily, sometimes this is barely noticeable, but sometimes the video shows a big smile. For example, a big smile occurred when Gunnar was talking with Ingerid about an orange. Figure 7.2 shows that occasion at time 01:10, when a big smile is accompanied by a vocal sound, as happy.

7.1.1.4 Reconstructing shared experience One day Ingerid and Vege were fishing for crabs and they were sharing emotions while feeling crabs moving in their palms and then on a bare forearm (Souriau, Rødbroe and Janssen, 2008, p. 23). These included sensations and movements of a crab crawling on arms and hands, excitement of what happened on the arm and location of movements of the crab on the body.

The following day Ingerid and Vege talked about their past shared experiences, including the episode with the orange (see above). Souriau, Rødbroe and Janssen (2008, pp. 32–33) describe the situation: 'Suddenly, in the middle of "The Orange" narrative, Ingerid stood up. She took a turn in the dialogue with her left hand moving up the right arm, exactly as she had expressed the gesture

Figure 7.2 A big smile accompanied by a vocal sound at time 01:10, as happy

in the immediate dialogue on the Pier. Gunnar confirmed her gesture, by expressing the same gesture.'

This led to re-establishing the shared experience that took place the previous day, and the two participants recreated the crab-line theme. Gunnar 'placed the crab in his palm' and Ingerid touched his palm in the same way as on the previous day. Then she 'allowed the crab to circle in her palm'. She took more initiative and 'said' that it felt like the crab going up her arm and showed it by her fingertips: 'The co-construction of the narrative continued through touching the aspects that had made impressions . . . the traces were then clearly fixed and stabilized manifesting themselves as distinct meaningful signs' (Souriau, Rødbroe and Janssen. 2008, p. 33).

The example of the crab-line theme and the co-construction of the narrative draws attention to imagination as a guiding force in this co-construction. In his letter on the blind, Diderot (1749/1916) asked himself questions like how are 'their' mental processes different from 'ours'? How do 'they' form ideas of figures? How do 'they' imagine? 'Their' imagination comes from fingertips; 'their' only chance is to form images by calling to mind and combining palpable sensations while a sighted person calls to mind visible and coloured points. Diderot's ideas about mental processes and imagination represent the Enlightenment ideas about rationality of the individual. In contrast, imaginative thinking is one of the axioms of dialogical epistemology, which is derived from the Self–Other interdependence. The co-construction of a narrative in CDB involves imagination that is jointly produced by the person with CDB and his/her carer. Ingerid's narrative is facilitated by Gunnar's dialogical capacity

to take the perspective of the person with CDB, to recreate the atmosphere of joint experience and to provide space for Ingerid's self-expression. As Souriau, Rødbroe and Janssen (2008, p. 33) note, the traces of these experiences become stabilised and manifest themselves as meaningful signs which the participants share.

In conclusion, CDB lays bare the essential features of dialogical epistemology by highlighting the unique capacities of the dialogical mind in the most difficult conditions of communication and life experiences (Nafstad, 2015; Souriau, 2001; 2013). The uniqueness of the Self–Other interdependence in CDB is particularly discernible in Vege's and Berteau's research. They both explain that it is because of the uniqueness of individuals involved in their studies that the single case approach, to which we shall turn later, was vital for success in their work.

7.1.2 Multivoicedness in dialogical practices

Throughout this book I have referred to dialogical multivoicedness or heteroglossia as one of the axioms characterising the Self–Other(s) interdependence. It takes simultaneously several forms in a concrete dialogue (Wagoner et al., 2011). First, a concrete dialogue, we have seen, echoes other dialogues or, more generally, is part of 'a life as hyper-dialogue'. This also means that any dialogue not only involves the voices of actual participants but that it also resonates with voices of participants who are not present, as well as with the past and contemporary cultural and institutional standpoints. Second, heteroglossia is a double-voiced discourse, by means of which a speaker simultaneously expresses different intentions (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 324). Thus, in a novel, one intention could be directly articulated by the hero or by the speaking character, while the author of the novel might express another intention. The hero's and the author's intentions may clash and lead to transformations of one another's intentions and so contribute to the dynamics of dialogue. For example, the hero may express his/her intention to carry out a particular action while the author may, through the mouth of the hero, question the morality of that intention. Manifestations of different intentions sometimes merge, and sometimes they compete with one another. Thirdly, multivoicedness or heteroglossia may refer to the speakers' external and internal dialogues. We have touched on internal and external dialogues and their possible tensions many times in this book, for example, with respect to the speakers' confessions or with regard to internal dialogues in people with CDB. Yet another kind of multivoicedness may refer to the professional's repetitions of the partner's dialogical contribution in order to confirm that it was understood correctly. In such situations, the professional or carer articulates both his/her own words and the voice of the partner with disability. We have already seen examples of

this kind of multivoicedness in communications involving people with CDB and I shall now present another instance of multivoicedness in communication involving a person with cerebral palsy.

7.1.2.1 Multivoicedness in cerebral palsy Just as in the communication involving people with CDB, where both partners visibly co-construct their dialogical contributions, the joint co-construction of dialogical contributions is made explicit in communication involving people with cerebral palsy (Collins and Marková, 1999; Marková, 2003a). Cerebral palsy is a disorder of movement and posture caused by trauma to the brain before or at birth. A person with cerebral palsy may have multiple disabilities, ranging from severely limited voluntary bodily movements, uncontrollable spasms, epilepsy and atony, to learning difficulties. People with cerebral palsy may have problems with articulating speech, and to make themselves understood, they use a range of gestures, facial expressions and bodily movements. In order to facilitate their interactions with others, they may use electronic- and/or paper-based alternative and augmentative communication systems.

In the following example the person with cerebral palsy is a seventeen-year-old woman who used a board with icons to which she pointed in order to communicate. In this particular case, she was telling the carer that on Thursday night she and other girls made a joke. They put a spider into the bed of the therapist Judith. The girls had a lot of fun because Judith did not like spiders and she screamed. In this case the carer used three different voices that were clearly distinguished by intonation. The first voice articulated the non-speaker's voice as a commentator; the second voice was the carer's response to the non-speaker; and finally, the carer conveyed what she might be saying to herself, that is her possible inner voice. Here is an extract from the narrative the speakers co-constructed:

An extract from Spider[2]: M = non-speaker; A = carer

M:	*(pointing on board)* *(vocalisation)*	
A:	Thursday	A articulates the word 'Thursday'
M:	*(pointing on board)*	to which M pointed on the board. The
	*(*VOCALISATION*)*	utterance 'Thursday night was funny after
A:	night	[sic] went home' was spoken with a narrative
M:	ye	tone – like when telling a story
M:	*(pointing on board)* *(vocalisation)*	
A:	was	
M:	*(pointing on board)* *(vocalisation)*	

[2] The transcript was made by Sarah Collins.

A: *(nods)*
.huhh funny
M: after
M: *(smiling)*
(pointing on board)
(vocalisation)
A: *(laughing)*
M: *(smiles)*
(pointing on board)
(vocalisation)
A: *(smiling)*
M: *(smiles)*
A: (tuts) went ho::me
M: aye
A: *(nodding)*
(tuts) I missed all the fun — as if speaking to herself
M: *(laughing)*
A: what did you do — eliciting the response from M
M: *(pointing on board)* *(pointing on board)*
(vocalisation) *(vocalisation)*
A: *(smiles)*
.
.
.
A: .hhh.hhh ye::s :tell me more — eliciting response from M
M: *(laughs)*
M: *(smiling)* *(pointing on board)*
A: put hhh .hhh
M: *(smiling)* *(pointing on board)*
A: *(smiles)*
M: *(knowingly)*
A: a spi::de::r — voicing M's word
M: *(looking on board)* *(laughs)*
A: *(looking on board)* *(laughs)*
Mm I think I know what's coming — as if talking to herself
M: *(pointing on board)* *(laughs)* *(laughs)*
A: in::: *(in tone of anticipation)* — voicing M's utterance
M: *(nods)*
A: Judith::'s be:d!
M: *(nods)*
A: ((tuts)).hhhh (.) does she like spiders (serious tone) — commenting on M's message,
M: *(shaking head)* *(pointing on board)* — which expresses dislike of spiders
(laughing) *(vocalisation)* — in the culture they share

We can also note that the different voices that M is using to co-construct the narrative with A refer to different kinds of shared knowledge: cultural (e.g. not liking spiders), personal (e.g. appreciating emotional features of the story),

dialogically established forms of interaction (e.g. anticipations and imaginations of what will happen, expressing interest in the story, inner comments). Whatever form multivoicedness takes, it testifies to the fact that dialogues are not linear strings of single voices, transparent meanings or question–answer sequences. Multivoicedness not only testifies to the richness of communication but also challenges professionals and their clients to take account of the competing voices in dialogue.

7.1.2.2 Multivoicedness in psychotherapy Grossen and Salazar Orvig (2011) investigate in what ways multiple and intermingling voices of actual and absent participants contribute to defining the problem in therapeutic consultation. Assuming that a concrete dialogue is no more than a slice in a lifelong dialogue, the authors explore not only the voices of participants who are present but also echoes of the voices that took part in past discourses, or even in imagined discourses. This assumption recalls the Bakhtinian position that any discourse is shaped by preceding discourses and by speakers' anticipations of responses from their listeners. Following French dialogical pragmatics (e.g. Anscombre and Ducrot 1983; Ducrot 1984; Vion, 1998), Grossen and Salazar Orvig distinguish between speakers' different 'enunciative positionings'. By enunciative positioning they mean a relation between the speaker's attitudes towards the different voices, whether his/her own voices or those of other absent enunciators (Grossen and Salazar Orvig, 2011, p. 57). They explain that speakers may consider themselves as authors of the utterance in question, and therefore, they take the epistemic responsibility for the utterance. Alternatively, they may present themselves as not being epistemically responsible for the discourse; they only portray the utterance from a particular perspective. That perspective may come from a discourse that involves other voices; speakers may distance themselves from the utterance, or they may reject or reformulate it. The authors insist that among these two poles, that is, accepting and rejecting epistemic responsibility, there are subtle forms and mitigators expressing a range of relations between speakers and the enunciative positions of the actual and absent parties.

With these dialogical presuppositions, Grossen and Salazar Orvig analysed processes in therapeutic discourse, in which voices intermingled, for example, speakers explicitly or implicitly invoked absent persons, while developing their own positions in conjunction with positions of their present interlocutors. The authors refer to these processes as a 'dialogized heteroglossia' (Bakhtin, 1981), that is, as a phenomenon in which speakers not only invoke and amalgamate diverse voices but link together past discourses and anticipate the future ones. In and through their analysis it becomes apparent that the speaker is not homogeneous and monological but heterogeneous and dialogical. The authors show that in one and the same utterance a speaker not only

invokes different voices but that diverse voices may converge and conflict with one another. In the following example Grossen and Salazar Orvig show that the therapist and the mother in the interview presented an absent voice of the teacher and the reformulations of that voice in the actual discourse. In the extract, in lines 1–3 the mother uses the term 'brusque' that had been first used by the absent teacher. In the actual discourse it was reintroduced by the therapist's reformulation of the mother's utterance in line 6 below, and then addressing the child in line 9[3]:

1 M: (. . .) the teacher also told me (. . .)
2 M: (. . .) he is quite brusque also in his- in his- in his
3 behaviours he's a::
4 T: [a direct]
5 M: [a little bit] excited, a bit direct yeah yeah +
6 T: so he is brusque and then it provokes reactions'
7 M: from the others'
8 M: yeah (T looks at Alain)
9 T: (to Alain) how do they react when you are brusque'

This example shows that the term 'brusque', which the mother used with reference to the previous teacher's discourse, was integrated into the therapist's discourse, but it did not show any enunciative position, that is, it did not indicate who was epistemically responsible for the meaning expressed by that term. However, the therapist's expression 'so he is brusque and then it provokes reactions' implicitly requires the mother to take a position with respect to that expression. Lastly, the therapist addresses the child using the term 'brusque' as if it was the therapist's chosen term, while the reference to the teacher is now completely lost.

In sum, the speaker may simultaneously take several positions, for example, as an author of his/her utterance, as someone who responds to the interlocutor, as someone who echoes an opinion of his/her parents or of a political party, or as someone who is anxious about the opinion of his/her interlocutor. The richness of styles, genres, as well as of stereotypes expressed in and through the diversity of voices would not be possible if speakers did not rely upon cultural, institutional, socially shared and common-sense knowledge.

[3] Norms of transcription in the extract:

() Parentheses are used to give contextual information, such as laughter, telephone rings, sigh, etc.
:: stretching of a sound
+ pause of a half-second
[. . .] a part of the turn has been cut for reasons of space restriction
− interruption
, indicates a falling intonation

7.1.3 Epistemic trust in dialogical practices

7.1.3.1 Revealing and concealing secrets Professionals are often faced with individuals or families who are not willing to reveal sensitive information or secrets that threaten their integrity and social recognition. These encompass a wide variety of issues like incest, mental and physical illness, alcoholism, extramarital affairs, suicides, homicides, artificial procreation, adoption and so on (Rober, Walravens and Versteynen, 2012). Keeping secrets may lead to tensions and conflicts within the individual as well as the fear that, for one reason or other, one day the secret may be revealed. It may also result in deterioration of interpersonal relations within a family or between friends; it can be interpreted as lack of trust, or as non-recognition of the other as a worthy partner. One may disclose a secret to certain individuals while excluding others; one may avoid certain topics or change a topic or just keep silence. All this may create barriers among members of a family as well as trigger the formation of coalitions (Imber-Black, 1998) between some members while excluding others, and so may lead to stress and loneliness in the excluded family members.

Rober, Walravens and Versteynen (2012) posed the question as to what dialogical tools are available to family therapists in order to cope with family secrecy in its complexity. As the authors note, one secret is often linked with other secrets, for example, a suicide in the family may be linked to a mental illness or to poor marital relations and so on. Secrets encourage imagination and fantasies, which may be highly exaggerated and relations between members may be ruined due to presumed untrustworthy and half-true communications, silences and taboos (Imber-Black, 1998). Rober, Walravens and Versteynen (2012) carried out a case study based on the analysis of the autoethnographical documentary film entitled *Familiegeheim* (Family Secret) by the Dutch director Jaap van Hoewijk. In this film, van Hoewijk investigates the secret which the family kept from the children concerning the suicide of their father. Rober, Walravens and Versteynen (2012) acknowledge that due to the polysemic nature of visual material, the use of a film as a qualitative method provides rich material for interpretation. It far surpasses methods based on verbal materials like interviews or focus groups. The authors show the interplay of trust and distrust between keeping the family secret and selectively disclosing some information to some family members but not to others. In the particular case of the film *Familiegeheim*, this led to tension between the son and his mother; he could not trust her and was never sure whether she was telling him the truth.

Conventional knowledge implies that if the whole story of the family secret is revealed, then it is possible for truth to be made known. However, the authors' dialogical perspective showed that multiple voices were telling

different 'truths' and none of them could count as a definite truth because they were dealing with a process never to be completed (Bakhtin, 1981). Therefore, rather than talking about a 'secret', the authors turned to the term 'selective disclosure', which captured more fully the complexities of family communication as a multifaceted process in time, allowing for the creation of an open dialogical space. Questions could be asked within that space which would permit the voicing of certain issues while accepting that other issues could not be exposed (Rober, Walravens and Versteynen, 2012, p. 538). The authors conclude that selective disclosure takes place in one form or other in all families and that it would not be correct to interpret selective disclosure as a pathological response to revealing secrets. Rather than aiming at a total disclosure, the therapist should facilitate a space for dialogical communication.

Another case study on revealing and concealing secrets was carried out by Flåm and Haugstvedt (2013), who examined caregivers' awareness of children's first signs of sexual abuse, circumstances facilitating and hindering such awareness, and trust/distrust in relation to such circumstances. The disclosure of a child's signs in their study was largely determined by dialogical sensitivity of the trusted caregivers to the child's report leading to unveiling of the event, in particular if that involved another trusted person. In such compromising cases the child needed a great deal of encouragement from the adult. Without such encouragement his/her answers did not lead to disclosure.

In contrast, when the trusted caregiver posed thoughtful questions and so provided space for intersubjective understanding, the child used this opportunity for disclosure. The difficulty of revealing such formidable secrets is due to the fact that the child, abused by a trusted person like a parent or a neighbour, might feel responsible for the abuse. The child might be frightened for possibly causing harm to others, of not being taken seriously and so on. Moreover, the adult might not be a good listener, might disbelieve the child and be altogether lacking in dialogical sensitivity. Flåm and Haugstvedt (2013) provide numerous instances showing the caregiver's disregard for the child's information, in particular if the child is unable to speak directly about the incident and if he/she uses indirect questions like: 'Do I HAVE to go to uncle?' or 'Do I HAVE to wash the dishes even though I get paid?' The adult may interpret these questions as a temporary reluctance, unwillingness or laziness. The authors find that in such cases the child does not repeat the request, and only after a long delay new information comes out through other sources. They point out that normalising the child's request, correcting the child and not asking any further question suppresses the child's agency and stops him/her from pursuing a dialogue. In contrast, the caretaker's dialogical sensitivity provides opportunity for his/her action. Flåm and Haugstvedt (2013) provide another example: Mother was about to leave for a night shift and the daughter asks: 'Is it YOU, mommy? Do you HAVE to leave for work?' Mother found the daughter's voice strange

and terrified and shortly found out that her husband was abusing their daughter. The authors conclude that the adult's open dialogical attunement provided space for the mother's recognition of the problem.

7.1.3.2 Epistemic trust in psychotherapy If dialogue is a cure (Nafstad, 2015), then building up and maintaining epistemic trust in and through psychotherapy is vital to the success of the therapeutic process and healing. Epistemic trust and distrust in psychotherapy can be discerned in different forms and these forms parallel those of intersubjectivity as discussed in Chapter 4, namely interpersonal, institutional and generalised (or state, system) forms. Salgado (2014) refers to several layers of trust/distrust with respect to psychotherapeutic services. These layers take place simultaneously in transindividual, interpersonal and intrapersonal forms, which grow together and transform themselves into new forms. As a transindividual form, a generalised trust of society facilitates the establishment of institutions to be trusted. Forms and degrees of trust and distrust depend on clients'/patients' own experience, on the influence of the media, on political and economic conditions, among other issues, like rules that govern activities of institutions and legal implications. As an interpersonal form, trust in the here-and-now encounter between the psychotherapist and client has a number of features, like building the therapeutic alliance as a dialogical engagement in terms of sharing emotions and of the therapeutic goal to be achieved. Interpersonal trust is interrelated with intrapersonal trust in Others as well as in the Self. In a clinical practice, these kinds of trust may be simultaneously at stake: lack of trust in oneself instigates distrust in Others and this tends to create defensive interpersonal and intrapersonal malfunctioning (see also Erikson, 1968). In this context, Salgado (2014) emphasises the role of a therapeutic relationship based on shared values and mutual understanding, cultivating 'a deep transpersonal trust' based on ethics of the profound commitment to Others and therefore to the Self.

Referring specifically to a Bakhtinian approach based on open dialogues, Seikkula and Trimble (2005) and Seikkula (2011) discuss its role in therapeutic dialogue. The authors devise an Open Dialogue Approach which conceives dialogue as a precondition of the healing process in any kind of therapy. The term 'open dialogue' indicates several kinds of relations. First, it refers to the authenticity of communication of all involved parties, to openness, that is, unfinalisability of dialogue. Authenticity implies that all conversations and all decisions must involve all participants, who are involved in the therapeutic team network. This also includes the patient, who may be very anxious at the beginning of treatment. This may present a challenge for the team in terms of tolerating intense emotional states, ambiguity of the problem and considerable stress. The second meaning of openness, that is, unfinalisability of dialogue, comes from the assumption that a word or an utterance derives its meaning both

from the speaker and listener. During the dialogue the participants continuously shift and transform meanings and therefore open the dialogue to new possibilities of understanding. In a therapeutic team of the Open Dialogue Approach, moreover, each member expresses his/her perspective, thus giving credence to 'polyphonic' relations (Bakhtin, 1984a). Finally, openness means that sessions are not pre-planned, which allows for sharing of the emotional experience of healing between the therapeutic team and the patient. Spontaneity of communication of the involved parties facilitates the creation and usage of new words to express emotions more accurately using everyday language with which all participants are familiar. Reflection generated in and through multivoiced dialogue encourages the pursuit of detailed comments from each person in the team. Most importantly, the patient experiences that he/she is worthy of being listened to.

Being theoretically rooted in Bowlby's concept of attachment rather than in Bakhtin's dialogism, Fonagy and his colleagues (e.g. Bateson and Fonagy, 2010; Fonagy and Allison, 2014) have developed the concept of mentalising, that is, the capacity to understand Others' and one's own mental states and activities (see also Chapter 5). Mentalising is a social process that facilitates the individual to achieve a sense of being understood as a unique being: 'Feeling understood in therapy restores trust in learning from social experience (epistemic trust) but at the same time also serves to regenerate a capacity for social understanding (mentalizing)' (Fonagy and Allison, 2014, p. 378). Fonagy and his colleagues study patients with borderline personality disorder. They propose that the therapeutic process proceeds along three communication systems. The first system is based on the patient's learning of the content relating to his/her problem. In and through interaction with the therapist the patient examines issues relating to his/her disorder, which enables mutual understanding of the therapist and patient, and thereby the patient feels personally acknowledged by the therapist. This is important in order to reduce the patient's 'epistemic hypervigilance', to generate epistemic openness and to facilitate the growth of epistemic trust. The second communication system creates a change in the quality of interpersonal communication. The patient is more open because the therapist gives him/her the feeling of social recognition and shows willingness to understand the patient's perspective. The patient is ready to listen to the therapist which leads to the development of a more trusting relationship. As Fonagy and Allison (2014, p. 377) put it, in and through social interchanges patients 'experience themselves as an agent in the mind of their therapist – they "find themselves in the mind of the therapist"'. The final communication system concerns the re-emergence of social learning. Better understanding of social situations through mentalising increases the patient's capacity for becoming aware of sensitive responses from others and of being understood. This opens up the patient's capacity for new learning in a broader context

beyond the therapeutic sessions and enables the patient to form more interpersonal relations with others. As the patient's hypervigilance decreases, his/her capacity for epistemic trust and social understanding increases beyond the therapeutic session.

Originally, Fonagy and his colleagues developed the mentalising-based therapy in order to understand and treat borderline personality disorder. However, Fonagy emphasises that the principle of mentalising is embedded in many other therapies. Mentalising may be the common factor in different forms of therapy regardless of the modalities in which it takes place.

7.2 In search of dialogical methods

So far, throughout this book I have not directly raised one issue that is of considerable interest both to dialogically orientated professionals and to researchers: what are the methodological implications of dialogical epistemology? How can we design dialogical methods? I have left this issue purposefully towards the very end, because it would have not made such sense to raise it before discussing the main axioms of dialogical epistemology.

7.2.1 The problem of designing dialogical methods

The Self–Other interactions involve heterogeneous relations (e.g. Self-group, family-culture), heterogeneous voices (e.g. Self-inner Other; Self-external Other) as well as other kinds of dynamic relations. The complexity of such interactions has necessarily led to challenging questions about empirical studies and researchers have been for some time preoccupied with the problem of designing dialogical methods (e.g. Märtsin et al., 2011). Michèle Grossen (2010, p. 2) puts forward this question clearly: 'to what extent is it possible to develop analytical tools that are fully coherent with dialogical assumptions?' In reflecting on this difficult question, she refers to a number of issues that make this option 'not only undesirable but also impossible'. Any analysis, she argues, contradicts multivoicedness, the complexity of interactions and the considerations that have to be given to larger contexts. While dialogical approaches are holistic, any analysis presupposes breaking down the data into elements, whether by coding or postulating dependent and independent variables. This, however, eliminates the dynamic nature of the data and turns them into static and inflexible items. Grossen's insightful analysis of the problem of dialogical methodologies has been followed up by other researchers who share such concerns.

Nevertheless, while they have acknowledged problems that Michèle Grossen identifies, more and more researchers have persistently attempted to overcome these difficulties by proposing methods for the study of dialogue

and dialogicality that could cope with the complexities and heterogeneities of the dialogical mind. Some proposals attempt to create methods that would be more dynamic than the traditional ones. For example, Lehman (2012) proposes a dialogical sequence analysis in order to study clients' utterances in psychotherapy. Another proposal for a specific method, called Dialogical Methods for Investigation of Happening of Change in family therapy, is offered by Seikkula, Laitila and Rober (2012). Their method is based on the categorisation and qualities of responsive dialogues and on the micro-analysis of topical episodes. Salgado, Cunha and Bento (2013) provide an extensive review of dialogical methods and draw attention to some progress that has been achieved in the field. All the same, the authors are critical of the limitations of dialogical methods, and in particular of their static nature, and of the difficulties involved in bringing them in line with more systematic research practices. These authors focus specifically on conceptualising the Self and they propose a new micro-genetic method to study the multiplicity of Self-positionings using the theoretical framework of the Ego–Alter–Object.

Gillespie and Cornish (2014) attempt to avoid the rigidity of fixed procedures by proposing an analysis of dialogue based on what they call 'sensitising questions'. The meaning of utterances is dependent on the local contexts in which they are expressed, and sensitising questions facilitate the interpretation of dialogical utterances in their specific contexts. The authors are inspired by Ragnar Rommetveit's (1983) demonstration of multiple interpretations of a single utterance 'Mr. Smith is mowing the lawn', which depend on the context in which the utterance is expressed. Gillespie and Cornish's (2014) point of departure is the situated and intersubjective nature of utterances. An utterance is always directed at someone and its meaning expresses the relation between the participants and their local contexts. In order to facilitate the interpretation of a single utterance the authors propose six sensitising questions with sixteen sub-sections. Applying the tripartite dialogical relation, the Ego (speaker 1 directing the message at someone)–Alter (speaker 2 interpreting the message)–Object (relevant context), the authors analyse in considerable detail all possible interpretations of the utterance. By doing this they facilitate, rather than formalise, a method and make it apposite to the assumptions of dialogism.

Most proposals presuppose that dialogical methods can be developed by overcoming weaknesses of the existing empirical methods and in particular by taking into consideration the multiplicity of Self-positions and by interpretations of contexts in which dialogically based studies take place. By attempting to devise dialogical methods, researchers refer to and consider essential features of dialogicality, even if they do not succeed in applying them completely.

7.2.2 *One does not test axioms*

The presupposition that one can develop dialogical methods by overcoming weaknesses of current empirical methods contradicts the very idea of the dialogical mind according to which the Self–Other forms a unique and unbreakable relationship. If one adopts the dialogical presuppositions of the Self–Other interdependence, one cannot develop dialogical methods by improving traditional empirical approaches based on individualistic and static epistemology. Equally, if researchers presuppose that dialogical phenomena are multivoiced, dynamic, heterogeneous, intersubjective and so on, then this means that these are foundations or axioms or 'the unquestioned givens'.

If something is 'the given', or if it is an axiom from which the researcher starts, then he/she does not ask or test whether 'the given' exists. There is nothing remarkable about this; any science or any scholarly discipline is based on this line of reasoning. Nevertheless, let us clarify this basic assertion by referring to the traditional epistemology in psychology according to which the point of departure is the individual's cognition, information processing and the existence of external facts in the outside world. According to this epistemology, the individual's cognition, information processing and the existence of external facts in the outside world are 'the givens' that the researcher does not test but he/she presupposes them. The researcher poses questions that are built on these 'givens'. One can find many examples of psychological experiments based on these 'givens', and I have chosen one that was published by a very distinguished American social psychologist Shelly Chaiken (1980). The author took it for granted that humans are information processors. Building on this 'given', the author distinguishes between systematic and heuristic information processing in persuasion. In this experiment which, according to Google, was cited more than three thousand times, the researcher experimentally studied subjects who were highly and lowly involved in a persuasive message, which was presented either by likeable or unlikeable subjects. Using an inductive type of design, Chaiken found that high involvement in a persuasive message was related to systematic information processing while low involvement was connected with heuristic information processing. In this example the researcher makes her 'givens', or her axioms, like 'humans as information processors', part of the research design without questioning them: axioms are indubitable presuppositions from which the researcher starts.

The same idea must be applied to the epistemology of dialogism. If dialogical epistemology presupposes that the Self–Other forms a unique relation, it implies that in dialogical research and professional practices. This relation is an axiom or 'the given', and therefore it is not questioned.

However, epistemologies we implicitly hold cannot be discarded by sheer will. Rather, they are like irresistible beliefs (Chapter 4) which are not in our

possession but instead they possess us: they constitute our ways of thinking and *seeing* the world. In communication involving people with deafblindness, the experienced professional or a carer *sees* instantaneously that communication between two persons is jointly co-created, or, in more difficult cases, he/she presupposes the possibility of co-creation of communication. He/she *knows* from experience that language and communication start and develop from the interaction between the person with deafblindness and the carer. Of course, one can always argue, as Descartes did, that perception can deceive us. While this is true, humans always perceive and represent the world around them from a particular perspective. One of the researchers and carers for people with CDB, Paul Hart stated in a personal communication how difficult it was for him to convince his colleagues in the Department of Psychology. He showed them video-tapes involving carers and people with CDB and he claimed that they were communicating. His colleagues said, 'all I see are people moving their hands about – I don't see any communication taking place'. The fact that Paul Hart saw communication rather than moving hands was given by the fact that he saw the world from the perspective of dialogical epistemology.

In sum, some humans view Others as cognitive beings or information processors searching for 'objective' information. Some humans view Others as dialogical and ethical beings. Since dialogical professionals and carers view Others as dialogical and ethical beings, they directly *see* the communicative interdependence of Selves–Others.

Equally, if the researcher presupposes the triangularity of the Ego–Alter–Object, multivoicedness and so on, then he/she does not design a study to test for the existence of these 'givens'. If the dialogical researcher presupposes that multivoicedness is a characteristic of human language, then he/she does not design a test to prove that multivoicedness exists (e.g. Akkerman et al., 2006) and does not devise a coding scheme to prove the existence of diverse voices. Rather, presupposing multivoicedness, he/she studies forms and qualities of multivoicedness in different conditions of a unique Self–Other interdependence. Carers and researchers like Hart do not ask how to make multivoicedness apparent in empirical data and what techniques can researchers use to empirically prove its existence. Instead, they see it as part of reality like Mikhail Bakhtin when analysing Dostoyevsky's novels. Bakhtin did not pose the question whether multivoicedness exists. Presupposing it, he showed its properties and specificities. Bakhtin presupposed that polyphony (multivoicedness) and plurality of consciousnesses were the chief features of Dostoyevsky's novels, and he examined the ways by means of which Dostoyevsky mastered his art. Bakhtin viewed the plurality of voices that remain independent, autonomous and unfinished (Bakhtin, 1984a, e.g. pp. 6, 21, 284). Independent voices are in a constant tension, but they always remain

autonomous: their unification would be a flat monological voice. The idea of unfinished dialogues to which I referred in many places in Part II of this book penetrates the entirety of Bakhtin's work. As he explains, every thought in Dostoyevsky's heroes is, from the very beginning, 'a *rejoinder* in an unfinalized dialogue' (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 32). Nothing is finished in a dialogue, tension is orientated towards new events, towards new interpretations of the other's words. The hero's inner dialogues clash among themselves, the inner dialogues are in conflict with external dialogues with the others, all leading to new discoursive possibilities. Bakhtin views the problem of polyphony not as a search for method but for understanding the unfinalised human existence, Self- and Other-consciousness, whether in daily life, art or science.

In conclusion, rather than searching for new methods, dialogical and cultural psychologists need to reflect on their epistemological foundations because these will determine how to reconstruct their theories and methods (Arruda, 2003; Valsiner, 2014). Valsiner argues that this cannot be achieved by attacks on constructivists or on the remaining positivism in social sciences. Instead, cultural psychologists should conceive 'the centrality of culture within the human *psyche*' (Valsiner, 2014, p. 155) as a clear axiomatic stand. If culture is conceived in this way, then it is not a phenomenon to be tested empirically in cross-cultural studies using a battery of standardised tests. Cultural psychologists must study multifaceted phenomena involving 'art, theatre, music, religion, architecture, governments, families, and other complex organisms' (Valsiner, 2014, p. 156) which represent 'the human ways of being'. The ways we pose problems determine how we go about solving them, and the ways we pose problems arise from our epistemological frameworks. In other words, if our point of departure is dialogical epistemology, we pose the problem in terms of dialogical epistemology and we devise ways of solving it in terms of this epistemology.

7.2.3 Single case studies

7.2.3.1 Non-interactional and interactional methodologies We noted at the beginning of Part II of this book that there is a fundamental conceptual difference between non-interactional and interactional epistemologies and ensuing theories. This difference has a considerable effect on methodological approaches advocated by each of these two kinds of epistemologies and theories based on them.

Non-interactional theories presuppose that knowers (subjects, individuals) and the external 'objective' world (objects) are strictly independent from one another. Consequently, research methods in non-interactional theories in human and social sciences presuppose that data concerning the external world which are independent of the knower must be empirically accumulated

and statistically analysed. Inductive methods, based on aggregation of data from numerous knowers (subjects), serve well these purposes. Moreover, curious historical reasons led psychologists to believe that researchers should uncover pure elements of subjects' psychological capacities from which meanings are removed and that, therefore, subjects' responses are recorded in their uncontaminated forms (for a review, see Wagoner, 2015).

Let us recall that in interactional epistemologies and in theories derived from them, subjects or entities (e.g. knowers, individuals, elements, organisms) and objects that environ them (e.g. the known, contexts, *Umwelt*, environments) form irreducible ontological, that is, existential, units (pp. 156–160). This also implies that research methods studying the nature of such unique interdependencies between subjects and objects are based on dynamic and holistic interactions. Among these methods, single subject studies appear to be most favoured. Consider some examples.

From the position of Gestalt psychology Kurt Lewin (1938/1999) argued that the structure of human behaviour is formed by 'a whole-of-processes' that operate at different levels and depths. Therefore, these can be captured by single case studies as concrete events that cannot be submitted to statistical analysis (Lewin, 1938/1999, p. 284; on the analysis of Lewin's argument, see Billig, 2015). Lewin's study of group relations pertaining to democratic and non-democratic thinking did not require representative samples from which to generalise to the population. Instead, his experiments pursued the dynamics of interactions between individuals in groups and their social environment. According to Lewin, interactions modelled realities of daily life, and a sense of reality was an important feature of his theory. Like Giambattista Vico, Lewin argued that reality 'is established by "doing something with" rather than "looking at"' (Lewin, 1947/1951, p. 193). 'Reality', however, is not everything that is 'outside'. Humans have the capacity to select elements in their environment which they consider relevant. They attend to some things and not to other things, and in doing so, they consider the intentions, motives and desires of others; they have the ability to combine these capacities into meaningful wholes in terms of past traditions, daily life experiences and future expectations. Rommetveit argued that in communication, no external context as such is relevant unless participants share common presuppositions that enter the dialogue as being cognised by the participants: 'the extralinguistic context cannot be assessed "publicly" or "privately", but only in terms of the architecture of intersubjectivity' (Rommetveit, 1974, p. 45). 'Reality' is intersubjectively constructed and participants jointly choose its relevant features.

In her study of social representations of mental illness, Jodelet (1989/1991), too, emphasised that lay people, in representing the clinical state of the mentally ill patients, select only some elements of the relevant context. For

example, she found that villagers, who took part in her research, represented mentally ill patients as having no affects and willpower. Gender and sex relationships played no role in these villagers' social representations expressed in a verbal discourse. The researcher's task is to search for those aspects of the context that participants select or deselect, as well as for signs of those features that are unconsciously present in participants' social representations.

In the early twentieth century, Frederic Bartlett's research methods, too, were based on holistic assumptions about human actions. Wagoner (2015) describes Bartlett's methodological approach in terms of a number of presuppositions, focusing on the following:

psychological qualities as superior to quantities
psychological control as preferable to physical control
human reactions should be treated in holistic manner
single case studies as preferable to group probabilities
types as preferable to trait differences
insight overrules prediction
theory-building should be systematic
thinking is preferable to the accumulation of facts

These Bartlett's methodological presuppositions, based on holistic and dynamic approach to human conduct, were in accord with other interactional theories in the early years of the twentieth century. One could augment these considerations by detailing methodological ideas in the classic studies of Jean Piaget, Albert Michotte and others who made notable contributions to psychological knowledge based on single case studies and naturalistic observations.

Disputes about the appropriateness of inductive and single case studies in psychology have persevered since the nineteenth century (for excellent reviews of these issues, see Salvatore and Valsiner, 2010; Wagoner, 2015). However, it was in the 1950s that Western social psychology conferred an ultimate scientific label on the experimental method based on induction. As a result, methods of invention and of the discovery of new phenomena turned into methods of proving statistical relations between dependent and independent variables (Moscovici and Marková, 2006, p. 257). In this situation, single case studies based on the uniqueness of interdependent relations between subjects and objects could play no scientific role. Not only the experimental method based on induction defined the whole field of research in social psychology, but in the aftermath of 1950s other kinds of methods lost respectability. The influential methodologist Donald Campbell (1975) remembered that time when speaking about his own earlier thoughts about single case studies. He pointed out that his earlier dogmatic view expressing the 'caricature of single-case study approach' (Campbell, 1975, p. 179) was later corrected when he changed his view about daily thinking, common sense and naturalistic observation. While common sense could misguide us, he maintained, 'it is all that

we have. It is the only route to knowledge – noisy, fallible, and biased though it be. We should be aware of its weaknesses, but must be willing to trust it' (Campbell, 1975, p. 179).

7.2.3.2 Uniqueness of the Ego–Alter interdependence Uniqueness of the Self–Other interdependence is the foremost feature of dialogical epistemology and therefore, by definition, in order to capture uniqueness, one must explore each case of the Self–Other interdependence as a specific instance. Well designed single case studies seem to fulfil such a criterion.

Moscovici's (1961; 1976/2008) study of social representations of psychoanalysis was a single case study. Specifically, social representations of psychoanalysis in France in the 1950s (the Object) were co-constructed in and through citizens' (the Ego) thinking and communications about psychoanalysis and political powers of the Communist Party and of the Catholic Church (the Alter). These components mutually defined and transformed one another. Within such patterns of interdependence, the Self–Other jointly generated new patterns of knowledge, beliefs and images of psychoanalysis as the Object of representation. Equally, the research in Rio de Janeiro's favelas by Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernandez (2013) is a single case study based on the analysis of the participants' self-expressions and the vibrant and resilient culture in which they lived. The authors' approach, founded on the concept of the development as freedom, shows the interdependence and mutual transformation of the participants and their human-centred community.

With these considerations, it is not surprising that all studies that were discussed in this chapter were based on single cases emphasising the uniqueness of the Ego–Alter interdependence. This does not mean that studies based on single cases discard the use of questionnaires, experiments and other classic methods used in human and social sciences. Single case studies are often wrongly confounded with qualitative methods as Yin (2003) observed. Some classic single case studies, like Moscovici's (1976/2008) research of psychoanalysis as a social representation, are based both on quantitative and qualitative techniques. It is vital to single case studies that the Self and his/her sociocultural context are interdependent, both contributing empirical data. It is the problem that the researcher intends to solve, which defines how he/she goes about designing a single case study.

Although from the professional perspective the study of unique single cases is not only effective but also most meaningful to the involved participants, this unavoidably leads to the notorious question: can one make generalisations from findings based on single cases? Sciences and professions aim at providing credible knowledge that would be applicable to diverse cases and conditions,

and therefore this issue, throughout the history of science and professional disciplines, has been considered to be of vital importance.

7.2.4 Dialogical generalisation

The question 'can one generalise from single cases?' is provocative because it seems to offend conventional knowledge according to which one needs more than a single case to be assured – or at least to expect – that the matter in question has a general validity. After all, this is what the customary wisdom as well as statistics tell us. But the customary wisdom and statistics usually ignore that the question about generalisation in human and social sciences can be answered in different ways.

The advocates of statistical methods argue that since single case studies cannot fulfil the requirements of inductive methods, one cannot generalise from single studies to populations. Single case studies, however, are not considered to be totally worthless. It is argued that they can be used as pilot or preliminary studies, but they cannot be used as a basis for generalisation (e.g. Lee and Baskerwille, 2003).

Among the most up-front advocates of generalisation based on single case studies is the Danish researcher Bent Flyvbjerg (2006). Arguing against conventional misunderstandings of single case studies he refutes the claim of customary wisdom that one cannot generalise from single case studies. He emphasises that the extent to which the researcher can generalise, depends on what the case is, and how it is chosen. Single cases must be strategically selected in order to bring out their richness, and to make them most effective for analytic generalisation. He points out that when the aim of research is to bring about the greatest possible knowledge about a given phenomenon, then random or representative samples, aggregation, and averaging of gathered facts do not provide rich knowledge about the phenomenon in question. He suggests several possibilities around choosing the case for study. Among these, he proposes that the researcher should look for extreme or deviant cases that can provide complex and productive data that cannot be obtained from inductive studies. In accord with this perspective we have seen that single case studies based on discourse involving people with communicative disabilities provide fundamental dialogical knowledge that could hardly be acquired in non-problematic communication.

Moscovici's (1961; 1976/2008) above-mentioned study of psychoanalysis as a social representation could be considered as another example of an extreme case in the sense that it captured social representations during a cultural fight between the Catholic Church and the strong Communist Party in France in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In this single historical event it was the co-existence of strong contradictory forces which interacted with common-sense thinking

that generated social representations of psychoanalysis. In the findings from this single historical event, different kinds of intellectual polemics were generated. The forms of thinking and the clash with the established values – all these are transferable to other kinds of events typified by that event (Marková, 2014b), for example, religious clashes, contemporary problems of migration or epidemics of severe illnesses. The forces that form such events do not leave any of the components stable over time, neither the data gathered from participants (interviews, the media) nor the data constituted by the relevant historical, political and social situation.

However, choosing an extreme exemplar case is only one strategic example and there are other possibilities. Among others, Flyvbjerg discusses the choice of a marginal or a critical case. One can assume that if a marginal (critical) case does not show any effect, then non-critical cases, equally, would be without effect. For example, if a committed member of the Communist Party has no social representation of Marxist economy, one can assume that non-committed individuals, represented by average citizens, would likewise not have such representations.

While single case studies cannot be submitted to statistical generalisation, they can be generalised through theories. The idea that theoretical or analytic (Yin, 2003) generalisation is particularly suitable for single case studies has a long history. Salvatore and Valsiner (2010) recall the concept of 'abductive' generalisation of Charles S. Peirce.

Peirce did not start with the search for data. Instead, real life phenomena were in front of him to be observed, to be made sense of, or to be explained (Peirce, 5.145). In Peircean way of thinking, the researcher observes a single event as a whole, and devises a preliminary theory concerning that whole by means of intuition (or what Peirce called instinct). As Salvatore and Valsiner (2010) maintain, Peircean abductive generalisation is based on the theoretical, rather than empirical, construction of the object. In 'Scientific Imagination' Peirce argues that when a researcher desires to know the truth, 'his first effort will be to imagine what that truth can be' (Peirce, 1.46). This is accomplished by abductive reasoning by which Peirce (8.209) meant 'examining a mass of facts and in allowing these facts to suggest a theory' and in doing so the researcher gains new ideas. Such a preliminary theory merely suggests that something may be or may not be the case (5.171; 6.475; 8.238) and the researcher must be prepared to discard or to change it if it proves to be irrelevant. Yet if abductive reasoning proves to be correct, 'it allows characterizing the dynamics of the unique case while it arrives at generalization' (Salvatore and Valsiner, 2010, p. 817).

Let us conclude that conceptually underlain and well-designed single case studies provide the basis for theoretical generalisation (Valsiner, 2014, p. 153) and that even a single episode in the flow of experience of a single person can

serve such purpose (Salvatore and Valsiner, 2010). Nevertheless, such studies must show their 'clear axiomatic stand' (Valsiner, 2014, p. 156).

7.3 Conclusion

Dialogical professional practices discussed in this chapter are all based on the Ego–Alter interdependence as an unbreakable ethical unit. All axioms discussed in these professional practices like intersubjectivity, the search for social recognition, imagination, multivoicedness, epistemic trust and epistemic responsibility are derived from the Ego–Alter interdependence. In non-problematic communication these axioms are present implicitly without speakers even being aware of them. In contrast, in problematic communications like those involving people with deafblindness and with cerebral palsy, these axioms must be explicitly negotiated and acknowledged for communication to take place.

Dialogical axioms lead to the development of dialogical concepts, such as resilience and dignity (Nafstad, 2015), hyper-dialogue (Souriau, 2013), and dialogised heteroglossia (Grossen and Salazar Orvig, 2011). Dialogical concepts link together past and anticipated discourses. While the dialogical approach has been effective in therapeutic practices, further challenges lie ahead. For example, dialogical scholars have not yet started exploring communicative disorders that appear to violate dialogicality, like autism, Asperger syndrome or pervasive developmental speech disorders, and it is even unclear how questions about these conditions could be raised. No doubt, such disorders will have to explore the relations between the dialogical mind and the brain.

Finally, if one adopts dialogical epistemology, one poses professional and research questions in terms of this epistemology. This implies that therapeutic and research methods, too, are postulated in terms of this epistemology. This further means that dialogical methods cannot be developed by improving traditional methods of non-dialogical epistemology by making them more dynamic, less formal and otherwise. Instead, the point of departure of dialogical methods is the Self-Other interdependence as an irreducible axiom. It appears that single case studies are most apt to examine features of this interdependence in their historical, cultural and social contexts. Generalisation is a persistent question with respect to single-case studies. One can suggest that theoretical generalisation showing 'a clear axiomatic stand' in a specific study is likely to have implications for other studies based on the same axiomatic stand, but carried out in different contexts.

Conclusion to Part II

In this book I have proposed that dialogical epistemology is based on the ethical nature of the Ego–Alter (Self–Other(s)) and the Ego–Alter–Object (Self–Other–Object) interdependencies which have their roots in the culturally and historically based common-sense *themata*.

- In discussing the dialogical epistemology of daily life and of professional practices I have made a distinction between *dialogical axioms* and *dialogical concepts. Dialogical axioms* are presuppositions implicitly rooted in common sense. They define the dialogical epistemology and therefore, one cannot speak about dialogical epistemology without the acceptance of these axioms. Without claiming that they are exhaustive, I have discussed the following *dialogical axioms:*
    - the Ego–Alter come into being and mutual interaction together as an irreducible ethical and *ontological* unit. Their interdependence takes place at intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-group, institutional, cultural and historical planes.
    - the Ego–Alter–Object is an irreducible ethical and *epistemological* unit
    - the Ego–Alter and the Ego–Alter–Object are interdependent in terms of dialogical thinking, communication and mutual action. Their fundamental features are imagination, intersubjectivity, the search for social recognition, trust and responsibility. These features are dynamic, multivoiced, open and unfinalisable, and they are in continous tension. For example, there is tension between the Ego and the Alter; between the Ego, the Alter and the Object; between relations of symmetry and asymmetry; between the search for intersubjectivity and the search for social recognition; imagination and lack of imagination; epistemic trust and distrust; epistemic responsibility and withdrawal from responsibility; and between unreflected common sense and reflected experiences.
- On the basis of dialogical axioms which are the presuppositions of dialogical epistemology, researchers and professionals create *dialogical concepts*. These form theoretical and practical extensions of axioms, and they facilitate the

solving of particular problems and the development of appropriate theories. For example, a theory of dialogical authority can be constructed on the basis of dialogical axioms like the Self–Other interdependence, epistemic trust, epistemic responsibility and so on.

- *The ethical nature* of the Self–Other interdependence does not imply saintliness of humans. Indeed, all humans experience and create evil, cruelty and malpractices in daily living that they inflict on one another. They do this very often in the name of the highest values of science, religion, beliefs of grace, and political justice. Equally, humans experience examples of extraordinary moral strength and sacrifice of the Self for Others. In referring to humans as ethical beings I suggest that dialogical epistemology builds on the capacities of humans
    - to evaluate their own and Others' thoughts and actions
    - to imagine how Others think and evaluate the Self's and Others' thoughts and actions
    - to aim at achieving the 'good life' with Others and in just institutions (Ricoeur)
    - to make choices and judgements concerning their own and Others' capacities
    - to form relations of trust and distrust as well as to break them
    - to take and avoid responsibilities

- *Epistemic trust and responsibility* are vital axioms based on the Self-Other relations. Communication could not take place if humans did not trust their shared common ground and if they were not willing to attend to and learn from others. Epistemic trust goes hand in hand with the Self's epistemic responsibilities for his/her actions in relation to Others. Epistemic responsibility, as we have seen in examples from Bakhtin and Levinas, ranges from symmetric to asymmetric; these forms can be conceived as complementary.

- *Infinite openness of dialogical epistemology* refers to the fact that humans do not experience interdependencies between the Self–Others–Objects as fixed and transparent, but as constantly changing, hiding and revealing their meanings. Humans make sense of meanings by interpreting and imagining intentions, thoughts and actions of Others. More than that, dialogical epistemology is characterised by infinite openness towards the social world. Openness is due to the unfinalizability of communication and its heterogeneities, and to the uniqueness of the Self and Others as intentional and creative beings producing 'surprising' phenomena.

- *The historical and cultural perspective* of dialogical epistemology is essential for the understanding of contemporary phenomena. The world is interconnected and one discipline is influenced by developments in other disciplines. For example, the discovery of the concept of modern perspective in mathematics and geometry during the Renaissance affected not only the artistic styles, but as Panofsky (1991) stated, it became a new epistemological worldview. The concept of perspective altered the concept of knowledge; it led to the appreciation that there were various ways of thinking and knowing, and this had far-reaching political, religious and scientific significance. Today, technological advancements in digital social media have a profound influence on the nature of human interactions, self-actualisation and self-presentation. Moreover, scientific, political, aesthetic and moral ways of thinking do not appear arbitrarily but they are meaningful components of particular human experiences, imagination and creation of social reality at any particular time. For example, the fact that Hamlet could not have been written at the time and court of Genghis Khan 'is not something that we derive from a careful inductive investigation of conditions in Outer Mongolia, as opposed to those of Elizabethan England . . . but from a more fundamental sense' (Berlin, 1963, pp. 102–103) of tradition and human experience. The child does not think like an old man, and a trainee does not have the experience of a professional. The music of Bach, Beethoven or Mozart could be written only in a particular historical period, and similarly paintings have their history and social contexts. All this springs from the knowledge of life and 'from interaction with others and with the surrounding environment and constitutes the sense of reality' (Berlin, 1963, p. 103) which gives the human and social studies coherence and separates them from unintelligibility and illusion.

- *Dialogical methods* follow the idea of uniqueness and integrity, i.e. the wholeness of humans. This implies that dialogical methods do not search for generalisations leading to 'universal truth' and 'universally valid knowledge' based on inductive approaches. Instead, dialogical methods build on the idea of theoretical or analytic generalisation that is based on the idea of the uniqueness and integrity of humans in single case studies.

- *Dialogical epistemology in professional practices* seems to be crucial for the success of therapy and treatment. Human communication is symbolic, whether using verbal language or non-verbal means. Specifically, in difficult communication like that which involves people with deafblindness or cerebral palsy, the symbols and signs that are largely hidden in a relatively non-problematic communication, come explicitly to the fore. Dialogical professional practices are aware of the uniqueness of each individual and of

each interaction between the client/patient on the one hand, and the practitioner or therapeutic team on the other hand. This is why theoretical generalisation is particularly important in dialogical professional practices like education, psychotherapy, and practices involving the care and/or cure of, people with disorders of language and communication.

- *Dialogical epistemology displays boundless possibilities for social psychology.* Most importantly, dialogical epistemology opens up novel ways for social psychology to explore phenomena in daily living, education, health services, at universities and in politics. Rather than imitating natural sciences which study non-intentional phenomena, information processing and mechanisms that can be fragmented into elements, social psychology has the option to develop its specific theories. These can be based on axioms of dialogical epistemology rooted in common sense thinking, leading to the development of dialogically based concepts, e.g. epistemic authority, semiotic relations, resilience, dignity, and so on.

- *The axioms and concepts of dialogical epistemology* are vital features of thinking, communicating and acting in the social life-world and in dialogical professional practices. Due to their fundamental role in the life of humans they may even contribute to the ultimate disappearance of the metaphor of 'inferior' and 'superior' thinking.

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