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15 Political Community and the North Atlantic Area

KARL W. DEUTSCH ET AL.

In the 1950s, with memories of World War II still fresh and the Cold War threatening to burn hot, the issue of war and peace in Europe remained vital. European politicians were busy abolishing war between France and Germany by laying the foundation for a united Europe. In the meantime, U.S. social scientists, many of them immigrants from the Continent, began systematically studying the European integration process to discover what propelled it and whether it would actually ensure peace.

One of these academics, a 1938 German-Czech refugee named Karl W. Deutsch (1912–1992), helped revolutionize the study of international relations by introducing scientific and quantitative methods. While at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (he later taught at Yale and Harvard), he and seven of his colleagues applied their new social scientific skills to "the study of possible ways in which men someday might abolish war." The result of this study was Political Community and the North Atlantic Area *(1957). The work did not focus on the new supranational institutions of Europe, but rather examined ten historical cases of integration to see if lessons could be applied to an area that included Western Europe, Canada, and the United States. After comparing these cases, they concluded that successful integration required a sense of community—a "we-feeling"—among the populations of the integrating territories, a core political*

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area around which this community could coalesce, and a rise in administrative capabilities to meet the challenge of an enlarged domain. To meet these requirements for an "amalgamated security-community," Deutsch and his colleagues argued that the integrating territories must share a common set of values and that the communication and transactions between them must expand in numerous ways. This was their key insight: integration was a learning process that took place over a long period of extensive and sustained contact between people from the politically relevant strata of society. They were skeptical of the functionalists' claim (see Chapter 14) that integrating government tasks one step at a time would lead to more successful amalgamation, but they did confirm that functionalism had succeeded in the past.

Deutsch's transactionalist approach to integration was largely overshadowed by the rise of neofunctionalism (see Chapter 16) in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but recently Deutsch has attracted attention from a new generation of scholars impressed by his prescient insights. His relevance seems to grow as the European Union enlarges to the east and the question of who is a "European" increases in importance.

■ THE PROBLEM

We undertook this inquiry as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which men someday might abolish war. From the outset, we realized the complexity of the problem. It is difficult to relate "peace" clearly to other prime values such as "justice" and "freedom." There is little common agreement on acceptable alternatives to war, and there is much ambiguity in the use of the terms "war" and "peace." Yet we can start with the assumption that war is now so dangerous that mankind must eliminate it, must put it beyond serious possibility. The attempt to do this may fail. But in a civilization that wishes to survive, the central problem in the study of international organization is this: How can men learn to act together to eliminate war as a social institution?

This is in one sense a smaller, and in another sense a larger, question than the one which occupies so many of the best minds today: how can we either prevent or avoid losing "the next war"? It is smaller because there will, of course, be no chance to solve the long-run problem if we do not survive the short-run crisis. It is larger because it concerns not only the confrontation of the nations of East and West in the twentieth century, but the whole underlying question of relations between political units at any time. We are not, therefore, trying to add to the many words that have been written directly concerning the East-West struggle of the 1940–1950's. Rather, we are seeking new light with which to look at the conditions and processes of long-range or permanent peace, applying our findings to one contemporary problem which, though not so difficult as the East-West problem, is by no means simple: peace within the North Atlantic area.

Whenever a difficult political problem arises, men turn to history for clues to its solution. They do this knowing they will not find the whole answer there. Every political problem is unique, of course, for history does not "repeat itself." But often the reflective mind will discover situations in the past that are essentially similar to the one being considered. Usually, with these rough parallels or suggestive analogies, the problem is not so much to find the facts as it is to decide what is essentially the same and what is essentially different between the historical facts and those of the present.

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We are dealing here with political communities. These we regard as social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance. A political community is not necessarily able to prevent war within the area it covers: the United States was unable to do so at the time of the Civil War. Some political communities do, however, eliminate war and the expectation of war within their boundaries. It is these that call for intensive study. We have concentrated, therefore, upon the formation of "security-communities" in certain historical cases. The use of this term starts a chain of definitions, and we must break in here to introduce the other main links needed for a fuller understanding of our findings.

> A SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become "integrated."
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> By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population.
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> By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change."

> By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.

A security-community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. If the entire world were integrated as a security-community, wars would be automatically eliminated. But there is apt to be confusion about the term "integration."

In our usage, the term "integration" does not necessarily mean only the merging of peoples or governmental units into a single unit. Rather, we divide security-communities into two types: "amalgamated" and "pluralistic."

> By AMALGAMATION we mean the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal. The United States today is an example of the amalgamated type. It became a single governmental unit by the formal merger of several formerly independent units. It has one supreme decision-making center.
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> The PLURALISTIC security-community, on the other hand, retains the legal independence of separate governments. The combined territory of the United States and Canada is an example of the pluralistic type. Its two separate governmental units form a security-community without being merged. It has two supreme decision-making centers. Where amalgamation occurs without integration, of course a security-community does not exist.
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> Since our study deals with the problem of ensuring peace, we shall say that any political community, be it amalgamated or pluralistic, was eventually SUCCESSFUL if it became a security-community—that is, if it achieved integration—and that it was UNSUCCESSFUL if it ended eventually in secession or civil war.

Perhaps we should point out here that both types of integration require, at the international level, some kind of organization, even though it may be very loose. We put no credence in the old aphorism that among friends a constitution is not necessary and among enemies it is of no avail. The area of practicability lies in between.

Integration is a matter of fact, not of time. If people on both sides do not fear war and do not prepare for it, it matters little how long it took them to reach this stage. But once integration has been reached, the length of time over which it persists may contribute to its consolidation.

It should be noted that integration and amalgamation overlap, but not completely. This means that there can be amalgamation without integration, and that there can be integration without amalgamation. When we use the term "integration or amalgamation" in this book, we are taking a short form to express an alternative between integration (by the route of either pluralism or amalgamation) and amalgamation short of integration. We have done this because unification movements in the past have often aimed at both of these goals, with some of the supporters of the movements preferring one or the other goal at different times. To encourage this profitable ambiguity, leaders of such movements have often used broader symbols such as "union," which would cover both possibilities and could be made to mean different things to different men.

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■ THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS: SOME GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

For purposes of exposition, we have divided our findings into two parts: first, general changes in our way of thinking about political integration; and second, specific findings about the background conditions and the dynamic characteristics of the integrative process. . . . [W]e we shall first discuss our general findings. Our more specific findings will follow in later sections. . . .

□ *Reexamining Some Popular Beliefs*

To begin with, our findings have tended to make us increasingly doubtful of several widespread beliefs about political integration. The first of these beliefs is that modern life, with rapid transportation, mass communications, and literacy, tends to be more international than life in past decades or centuries, and hence more conducive to the growth of international or supranational institutions. Neither the study of our cases, nor a survey of more limited data from a larger number of countries, has yielded any clear-cut evidence to support this view. Nor do these results suggest that there has been inherent in modern economic and social development any unequivocal trend toward more internationalism and world community.

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Another popular belief that our findings make more doubtful is that the growth of a state, or the expansion of its territory, resembles a snowballing process, or that it is characterized by some sort of bandwagon effect, such that successful growth in the past would accelerate the rate of growth or expansion of the amalgamated political community in the future. In this view, as villages in the past have joined to make provinces, and provinces to make kingdoms, so contemporary states are expected to join into ever-larger states or federations. If this were true, ever larger political units would appear to be the necessary result of historical and technological development. Our findings do not support this view. While the successful unification of England facilitated the later amalgamation of England and Wales, and this in turn facilitated the subsequent amalgamation of England and Wales with Scotland in the union of the two kingdoms, the united kingdom of Britain did not succeed in carrying through a successful and lasting amalgamation with Ireland. Nor could it retain its political amalgamation with the American colonies. These seceded from the British Empire in 1776 to form the United States; and Ireland seceded in effect in the course of the Anglo-Irish civil war of 1918–1921. The unity of the Habsburg monarchy became increasingly strained in the course of the nineteenth century and was followed by disintegration in the twentieth; and so was the more limited union of the crowns of Norway and Sweden.

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Another popular notion is that a principal motive for the political integration of states has been the fear of anarchy, as well as of warfare among them. According to this view, men not only came to look upon war among the units concerned as unpromising and unattractive, but also as highly probable. For they came to fear it acutely while believing it to be all but inevitable in the absence of any strong superior power to restrain all participants. Consequently, according to this theory, one of the first and most important features of a newly-amalgamated security-community was the establishment of strong federal or community-wide laws, courts, police forces, and armies for their enforcement against potentially aggressive member states and member populations. Beliefs of this kind parallel closely the classic reasoning of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke; and some writers on federalism, or on international organization, have implied a stress on legal institutions and on the problem of coercing member states. Our findings suggest strong qualifications for these views. The questions of larger-community police forces and law enforcement, and of the coercion of member states, turned out to be of minor importance in the early stages of most of the amalgamated security-communities we studied.

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This stress on the supposed importance of the early establishment of common laws, courts, and police forces is related to the suggestion that it is necessary to maintain a balance of power among the member states of a larger union or federation, in order to prevent any one state from becoming much stronger than the others. There is much to be said for this point of view: if a member state is far stronger than all the rest together, its political elite may well come to neglect or ignore the messages and needs of the population of the smaller member units, and the resulting loss of responsiveness may prevent integration or destroy it. The evidence from our cases suggests, however, that not merely amalgamation, but also responsiveness and integration can all be achieved and maintained successfully without any such balance of power among the participating states or political units. Neither England within the United Kingdom, nor Prussia in Germany after 1871, nor Piedmont in Italy for some time after 1860, was balanced in power by any other member or group of members, yet each of the larger political communities achieved integration.

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General Findings

Among our positive general findings, the most important seems to us that both amalgamated security-communities and pluralistic security-communities are practicable pathways toward integration. In the course of our research, we found ourselves led by the evidence to attribute a greater potential significance to pluralistic security-communities than we had originally expected. Pluralistic security-communities turned out to be somewhat easier to attain and easier to preserve than their amalgamated counterparts. . . .

The strengths of pluralism. The somewhat smaller risk of breakdown in the case of pluralistic security-communities seems indicated by an examination of the relative numbers of successes and failures of each type of security-community. We can readily list a dozen instances of success for each type. . . .

On the other hand, we find a sharp contrast in the number of failures for each type. We have found only one case of a pluralistic security-community which failed in the sense that it was followed by actual warfare between the participants, and it is doubtful whether a pluralistic security-community existed even in that case: this was the relationship of Austria and Prussia within the framework of the German Confederation since 1815. . . .

On balance, therefore, we found pluralistic security-communities to be a more promising approach to the elimination of war over large areas than we had thought at the outset of our inquiry.

But this relative superiority of a pluralistic security-community as a more easily attainable form of integration has limited applications. It worked only in those situations in which the keeping of the peace among the participating units was the main political goal overshadowing all others. This goal has been the main focus of our study. In our historical cases, however, we found that men have often wanted more: they have wanted a political community that would not merely keep the peace among its members but that would also be capable of acting as a unit in other ways and for other purposes. In respect to this capacity to act—and in particular, to act quickly and effectively for positive goals—amalgamated security-communities have usually been far superior to their pluralistic counterparts. In many historical cases, men have preferred to accept the somewhat greater risk of civil war, or of war among the participating units, in order to insure this greater promise of joint capacity for action. It is only today, in the new age of nuclear weapons, that these risks and gains must be reevaluated. Now a pluralistic security-community may appear a somewhat safer device than amalgamation for dealing with man's new weapons.

The thresholds of integration. Our second general finding concerns the nature of integration. In our earliest analytical scheme, we had envisaged this as an all-or-none process, analogous to the crossing of a narrow threshold. On the one side of this threshold, populations and policy-makers considered warfare among the states or political units concerned as still a serious possibility, and prepared for it; on the other side of the threshold they were supposed to do so no longer. . . .

Somewhat contrary to our expectations, however, some of our cases taught us that integration may involve a fairly broad zone of transition rather than a narrow threshold; that states might cross and recross this threshold or zone of transition several times in their relations with each other; and that they might spend decades or generations wavering uncertainly within it.

Thus we found that states could maintain armed forces which were potentially available for warfare against each other, but which were not specifically committed to this purpose. The American state militias from 1776 to 1865 and the forces of the Swiss cantons from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries seem to have been available for such purposes if the political temper of their respective communities had warranted such employment, as it did on a few occasions. It would thus be extraordinarily difficult to say just in which year warfare between the Protestant and Catholic cantons ceased to be a practical political possibility after 1712, or when it again became temporarily a practical possibility between 1815 and 1847; or just when integration within the United States was lost in the period between 1820 and 1861, and warfare between North and South became a substantial possibility.

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The threshold of integration thus turned out to be far broader, and far less easy to discern, in our historical cases than we had envisaged at the outset. Not only the approach toward integration, but the very act of crossing the integration threshold, have turned out to be much lengthier and more uncertain processes than had been expected.

Communication and the sense of community. Integration has proved to be a more continuous process than our earliest analytical scheme had suggested; but it continues to be characterized by important thresholds. Within this framework of our revised general concept of integration, we have arrived at a somewhat deeper understanding of the meaning of "sense of community." It appears to rest primarily on something other than verbal assent to some or many explicit propositions. The populations of different territories might easily profess verbal attachment to the same set of values without having a sense of community that leads to political integration. The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration, and therefore for our study, turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling," trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it—in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making. "Peaceful change" could not be assured without this kind of relationship.

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Growth around core areas. As such a process of integrative behavior, sense of community requires some particular habits of political behavior on the part of individuals and some particular traditions and institutions on the part of social groups and of political units, such as provinces or states.

These habits, in turn, are acquired by processes of social learning. People learn them in the face of background conditions which change only slowly, so that they appear at any moment as something given—as political, economic, social, or psychological facts that must be taken for granted for the purposes of short-range politics. The speed and extent of this learning of habits of integrative political behavior are then influenced in each situation by these background conditions, as well as by the dynamics of the particular political process—the particular movement toward integration. Some of our more specific findings deal with the importance of certain background conditions in each area studied, while others deal with the successive stages of the integrative political process that occurred.

The outcome, then, of the integrative process among any particular group of countries depends on the interplay of the effects of background conditions with moving political events. One aspect of this interplay deserves to be singled out for particular attention. It is the matter of political, economic, and social capabilities of the participating political units for integrative behavior.

Generally, we found that such integrative capabilities were closely related to the general capabilities of a given political unit for action in the fields of politics, administration, economic life, and social and cultural development. Larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed.

Political amalgamation, in particular, usually turned out to be a nuclear process. It often occurred around single cores, as in the case of England, Piedmont, Prussia, and Sweden. Each of these came to form the core of a larger amalgamated political community (even though the Norwegian-Swedish union turned out to be transitory). . . .

The need for rising capabilities. The extent of integrative capabilities which already existed in the individual political units at the beginning of a major drive toward amalgamation thus turned out to be very important for the future development of the process. But another step was no less important: the further increase of these capabilities in the course of the movement toward amalgamation. The presence or absence of growth in such capabilities played a major

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role in every integrative process we studied, and particularly in every case of an amalgamation movement.

Generally, amalgamation did not come to pass because the government of the participating units had become weaker or more inefficient; nor did it come to pass because men had been forced to turn away from these increasingly incapable organizations to the building of a larger and less decrepit common government. Rather, amalgamation occurred after a substantial increase in the capabilities of at least some of the participating units, or sometimes of all of them. Examples are the increase in the capabilities of the American colonies before 1789, and in the capabilities of Prussia before 1871. The increase in the capabilities of the political organizations or governments of the individual states, cantons, principalities, and the like, formed a major element in the dynamic political process leading to amalgamation in each instance.

Such capabilities relevant to integration were of two broad kinds. One was related to the capacity to act of a political unit—such as its size, power, economic strength, administrative efficiency, and the like. The other kind was related to the ability of a unit to control its own behavior and to redirect its own attention. More accurately, this means the ability of its political decision-makers and relevant political elites to redirect and control their own attention and behavior so as to enable rulers to receive communications from other political units which were to be their prospective partners in the integrative process. It means, further, the ability to give these messages from other political units adequate weight in the making of their own decisions, to perceive the needs of the populations and elites of these other units, and to respond to them quickly and adequately in terms of political or economic action. The first kind of capabilities—those related to the capacity to act and to overcome external obstacles—are closely linked to what we often call power; the second kind are linked to what we propose to call responsiveness.

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The race between capabilities and loads. Another set of data we found to be of crucial importance pertained to the burdens thrown upon the tangible and intangible resources of political units by the requirements of establishing or maintaining either an amalgamated or a pluralistic security-community. Such loads or burdens, as we have called them, were of many kinds. They included military or financial burdens, drains on manpower or wealth; the burden of risk from political or military commitments; costs of social and economic readjustments, such as at the establishment of a customs union; and similar burdens of a material kind. But they also included intangible burdens upon government, which could be visualized as somewhat similar to traffic loads of vehicles at a road intersection or of messages at a telephone exchange. In the cases of crossroads or switchboards, the flow of vehicles or messages requires more than a certain volume of material facilities for its accommodation; it also requires a certain number of decisions which must be made in a limited amount of time by the traffic officer who controls traffic at the intersection, or by the persons or apparatus that control the flow of calls through the telephone exchange.

It is this burden, imposed by the traffic load of messages and signals upon the attention-giving and decision-making capabilities of the persons or organizations in control, that has close parallels in the burden of government upon rulers. It is a burden upon the attention-giving, information-processing, and decision-making capabilities of administrators, political elites, legislatures, or electoral majorities. Thus the failure of the British Parliament to respond quickly and adequately to the disastrous Irish famine of 1846 was not caused primarily by any lack of material or financial resources to provide relief. Rather, the failure was one of adequate attention, perception, and decision-making to meet the burdens of responsibility which the Parliament had taken upon itself under the terms of Anglo-Irish union. It was nonetheless a failure that was to have far-reaching effects upon the future of Anglo-Irish relations.

Political amalgamation in general tended to increase the load of demands upon the material resources and the decision-making capabilities of governments, since decisions for larger areas and populations had to be made by fewer central institutions. The success or failure of amalgamation, then, depended in considerable part upon the relationship of two rates of change: the growing rate of claims and burdens upon central governments as against the growing—in some instances, the insufficiently growing—level of capabilities of the governmental institutions of the amalgamated political community. The load of communications, demands, and claims upon the capabilities of government was also growing from independent causes—such as the increasing complexity of economic life, the increasing level of popular expectations in terms of living standards, social opportunities, and political rights, and the increasing political activity of previously passive groups and strata. Hence the outcome of the race between the growth of loads and capabilities sometimes remained precarious for a longer period, or it changed from one period to another.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF BACKGROUND CONDITIONS

In general, our cases have left us impressed with the importance of certain background conditions for the success or failure of the integrative process. The influence of background conditions appears to be larger, and the opportunities for decisive action by political leaders or movements appear to be somewhat more limited, than we had thought at the beginning of our study.

To be sure, we found that the importance of a few background conditions had been somewhat overrated. Certain conditions which had often been considered as essential for the establishment of an amalgamated security-community turned out to be helpful to that end but not essential to it. Such helpful but nonessential conditions included previous administrative and/or dynastic union; ethnic or linguistic assimilation; strong economic ties; and foreign military threats. While all of these turned out to be helpful to integration, none of them appeared to be essential since each of them was absent in the successful establishment of at least one amalgamated security-community.

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SOME ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AMALGAMATED SECURITY-COMMUNITIES

A number of conditions appear to be essential, so far as our evidence goes, for the success of amalgamated security-communities—that is, for their becoming integrated. None of these conditions, of course, seems to be by itself sufficient for success; and all of them together may not be sufficient either, for it is quite possible that we have overlooked some additional conditions that may also be essential. Nonetheless, it does seem plausible to us that any group of states or territories which fulfilled all the essential conditions for an amalgamated security-community which we have been able to identify should also be at least on a good part of the way to successful amalgamation.

Values and Expectations

The first group of essential conditions deals with motivations for political behavior, and in particular with the values and expectations held in the politically relevant strata of the political units concerned. In regard to values, we found in all our cases a compatibility of the main values held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units. Sometimes this was supplemented by a tacit agreement to deprive of political significance any incompatible values that might remain.

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Values were most effective politically when they were not held merely in abstract terms, but when they were incorporated in political institutions and in habits of political behavior which permitted these values to be acted on in such a way as to strengthen people's attachment to them. This connection between values, institutions, and habits we call a "way of life," and it turned out to be crucial. In all our cases of successful amalgamation we found such a distinctive way of life—that is, a set of socially accepted values and of institutional means for their pursuit and attainment, and a set of established or emerging habits of behavior corresponding to them. To be distinctive, such a way of life has to include at least some major social or political values and institutions which are different from those which existed in the area during the recent past, or from those prevailing among important neighbors. In either case, such a way of life usually involved a significant measure of social innovation as against the recent past.

Putting the matter somewhat differently, we noted in our cases that the partial shift of political habits required in transferring political loyalties from the old, smaller political units, at least in part, to a new and larger political community has only occurred under conditions when also a great number of other political and social habits were in a state of change. Thus we find that the perception of an American people and an American political community, as distinct from the individual thirteen colonies, emerged between 1750 and 1790. This occurred at the same time as the emergence of a distinct American way of life clearly different from that of most of the people of Great Britain or French Canada. This way of life had been developing since the beginnings of colonial settlement in the seventeenth century, but had undergone accelerated change and development in the course of the American Revolution and its aftermath. . . .

In regard to expectations, we found that in all our cases amalgamation was preceded by widespread expectations of joint rewards for the participating units, through strong economic ties or gains envisaged for the future. By economic ties, we mean primarily close relations of trade permitting large-scale division of labor and almost always giving rise to vested interests. It was not necessary, however, for such strong economic ties to exist prior to amalgamation. . . . Only a part of such expectation had to be fulfilled. A "down payment" of tangible gains for a substantial part of the supporters of amalgamation soon after the event, if not earlier, seems almost necessary. . . .

Some noneconomic expectations also turned out to be essential. In all our cases of successful amalgamation we found widespread expectations of greater social or political equality, or of greater social or political rights or liberties, among important groups of the politically relevant strata—and often among parts of the underlying populations—in the political units concerned.

☐ *Capabilities and Communication Processes*

Values and expectations not only motivate people to performance, but the results of this performance will in turn make the original values and expectations weaker or stronger. Accordingly, we found a number of essential conditions for amalgamation which were related to the capabilities of the participating units or to the processes of communication occurring among them. The most important of these conditions was an increase in the political and administrative capabilities of the main political units to be amalgamated. Thus the amalgamation of Germany was preceded by a marked increase in the political and administrative capabilities of Prussia from 1806 onward, and by a lesser but still significant increase in the corresponding capabilities of Bavaria and of other German states. . . .

Another essential condition for amalgamation, closely related to the increase in capabilities, is the presence of markedly superior economic growth, either as measured against the recent past of the territories to be amalgamated, or against neighboring areas. Such superior economic growth did not have to be present in all participating units prior to amalgamation, but it had to be present it least in the main partner or partners vis-à-vis the rest of the units to be included in the amalgamated security-community. . . .

Another essential requirement for successful amalgamation was the presence of unbroken links of social communication between the political units concerned, and between the politically relevant strata within them. By such unbroken links we mean social groups and institutions which provide effective channels of communication, both horizontally among the main units of the amalgamated security-community and vertically among the politically relevant strata within them. Such links thus involve always persons and organizations.

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[A final] essential condition, related to the preceding one, is the broadening of the political, social, or economic elite, both in regard to its recruitment from broader social strata and to its continuing connections with them. An example of such a broadening of the elite was the emergence of a new type of political leader among the landowners of Virginia, such as George Washington, who retained the respect of his peers and at the same time also knew, well before the American Revolution, how to gain the votes of poorer farmers and frontiersmen at the county elections in Virginia. . . .

Mobility of Persons

Another condition present in all our cases of successful amalgamation was the mobility of persons among the main units, at least in the politically relevant strata. It is quite possible that this condition, too, may be essential for the success of amalgamation. In any event, our cases have persuaded us that the mobility of persons among the main political units of a prospective amalgamated security-community should be given far more serious consideration than has often been the case. Full-scale mobility of persons has followed every successful amalgamated security-community in modern times immediately upon its establishment. . . .

Multiplicity and Balance of Transactions

We also found that it was not enough for a high level of communications and transactions to exist only on one or two topics, or in one or two respects, among two or more political units if their amalgamation was to be successful. Rather it appeared that successfully amalgamated security-communities require a fairly wide range of different common functions and services, together with different institutions and organizations to carry them out. Further, they apparently require a multiplicity of ranges of common communications and transactions and their institutional counterparts. . . .

Two other conditions may well turn out to be essential for the success of amalgamation, but these will have to be investigated further. The first of them is concerned with the balance in the flow of communications and transactions between the political units that are to be amalgamated, and particularly with the balance of rewards between the different participating territories. It is also concerned with the balance of initiatives that originate in these territories or groups of population, and finally with the balance of respect—or of symbols standing for respect—between these partners. In the course of studying cases of successful amalgamation, we found that it was apparently important for each of the participating territories or populations to gain some valued services or opportunities. It also seemed important that each at least sometimes take the initiative in the process, or initiate some particular phase or contribution; and that some major symbol or representative of each territory or population should be accorded explicit respect by the others. . . .

The second condition follows from the preceding one. It was not essential that the flow of rewards, of initiatives, or of respect should balance at any one moment, but it seems essential that they should balance over some period of time. Sometimes this was accomplished by alternating flows or by an interchange of group roles. Territories which received particular prestige, or material benefits, at one time might become sources of benefits for their partners at another; or territories whose political elites found themselves ranged with a majority on one political issue might find themselves in a minority on another, without any one particular division between majorities and minorities becoming permanent. . . .

Mutual Predictability of Behavior

A final condition that may be essential for the success of amalgamation may be some minimum amount of mutual predictability of behavior. Members of an amalgamated security-community—and, to a lesser extent, of a pluralistic security-community—must be able to expect from one another some dependable interlocking, interchanging, or at least compatible behavior; and they must therefore be able, at least to that extent, to predict one another's actions. Such predictions may be based on mere familiarity. . . . While familiarity appears to have contributed successfully to the growth of mutual trust in some of our cases, such as that between Scottish Highlanders and Lowlanders, and later between Scots and Englishmen, or between German, French, and Swiss during much of the eighteenth century, we found in a number of our cases that mutual predictability of behavior was eventually established upon a firmer basis.

This firmer basis was the acquisition of a certain amount of common culture or of common group character or "national character." In this manner, an increasing number of Germans in the German states, of Italians in the Italian principalities, and of Americans in the American colonies, came to feel that they could understand their countrymen in the neighboring political units by expecting them, by and large, to behave much as they themselves would behave in similar situations; that is to say, they came to predict the behavior of their countrymen in neighboring political units on the basis of introspection: by looking into their own minds they could make a fairly good guess as to what their neighbors would do, so they could trust them or at least understand them, to some extent much as they would trust or understand themselves. The extent of mutual predictability of behavior, however, seems to have varied from case to case, and it also seems to have varied with the particular political elites or relevant strata concerned. That some mutual predictability of political behavior is an essential condition for an amalgamated security-community seems clear from our cases; but the extent of such predictability must remain a matter for further research.

□ *Summary*

Altogether we have found nine essential conditions for an amalgamated security-community: (1) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive way of life; (3) expectations of stronger economic ties or gains; (4) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; (5) superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units; (6) unbroken links of social communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata; (7) a broadening of the political elite; (8) mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata; and, (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction. And we have found indications that three other conditions may be essential: (10) a compensation of flows of communications and transactions; (11) a not too infrequent interchange of group roles; and, (12) considerable mutual predictability of behavior.

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■ BACKGROUND CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO DISINTEGRATION

Several conditions were found present in all cases of disintegration of amalgamated political communities which we studied, and they appear likely to promote disintegration wherever they occur. This does not mean, however, that they are sufficient by themselves to produce disintegration. We have found these conditions also present in some cases where disintegration did not follow but where other factors favoring integration were present in particular strength. The establishment and preservation of amalgamated security-communities thus turned out to depend upon a balance of favorable and adverse conditions. Amalgamation does not seem likely to be established, or to persist, except in the presence of the nine essential conditions for amalgamation which we listed earlier in this chapter; but even in their presence, the disintegrative conditions which we shall discuss below could prevent, destroy, or at least endanger an amalgamated security-community.

In our earlier general discussion, we have described integration as a process depending upon a balance between political loads upon a government, and its capabilities for maintaining amalgamation, or its capabilities for maintaining integration within a pluralistic security-community. In accordance with this general view, we may group the disintegrative conditions in our cases under two headings: conditions that increased the burdens upon amalgamated governments, and conditions that reduced the capability of such governments to cope with the burdens put upon them.

One of the outstanding conditions that tended to destroy amalgamated security-communities by placing excessive burdens upon them was the effect of excessive military commitments. Common armies with light burdens and conspicuous gains in prestige or privileges, or short wars of similar character, were helpful, though not essential, to the deeper integration of a political community; but heavy military burdens with few conspicuous gains over the *status quo* tended to have the opposite effect.

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Another condition which tended to increase greatly the load upon governments, and thus tended to disintegrate amalgamated security-communities, was a substantial increase in political participation on the part of populations, regions, or social strata which previously had been politically passive. Such a substantial increase in political participation meant in each case that the needs, wishes, and pressures of additional social strata or regions had to be accommodated within an old system of political decision-making that might be—and often was—ill-suited to respond to them adequately and in time. . . .

A further disintegrative condition related to this rise in political participation is the increase in ethnic or linguistic differentiation. Another aspect of the same condition is a rise in the political awareness of such differentiation as already may exist. Both of these are likely to be a consequence of the rise in political participation among groups that are already thus differentiated, in language and culture, from the predominant nationality or regional-cultural group within the political community in question. . . .

Another group of disintegrative conditions tends to weaken or destroy amalgamated security-communities by reducing the capabilities of their governments and political elites for adequate and timely action or response. One such condition in our cases appeared to be any prolonged economic decline or stagnation, leading to economic conditions comparing unfavorably with those in neighboring areas.

Another disintegrative condition of this kind was the relative closure of the established political elite. This tended to promote the rise of frustrated counter-elites, somewhat in Pareto's sense, among ethnic or cultural out-groups, or in outlying regions.

Another disintegrative condition, related to the foregoing, was the excessive delay in social, economic, or political reforms which had come to be expected by the population—reforms which sometimes had already been adopted in neighboring areas.

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SPECIAL FEATURES OF PLURALISTIC SECURITY-COMMUNITIES

In regard to the problem of a pluralistic security-community, we found that its attainment would be favored by any conditions favorable to the success of an amalgamated security-community, and that it was sometimes hindered by conditions or processes harmful to the latter. Pluralistic security-communities sometimes succeeded, however, under far less favorable conditions than the success of an amalgamated government would have required; and they sometimes survived unfavorable or disintegrative processes which would have destroyed an amalgamated political community.

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Of the twelve conditions that appeared to be essential for the success of an amalgamated security-community, or at least potentially so, only two or possibly three were found to be very important for a pluralistic security-community as well. The first of these was the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making. The second was the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence. . . . A third essential condition for a pluralistic security-community may be mutual predictability of behavior; this appears closely related to the foregoing. But the member-states of a pluralistic security-community have to make joint decisions only about a more limited range of subject matters, and retain each a far wider range of problems for autonomous decision-making within their own borders. Consequently the range and extent of the mutual predictability of behavior required from members of a pluralistic security-community is considerably less than would be essential for the successful operation of an amalgamated one.

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Altogether, our findings in the field of background conditions tend to bring out the great and potentially restrictive importance of these conditions for the establishment and preservation of amalgamated security-communities. Further, our findings tend to bring out the very considerable potentialities of pluralistic security-communities for overcoming even partially unfavorable background situations.

POLITICAL INTEGRATION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS

The transition from background to process is fluid. The essential background conditions do not come into existence all at once; they are not established in any particular fixed sequence; nor do they all grow together like one organism from a seed. Rather, it appears to us from our cases that they may be assembled in almost any sequence, so long only as all of them come into being and take effect. Toward this end, almost any pathway will suffice. As each essential condition is fulfilled, it is added, one by one or a few at a time, as strands are added to a web, or as parts are put together on an assembly line.

So long as this assembling of conditions occurs very slowly, we may treat the status of each condition and the status of all of them together at any one time as a matter of stable, seemingly unchanging background. Indeed, in our historical cases they were so considered, as practically unchanged or slow-changing situations, by most of their contemporaries. But as the last of the conditions in each sequence are added to those whose attainment was assembled previously, the tempo of the process quickens. Background and process now become one. A multiplicity of ranges of social communication and transaction was a background condition for amalgamation, but the rapid adding of new ranges of such communications and transactions is a process. Moreover, it is a process that may become accelerated as a by-product of other processes of political and social change. A balance of flows of transactions between the different units eligible for amalgamation is another of the necessary background conditions for amalgamation. This is particularly true in regard to a balance of initiatives, of rewards, and of respect. But substantial progress toward the establishment of some such balance may be a matter of political process, or else a political process directed toward the attainment of amalgamation may produce a better balance of transaction flows as one of its by-products.

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THE ISSUE OF FUNCTIONALISM AS A PATHWAY TO AMALGAMATION

Our finding that the bringing together of the necessary background conditions for amalgamation in our cases resembled an assembly-line process suggests indirectly an answer to an old question: does merging of one or more governmental functions among two or more political units promote progress toward later over-all amalgamation of their governments? Or, on the contrary, does what we shall call functional amalgamation impede such over-all amalgamation by inadequate performance of the few already amalgamated functions? Does it take the wind from the sails of the movement for full-scale amalgamation by making the few already amalgamated functions serve adequately the main needs which had supplied most of the driving power for the over-all amalgamation movement?

Before we answer this question, we must say exactly what we mean by functionalism. As we are using the term here, it includes all cases of partial amalgamation, where some governmental functions are delegated by the participating units on a low or a high level of decision-making. Whether a particular function or institution is so important that its pooling with another government would have the effect of over-all amalgamation rather than partial—and thus take it out of the field of functionalism—depends on the importance of this particular function or institution in the domestic politics of the participating units.

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How helpful, then, has functionalism been? We have found, first of all, that over-all amalgamation can be approached functionally and by steps, with successful over-all amalgamation at the end. This occurred in the cases of Germany with the Zollverein (of which, significantly, Austria was not a member); the United States with the common administration of Western lands under the Articles of Confederation; the Swiss cantons since the fourteenth century, and the common citizenship between Geneva, Bern, and Fribourg, and later other Swiss cantons from the sixteenth century onward; finally, between England and Wales and England and Scotland before the

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union of crowns preceding full amalgamation. In all these cases amalgamation eventually was successful. But functional amalgamation was also proposed and rejected among the Italian states in the 1840's, and eventually amalgamation was achieved without its aid. Moreover, functional amalgamation took place in at least three of our cases that were eventually unsuccessful: there was the union of crowns between Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary from 1526 onward; there was the union of crowns between Norway and Sweden in 1814; and there were various forms of partial amalgamation between England and Ireland before 1801.

These examples are taken from a sample collection of historical cases and situations in which instances of successful amalgamation outnumber the unsuccessful ones by more than two to one. From this it should be clear that the historical evidence in favor of functionalism is quite inconclusive.

It seems safest to conclude that the issue of functionalism has been greatly overrated. Functionalism, it appears, is a device that has been widely used both in successful and in unsuccessful movements toward amalgamation, somewhat as functional devolution and decentralization have been used in successful and in unsuccessful attempts at secession. The outcome in all such situations seems mostly to have been the result of other conditions and other processes—depending largely on whether functionalism mainly was associated with experiences of joint rewards or of joint deprivations—with functionalism in itself doing little to help or to harm. . . . Perhaps the most that can be said for functionalism as an approach to integration is that it seems less hazardous than any sudden attempt at over-all amalgamation.

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