

39. *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 32: 101; Beschloss, *Reaching for Glory*, 300–301; McPherson, “Misled by Himself,” 137.
40. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 173–174.
41. Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 19.
42. Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 739. Martin admitted that his interpretation of the president’s motives was a “guess.” Experience had convinced him, however, that “the makers of foreign policy must take into account domestic public opinion, that is, domestic politics” (*ibid.*).
43. Ball, quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 210.
44. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” iv, 34, 132, 173, 231; Dallek, *Flamed Giant*, chap. 4.
45. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 125–129, 132, 231; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 104–105.
46. Howard J. Wiarda, “The United States and the Dominican Republic: Intervention, Dependency, and Tyrannicide,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 22, no. 2 (May 1980): 247.
47. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” iv, 413.
48. VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, chaps. 4–6; Dallek, *Flamed Giant*, chap. 5.
49. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 330–331.
50. Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 5, 19, 154–155.
51. Wiarda, “The United States and the Dominican Republic,” 253; Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 327; Kai P. Schoenhals and Richard A. Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 92; Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World*, 254; Walter LaFeber, “Latin American Policy,” in *Exploring the Johnson Years*, ed. Robert A. Divine (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 76; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 661. According to Wiarda and Kryzaneck, Johnson in 1965 “was in the midst of preparing for the massive buildup of U.S. forces in Viet Nam. His intervention in Santo Domingo was meant to send a message to the North Vietnamese of U.S. strength and a willingness to use it.” See Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J. Kryzaneck, *The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), 44.
52. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 152. In March 1965, national security adviser McGeorge Bundy had informed Johnson that the “cardinal” objective of U.S. policy in Vietnam was “not to be a Paper Tiger.” Quoted in VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 101. “The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam,” Bundy advised the president (*ibid.*, 66). That same month, a Defense Department study concluded that the predominant U.S. goal in Vietnam was “To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as guarantor) [of South Vietnam’s security].” It was “essential,” the Defense Department study continued, that the United States be seen as having “kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the US will behave in future cases of particular interest to those nations—regarding US policy, power, resolve and competence to deal with

their problems” (*The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam* [Boston: Beacon, 1971], 3: 695, 700).

53. Dallek, *Flamed Giant*, 100, 244–246; VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 47, 60, 96–97, 106, 213. National security adviser McGeorge Bundy had played heavily on Johnson’s political fears in lobbying for a major U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Arguing in February 1965 for a U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam, Bundy advised Johnson that even if the bombing failed, “the policy will be worth it. . . . At a minimum, it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own” (*ibid.*, 67; emphasis added). The following month, Bundy advocated the deployment of U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam, asking Johnson, “In terms of domestic politics, which is better: to ‘lose’ now or to ‘lose’ after committing 100,000 men? Tentative answer: the latter”—because, according to Bundy’s reasoning, “if we visibly do enough in the South, any failure will be, in that moment, beyond our control” (quoted in *ibid.*, 101, and in Dallek, *Flamed Giant*, 255).
54. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 324.
55. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 330.
56. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 187.
57. Quoted in Dallek, *Flamed Giant*, 100.
58. Beschloss, ed., *Taking Charge*, 401–402.
59. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 178, 230–232.
60. VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 133–134; Gardner, *Pay Any Price*, 209, 211–212.
61. VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 132, 134. VanDeMark drew the quote “sheared away the left wing of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society consensus” from Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power* (New York: New American Library, 1966), 511.
62. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 131, 173, 182, 232–233, 301–302.

Chapter Five. Chile, 1970

1. Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Pocket, 1979), 294.
2. Paul E. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964–1976* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 131, 147; Robert J. Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1978), 137–143.
3. Sigmund, *Overthrow of Allende*, 24; Mark Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–1989: A Critical History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989), 44.
4. Sigmund, *Overthrow of Allende*, 88–89; Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–1989*, 26–30; Julio Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 165, 167–169, 171, 191–192, 194–195; Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile*, 133–137.
5. Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–1989*, 31; Robert Moss, *Chile’s Marxist Experiment* (Newton Abbot, UK: David & Charles, 1973), 49; Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 33; Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, 140. Also see the revealing assessment of former Allende supporter Roberto Ampuero,

"Thirty Years On, a Chilean Laments 'We All Killed Allende,'" *Washington Post*, 7 September 2003.

6. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, 63, 84, 93.
7. *Ibid.*, 112, 118-120; Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile*, 188-189. Specifically, the "statute of democratic guarantees" guaranteed "the free functioning of political parties, trade unions, private education, and the mass media and the independence of the armed forces from political control" (Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile*, 49).
8. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, 111; Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile*, 193.
9. "The Programme of Unidad Popular," in *Chile's Road to Socialism*, ed. Joan E. Garces, trans. J. Darling, introduction by Richard Gott (Harmondsworth, UK, and Baltimore: Penguin, 1973), 23-24, 27, 29-30.
10. Moss, *Chile's Marxist Experiment*, 59.
11. Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile*, 58; Allende, "The Programme of Unidad Popular," 25.
12. U.S. House of Representatives, *United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 1970-1973: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 1, 1971-September 18, 1974*, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 375, 405, 408, 546; address by Salvador Allende, *Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly*, Twenty-Seventh Session, 2,096th Plenary Meeting, 4 December 1972, 2; Armando Uribe, *The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile* (Boston: Beacon, 1975), 21; "The Programme of Unidad Popular," 25; Jacques Zylberberg and Miguel Monterichard, "An Abortive Attempt to Change Foreign Policy: Chile, 1970-3," in *Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World*, ed. K. J. Holsti (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 191. As president, Allende quickly nationalized the U.S. copper companies and arrived at a compensation figure that, after "excess profits" had been deducted from the book value of the companies' Chilean holdings, left the copper companies owing the Chilean government nearly \$400 million. Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile*, 61-62.
13. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, 131; F. Parkinson, *Latin America, the Cold War, and the World Powers, 1945-1973* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1974), 239; "The Programme of Unidad Popular," 49; Uribe, *The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile*, 74, 76, 78; James Petras and Morris Morley, *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 178n13; Zylberberg and Monterichard, "An Abortive Attempt to Change Foreign Policy: Chile, 1970-3," 180.
14. Parkinson, *Latin America, the Cold War*, 64n69, 196; Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), 7; U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities: Hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*, vol. 7: *Covert Action*, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 33, 116 (hereafter cited as Senate Hearings, *Intelligence Activities*); Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, 131; "The Programme of Unidad Popular," 49-50.
15. Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970-1989*, 46; Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr., eds., *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America*, 3rd rev. ed. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), 129; William Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 133 (also quoted in Stephen G.

Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 111; Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile*, 170; Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile*, 140-141.

16. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic, 2005), 69-70, 72, 75.
17. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, 24-25, 44, 53; Edward Korry, "The Sell-Out of Chile and the American Taxpayer," *Penhouse*, March 1978, 72; U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973: Staff Report*, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 14-17 (hereafter cited as Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*); Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 285.
18. Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, 20-22; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 662-669; Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 291; Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit, 1983), 266. Also see Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 370-371; and Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970-1989*, 204-207.
19. Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: New Press, 2003), chap. 1; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 670-672; Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, 23-26; U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 231-234 (hereafter cited as Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*); Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York: Basic, 1987), 104.
20. Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, chap. 1; Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 225-229, 231-235; Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, 23, 25-26. One U.S. official present at the September 15 meeting described Nixon as "frantic." Stephen Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 172. A special CIA task force was created to carry out Track II. Its assignment consisted of a "three-part program": "a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers; b. Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup; [and] c. Inform those coup-minded officers that the U.S. Government would give them full support in a coup short of direct U.S. military intervention" (Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 234).
21. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 277; Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, 26; Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, 29.
22. Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, chap. 2; Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, 26-28; Mark Falcoff, "Kissinger and Chile: The Myth That Will Not Die," *Commentary*, November 2003, 41-49.
23. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 270, 296.
24. Petras and Morley, *The United States and Chile*, viii-ix.
25. Address by Salvador Allende, *Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly*, 4 December 1972, 3; Uribe, *The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile*, 144-145.
26. Treverton, *Covert Action*, 161-162; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 266-268, 276; Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, 12; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings on the International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970-71*, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., March 20-April 2, 1973, pt. 1, 21-22 (hereafter cited as Senate, *ITT Hearings*).

27. Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973*, 45; Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 229.
28. *New York Times*, 26 May 1977, B6.
29. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, 656; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 376; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 270; Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 241.
30. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 266, 268, 276; Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973*, 12. Although it turned down I.T.T. funds for anti-Allende operations, the CIA advised the company on how to pass money to Allende's opponent Alessandri and his National Party. According to a subsequent Senate investigation, "Eventually at least \$350,000 was passed by I.T.T. to [Alessandri's] campaign. A roughly equal amount was passed by other U.S. companies; the CIA learned of this funding but did not assist in it" (Senate, *Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973*, 13). Danish historian Poul Jensen offers an economic interpretation of a different stripe. Jensen places Nixon's Chilean intervention within the context of a severe balance-of-payments crisis that was threatening to deplete U.S. gold reserves in 1969–1970. Because U.S. foreign-exchange earnings were heavily dependent on "remitted income . . . from direct US overseas investments," Jensen writes, Allende's determination to nationalize foreign capital would—by eliminating the \$100 million in income that U.S. corporations in Chile remitted each year to the U.S. domestic economy—have made a bad situation considerably worse. Nixon responded to the growing balance-of-payments deficits by establishing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a new "government insurance company" that provided U.S. foreign investors with insurance coverage to protect their investments in the event of expropriation. By late 1970, according to Jensen, more than \$310 million of U.S. investment capital in Chile was protected by OPIC expropriation insurance, even though the corporation had available less than \$70 million in financial reserves to meet its expropriation-insurance commitments worldwide. Administrators were openly warning that a series of large-scale nationalizations in Chile would be "catastrophic" for their corporation. And if successful expropriations in Chile stimulated a wave of nationalizations throughout Latin America and the Third World, Jensen concludes, the "harmful economic effects" on the United States would obviously be "even greater." Nevertheless, even Jensen is forced to admit that there is no actual evidence that the White House officials who ordered the Chilean intervention had any "awareness of" or "interest in . . . the particular consequences of the expected Chilean nationalizations for OPIC." See Poul Jensen, *The Garotte: The United States and Chile, 1970–1973* (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1988), 450–460, 464–466, 474, 484–485, 487, 495.
31. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 656.
32. *New York Times*, 25 May 1977, B6.
33. *Ibid.* Nixon repeated his "Italian businessman" anecdote in *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 490.
34. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 376.
35. Edward M. Korry, "Contingency Paper ('Fidelism without Fidel),'" August 1970, 23, reproduced in "Chile in the Archives of the USA (1970): Documents from the Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward M. Korry (1967–1971)," *Estudios Públicos* (Centro de Estudios Públicos, Santiago, Chile), no. 72 (1998), www.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_1147_316/rev72_korrydocing.pdf; Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 229; Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, 8, 11.
36. Senate, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973*, 44.
37. *Ibid.*, 47.

38. Korry to Rogers, 5 September 1970, 4, in *Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, 1970–1976*, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 8, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm>.
39. Paul E. Sigmund, "Crisis Management: Chile and Marxism," in *United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge, 1961–1986*, ed. John D. Martz (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 158; Treverton, *Covert Action*, 173.
40. Melvin Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 59–60.
41. *Ibid.*, 60–65, 97; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), chaps. 9–10; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 124–130, 135–136, 163–165, 191–192; Nixon, *RN*, 341–349.
42. Nixon, *RN*, 380, 406; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 143–147, 159–161, 278, 283, 313; Michael A. Genovese, *The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990), 116; Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 116, 118, 171.
43. Kissinger, *White House Years*, chaps. 14–15; Nixon, *RN*, 483.
44. Kissinger, *White House Years*, chap. 16; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962–1972* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 381. Also see Nixon, *RN*, 485–486.
45. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 118–119, 162, 316, 570, 594; Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 292; Nixon, *RN*, 485, 490; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 251.
46. Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon*, 65; Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam*, 38, 62, 72; Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 120. Also see H. R. Haldeman, *The Ends of Power* (New York: Times Books, 1978), 98–99.
47. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 228.
48. Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam*, 225.
49. Nixon, *RN*, 380; Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam*, 136.
50. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), 408–409.
51. Nixon, *RN*, 490; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 593 (emphasis added). According to Kissinger, "The Nixon Administration had told Moscow many times that we were prepared for a period of mutual restraint and conciliation. In the autumn of 1970 Moscow chose to test whether this willingness reflected indecision, domestic weakness due to Vietnam, or the strategy of a serious government" (*ibid.*, 652).
52. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 654.
53. Nixon, *RN*, 490. In Kissinger's view, "None" of the "three major crises" that "descended upon the Administration" in September 1970—Jordan, Grenfuogos, or Chile—"could have succeeded without Communist impetus or encouragement" (Kissinger, *White House Years*, 594).
54. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 656; Petras and Morley, *The United States and Chile*, 39.
55. Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam*, 173, 182–183, 230; William Buckley, "U.S. Policies in Chile under the Allende Government: An Interview with Former Ambassador Edward Korry," in *Chile: The Balanced View*, ed. Francisco Orrego Vicuña (Santiago: University of Chile Institute of International Studies, 1975), 294.
56. Korry to Senator Frank Church, 23 October 1975, in Senate Hearings, *Intelligence Activities*, 118–119.

57. Buckley, "U.S. Politics in Chile under the Allende Government," 294; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 102–103, 388, 657, 920–922; Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos, *Kissinger and Brzezinski: The NSC and the Struggle for Control of US National Security Policy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 21–22; Robert H. Johnson, *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and Beyond* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 66; Ricardo Israel, *Politics and Ideology in Allende's Chile* (Tempe: Arizona State University Center for Latin American Studies, 1989), 157. Kissinger's concern about the link between the "Chilean model" and Eurocommunism may have been well founded. Robert Alexander writes that "European Communists, especially those of Italy and France, were keeping a close eye on the Unidad Popular experiment. . . . In both Italy and France, the Communist parties had for some time been seeking an alliance with Socialists—and in Italy's case, even with Christian Democrats—which would permit them to return to the government of those countries, at least as junior partners" (Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile*, 136). Mark Falcoff reports that "a group of Italian sympathizers told Allende shortly after his election, 'If you can show in Chile that a second road to socialism is possible . . . , then the next country to advance along that road will be Italy, and very soon others in Latin America, and later, in one or two generations, half the world'" (Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–1989*, 2). Allende's foreign minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, later recalled that "the victory of a clearly anti-imperialist, socialist political force in an important Latin American country changed the balance of power on the continent, and was inevitably linked to the general political process in Latin America and the hemisphere. This in turn had ramifications, at least to some extent, in the world political arena where the East-West conflict overshadowed . . . every event. Indeed, important actors in the *Unidad Popular* had participated in that world conflict and saw the Chilean experience in a larger context" (Clodomiro Almeyda Medina, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government," in *Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970–1973*, ed. Federico G. Gil, Ricardo Lagos E., and Henry A. Landsberger [Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979], 76).

58. Korry to Church, Senate Hearings, *Intelligence Activities*, 118.

59. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 270.

60. Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, 241 (emphasis in original).

61. Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 229n3; Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, 8.

62. Quoted in Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, 79, 119.

63. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 129, 664, 668n678. Kissinger later observed that "the appearance of inferiority—whatever its actual significance—can have serious political consequences" (Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 288; emphasis in original).

64. Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon*, 67; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1187.

65. George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 245; Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam*, 118, 216–217, 229–230; Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon*, 67; Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography*, 287; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 969. That Nixon had inherited the domestic political turmoil over U.S. involvement in Vietnam that had driven Johnson from the presidency became evident during his 1969 inaugural parade when the incoming president's limousine was pelted by "a barrage of sticks, stones, beer cans, and what looked like firecrackers" by crowds of antiwar demonstrators (Nixon, *RN*, 366).

66. H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: Putnam's, 1994), 192–194. "Richard Nixon was a full-time politician," White House domestic affairs counsel John Ehrlichman later wrote. "At home and abroad, every day of the

week and whatever the occasion, he (and we) looked after the politics" (John Ehrlichman, *Witness to Power: The Nixon Years* [New York: Pocket, 1982], 288).

67. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 126, 634; Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician*, 19–20.

68. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician*, 378. One of Kissinger's National Security Council aides said of the administration's interventionist motives: "It was the 'who-lost-Chile' syndrome" (Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, 241).

69. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 671 (emphasis in original).

70. National Security Council, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM97)," 3 November 1970, 3, 5, in *Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, 1970–1976*.

71. Memorandum, Chapin to H. R. Haldeman, 4 November 1970, in File 66-6, "National Security Council, 9-1-70 to 11-4-70," White House Central Files, Subject Files, Confidential Files, 1969–1974, box 14, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD. Also quoted in Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, 80.

72. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 653. The full text of Korry's cable can be found in *Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, 1970–1976*.

73. Peter Kornbluh, "The *El Mercurio* File: Secret Documents Shine New Light on How the CIA Used a Newspaper to Foment a Coup," *Columbia Journalism Review*, September–October 2003, 14, 16–17; Kinzer, *Overthrow*, 170–172, 177; Israel, *Politics and Ideology in Allende's Chile*, 171; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 266; Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile*, 50, 55, 83; Korry, "The Sell-Out of Chile and the American Taxpayer,"

88; *Washington Post*, 28 November 1975, A4; Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 291–292, 299; Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician*, 378; Jensen, *The Garotte*, 244; Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 228n1; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 673. For Edwards' extensive ties to the CIA, see Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 260; Senate, *Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973*, 19, 22, 29; Korry, "The Sell-Out of Chile and the American Taxpayer," 114.

74. Senate Hearings, *Intelligence Activities*, 29; Senate, *ITT Hearings*, 292, 305.

75. Jensen, *The Garotte*, 491, 596n151.

76. National Security Council, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)," 3 November 1970, 17, in *Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, 1970–1976*.

Chapter Six. Nicaragua, 1981

1. Robert Kagan, *A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977–1990* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 200–203, 225–226; Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.–Latin American Relations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 188; Ariel C. Armony, *Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-communist Crusade in Central America, 1977–1884*, Monographs in International Studies no. 26 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997), 115.

2. E. Bradford Burns, *At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 22–23; Ronnie Dugger, *On Reagan: The Man and His Presidency* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 353, 518.

3. Matilde Zimmermann, *Sandinistas: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), chaps. 2–5 (1968 Fonseca quote, 108); Dennis Gilbert, *Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 4,