

President Johnson, 24 October 1964, National Security File, Country File, "United Kingdom: Walker Talks with President and Others," box 213, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library; memorandum, George Ball to President Johnson, [early December 1964], National Security File, Country File, "United Kingdom: PM Wilson Visit (I), December 7-8, 1964," box 214, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The National Security Council paper advised the administration to warn Wilson that any attempt to set "an early date for [British Guiana's] independence prior to the outcome of the elections" would "severely damage UK-U.S. relations. . . and adversely influence our continuing cooperation in other areas."

Chapter Four: Dominican Republic, 1965

1. Robert Dallek, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 60-61, 82-83, 86; Brian VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), xv, 54, 213.
2. Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, 100-101.
3. Michael R. Beschloss, ed., *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 401n4; Robert J. McMahon, "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 15, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 446. According to McMahon, "The Vietnam War provides the most dramatic case of how America's fixation with its credibility could overshadow most other policy considerations. American leaders explained, justified, and defended the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam so frequently in terms of the need to prove U.S. credibility that their statements resemble ritualistic incantations. . . . Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that for Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon, Vietnam's importance derived primarily from the meanings that others would ascribe to American actions there" (*ibid.*).
4. VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, xiv-xv, 106, 112-113; Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, 106, 269.
5. Robert H. Johnson, *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 143; Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, 100; Beschloss, ed., *Taking Charge*, 135.
6. VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, xiv, 25, 216, 220.
7. Quoted in Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 252-253. According to VanDeMark, "LBJ seemed determined, even obsessed, with avoiding Truman's ordeal. This dread of a conservative backlash—much more than personal pride or fear of another 'Munich'—conditioned Johnson's basic attitude toward Vietnam. As he had remarked in private shortly after assuming the presidency: 'I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went'" (VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 25).
8. Beschloss, ed., *Taking Charge*, 213nn6, 7; Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, 106; VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, xv.
9. VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 47, 60, 140; H. W. Brands, *The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 28, 231; Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, 244.
10. Quoted in David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972), 530.
11. Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-*

- 1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 180-184; Michael L. Conniff, *Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 120.
12. Thomas Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 113-115, 214, 253-286; Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 15; Peter Flynn, *Brazil: A Political Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978), 230-237, 266-276.
 13. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil*, 286-292; John W. F. Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955-1964* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), 267-272; Ruth Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1990), 174-176; Jorge G. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War* (New York: Vintage, 1993), 34n21.
 14. Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1978), 377.
 15. Brands, *Wages of Globalism*, 48.
 16. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*), 1964-1968, vol. 31: *South and Central America; Mexico* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 412-413.
 17. Brands, *Wages of Globalism*, 47; Philip Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 78; Walters, *Silent Missions*, 386.
 18. Walters, *Silent Missions*, 381-383, 388; Brands, *Wages of Globalism*, 47-48, 261; Phyllis R. Parker, *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 75-76, 86-87, 104; Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution*, 214; Gaddis Smith, *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994), 121.
 19. Piero Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), chaps. 5-9; Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), chap. 3 (the "bloodiest single battle in Dominican history," 93).
 20. Telegram, Connett to Rusk, 25 April 1965, in *Crises in Panama and the Dominican Republic: National Security Files and NSC Histories (1963-1969)*, ed. Paul Kesaris (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982), microfilm, reel 5, frame 0022. "We believe there is serious threat of Communist takeover in country and that very little time remains in which to act," the embassy reported the following day (telegram, Connett to Rusk, 26 April 1965, in *ibid.*, reel 5, frame 0047).
 21. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 72-73, 78-79, 88, 215-216n42; John Bartlow Martin, *Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis—From the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1966), 647-651, 654-655; Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 226; *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 32: *Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 69. Also see Johnson's account in his memoir *The Vantage Point*, 193-194. An April 29 embassy report described the rebel forces as "mad dogs" (*FRUS, 1964-1968*, 32: 99).
 22. *FRUS, 1964-1968*, 32: 71, 73-74, 76-77, 85; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 101, 109-110; Peter Felten, "The 1965-1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1995), 116; Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 253.
 23. Felten, "The 1965-1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 120, 132-133, 135-141, 162; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 108-110, 115; Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 256-258. On 29 April, Ambassador Bennett complained to Washington that loyalist military commanders "feel . . . that they can sit back now and let us do an efficient job for them" (*FRUS, 1964-1968*, 32: 96).

24. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, chap. 10; Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," chaps. 5–7. For a detailed account of the intervention by the commander of U.S. military forces in the Dominican Republic, see General Bruce Palmer Jr., *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989).

25. Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 52–55, 74, 111–112, 174; Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 133–145, 228–230, 251; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 154–155, 215–217n42; Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 36–42; Juan Bosch, "A Tale of Two Nations," *New Leader*, 21 June 1965, 5.

26. Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World*, 69–70; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 154–155; Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 74.

27. Howard J. Wiarda, interview with author, 11 December 1997; Wiarda, *Universities, Think Tanks and War Colleges: The Main Institutions of American Educational Life—A Memoir* (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 1999), 113–114.

28. Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 451. As Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright observed in September 1965: "The specter of a second Communist state in the hemisphere—and its probable repercussions within the United States and possible effects on the careers of those who might be held responsible—seems to have been the most important single factor in distorting the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men" (*Congressional Record*, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, 111, pt. 18, 23859; also quoted in Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, 32n).

29. George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* (New York: Norton, 1982), 327–328; Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, 25. According to journalist Tad Szulc, who covered the intervention for the *New York Times*, Bennett privately referred to the Constitutionalists as "Communist scum" (Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, 230n17).

30. Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 71–73, 79, 81, 96–97, 137, 167; Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, 41; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 69, 87, 109; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 651, 708. Felten concludes that "the conservative, anti-communist bias of its Dominican contacts colored the embassy's reporting from the beginning of the crisis" (Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 72). Slater recounts a "story told by a wealthy oligarch sympathetic to the constitutionalists. On the first day of the revolution he received a telephone call suggesting that he contact all his friends and ask each to tell the American Embassy that the revolutionaries were 'Communists'" (Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, 41). According to Felten, the loyalists also endeavored to influence U.S. public opinion: "The loyalists intended to create a political climate in the United States which made accommodation with the rebels impossible. To this end, the loyalist military helped Jules Dubois, the rabidly anti-communist *Chicago Tribune* Latin America correspondent, enter the Dominican Republic before any other English-language reporter. Like nearly all involved, the coup caught the media by surprise, so no members of the U.S. press were in the country when the crisis broke. The subsequent chaos kept foreign reporters out, despite a large number clambering to get the story. Dubois, however, had unparalleled access to the loyalists, interviewing by telephone General Wessim on April 27 and arriving at a loyalist airport early the next morning, the first foreign reporter to enter the country since hostilities began. Dubois served as a mouthpiece for the loyalists, whom he called the 'anti-communist forces.'

He repeated Wessim's claims that 'Bosch is a communist sympathizer' and that 'this country came within 12 hours of a communist takeover' on April 26. By using journalists like Dubois, San Isidro conducted a propaganda offensive aimed at both official and public opinion in the United States" (Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 96–97).

31. Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 79, 100–102; Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 90, 114–115, 117, 135; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 656–657. Representatives of conservative governments elsewhere in Latin America reinforced the loyalists' warnings. Ambassador Bennett informed Washington on 30 April that the Colombian and Guatemalan ambassadors in Santo Domingo concurred with his assessment and believed that only a U.S. military intervention could prevent another Cuba (Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 139).

32. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 292–293; Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, 30.

33. Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 143–145, 177, 181; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 465–466, 474. Invaluable insight into Johnson's views during the Dominican crisis can be found in the tapes of his telephone conversations. See *Lyndon Baines Johnson Library Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings: Transcripts and Sound Recordings of Telephone Conversations—White House Series* (Austin, TX: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, 1996–). Many of the recorded conversations are reproduced in Michael Beschloss, *Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes, 1964–1965* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).

34. See, e.g., Theodore Draper, *The Dominican Revolt: A Case Study in American Policy* (New York: Commentary, 1968); Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention*; Alan McPherson, "Misled by Himself: What the Johnson Tapes Reveal about the Dominican Intervention of 1965," *Latin American Research Review* 38, no. 2 (2003), 127–146.

35. Felten, "The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic," 129, 175–176, 235; *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 32: 109–111; Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 5, 8. Even ambassador Bennett admitted, on 9 May, that the embassy did not have enough evidence to prove "in court" that communists actually controlled the rebel movement (Tad Szulc, *Dominican Diary* [New York: Delacorte, 1965], 170).

36. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 43; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 631; Smith, *Last Days of the Monroe Doctrine*, 128. Ambassador Bennett referred to the Castro analogy in a 30 April television interview: "I don't think it's so important the actual number [of communists on the rebel side] when one recalls that Fidel Castro first took to the hills with only twelve men. I think it's a question of training, of determined objectives and of being able to influence others who, for very legitimate motives, may be in the fight" (quoted in Draper, *The Dominican Revolt*, 160). Secretary of State Rusk's analogies extended farther back in time. On 26 May, he stated that he was "not impressed by the remark that there were [only] seven or a dozen known Communist leaders and that therefore this was not a very serious matter. There was a time when Hitler sat in a beer hall in Munich with seven people. And I don't believe that one underestimates what can be done in chaos, in a situation of violence and chaos, by a few highly organized, highly trained people who know what they are about and know what they want to bring about" (quoted in *ibid.*, 160).

37. Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World*, 253–254 (emphasis in original).

38. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 293, 413n18; Dallek, *Flamed Giant*, 265–266; VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 133; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 661.

39. *FRUS, 1964–1968*, 32: 101; Beschloss, *Reaching for Glory*, 300–301; McPherson, “Misled by Himself,” 137.

40. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 173–174.

41. Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 19.

42. Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 739. Martin admitted that his interpretation of the president’s motives was a “guess.” Experience had convinced him, however, that “the makers of foreign policy must take into account domestic public opinion, that is, domestic politics” (*ibid.*).

43. Ball, quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 210.

44. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” iv, 34, 132, 173, 231; Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, chap. 4.

45. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 125–129, 132, 231; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 104–105.

46. Howard J. Wiarda, “The United States and the Dominican Republic: Intervention, Dependency, and Tyrannicide,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 22, no. 2 (May 1980): 247.

47. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” iv, 413.

48. VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, chaps. 4–6; Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, chap. 5.

49. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 330–331.

50. Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 5, 19, 154–155.

51. Wiarda, “The United States and the Dominican Republic,” 253; Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 327; Kai P. Schoenhals and Richard A. Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 92; Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World*, 254; Walter LaFeber, “Latin American Policy,” in *Exploring the Johnson Years*, ed. Robert A. Divine (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 76; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 661. According to Wiarda and Kryzaneck, Johnson in 1965 “was in the midst of preparing for the massive buildup of U.S. forces in Viet Nam. His intervention in Santo Domingo was meant to send a message to the North Vietnamese of U.S. strength and a willingness to use it.” See Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J. Kryzaneck, *The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), 44.

52. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 152. In March 1965, national security adviser McGeorge Bundy had informed Johnson that the “cardinal” objective of U.S. policy in Vietnam was “not to be a Paper Tiger.” Quoted in VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 101. “The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam,” Bundy advised the president (*ibid.*, 66). That same month, a Defense Department study concluded that the predominant U.S. goal in Vietnam was “To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as guarantor) [of South Vietnam’s security].” It was “essential,” the Defense Department study continued, that the United States be seen as having “kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the US will behave in future cases of particular interest to those nations—regarding US policy, power, resolve and competence to deal with

their problems” (*The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Deceptionmaking on Vietnam* [Boston: Beacon, 1971], 3: 695, 700).

53. I. Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, 100, 244–246; VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 47, 60, 96–97, 106, 213. National security adviser McGeorge Bundy had played heavily on Johnson’s political fears in lobbying for a major U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Arguing in February 1965 for a U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam, Bundy advised Johnson that even if the bombing failed, “the policy will be worth it. . . . At a minimum, it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own” (*ibid.*, 67; emphasis added). The following month, Bundy advocated the deployment of U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam, asking Johnson, “In terms of domestic politics, which is better: to ‘lose’ now or to ‘lose’ after committing 100,000 men? Tentative answer: the latter”—because, according to Bundy’s reasoning, “if we visibly do enough in the South, any failure will be, in that moment, beyond our control” (quoted in *ibid.*, 101, and in Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, 255).

54. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 324.

55. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 330.

56. Johnson, *Vantage Point*, 187.

57. Quoted in Dallek, *Flawed Giant*, 100.

58. Beschloss, ed., *Taking Charge*, 401–402.

59. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 178, 230–232.

60. VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 133–134; Gardner, *Pay Any Price*, 209, 211–212.

61. VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire*, 132, 134. VanDeMark drew the quote “sheared away the left wing of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society consensus” from Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power* (New York: New American Library, 1966), 511.

62. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 131, 173, 182, 232–233, 301–302.

Chapter Five. Chile, 1970

1. Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Pocket, 1979), 294.

2. Paul E. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964–1976* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 131, 147; Robert J. Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1978), 137–143.

3. Sigmund, *Overthrow of Allende*, 24; Mark Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–1989: A Critical History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989), 44.

4. Sigmund, *Overthrow of Allende*, 88–89; Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–1989*, 26–30; Julio Frände, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 165, 167–169, 171, 191–192, 194–195; Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile*, 133–137.

5. Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–1989*, 31; Robert Moss, *Chile’s Marxist Experiment* (Newton Abbot, UK: David & Charles, 1973), 49; Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile*, 164–171, 196–197; Paul E. Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 33; Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, 140. Also see the revealing assessment of former Allende supporter Roberto Ampuero,