

rollback of communism in the United States' Central American sphere of influence was a "safe" intervention in the sense that it was unlikely to provoke a Soviet military response that might trigger a general war. If carried out covertly, utilizing Central American proxies, a U.S. intervention would also enable Eisenhower to "plausibly deny" U.S. involvement, shielding the administration from outraged protests by its Latin American allies (Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, 220; Scott, "Dismantling the Good Neighbor," 5, 12–13, 28).

67. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1091–1093; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 363–364.
68. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 280, 295–304; Cullather, *Secret History*, 80–82; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 156, 158.
69. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 179; Scott, "Covert Operations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," 132–133; John Foster Dulles, "International Communism in Guatemala," *Department of State Bulletin* 31, no. 785 (12 July 1954): 43–45.
70. Blasier, *Hoovering Giant*, 229; Scott, "Dismantling the Good Neighbor," 29–30.
71. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 152–153; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 303; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1954 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 731, 780, 981, 989, 998, 1004; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1955 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959), 191–192; Scott, "Dismantling the Good Neighbor," 31; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 196; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 4.
72. Scott, "Covert Operations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," 134–135; Richard Harkness and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of the CIA," *Saturday Evening Post*, 30 October–13 November 1954; Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 124. Meanwhile, at lower echelons of the CIA, the intelligence officers who carried out the intervention were basking in the confident assurance "that their careers would take off." "After Guatemala," the wife of one CIA operative recalled, "it was, 'You can have any job you want! You can own the world!'" (Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 126).

Chapter Two. Cuba, 1961

1. Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 106; Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 272, 289, 306, 310; Richard E. Welch Jr., *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959–1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 87, 91; Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 308; Peter Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New York: Free Press, 1998), 38, 55; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 236, 241–242; W. W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 210–211. Casualty figures from Thomas G. Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Fidel Castro," in *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 132. Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles described Kennedy as "quite shattered" in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. Robert Dallek, *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963* (Boston: Little, Brown, 2003), 367.
2. Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 87–88; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy*, 1961 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 304–

306; Michael R. Bessloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1961* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 129; Lloyd C. Gardner, *Play Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 44. As Richard J. Walton noted, Kennedy's denial of U.S. military involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion was "quite an extraordinary statement. Not only was the invasion planned by the United States, but the United States recruited, paid, and trained the exile force. . . . The exiles used American military equipment. They were trained by American military men. . . . The warplanes were American, flown by Americans. The frogmen who were the first on the beach were American. American ships carried the invaders, and American naval units accompanied them. Americans were killed in the operation. To claim that America did not intervene was to lie and be caught in the lie" (*Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy*) [New York: Viking, 1972], 49–50).

3. Louis A. Pérez Jr., *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 295–303; Marifeli Pérez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 27–31; James O'Connor, *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), 58.

4. Louis A. Pérez Jr., *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 218–225; Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 35, 41–43; Morris H. Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 51; Sebastian Balfour, *Castro*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1995), 8.

5. Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 113–117, 138–139, 152–159; Whitney Perkins, *Constraint of Empire: The United States and Caribbean Interventions* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1981), chap. 1; Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, chap. 3; Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution*, chap. 2; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*), 1958–1960, vol. 6: *Cuba* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 190; Balfour, *Castro*, 9.

6. Castro, quoted in Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: Avon, 1986), 164, 240.

7. Mario Llerena, *The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 60–61. Also see Marta Harnecker, *Fidel Castro's Political Strategy: From Moncada to Victory* (New York: Pathfinder, 1987), 24–25.

8. Fidel Castro speeches, Havana, 23 March 1959 and 15 December 1959, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, available through the *Castro Speech Data Base: Speeches, Interviews, Articles*, Latin American Network Information Center, <http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html>; J. P. Morray, *The Second Revolution in Cuba* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), 31.

9. Szulc, *Fidel*, 38, 145–146, 166, 173–176, 355; Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdes, eds., *Selected Works of Fidel Castro*, vol. 1: *Revolutionary Struggle, 1947–1958* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972), 272; Balfour, *Castro*, 64; Carlos Franqui, *Diary of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1980), 338.

10. Jules R. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in the Age of National Liberation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 215; Fidel Castro speech, Havana, 17 January 1959, *Castro Speech Data Base*; Robert E. Quirk, *Fidel Castro* (New York: Norton, 1993), 224; Hugh Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 294, 296; *New York Times*, 16 January 1959, 1, and 21 February 1959, 8; Morray, *Second Revolution in Cuba*, 30.

11. Morray, *Second Revolution in Cuba*, 31; Fidel Castro speech, Havana, 21 January 1959, *Castro Speech Data Base*; *New York Times*, 22 January 1959, 1, and 21 February 1959, 8.
12. Boris Goldenberg, *The Cuban Revolution and Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 179; *New York Times*, 21 February 1959, 8, and 23 March 1959, 1; Fidel Castro speeches, Caracas, 25 January 1959, and Havana, 1 March 1959, *Castro Speech Data Base*; Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 26–27.
13. Fidel Castro speech, Havana, 21 January 1959, *Castro Speech Data Base*; Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, 170–171; Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, 308; Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967), 48n36. “At the beginning of the first revolutionary government,” Castro’s first treasury minister writes, “Castro believed that the U.S. would eventually invade Cuba. Most of his moves were made with this idea in mind. . . . He had a psychopathic suspicion of everything American.” Rufo López-Fresquet, *My Fourteen Months with Castro* (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1966), 164–165. Also see Philip W. Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 67.
14. Szulc, *Fidel*, 364; Wayne S. Smith, “Castro’s Cuba: Soviet Partner or Nonaligned?” Latin American Program working paper (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1984), 6, 9. During his January 1959 trip to Venezuela, Castro proclaimed that his “dream” was to see Latin America “entirely united in a single force.” He hoped, he said, “to sow the seeds of unity in the countries of Latin America in defense of their common interests,” and he envisioned the day when Latin Americans would be united by a common market and a common passport, a day when “the U.S. will have to adapt itself to Latin American politics [and] will not always be defending the interests of monopolies” or helping to “install and maintain Latin American dictators” (Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, 304, 307–308; Fidel Castro speech, Caracas, 25 January 1959, *Castro Speech Data Base*).
15. Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 11; Smith, “Castro’s Cuba,” 7; Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, 450; Bonsal, *Cuba, and the United States*, 66, 76.
16. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, 18, 32; Szulc, *Fidel*, 512–513, 531, 536–539; Balfour, *Castro*, 65, 68; Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 26–27; *New York Times*, 18 April 1959, 1, and 20 April 1959, 1; Jeffrey J. Safford, “The Nixon-Castro Meeting of 19 April 1959,” *Diplomatic History* 4, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 425–431; Thomas, *Cuban Revolution*, 431; López-Fresquet, *My Fourteen Months with Castro*, 114.
17. Pérez, *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*, 320; Pérez-Stable, *Cuban Revolution*, 64; Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, 181; Szulc, *Fidel*, 543–545; Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 240; Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution*, 83. In Castro’s words, the May 1959 agrarian reform “truly established a rupture between the Revolution and the richest and most privileged sectors of the country, and a rupture with the United States [and] transnational corporations” (quoted in Szulc, *Fidel*, 543).
18. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: *Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: Norton, 1997), 21–22; Szulc, *Fidel*, 523–525; Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, 435.
19. Balfour, *Castro*, 55–56, 65; Szulc, *Fidel*, 214, 230–231, 264, 360–361, 363, 512–514; Smith, “Castro’s Cuba,” 3.
20. I am indebted to Professor Carlos Alzugaray, a Cuban diplomat and scholar at the Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales in Havana, for defining the ideological

and geopolitical views of the 26th of July Movement’s moderate and radical factions. See Alzugaray’s July–August 1998 Internet dialogue with U.S. subscribers to H-DIPLO, the H-NET List for Diplomatic History (h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu), especially his postings of 25 July, 26 July, and 28 July, at the H-NET archives, which can be accessed through the H-DIPLO subscription page at <http://www.lsoft.com/scripts/wl.exe?SL1=H-DIPLO&H=H-NET;MSUEDU>.

21. Jacques Levesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategic Perspectives, 1959–1977* (New York: Praeger, 1978), xix; López-Fresquet, *My Fourteen Months with Castro*, 163; Balfour, *Castro*, 54–55, 65–66; Szulc, *Fidel*, 311, 465, 518–522; Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, 220–221.
22. Szulc, *Fidel*, 63, 513, 524, 544, 554–558, 575; Balfour, *Castro*, 66–67; Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” 21–22, 31; Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, 473; Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 274–275.
23. Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 162; López-Fresquet, *My Fourteen Months with Castro*, 148, 163; Smith, “Castro’s Cuba,” 9–11; Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” 11–12, 20–29, 36, 38.
24. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, 16, 21–22; Nicola Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959–1987* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 73; Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism*, 84–85; Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” 38–39. “By the end of 1959,” Szulc writes, “Castro had the Russians pretty much where he wanted them—as an antidote to the Americans” (*Fidel*, 559). In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev acknowledged that it was the Cubans who initiated proposals for collaboration with the USSR. See *Khrushchev Remembers*, ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 489, 491.
25. *FRUS, 1958–1960*, 6: 190–191, 264, 302–307, 732; *Operation ZAPATA: The ‘Ultrasensitive’ Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981), 55–56; Levesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, xx; Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution*, 63–64; Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, 225 and chaps. 17–19.
26. *FRUS, 1958–1960*, 6: 1000–1001.
27. *Ibid.*, 635–639, 651–652, 656–658, 732–733, 733n6, 742–743, 850–851, 861–863, 955; David J. Ulbrich, “Research Note: ‘A Program for Covert Action against the Castro Regime, 16 March 1960,’” *Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations* 33, no. 3 (September 2002): 1–19; Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 24.
28. Paterson, *Containing Castro*, 183–187; *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. 5: *American Republics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 393, 412; *FRUS, 1958–1960*, 6: 187, 190, 459, 506, 636.
29. Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution*, 400n114; *FRUS, 1958–1960*, 6: 305, 331, 653, 870–871; Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, 221; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, vol. 11, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, 125; Bonsal, *Castro, Cuba, and the United States*, 40; Safford, “The Nixon-Castro Meeting of 19 April 1959,” 431; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean: Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws* (pt. 3), 86th Cong., 1st sess., 5 November 1959, 162–164.
30. *FRUS, 1958–1960*, 6: 513–516, 539–542, 552, 605–611, 1001.
31. Alzugaray, H-DIPLO posting, 22 July 1998; *FRUS, 1958–1960*, 6: 742–743, 1000–1001; *FRUS, 1958–1960*, 5: 429.

32. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 539-542, 552-553, 732; Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 240; Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution*, 99-102, 127.
33. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 519, 722; Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 92-96, 131.
34. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1963), 420; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 64-65; *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 5: 429.
35. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, 181; Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution*, 84; *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 5: 398.
36. CIA, "Sino-Soviet Activity in Latin America," intelligence précis, 14 March 1960, Annex A of National Security Council, "Operations Coordinating Board Report on U.S. Policy toward Latin America," NSC 5902/1, 6 April 1960, 11, in *Documents of the National Security Council—Second Supplement* (Washington, DC: University Publications of America, 1983), microfilm, reel 2, frame 848.
37. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 5: 91-92 (emphasis added).
38. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 455, 460, 482, 636, 760, 1001; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1965), 522; Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, 256; Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 35.
39. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 5: 372, 383-384; *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 502, 542, 562, 636, 742, 760. It was during June-July 1959—at the height of U.S. concern over the Cuban agrarian-reform program—that U.S. officials began to seriously contemplate Castro's overthrow. Nevertheless, discussion of Cuban matters in National Security Council meetings of 25 June and 9 July focused almost entirely on the issue of Cuban support for revolutionary activity in the Caribbean; the expropriation of U.S. investments was scarcely mentioned. See *ibid.*, 541-555. For a detailed U.S. intelligence analysis of Castro's efforts to promote revolution in neighboring countries, see Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Castro's Revolution and Subversive Plotting in the Western Hemisphere (February-April 1959)," Intelligence Report no. 7956.1, 18 May 1959, in *OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports: Latin America, 1941-1961*, ed. Paul Kesaris (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1979), microfilm, reel 8, frame 0427.
40. Speech by Raúl Roa, in *Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly*, Fourteenth Session, 806th Plenary Meeting, 24 September 1959 (New York: United Nations, 1959), 145-146; *New York Times*, 20 December 1959, 19; Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, 97; *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 740-741, 765, 926. Also see Smith, "Castro's Cuba," 7-9. U.S. officials had been expressing concern over Castro's "Nasserist-like ambition" and the danger that the Cuban leader would go off "on a Nasserist or neutralist tangent" after the early weeks of 1959. See, e.g., *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 387, 405.
41. Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, 104, 108, 133-135; *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 628, 639, 642, 823-825; *New York Times*, 27 October 1959, 1; Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 269-270, 301-302; Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution*, 468; Castro speeches, Havana, 27 October 1959 and 7 March 1960, *Castro Speech Data Base*.
42. "Communist Influence in Cuba," Special National Intelligence Estimate no. 85-60, 22 March 1960, 1, in *Declassified Documents Reference System* (Washington, DC: Carrollton, 1984), microfiche no. 1513; CIA, "Sino-Soviet Activity in Latin America," intelligence précis, 14 March 1960; Zachary Karabell, *Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946-1962* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 183.

43. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 154; H. W. Brands, *The Spectre of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 305; *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 858.
44. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 830 (emphasis added).
45. Despatch no. 789, Bonsal to Department of State, 27 November 1959, decimal file 611.37/11-2759, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD.
46. Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 291-292; Chester J. Pach and Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 170-171; Robert A. Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952-1960* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), 184-185, 187-188.
47. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 656-658 (emphasis added).
48. *Ibid.*, 519, 605-610, 831 (emphasis added).
49. Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 105-107; Pamela K. Starr and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1958-1960," *Pep Case Studies in International Affairs*, no. 328 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1988), 33.
50. Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 60, 110-112; Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, 134; *National Review*, 13 February 1960, 95, and 23 April 1960, 253-254.
51. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 58, 97-98; Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 12; *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 90; Lee Riley Powell, *J. William Fulbright and His Time: A Political Biography* (Memphis, TN: Guild Bindery Press, 1996), 71-72; Eugene Brown, *J. William Fulbright: Advice and Dissent* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985), 34-35; *New York Times*, 9 September 1959, 11.
52. Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 112-113.
53. *Ibid.*, 48; Richard M. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro and John F. Kennedy: Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy," *Reader's Digest*, November 1964, 288; Trumbull Higgins, *The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs* (New York: Norton, 1989), 44.
54. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 705; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 128.
55. Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), 352.
56. Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 349; U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, *Freedom of Communications*, pt. 1, *The Speeches, Remarks, Press Conferences, and Statements of Senator John F. Kennedy, August 1 through November 7, 1960*, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, S. Rept. 994, 510; Kent M. Beck, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths: Cuba in the 1960 Campaign," *Diplomatic History* 8, no. 1 (Winter 1984): 45; Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, 171; James N. Giglio, *The Presidency of John F. Kennedy*, 2nd rev. ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 51; Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections*, 235.
57. Melvin Small, *Democracy & Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 105; U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, *Freedom of Communications*, pt. 1, 515; Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, 172-173; Beck, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths," 46.
58. Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, 174; Beck, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths," 38, 40-42, 47.
59. Beck, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths," 40; Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 29-30.
60. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6: 1089; Beck, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths," 40; Wyden,

Bay of Pigs, 30, 66. According to Wyden, Nixon's press secretary, Herbert Klein, "had been briefed by the Vice President about the Cuban operation" and was hopeful that Castro would be overthrown in October. Klein "was deeply involved in the difficult presidential campaign" and knew that "[a] successful Cuba operation would have been 'a major plus,' indeed 'a real trump card.' He knew that Nixon kept urging Eisenhower on. He worried that no move might come until November. If it had to be November, he would have been grateful if it were to be November 1 rather than closer to the election on the eighth" (8).

61. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913–1962* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 590–591; Beck, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths," 49n35; Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, 170–171.

62. Beck, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths," 50; Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 349. Nixon strongly suspected that his Democratic rival had been briefed on the CIA's secret preparations for a Cuban intervention by agency director Allen Dulles and that Kennedy was deliberately using that knowledge to gain political advantage in the campaign. By advocating a militant interventionist policy, knowing all the while that Nixon would need to protect the secrecy of the planned intervention, Kennedy would attract the support of voters who favored strong action against Castro. As Nixon later wrote, "I thought that Kennedy, with full knowledge of the facts, was jeopardizing the security of a United States foreign policy operation. And my rage was greater because I could do nothing about it. I was faced with what was probably the most difficult decision of the campaign. Kennedy had me at a terrible disadvantage. He knew, as I did, that public sentiment in the United States was overwhelmingly in favor of a tougher line against Castro. I had long favored and fought for this line within the Administration, and the covert training of Cuban exiles as well as the new overt quarantine policy were programs due, in substantial part at least, to my efforts. Kennedy was now publicly advocating what was already the policy of the American government—covertly—and Kennedy had been so informed. But by stating such a position publicly, he obviously stood to gain the support of all those who wanted a stronger policy against Castro but who, of course, could not know of our covert programs already under way. What could I do? One course would be simply to state that what Kennedy was advocating as a new policy was already being done, had been adopted as a policy as a result of my direct support, and that Kennedy was endangering the security of the whole operation in his public statement. But this would be, for me, an utterly irresponsible act: it would disclose a secret operation and completely destroy its effectiveness. There was only one thing I could do. The covert operation had to be protected at all costs. I must not even suggest by implication that the United States was rendering aid to rebel forces in and out of Cuba. In fact, I must go to the other extreme: I must attack the Kennedy proposal to provide such aid as wrong and irresponsible because it would violate our treaty commitments" (Nixon, *Six Crises*, 354–355). In the end, Nixon concluded, "The position I had to take on Cuba hurt rather than helped me. . . . The general 'image' to the end of the campaign was to be one of Kennedy stronger and tougher than I against Castro and Communism" (*ibid.*, 356–357). For additional evidence supporting Nixon's contention that Kennedy learned about the planned intervention during the campaign and used it for political gain, see Seymour Hersh, *The Dark Side of Camelot* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997), chap. 12; Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 28–30n; and the reminiscences of John Patterson, Democratic governor of Alabama in 1960, in Deborah Hart Strober and Gerald S. Strober, comps., *The Kennedy Presidency: An Oral History of the Era*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2003), 325–327.

63. Beck, "Necessary Lies, Hidden Truths," 57; Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 351. As the campaign neared its end, Castro worried that political considerations might prompt Eisenhower

to invade Cuba. According to the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Castro told Cuban army cadets in a 29 October 1960 graduation address "that since Cuba had become a matter of contention in [the] U.S. presidential campaign, there was danger [that the] present administration would attack Cuba to satisfy interests which support it and to outdo [the] other political party" (*FRUS, 1958–1960*, 6: 1112). During the campaign's final two weeks, Kennedy's staff was also worried that Eisenhower would provoke a Cuban crisis in order to boost Nixon's campaign (Hersh, *The Dark Side of Camelot*, 182).

64. Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 350; Dallek, *An Unfinished Life*, 356. Nixon later wrote that "most observers agree that our positions on the Cuban issue could well have been the decisive factor" in the election and that the appearance of being "softer" on Cuba than Kennedy cost him the presidency (Nixon, "Cuba, Castro and John F. Kennedy," 288). See also Fawn M. Brodie, *Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character* (New York: Norton, 1981), 412. According to Gleijeses, Kennedy's "inflammatory language" during the campaign "came back to haunt him" as president. "It limited his options by raising the political cost of scuttling the operation once he was in office" (Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 27, no. 1 [February 1995]: 25). During the campaign, former secretary of state Dean Acheson warned Kennedy that his campaign rhetoric was locking him into an untenable position on Cuba (Higgins, *The Perfect Failure*, 60). The political pressures on President Kennedy to approve the Bay of Pigs invasion are discussed more fully below.

65. Karabell, *Architects of Intervention*, 174, 195–197; Bonsal, quoted in Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 248. Alfredo Durán, a member of the exile brigade that landed at the Bay of Pigs, offers additional evidence that the Cuban exiles were consciously manipulating U.S. policy for their own purposes. According to Durán, "The Cuban government and some others have said that we worked for the CIA—that the CIA used us. I think that the feeling among the people in the brigade was that we were using the CIA, not the CIA using us." See James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 71.

66. Karabell, *Architects of Intervention*, 195; Dallek, *An Unfinished Life*, 361.

67. Karabell, *Architects of Intervention*, 173.

68. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, 195; Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 242–243; Szulc, *Fidel*, 562, 571–572; Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, 145–153, 158–161, 165–166.

69. Theodore Draper, *Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities* (New York: Praeger, 1962), 81; Szulc, *Fidel*, 577, 586–587.

70. Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," 42, 52–55, 60–61, 71; Szulc, *Fidel*, 573, 582–583, 595; Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 332.

71. *FRUS, 1958–1960*, 6: 962, 1124–1125; Bohlen, quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," 52. Mann statement, in *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. 10: *Cuba, 1961–1962* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 97. In February 1961, Bohlen also "assured Kennedy that Khrushchev would not go to war over as strategically unimportant an area as Cuba" (Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 90).

72. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 57; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "The Situation in Cuba," Intelligence Report no. 8385, 27 December 1960, 4, in Kesaris, ed., *OSS/State Department Intelligence*, microfilm, reel 8, frame 0464; U.S. Department of State, "Cuba," Department of State Publication no. 7171, Inter-American Series 66, April 1961, 33; *FRUS, 1958–1960*, 6: 1005, 1142, 1174. Two days after Kennedy's inauguration, CIA director Dulles warned the new administration's top national-security

advisers that “the Castro regime had plans to export Castro’s communism” and that “they already have power among the people in the Caribbean countries and elsewhere, particularly in Venezuela and Colombia” (*FRUS, 1961–1963*, 10: 50). Three days later, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer personally warned Kennedy that Castro was “sending agents and arms into other countries of Latin America” (*ibid.*, 54). A 17 February 1961 CIA study concluded that “Cuba will, of course, never present a direct military threat to the United States and it is unlikely that Cuba would attempt open invasion of any other Latin American country since the U.S. could and almost certainly would enter the conflict on the side of the invaded country. Nevertheless, as Castro further stabilizes his regime, obtains more sophisticated weapons, and further trains the militia, Cuba will provide an effective and solidly defended base for Soviet operations and expansion of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Arms, money, organizational and other support can be provided from Cuba to dissident leaders and groups throughout Latin America in order to create political instability, encourage Communism, weaken the prestige of the U.S., and foster the inevitable popular support that Castro’s continuance of power will engender. A National Estimate states: ‘For the Communist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of incalculable value. More importantly, the advent of Castro has provided the Communists with a friendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout the rest of Latin America and with a highly exploitable example of revolutionary achievement and successful defiance of the United States’” (*ibid.*, 101). In April 1961, Llewellyn Thompson, the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, informed Khrushchev that “what bothered us particularly about Cuba was its use as a base for attempts on overthrow of other Latin American govts” (*ibid.*, 183). “Cuba alone was not regarded as a threat,” President Kennedy told Khrushchev at the June 1961 Vienna summit. “It was Castro’s announced intentions to subvert the hemisphere that could be dangerous” (Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 547).

73. Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 64, 67–68; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961*, 1; I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 52–53; Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 363.

74. Blight and Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion*, 63–64, 271–272; Fursenko and Naftali, “*One Hell of a Gamble*,” 73, 78, 79; Castro, quoted in Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 342; Kennedy, quoted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, *Freedom of Communications*, pt. 1, 434, and *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961*, 564; Paterson, “Fixation with Cuba,” 127. “If Castro can spread his influence throughout all of Latin America,” candidate Kennedy told a St. Paul audience on 2 October 1960, “then the balance of power will begin to move in the direction of the Communist world, and his future and the Communist future is assured” (U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, *Freedom of Communications*, pt. 1, 434).

75. Paterson, “Fixation with Castro,” 126; Gleijeses, “Ships in the Night,” 25–26; O’Donnell, quoted in Dallek, *An Unfinished Life*, 358; Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power*, 214; Walt W. Rostow oral history interview, 59–60, in *The John F. Kennedy Presidential Oral History Collection*, pt. 1, *The White House and Executive Departments* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1988), microfiche no. 161. CIA Deputy Director of Planning Richard Bissell, the principal architect of the Bay of Pigs invasion, later recalled that “there was nothing that the president wanted less than to seem, at the beginning of his term, to be soft in the face of a threat; to be unwilling to use strong measures if they held some promise of success. I’m sure he had visions of being told in the press that he had lost Cuba in the first few weeks of his administration by throwing away a plan to retrieve Cuba

from Castro” (quoted in Strober and Strober, comps., *The Kennedy Presidency*, 335). During a 1996 scholarly conference on the Bay of Pigs invasion, historian James G. Hershberg suggested that “what happened at the Bay of Pigs can be read as deriving mainly from the fear of looking soft on communism. Obviously, for Democrats there was the possibility of this being exacerbated by the fear of attack from the right wing, the fear that they would be accused of not living up to campaign promises—in this case, to unseat Castro.” In reply, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who served as special assistant in the Kennedy White House, agreed that “the fear of sounding soft on communism was a very strong one. A liberal Democrat like Kennedy had to be constantly concerned with this issue” (Blight and Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion*, 62, 65).

76. Quirk, *Fidel Castro*, 359, 362–363; Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 308; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 242; Bundy, quoted in Higgins, *The Perfect Failure*, 88, and in Blight and Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion*, 268; Dallek, *An Unfinished Life*, 357, 359; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 296–297; *Operation ZAPATA*, 18. Wyden writes that on 11 March 1961 “the president agreed it might be best to let the exiles go to the destination of their choice: Cuba. After all, Ike had urged him to go ahead and the retired President was more than a revered general. He and his party commanded powerful political support. If Kennedy cancelled the project, the Cuban exiles would be loudly furious. The Republicans would call him chicken. The political repercussions would be nasty” (Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 100). According to Higgins, “It would have been difficult—even secretly—even Kennedy to repudiate Dulles’ program . . . so soon after the President’s closely contested election victory. In fact, the President-Elect was deeply concerned over both his marginal electoral victory and Republican criticism of him” (Higgins, *The Perfect Failure*, 67–68). Also see Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 160; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 171; Paterson, “Fixation with Cuba,” 132.

77. Blight and Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion*, 64.

78. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 399, 534; Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 77, 79, 80; Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 2; Higgins, *The Perfect Failure*, 112.

79. Gleijeses, “Ships in the Night,” 17, 22, 23; Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 291; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 249–250.

80. Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, 2, 13, 265; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 364–372; Richard Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 169; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 242–243; *FRUS, 1961–1963*, 10: 143; Gleijeses, “Ships in the Night,” 22, 34, 37–39; Blight and Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion*, 2, 65; Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 105, 128, 144; Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 100, 102, 308; Higgins, *The Perfect Failure*, 145, 151; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 297.

81. Wyden’s *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* remains the best narrative account of the invasion. For contrasting White House and CIA perspectives, see Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, chaps. 10–11; and Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, chap. 7.

82. Blight and Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion*, 2–3, 108, 139, 150; Higgins, *The Perfect Failure*, 161, 163–164; Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 310–311; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 309.

83. CIA, “Consequences for the U.S. of the Abortive Rebellion in Cuba: Some Preliminary Thoughts,” 28 April 1961, *Declassified Documents Reference System*, 1976, microfiche 10B; *FRUS, 1961–1963*, 10: 61–63, 327, 329. Europeans were “incredulous . . . that the U.S. Government had been quite so incompetent, irresponsible and stupid,” a White House aide informed Kennedy in early May (Blight and Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion*, 271).

84. Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506* (New York: Norton, 1964), 237; Gardner, *Pay Any Price*, 40; Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 107–108; Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba," 136; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 669, 670. "Barry Goldwater declared that Kennedy's Cuban fiasco should fill every American with 'apprehension and shame'" (Beschloss, *The Crisis Years*, 129).

85. See *Operation ZAPATA*; the CIA inspector general's critical assessment, published in Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified*; and McGeorge Bundy, "Some Preliminary Administrative Lessons of the Cuba Expedition," in Blight and Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion*, 266–269.

Chapter Three. British Guiana, 1963

1. Thomas J. Spinner Jr., *A Political and Social History of Guyana, 1945–1983* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 17–37; Jane L. Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy? The United States and Britain in British Guiana, 1961–1964" (Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1996), 10–26, 71. Also see Cheddi Jagan, *The West on Trial: The Fight for Guyana's Freedom*, rev. ed. (New York: International Publishers, 1972), chaps. 1–6.

2. Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 26–31, 34–35; Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 37–46, 59–60; Jagan, *The West on Trial*, chaps. 6–8.

3. Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 18, 22, 23, 29, 30, 35; Robert Waters and Gordon Daniels, "The World's Longest General Strike: The AFL-CIO, the CIA, and British Guiana," *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 2 (April 2005): 285–286; Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 35; Jagan, *The West on Trial*, 106, 123.

4. Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 25, 45, 48–49; Cary Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940–1964* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994), 169, 174, 197n46; Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 72–74, 80.

5. Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 68; Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 41–42.

6. *New York Times*, 1 September 1957, 24, and 16 September 1957, 11; Jagan, *The West on Trial*, 189–192, 198; Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism*, 179–180; Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 93–95; Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 73–74.

7. Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism*, 181–182; Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 48, 49, 56; Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 76, 82.

8. Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 78, 80; Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism*, 184, 185; Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 81–82.

9. U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, "Communist-Led Party Sweeps British Guiana General Election," Intelligence Report no. 6292, 27 May 1953, 1, 2, 4, 8, in *OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports: Latin America, 1941–1961*, ed. Paul Kesaris (Washington, DC: University Publications of America, 1979), microfilm, reel 9, frame 318; Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism*, 129; Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 32–33; Jagan, *The West on Trial*, 138.

10. Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 47, 49, 56, 68, 70, 73.

11. *Ibid.*, 68, 76; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*), 1961–1963, vol. 12: *American Republics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 519–520. For a useful overview of U.S.–British tensions over British Guiana, see Nigel Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 67–71.

12. *FRUS*, 1961–1963, 12: 521–522; Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 69, 73, 76–77.

13. Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 73–74, 81, 84–86, 88–89, 103–104; *FRUS*, 1961–1963, 12: 524, 530, 533–534.

14. Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 83–84; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 775; Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 110, 116. Stephen G. Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 87. According to Schlesinger, Jagan's refusal "to say anything critical of the Soviet Union" during his *Meet the Press* appearance "left an impression of either wooliness or fellow-traveling. This appearance instantly diminished the enthusiasm for helping his government. The President, who caught the last half of the show, called for a re-examination of all aspects of the problem, saying he wanted no commitments made until he had seen Jagan himself" (Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 775).

15. *FRUS*, 1961–1963, 12: 537; Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 84; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 775–777.

16. *FRUS*, 1961–1963, 12: 537.

17. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 776–777; *FRUS*, 1961–1963, 12: 539; Jagan, *The West on Trial*, 353; Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 111–114; Fowler Hamilton interview, 18 August 1964, 26, in *John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection*, pt. 1: *The White House and Executive Departments* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1988), microfiche no. 80. Following his unsatisfactory meeting with AID's Hamilton, Jagan "demanded another meeting with Kennedy, 'to let him know exactly what he thought about being given the run around in this way'" (Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 113). Kennedy responded with "a personal note . . . regretting his inability to accede to a request . . . for a further meeting" due to "his crowded schedule" (*FRUS*, 1961–1963, 12: 539).

18. *FRUS*, 1961–1963, 12: 542, 544–545 (emphasis added); Fowler Hamilton interview, *John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection*, 26; Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 126, 155, 158.

19. Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 163–164; letter, Thomas J. Dodd to President Kennedy, 17 May 1962, President's Office Files, Countries: British Guiana, Security, 1961–1963, box 112A, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.

20. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 778–779; telegram, U.S. State Department to U.S. embassy, London, and U.S. consulate, Georgetown, British Guiana, 11 August 1961, in *John F. Kennedy National Security Files: Latin America, 1961–1963*, ed. George C. Herring (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1987), microfilm, reel 3, frame 0834; Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 164; *FRUS*, 1961–1963, 12: 572–573. Also see Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana*, 99–100. In 1959, the British governor of British Guiana described Burnham as "cynical, superficial, unreliable, prejudiced and irrational" (quoted in Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 50).

21. Sillery, "Salvaging Democracy?" 133, 141, 184; Philip Reno, *The Ordeal of British Guiana* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964), 52; Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana*, 78, 91; Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1969), 394, 398, 402; telegram, U.S. State Department to U.S. consulate, Georgetown, British Guiana, and U.S. embassy, London, 10 September 1961, in Herring, ed., *John F. Kennedy National Security Files*, microfilm, reel 3, frame 940. In addition, Peter D'Aguiar, a conservative Guianese businessman and leader of the right-wing United Front party, was warning administration officials that Jagan would deliver British Guiana "lock, stock, and barrel to the Communist camp." Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana*, 83.