

regional organization's subsequent formal request for U.S. military intervention played a key role in Reagan's decision to act. The Panamanian opposition's anti-Noriega media campaign and lobbying efforts in the United States were instrumental in creating the climate of opinion in U.S. domestic politics that led the Reagan and Bush administrations down a path toward eventual intervention.

In two of the interventions, in fact, the roles played by local elites appear to have been not only influential but decisive. According to Henry Kissinger and former CIA director Richard Helms, Nixon's decision to intervene in Chile was directly triggered by the alarming reports that he had received hours earlier from Chilean millionaire Agustín Edwards. And in the Panamanian case, George Bush eventually found himself compelled to intervene because of political pressures emanating from the anti-Noriega environment in the United States that the dictator's Panamanian opponents had played a central role in fostering.

Throughout the Cold War, Latin American radicals routinely blamed their nations' plights on a "symbiotic alliance" composed of foreign "imperialism" and domestic "reaction." That hypothesis could perhaps be stretched to fit some cases of U.S. interventionism—Guatemala, Chile, Nicaragua, possibly the Dominican Republic—but not others. In the Bay of Pigs invasion, the United States' Cuban collaborators were not reactionary oligarchs but anti-Batista middle-class elements and disillusioned former members of Castro's 26th of July Movement. In British Guiana, Washington's favored alternative to Cheddi Jagan was Forbes Burnham, a socialist and former member of Jagan's People's Progressive Party. The Panamanian opposition essentially represented the interests of their nation's urban middle classes. Even in Guatemala, Castillo Armas, the instrument of U.S. intervention, was the protégé of a military hero of the 1944 revolution (Francisco Arana) and had served as an officer in Juan José Arévalo's army.<sup>21</sup> But nevertheless, whatever the political or class background of the specific local partner, the record clearly indicates that Latin American or Caribbean actors were, in every case, important "architects" of U.S. intervention.<sup>22</sup>

In 1954, David Atlee Phillips overcame his personal moral qualms and participated in the Eisenhower administration's Guatemalan intervention in the belief that he was helping to protect the national security of the United States. What he did not know—and what the thousands of other U.S. intelligence operatives and military personnel who carried out their presidents' Cold War hemispheric interventions did not know—was that the policy decisions that committed them to action had been shaped predominantly by factors of image, prestige, political self-interest, and foreign manipulation.

### Preface

1. David Atlee Phillips, *The Night Watch* (New York: Ballantine, 1982), 37, 42–43, 45.
2. *Ibid.*, 66–67.
3. The reference is to Geir Lundestad's article "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952," *Journal of Peace Research* 23, no. 3 (1986), 263–277 in which he argues that the growth of the U.S. economic and military presence in Western Europe following World War II was in substantial part at the invitation of Western European governments.

### Chapter One. Guatemala, 1954

1. Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 60; Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 216; Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men—Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 122–124.
2. The following brief overview of the intervention's operational aspects is drawn from four basic sources: Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*; Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
3. CIA memorandum to Eisenhower, quoted in Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 161 (emphasis in original).
4. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 246–247, 304–305, 307, 335; Cullather, *Secret History*, 68, 96–97. On 15 June 1954, the CIA station chief in Guatemala informed a high-ranking Guatemalan army officer that the time had come to "get moving and take over the Army," warning that this was "the last opportunity for the Army to salvage its honor and even its existence" (*ibid.*, 84).
5. Several authors have argued that U.S. economic self-interest was the primary motivation for the 1954 intervention. In *Bitter Fruit*, Schlesinger and Kinzer write that Arbenz's "takeover of United Fruit land was probably the decisive factor pushing the Americans into action" (106). According to Jonas, "The U.S. could not tolerate the Guatemalan Revolution essentially because a nationalistic independent capitalism directly threatened existing U.S. interests there and called into question the feasibility of maintaining the area as a 'safe' preserve for future investments" (Suzanne Jonas, "Guatemala: Land of Eternal Struggle," in *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond*, ed. Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein [New York: Wiley, 1974], 165). Also see José M. Aybar de Soto, *Dependency and Intervention: The Case of Guatemala in 1954* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978). Immerman, on the other hand, concludes that "the Eisenhower admin-



istration approved the CIA operation because all concerned officials believed that Communists dominated Guatemala's government and leading institutions. . . . The United States did not ultimately intervene in Guatemala to protect United Fruit. It intervened to halt what it believed to be the spread of the international Communist conspiracy" (*CIA in Guatemala*, 68, 82). Gleijeses offers a more holistic explanation: that "a complex interplay of imperial hubris, security concerns, and economic interests" produced the U.S. intervention (*Shattered Hope*, 7).

6. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 3.

7. Mario Rosenthal, *Guatemala: The Story of an Emerging Latin American Democracy* (New York: Twayne, 1962), 235-237; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, chaps. 1-2; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, chaps. 2-3; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, chap. 3; Jonas, "Guatemala: Land of Eternal Struggle," 150-153.

8. For valuable interpretive overviews of Latin American political trends in the 1940s, see Fredrick Pike, *Spanish America, 1900-1970: Tradition and Social Innovation* (New York: Norton, 1973); and James Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern," in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, ed. James Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).

9. Thomas Melville and Marjorie Melville, *Guatemala—Another Vietnam?* (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1971), 70-71; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 19-22, 86-93; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 68-75, 79, 82-83; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 65-71, 75; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*), 1952-1954, vol. 4: *The American Republics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 1060. On UFCO's pre-1944 role in Guatemala, see Paul Dosal, *Doing Business with the Dictators: A Political History of United Fruit in Guatemala, 1899-1944* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1993).

10. Juan José Arévalo, *Escritos políticos y discursos* (Havana: Cultural, 1953), 115, 165-166, 310, 395 (my translations).

11. Jonas, "Guatemala: Land of Eternal Struggle," 153. According to Jonas, "The Arévalo government made no attempt to facilitate rural unionization, and on some occasions obstructed it" (*ibid.*).

12. *Ibid.*, 154; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 75-79; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 93, 103.

13. Jonas, "Guatemala: Land of Eternal Struggle," 154, 160; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 107-115, 118-119; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 97.

14. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 37; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 23-24, 86, 117, 121-122; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 26, 30, 34. In July 1950, Arévalo told U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller that Guatemala's "destiny" was "of geographic necessity economically and politically tied to the United States and the Western Hemisphere" (*FRUS*, 1950, vol. 2: *United Nations; Western Hemisphere* [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976], 907).

15. U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, "Guatemala: Communist Influence," Intelligence Report no. 5123, 23 October 1950, 48-49, in *OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports: Latin America, 1941-1961*, ed. Paul Kesaris (Washington, DC: University Publications of America, 1979), microfilm, reel 9, frame 0082; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 39, 175.

16. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 40, 42, 175; Ronald M. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954* (New York: Praeger, 1959), 42.

17. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 76-81, 134-143, 147-148.

18. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala*, 193; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 147, 182, 189.

19. *FRUS*, 1952-1954, 4: 1093.

20. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 147-148; Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala*, 80. According to José Manuel Fortuny, "The Guatemalan Labor Party does not propose to fight immediately for a socialist society in Guatemala. It fights now against the backward feudalism and imperialist oppression from which our country suffers, especially the oppression of North American imperialism which plunders our wealth, monopolizes our foreign trade and tries to impose upon us its political dictates and drag us into its warlike adventures. We fight for the economic development of Guatemala along capitalist lines, not because capitalism is 'good,' but because existing national and international conditions suggest that Guatemala take the path of liquidating feudalism and the backward forms of production which obtain today in our country" (quoted in Daniel James, *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude* [New York: Day, 1954], 95).

21. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 149-156; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 63-65; Jonas, "Guatemala: Land of Eternal Struggle," 156-159.

22. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 144-147, 152; Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala*, 80.

23. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 155-156, 164, 194-196; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 65-67, 81. Also see U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, "Agrarian Reform in Guatemala," Intelligence Report no. 6001, 5 March 1953, 5-6, in Kesaris, ed., *OSS/State Department Intelligence*, microfilm, reel 9, frame 0208. Among the landholdings expropriated under the agrarian reform program were 1,700 acres owned by Arbenz and 1,200 belonging to his friend and future foreign minister Guillermo Toriello. See Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 55.

24. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 178-182; U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, "Guatemalan Support of Subversion and Communist Objectives (1950-1953)," Intelligence Report no. 6185, 30 April 1953, 18-19, in Kesaris, ed., *OSS/State Department Intelligence*, microfilm, reel 9, frame 0220.

25. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 141, 178, 180, 184-189.

26. *Ibid.*, 148, 177.

27. *Ibid.*, 94, 99; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 75-78.

28. *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 8: *American Republics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 713.

29. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 93-94, 96, 103; Alex Roberto Hybel, *How Leaders Reason: US Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America* (Oxford, UK, and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 55; Harold A. Scott, "Dismantling the Good Neighbor: Domestic Politics and the Overthrow of the Guatemalan Revolution" (unpublished paper, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs), 20-21; Bryce Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 154.

30. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 9, 12, 48-49, 99, 217-219, 337; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 40, 74; Arévalo radio address, reprinted in Arévalo, *Escritos políticos y discursos*, 406-407. Also see Zachary Karabell, *Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946-1962* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 114. During Arévalo's six-year term as president, "Some 25 to 35 uprisings either occurred or were uncovered in the planning stage." Max Gordon, "A Case History of U.S. Subversion: Guatemala, 1954," in *Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History*, ed. Jonathan Fried, Marvin Gettleman, Deborah Levenson, and Nancy Peckham (New York: Grove, 1983), 53.



31. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 89, 120, 129; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 365; Karabell, *Architects of Intervention*, 122–123. Also see Cullather, *Secret History*, 34. In March 1953, Guatemala's ambassador to the United States told State Department officials that "Guatemala's neighbors were professing alarm over Guatemalan Communism, but in reality their alarm was only that of the wealthy landowners over agrarian reform" (*FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1060). In 1954, Castillo Armas received "generous amounts of cash and arms" from the dictatorships of Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela. See Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," *Diplomatic History* 14, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 76. In preparation for the 1954 invasion, Somoza allowed Castillo Armas and the CIA to set up training bases in Nicaragua, including one on a Somoza-owned plantation. The invasion was launched from staging areas in Honduras, and the governments of Nicaragua and Honduras permitted the CIA to use their territory for radio warfare and aircraft sorties against the Arbenz government. See Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 114–116, 169–170. According to the CIA's internal history of the intervention, "Somoza's support became essential to PBSUCCESS" (Cullather, *Secret History*, 48).
32. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 95–104, 362–363.
33. *Ibid.*, 101–102; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 89; *FRUS*, 1950, 2: 912; "Guatemala," CIA research report, 27 July 1950, 1, in *CIA Research Reports: Latin America, 1946–1976*, ed. Paul Kesaris (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982), microfilm, reel 5, frame 0073.
34. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 76, 80, 102, 142–143, 183, 195; Gutiérrez quoted in U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, "Guatemala: Communist Influence," Intelligence Report no. 5123, 23 October 1950, 102, in Kesaris, ed., *OSS/State Department Intelligence*, Appendix C, microfilm, reel 9, frame 0082. A predecessor to the PGT had been crushed by Ubico in 1932. See Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 8–10.
35. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 99; *FRUS*, 1950, 2: 866. Jonas charges that Patterson "carried his involvement with the opposition beyond cocktail parties to the point of attending clandestine meetings plotting Arévalo's overthrow" ("Guatemala: Land of Eternal Struggle," 160–161). Also see Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 86.
36. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 109–110; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 128–129; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1144.
37. Scott, "Dismantling the Good Neighbor," 15–17; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 129. As Robert F. Woodward, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs in 1953–1954, later recalled: "So far as 'indoctrination' is concerned, there was no deliberate, planned or systematic training in policy for the Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) who were working on Latin American relations. But 'non-intervention' was so much the centerpiece of all relations with Latin America that it loomed like Mount Hood or Mount Rainier on the landscape. It was just there. You took it for granted as being something big and immovable" (quoted in Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 160).
38. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 125–127.
39. *FRUS*, 1951, vol. 2: *United Nations; Western Hemisphere* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 1437; Cullather, *Secret History*, 17, 24, 27. In August 1950, the CIA began recruiting "suitable indigenous Guatemalan personnel" as assets, but as late as December 1953 the agency's Guatemalan station had "no penetrations of the PGT, government agencies, armed forces, or labor unions"—raising questions about the agency's sources of field information (Cullather, *Secret History*, 18, 46).
40. Cullather, *Secret History*, 28–32; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 228–230; Immerman,

*CIA in Guatemala*, 120–121; *FRUS*, 1952–1954: *Guatemala Supplement* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 1, 28–29, 31–32, 34–35. Former CIA director Richard Helms told interviewer Piero Gleijeses in 1989 that "Truman okayed a good many decisions for covert operations that in later years he said he knew nothing about. It's all presidential deniability" (Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 366–367n17).

41. Among the Eisenhower administration officials with personal ties to UFCO were Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, CIA director Allen Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State (and former CIA director) Walter Bedell Smith, Special White House Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, and Eisenhower's personal White House secretary, Ann Whitman. Influential "outsiders" with UFCO connections included World Bank President John J. McCloy and former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Spruille Braden. See Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 106–107; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 124–128.

42. Cullather, *Secret History*, 19, 37; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 191–196. The NSC hypothesized additional repercussions: "Institution of the action would provide a propaganda weapon generally to Communists and leftists in Central America. Moreover, to the degree that it would promote governmental seizure, it would assure the placement of extremists in charge of the former Company properties, and would thus increase the power of elements opposed to the United States in Central America, possibly including Panama, and make uncertain the cooperation of the governments of the area with the United States. Finally, it might contribute to the spread of the Guatemalan example and to the eventual overthrow of four Central American governments now friendly to the United States, which would transform our present security in the Caribbean into a dangerous threat at our backdoor. . . . In Latin America generally, nationalization of the United Fruit Company properties would further stimulate the already serious movement for similar action against U.S. companies, which have properties with an established value of \$5 billion in Latin America, including strategic industries in the fields of mining and petroleum. . . . Action by one branch of the U.S. Government against one private company, as a monopoly, would make most difficult the successful defense of that company's legitimate interests by the Department of State, and weaken very seriously the ability of that Department to oppose the tide of nationalization of other American properties in the entire area and elsewhere. Increased nationalization of U.S. properties would not only deprive the United States and U.S. nationals of a degree of control of strategic resources, but would be contrary to the policy . . . of encouraging Latin American countries to take measures to attract private investment" (*FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 193).

43. Cullather, *Secret History*, 37; Dulles quoted in Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 82; Fortuny quoted in Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 366 (also see 362–363); *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1059.

44. Allen Dulles quoted in Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 31; Cabot quoted in Wood, *Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 161; Milton Eisenhower quoted in Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 268–269, and in Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 133; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1061–1064, 1070, 1083. "The Army," the May NIE noted presciently, "is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation" (*FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1062).

45. John Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 108.

46. *Ibid.*, 26–27; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 82, 232n8; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4:



1095n1, 1106, 1109–1110. CIA officials “assumed the existence of links between the PGT and Moscow.” They believed that “all Communist Parties, acting under the direction of the Soviet Union, followed the same general pattern in seeking to capture free social institutions and democratic governments. Some operate openly and others clandestinely, but all are integral parts of the world wide Communist effort” (Cullather, *Secret History*, 26, 47n27). Eisenhower’s ambassador to Guatemala, John Peurifoy, was more colorful in his assessment: “Communism is directed by the Kremlin all over the world,” he told a congressional committee in 1954, “and anyone who thinks differently doesn’t know what he is talking about” (ibid., 26). After Arbenz’s overthrow, U.S. agents combed through the ousted government’s records but found “nothing conclusive” linking the PGT with the Soviets (Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 57).

47. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1078–1079, 1083–1084.

48. Ibid., 1145–1148; Cullather, *Secret History*, 33; Gaddis Smith, *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994), 85. “Communist penetration in Guatemala was the most striking example of the Kremlin’s strategy in Latin America,” U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy told a congressional committee three months after the 1954 intervention. “Busy with power expansion in Europe and Asia, the Red rulers of Russia have long pushed their conspiracy in Latin America as a diversionary tactic which, while showing no immediate gain of territory under their domination, would at least weaken and harass our defenses” (Peurifoy testimony, U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Communist Aggression, Subcommittee on Latin America, *Hearings on Guatemala*, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 27 September 1954, 116).

49. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, vol. 9: *Western Hemisphere* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 132; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 7, 468; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 30. “If we did not have the Latins with us in the voting processes in the UN,” Eisenhower’s ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, told Vice President Richard Nixon, “the United States would simply have to get out of the United Nations” (*FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. 7: *American Republics: Central and South America* [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987], 615).

50. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1065, 1068, 1074–1075, 1147; Cullather, *Secret History*, 24; U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, “Guatemalan Support for Subversion and Communist Objectives (1950–1953),” Intelligence Report no. 6185, 30 April 1953, 16, in Kesaris, ed., *OSS/State Department Intelligence*, microfilm, reel 9, frame 0220. “The immediate Communist objective,” U.S. ambassador Rudolf Schoenfeld reported in February 1953, was “the neutralizing of Guatemala as a Western nation” (*FRUS*, 1952–1954: *Guatemala Supplement*, 68–69).

51. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1083, 1147–1149.

52. Quoted in Blanche Wiesen Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), 269–270.

53. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 4: 1107.

54. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 124.

55. Ibid., 135.

56. Ibid., 75–80; Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 12–19; Melvin Small, *Democracy & Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 95; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 29; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 234; Stephen G. Rabe, “Dulles, Latin America, and Cold War Anticommunism,” in John Foster

Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 160; Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1910–1985*, rev. ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 229; Cullather, *Secret History*, 32.

57. Scott, “Dismantling the Good Neighbor,” 19.

58. Edward L. Bernays, *Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel Edward L. Bernays* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), 758–762, 767; Cook, *Declassified Eisenhower*, 226; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 111–114, 125; Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 79–89; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 232–234. For a useful overview of Bernays’ Guatemalan campaign, see Larry Tye, *The Father of Spin: Edward L. Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations* (New York: Crown, 1998), 166–182.

59. Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 80–81, 89–90, 94–97; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 126–128.

60. Quoted in *Time* magazine, 11 January 1954, 27.

61. Schlesinger and Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit*, 90–96; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 116; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 90, 129; David McKean, *Tommy the Cork: Washington’s Ultimate Insider from Roosevelt to Reagan* (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth, 2004), 214–216, 219–224; Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 371; Cullather, *Secret History*, 16–18.

62. E. Howard Hunt, *Undercover: Memoirs of an American Secret Agent* (New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1974), 84, 97; Cook, *Declassified Eisenhower*, 227–228.

63. Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 10, 86, 125, 142–143, 148–151, 222; David W. Reinhard, *The Republican Right since 1945* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 100–101, 104–108, 115, 121; Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, 76, 80; Gary W. Reichard, *Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and Eisenhower* (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1988), 91; Chester J. Pach and Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 59–62; Ronald J. Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), 274–275; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 115; *New York Times*, 17 October 1953, 13; Harold A. Scott, “Covert Operations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: U.S. Intervention in Iran and Guatemala” (Ph.D. diss., Carnegie Mellon University, 1999), 66–79, 142. Donovan reports that Eisenhower’s “vexation with the powerful right wing reached such extremes in the summer of 1953 that for a time he gave prolonged thought to the idea of forming a new political party in America” (Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, 142). According to Harold Scott, Eisenhower chose “covert operations in Iran and Guatemala in this political context.” The two interventions “helped the . . . administration ward off charges of appeasement from the Republican right.” The conservative Republicans’ “challenge . . . ranked as the administration’s most pressing domestic concern” during its first two years in office. Eisenhower “needed demonstrable victories against Communism to quiet charges of appeasement. This required taking decisive actions that would play as dramatic victories before home audiences but did not risk increasing American commitments.” Both interventions “achieved domestic political objectives,” Scott concludes (“Covert Operations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” 78, 142).

64. Pach and Richardson, *Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 16–20, 50, 75–82, 88–89; Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, 43, 70–71, 75, 78–79.

65. Cullather, *Secret History*, 35–37.

66. There were tactical benefits as well. In contrast to Eastern Europe or Asia, a U.S.



rollback of communism in the United States' Central American sphere of influence was a "safe" intervention in the sense that it was unlikely to provoke a Soviet military response that might trigger a general war. If carried out covertly, utilizing Central American proxies, a U.S. intervention would also enable Eisenhower to "plausibly deny" U.S. involvement, shielding the administration from outraged protests by its Latin American allies (Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, 220; Scott, "Dismantling the Good Neighbor," 5, 12–13, 28).

67. *FRUS, 1952–1954*, 4: 1091–1093; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 363–364.
68. Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 280, 295–304; Cullather, *Secret History*, 80–82; Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 156, 158.
69. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 179; Scott, "Covert Operations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," 132–133; John Foster Dulles, "International Communism in Guatemala," *Department of State Bulletin* 31, no. 785 (12 July 1954): 43–45.
70. Blasier, *Hoeving Giant*, 229; Scott, "Dismantling the Good Neighbor," 29–30.
71. Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, 152–153; Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 303; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), 731, 780, 981, 989, 998, 1004; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959), 191–192; Scott, "Dismantling the Good Neighbor," 31; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 196; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 4.
72. Scott, "Covert Operations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," 134–135; Richard Harkness and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of the CIA," *Saturday Evening Post*, 30 October–13 November 1954; Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 124. Meanwhile, at lower echelons of the CIA, the intelligence officers who carried out the intervention were basking in the confident assurance "that their careers would take off." "After Guatemala," the wife of one CIA operative recalled, "it was, 'You can have any job you want! You can own the world!'" (Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 126).

## Chapter Two. Cuba, 1961

1. Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 106; Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 272, 289, 306, 310; Richard E. Welch Jr., *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959–1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 87, 91; Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 308; Peter Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New York: Free Press, 1998), 38, 55; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 236, 241–242; W. W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 210–211. Casualty figures from Thomas G. Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Fidel Castro," in *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 132. Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles described Kennedy as "quite shattered" in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. Robert Dallek, *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963* (Boston: Little, Brown, 2003), 367.
2. Welch, *Response to Revolution*, 87–88; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 304–

- 306; Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1961* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 129; Lloyd C. Gardner, *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 44. As Richard J. Walton noted, Kennedy's denial of U.S. military involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion was "quite an extraordinary statement. Not only was the invasion planned by the United States, but the United States recruited, paid, and trained the exile force. . . . The exiles used American military equipment. They were trained by American military men. . . . The warplanes were American, flown by Americans. The frogmen who were the first on the beach were American. American ships carried the invaders, and American naval units accompanied them. Americans were killed in the operation. To claim that America did not intervene was to lie and be caught in the lie" (*Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* [New York: Viking, 1972], 49–50).
3. Louis A. Pérez Jr., *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 295–303; Marifeli Pérez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 27–31; James O'Connor, *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), 58.
4. Louis A. Pérez Jr., *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 218–225; Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 35, 41–43; Morris H. Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 51; Sebastian Balfour, *Castro*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1995), 8.
5. Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 113–117, 138–139, 152–159; Whitney Perkins, *Constraint of Empire: The United States and Caribbean Interventions* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1981), chap. 1; Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, chap. 3; Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution*, chap. 2; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*), 1958–1960, vol. 6: *Cuba* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 190; Balfour, *Castro*, 9.
6. Castro, quoted in Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: Avon, 1986), 164, 240.
7. Mario Llerena, *The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 60–61. Also see Marta Harnecker, *Fidel Castro's Political Strategy: From Moncada to Victory* (New York: Pathfinder, 1987), 24–25.
8. Fidel Castro speeches, Havana, 23 March 1959 and 15 December 1959, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, available through the *Castro Speech Data Base: Speeches, Interviews, Articles*, Latin American Network Information Center, <http://www1.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html>; J. P. Morray, *The Second Revolution in Cuba* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), 31.
9. Szulc, *Fidel*, 38, 145–146, 166, 173–176, 355; Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdes, eds., *Selected Works of Fidel Castro*, vol. 1: *Revolutionary Struggle, 1947–1958* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972), 272; Balfour, *Castro*, 64; Carlos Franqui, *Diary of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1980), 338.
10. Jules R. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in the Age of National Liberation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 215; Fidel Castro speech, Havana, 17 January 1959, *Castro Speech Data Base*; Robert E. Quirk, *Fidel Castro* (New York: Norton, 1993), 224; Hugh Thomas, *The Cuban Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 294, 296; *New York Times*, 16 January 1959, 1, and 21 February 1959, 8; Morray, *Second Revolution in Cuba*, 30.