

57. Buckley, "U.S. Policies in Chile under the Allende Government," 294; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 102–103, 388, 657, 920–922; Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos, *Kissinger and Brzezinski: The NSC and the Struggle for Control of US National Security Policy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 21–22; Robert H. Johnson, *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and Beyond* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 66; Ricardo Israel, *Politics and Ideology in Allende's Chile* (Tempe: Arizona State University Center for Latin American Studies, 1989), 157. Kissinger's concern about the link between the "Chilean model" and Eurocommunism may have been well founded. Robert Alexander writes that "European Communists, especially those of Italy and France, were keeping a close eye on the Unidad Popular experiment. . . . In both Italy and France, the Communist parties had [d] for some time been seeking an alliance with Socialists—and in Italy's case, even with Christian Democrats—which would permit them to return to the government of those countries, at least as junior partners" (Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile*, 136). Mark Falcoff reports that "a group of Italian sympathizers told Allende shortly after his election, 'If you can show in Chile that a second road to socialism is possible . . . , then the next country to advance along that road will be Italy, and very soon others in Latin America, and later, in one or two generations, half the world'" (Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–1989*, 2). Allende's foreign minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, later recalled that "the victory of a clearly anti-imperialist, socialist political force in an important Latin American country changed the balance of power on the continent, and was inevitably linked to the general political process in Latin America and the hemisphere. This in turn had ramifications, at least to some extent, in the world political arena where the East–West conflict overshadowed . . . every event. Indeed, important actors in the *Unidad Popular* had participated in that world conflict and saw the Chilean experience in a larger context" (Clodomiro Almeyda Medina, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government," in *Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970–1973*, ed. Federico G. Gil, Ricardo Lagos E., and Henry A. Landsberger (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979), 76).

58. Korry to Church, Senate Hearings, *Intelligence Activities*, 118.
 59. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 270.
 60. Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, 241 (emphasis in original).
 61. Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 229n3; Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, 8.
 62. Quoted in Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, 79, 119.
 63. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 129, 664, 668n678. Kissinger later observed that "the appearance of inferiority—whatever its actual significance—can have serious political consequences" (Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 288; emphasis in original).

64. Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon*, 67; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1187.
 65. George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 245; Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam*, 118, 216–217, 229–230; Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon*, 67; Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography*, 287; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 969. That Nixon had inherited the domestic political turmoil over U.S. involvement in Vietnam that had driven Johnson from the presidency became evident during his 1969 inaugural parade when the incoming president's limousine was pelted by "a barrage of sticks, stones, beer cans, and what looked like firecrackers" by crowds of antiwar demonstrators (Nixon, *RN*, 366).

66. H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: Putnam's, 1994), 192–194. "Richard Nixon was a full-time politician," White House domestic affairs counsel John Ehrlichman later wrote. "At home and abroad, every day of the

week and whatever the occasion, he (and we) looked after the politics" (John Ehrlichman, *Witness to Power: The Nixon Years* [New York: Pocket, 1982], 288).

67. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 126, 634; Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician*, 19–20.

68. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician*, 378. One of Kissinger's National Security Council aides said of the administration's interventionist motives: "It was the 'who-lost-Chile' syndrome" (Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, 241).

69. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 671 (emphasis in original).

70. National Security Council, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM97)," 3 November 1970, 3, 5, in *Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, 1970–1976*.

71. Memorandum, Chapin to H. R. Haldeman, 4 November 1970, in File 66-6, "National Security Council, 9-1-70 to 11-4-70," White House Central Files, Subject Files, Confidential Files, 1969–1974, box 14, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD. Also quoted in Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, 80.

72. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 653. The full text of Korry's cable can be found in *Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, 1970–1976*.

73. Peter Kornbluh, "The *El Mercurio* File: Secret Documents Shine New Light on How the CIA Used a Newspaper to Foment a Coup," *Columbia Journalism Review*, September–October 2003, 14, 16–17; Kinzer, *Overtown*, 170–172, 177; Israel, *Politics and Ideology in Allende's Chile*, 171; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 266; Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile*, 50, 55, 83; Korry, "The Sell-Out of Chile and the American Taxpayer," *Washington Post*, 28 November 1975, A4; Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 291–292, 299; Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician*, 378; Jensen, *The Garotte*, 244; Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, 228n1; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 673. For Edwards' extensive ties to the CIA, see Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 260; Senate, *Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973*, 19, 22, 29; Korry, "The Sell-Out of Chile and the American Taxpayer," 114.

74. Senate Hearings, *Intelligence Activities*, 29; Senate, *ITT Hearings*, 292, 305.

75. Jensen, *The Garotte*, 491, 596n151.

76. National Security Council, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)," 3 November 1970, 17, in *Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, 1970–1976*.

Chapter Six. Nicaragua, 1981

1. Robert Kagan, *A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977–1990* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 200–203, 225–226; Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.–Latin American Relations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 188; Ariel C. Armony, *Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-communist Crusade in Central America, 1977–1984*, Monographs in International Studies no. 26 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997), 115.

2. E. Bradford Burns, *At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 22–23; Ronnie Dugger, *On Reagan: The Man and His Presidency* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 353, 518.

3. Matilde Zimmermann, *Sandinistas: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), chaps. 2–5 (1968 Fonseca quote, 108); Dennis Gilbert, *Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 4,

19–20, 22, 25; “The Historic Program of the FSLN (1969),” in *Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional Perspective*, ed. Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), a B, 321; David Nolan, *The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Institute of Interamerican Studies, 1984), 17. Victor Tirado, a member of the Sandinista national directorate, later recalled that “we, the founders and builders of the FSLN, prepared our strategy, our tactics and our program, on the basis of Marx’s teachings” (quoted in Gilbert, *Sandinistas*, 22).

4. Zimmermann, *Sandinista*, 79, 173; “Historic Program of the FSLN (1969),” 319; Borge, quoted in Jorge Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War* (New York: Vintage, 1993), 105n33.

5. Zimmermann, *Sandinista*, 162–169, 206; Nolan, *Ideology of the Sandinistas*, chaps. 3–4; Gilbert, *Sandinistas*, 8; Holly Sklar, *Washington’s War on Nicaragua* (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 14; Lawrence Pezzullo and Ralph Pezzullo, *At the Fall of Somoza* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 50. For a descriptive overview of the 1978–1979 insurrection that drove Somoza from power, see Thomas W. Walker, *Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), 34–40.

6. Nolan, *Ideology of the Sandinistas*, 61–67, 76; “General Political–Military Platform of the FSLN for the Triumph of the Popular Sandinista Revolution (May 1977),” in Valenta and Duran, eds., *Conflict in Nicaragua*, a A, 302–303, 305, 309; Gilbert, *Sandinistas*, 30. The “General Political–Military Platform” identified capitalism as “the major obstacle to social progress”—a system that “subjects the majority of the people—from laborers and semiproletarians, to farmers and other sectors of the population—to the cruelest oppression and exploitation.” According to the document, “The dialectical development of human society” led ultimately to a transformation “from capitalism to socialism” (301).

7. Nolan, *Ideology of the Sandinistas*, 67–68.

8. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, chap. 13; “The Seventy-two Hour Document,” in *The Continuing Crisis: U.S. Policy in Central America and the Caribbean*, ed. Mark Falcoff and Robert Royal (Lanham, MD: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987), a C, 497, 500, 504; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic, 2005), 120–121.

9. Zimmermann, *Sandinista*, 45–47; Nolan, *Ideology of the Sandinistas*, 20–21; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way*, 41–42.

10. “General Political–Military Platform of the FSLN,” 293, 301.

11. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 195–196. According to Arturo Cruz, a prominent Nicaraguan economist who served in the Sandinistas’ initial Government of National Reconstruction, “During the first months after the victory, some of the *comandantes* adopted the extreme view that the United States had not intervened in Nicaragua in 1979 . . . because of the shift in the world balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. They even claimed that the United States actually had been constrained by fear of Cuba. . . . At the beginning of the revolution,” he continued, “there was a pro-Soviet consensus among the *comandantes*” (Arturo Cruz Sequiera, “The Origins of Sandinista Foreign Policy,” in *Central America: Anatomy of Conflict*, ed. Robert S. Leiken (New York: Pergamon, 1984), 102, 106. Jaime Wheelock, leader of the FSLN’s “Proletarian” faction and Nicaraguan minister of agriculture in the Sandinista government, recalls that “we thought there was a great potential and vast resources in the socialist countries and the USSR. We underestimated the extent of the crisis of socialism” (quoted in Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed*, 108n38).

12. Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way*, 121; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 130, 194–196; Nolan, *Ideology of the Sandinistas*, 116–117; Gilbert, *Sandinistas*, 162; Jiri Valenta, “Nicaragua: Soviet-Cuban Pawn or Non-aligned Country?” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 27 no. 3 (Fall 1985): 168; Mary Vanderlaan, *Revolution and Foreign Policy in Nicaragua* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 315.

13. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 195; Gilbert, *Sandinistas*, 162; Nolan, *Ideology of the Sandinistas*, 117, 125–126; Vanderlaan, *Revolution and Foreign Policy in Nicaragua*, 257, 277, 293.

14. Zimmermann, *Sandinista*, chaps. 3–4; Robert A. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 35; Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, *The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1993), 97. For Tomás Borge, a founding member of the Sandinistas, “The Victory of the armed struggle in Cuba, more than a joy, was the lifting of innumerable curtains, a flash of light that shone beyond the simple and boring dogmas of the time” (quoted in Nolan, *Ideology of the Sandinistas*, 22).

15. Pezzullo, *At the Fall of Somoza*, 50, 78, 123; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 159–160; Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed*, 59; Miranda and Ratliff, *The Civil War in Nicaragua*, 98–99.

16. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed*, 59n9; Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 143.

17. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed*, 32, 110–111; Dario Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 63–66; Morris H. Morley, *Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas: State and Regime in U.S. Policy toward Nicaragua, 1969–1981* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 298–300; Humberto Ortega, quoted in Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 122. Once Somoza had been overthrown, Ortega recalled, “We radicalized our model to look more like Cuba. Whether *Terceristas* or not, we wanted to copy in a mechanical way the model that we knew—which was Cuba—and we identified with it. . . . We didn’t want to follow the other models” (quoted in Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 122).

18. Vanderlaan, *Revolution and Foreign Policy in Nicaragua*, 252; “General Political–Military Platform of the FSLN,” 291, 305; Gilbert, *Sandinistas*, 28–29.

19. “General Political–Military Platform of the FSLN,” 294; Fonseca, quoted in Zimmermann, *Sandinista*, 78 (emphasis in original).

20. “General Political–Military Platform of the FSLN,” 301–302 (emphasis in original). 21. Miranda and Ratliff, *The Civil War in Nicaragua*, 73; Ortega, quoted in telegram 1552, U.S. Embassy Managua to State Department, 2 April 1981, 1, in National Security Archive, *Nicaragua: The Making of U.S. Policy* (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1991), microfiche, document no. 01304.

22. Fonseca quoted in Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 40; Karl Bermann, *Under the Big Stick: Nicaragua and the United States since 1848* (Boston: South End Press, 1986), chaps. 8–10; Nolan, *Ideology of the Sandinistas*, 45; Carlos Fonseca Amador, “Nicaragua: Zero Hour,” in *Sandinistas Speak*, by Tomás Borge et al. (New York: Pathfinder, 1982), 23; Ortega, quoted in telegram 1552, U.S. Embassy Managua to State Department, 2 April 1981, 2, in National Security Archive, *Nicaragua: The Making of U.S. Policy*, microfiche, document 01304. The historical record suggests that U.S. support for the senior Somoza’s regime fluctuated over time. During World War II and the early Cold War period, faced with security threats from European totalitarian enemies, the United States government welcomed Somoza as a reliable ally. From 1945 to 1947, however, the State Department actively promoted democratic change in Nicaragua, pressuring Somoza to step down as president, suspending U.S. military assistance, and even threatening to break relations. See Paul

Coe Clark, *The United States and Somoza: A Revisionist Look* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), chaps. 8–9; and Richard E. Clinton Jr., “The United States and the Caribbean Legion: Democracy, Dictatorship, and the Origins of the Cold War in Latin America, 1945–1950” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio University Department of History, 2001), chap. 4.

23. Telegram 1552, U.S. Embassy Managua to State Department, 2 April 1981, 2–3, in National Security Archive, *Nicaragua: The Making of U.S. Policy*, microfiche, document 01304; Fonseca, “Nicaragua: Zero Hour,” in Borge et al., *Sandinistas Speak*, 23. It was the Somoza family, not U.S. firms, that controlled Nicaragua’s economy. According to Thomas W. Walker: “By the time the dynasty was overthrown the [Somoza] family had acquired a portfolio worth well in excess of \$500 million (U.S.)—perhaps as much as one or one-and-a-half billion dollars. The Somozas owned about one-fifth of the nation’s arable land and produced export products such as cotton, sugar, coffee, cattle, and bananas. They were involved in the processing of agricultural exports. They held vital export-import franchises and had extensive investments in urban real estate. They owned or had controlling interests in two seaports, a maritime line, the national airline, the concrete industry, a paving-block company, construction firms, a metal extruding plant, and various other businesses including *Plasmaféresis de Nicaragua*, which exported plasma extracted from whole blood purchased from impoverished Nicaraguans” (Walker, *Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino*, 58). As late as 1978, direct U.S. investments in Nicaragua totaled a relatively insignificant \$90 million (Bermann, *Under the Big Stick*, 295–296).

24. Fonseca, “Nicaragua: Zero Hour,” 42; “The Historic Program of the FSLN (1969),” 328; “The Seventy-two Hour Document,” 504; Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 202; “Literacy Campaign Textbooks (August 1980): The FSLN Anthem,” in *The Central American Crisis Reader*, ed. Robert S. Leiken and Barry Rubin (New York: Summit, 1987), 235.

25. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 51; Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 49; Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 5, 30–35.

26. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 30–31; Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 5–6.

27. Morley, *Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas*, 114–115, 166, 175–176; Anthony Lake, *Somoza Falling* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 193, 199; Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 53–54; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 74–75. Another conservative Democrat, Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas, a member of the House Appropriations Committee, warned the White House that he would block the administration’s entire foreign-aid bill if any further cuts were made in U.S. economic assistance to Nicaragua (Lake, *Somoza Falling*, 165; Morley, *Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas*, 114).

28. Morley, *Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas*, 166–167, 175–176; Sklar, *Washington’s War on Nicaragua*, 24.

29. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 142, 148; Lake, *Somoza Falling*, 220–221, 226; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 92.

30. Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 59; Morley, *Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas*, 188; Bermann, *Under the Big Stick*, 270; Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 147; Lake, *Somoza Falling*, 220–221, 226.

31. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 148; Lake, *Somoza Falling*, 226, 275; Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 59–60.

32. Sklar, *Washington’s War on Nicaragua*, 25.

33. Morley, *Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas*, 227–228, 305; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 92; Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 192–195, 206–207; Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 61–62; Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 46–47.

34. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 193–194.

35. Quoted in Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 65–66.

36. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 194.

37. Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 63–69; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 157.

38. Robert D. Schulzinger, *U.S. Diplomacy since 1900*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 326–331; I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 73–78.

39. Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 30, 44–48, 76–77.

40. Morley, *Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas*, 293, 307; Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 102–103; Peter Kornbluh, *Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987), 19.

41. Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 47–48, 77, 79–81; Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 225–228.

42. Dinesh D’Souza, *Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader* (New York: Free Press, 1997), 85; William E. Pemberton, *Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 85, 95, 97; Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 188, 338; Martin Anderson, *Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 92; Alexander M. Haig Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 81.

43. Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 205; Pemberton, *Exit with Honor*, 109; Kai Schoenhals and Richard A. Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 122; Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 10, 22; Haig, *Caveat*, 26–27, 30–31, 123; James M. Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 16–17, 28. Haig recalled that “We confronted a situation where strategic passivity during the Ford Administration and the excessive piety of the Carter Administration’s human rights crusade had sapped the will of authoritarian anti-communist governments, eroded the confidence of Western allies, and encouraged risk-taking by the Soviet Union and by Soviet-manipulated totalitarian regimes. Since 1978, this bi-partisan policy of failure had permitted the Soviet Union to inflict disastrous defeats on the United States at regular six month intervals” (quoted in Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 85).

44. Reagan, *An American Life*, 266–267.

45. Quoted in Pemberton, *Exit with Honor*, 133.

46. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 360.

47. Haig, *Caveat*, 95–96.

48. *Ibid.*, 96.

49. *Ibid.*, 30–31.

50. *Ibid.*, 96–97. In his January 1981 Senate confirmation hearing, Haig stated that “over the last decade, America’s confidence in itself was shaken, and America’s leadership faltered. The United States seemed unable or unwilling to act when our strategic interests were threatened. We earned a reputation for ‘strategic passivity,’ and that reputation still weighs heavily upon us and cannot be wished away by rhetoric. What we once took for granted abroad—confidence in the United States—must be reestablished through a steady

accumulation of prudent and successful actions" (quoted in Schoenhals and Melanson, *Revolution and Intervention in Grenada*, 124).

51. Piero Gleijeses, *Tilting at Windmills: Reagan in Central America*, Occasional Papers in International Affairs (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute, April 1982), 4; Haig, *Caveat*, 30; Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 26; Laurence I. Barrett, *Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1983), 207; Cynthia J. Arnson, *Crossroads: Congress, the Reagan Administration, and Central America* (New York: Pantheon, 1989), 52–53.

52. William M. LeoGrande, "A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador," *International Security* 6, no. 1 (Summer 1981): 45.

53. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982 (Part I): Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 18 March 1981, 194; Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 71–72.

54. *New York Times*, 28 April 1983, A12; Reagan, *An American Life*, 473.

55. Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America*, 259; Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987* (New York: Pocket, 1987), 331.

56. Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 85.

57. Quoted in Barbara Epstein, "Reagan Administration Policymakers," in *Vital Interests: The Soviet Issue in U.S. Central American Policy*, ed. Bruce D. Larkin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 195–196.

58. Haig, *Caveat*, 129.

59. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), 605, 607.

60. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 170.

61. Cannon, *President Reagan*, 344. According to William LeoGrande, "In the midst of the [1980] presidential campaign, a skeptical reporter asked one of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisers whether he and his candidate really believed their own rhetoric about the communist menace in El Salvador. 'El Salvador itself doesn't really matter,' the adviser replied, 'we have to establish credibility because we're in very serious trouble'" (LeoGrande, "A Splendid Little War," 27).

62. Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 89.

63. *Ibid.*, 186; Reagan, *An American Life*, 238; Haig, quoted in Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 97; Viron Vaky, "Reagan's Central American Policy: An Isthmus Restored," in Leiken, ed., *Central America: Anatomy of Conflict*, 240. As Eldon Kenworthy writes, "In an important sense, Reagan policy toward Nicaragua was only marginally about Nicaragua" (Kenworthy, "Selling the Policy," in *Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua*, ed. Thomas W. Walker [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987], 162).

64. Roy Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981–1987* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 28–29; I. M. Destler, "The Evolution of Reagan Foreign Policy," in *The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 135–136; Alex Roberto Hybel, *How Leaders Reason: US Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America* (Oxford, UK, and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 265–266; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 196, 345; Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 101. In November 1980, during the presidential transition, Reagan's designate as national security adviser, Richard Allen, promised that the new administration would take "quick action against Fidel Castro's Soviet directed,

armed, and financed marauders in Central America, specifically Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala" (quoted in LeoGrande, "A Splendid Little War," 43n30). In a December 1980 preinaugural meeting of Reagan and his key national security officials, Haig stated that "it was quite clear we would have to invade Cuba and, one way or another, put an end to the Castro regime" (Caspar W. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* [New York: Warner, 1990], 31).

65. Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 101; Hybel, *How Leaders Reason*, 266; Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game: How Washington Works* (New York: Random House, 1988), 349–350; Destler, "The Evolution of Reagan Foreign Policy," 137; Haig, *Caveat*, 99–100; I. M. Destler, "The Elusive Consensus: Congress and Central America," in Leiken, ed., *Central America: Anatomy of Conflict*, 321.

66. Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 101–102; Barry Rubin, "Reagan Administration Policymaking and Central America," in Leiken, ed., *Central America: Anatomy of Conflict*, 305.

67. Cannon, *President Reagan*, 196, 355, 382; Smith, *The Power Game*, 350; Rubin, "Reagan Administration Policymaking and Central America," 302, 304, 306–307; Destler, "The Elusive Consensus," 321. Deaver later recalled that "Baker was convinced from day one that the hard-right people—Casey, Clark, and Haig—would try to move the president into some kind of military action in Central America and destroy his presidency" (Deborah Hart Strober and Gerald S. Strober, comps., *The Reagan Presidency: An Oral History of the Era* [Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2003], 165–166).

68. Destler, "The Elusive Consensus," 321; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 344.

69. Gergen, quoted in Smith, *The Power Game*, 350–351.

70. *Ibid.*, 351.

71. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 176–177, 187–188; Woodward, *Veil*, 174; Arnson, *Crossroads*, 76; Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 96.

72. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 190–192; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 67, 73, 77; Christopher Dickey, *With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 110; Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 99; Rubin, "Reagan Administration Policymaking and Central America," 307; William M. LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 119; Woodward, *Veil*, 175. Enders' strategy was to see if he could "use the threat of confrontation rather than confrontation itself" to stop the Sandinistas from continuing their assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas (Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 190).

73. Ortega, quoted in Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 194.

74. *Ibid.*, 192; Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 235; Woodward, *Veil*, 175.

75. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 192; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 70.

76. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 192; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 67.

77. Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 66–67.

78. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 193; Hybel, *How Leaders Reason*, 266. A U.S. military officer described the military maneuvers as "a deliberate attempt to stick it in their eye" (Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 73).

79. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 193–194, 197. For a different interpretation, which places the blame for the collapse of negotiations on the unreasonable demands imposed by Reagan administration hard-liners seeking to "sabotage" Enders' initiative in favor of a paramilitary option, see LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 118–123.

80. Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 66; Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*, 159.

81. *Washington Post*, 8 May 1983, A10; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 64, 84–85; Scott,

Deciding to Intervene, 160; Duane R. Clarridge (with Digby Diehl), *A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Scribner, 1997), 199.

82. Schweitzer, *Victory*, 10, 22–23; Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*, 15, 19–20, 160.

83. Cannon, *President Reagan*, 355–356; Woodward, *Veil*, 186; Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 243; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 188, 200; Moreno, *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 96–97; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 80–81; D'Souza, *Ronald Reagan*, 89, 102.

84. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 203; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 83. For a useful chronology of U.S. policy decisions between November 16 and December 1, see LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 143–146.

85. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 204–205.

86. Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 39–44; Dickey, *With the Contras*, 46; Armony, *Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-communist Crusade in Central America*, 114; Clarridge, *A Spy for All Seasons*, 200–201.

87. Dickey, *With the Contras*, 80, 90, 118–119; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 151, 185, 200–201; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 52–55; LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 115–116; Armony, *Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-communist Crusade in Central America*, 125–126; Clarridge, *A Spy for All Seasons*, 200–201, 208. Argentines had been actively involved on both sides in the Nicaraguan revolution. Members of Argentina's leftist revolutionary movements—the Montoneros and the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP)—fought alongside the Sandinistas during the 1979 insurrection and subsequently remained in Nicaragua, assisting the FSLN in running its intelligence and security organizations. See Armony, *Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-communist Crusade in Central America*, 79–80; Dickey, *With the Contras*, 30. Meanwhile, the military regime in Buenos Aires provided covert support to Somoza's government in an effort to prevent its overthrow. According to Ariel Armony, Argentine military operatives arrived in Nicaragua in 1978 “to identify Argentine guerrillas fighting in the Sandinista ranks.” At least one guerrilla was captured in Nicaragua and sent back to Buenos Aires where he was executed in the infamous Navy Mechanics School torture center (Armony, *Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-communist Crusade in Central America*, 82–83). During the 1979 revolution, Argentine military officers assisted Somoza's National Guard and secret police; three of the officers were captured by the Sandinistas when they seized control of Managua in July 1979 (*ibid.*, 82–83). Also see Dickey, *With the Contras*, 54. The Argentine dictatorship's subsequent support of the Contras was the logical extension of this involvement. Indeed, according to Armony, the military regime in Buenos Aires began to provide money to Nicaragua's counterrevolutionaries as soon as they began organizing following the fall of Somoza, and by the end of 1980 Argentine operatives were organizing and training bands of former National Guardsmen in exile in Guatemala (Armony, *Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-communist Crusade in Central America*, 93–94). Contra leader Enrique Bermúdez later stated that “the Argentines were the ones who gave us the necessary sponsorship to begin our military struggle against the Sandinistas.” The U.S. government, Bermúdez said, “wanted to do something but at that time they didn't know how to do it. And the Argentines eased the way for United States involvement” (*ibid.*, 130–132).

88. Clarridge, *A Spy for All Seasons*, 200–201; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 45–47; LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 116.

89. Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 48–49; LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 116–118; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 201; Armony, *Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-communist*

Crusade in Central America, 119, 130–131. Also see Duane Clarridge's recollections in Strober and Strober, *The Reagan Presidency*, 165.

90. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 202; *Washington Post*, 8 May 1983, A10. According to Duane Clarridge, the CIA “did not ‘invent’ the Nicaraguan guerrillas, freedom fighters, or contras, whatever you want to call them. The truth is that anti-Sandinista forces, both political and military, were in Honduras before we got there. We simply capitalized on the disenchantment of a sizable Nicaraguan population with the anti-Catholic Church, agricultural-collectivization, single-political-party, and generally dictatorial policies of the Sandinistas themselves to create the single largest guerrilla force in Latin American history” (Clarridge, *A Spy for All Seasons*, 198–199; emphasis in original).

91. Kornbluh, *Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention*, 22–23; Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 100; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 84–85.

92. Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*, 160–161; LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 111, 144, 285–286, 299–300; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 80, 85; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 202, 204–206; Woodward, *Veil*, 185; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 355–356. “The proposal for covert action ‘was presented to [Reagan] as pressure rather than conquest,’ Enders recalls, ‘a lowball option, a small operation not intended to overthrow’” (Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 202).

93. LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 111, 141–142, 306–309; Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*, 160; Clarridge, *A Spy for All Seasons*, 209; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 355; Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 98–99, 131; Armonson, *Crossroads*, 102.

94. Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, 172; Howard J. Wiarda, *American Foreign Policy in the 80s and 90s: Issues and Controversies from Reagan to Bush* (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 8. In his autobiography *An American Life*, Reagan writes that “in late 1981, I authorized Bill Casey to undertake a program of covert operations aimed at cutting the flow of arms to Nicaragua and other Central American countries” (474). For additional evidence that interdiction was Reagan's initial goal, see Douglas Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 50, 52. William LeoGrande, however, concludes that “Reagan was one of the least enthusiastic supporters of the covert action proposal at first—not because it appeared overly ambitious, but because it was not ambitious enough. ‘It took some persuading’ to get Reagan interested in the contra program, according to a senior administration official. Plans for a small force to harass the Sandinistas or interdict arms did not interest him. He was only convinced the plan had merit when it was presented as a way to roll back the Nicaraguan revolution. The contra army would be Washington's answer to Soviet support for wars of national liberation” (LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 145).

95. LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 299–322; Kagan, *Twilight Struggle*, chaps. 22, 25, 27–29; Armonson, *Crossroads*, 76–78, 100–110, 117–129; Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 84–86, 116–117, 192–193, 199–200.

Chapter Seven. Grenada, 1983

1. Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 232–233; Dinesh D'Souza, *Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader* (New York: Free Press, 1997), 104–105; Peter Goldman and Tony Fuller, *The Quest for the Presidency: 1984* (New York: Bantam, 1985), 20; Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover, *Wake Us When It's Over: Presidential Politics of 1984* (New York: Macmillan, 1985), 34–35; William E. Pemberton, *Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 85.