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By all necessary means? Emerging powers and the use of force in peacekeeping

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ABSTRACT

Emerging powers from the global south have generally opposed the use of force in international politics. However, taking a closer look at the area of peacekeeping, the international community's most institutionalized response to international insecurity, it is clear that the global south has been actively engaged in what has been described as peacekeeping's coercive turn: the increasingly greater use of force. Building on the cases of Brazil and Indonesia, we argue that the peacekeeping policies of these emerging powers have been inconsistent with their declared reticence to use force. We explain the inconsistency by reference to knowledge imbalances between civilian and military actors, a gap in peacekeeping expertise and involvement in policy-making that allowed the armed forces to push the two countries into increasingly coercive peacekeeping. Moreover, civil–military knowledge imbalances prevented the emergence of alternative ideas more in line with Brazil's and Indonesia's traditional stance on the use of force.

KEYWORDS Peacekeeping; use of force; legitimate intervention; civil–military relations; emerging powers

The literature on peacekeeping often notes that postures on the use of force in peacekeeping can broadly be divided into a generally favorable position taken by countries from the global north and a less permissive position taken by countries from the global south (Berdal, 2018, p. 726; Karlsrud, 2015, pp. 49–50; Paddon Rhoads, 2019, p. 10). Although the dichotomy is certainly not absolute, peacekeeping expert Tardy (2011) speaks of “North–South divisions over peacekeeping issues” (p. 158). Thakur (as cited in Howard & Kaushlesh Dayal, 2018, p. 27), former Assistant-Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), affirms that “no countries from the south have been pushing the Chapter VII agenda” in peacekeeping, that is, the basing of mandates on the UN Charter's Chapter VII, which allows for the use of force in case the Security Council determines the existence of a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.

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However, the ostensive “reluctance” (Destradi, 2018) or even opposition to the use of force in peacekeeping from the global south is less straightforward than it is often presented. Such states have, in fact, actively supported peacekeeping operations based on Chapter VII and applied robust force to accomplish mission mandates. For instance, India officially declared that it “is not unfamiliar with the concept of ‘robust’ peacekeeping,” already since its large-scale involvement in the UN’s peacekeeping operation in Congo in the 1960s (as cited in Tardy, 2011, p. fn 19). China is another illustrative case of a country that “transformed from wariness and avoidance [of UN peacekeeping] to acceptance and enthusiasm” in less than two decades, despite the fact that peacekeeping has become more permissive toward the use of force (Hirono, Jiang, & Lanteigne, 2019, p. 17). These apparent ambiguities beg the question of what role emerging powers from the global south have played in shaping ideas on the legitimate use of force in peacekeeping.

This article provides some first insights on two emerging powers that have traditionally stressed the need to avoid force in international politics: Brazil and Indonesia. Specifically, we ask the following questions: How can we explain the position Brazil and Indonesia have taken with regard to the use of force in peacekeeping operations, which, we will show, has at times been inconsistent? Why have alternative ideas more in line with the two countries’ traditional foreign policy principles failed to prosper?

Existing studies note the ambiguous stance of emerging powers regarding the international norms of non-intervention and minimum use of force (Destradi, 2018; Harig & Kenkel, 2017; Hutabarat, 2014; Lanteigne, 2019). They largely agree that the apparent inconsistencies are the result of a transition process in which emerging powers have outgrown their regional space but at the same time lack the capacity to act as norm entrepreneurs at the global level. The push “to adjust policies according to their changed (or changing) international status” for reputation gains creates normative tensions with regards to traditional normative standards (Destradi, 2018, p. 5), leading to a zigzag course in emerging powers’ international behavior.

While this explanation appears plausible and has been found applicable to cases as diverse as China, Brazil, and India (Destradi, 2018; Harig & Kenkel, 2017; Lanteigne, 2019), it overlooks an important factor which, we will argue, can account for the nature of inconsistency that can be observed in the cases of Brazil and Indonesia. This inconsistency refers to a contradiction between a historically strong foreign policy discourse opposing the use of force in international politics, including peacekeeping, and the contemporary policies of the two countries that have both formally and in practice supported the tendency toward more forceful peacekeeping. The gap between peacekeeping policy discourses and practices, we argue, can be explained with reference to civil–military knowledge imbalances in the two countries. Such knowledge

gaps between civilians and the armed forces do not imply military insubordination. Rather, they describe a “defense knowledge deficit” (Pion-Berlin, 2005) on part of civilians that goes beyond the armed forces’ natural advantage in theoretical, technical and operational expertise on military matters (Feaver, 2003, pp. 69–70). In consequence, the military enjoys considerable autonomy in its fields of action, including peacekeeping.

Given that both the Brazilian and Indonesian militaries have been keen to take on peacekeeping as a new mission without concerning themselves too much about its increasingly coercive character, the two countries quickly found themselves participating in missions civilian policy-makers and bureaucrats only gradually began to realize were challenging traditional foreign policy principles. Faced with a *fait accompli*, the pressure to live up to their emerging power status made it hard for Brazil and Indonesia to pull back. Their options were either continuing to contribute while putting up rhetoric fences to ever more coercive peacekeeping, or proposing alternatives. Due to existing knowledge imbalances, however, alternative peacekeeping proposals have failed to flourish.

The article is divided into five parts. First, we discuss existing studies on emerging powers’ international peace and security policies. After presenting the methodology, we then provide evidence showing that Brazil’s and Indonesia’s positions on increasingly coercive peacekeeping have been inconsistent. The following section presents the argument on how civil–military knowledge imbalances moved Brazil and Indonesia more rapidly and deeply into coercive peacekeeping than civilian policy-makers and diplomats wished to. The last section concludes.

Emerging powers in international peace and security

Emerging powers are rising “second generation” middle powers (Jordaan, 2003) that due to their economic growth aspire a global political role. This category of states, which began to emerge in the course of the post-Cold War, comprises countries as diverse as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Mexico, and Nigeria, among others. Often, these emerging powers act as regional powers shaping politics within their immediate neighborhood (Des-tradi, 2018, p. 2223).

Despite their heterogeneity, emerging powers share several commonalities in their international relations (Kahler, 2013). Thus, emerging powers “have insisted on multilateral, UN support for [peacekeeping]. They have consistently defended a traditional conception of sovereignty and professed skepticism regarding armed intervention against incumbent governments” (Kahler, 2013, p. 718). This stands in opposition to a generally more “interventionist” agenda promoted by established Western powers in favor of humanitarian interventions, responsibility to protect (R2P), and intrusive policies toward

conflict-ridden countries in order to prevent the spill-over of negative externalities.

Emerging powers possess insufficient capacity to project military power at the global stage, which explains at least part of their resistance to forceful interventions. Yet, this shortcoming can be turned into an asset when emerging powers act as international norm promoters. Because they are less threatening than great powers, emerging powers can assume the role of honest brokers in international conflicts (Chapnick, 1999). Generally, thus, emerging powers are *status quo* stabilizing states that legitimize the existing international order and behave as “good international citizens” (Evans, 2011) due to their reliance on peaceful international means and their desire to be part of the exclusive circle of global players.

Peacekeeping’s fundamental principles, the “holy trinity” of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force (Bellamy & Williams, 2010, p. 173), fit well with emerging powers’ traditionally preferred mode of foreign conduct. However, recent trends in peacekeeping have challenged the traditional interpretation of non-intervention and non-use of force, both at the strategic and tactical levels (Karlsrud, 2015; Tardy, 2011). At the strategic level, the use of force is authorized by the mission’s mandate either explicitly, when the mandate refers to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or implicitly, when it sanctions the use of all “necessary measures” (Sloan, 2014, p. 686). Contrary to previous practice, all of the UN’s 22 multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations implemented since 1999 have been mandated under Chapter VII (Howard & Kaushlesh Dayal, 2018, p. 6). At the tactical level, the use of force is cast in the term “robust peacekeeping,” defined in the UN Capstone Doctrine as force against “spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process” (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008, p. 98). The extent to which force is used robustly depends above all on the force commander and ultimately the contingent commanders and the individual peacekeepers. However, an increasingly coercive posture has been legitimized through a number of UN declarations and authoritative statements issued over the past two decades (United Nations, 2000; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008; United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017).

The normative considerations influencing emerging powers’ conservative views on the use of force have been highlighted in a number of studies on Brazil (Aguilar, Hamann, Macedo, & Rodrigues, 2017; Harig & Kenkel, 2017; Kenkel, 2010; Passarelli, 2012) and in the very few academic texts dealing with Indonesia (exceptions are Capie, 2016; Cook, 2014). At the same time, these studies point to status and international prestige as important push factors toward a more permissive stance to the effect that both countries have participated in increasingly coercive peacekeeping. Kenkel (2012, p. 21) speaks of a “dilemma” Brazil has faced, a “clash between regional

norms that have until recently been adequate to the country's previous focus, and the attitudes inherent to a position of greater influence at the international level." The result are at times contradictory positions that seek to satisfy both, new international demands and entrenched regional/domestic principles (Capie, 2016; Destradi, 2018). In their explanation, Hutabarat (2014) and Cavalcante (2010) both cite the absence of a clearly defined peacekeeping policy in Indonesia and Brazil, respectively, to explain the slalom course between safeguarding the two countries' traditional foreign policy principles and playing an active role in international security on the terms of the West. However, the literature leaves two important questions unanswered: Why has peacekeeping's coercive turn met reservations, but rarely open resistance by Brazil and Indonesia? And, if the two countries felt uneasy about peacekeeping's developments, why have alternative proposals failed to emerge?

Taking into account that per definition emerging powers lack a consolidated foreign policy identity globally while at the same time counting with a firmly established national and regional foreign policy outlook, the shift toward their participation in coercive peacekeeping occurred surprisingly quickly. No international coalition was formed between countries from the global south to oppose peacekeeping's increasingly permissive use of force (Berdal, 2018; Karlsrud, 2015). If the observed inconsistencies in Brazil and Indonesia were merely due to a clash of old and new norms, as Harig and Kenkel (2017) and others hold, the politics of norm contestation, that is, the process through which the meanings of a norm are renegotiated, should have been clearly visible. Nevertheless, in none of the two countries was there a political debate on coercion in peacekeeping. The above cited works highlighting emerging powers' inconsistent stance on the use of force shed a blind eye on the surprisingly smooth process by which these states have become active participants in a policy that challenges some of their long-standing national principles. We shall argue below that it was ultimately the military's advantage in peacekeeping knowledge that pushed the two countries into increasingly coercive peacekeeping as it developed. In consequence, the room for contestation and new ideas was severely limited.

Brazil, Indonesia, and their participation in peacekeeping

Our article builds on a comparative design of two cases of emerging powers that represent similar outcomes, that is, inconsistent peacekeeping policies. Choosing cases according to the dependent variable is justified by the interest in the mechanism that explains the curious outcome of an ambiguous stance on the use of force within the relatively limited pool of cases of emerging powers. Although the design does not allow for generalizing the conclusions, it provides useful insights on the two cases and an avenue for future research

on the role of emerging powers in defining what constitutes legitimate force in international security governance.

The inconsistency in peacekeeping policies, which we shall illustrate in the next section, can be evidenced as a gap mainly between historically strong policy discourses resisting the use of force and an actual practice of supporting coercive peacekeeping. We consider three forms of support, each of which is counted as coercive peacekeeping practice: i) political support at the UN of missions that allow for the use of force at the strategic and/or the tactical level beyond self-defense, ii) participation in missions authorized under Chapter VII, and iii) the use of force within missions that have a robust mandate. The rationale for the case selection is explained below.

Considering as insufficient the dominant explanation that emerging powers face a “dilemma” (Kenkel, 2012) between old, regional and new, global norms, the research proceeded inductively by tracing the two countries’ peacekeeping policies over roughly two decades. As the emerging pattern pointed to imbalances in the involvement in peacekeeping policy-making of civilians and the military, respectively, further research was directed toward exploring what Huntington (1957, p. 20) called “the [civil–military relations] problem of the modern state... the relation of the expert to the politician.” The armed forces, by way of executing their tasks, “hold a monopoly on theoretical, technical, and operational expertise” that feeds into the policy-making process (Bland, 1999, p. 26). It is the task of civilians to filter and translate the expert advice into policies reflective of society’s preferences. However, as we shall argue below, civilians in Brazil and Indonesia lacked sufficient knowledge of peacekeeping to manage this process successfully.

Case selection

The two emerging powers chosen for this study both have the status of regional powers (Passarelli, 2012, p. 74; Sukma, 2011) that eye a role at the global stage, but lack the material capacity to intervene globally to restore international peace and security. We chose two countries from different regional security environments and with different cultural and societal characteristics in order to control for these factors to influence the outcome. At the same time, the two countries are similar in a number of factors that are likely to shape a country’s position with regard to the use of force and which render them comparable. Neither of the two countries has been involved in an active interstate conflict during the past decades. Brazil and Indonesia are democratic, governed by presidential systems and both their ministries of foreign affairs are known as strong bureaucracies that have ensured relative continuity in foreign policy-making even in times of political crisis.

Importantly, both Brazil and Indonesia have stressed the need to avoid force in international politics, including peacekeeping. The relevance that both have historically ascribed to the principle of non-intervention is explained by their history of colonialism and their peripheral place within an international system dominated by North America and Western Europe. Thus, the two countries have a strong political tradition in advocating the preference of multilateralism, international law, diplomacy, and consensus building over coercion and force in international politics (Anwar, 2000; Kacowicz, 2005). Brazil's 1988 Constitution lists amongst the principles that guide its international relations non-intervention, the defense of peace, and peaceful solutions to conflict (Article 4). These have a long history going back to the Baron of Rio Branco, who is considered the father of Brazilian diplomacy due to his skillful settlement of Brazil's border disputes short of armed conflict while serving as foreign minister in 1902-1912.

The same principles of peaceful conflict resolution and non-interference have played an important role in Indonesia's foreign policy. In 1955, the country served as the host of the Bandung conference before it became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which has called on all states to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. The fourth paragraph of the Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution stipulates that the country shall "contribute to the establishment of a world order based on independence, permanent peace and social justice" (Widodo, 2013), a provision Indonesian policymakers and the military have understood as a mandate to participate in international peacekeeping.

The analysis focuses on the period since the mid-2000s. This is the time when important changes took place creating increasingly permissive conditions for the use of force in peacekeeping (Karlsrud, 2015, p. 42; Tardy, 2011, pp. 152-153). As [Figure 1](#) shows, it is also the time when peacekeeping gained importance in Brazil and Indonesia.

In Brazil, the new-found interest in peacekeeping was mostly due to former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and his foreign minister Celso Amorim, who turned Brazil into a proactive international player, "at least at the discourse level" (Passarelli, 2012, p. 77). Although the number of Brazilian peacekeepers fell dramatically in 2017 with the closedown of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), where it had provided the largest troops contingent since 2004, both the administrations of Michel Temer (2016-2018) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-) have remained committed to supplying peacekeepers to different missions around the world. Likewise, in Indonesia, it was a president with an internationalist outlook that pushed the country's peacekeeping policy. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014, known as SBY), himself a former peacekeeper, brought Indonesia into the




Figure 1. Participation of Brazil and Indonesia in UN peacekeeping operations, 1990–2018. Source: Based on UN Global Peacekeeping Operations Data, retrieved from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>. The numbers were taken for the month of November each year.

list of the top ten contributing countries. Thus, the study period covers the years that consolidated both Brazil’s and Indonesia’s emerging power status.

The analysis draws on academic literature and a range of primary sources. It should be noted that the depth of information is not equal in the two cases given the dearth of sources on Indonesian peacekeeping as compared to a sizable number of studies on Brazil. Except for Capie (2016), Cook (2014), and Hutabarat (2014), who deal with the development and motivations of Indonesia’s peacekeeping policy, the only main contributions identified to inform the questions at hand are Alexandra’s (2012, 2017) studies on Indonesia’s stance toward R2P and peacebuilding. Since none of these contributions focuses on the question of force, the present study contribute to the case of Indonesia also in empirical terms.

The primary sources used include newspaper reports, digitally available records from the UN’s peacekeeping-relevant bodies such as the Security Council and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, as well as data from armed forces personnel, diplomats, and foreign policy-makers. In the case of Brazil, the information is based on previous research (Carvalho, Duarte Villa, Rodrigues, & Breitenbauch, 2015; Jenne, 2019) and was complemented by written questionnaires answered via e-mail by seven members of the armed forces and five civilians. The Indonesian case is based on semi-structured interviews with 18 military personnel, active and retired, and 14 civilians, carried out in Indonesia. All participants were chosen based on the criterion that they have held positions in peacekeeping or peacekeeping policy-making with a possibility to influence how their country positions itself with regards to the use of force.

Inconsistencies: Discourse on the use of force and participation in peacekeeping

Before we discuss the reasons for the observed inconsistencies in Brazil's and Indonesia's peacekeeping policies, we substantiate these by considering the level of decision-making and actions in the field. We examine official declarations, voting in the UN Security Council and participation in peacekeeping operations. For the latter, we coded all missions Brazil and Indonesia participated in during 1988–2018 based on the Security Council resolutions that establish the mandate of the mission. In order to capture differences in the emphasis placed on the use of force, missions were divided into four categories: i) missions that are based on the explicit mention of Chapter VII; ii) implicit Chapter VII missions that make no explicit reference to Chapter VII but nevertheless authorize the use of force, often mentioning the purpose of “stabilization,” or that are derived from a previous mission that was created under Chapter VII;¹ iii) missions that are based on Chapter VI, explicitly or implicitly; and iv) missions that are mandated to use all “necessary measures,” which indicates that they are close to be under Chapter VII without the Chapter being mentioned. Examples of the latter include Resolution 745 (1992) that established the UN's Transitional Authority in Cambodia and Resolution 1704, which expanded the UN's presence in Timor Leste in 2006.

Brazil

In the period under consideration, Brazil was twice a member of the Security Council, in 2004–2005 and 2010–2011. In both periods, Brazil voted favorably for all missions that were established or renewed at the time.² It must be noted that there are rarely abstentions or negative votes in the Security Council. For example, of the 108 peacekeeping operations-related United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions adopted during the two terms of Brazil, only three counted with one negative vote each. Nevertheless, before the mid-2000s, Brazil had assured its peacekeeping policies were in line with its traditional foreign policy principles and abstained from supporting two resolutions under Chapter VII (S/RES/929 [1994], S/RES/940 [1994]). Brazil's position at the time was that “the Council should do its utmost to avoid invoking the extraordinary powers conferred upon it by Chapter VII” (United Nations Security Council, 1994a). It warned that “the recourse to force under the terms now being considered ... constitute a worrisome departure from the principles and customary practices ... [of] peace-keeping (sic)” (United Nations Security Council, 1994b). However, Brazil's stance changed in the 2000s, when missions based on Chapter VII became the norm and the robust use of force was widely advocated at the UN. Apart from occasional

notes of caution that force should only be employed under specific circumstances (see for example United Nations Security Council, 2009), the archives of the UN's relevant peacekeeping bodies contain only two entries of Brazilian representatives making substantive remarks on the use of force.

The first was the debate on R2P. Although Brazil had initially been critical of the concept, the broad support it received at the 2005 World Summit led Brazilian policy-makers to embrace the idea albeit with some reservations (Kenkel, 2012, p. 18). In 2011, Brazil presented to the UN a note *Responsibility while Protecting*, highlighting the need to use force responsibly. Despite the fact that the note “had generated an unusual amount of interest and debate on a global scale,” the initiative was short-lived as Brazil failed to develop the idea further (see below).

The second instance when Brazil expressed its unease with the reliance on force in peacekeeping was in 2016–2017. At the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, Brazilian representatives stated that “[r]ecent experience had shown the limits and counterproductive effect of resorting to military force” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b). And, even more clearly: “Innovation in peacekeeping should not be equated with an increased focus on military force or coercion” (United Nations General Assembly, 2017). These statements were complemented at a meeting of the Group of 20 (G20) in 2017, where Foreign Minister José Serra urged a “change in approach” (Itamaraty, 2017b). “The use of force should always be the last resort,” he said, instead, “prevention and diplomacy must be again at the forefront of our endeavours.”

Considering that Brazil has not shied away from using coercive peacekeeping (see below), it is plausible to argue that these statements were made in anticipation of the so-called Cruz report. Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, a Brazilian general who had served as force commander in Haiti (2007–2009) and in the Congo (2013–2015), was one of three authors commissioned by the UN Secretary General to develop recommendations to increase the security of UN peacekeepers. The Cruz report was published in late 2017 and advocated a more explicit commitment to use force (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017). Welcomed by many for its for UN standards unusually strong message, the Cruz report stood in stark contrast to Brazil's longstanding diplomatic position relating the need for “stabilization” not to force but to “dialogue, reconciliation and development” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b), something that the report labelled “Chapter VI syndrome.” Although Cruz served in his various UN positions not as a representative of Brazil, it was difficult to dissociate him from his nationality. Cruz was to become the most prominent Brazilian influence on UN peacekeeping, and once his name was known within the peacekeeping community, Brazilian diplomats had few choices other than to embrace his widely applauded approach.

Considering peacekeeping practice, Brazil has been even less attached to the anti-revisionist peacekeeping agenda than some of its foreign policy

discourses suggest. Already in the 1950s and 1960s, Brazil took part in two missions that were implicitly authorized to use force (First United Nations Emergency Force, UNEF-I; United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, UNFICYP) and another four missions that relied on all “necessary measures” (United Nations Operation in the Congo, ONUC; United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea, UNSF; United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission, UNIPOM; United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, UNAVEM-I). [Figure 2](#) shows that over the past three decades Brazil has contributed to 18 of in total 22 peacekeeping operations mandated under Chapter VII. Furthermore, Brazil participated in two missions implicitly mandated under Chapter VII and in another seven missions authorized to make use of all “necessary measures” to fulfill their mandate.

With regard to the tactical use of force, too, Brazil has followed the global trend toward more coercive peacekeeping. In 1999, when Brazil sent its first contingent to a mission under Chapter VII (INTERFET, East Timor) the government issued orders strictly limiting the tactical use of force (Aguilar et al., 2017, p. 6). The restrictive stance changed in the mid 2000s as a result of MINUSTAH, where Brazil took on a leading role. It was the largest troop contributor and provided nearly all force commanders throughout the mission (2004–2017). Under initial pressure by the United States, France, and Canada, these implemented a robust approach especially during the first years to come to terms with gang violence in Haiti’s capital Port-au-Prince (Pingeot, 2018, p. 376). As Fernando Goulart, MINUSTAH’s force




Figure 2. Brazil’s and Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations according to mandate, 1988–2018. Source: The authors, based on United Nations Security Council resolutions, retrieved from <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0>

commander during 2012–2013, remembered, initial concerns about the offensive use of force in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense were quickly brushed aside after the “transition to a broader employment of military force in the direction of the UNSC, which took place in 2005 ... , bore fruits” (personal communication, May 6, 2019). Brazil’s military fully embraced robust peacekeeping including the use of snipers and special forces in urban areas as well as the acceptance of “collateral damage” amongst civilian populations (Harig, 2019, p. 140). Thus, despite “resistance especially in the diplomatic sphere,” a military officer involved in the mission concluded that “it is indisputable that Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH acted on the whole spectrum of military operations and, when necessary, made intensive use of force” (Chagas VB, 2017, p. 42). On the whole, this section has shown that Brazil’s peacekeeping policy has evolved, in a sometimes contradictory manner.

Indonesia

Like Brazil, since the mid-2000s Indonesia has served twice on the Security Council, in 2007–2008 and 2019–2020. And like Brazil, also Indonesia voted favorably in all peacekeeping operations-related resolutions adopted during this time, without making additional remarks in any of the sessions. On several other occasions, however, Indonesia expressed caution regarding peacekeeping’s coercive turn.

One example was UNIFIL in Lebanon, the single one peacekeeping operation that sparked public political declarations in Indonesia (Sebastian, 2006). The government refused getting involved in disarming Hezbollah, insisting that such interference fell beyond UNIFIL’s Chapter VI mandate. Rather than a principled stance against coercive peacekeeping, however, this decision reflected Indonesia’s wish to maintain its traditionally good relation with Hezbollah.

On a different occasion, the Indonesian representative to the UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping expressed his country’s unease with the Force Intervention Brigade as part of the UN’s mission in the Congo (MONUSCO). The Brigade, the Indonesian representative cautioned, “risked being perceived as partial,” undermining the credibility of the mission (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). Nevertheless, the Indonesian concerns did not lead it to withdraw from the MONUSCO but rather to call for “clarify[ing]” the circumstances under which force should be used. The same call for greater clarity was repeated in other occasions, such as the Special Committee’s meeting in 2016 where the Indonesian speaker demanded that there were “a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016a). He did not, however, rule out the latter. That Indonesia had already moved

away from adhering to previous interpretations of peacekeeping's minimum-force principle was confirmed by the Director-General for Multilateral Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when he referred to "evolving mandates, in particular the increasing demand for a robust role in civilian protection" as a major challenge for peacekeeping (Ruddyard, 2018). "Indonesia," he affirmed, "is well-positioned to be part of the solution to this challenge."

The above shows that Indonesia's foreign policy elite has not wholeheartedly subscribed to the idea of coercive peacekeeping though it did not openly oppose it either. Considering Indonesia's peacekeeping practice, it is clear that concerns over Chapter VII have not deterred its participation in any way. Figure 2 above shows that in the past three decades the country participated in 14 of the 22 UN missions that were explicitly mandated under Chapter VII. Furthermore, Indonesia sent peacekeepers to six missions with either implicit Chapter VII mandates or mandates that authorize all "necessary means." A foreign policy official at the Foreign Minister's office explained the tension between Indonesia's official, cautioning stance and its participation in Chapter VII missions as follows: "Why are we there? Because we wanted to participate. As long as the mission's mandate has the approval by the UN, it is consistent with our foreign policy principles" (S. Darmosumarto, personal communication, January 18, 2019).

At the Indonesian peacekeeping training center, outgoing blue helmets have been prepared for robust peacekeeping where it will be necessary or requested. The mastering of tactical-level force has been especially important for the country's contingent in the Congo, where Indonesian peacekeepers form a Rapidly Deployable Battalion Task Force trained to work in remote areas under rebel control. The Deputy Director for International Peace and Security at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that "we [at the Ministry] assure our peacekeepers that we will fully back them as long as they follow the mission leadership and comply with UN standards" (R. Sembiring, personal communication, January 18, 2019). Thus, in addition to Indonesia's participation in Chapter VII missions, the use of offensive force at the tactical level has been anything but a taboo for Indonesian peacekeepers.

In both, the Brazilian and the Indonesian cases, the inconsistencies in their stance on the use of force in peacekeeping have manifested themselves above all as a gap between declarations and peacekeeping practice. Thus, alternative arguments such as changes in government or cycles of political (in)stability cannot adequately account for the inconsistencies. The following section argues that inconsistencies are best explained by reference to civil-military knowledge imbalances, which have influenced the two countries' position regarding the use of force in peacekeeping in the context of their status-seeking as emerging powers.

Civil–military knowledge imbalances and the need to play along

A greater role on the international stage comes with responsibilities. Global players are expected to become responsible stakeholders and play an active role in international peace and security. Such expectations create pressures that are clearly observable in the two cases considered. In Brazil and Indonesia, the foreign policy elites have looked at peacekeeping as “part of the price you have to pay to be among the nations who make the rules” (Herz as cited in Kenkel, 2012, p. 30). Considering that peacekeeping’s coercive turn has challenged long established policy traditions in the two countries, we would either expect them to change their established course and take ownership of peacekeeping, or to propose different ideas more suitable to their own preferences. Yet, as previously shown, neither Brazil nor Indonesia embraced peacekeeping’s increasingly coercive nature wholeheartedly. We argue that the two countries experienced a process in which they found themselves quickly involved with coercive peacekeeping due to the armed forces, who were keen to take on peacekeeping as a new role and acquired privileged institutional knowledge that allowed them to push for their own preferences.

That privileged knowledge can lead to a civil–military relations problem is well understood (Feaver, 2003, pp. 69–70). The technical and operational expertise of the military is difficult to match by civilians and therefore brings it invariably into the realm of policy-making (Bland, 1999, p. 27). The challenge in democratic systems is striking a balance between civilian “control of defense and foreign policy ... and sensible deference to military expertise” (Cottey, Edmunds, & Forster, 2002, p. 38). Contrarily, knowledge imbalances indicate that a given situation falls short of the desired “balance of competence” between the armed forces and the civilians who are supposed to oversee them (Pion-Berlin, 2005, p. 21). The existence of a disproportionate gap in defense knowledge increases the role of the military, pushing the delineation of the proper sphere of influence of the armed forces vis-à-vis civilians.

With the military in the driver’s seat of peacekeeping, Brazil’s and Indonesia’s participation in robust missions created a *fait accompli* that made it harder for the foreign policy elite to keep control over the implementation of peacekeeping operations and eventually, to withdraw from practices that contradicted their long-standing foreign policy principles. In the context of existing incentives to make good on their emerging power status through peacekeeping, the military tilted the balance in favor of playing along according to the rules defined by others.

It should be noted that in the two countries under study, the conditions for peacekeeping knowledge imbalances to emergence were favorable given that civilians’ expertise and involvement in defense and security policy-making have generally been limited (on Brazil, see Martins Filho, 2014; Winand &

Saint-Pierre, 2010; on Indonesia, Muhamad Haripin, 2020; Sebastian, Syailendra, & Marzuki, 2018). Even in countries that meet higher standards of democratic civil-relations, however, it is possible that knowledge imbalances emerge within a specific issue area given that such do not imply military insubordination. In Brazil and in Indonesia, civilian authorities have set the guidelines for participation in peacekeeping, which amount to rejecting decisions taken outside the framework of the UN (Widodo, 2013). Thus, the military's influence was not such that it completely overturned the bureaucracy and entrenched norms on the use of force. Nevertheless, within the broad lines defined by civilian authorities, the armed forces exercised considerable influence moving Brazilian and Indonesian peacekeeping closer to the interventionist stance.

Civil-military knowledge imbalances and the push for playing along

How and why has the military acquired a crucial role in defining Brazil's and Indonesia's peacekeeping policies? In both countries, the armed forces have been keen to take on peacekeeping as a new mission. In Brazil, the armed forces saw important institutional benefits in peacekeeping allowing for cultural and doctrinal exchanges and the deployment of troops and equipment under real circumstances, "resembling combat experience" more than any other of its missions (Kenkel, 2013, p. 345; Peixoto, 2017). In Indonesia, the military was eager to assume new roles after the end of the Soeharto regime in 1998–1999 when it was gradually maneuvered out of politics. It is no coincidence that it was a former army general, president SBY, who turned Indonesia into a top contributing country in order to enhance Indonesia's international image, push for military reform and, not least, to "give the army a new task" (J. P. Ate, personal communication, January 13, 2019). Since internal conflicts in Aceh and Papua have calmed down and given that the probability of an external war has long tended towards zero, over the last decade the military, like its civilian counterparts, have looked at peacekeeping as a possibility to develop a more professional force (Capie, 2016, pp. 11–12). Thus, in both countries the military has not only followed the lead of the foreign ministry in deciding where they would deploy but has proactively prepared to do peacekeeping.

From the outset, the military has understood that peacekeeping is an instrument at the intersection of violence and peace, where the means of coercion have become increasingly important. Nevertheless, for the military "participation is more important than the consideration what mandate it is based on" (S. Aguilar, personal communication, January 31, 2019). Meanwhile, the civilian leadership in Brazil and Indonesia has been slow to develop new knowledge on the coercive turn and struggled to justify peacekeeping with the traditional maxims of foreign policy-making.

In the case of Brazil, the reactive coming-to terms with real world changes is evident in the development of the country's peacekeeping trajectory. In 1999, when it first participated in a mission authorized under Chapter VII (INTERFET, East Timor), the government took precautions in order to reconcile its participation in a mission that Brazilian peacekeepers labelled an "authorized intervention" (S. Aguilar, personal communication, January 31, 2019) with its preference to prioritize the limitation of force over other goals of peacekeeping. Thus, Brazil participated with an Army Police squad to send a clear signal that they were doing peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement. Furthermore, Brazilian peacekeepers "were not authorized [by the government] to use force except for self-defense and to carry out typical police functions" (Aguilar et al., 2017, p. 6).

In 2004, through its participation in MINUSTAH, the Foreign Ministry gave in another step towards coercive peacekeeping that would tilt the Brazilian position towards robust action. First, contrary to its previous policy line, as a member of the Security Council Brazil sanctioned the Multilateral Interim Force in Haiti (MIFH) and subsequently MINUSTAH, which were both based on Chapter VII. Brazil's unease with that decision was clear as it excused itself by saying that only one clause, but not MINUSTAH's entire mandate, were based on Chapter VII (Gomes, 2016, pp. 859–860).

Secondly, under the lead of Brazilian force commanders, MINUSTAH and the Brazilian contingent in particular took an offensive approach to gangs that controlled parts of the Haitian capital. The approach was advocated by the United States, Canada and France (Pingeot, 2018, p. 376), and was initially opposed by Brazilian diplomats and commanding officers (Chagas VB, 2017, p. 42). Carlos Chagas, assistant to the first force commander Augusto Heleno, explained the military's "initial resistance" with reference to "the fact that [back then] Brazil lacked experience in Chapter VII missions." Under pressure by North America and France, the Brazilian military eventually changed course when Heleno was described as a "development economist or philosopher rather than a soldier" (Pingeot, 2018, p. 375). As the forceful approach succeeded in curbing the influence of non-state actors (although at a high cost, see Tardy (2011)), the foreign policy elite began to accept and even celebrate Brazil's robust peacekeeping effort. The Foreign Ministry, known as Itamaraty, legitimized the tactical use of force retrospectively, highlighting its deterrent effect and the necessity to defend the physical integrity of civilians and peacekeepers (see DPAZ/MRE, 2015). The popularity gained by the Brazilian force commanders translated into political weight and still greater disparities in peacekeeping knowledge, as it was seen at a 2015 meeting of the Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations where Brazil was represented not by a diplomat, but a general (Caiafa, 2018).

In Indonesia, the foreign policy elite sought to overcome the increasing dissonance between its traditional, non-coercive stance and actual developments

on the ground by arguing that the country's participation had the character of "Chapter six point five" or "Chapter VII minus half" but not, as it was really the case, Chapter VII. Meanwhile, those directly involved with peacekeeping in the military found this course restrictive and "old fashioned," a course promoted by "hardliners" within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "ignores the requirements on the military: it is not black or white, Chapter VI or Chapter VII, the action can shift from one to another according to the specific circumstance" (J. P. Ate, personal communication, January 13, 2019). What the military clearly understood but civilians were struggling with is that this does not mean that peacekeeping is "less" than Chapter VII, even if coercive means are not actually employed. In the words of an officer: "As a peacekeeper, you have to follow the rules. It is the foreign policy-makers who feel a need to rebrand it to Chapter VI.5 when they see it is actually Chapter VII" (Arvie, personal communication, January 14, 2019).

While civilians have continuously emphasized Indonesian peacekeepers' humanitarian contributions in peacekeeping, including infrastructure building, an army officer who participated in the development of the UN's Military Engineer Unit Manual and its supplementing Statement of Unit Requirement affirmed that "in substantive terms, there is no longer a distinction between construction and combat engineering" (Winarno, personal communication, January 23, 2019). Similarly, an officer at the peacekeeping training center, himself a former peacekeeper, stated that the distinction no longer exists for the Indonesian military: "Chapter VI or VII, it actually does not matter because I am under the force commander and I follow his orders" (G. A. Surya Mahendra, personal communication, January 14, 2019). This insight, however, has not yet held sway amongst policy-makers who continue to speak about Chapter VI.5 missions. Both the responsible Directorate at the military-dominated Ministry of Defense and the unit in charge of peacekeeping at the Army's Operations Department (ASOPS) report that there have been at times "intense debates" with foreign affairs officials over the use of force (Sriyanto, personal communication, January 24, 2019). Nevertheless, "eventually they [civilians opposing increased use of force] abandon their opposition because they follow the UN's requirements" (O. Ramsi, personal communication, January 18, 2019). Unable to pull back from the policy defined on the ground and at the UN, the Foreign Ministry has thus come to back the peacekeeping center's instructions to "stick to the mandate and follow the force commander" (R. Sembiring, personal communication, January 18, 2019).

To be clear, we do not suggest that the armed forces have unduly militarized peacekeeping. Instead, it has been civilians' knowledge deficit and lack of guidance that has prevented a political debate and consequently a sovereign decision about the use of force in peacekeeping. Naturally, the military has not been concerned about peacekeeping's coercive nature

and it is to be expected that it uses force if the conditions demand or even allow it.

The military's push for participation in peacekeeping due to its privileged knowledge was facilitated by its place in the decision-making process in the two countries. In Brazil, a former director from the peacekeeping training center (CCOPAB) described peacekeeping as a "restricted policy area" that only "sporadically ... becomes a matter of political debate" (R. Vendramim, personal communication, January 24, 2019). The military-dominated Ministry of Defense has played a key role in all stages from the evaluation of incoming calls for contributions by the UN, to the elaboration of an Inter-Ministerial Motive Exposition that is presented to the president and Congress for approval, to the drafting of the ministerial directive that serves as a basis for the deployment (Rizzo, 2006). In the words of a senior diplomat, given the absence of a civilian bureaucratic structure in the Ministry, "[c]ivilian policy direction on [peacekeeping] remains precarious, being hostage to the perceptions of the [military]" (Alsina, 2017, p. 10).

Likewise, in Indonesia the military has been able to convince civilian policy-makers that it is "compulsory, nowadays, to do Chapter VII missions" (Sriyanto, personal communication, January 24, 2019) because it holds a privileged position in peacekeeping policy-making. Peacekeeping policy is made under the Coordination Team (*Tim Koordinasi*), which is formally headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The military is represented in *Tim Koordinasi* through the peacekeeping training centre, the Ministry of Defense and the Head of National Intelligence, which rotates between the police and the armed forces. Since its creation in 2011, *Tim Koordinasi* was only twice chaired by the foreign minister and is otherwise delegated to the Director-General level. While the armed forces look at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a necessary and capable actor for dealing with the UN, it is the military that indicates whether and under which conditions they are able to deploy to a mission (O. Ramsi, personal communication, January 18, 2019). Thus, with the military eager to expand its peacekeeping engagement, governments have adopted what the Deputy Director for International Peace and Security at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described as a "balanced approach: we hold up the basic principles of peacekeeping, but we are also aware of the reality" (R. Sembiring, personal communication, January 18, 2019).

Playing along: Why alternative ideas failed to prosper

While one could plausibly expect emerging powers to push for alternative policies more in line with their traditions and preferences, civil-military knowledge imbalances forestalled the envisioning of new and innovative, broadly backed proposals. In Brazil and Indonesia, civilians have mostly been a step

behind actual developments and thus unable to develop foresighted ideas for peacekeeping.

Like many countries from the global south, Brazilian and Indonesian policy-makers have highlighted the need for social stability and economic development to underpin stable peace. In this line, they repeatedly called for the development of civilian capacities in peacekeeping (Kenkel, 2013, p. 348; Voltaire Network, 2013). However, while such an approach might differ from NATO peacekeeping, it fully reflects the UN's security-development nexus "as an indispensable element for sustainable peace" (Itamaraty, 2017a).

The fact that the promotion of a less military-oriented, "supposedly alternative way of intervention" (Gomes, 2016, p. 863) reflects less a reality than the unease of diplomats with peacekeeping having moved away from its traditional principles is evident when considering that neither Brazil nor Indonesia have actually developed civilian peacekeeping capacities (Avelar, 2014; Hutabarat, 2014, p. 192). Besides *ad hoc* deployments of small numbers of civilian peacekeepers serving as health workers or liaison personnel, no efforts have been made to define a regulatory framework for civilian peacekeepers.

In both countries, the disconnect between the armed forces and civilian peacekeeping authorities meant that potential alternative ideas failed to obtain the necessary backing. Even in the case of Brazil, where Itamaraty is arguably more involved in peacekeeping for instance by selecting contingent commanders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military "remain highly independent and produce policy preferences in isolation, on the basis of divergent criteria and motivations" (Kenkel, 2013, p. 337). Moreover, since the military has succeeded in installing a discourse celebrating the positive results of robust peacekeeping in Haiti (Harig, 2019; for a critique see Tardy, 2011, p. 163), is it no surprise that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abstained from promoting alternative ideas that would counter the image of Brazil as the efficient peacemaker that eradicated the gangs of Port-au-Prince.

The only "serious effort at norm entrepreneurship" at the UN (Serbin & Serbin Pont, 2015, p. 172) with regards to what is seen as legitimate force was Brazil's Responsibility while Protecting note from 2011. The note's main contribution was that it combined previously unconnected ideas in the debate on R2P into a comprehensive framework adorned with a new label (Passarelli, 2012, p. 81). Nevertheless, for Brazil it constituted a clear departure from its traditional stance on non-intervention. Soon after the proposal was presented, however, the foreign minister changed post and the note was never followed up upon. Therefore, it must be concluded that neither Brazil nor Indonesia have undertaken serious efforts to promote alternative ways of doing peacekeeping. Instead, both have looked to the UN for guidance.

Conclusion

As emerging powers from the global south, the long-standing reticence of Brazil and Indonesia to rely on coercion in international politics has contrasted with their readiness to participate in increasingly robust forms of peacekeeping. Understanding this inconsistency is important given that actions on the ground set precedents, especially in highly decentralized UN peacekeeping. At the very least, participation signals a tacit agreement with the mandates issued by the Security Council and the peacekeeping policies made at the UN, thus legitimizing a greater reliance on force.

We argued that reference to Brazil's and Indonesia's position as emerging powers is insufficient to explain the inconsistencies in their national peacekeeping policies. Complementing this argument, we showed that civil–military knowledge imbalances, the military's comparative advantage in peacekeeping expertise, brought the two countries into coercive peacekeeping, from where it was difficult to withdraw. Once involved, instead of proposing alternative ideas, the respective foreign policy elites merely sought to limit the extent to which peacekeeping's fundamental principles have been being reinterpreted.

Although Brazil and Indonesia are representative of other emerging powers from the global south with regards to their traditionally strong insistence on non-intervention and the non-use of force in international politics, the north–south dichotomy is certainly simplistic. Moreover, the group of emerging powers is rather heterogeneous with regards to their involvement in external conflict and civil–military relations, which are likely to influence a country's stance on the use of force. While factors other than civil–military knowledge imbalances might explain inconsistencies in other cases, the strongly empirically-driven findings derived from this study contribute to advancing research on the role of emerging powers in shaping peacekeeping and international security governance more generally. In the case of Brazil and Indonesia, a more balanced distribution of peacekeeping knowledge would allow devising national policies in line with the countries' foreign policy and security objectives instead of merely playing along. Ultimately, what is at stake for them and other countries wary of a more “interventionist” agenda in peacekeeping is the fundamental question over what is considered legitimate force in international politics.

Notes

1. Examples for this category include S/RES/846 (1993), S/RES/983 (1995), and S/RES/1038 (1996).
2. The resolutions are digitally available through the Search Engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions>.

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