Reorganizing the Neighborhood? Power Shifts and Regional Security Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space and Latin America

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Abstract

The article explores how power shifts in world politics and the emergence of regional powers affect regional security governance. We identify the post-Soviet space and Latin America as two regions where a traditional hegemon and Cold War superpower (the United States and Russia, respectively) has recently been challenged by a rising power (Brazil and China). In both regions, an older regional organization shaped by Cold War dynamics exists alongside a newer organization shaped by the rising power. But do similar patterns of power shifts lead to analogous types and trajectories of security governance? We analyze four security organizations from the two regions: the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) from the post-Soviet space, and the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) from Latin America. We show how power shifts are reflected in (1) the factors driving organizational foundation and transformation, (2) the organizations’ security conceptions and practices, and (3) organizational overlap. Responding to the call for more studies in comparative regionalism, this article contributes to the debate on how powers of various kinds shape regions, regional organizations, and their security priorities, and adds new insights to research on overlapping regionalism.

Keywords: regional organization, regional security, cooperation, power shifts, overlapping regionalism, Latin America, post-Soviet space

Introduction

This article explores the impact of global and regional power shifts on regional security governance. Regions have gained relevance as security spaces and as spheres where power relations between states are negotiated. In response to the ongoing transformation and increase of international security threats, regional organizations (ROs) have assumed more responsibility and acquired an important role as security providers (Kirchner and Domínguez 2011b; Breslin and Croft 2012; Aris and Wenger 2014; Winther 2014). While there are numerous analyses of security governance in individual regions, there are hardly any comparative studies on how security governance in different regions is shaped through factors such as new security challenges, the influence of traditional and rising powers, and the foundation of new or the transformation of existing security organizations. Against the background of an international order in transformation and the perceived lack of efficiency of global security institutions, regional security governance and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter have gained relevance, and it is of utmost importance for global security studies to analyze the provisions and actions of regional...
security organizations and to engage in a more systematic exploration of similarities and differences across regions.

This article connects a descriptive account of regional security challenges and the proliferation of regional organizations to an investigation of the potential impact of broader regional and global political developments, such as the rise of emerging powers, the changing role of the former Cold War superpowers (both globally and within their respective regions), and power dynamics between regional and global powers. Our main research question is whether similar patterns of power shifts lead to analogous types and trajectories of security governance in different world regions. To that end, we compare power shifts and security institutions in the post-Soviet space and Latin America. While distant and unconnected, these two regions are characterized by substantial similarities regarding the factors we assume to have an impact. First, both regions are inhabited by a traditionally influential hegemon and Cold War superpower—Russia and the United States, respectively—who consider the region its sphere of influence.1 Second, both hegemons have been challenged by an emerging power—China and Brazil—over the last fifteen to twenty years. Third, both regions feature the existence of an old and large RO whose trajectory was defined by Cold War dynamics alongside a new and smaller (in terms of geographical scope and number of member states) RO, which has served as a springboard for the rising power to expand its influence in the region.2 The unique combination of these characteristics exists solely in these two regions, making them ideal cases for exploring the question of how global and regional power shifts affect regional security governance.

We study these dynamics combining intra- and interregional comparisons, which entails the necessity to first introduce the commonalities and differences between the individual ROs in order to analyze the dynamics within each region, and then to compare them across regions. We select two juxtapositions of four security organizations from the two regions: the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) from the post-Soviet space, and the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) from Latin America. The OSCE’s key function is to mitigate geostrategic tensions between Western Europe and the post-Soviet space, whereas the SCO’s key function is to strengthen Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia and to address new security risks such as terrorism and separatism. At a broader strategic level, the SCO aims at counterbalancing Western influence. Due to its geographic location, the SCO is part of Russia’s attempt to maintain its dominant role in the post-Soviet space. Simultaneously, China is considered both an initiator and driving force, with the SCO as expression of China’s new policy for regional security cooperation. A similar constellation of overlapping spheres of influence can be observed in Latin America. The OAS for most of its lifetime served as a forum to voice conflicts of interests between Central and South America on the one hand and North America (in particular the United States) on the other. In turn, UNASUR, promoted by Brazil, sought to strengthen South America as a region and to diminish the leverage of the United States on the South American space.

Hence, in both regions the primary role of the old, larger RO was to bridge divides within it, whereas the logic of the two new, smaller ROs has been mainly one of differentiation of the respective (sub) region from the outside world. In turn, the divides within them—ideological divisions in the case of UNASUR and potential power contestations between Russia and China in the case of the SCO—have for most of their lifetime been glossed over. However, in the past few years, ideological divergence between right-wing and leftist governments resulted in an open confrontation in the course of UNASUR’s ultimately unsuccessful attempts to provide a response to Venezuela’s political and migration crisis, leading the organization to an impasse in 2018.3 For this reason, the main focus of our analysis will be the time period from the early 2000s to the mid-2010s, in which the configuration of the security architecture described above was in full force.

Our research seeks to understand which factors affect security governance and how. It specifically focuses on the effects of power shifts. Thus, the article aims to examine and empirically substantiate the assumption that

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1 Admittedly, while similar during the Cold War, the current notion of a “sphere of influence” differs between the United States, whose relations to Latin America follow a functional economy-related dominance approach, and Russia, who rather pursues an ideological “my-backyard” approach in its nearer abroad.

2 Another parallel (that will, however, not play a significant role in this article) is that the respective other, more distant former superpower pursues its interests in the other’s region (i.e., the United States in the post-Soviet space and Russia in South America).

3 While we do not venture out to predict the future of UNASUR here, the comparison between UNASUR and the SCO raises the question whether a similar fate might await SCO if a dispute over a regional issue arises between Russia and China.
there is a causal connection between power shifts and regional security governance. It does so by examining three observable indicators of power shifts—the drivers of RO foundation and transformation, RO’s security conceptions and practices, and the overlap of security organizations. First, if power shifts are important, we expect the interests of key states to be one of the main drivers of RO foundation and transformation. Second, we assume to find a link between power shifts and the evolution of a RO’s security conceptions and practices. Third, we suggest that power shifts are at play when struggles for spheres of influence are carried out within and among overlapping ROs.

The following two sections introduce the pieces of our puzzle in more detail and present our analytical framework. In the fourth and fifth section, we apply this framework to the cases of Latin America and the post-Soviet space. Subsequently, we embark on an interregional comparison and draw conclusions on whether the impact of power shifts on the three spheres of regional security dynamics is comparable across the two regions.

Regions, Powers, and Security Institutions

This article addresses the question how power shifts shape regions, regional organizations, and their security priorities. This theme is situated at the intersection of three burgeoning bodies of literature. One body is the literature on emerging or rising powers. This literature identifies and theorizes powers of various kinds (e.g., Buzan and Waever 2003; Nolte 2010; Prys 2010; Schweller 2011) and analyzes the interactions between such powers in their regional context, that is, when they share a neighborhood that they perceive as a sphere of interest (e.g., Piet and Simão 2016; Schunz, Gstöhl, and Van Langenhove 2018). The second body of literature accounts for an increasingly fragmented global governance architecture and studies issues such as regime complexity and overlap of international organizations with respect to their members and mandates (Aggarwal 1998; Raustiala and Victor 2004; Busch 2007; Alter and Meunier 2009; Weiffen, Wehner, and Nolte 2013; Panke and Stapel 2018), as well as interorganizational relations (Biermann and Koops 2017). With the first body focusing on states and the second one on international or regional organizations, there is in our view a largely unexplored space in between—namely the question how the rise and decline of powers contribute to changes in the institutional architecture.

As we aim to explore these dynamics on the level of regions, the third body of literature is that of (comparative) regionalism, which is interested in mostly state-led processes of institution-building in regional contexts. There is a strong belief in the constitutive role of regions in today’s world order (Katzenstein 2005; Acharya 2007; Van Langenhove 2011). Since the beginning of the 1990s, regionalism has sprouted a growing field of research (Hurrell 1993; Mansfield and Milner 1999). Yet, as Söderbaum (2016a, 2016b) points out, ideas and theories of regionalism need to be related to the political context in which they developed. He identifies three subsequent phases in the study of regionalism—old regionalism, new regionalism, and the current phase of comparative regionalism—each of which developed against the background of a different world order. While old regionalism refers to ROs created in the post–World War II and Cold War context, the phenomenon of new regionalism is linked to the post–Cold War context and the challenges of globalization and neoliberalism and is characterized by a more varied institutional design and a more active role of nonstate actors (Söderbaum 2016a, 26). In this phase, area studies scholars began to emphasize the limitations of using the European Communities/European Union (EC/EU) as the primary point of reference for regional integration and set out to explore ROs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in their own right (Acharya 2016). However, both phases presented obstacles for a truly comparative perspective. While EU-centered generalizations led to misperceptions on how regionalism works in other world regions, the attempt to emancipate from Eurocentric views by avoiding comparisons with the EU propelled scholars to focus on intraregional comparisons in the global south (De Lombaerde et al. 2010). As most recent phase, comparative regionalism therefore aims to combine knowledge on Europe with ideas and concepts originating outside of the European context.

Comparative regionalism emerged against the background of a world order transforming into a multipolar structure and facing the war on terror as well as recurrent economic and financial crises (Söderbaum 2016a, 31). The past two decades have seen the economic and political rise of China as well as the growing assertiveness of formerly peripheral states such as India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and others that are commonly referred to as emerging powers (Nel 2010; Schweller 2011). In recent years, an increasingly proactive and nationalistic Russia has returned to the world stage. Emerging powers became more influential in international affairs as individual actors, members of multilateral institutions, and participants of South-South groupings such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) (Stuenkel 2015a, 2015b; Kingah and Quiliconi 2016). At the same time, even before the election of Donald Trump to the US
presidency, traditional multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the global financial institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the EU started losing reputation and legitimacy. The United States is widely perceived to be in decline. It has lost its ability and the motivation to exert leadership and shape the world order after its own interests and image. As a consequence, the United States might be just one among a number of actors playing a role in an interdependent “multiplex” world, including emerging powers, regional forces, and a concert of the old and new powers (Acharya 2014). In the face of these developments, the first element of our analytical framework will be to explore to what extent global and regional power shifts have driven the foundation and transformation of ROs.

The challenge to grapple with the reshuffling world order is reflected in studies on regional security. The immediate post–Cold War phase was characterized by numerous attempts to theorize security cooperation in regional spaces after the end of the bipolar world (for an overview see Kelly 2007). These approaches explored the ties between states at the regional level and the role of powers in shaping regions (Lake and Morgan 1997; Buzan and Waever 2003; Katzenstein 2005). In turn, the newest phase of comparative regionalism has brought about more rigorous attempts to develop analytical frameworks for a comparative assessment of regional security governance across different world regions (Tavares 2010; Kirchner and Domínguez 2011b; Breslin and Croft 2012; Aris and Wenger 2014). We will draw on those frameworks for the second element of our analytical framework, which will track whether changes in RO security conceptions and practices were attributable to power shifts.

At the same time, the ascent of regionalism has not led to a decline of the nation state. While even the EU as model case of supranational integration is currently experiencing a nationalist backlash, ROs in the global south have long concentrated on expanding intergovernmental security cooperation. Member states are reluctant to give up too much of their sovereignty; they shy away from delegating it to a supranational level and insist on strict nonintervention norms (Acharya and Johnston 2007; Kirchner and Domínguez 2011a, 9). In fact, all of the four organizations studied here remain essentially dominated by states. The examples of UNASUR and SCO demonstrate that regionalism proliferates even in regions where states are highly reluctant to limit their sovereignty and to delegate decision-making power to ROs. Thus, more regionalism does not necessarily imply more supranational integration.

One possible explanation for this observation involves the interaction between established hegemons and rising powers. When diagnosing a “resurgence of regionalism” in the 1990s, Hurrell (1995) highlighted several ways in which hegemony can act as a stimulus to regionalism. On the one hand, hegemons are actively involved in RO creation. The establishment of a RO requires leadership, that is, an actor that takes the initiative and is willing to provide moral or material resources to push the project forward (Mattli 1999). From the perspective of smaller states, regionalism might help them to restrict the unchecked exercise of hegemonic power by integrating the hegemon into ROs (“binding”). Alternatively, smaller states may follow the regional hegemon in the hope of receiving special rewards (“bandwagoning”) (Hurrell 1995; Lobell, Jesse, and Williams 2015). On the other hand, the presence of a hegemon is potentially dangerous for a RO when it seizes the organization’s decision-making apparatus, effectively paralyzes it, or exploits it to pursue national agendas. Another repercussion of hegemony is the stimulation of resistance from within the region, as it manifests itself in the foundation of subregional groupings creating alternative venues to bypass the hegemonic organization (Hurrell 1995; Acharya 2007).

In many cases, regional hegemons and resistance to them have effectively led to the emergence of complex webs of nested and overlapping institutions in regional spaces, often with similar mandates (Aggarwal 1998; Panke and Stapel 2018). Theoretical accounts of organizational proliferation point to new challenges in the global environment or changes in state preferences as the main driving forces. According to this view, institutional overlap is steered by policy issues and actors’ expectations that new institutions will contribute to a better management of these issues (Morse and Keohane 2014). In the face of emerging powers and the reshuffling of regional orders, however, overlapping regionalism may also be driven by regional power shifts (Acharya 2007; Weiffen and Villa 2017). The third element of our analytical framework will thus be to study whether power shifts influence the emergence and handling of overlapping RO mandates.

The Impact of Power Shifts

Our analysis explores how power shifts impact on regional security governance. Regarding the dependent variable, we focus on “security arrangements in each region, institutionalized through regional and subregional organizations that share understandings, rules,
and practices in the security realm” (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016, 299). We assume that power shifts lead to a reconfiguration of regional security governance by shaping the foundation and transformation of security institutions, their security conceptions and practices, and the emergence of overlapping security institutions in both regions.

Four ROs from the post-Soviet space and Latin America are the focus of the comparison. The selected organizations reflect two different waves of regionalism. The OAS was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War in 1948, and the CSCE (as the OSCE’s predecessor) was created during the Cold War in 1975. Both were hence shaped by bipolarity and are examples of old regionalism. In turn, SCO, founded in 2001, and UNASUR, formally established in 2008, were shaped by the end of bipolarity, the intensification of (economic) globalization, recurrent fears over the stability of the multilateral order, and the critique in the developing and postcommunist countries of the (neo)liberal economic development and political system—that is, features of new regionalism (Söderbaum 2016a, b). All four organizations are multi-purposed, including numerous issues besides security. With respect to security issues, however, all of them are largely state-centric, in line with Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan’s (2016, 300) observation that, “in the realm of security, regional governance is still overwhelmingly dominated by states and state instruments, such as regional organizations.” They share features of typical organizations of the global south: None of them pursues integration in the sense of setting up supranational institutions on the regional level and transferring authority and sovereignty to them; rather, they foster cooperation (i.e., the joint exercise of state-based political authority in intergovernmental institutions) (for this analytical distinction, see Börzel 2016; Börzel and Risse 2016).

We assume that the influence of power shifts on security governance is noticeable in three respects: they may be a driver of the transformation of old and the creation of new ROs; they may lead to changes in the security conceptions and practices of these ROs and to overlapping RO mandates within the same region; and they may influence how states deal with overlapping RO mandates.

Drivers of RO Foundation and Transformation
Examining the drivers reveals whether the foundation and transformation of ROs is principally propelled by demands to respond to new security challenges; whether they reflect power dynamics among old superpowers and emerging powers; or whether they are driven by claims to define and delineate regional identities. If power shifts are important, we expect the interests of key states to be one of the main drivers of RO foundation and/or transformation.

The three explanatory lenses are related to major theories of international relations (as summarized in Figure 1). First, explanations in line with institutionalist theories focus on the demand for security cooperation. The foundation and transformation of ROs is conditioned by actual or perceived security threats within or outside the region that require new or different forms of governance (e.g., Wallander and Keohane 1999). Second, explanations in line with (neo)realist theories highlight the role of powerful states and power contestations between influential or hegemonic states in a given region (e.g., Mattli 1999). According to these approaches, hegemonic leadership is the primary supply factor for RO foundation and transformation (for demand and supply
Drivers | Influential Factor | Theoretical Approach
---|---|---
Demand factors | Functional problem solving | Institutionalism
Supply factors | Power contestations between states | (Neo)Realism
Identity factors | Collective identity | Constructivism

Figure 1. Drivers of RO foundation and transformation

Factors in regional governance, see Börzel and van Hüllen 2015; Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016). This would imply that transformations of old organizations primarily serve the interests of a hegemonic state and that the foundation of new organizations is meant to buttress emerging states’ claim for influence. Third, explanations in line with constructivist approaches focus on regional identity (e.g., Adler and Barnett 1998; Checkel 2016). These theories assume a sense of community or ideational affinity in the region. Processes of RO foundation and transformation are characterized by the invocation of a particular identity narrative and skepticism toward old, preexisting ROs.

Security Conceptions and Practices
The identification of security conceptions and practices allows detecting similarities and differences between several organizations governing the same space. It also gives indications on whether the newer RO challenges or even displaces its antecedent in any field of security governance, or whether they have distinct spheres of activity. We assume that power shifts are at play when a new organization not only aims to provide better answers to existing security challenges, but also to do so under a different leadership and/or involving a different set of cooperation partners.

Following Aris and Wenger (2014), security conceptions in ROs address the core norms of the organization, such as the stated security aims, the definition of security threats, the prioritization of different security threats, and whether the focus is predominantly traditional or nontraditional in nature. Security practices denote the way in which ROs translate their security conceptions into action: their specification and concretization as well as their active implementation through various mechanisms and instruments (such as monitoring, peaceful conflict management or enforcement) (Aris and Wenger 2014).

Security institutions address interstate, intrastate, and “intermestic” challenges (see Figure 2). Regarding the governance of interstate relations, three types of conceptions and practices can be distinguished (Wallander and Keohane 1999): (1) Collective defense arrangements undertake deterrence and defense against threats from extraregional actors and/or processes. This may include nontraditional threats that transcend the region, such as global terrorist networks or the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. (2) Collective security provisions maintain order among member states, contain and integrate potential aggressors into the organization’s system of norms and rules, and punish noncompliance. (3) Cooperative security denotes efforts to mitigate rivalries and distrust among members through noncoercive means, such as confidence-building measures.

Intrastate issues are a more controversial field of security governance due to the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs. Institutionalized response mechanisms to these challenges are hence a more recent development in regional governance. Conceptions and practices of intrastate conflict management and resolution are meant to handle intrastate conflict. In turn, conceptions and practices of (5) democracy promotion and protection have gained importance as a means for ROs to mitigate challenges to their member states’ political stability. Finally, today’s security challenges are not limited to traditional inter- and intrastate conflicts and crises. Hence, many ROs engage in (6) security management to confront nontraditional, intermestic security threats—that is, issues of domestic origin that cross the border to neighboring states, such as organized crime, drug traffic, illegal migration, the spill-over of domestic instability, uncontrolled refugee flows, environmental degradation, and pandemics.

Obviously, there are several other institutional features, which could be used to compare security organiza-

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7
Conceptions and practices

Type of security challenge

(1) Collective defense
Common external threats

(2) Collective security
Inter-state threats, containment of potential aggressors

(3) Cooperative security
Inter-state rivalry and distrust

(4) Conflict management and resolution
Challenges to territorial integrity

(5) Democracy promotion and protection
Challenges to political stability

(6) Security management
Intermestic threats

**Figure 2. RO Security conceptions and practices**

Member states’ cross-institutional strategies Inter-organizational relations

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<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Forum shopping</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
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<th>Interpretation of norms</th>
<th>Strategic ambiguity</th>
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**Figure 3. Effects of overlapping regionalism**

Overlapping Regionalism

The foundation of new regional organizations alongside preexisting ones leads to an overlap regarding members, but also with respect to security conceptions and practices. The way member states handle overlapping regionalism and the ensuing interorganizational relations are the third sphere where the impact of power shifts on regional security governance potentially becomes visible. Power shifts evidently play a role if struggles for spheres of influence are carried out within and among ROs.

Recent research on overlapping regionalism indicates that this phenomenon might precipitate several consequences for regional governance (Russo and Gawrich 2017; Weiffen 2017; Nolte 2018). One consequence concerns the cross-institutional strategies of member states: how they behave within overlapping institutions and how they interpret the different organizations’ norms (see Figure 3). Regarding behavior, overlapping memberships in several ROs provide states with opportunities for forum-shopping (i.e., the strategic selection on a case-by-case basis of the appropriate venue to obtain the most desirable outcome). In turn, regime-shifting is a more permanent tendency of moving negotiations to an alternative multilateral institution with a more favorable mandate and decision rules (Busch 2007; Morse and Keohane 2014; Gómez Mera 2015). Regarding the interpretation of norms, the existence of overlapping organizations erodes the clarity of legal obligations and creates strategic ambiguity regarding the interpretation of any single agreement (Alter and Meunier 2009, 17; Gómez Mera 2015). States may exploit this ambiguity to play the ROs in which they participate against each other, thereby circumventing costly commitments. Furthermore, new institutions often aim to downplay the influence of old institutions to protect their members from dominance, neglect, or abuse by more powerful actors. The member states create new context-specific norms that may question and subvert the norms of the preexisting institution, creating strategic inconsistency (Raustiala and Victor 2004, 298).

How the member states behave within overlapping ROs has implications for interorganizational relations (see Figure 3). International organizations can either cooperate or compete with one another in a given policy domain at a certain point in time. From a rationalist perspective, cooperation between organizations is more likely in dense political spaces, characterized by high interdependence (Keohane 1984; Biermann and Koops 2017). Yet, cooperation can be undermined when power shifts are underway. A new organization’s strive for autonomy, visibility, and reputation often leads to
competition with an old organization. In this case, power shifts find their expression in competitive interorganizational relations.

Regional Security Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space: OSCE and SCO

Drivers

Despite ongoing confrontations and the antagonism between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the two Cold War blocs under the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union pursued a détente policy. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 founded the predecessor to today’s OSCE, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and formulated its aim to establish an institutionalized security dialogue (Tudyka 2007; Ibraimova 2011; Jawad 2012). The creation of the CSCE could be mainly explained by the demand to reduce the risk of a military confrontation during the Cold War.

During the first half of the 1990s, actual and perceived security threats resulting from the Balkan wars and the dissolution of the Soviet Union created the necessity of functional problem-solving and of a revision of the European security architecture, triggering the CSCE’s evolution into the permanent Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994/1995. At that time, improved relations between Western countries and Russia under President Yeltsin created a unique window of opportunity. Despite occasional disagreements about the OSCE’s political-military security dimension, Russia, the United States, and European countries cooperated to strengthen its democracy-oriented human dimension (Tudyka 1996). Consequently, the organization’s transformation was driven by functional demand factors such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Balkan conflict management, and by identity-related factors, most importantly the aim to unite the wider Europe, including Russia, on the basis of common norms.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), created in 2001, is rooted in earlier attempts by China, Russia, and Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) to settle their unresolved border issues after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Those states, which later became known as the “Shanghai Five,” signed two documents—the Shanghai Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area (1996) and the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas (1997). These paved the way to establish an informal platform exploring confidence-building and other areas for potential cooperation, and to eventually create the SCO (Douhan 2013).

The SCO became a channel for Beijing’s ambitions to strengthen its influence and reputation in Central Asia—without ignoring Russian interests—and concurrently facilitated exchange among the participating states on their growing concerns about instability in the broader region. The anxiety was primarily associated with Islamic extremist groups, terrorist attacks and separatist insurgencies in post-Soviet Central Asia (especially Uzbekistan), Russia (Chechnya), and the Xinjian province of China, as well as the Tajikistani Civil War of 1992–1997 (Aris 2013). The foundation of the SCO was thus driven by demand factors related to those nontraditional domestic and transnational security threats. Furthermore, supply factors played a role: SCO not only served as a forum for both Russia and China to accommodate their growing interests in the region, but also to cooperate on their common goal of balancing against US influence in Central Asia and to protect the norms of sovereignty, nonintervention, and territorial integrity.

In turn, its further development was distinguished by a reorientation toward regime stability. In the face of the “color revolutions” of the 2000s in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and the “Arab Spring” in 2011, the SCO became a tool for member states to reassure mutual support of each other’s political leaderships, along with preventing and counteracting abrupt regime change (Contessi 2010; Haas 2013). This augmented an element of ideational affinity to the organization and the SCO’s further development could hence be regarded as driven by identity-related factors.

Conceptions and Practices

The impetus for creating the CSCE was the containment of potential aggression among its members. While this makes it a collective security forum by definition, it never developed enforcement capabilities; its strength rather lay in the development of noncoercive means of conflict prevention, such as confidence-building measures. Participating states explicitly sought to discuss security outside the confines of the military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and pursued a “comprehensive security” approach, which connects political-military security aspects with economic-environmental and human dimensions (Gawrich 2014b). Following the Cold War, the

8 OSCE consists of fifty-seven participating states in North America, Europe, and Asia.

9 At the time of its foundation, SCO included the “Shanghai Five” plus Uzbekistan. In June 2017, India and Pakistan joined the organization.
Charter of Paris for a New Europe reiterated the comprehensive security approach as well as the importance of confidence-building measures as a basis for a new phase of cooperative security and also laid the conceptual groundwork for democracy promotion activities (CSCE 1990). Subsequently, OSCE expanded its activities to the areas of conflict management and resolution as well as to security management.

Several steps were taken after 1990 to strengthen the CSCE/OSCE’s political-military dimension. The Vienna Document, adopted in 1990 and revised at various times (OSCE 2011), improved confidence-building and cooperation in the field of arms control. Prior to the Russian annexation of the Crimea Peninsula, it was a meaningful mechanism of military transparency. The 1992 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), while not an OSCE treaty per se, was embedded in the OSCE security dialogue structures and was a cornerstone of East-West cooperation before Russia ceased its participation in 2007 (Richter 2012; Zellner 2014). In 1994, the OSCE adopted the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which was considered “fruitful” for reporting and discussing military issues among OSCE members (Lambert 2006). Yet the Code’s demands for “respect for each other’s sovereign equality” (CSCE 1994) were violated by Russia in its annexation of Crimea and undeclared war in Eastern Ukraine.

After the experience of the Kosovo war, the OSCE unsuccessfully proposed a number of initiatives to improve its security conceptions. The Charter for European Security adopted at the 1999 Istanbul Summit never gained substantial importance due to a lack of US and Russian interest (Ghebali 2001, 290). The Corfu Process, introduced in 2008 against the backdrop of the Russian-Georgian war, illustrated that the OSCE was no longer able to bridge the gap between East and West (Saivetz 2012). Later in 2010, the Astana Framework for Action could not be adopted because of dissensus among OSCE member states (Zellner 2011). Despite the OSCE’s contributions to cooperative security between Eastern and Western powers, it was no longer suited to adequately address the underlying balance of power issue.

The OSCE’s most visible security concepts and practices comprise both interstate and intrastate conflict management, as well as an emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights (Gawrich 2014a). Its activities in conflict management are evident in its field missions, which enjoy substantial international legitimacy, particularly following the deployment of missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995) and Kosovo (since 1999). However, its numerous initiatives to pursue conflict management and resolution in the Balkans and parts of Eastern Europe merely contained conflicts or prevented frozen conflicts from escalating—but failed to achieve any sort of resolution. As far as the post-Soviet space is concerned, the OSCE is an active facilitator of international negotiations over the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, the OSCE had some influence in Central Asia by contributing to the Tajik peace process in the late-1990s and monitoring of the 2010 Kyrgyz crisis. Due to its consensus-based decision-making, the OSCE was increasingly paralyzed after the deterioration of relations between Russia and NATO member states following the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 (Jawad 2012). More recently, the OSCE regained its importance through its conflict management efforts in Ukraine. Although the OSCE is not able to provide collective security, it has contributed to conflict containment by facilitating the negotiations of the Minsk Agreements and deploying monitoring missions to Ukraine (Gawrich 2014b).

In the area of democracy promotion and protection, the OSCE’s watchdog strategies regarding freedom of the media, minority protection, free and fair elections, and freedom of assembly aim at preventing domestic crises (Gawrich 2014a). In addition, the OSCE pursues some activities in the field of countering cross-border crimes and terrorism, thus engaging in security management. Based on an Anti-Terrorism Framework adopted in 2012, the OSCE established cooperation guidelines (e.g., in the field of information warfare, internet security, and travel document security) (Uhrig and Hiller 2014).

The SCO’s principal objective is security, though it points out that economic cooperation is instrumental to confidence-building and stability in the region. The SCO’s security conceptions and practices focus primarily on security management and cooperative security. Concerning the former, its security agenda is centered on combatting the “Three Evils,” “terrorism, separatism, and extremism in all their manifestations,” as well as “fighting against illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration” (SCO 2002, art. 1; also see Allison 2004; Aris 2013). Among the key principles of the organization are respect for its member states’ sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs, also known as the “Shanghai Spirit” (Zhongwei 2002).
This accommodates the principle of mutual recognition to reciprocally acknowledge an act of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, regardless of whether the legislation of SCO member states includes a corresponding act in the same category of crimes (Human Rights in China 2011, 74).

While the SCO remains a largely consultative platform with its weak secretariat and consensus-based decision-making, it created a new body in 2004 to foster the implementation of its security agenda—the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) (Douhan 2013). The RATS coordinates member state activities in combating terrorism, separatism, extremism, and transnational crime (e.g., drug trafficking). It compiles and updates a database of terrorist, separatist, and extremist actors across the region and serves as a hub for sharing intelligence (Aris 2013).

Regarding cooperative security, the SCO can be understood as a “tactical alliance,” whose long-term goals are not fully clear. On the one hand, the organization has mitigated competition between Russia and China (Kushkumbayev 2013), and its very nature and development are rooted in an attempt to establish a regional platform for confidence-building. Apart from providing a space for dialogue on joint economic initiatives, the SCO has held regular (annual or biannual) military exercises known as “peace missions” since 2007. Chinese and Russian forces typically dominate maneuvers, with a considerable participation of troops from Kazakhstan. Member states have never deployed an actual joint peace mission, and the varying scales and intervals of the maneuvers suggest that joint military capabilities are a distant SCO goal. Rather, the exercises intend to demonstrate readiness for common action in response to a potential security crisis created by the Three Evils. At the same time, they serve as a means of confidence-building among member states and their military structures (Rozanov 2013). On the other hand, expectations of Russia and China have started to diverge since the start of the Ukraine crisis and the war in Eastern Ukraine. While Russia perceives the SCO primarily as a security regime, from a Chinese perspective it should be more active in economic, trade-related, and further nonmilitary issues (Lanteigne 2017).

Overlapping Regionalism
The nature of overlap between the two organizations in the post-Soviet space is distinct to the region. First, Russia is one of the key members of both the OSCE and SCO. As the successor to the Soviet superpower, whose participation was essential in the creation of the CSCE, the Russian Federation is potentially still among the agenda-setters in the organization. However, in recent years its main power has been to veto consensus decisions. Simultaneously, it is one of the dominant actors in the new regional organization initiated by Beijing and actively uses the SCO to channel its security interests in Central Asia and find common ground with China as a rising power and potential new hegemon.

Second, the security conceptions and practices of the OSCE and SCO are by no means identical. The OSCE’s conceptions and practices include collective security (although in practice the organization is only able to provide cooperative security), conflict management, and promotion and protection of democracy. The SCO, in turn, has a strong focus on transnational security threats (security management) and pursues a variety of confidence-building measures among its member states (cooperative security). Third, despite their overlap in membership, both ROs differ fundamentally in their power centers. The OSCE is dominated by the West, with the EU and the United States as most influential powers, while Russia’s influence is limited to the role of a veto player. In turn, the SCO clearly centers on Eurasia. Due to these different profiles, state strategies such as forum-shopping or regime-shifting are not highly relevant, and there is neither significant competition nor cooperation between the two organizations. However, collisions between the OSCE’s comprehensive security approach and the different emphases set by the SCO might amount to strategic inconsistency. In fact, the SCO is at times regarded as a “spoiler” of the OSCE’s normative agenda in the post-Soviet space, centered on the promotion of democracy and human rights (Axyonova 2015).

Regional Security Organizations in Latin America: OAS and UNASUR
Drivers
The experience of World War II set the stage for a regional security framework in the Americas, under the leadership of the United States, to be able to collectively defend against external threats. Furthermore, as evidenced by the war between Peru and Ecuador in 1941, there was a need to create mechanisms for peaceful dispute settlement between states to address numerous unresolved border issues in the region. The signing of the OAS Charter in 1948 was thus clearly driven by demand factors. However, supply factors were also relevant, especially the hegemonic role of the United States, but

11 Tajik and Kyrgyz troops’ participation is usually limited, whereas Uzbekistan mostly opts out of the joint military exercises.
also a corresponding desire of the Latin American states to restrain any exercise of hegemonic power by binding the United States into a common RO. After a thawing of Cold War tensions and the wave of democratization in the region, demand factors played a sustained role as the OAS faced the task of formulating a new security concept. The 1990s were also a period of ideational affinity in that the OAS member states unanimously adhered to representative democracy and constructed regional mechanisms to promote and protect it.

Created in 2008, UNASUR concentrated exclusively on South America, covering various issue areas by means of its ministerial and sectoral councils. For the purpose of this article, we will primarily focus on the South American Defense Council (SDC), one of the councils created within UNASUR and so far the only South American institution with a clear mandate in security. Most South American countries consider the United States to be a potential threat to national security interests, and UNASUR could be interpreted as a balancing strategy to curb US influence. Brazil proved integral in creating UNASUR as it convened the first summit of South American presidents in 2000 and was the driving force behind the further evolution toward UNASUR. The organization provided Brazil with the means to exert its leadership in South America and is hence a supply-driven enterprise to promote the country’s interests within its geographic neighborhood (Tussie 2009). Identity-related factors played a significantly bigger role than demand factors for the creation of the SDC, as it did not respond to any new security challenge in particular. Rather, it reflected the impression that the OAS was an outdated organization, as well as the interest of South American governments in developing an alternative regional defense agenda with parallel guarantees of autonomy and a self-organization of defense (Nolte and Wehner 2014). The SDC is meant to consolidate South America as a zone of peace and to contribute to a South American defense identity (UNASUR 2008a, art. 4).

Conceptions and Practices

The OAS defined itself as a system of collective security and created mechanisms for dispute settlement in its Charter (OAS 1948, Chapter V and VI) and the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, or Pact of Bogotá, signed along with the Charter in 1948. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) of 1947 featured a collective defense component to respond to military aggression from outside the region. During the 1990s, the emphasis of the OAS shifted toward cooperative security, democracy promotion and protection, and security management. At the same time, collective security was revived.

In its initial days, the OAS focused on the mitigation of interstate threats, such as the Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 (Shaw 2004; Herz 2011). Following the Cuban Revolution (1959), the “communist threat” became paramount. The United States framed its fight against communism as defense of the region against external influences and repeatedly intervened unilaterally to oust left-leaning regimes. Latin American leaders began to perceive the OAS as an instrument of US foreign policy. Only after the Cold War did the OAS revive its traditional spheres of activity when it settled long-standing territorial disputes, responded to border skirmishes, and adopted new legal instruments for arms control.

The OAS’s turn toward cooperative security is reflected in numerous institutional practices. The Inter-American Defense Board, created in 1942 to foster defense against external threats, is now in charge of technical and educational advice and consultancy. The 1990s saw the additional creation of the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS), a diplomatic consultative body, alongside the promotion of high-intensity confidence-building measures, which aim to reduce or eliminate uncertainty. A major innovation was the adoption of mechanisms to protect democracy. In 1991, Resolution 1080 stipulated procedures to be adopted against interruptions of the constitutional order. The 1992 Washington Protocol made it possible to suspend a member state in the event of an overthrow democratic government. The 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC)
offered responses to different types of unconstitutional alterations and interruptions of the democratic order (Lagos and Rudy 2004; Heine and Weiffen 2015) and was invoked in several political crises across the region.

Reflecting a multidimensional approach to security, the 2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas included traditional security threats (i.e., territorial and boundary disputes) but also nontraditional challenges, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, arms trade and contraband, migration, natural disasters, public safety, and social problems such as poverty and disease (OAS 2003, art. 4m). Two entities for security management, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, had already been established earlier.

UNASUR did not emerge in a political vacuum, but to a large extent drew upon security conceptions and practices developed previously in the inter-American system (Weiffen, Wehner, and Nolte 2013). The security agenda delineated in UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty and in the Statute of the SDC mainly addressed issues that the OAS also deals with. This included collective security objectives such as disarmament, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and the promotion of peaceful dispute settlement (UNASUR 2008a, art. 3). The SDC also emphasized cooperative security, specifically aiming to elaborate joint positions in multilateral defense forums, to foster the adoption of confidence-building measures, to increase transparency of defense expenditures, and to encourage information exchange on military education and training (UNASUR 2008a; Nolte and Wehner 2014). In 2015 the South American School of Defense, which trains civilians and military personnel, was inaugurated in Quito, Ecuador.

Crisis response activities did not rank high on UNASUR’s original agenda, but the organization developed ad hoc practices to manage both interstate and intrastate crises (Nolte and Wehner 2014; Nolte 2018). In 2010 for example, UNASUR reduced border tensions between Colombia and Venezuela. UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty included only a brief mention of democracy (UNASUR 2008b, art. 2). Yet, UNASUR took action to protect democracy during the 2008 political crisis in Bolivia (a violent confrontation between the resource-rich eastern departments and the central government) and a 2010 police mutiny in Ecuador that appeared to threaten President Rafael Correa. Building on these experiences, UNASUR adopted the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on Commitment to Democracy in November 2010 (in force since 2014).

UNASUR also drew on the OAS concept of multidimensional security and included nontraditional challenges such as “the fight against corruption, the global drug problem, trafficking in persons, trafficking in small and light weapons, terrorism, transnational organized crime,” and “cooperation for the strengthening of citizen security” (UNASUR 2008b). Besides the SDC, suborgans such as the South American Council Against Drug Trafficking, the South American Health Council, and the South American Social Development Council address nontraditional challenges.

Overlapping Regionalism
UNASUR’s security conceptions and practices overlap considerably with those of the OAS. While UNASUR tended to distance itself and its security agenda from the OAS, it emulated and built on the older organization’s conceptions and practices of cooperative and collective security, security management, and the promotion and protection of democracy (Weiffen, Wehner, and Nolte 2013). UNASUR adopted the concept of confidence-building and numerous practices that had been developed in the OAS during the 1990s. Both UNASUR and the OAS adhere to a multidimensional security concept that includes nontraditional, transnational challenges and created specialized entities to counter them.

In the realm of crisis management, the OAS is no longer the solitary arena. On occasion, states pursued a strategy of forum-shopping, resorting to the venue they believed would offer more effective or more favorable solutions. However, the more pronounced trend in South America has been regime-shifting. UNASUR’s ad hoc crisis responses in Bolivia and Ecuador were significant steps in the endeavor to prevent US interference in South America and to supplant the OAS. UNASUR interventions embraced the widely shared perception among South American countries that the resolution of border disputes and tensions between states as well as the mitigation of domestic political crises function more seamlessly in a subregional rather than a hemispheric...
forum—especially in cases where the United States is biased in favor of one conflict party. The states in South America framed most problems as subregional rather than hemispheric, and UNASUR was perceived as the responsible organization.

Regarding the protection of democracy, the overlap between OAS and UNASUR also constituted strategic inconsistency. While the IADC explicitly refers to and defines representative democracy, UNASUR’s democracy clause is less specific. Decisions to apply any mechanisms were highly politicized, and interpretations on what constitutes a violation of democratic norms often diverged. In recent instances of political instability, such as the express impeachment proceedings of 2012 in Paraguay and the various episodes of the ongoing political crisis in Venezuela since 2014, there was no longer a consensus among ROs on whether the events represented an assault on the democratic order or not (Weiffen 2017; Nolte 2018). While there have been attempts to collaborate in response to specific crises, there is no formal interorganizational cooperation between OAS and UNASUR, and although most of their security conceptions and practices coincide, interorganizational relations are dominated by competitive dynamics.

Comparison: Power Shifts and Regional Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space and Latin America

This article set out to explore the role of regional power shifts for security governance in two regions that were once dominated by the Cold War superpowers, focusing in particular on the creation of new regional security organizations, such as the SCO in the post-Soviet space and UNASUR in Latin America. In our intraregional analysis above, we studied the drivers of the foundation of the two new ROs as well as their security conceptions and practices, and compared them to the two old ROs. This provided insight into how power shifts are reflected in overlapping regionalism in both regional spaces.

At the time of their foundation, both Cold War organizations were driven by the need to address security threats in the antagonistic context of the time (demand factors). In the case of the OAS, US hegemony in the region was an additional driving force; in the case of the CSCE, the Soviet Union supported it as a way to validate the postwar status, including the recognition of borders in its sphere of influence (supply factors). After the Cold War, both organizations adapted to changing security challenges, and transformed their conceptions and practices accordingly. While demand continued to function as the main driving force, ideational affinities such as the commitment to democratic norms and the aim to (re)construct a regional community after the fault lines of the Cold War had been overcome were additionally fostering the transformation of the two old organizations (identity factors).

As regards the foundation of the new organizations, supply factors and identity-related factors outweighed demand factors. While the creation of the SCO was propelled by new intermestic threats, which were not adequately addressed by previously existing regional security institutions, UNASUR largely shares the security priorities of the OAS. The power-related instrumental role of UNASUR and SCO is at least as important as their functional role in responding to security challenges. The creation of both new organizations reflected regional power shifts, with rising powers trying to elevate their position and to contend the dominance of traditional regional hegemons (supply factors). UNASUR’s member states set out to emancipate themselves from the United States and to reshape regional security governance in South America by excluding the northern hegemon. Brazil as a rising power (and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela as regional power) played an important part in this process. The SCO was established jointly by Russia as a traditional hegemon and China, which is still considered a rising power on the global stage, but acts as a hegemon in its own region. While China sought to expand its influence in Central Asia, without ignoring the strategic interests of Russia, both used the new organization to emancipate themselves from the Western security agenda associated with the OSCE.

Additionally, the aim to build and shape a regional identity and ideational affinities played a strong role for the new organizations in Central Asia and South America. Both UNASUR and SCO responded to a strong sense of regional “we-ness,” going hand in hand with skepticism toward “Western-led” international institutions. Member countries shared the understanding that they operate in a world order that was constructed to benefit the power and interests of the West and built on norms and principles to which they do not always adhere. Consequently, the foundation and present shape of both UNASUR and SCO also contained an emancipatory impetus. Regarding foundation and transformation, the two old as well as the two new organizations thus have many parallels (summarized in Figure 4).

However, the new ROs exhibit significant divergences in their security conceptions and practices (see Figure 5) as well as in their overlap with the older ROs (see Figure 6). In terms of conceptions and practices, the Cold War organizations coincided in prioritizing collective security to maintain peace among member states. In
### Figure 4. Comparing drivers of RO foundation and transformation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drivers</th>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th>After Cold War</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>OAS, CSCE</td>
<td>OAS, OSCE, SCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>OAS, CSCE</td>
<td>SCO, UNASUR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>OAS, OSCE</td>
<td>SCO, UNASUR</td>
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### Cold War | After Cold War
---|---
Collective defense | OAS
Collective security | CSCE, OAS
Cooperative security | CSCE
Conflict management and resolution | OSCE
Democracy promotion and protection | OSCE, OAS, UNASUR
Security management | OSCE, OAS, SCO, UNASUR

### Figure 5. Comparing RO security conceptions and practices

addition, the OAS under US leadership focused on collective defense against extraregional threats, while the CSCE with its comprehensive security approach developed the idea of confidence-building measures as a core building block for cooperative security. After the Cold War, both OAS and OSCE gave continuity to their established security conceptions and practices, but also developed new ones in the areas of democracy promotion and protection, security management, and, in the case of the OSCE, conflict management and resolution.17

UNASUR remarkably adapted many of the conceptions and practices of the OAS. Hence, there is considerable overlap between these organizations regarding collective and cooperative security, the protection of democracy, and security management. In turn, OSCE and SCO have distinct profiles in terms of security conceptions and practices. For example, the OSCE has developed multiple activities in conflict management and resolution. The SCO has paid special attention to security management, which, despite a few activities, is not a central concern in the OSCE. As the post-Soviet space is largely populated by autocracies, it is not surprising that the SCO has no provisions for democracy promotion and no substantial normative overlap with the OSCE’s comprehensive security approach.

While the OAS was the sole security organization in the Americas for a lengthy period, the OSCE has never been as important a security player as NATO. Furthermore, being a South American organization promoted by Brazil, the United States is not a member of UNASUR, whereas Russia and China are both members of the SCO. These differences, in addition to the strong overlap of security conceptions and practices, might explain why OAS and UNASUR competed for influence in South America, whereas SCO can be considered complementary to the OSCE in Central Asia.

As a consequence, overlapping regionalism generated more strategic behavior in the case of UNASUR and OAS than in the case of SCO and OSCE. UNASUR member states repeatedly engaged in strategies like forum-shopping and regime-shifting and exhibited strategic inconsistency regarding the interpretation of organizational norms. For SCO members, only the latter phenomenon is relevant to some extent, as the organization is perceived to be a spoiler to OSCE human rights and democracy-related initiatives in Central Asia.

17 On paper, both OAS and the CSCE were committed to democratic norms already during the Cold War. The OAS endorsed democracy in its founding Charter of 1948 and in the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, adopted in the same year. Likewise, the Helsinki Final Act in its third basket established liberal democratic norms. However, it was only the 1990s when the organizations developed an institutionalized mechanism and instruments to actively promote and protect democracy in their member states.

### Figure 6. Effects of overlapping regionalism

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<th>Member states’ cross-institutional strategies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Forum shopping</td>
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<td>Regime shifting</td>
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<td>Strategic ambiguity</td>
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<td>Strategic inconsistency</td>
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<tr>
<th>Inter-organizational relations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
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In both regions, no institutionalized forms of interorganizational cooperation between the old and the new RO were established; rather, interorganizational relations between OAS and UNASUR were characterized by competitive dynamics.

**Conclusion**

In a multipolar world with growing influence of emerging powers and a loss of reputation of global institutions such as the UN, the WTO, and the IMF, ROs are increasingly relevant as a part of multilayered global governance (Söderbaum 2016a). Familiarity with area-specific knowledge becomes arguably more critical to enable an in-depth look into regions and understand the different ways in which actors in different regions have been responding to transnational and global phenomena. Interregional comparisons facilitate an improved understanding of regional dynamics and the identification of patterns. In this article, we have focused on Latin America and the post-Soviet space, which are comparable in that both regions are affected by power shifts and face substantial security challenges. Despite their particularities, similar intra-regional dynamics play out, and power shifts have had an impact on the evolution of regional security governance.

This article contributes to existing research on regional security governance in three ways: First, our findings suggest that regional security organizations are often established for reasons other than a demand to respond to actual security threats. The foundation and transformation of ROs is frequently driven by power contestations, but also by attempts to shape a regional identity. In view of the current pushback against multilateral and regional institutions (exemplified by the decline of UNASUR), future research should consider the role of power shifts not only as a driver, but also as “underminer” of regional security cooperation.

Second, we provided an analytical framework for the study of security conceptions and practices of old and new regional security organizations. Our comparative analysis has shown that, while individual ROs differ significantly in their security conceptions and practices, there are some common trends across regions, such as the spread of provisions to promote and protect democracy and the adoption of a multidimensional approach reflecting the inclusion of nontraditional threats. Building on our findings, it might be interesting to explore in more detail whether ROs in different regions respond in similar ways to the same global and transnational challenges and whether and through which mechanisms security concepts and practices have diffused across regions.

Third, overlapping regionalism is an example of “conceptual parallelism” (Soest and Stroh 2018, 71), where “regionalized” academic communities for some time considered the phenomenon to be area-specific. Our analysis has demonstrated that an application of the concept of overlapping regionalism to different regions allows to identify similar patterns. In particular, the emergence of institutional overlap, the cross-institutional strategies that states employ to navigate within a complex regional governance architecture, and the resulting interorganizational relations, frequently are an expression of power shifts and contestations. Future research is necessary to provide a refined analysis of how power shifts influence the emergence of overlap (and why rising regional powers decide to create a new RO rather than challenge the distribution of power within an existing one); of member state’s strategic behavior in different regions; and of how interorganizational competition affects the management of concrete regional challenges (such as the Venezuelan crisis).

Overall, our findings indicate that regional security governance is shaped to a significant extent by powers of various kinds and ongoing regional and global power shifts. Further evidence from other world regions would be required in order to improve our understanding of the effects of power shifts on the evolution of regional security governance.

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**References**


While the theoretical diversity has meanwhile been discovered and overlapping regionalism has been discussed in comparative perspective at various workshops and conference panels, most published work so far analyzes only one region.


Power Shifts and Regional Security Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space and Latin America


