On the Exclusion of the Palestinian Nakba from the “Trauma Genre”

Author(s): Rosemary Sayigh

Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Autumn 2013), pp. 51-60

Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2013.43.1.51
ROSEMARY SAYIGH

The extensive literature on trauma, social suffering, memory and loss has so far excluded consideration of the Palestinian Nakba, in spite of its place in world politics, its many similarities to other cases of social suffering, and the unusual feature of its continuation and escalation more than sixty years after the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland. This paper examines this exclusion through reviewing the genealogy, theoretical orientations, and institutional supports of the “trauma genre,” from its crystallization in the early 1990s, through its expansion up to today. The idea of the way the communication of suffering is facilitated within “moral communities” is invoked as one kind of explanation of the trauma genre’s failure to consider the Nakba.

Introduction

A Palestinian woman, twice displaced, first from Palestine in 1948, and then from Syria in 2012, gave the following testimony:

I was six and a half when we left [Palestine]. We were in Wadi Salama near Bint Jbeil, between two mountains, staying under the olive trees. People were harvesting the wheat. My mother covered us with wheat stalks. Israeli planes came and bombed the olive trees and the cactus. They bombed everything. My uncle was killed. Where could we go? We slept on the road [cries]. . . . I was crying, “Mama, I want to drink.” There was a Lebanese policeman. The pool was as large as this sitting room. It had a tap. I said “Uncle, uncle! Give me some water.” I still remember. I was six and a half. He said, “I can’t give you water until the sergeant comes.”

My family stayed here [in ‘Ayn al-Hilwa], I married someone from Syria. . . . To Yarmuk! Yarmuk! We were fine in Yarmuk. But where is it now? Now people are scattered, some here, some there. Those who had money left, those who had a car left, but the poor—where can they go?
The war started . . . problems . . . bullets. We weren’t afraid. They attacked the camp for two or three days. The young men of the quarter stood at every entry; they didn’t let them come in to the houses. There were bullets near our house. We weren’t afraid. The airplane came and hit its target. We weren’t afraid. Then mortars started coming down, in front, behind, all round us. Houses collapsed. The doors flew; the windows went. We left under the shelling. We went to Khan al-Sheikh, me, my daughter-in-law, her children, and my children. There wasn’t time to take clothes, just the kids. As we were leaving, a mortar came down between us and the pharmacy.

We stayed a month in Khan al-Sheeh, and then we came here. We didn’t want to leave Syria—does anyone want to leave their home? My husband is still there. My daughter is there, she is married and has five children. [cries] There! In Damascus! And my other daughter. Everybody is somewhere. Here, there’s no work, no food [cries]. My other son stayed there in his house, under the shelling. Yesterday, there was fighting [in Yarmuk].

Someone asks: Do you expect to go back to Yarmuk?
The speaker begins to cry:

    What can I tell you? Before we left my husband gave me the key and said, “Take the key in case you don’t find me when you get back.”
    At least, let us go back to Palestine!¹

The Trauma Genre: A Critique

Against this elderly Palestinian woman’s narrative, I present an analysis of a field of studies called the “trauma genre.” The trauma genre, which began in the early 1990s with studies that focused on the Holocaust by Caruth, as well as Felman and Laub,² assembles a mass of case studies, experiences, and discourses on suffering worldwide that make an implicit claim to universality and inclusiveness. Yet one must ask whether the trauma genre does not itself set up “cultural frames of reference” that delimit what it recognizes as suffering. Have the witnesses whose writing constitutes the trauma genre—psychologists, literary scholars, film makers, social scientists—selectively focused on particular cases of social suffering, highlighting some and excluding others?

The interview quoted above conveys the immensity of the Nakba and its continuation as an ongoing source of suffering for the Palestinian people. The Nakba is the historical circumstance which caused the displacement of the Palestinians, and continues today to disconnect them from their homeland, their communities, and their history. The loss of recognition of their rights to people- and state-hood created by the Nakba has led to an exceptional vulnerability to violence, as their desperate current situation in Syria shows. However, even as the trauma genre has expanded over the years to include work on memory, mourning, and postcolonial trauma, the Palestinian Nakba remains glaringly absent from the field. Suffering is a phenomenon that cannot be measured, and therefore discourses on suffering become a matter of the personal outlook and biases of scholars, editors and publishers within the genre. In this paper, I review the origins and expansion of the trauma genre, as well as the way that Palestinians are framed in the few instances

¹ | | Journal of Palestine Studies
they are taken as objects of study. By taking into account the powerful sponsors of research and publishing in the field of “trauma,” I raise questions about the extent to which racism and Western ethnocentrism have entered into the genre’s orientations.

Though the trauma genre began with the Holocaust studies of Caruth and Felman and Laub, it is the three volumes edited by Arthur Kleinmann, Veena Das, and others—Social Suffering (1997), Violence and Subjectivity (2000), and Remaking a World (2001)—which are generally recognized as the foundational references of the trauma genre. In his celebrated work on “humanitarian governance,” Didier Fassin notes their “marked influence on the scientific field and beyond,” extending to policy makers and the lay public. These three volumes, which I shall refer to for the sake of brevity by the names of Kleinmann and Das, introduce the perspectives towards world suffering that justify use of the term “genre” in spite of variation in thematic emphasis. Social suffering, they say in the introduction to the first volume:

. . . brings into a single space an assemblage of human problems that have their origins and consequences in the devastating injuries that social force can inflict on human experience. Social suffering results from what political, economic, and institutional power does to people and, reciprocally, from how these forms of power themselves influence responses to social problems.

On a theoretical level, Kleinmann and Das propose a new language, one of “dismay, disappointment, bereavement, and alarm” rather than “the usual terminology of policy and programs.” In this respect, the purpose appears to be to sensitize and mobilize public opinion to stand in for the failure of states to prevent or limit violence. Scholars of the trauma genre introduce historical and existential crises to become a defining element of the trauma genre, and with it, the central role of the witness who both elicits testimonies of trauma and conveys them to the outside world. The witness remains a polyvalent figure throughout the trauma genre, bringing forth testimonies, making them text, and conveying them to the public, who must be mobilized to prevent such catastrophes, because habitual mechanisms such as governments and international law have failed and are likely to fail again in the future.

The first of the three Kleinmann and Das volumes, Social Suffering, deals with “sources and major forms of social adversity, with an emphasis on political violence.” The second, Violence and Subjectivity, “examines the processes through which violence is actualized.” Finally, the third, Remaking a World, looks at how “communities ‘cope’ with—read, endure, work through, break apart under, and transcend traumatic violence and other, more insidious forms of social suffering.”

The Holocaust remains a basic reference of exceptional violence in the Kleinmann and Das series, but whereas Felman, Laub, and Caruth were solely concerned with European history and literature, the Kleinmann and Das series moves out into the non-Western world, adopting ethnography as the preferred lens for studying suffering universally. It is precisely this step that exposes the trauma genre to the charge of lack of critical self-reflection, undertaken without theorizing either the relationship between the West and the non-West, or how ethnography itself has served to create and sustain this dichotomy both ideologically and politically.

Later examples of the genre adopt both literary and ethnographic models, sometimes emphasizing aesthetic expressions of trauma, while at others leaning towards ethnographic studies.
of suffering in Western and non-Western worlds. Even in these extensions, however, trauma genre scholars never theorize the field in terms of global power asymmetry or ethnography’s origins as a Western method of studying the non-Western world. Nor do Kleinmann and Das clarify how suffering in the non-Western world may differ from European modes in its causes, local understandings, forms of expression, and techniques of treatment. They begin from a commonsense notion of universality, cleansed of the histories that have produced, and continue to reproduce, global inequality.

Kleinman and Das’s inclusion of several Holocaust studies together with numerous cases of civil conflict suggest that war trauma is a major concern. But which wars? Here we find a shortening of historical perspective that specifically excludes “(h)istorical memories of suffering—e.g., slavery, the destruction of aboriginal communities, wars, genocides, imperialistic and post-imperialistic oppression.” Indeed, Kleinman and Das view such memories as potential causes of violence, noting that “they have present uses . . . to authorize nationalism or class or ethnic resistance.”

The reader may ask why racial, regional, national, class, and ethnic struggles for justice should be presented as causes rather than as results of violence. Though Kleinmann and Das express a concern with “the workings of power in social life,” their work pays little attention to colonialism as a cause of world suffering.

Given this historical perspective, it is not surprising that Talal Asad is the only contributor to Social Suffering to remind readers of colonialism. Asad highlights how discourses on torture and human rights deflect attention from causes of suffering such as wars, which result in massive impositions of pain and suffering on whole populations. This criticism applies to Kleinmann and Das, who reproduce a geo-temporal-political boundary between regions that have historically generated violence through a near-monopoly over the means of force, and regions where violence develops through conflict for scarce resources, or hatreds exacerbated by colonialist control. Kleinmann and Das illustrate this point most forcefully by disregarding colonialism as cause of suffering in the present. The ethnographic method plays into this foreshortening of historical perspective through its limited temporality and local focus.

In the introduction to their second volume, Violence and Subjectivity, Kleinmann and Das write:

A new political geography of the world has emerged in the last two decades, in which whole areas are marked off as “violence-prone areas,” suggesting that the more traditional spatial divisions, comprising metropolitan centers and peripheral colonies, or superpowers and satellite states, are now linguistically obsolete.

This marking off of certain areas as “violence-prone” disconnects violence in those areas from historic centers of international military, political, and economic power. The focus of trauma genre case studies on civil conflicts within postcolonial states such as India, Ireland, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and South Africa, veils the colonial histories that have been, and often still are, major contributors to such conflicts. Here, it is important to discriminate between two uses of the term postcolonial: one that intends the meaning that colonialism has ended, and the other that sees colonialism as manifesting itself today in different ways than from in the past, through indirect rather than direct forms of control. The neglect of colonialism encapsulated in Kleinmann and
Das’s phrase “violence-prone areas” is reproduced throughout the trauma genre in the form of micro-level and, for the most part, ahistorical case studies.

Since Kleinmann and Das, the trauma genre has rapidly proliferated, branching out into studies of memory, mourning and melancholy, the politics of witness, sexual abuse, racism, homophobia, and postcoloniality. Expansion has brought an ever greater number of case studies into view, so that by now, beside the Holocaust, we find the partition of India, Hiroshima, the Armenian _aghed_ (catastrophe), apartheid South Africa, civil wars in the Balkans, Ireland, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Nigeria, lynchings in the southern United States, death through AIDS, and the sexual abuse of children. Yet we search in vain through this vast literature for the Palestinian Nakba.

**EXCISION OF A HISTORY**

The Nakba of 1948 not only severed Palestinians’ connection with a territory named Palestine, but also with their history and identity. Almost overnight, they became known internationally as “the Arab refugees” or “the Arab minority in Israel.”16 This severing of the Palestinians from their past and their territory was not a simple result of war, but rather, the outcome of political and diplomatic investments on the part of the US and the UK as major architects of post-Nakba arrangements.17 Indications of this severance can be found not only in the trauma genre’s exclusion of the Nakba, but also in its dehistoricization of the Palestinians in the genre’s few studies that mention them. Carol Bardenstein’s 1999 article “Trees, Forests, and the Shaping of Palestinian and Israeli Collective Memory,” for example, compares Palestinian and Israeli symbolization of trees and forests. Bardenstein comes close to acknowledging Palestinian suffering by quoting poetry that expresses bereavement; yet, at no point does she identify the Nakba as the origin of Palestinian poetry of loss. Though she refers to “people-land” bonds, she presents this bond as applying equally to both Israelis and to Palestinians, thus erasing the colonialist nature of the Israeli state. Bardenstein even reproduces a photo from the Jewish National Fund archive, together with its original caption “Transforming the bare landscape.”18 At first sight, the rolling hills indeed look “bare.” However, closer examination reveals them to be covered to the distant horizon with a dense network of terracing, the product of unacknowledged Palestinian labor. Bardenstein’s reproduction _tel quel_ of an apparent absence of cultivation in pre-Zionist Palestine subtly justifies Zionist appropriation, and blunts the mourning of loss in the Palestinian poetry she quotes.

In line with its focus on children and violence, Robben and Suarez-Orozko’s _Cultures Under Siege_ includes a report by Roberta Apfel and Bennett Simon on psychological testing of Israeli and Palestinian children’s attitudes to war and violence.19 The lives of Israeli and Palestinian children are not contextualized in an occupier/occupied framework, and there is no historical introduction explaining how these different groups appear to be sharing geopolitical space. Furthermore, the timing of the interviews during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 puts Israeli and Palestinian children equally under threat from Iraqi Scud missiles. The authors profess interest in the “intergenerational transmission of trauma,” but the interviews as conducted appear unrelated to this theme. The absence of their questionnaire in the report underlines the study’s incoherence, a quality that is most strikingly illustrated by the inclusion of a section unrelated to the authors’ own research, where they cite an _unpublished_ study carried out by other researchers in Gaza to

**Autumn 2013 | 55**
suggest that Palestinian children are being bred as suicide bombers. Omission of any mention of the Nakba here appears to underwrite a move to frame Palestinians—and perhaps even other Arabs—as inherently violent.

A paper in Postcolonial Disorders, Michael Fischer’s “Living with What Would Otherwise be Unendurable, II: Caught in the Borderlands of Palestine/Israel” illustrates a more sophisticated level of Nakba exclusion. Fischer approaches the Palestinians through two texts, one a segment from a speech made by a Palestinian psychiatrist at Tel Aviv University in 2003, and the other a student dissertation on Israeli and Palestinian joint patrols during the 1990s. Again, the context and historical background to what is clearly a situation of military occupation are absent. His choice of psychological texts appears to be based on opposition to “direct first-person testimonials.” This elision of what might have been Palestinian trauma narratives is justified by the claim that “[s]ubjectivity . . . is not usefully located merely in the enunciative function, particularly where traumatized subjects can mainly articulate laments.” His title, taken from Deleuze, also appears to refer to the trials of social scientists at work amid the sharp antagonisms of the Middle East rather than to a people subjected to an unending military occupation.

All three papers demonstrate constraints on the way Palestinians are represented in books published by elite Western university presses. First, Palestinians are always paired with Israelis, never presented as independently linked to Palestine. Second, there is no reference to power asymmetry and Israeli military occupation. Third and most crucially, history in general, and the Nakba in particular, is excised by scholars. It is a question for inquiry whether these “rules” are openly discussed between trauma book editors and contributors, or if they are due to an unspoken self-censorship.

THE ONGOING NAKBA

It has often been asserted that the Nakba cannot be compared with other world catastrophes because the Palestinian death toll in 1948 may or may not have been remarkable. For example, Gilbert Achcar contrasts Palestinian casualties with the far greater ones of the Algerians during their war of independence, and adds that “the Palestinians cannot . . . advisedly and legitimately apply to their own case the superlatives appropriate to the Jewish genocide.” But to frame a comparison between disasters in terms of numbers killed introduces a misleading perspective, since suffering cannot be reduced to quantitative measurement. Moreover, suffering caused by the Nakba has to be understood in terms of a continuing state of rightlessness, with all the varieties of abuse and violence that rightlessness exposes people to.

Unlike most of the disasters dealt with by the trauma genre, the Nakba is ever newly present. The Nakba is not merely a traumatic memory, but continually generates new disasters, voiding the present of any sense of security, and blacking out the future altogether. The Palestinian coinage “ongoing Nakba” (al-nakba al-mustamirrah) expresses this specific temporal feature. Joe Sacco captures it well in the introduction to his investigation into a forgotten massacre in Khan Yunis and Rafah, carried out during the Israeli invasion of Gaza in 1956–57:

Palestinians never have the luxury of digesting one tragedy before the next one is upon them. When I was in Gaza, younger people often viewed my research into the events of 1956 with
bemusement. What good would tending to history do them when they were under attack and their homes were being demolished now? But the past and the present cannot be so easily disentangled; they are part of a remorseless continuum, a historical blur.

The “remorseless continuum” of which Sacco speaks can be illustrated by listening to Palestinian testimonials recorded anywhere in their diaspora, whether in those parts of Palestine under Israeli control, in the Arab host countries, or, as above, among Palestinian refugees in and from Syria. The indifference of the “international community” to their suffering also needs to be factored into any effort to understand it. As Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad Sa’di put it, “The debilitating factor in the ability to tell their stories and make public their memories is that the powerful nations have not wanted to listen.”

Moral Communities

How does it happen that trauma genre scholars have not paid attention to the Nakba nor rated it as traumatic? Literary scholar David Morris proposes a theoretical framework through which concern for some sufferings and indifference to others may be explained. He points out that cultural traditions form genres through which suffering is made recognizable: “What literature has to tell us about suffering . . . depends on basic decisions about what counts as literature and whose suffering matters;” and adds that “those to whose suffering we remain blind are those who are not part of our ‘moral communities’.” This critical question—whose suffering matters—links us to Morris’s main explanatory concept of “moral community.” Since writers work “within a specific social landscape,” history and culture form boundaries. Stories of suffering do not easily pass through cultural barriers; suffering is not “a raw datum . . . that we can identify or measure but a social status that we extend or withhold. . . . We do not acknowledge the destruction of beings outside our moral community as suffering.”—an Iraqi truck-driver killed by US air attack “will play on American television as proof of superior United States technology.” Contemporary US drone attacks probably rouse the same reaction among mainstream Americans. Judith Butler trenchantly sets such myopia in the framework of racism: “Forms of racism instituted and active at the level of perception tend to produce iconic versions of populations who are eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable.”

Both Morris’s theory of moral communities and Butler’s grievable and ungrievable people offer us a handle through which to explore boundaries to the communication of suffering between predominantly Muslim peoples and predominantly Christian ones. The scholar Norman Daniels traces the beginning of European hostility towards Islam to early Christian texts soon after the birth of Christianity, citing the poet Dante as placing the prophet Muhammad in the eighth circle of Hell, with seducers and schismatics. European anti-Islamism powered the Crusades, missionary work, and colonialist penetration. If the extension of the trauma genre into the non-Western world shows little tendency to include the Nakba, we may attribute this in part to an ideological cartography akin to Orientalism. The ideological power vested in Western research and publishing institutions has enabled the labeling of Palestinians as quintessential “terrorists,” and as
an impediment to the integration of Israel in the Middle East to which Western governments are deeply committed for material reasons, as well as to exculpate themselves from the historic guilt of anti-Semitism. While vaunting their independence, academic institutions are not immune to the influence of official policy. In many Western academic circles today, anti-Palestinianism is a permissible form of racism, one that underwrites a continuing politics of exclusion.

Conclusion

What theories of trauma would not consider the quotation with which I began this paper an expression of suffering as intense as any to be found among the trauma genre’s testimonials? Is there reasonable doubt that the suffering of Palestinian refugees in and from Syria today find their initial cause in a condition of statelessness brought about by the Nakba? Presented with this or similar expressions of suffering, what arguments would editors of trauma volumes, or organizers of trauma conferences, resort to as reasons to exclude them? In effect, there are no arguments, because exclusion takes place in a domain outside that of rational debate, one of deep-seated cultural bias, and the fear of the stigma of anti-Semitism. Norman Finkelstein’s loss of his post at Hunter College and tenure denial at DePaul University is only the best known of numberless cases of dismissal, suspension, and delays in the appointment of junior faculty who have ventured into the forbidden realm of Palestinian studies.

The trauma genre is but one illustration of a broader cultural and political myopia where Palestine and Palestinians are concerned; however, it has a special interest because its focus on suffering should have brought the Nakba into view, along with other historic catastrophes. Any argument that the Nakba was minor because it did not involve—at the time—as great a loss of life as Hiroshima, the Holocaust, or the Armenian aghed is invalidated, first by the proliferation of Palestinian suffering since 1948, and second by the absence of rational hope that their suffering will end in a just settlement.

The absence of the Nakba from the trauma genre both reflects and reinforces the marginalization of Palestinian claims to justice and the recognition of the Nakba in world politics, and thereby, it contributes to the continuing failure to reach an equitable settlement. Can we doubt that there is a connection between academic studies and real world politics, particularly when the studies dealt with in this paper emanate from centers of ideological power? Sponsorship of the trauma genre has come from the Social Science Research Councils of the U.S. and UK, as well as leading universities such as Harvard, Yale, Johns Hopkins, University of California at Berkeley, Cambridge, and Oxford. We may ask—why have these universities not sponsored research into the suffering of refugees from war in Afghanistan and Iraq, as they have sought sanctuary and been rejected in Britain? Or the suffering of the Chagos Islanders evicted from San Diego Island by Britain to allow its leasing for an American base? Or the suffering of Iraqi or Gazan mothers of children with congenital birth defects caused by depleted uranium? Or the suffering of American Indians exposed to hate crimes? Such questions are legitimated by the trauma genre’s extension over time and into global space, and by its elevation of social suffering into a topos in its own right that even in some renditions claims the potential to offer solutions.
About the Author
Rosemary Sayigh is an anthropologist and oral historian who currently teaches at the American University of Beirut. She is the author of *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, A People’s History*, and *Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon.*

ENDNOTES

1 Um Hashem, interview by author, 6 March 2013, ‘Ayn al-Hilwa camp, Lebanon.
2 Shoshona Felman and Dori Laub’s *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History* (New York: Routledge, 1992) was based on their experience teaching the Holocaust in university and on clinical work with Holocaust survivors. Cathy Caruth’s *Trauma: Explorations in Memory* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) and *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) brought literature together with clinical studies to stimulate thinking about historical traumas such as the Holocaust.
5 Kleinman et al., *Social Suffering*, xi.
7 Das and Kleinman, "Introduction,” p. 2.
8 Das and Kleinman, “Introduction,” p. 3.
10 The medical anthropological approach is exemplified by Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good, Sandra Teresa Hyde, Sarah Pinto, Byron J. Good, eds., *Postcolonial Disorders* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008).
11 Kleinman et al., *Social Suffering*, xi.
12 Kleinman et al., *Social Suffering*, xi.
15 In its contemporary form, colonialism depends on control over technology, time and space, and labels and meanings rather than over territory, and is reproduced ideologically as well as militarily, as in Israeli suppression of the Palestinians and U.S. attacks against Afghanistan and Iraq. See Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 28.
The Nakba’s Exclusion from the “Trauma Genre”


20 Eventually published as The Road to Martyrs’ Square (Oxford University Press 2005), this “study” is described by Lori Allen as “an extended anti-Palestinian rant dressed up as colorful travelogue written in the style of a bad thriller.” Lori Allen, “Suicide as Political Violence,” review of The Road to Martyrs’ Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber, by Anne-Marie Oliver and Paul F. Steinberg, Journal of Palestine Studies 35, no. 2, p. 113.


23 Scholars such as Salman Abu Sitta would contest this point on the grounds that, first, the Nakba was not limited to 1948 but extended from 1947 to 1956, and second, that many massacres carried out during 1948 have still not been counted into the death toll.


25 This was in the context of the Suez War, when the UK, France, and Israel attacked Egypt after Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.

26 This was in 2002 at the height of the second intifada.


30 Morris, “About Suffering,” p. 25. (my italics)


