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Why Is There So Much Sex in Christian Conservatism and Why Do So Few Historians Care Anything about It?

By Bethany Moreton

Sit down and buckle your seatbelts! What I am about to tell you will shock and disgust you," ran the e-mail that Georgia state representative Calvin Hill sent to his supporters in February 2009. With the state facing a $2.3 billion budget shortfall, the Republican vice chairman of the House Appropriations Committee alerted his constituents that even during this economic crisis, "your tax dollars are being used at our state universities to pay professors to teach your children classes like 'Male Prostitution' and 'Queer Theory.'"[1] Although it quickly emerged that Representative Hill had mistaken a list of faculty areas of expertise for actual course offerings, he and another Republican representative, Charlice Byrd, took to the airwaves. As CNN reported their support from the Christian Coalition, Hill and Byrd demanded the firing of the faculty members and the cancellation of their classes in order to right this "major misuse of the state university system's budget."[2] When asked about university professors of religion, who far outnumber those with expertise in sexuality, Hill fumbled for a response. On an Atlanta street, a Georgia State University student was more direct: "Me, I'm a Christian," she told a reporter, "and if my mother heard about there are classes about being queer here, she'd probably withdraw me."[3]

[1] Jack Stripling, "Sex Crazed Oil Haters, and Other Claims," *Inside Higher Ed*, February 10, 2009, www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/02/10/sex.

[2] "State Representative Warns of Sex Classes Being Taught at Taxpayer Expense," *Christian Index*, February 12, 2009, www.christianindex.org/5184.article.

[3] Greg Bluestein, "Steamy Sex Courses Fire GOP's Ire: Effort to Oust Profs," Associated Press report, Athens (Ga.) *Banner-Herald*, February 7, 2009, http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/020709/gen_385535247.shtml; Laura Douglas-Brown, "Money and 'Morality': At Last, a Solution to the State's Budget Crisis: Stop Studying Queer Theory," *Southern Voice*, February 6, 2009, www.sovo.com/2009/2-6/view/editorial/9750.cfm; "Georgia's Sex Ed Showdown," American Morning, CNN, February 18, 2009, broadcast transcript at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0902/18/ltm.03.html (second and third quotations).

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As religion scholar Janet R. Jakobsen points out, the antipathy between nonreproductive sex and Christian conservatism has achieved the ultimate ideological goal—that of appearing so self-evident as to pass unexamined.[4] Instead of probing the content, the "culture wars" narrative laments that this presumably timeless relationship was drafted in service to laissez-faire capitalism. And on the surface, the recent move in the Georgia statehouse rehearses the familiar storyline: With its economic model in disarray, the conservative movement of the last thirty years might be expected to fall back on its most reliable hot-button issue. "[W]eary gay Georgians shouldn't be surprised," wrote an Atlanta columnist, that "it was professors studying gay topics that [Hill] singled out" from the extensive expertise guide.[5] Georgia, after all, has been among the hardest hit of the free market's domestic victims. Decades of disdain for public oversight produced a branch bank on every street corner and a frantic level of unscrupulous mortgage lending; in early 2009 the state was leading the nation in the number of troubled banks, by a factor of almost four, and was among the leaders in the extent of foreclosures.[6] In the culture-wars version of the conservative ascendancy, this economic outcome was enabled over two generations by the cynical manipulation of emotional, irrational religious prejudices. By periodically hollering "abortion" or "homosexual agenda," this explanation posits, the godless free marketeers duped the folks in the pews into dismantling their own New Deal protections, thereby forcing American wealth disparities back to nineteenth-century levels and greasing the skids for the wholesale off-loading of middle-class jobs. As Thomas Frank put it in the definitive popular formulation, the rise of the New Christian Right after 1970 is the spectacle of "a French Revolution in reverse—one in which the sans-culottes pour down the streets demanding more power for the aristocracy."[7]

From Jonathan Rieder's landmark 1989 essay on the silent majority to Matthew D. Lassiter's pathbreaking 2006 book of that title, historians have used this paradox to pose productive questions of the recent

[4] Janet R. Jakobsen, "Can Homosexuals End Western Civilization as We Know It? Family Values in a Global Economy," in Arnaldo Cruz-Malavé and Martin F. Manalansan IV, eds., *Queer Globalizations: Citizenship and the Afterlife of Colonialism* (New York, 2002), 49–50.

[5] Douglas-Brown, "Money and 'Morality.'"

[6] Russell Grantham, "Georgia Bank Woes 'Alarming,' Data Show," Atlanta *Journal-Constitution*, January 11, 2009; "Georgia's Greed Aided Meltdown; [Governor] Perdue, Assembly Gutted Predatory Lending Bill," *ibid.*, October 3, 2008; Paul Donsky, "1 in 8 Georgia Mortgage Holders Delinquent, in Foreclosure," *ibid.*, March 5, 2009.

[7] Thomas Frank, *What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America* (New York, 2004), 8.

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past.[8] Many have done so with one eye on the clock, wondering when the buzzer will sound halftime on the era of conservative ascendancy. As the scholarly profession anxiously waited for Lefty to return to the national stage, the historical explorations of conservatism evolved to ever more complex forms. One result has been a sort of collective penance for the condescension of the consensus historians of the mid-1960s and their social science allies, who underestimated conservative America by focusing on its radical fringe.[9] Despite a general lack of personal sympathy for conservatism, later scholars have often addressed it respectfully as an intellectual and political tradition. By the time of the 1994 *American Historical Review* forum on the topic, scholarly production was already well underway. As the Reagan Revolution failed to retreat, superb histories of the old Christian Right, the second Ku Klux Klan, the George C. Wallace and Barry M. Goldwater presidential candidacies, campus conservatism, the southern strategy, and suburbanization all found audiences within and beyond the academy.[10]

Meanwhile, back at the megachurch, white fundamentalism, Pentecostalism, and evangelical Protestantism benefited from the same scholarly

[8] Jonathan Rieder, "The Rise of the 'Silent Majority,'" in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980* (Princeton, 1989), 243–68; Matthew D. Lassiter, *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South* (Princeton, 2006).

[9] Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York, 1955); Bell, ed., *The Radical Right: The New American Right, Expanded and Updated* (Garden City, N.Y., 1963); Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York, 1965).

[10] Alan Brinkley, "The Problem of American Conservatism," *American Historical Review*, 99 (April 1994), 409–29; Leo P. Ribuffo, "Why Is There So Much Conservatism in the United States and Why Do So Few Historians Know Anything about It?" *ibid.*, 438–49; Susan M. Yohn, "Will the Real Conservative Please Stand Up? or, The Pitfalls Involved in Examining Ideological Sympathies: A Comment on Alan Brinkley's 'Problem of American Conservatism,'" *ibid.*, 430–37. Some touchstones of this vast subfield—leaving aside for the moment ones primarily concerned with religion—include Alan Brinkley, *Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression* (New York, 1982); Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics* (New York, 1995); Godfrey Hodgson, *The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America* (Boston, 1996); Jerome L. Himmelstein, *To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism* (Berkeley, 1990); Michael Kazin, *The Populist Persuasion: An American History* (New York, 1995); Rebecca E. Klatch, *Women of the New Right* (Philadelphia, 1987); Nancy MacLean, *Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan* (New York, 1994); Rebecca E. Klatch, *A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s* (Berkeley, 1999); Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton, 2001); and Leo P. Ribuffo, *The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War* (Philadelphia, 1983). Indispensable guides to this historiography include David L. Chappell, "The Triumph of Conservatives in a Liberal Age," in Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig, eds., *A Companion to Post-1945 America* (Malden, Mass., 2002), 303–27; Michael Kazin, "The Grass-Roots Right: New Histories of U.S. Conservatism in the Twentieth Century," *American Historical Review*, 97 (February 1992), 136–55; Leo P. Ribuffo, "The Discovery and Rediscovery of American Conservatism Broadly Conceived," *OAH Magazine of History*, January 2003, pp. 5–10; and Ribuffo, "God and Contemporary Politics," *Journal of American History*, 79 (March 1993), 1515–33.

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concern over the conservative counterrevolution. As interpreters of the nation's latter-day "evangelical heartland," in Ted Ownby's words, those who tell about the South had a privileged voice in the national conversation during the years when born-again Georgians, Arkansans, and Texans cycled through the White House.[11] Inspiration has been freely drawn from outside the discipline as well, where interest has also flourished—when the guest editors of *American Quarterly* issued a call for papers for a 2007 special issue on religion, for example, they were swamped with submissions on white evangelicalism.[12] Evidence, methods, and frames of reference from political science, anthropology, sociology, religious studies, American studies, literary criticism, and even, memorably, psychoanalysis all have animated historiography on American religious conservatives. When it comes to a willingness to search for new questions, historians of Protestantism have long been catholic.

Therefore, this article seeks to supplement rather than supplant the honor rolls justly familiar to most historians of religion or conservatism in the South, in order to help open the black box of single-issue politics. One trend has been to argue for a straightforward rhetorical substitution of sex for race after the 1970s, rather than to inquire about the positive content of sexual conservatism itself. Paul Harvey, for example, in his bracing consideration of the racial politics of the white Christian South, identifies the New Christian Right's vigorous promotion of male supremacy as an updating of the "venerable defenses of social hierarchies as necessary for a properly ordered liberty," an intellectual tradition he traces back to Edmund Burke by way of the theocratic Christian Reconstructionists, the Nashville Agrarians, and the theological defense of slavery. In compensation for their lost world of formal racial privilege, Harvey explains, the white religious conservatives apologized for slavery and racism and replaced their "now-discredited views [on race] with a renewed and updated defense of gendered hierarchy."[13] Similarly,

[11] Ted Ownby, "Evangelical but Differentiated: Religion by the Numbers," in Charles Reagan Wilson and Mark Silk, eds., *Religion and Public Life in the South: In the Evangelical Mode* (Walnut Creek, Calif., 2005), 31–61 (quotation on 39). For important guides to this literature and related works, see Jon Butler, "Jack-in-the-Box Faith: The Religion Problem in Modern American History," *Journal of American History*, 90 (March 2004), 1357–78; Samuel S. Hill, *Southern Churches in Crisis Revisited* (Tuscaloosa, 1999), esp. the opening and concluding portions and the excellent bibliography; Ribuffo, "God and Contemporary Politics"; and "Introduction," in Harry S. Stout and D. G. Hart, eds., *New Directions in American Religious History* (New York, 1997), 3–11.

[12] R. Marie Griffith and Melani McAlister, "Introduction: Is the Public Square Still Naked?" *American Quarterly*, 59 (September 2007), 527–63, esp. 545.

[13] Paul Harvey, "Religion, Race, and the Right in the South, 1945–1990," in Glenn Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South* (Lexington, Ky., 2005), 101–23 (first quotation on 120; second quotation on 101).

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Glenn Feldman writes that "[m]oral chauvinism, even 'moral authoritarianism' and autarchy, have largely filled the void left by the delegitimization of white supremacy as a vehicle of respectable politics," and James N. Gregory describes the shift "from silent to moral majority" as the Republicans' "graft[ing of] moral traditionalism onto the patriotic and racial traditionalism that had been helping them win elections."[14] These descriptions, coming toward the end of each historian's brilliant analysis of earlier moments in the rise of the Right, are doubtless true, but they are more statements of a problem than explanations for it. If sexual conservatism is just a borrowed raiment for "the new racism," then why would the Republican Party see the defense of marriage as its best hope for winning sympathy among African American voters?[15] Why would religiously based family values be so prominent in the political thought of conservative African American intellectuals?[16] Why would the AIDS crisis have demonstrated the political "boundaries of blackness" in the 1980s, when most black churches, like most white ones, could not imagine a Christian response to a gay plague?[17] What could white women—who made up the majority within their churches—have found so appealing about a hierarchy in which they lost out?

Certainly white supremacist sentiment did not leave the New Christian Right when its straightforward articulation ceased to be broadly acceptable, and some issues within the family values agenda are grimly familiar forms of scientific racism. The family values critique of reproductive sex among women of color has been an indispensable corollary to its disgust with nonreproductive sex more generally, as the Reagan era's mythic "welfare queen" made clear.[18] But with all

[14] Glenn Feldman, "The Status Quo Society, the Rope of Religion, and the New Racism," *ibid.*, 287–352 (quotation on 304); James N. Gregory, *The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White Southerners Transformed America* (Chapel Hill, 2005), 316.

[15] Feldman, "Status Quo Society," 287 (quotation); Angelique C. Harris, "Homosexuality and the Black Church," *Journal of African American History*, 93 (Spring 2008), 262–70; Dale McConkey, "Whither Hunter's Culture War? Shifts in Evangelical Morality, 1988–1998," *Sociology of Religion*, 62 (Summer 2001), 149–74. On the scapegoating of African American voters for the passage of a gay marriage ban in California in 2008, see Margaret O'Brien Steinfels, "Sex, Religion and Prop 8," *Commonweal*, February 27, 2009, pp. 10–11.

[16] Angela D. Dillard, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner Now? Multicultural Conservatism in America* (New York, 2001), chaps. 3–4.

[17] Cathy J. Cohen, *The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics* (Chicago, 1999). For additional references, see Melinda Chateauvert, "Framing Sexual Citizenship: Reconsidering the Discourse on African American Families," *Journal of African American History*, 93 (Spring 2008), 198–222, esp. 219*n*20–21.

[18] Ronald Reagan introduced the figure of the welfare queen to national political discourse in a 1976 campaign speech. "'Welfare Queen' Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign," New York *Times*, February 15, 1976, p. 51. On the role of white conservative hostility to black women's fertility in downsizing social provisions, see, for example, Ana Teresa Ortiz and Laura Briggs, "The Culture of Poverty, Crack Babies, and Welfare Cheats: The Making of the 'Healthy White Baby Crisis,'"

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the historical talent that has gone into analyzing black and white religious responses to slavery and white supremacy, the explicitly sexual basis for recent Christian conservatism is more assumed than explained. Fortunately, some classic research questions—"Cui bono?" "Cherchez la femme!"—are addressing the riddle at the heart of the secular liberal academy's concern with the post-1970 Republican coalition: Why has Christian opposition to abortion and homosexuality specifically been so effective as the enabler of free-market economic policies in this period? Why were so many evangelicals, fundamentalists, and Pentecostals, as well as many Catholics and Mormons, available for national mobilization around these particular issues and not, say, temperance or gambling? How did the self-styled "values voters" behind deregulation, privatization, and globalization come to see nonreproductive sex as the central threat to America's soul? In short, how did Milton Friedman wind up in bed with Jerry Falwell?

In order to untangle this odd couple, we can begin with a brief reminder of just how central the twin issues of abortion and homosexuality became to religious conservatives in the last three decades of the twentieth century.[19] Although pronatalism and rigid sexual mores have long been a conservative touchstone, the Right's newly obsessive focus on reproduction first took shape in the early 1970s. At first the targets were quite varied: the evangelical *Christianity Today*, for example, ramped up its coverage of sex-related issues with concern over what it saw as increased promiscuity after the upheavals of the sixties. But the focus soon narrowed sharply to the pair of sexual issues that insulated straight men themselves from criticism: abortion and homosexuality—crimes against reproduction—eclipsed much more broad-based sexual issues like rising divorce rates and heterosexual infidelity.[20] A Pentecostal Florida ministry promoted shepherding, a form of individual accountability to a male spiritual guide that descended from the Navigators, a ministry incorporated in California in 1943. The early shepherds were reportedly galvanized into this intense form of patriarchal

Social Text, 21 (Fall 2003), 39–57; and Susan L. Thomas, "Race, Gender, and Welfare Reform: The Antinatalist Response," *Journal of Black Studies*, 28 (March 1998), 419–46.

[19] Although there is not space here for a complete review of the political rise of family values, excellent summaries can be found in Dillard, *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner Now?* 137–70; and William Martin, *With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America* (New York, 1996), 168–90. For more recent syntheses, see Paul Boyer, "The Evangelical Resurgence in 1970s American Protestantism," in Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), 29–51; Matthew D. Lassiter, "Inventing Family Values," *ibid.*, 13–28; and Marjorie J. Spruill, "Gender and America's Right Turn," *ibid.*, 71–89.

[20] W. Bradford Wilcox, *Soft Patriarchs, New Men: How Christianity Shapes Fathers and Husbands* (Chicago, 2004), 46.

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authority by the revelation that a colleague in the charismatic Holy Spirit Teaching Mission was "a practicing homosexual."[21] Anita Bryant launched a campaign in 1977 to "Save Our Children" from sterile homosexual recruitment by schoolteachers. Her mobilization of conservative Floridians resulted in the removal of homosexuals from Dade County's antidiscrimination clause.[22] In 1977, Focus on the Family was founded by James Dobson, a child psychologist and the son of an itinerant evangelist couple from Oklahoma and Texas. The organization grew in two decades to generate more than a hundred million dollars annually through its vast media, research, and counseling activities.[23] And the canny use of direct mail by Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority organization, launched in 1979, united fundamentalists, evangelicals, conservative Catholics, and Mormons as a political force with attacks on abortion, homosexuality, pornography, and the Equal Rights Amendment.[24]

In 1979, Christian surgeon—and later United States surgeon general—C. Everett Koop teamed up with the prolific antiabortion crusader Francis A. Schaeffer to produce *Whatever Happened to the Human Race?* Under this title, a book, a five-part video sequence, and a traveling workshop laid out the winning argument against abortion for Christians who had previously shown little formal concern: rational Enlightenment values—"secular humanism" in the authors' argot—could not distinguish between vulnerable, unproductive, noncontributing members of the human race and any other drag on maximum efficiency. With the machine as its supreme being, the argument went, perverse, pitiless reason could define people as expendable. In the most striking linkage of these themes, Koop appears in the video posed on the Dead Sea site of Sodom, surrounded by thousands of plastic baby dolls floating face down in the brine. The connection might not have been entirely clear—sodomites are a traditionally underrepresented market for abortion services—but Koop was ready to spell it out: "Sodom," he explains as the camera focuses in on the dolls' faces, "was the most humanly corrupt city on earth" and thus demonstrated the depravity of a society cut loose from moral law.[25] This same

[21] Stephen Mansfield, *Derek Prince: A Biography* (Lake Mary, Fla., 2005), 227.

[22] For a firsthand account, see Anita Bryant, *The Anita Bryant Story: The Survival of Our Nation's Families and the Threat of Militant Homosexuality* (Old Tappan, N.J., 1977).

[23] Martin, *With God on Our Side*, 341.

[24] Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (New York, 1995), 128–36, 174–77.

[25] C. Everett Koop, *Koop: The Memoirs of America's Family Doctor* (New York, 1991), 267–68; Francis A. Schaeffer and C. Everett Koop, *Whatever Happened to the Human Race?*

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associational loop still echoed a generation later. Bishop Eddie L. Long of Atlanta's 10,000-seat New Birth Missionary Baptist Church, for example, called cloning, male homosexuality, and lesbianism "spiritual abortions" in a sermon on godly reproduction.[26]

The image of absolutely vulnerable human life tossed out as refuse has dramatically haunted conservative Christianity since the mid-1970s. Jerry Falwell's account of his awakening to an active prolife position invoked a dumpster in Los Angeles overflowing with the dismembered remains of 1,700 fetal bodies and a trash incinerator in Wichita, Kansas, sending up hundreds more like the victims of the Auschwitz concentration camp.[27] Here is a poignant link between the emotional content of so-called family values and the historically specific circumstances in which they gained purchase. During these same years, the postindustrial economy's accelerated drive to render people functionally obsolete was figured in the political Left's imagery as the dispossessed, the reserve army of the unemployed. But the mirror image on the Right found expression as horror at the potential loss of meaning in human reproduction. The dispossessed in this cosmology were the children unconceived or unborn because of their economic superfluity—hence the emphasis on abortion as the callous strategy of ambitious "career women" who cannot be inconvenienced by babies, or on homosexuals as an affluent population that selfishly consumes without reproducing.[28]

Reproduction became central as the American economy shifted from production to reproduction, or service. With the historical specificity of family values before them, scholars can augment the national story of the New Deal order and the Reagan Revolution with an international one: the rise of the economic philosophy of neoliberalism, that is, the belief that individual entrepreneurship, vigorous private property rights, and minimal barriers to trade are the best guarantors of personal freedom and

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(Old Tappan, N.J., 1979); *Whatever Happened to the Human Race?* (5 videocassettes; Muskegon, Mich., 1979–1980). The video sequence can be seen in *With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America* (6 videocassettes; [Alexandria, Va.], 1996), episode five, "And Who Shall Lead Them? 1985–1988."

[26] Jasmyne A. Cannick, "Gays Lose Advocate with Death of King," *Lesbian News*, 31 (March 2006), 39.

[27] Falwell's imagery is analyzed in Susan Friend Harding, *The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics* (Princeton, 2000), 196.

[28] For an illuminating exploration of these themes with reference to abortion specifically, see Kristin Luker, *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood* (Berkeley, 1984), esp. 204. On the homosexual portrayed as insatiable consumer, see Ann Pellegrini, "Consuming Lifestyle: Commodity Capitalism and Transformations in Gay Identity," in Cruz-Malavé and Manalansan, eds., *Queer Globalizations*, 134–45. Pellegrini points out that supporters of Colorado's antigay Amendment 2 argued that gays could not be a minority because of their purported affluence.

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well-being.[29] Although President Richard M. Nixon famously embraced Keynesianism as universal, the recession of 1973–1974 and the ensuing stagflation gave Keynes's rivals from the Mont Pelerin Society a chance to win hearts and minds. Market supremacy, initially a fringe doctrine of this Austrian school of economists, began in the 1970s to claim the commanding heights of international policy. The abandonment of the gold standard, the invention of new forms of hypermobile currency, and full-throttle deregulation in the United States began in the decade before Ronald Reagan's election. Soon Reaganomics, Thatcherism, and the market revolution in Deng Xiaoping's China anchored the new order. Bodies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund expanded from their postwar role of saving devastated Europe from communism to achieving international economic integration—a process that moved, after the early 1970s, along aggressively free-market lines. Thus the international economic terrain was reordered by free-trade treaties, financialization, deregulation, outsourcing, and privatization, as well as by the revolution in production and communication: the maquiladora, the shipping container, the big rig, and the private satellite system that coordinated them all.[30]

But as Nancy MacLean forcefully argues, this international genealogy obscures neoliberalism's regional roots in the United States. The one-party rule resulting from mass disenfranchisement in the South produced a gerontocracy of powerful incumbents in the congressional committee system. Making common cause with probusiness Republicans, these segregationist Democrats broke the back of the labor and civil rights Left in the years immediately following World War II. The antiunion Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 essentially halted the spread of unions beyond their established territory. Southern champions

[29] A helpful introduction is David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford, Eng., 2005); a longer historical grounding is available in the classic Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Social Origins of Our Time* (Boston, 1944).

[30] On the financial revolution see Wim Dierckxsens, *The Limits of Capitalism: An Approach to Globalization without Neoliberalism* (London, 2000); on the international reordering of production and distribution, see Edna Bonacich, with Khaleelah Hardie, "Wal-Mart and the Logistics Revolution," in Nelson Lichtenstein, ed., *Wal-Mart: The Face of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism* (New York, 2006), 163–87; Jefferson Cowie, *Capital Moves: RCA's Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor* (Ithaca, 1999); Dana Frank, *Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic Nationalism* (Boston, 1999); William Greider, *One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism* (New York, 1997); Shane Hamilton, *Trucking Country: The Road to America's Wal-Mart Economy* (Princeton, 2008); and Peter J. Hugill, "The Geostrategy of Global Business: Wal-Mart and Its Historical Forbears," in Stanley D. Brunn, ed., *Wal-Mart World: The World's Biggest Corporation in the Global Economy* (New York, 2006), 3–14. For a relevant perspective on the global "thinning out" of national sovereignty, see Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Introduction: Religion, States, and Transnational Civil Society," in Rudolph and James Piscatori, eds., *Transnational Religion and Fading States* (Boulder, Colo., 1997), 1–24 (quotation on 11).

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of industrial development lost no time in promoting their region's anti-unionism to lure facilities out of the Northeast. With the unions on the defensive, the conservative congressional alliance aggressively pursued political opposition through the domestic political surveillance of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and its many state-level imitators. Fearful that racial terrorism in the South would be called into question by international human rights treaties, the same coalition even prevented President Dwight D. Eisenhower from signing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. As examples from China and Russia, Chile and Bolivia would all later confirm for other settings, an unfree political system in the Jim Crow South could coexist quite productively with a free market.[31]

Elsewhere I argue for some of the evangelical content of American neoliberalism, but equally important was the long postwar experience of outsourcing state functions to religious bodies. Since World War II, finds historian Axel R. Schäfer, U.S. government subsidization of the faith industries has totaled billions in "tax exemptions, loans, vouchers, grants-in-aid and purchase-of-service agreements" offered to religious institutions in health care, education, and welfare. Taxpayer gifts to the sectarian faith sector included donating public land and former military installations, underwriting overseas missions, maintaining the military chaplaincy, and subcontracting to religious aid organizations. Far from being a redoubt of private associational life, the faith arena developed a robust relationship with the state along the same lines as many for-profit industries: legal protection and public funding welcomed as their due, oversight rejected as government tyranny. "Ironically," writes Schäfer, "the programs of the Great Society, so often vilified by the Christian Right, were crucial in bringing evangelical organizations into the public-private funding arrangement." By the time the second Bush administration established an Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, the church had long been a favored stand-in for the state.[32]

[31] James C. Cobb, *The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936–1980* (Baton Rouge, 1982), 101–2; Nancy MacLean, "Southern Dominance in Borrowed Language: The Regional Origins of American Neoliberalism," in Jane L. Collins, Micaela di Leonardo, and Brett Williams, eds., *New Landscapes of Inequality: Neoliberalism and the Erosion of Democracy in America* (Santa Fe, 2008), 27–28. See also Eugene D. Genovese, *The World the Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in Interpretation* (New York, 1969).

[32] Axel R. Schäfer, "The Cold War State and the Resurgence of Evangelicalism: A Study of the Public Funding of Religion Since 1945," *Radical History Review*, no. 99 (Fall 2007), 19–50 (quotations on 20). Schäfer's history is particularly helpful when read alongside Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945–60* (Urbana, 1994); Alice O'Connor, "Financing the Counterrevolution," in Schulman and Zelizer,

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Now the global financial markets, the national election returns, the suburban Atlanta megachurch, and the Christian home begin to come into focus as a unified field of action: In the United States, rather than sharing some of the concrete costs of reproduction through social provisions, we assign the majority of these costs directly to individual mothers. Most of the persistent gender gap in wages—women working full-time still earn annually only about 78 cents on the male dollar—is actually a gap between mothers and everyone else. At work, mothers are held to stricter standards of punctuality and productivity, hired less often, and judged less promotable, less competent, less dependable, and less committed to their jobs—all demonstrated in experiments that control for actual differences in performance or qualifications. Fathers, in contrast, find their earnings and approval enhanced compared with childless men's.[33]

Thus the sacralization of reproduction in the late twentieth century guarantees a socially honored position, writes Linda Kintz, "for women who have a deep and realistic fear that without such a guarantee, they will inevitably be judged against men and found lacking. Then they and their children will be left at great risk in a society based on masculine competition, whether built by free-market theorists or liberal institutions."[34] Mothers are particularly exposed by the American system of linking access to important social benefits like health insurance and Social Security to marriage rather than citizenship. Especially since the early 1970s, the new freedom of private investment capital to seek out a "good business climate" across national borders has meant that

eds., *Rightward Bound*, 148–68; and Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan* (New York, 2009).

[33] Lisa Belkin, "When Mom and Dad Share It All," *New York Times Magazine*, June 15, 2008, pp. 44–51, 74, 78; Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., "Is Anyone Doing the Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor," *Social Forces*, 79 (September 2000), 191–228; Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard, and In Paik, "Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 112 (March 2007), 1297–338; Institute for Women's Policy Research, "The Gender Wage Gap: 2008," www.iwpr.org/pdf/c350.pdf. Bianchi and her coauthors find that a lowering of the total number of hours that women spend on housework, along with some increase in the number men spend (particularly in discretionary chores like yard work), has narrowed the gap between them somewhat. Most of this narrowing, however, was accomplished by 1985. Subsequently, women have continued to perform roughly twice as much domestic labor as men in coupled households, and more of it in the "core" daily tasks like cooking and cleaning. The presence of children significantly increases that gap. For an influential earlier study, see Arlie Hochschild, with Anne Machung, *The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home* (New York, 1989). A recent New York *Times* article points out that even unemployed men do not take up the slack in housework or child care when their wives are working for pay. See Catherine Rampell, "As Layoffs Surge, Women May Pass Men in Job Force," New York *Times*, February 6, 2009, A1.

[34] Linda Kintz, *Between Jesus and the Market: The Emotions That Matter in Right-Wing America* (Durham, N.C., 1997), 39–40.

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countries offering generous social provisions are at a competitive disadvantage. Under the new free-trade model, the state must outsource its social functions to private families in order to present the svelte silhouette that woos multinational investment. The sanctification of reproduction gave conservative Christian men an ideological stake in the institution of marriage itself. As fallible as this commitment may have been, it at least openly acknowledged women's greater economic vulnerability in reproduction, whereas most workplaces still refuse to reimagine their employees—male or female—as people with responsibilities for reproductive labor. For women taking on the full risks of motherhood under these circumstances, a husband who understands his marriage as a covenant rather than a contract is a bulwark against multiple hardships.[35]

In the 1970s, then, the new political economy began to make the unpaid delivery of care a vital resource, as national governments shed their social services in order to attract the capital that now could follow the lowest taxes and laxest protections to redoubts like Ciudad Juárez or Shenzhen or even to the bulging prisons that began to fill rural America. To the extent that health care, child rearing, and elder care could be privatized—that is, in practice, largely relegated to individual women—then the state could in effect perform a striptease for international investors, showing them just what a cheap date it was prepared to be. Here, writes Lisa Duggan, lies another root cause of the status of family values as a ruling ideology in American political life: marriage—where church and state authority uniquely combine—is an ever more important "coercive tool of the privatization of social costs."[36]

For southern historians, this point should hardly be controversial: thanks to Stephanie McCurry's "masters of small worlds," Annette Gordon-Reed's Monticello, and Kathleen M. Brown's "anxious patriarchs," the field has ample ways to concretize the foundational distribu-

[35] See, for example, Nancy Tatom Ammerman, *Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern World* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1987); John P. Bartkowski, *Remaking the Godly Marriage: Gender Negotiations in Evangelical Families* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2001); Bartkowski, *The Promise Keepers: Servants, Soldiers, and Godly Men* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2004); Brenda E. Brasher, *Godly Women: Fundamentalism and Female Power* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1998); Dane S. Claussen, *The Promise Keepers: Essays on Masculinity and Christianity* (Jefferson, N.C., 2000); R. Marie Griffith, *God's Daughters: Evangelical Women and the Power of Submission* (Berkeley, 1997); Julie Ingersoll, *Evangelical Christian Women: War Stories in the Gender Battles* (New York, 2003); and Wilcox, *Soft Patriarchs, New Men.*

[36] Lisa Duggan, *The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy* (Boston, 2003), 17; Ruth Rosen, "The Care Crisis: How Women Are Bearing the Burden of a National Emergency," *Nation*, March 12, 2007, pp. 11–16. For related arguments about other relevant aspects of the neoliberal family, see Diana Marre and Laura Briggs, eds., *International Adoption: Global Inequalities and the Circulation of Children* (New York, 2009).

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tion of power, labor, and property through the mechanism of the family, the "two faces of republicanism" that defined a political sphere of equal male individuals by its necessary exclusion of those placed under their authority.[37] In the decades after 1970, then, in a context where women worked a second shift, where they continued to earn a fraction of men's wages for the same jobs, where white families could not so easily outsource domestic chores to black women, and where health insurance was a reward for those who could find someone else to mind the children, the sick, and the infirm for forty hours a week, this emphasis on reproduction served very real interests.[38] Across the Sun Belt, booming evangelical, fundamentalist, and Pentecostal congregations and parachurch organizations modeled themselves on the consumer-oriented service sector and undertook the hard work of feminizing men by redefining their domestic contributions as leadership.

While the servant-leader model was broadly influential under neoliberalism, some Christian conservatives took it to extraordinary lengths, creating what amounts to an alternative political economy of service. In a fascinating examination of the self-styled "Christian patriarchy" movement, journalist Kathryn Joyce traces a subculture of families that practice "biblical manhood and womanhood," homeschool their children, and strive for a "full quiver" of ten, twelve, even eighteen offspring (from Psalm 127: "As arrows are in the hand of a mighty man, so are children of the youth. Happy is the man that hath his quiver full of them"). Here, masculine authority, privatization of public services, and fervent pronatalism have combined, supported by a wide network of ministries, Christian homeschooling associations, teaching materials, training institutes, film festivals, Internet communities, blogs, and a flood of advice books and periodicals with titles like *The Excellent Wife*, *The Way Home*, *Created to Be His Help Meet*,

[37] Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill, 1996); Annette Gordon-Reed, *The Hemingses of Monticello: An American Family* (New York, 2008); Stephanie McCurry, *Masters of Small Worlds: Yeoman Households, Gender Relations, and the Political Culture of the Antebellum South Carolina Low Country* (New York, 1995); McCurry, "The Two Faces of Republicanism: Gender and Proslavery Politics in Antebellum South Carolina," *Journal of American History*, 78 (March 1992), 1245–64. For an excellent synthesis, with particular reference to Christianity, see Susan Juster, "The Spirit and the Flesh: Gender, Language, and Sexuality in American Protestantism," in Stout and Hart, eds., *New Directions in American Religious History*, 334–61.

[38] A related literature considers how the racialized international traffic in care workers—from nannies and maids to surrogate mothers and laborers in spa-style hospitals or retirement homes in low-wage countries—has "offshored" some of the reproductive work that is so unaccommodated in American homes and jobs. See, for example, essays in Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild, eds., *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy* (New York, 2003).

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Be Fruitful and Multiply, and *Patriarch*. "Among some purists," Joyce writes, "[submission] means submitting a list of daily activities to one's husband for approval and following his directions regarding work, going to church, clothing, head covering and makeup choices . . . . Sexually, it means being available at all times for all activities (barring a very limited number of 'ungodly,' 'homosexual' acts)"—a reminder that sexual services themselves are part of the domestic economy, not just a symbol of it.[39] As Joyce relates, the extreme norms of female submission are enforced by house churches reminiscent of the 1970s Gulf Coast–based shepherding movement, as well as by larger congregations with a full apparatus of disciplinary measures like collective shunning. Full-throttle Christian patriarchy has been influenced by the extreme, theocratic Christian Reconstructionist movement, whose primary architect, Rousas John Rushdoony, advocated abolishing public schools as well as prisons, credit, and taxation and returning to biblical legal norms like public stoning for sodomy and adultery.[40] More generally, Christian homeschooling, supported by a 1972 Supreme Court decision, exploded in the final third of the twentieth century.[41]

With these connections in view, where else can we look to see possible relationships among domestic politics, federal subsidy, world revival, neoliberalism, and family values? Several directions are particularly suggestive in the southern historical context. Historians have argued for literal continuities between, for example, slavery and the forced labor systems of nineteenth-century criminal justice regimes.[42] A wave of scholarship on the more recent "prison industrial complex" links the Nixon- and Reagan-era legacies of mass incarceration to the same economic and moral reordering under neoliberal family values.[43] Recently Tanya Erzen has made the link to evangelical conservatism more concrete with her work on faith-based prisons. In a pair of articles,

[39] Kathryn Joyce, *Quiverfull: Inside the Christian Patriarchy Movement* (Boston, 2009), esp. 53.

[40] Sara Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right* (Boston, 1989), 136–41.

[41] J. Gary Knowles, Stacey E. Marlow, and James A. Muchmore, "From Pedagogy to Ideology: Origins and Phases of Home Education in the United States, 1970–1990," *American Journal of Education*, 100 (February 1992), 195–235.

[42] Alex Lichtenstein, *Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor in the New South* (London, 1996); David M. Oshinsky, *"Worse than Slavery": Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice* (New York, 1996); Amy Dru Stanley, *From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation* (Cambridge, Eng., 1998).

[43] Angela Y. Davis, *Are Prisons Obsolete?* (New York, 2003), esp. chap. 6; Ruth Wilson Gilmore, "Globalisation and US Prison Growth: From Military Keynesianism to Post-Keynesian Militarism," *Race and Class*, 40 (March 1999), 171–88; Julia Sudbury, *Global Lockdown: Race, Gender, and the Prison-Industrial Complex* (New York, 2005).

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she describes Prison Fellowship Ministries (PFM), led by Watergate felon Charles W. "Chuck" Colson. Following the national trend to contract for policing, corrections, and military work, at least five states have outsourced to PFM the administration of whole sections of medium-security prisons for men. To participate in PFM's Christian immersion program, InnerChange Freedom Initiative, the prisoners must be born again, making PFM the only recipient of federal funds to actually require conversion. The program's instruction includes lessons in doctrine and scripture as well as time management, anger control, family relations, addiction counseling, and computer literacy. The InnerChange prisoners also receive considerable perks, like private bathrooms and visits from family members as well as personal mentoring by church volunteers.[44] "'The Christians do lots of stuff the state used to do,'" a Florida prisoner told Erzen, "'like vocational programs, but now they're only for believers.'" The elimination of Pell grants in 1994, moreover, meant college programs in prisons collapsed, whereas faith-based ones boomed. Christian organizations likewise provide many social services upon release, like housing, job placement, and a stable community, which are in scarce supply as public goods. "The program represents the cutting edge of the faith-based initiatives," Erzen writes, "which seek to have religious groups take over social services once provided by state and federal agencies and, in so doing, fulfill two goals: bringing more people to Christ and shrinking government."[45]

In fact, Erzen goes on to show, both PFM and the premier evangelical family values organization, Focus on the Family, are quite explicit about the neoliberal argument for individual Christian morality. In the case of the outsourced prison program, PFM's Chuck Colson argues that the personal transformation saves taxpayer money in the long run by reducing recidivism rates. For James Dobson, who heads Focus on the Family's advice and lobbying empire, the slippery slope of legalized gay marriage would bankrupt private employers and the insurance industry as well as the government by opening up vast new categories of dependents eligible for the concrete privileges of state-sanctioned sexual relations. In the absence of narrowly defined marriage, a Focus on the Family pamphlet explains, "what would keep two heterosexual single moms—or even six of them—from 'marrying' simply so they can

[44] Tanya Erzen, "Testimonial Politics: The Christian Right's Faith-Based Approach to Marriage and Imprisonment," *American Quarterly*, 59 (September 2007), 991–1015, esp. 1008.

[45] *Ibid.*, 1008 (quotations); Tanya Erzen, "Religious Literacy in the Faith-Based Prison," *Publications of the Modern Language Association*, 123 (May 2008), 659–64.

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receive family health, tax and social security benefits together?"[46] Both Dobson and Colson have served on the Council for National Policy, which brought conservative politicians like Oliver North and Tom DeLay to the table with Christian leaders like Bob Jones, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson. The personal testimonies of reformed criminals and "ex-gays" that anchor the conservatives' arguments allow nationally coordinated campaigns to speak through individuals—simultaneously the repetition and the enactment of Margaret Thatcher's famous dictum, "There is no such thing as society," only individuals. Conversion as the only route to change lets the state off the hook for crime and poverty. Groups like PFM, Focus on the Family, and Exodus International (an ex-gay ministry) "are involved in cultural and moral reform aimed at transforming the state. They highlight individual testimonies as a way to remold the criminal justice system, prisons, and laws governing marriage and sexuality into a biblical Christian worldview."[47]

For a country whose incarceration rate rivals fundamentalist Iran's, then, life behind bars is a sadly crucial archive. The military makes for an interesting counterpoint. As Joel A. Carpenter makes clear, the mass mobilizations of World War II contributed decisively to the missionary and evangelical boom that followed. Anne C. Loveland illuminates the organized growth of Pentecostal, evangelical, and fundamentalist influence within the military itself as well as organized evangelical campaigns to shape defense policy. Beginning in the 1940s, when evangelicals launched a "mission to the military" in the face of resistance from military leadership and an overwhelmingly mainline chaplaincy, the conservative Christians came from behind to achieve broad influence in the armed forces. "The turning point in their campaign," Loveland finds, "came during the 1960s and early 1970s, when, largely as a result of their support for the Vietnam War, they earned the appreciation and gratitude of the military leadership." Both at the Pentagon and in the far-flung encampments of the American forces, ministries like the Navigators, International Christian Leadership, and the Officers' Christian Fellowship organized Bible study, radio ministry,

[46] See *Is Marriage in Jeopardy?* at http://www.focusonthefamily.ca/tfn/family/PDF/Marriage_in_Jeopardy.pdf (quotation on 13); James Dobson, *Marriage Under Fire: Why We Must Win This War* (Sisters, Ore., 2004); and Erzen, "Testimonial Politics," 1008–9. See also Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, "Talking Straight: Narrating the Political Economy of Gay Rights," in Sanford F. Schram and Philip T. Neisser, eds., *Tales of the State: Narratives in Contemporary U.S. Politics and Public Policy* (Lanham, Md., 1997), 89–101.

[47] Erzen, "Testimonial Politics," 997 (third quotation), 1002, 1004 (first quotation); Margaret Thatcher, "Interview for *Woman's Own*," September 23, 1987, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689.

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biblical counseling, and prayer breakfasts, and retired officers rotated into command at the parachurch organizations. In the 1980s, born-again commanding officers engaged Focus on the Family's James Dobson as a consultant for the official army family program, and, as Lori Lyn Bogle documents, the Korean War–era Department of Defense actively promoted conservative Christian interpretations of the cold war through public seminars and materials.[48] The connections may continue even in the age of outsourcing: the military contractor Xe (formerly known as Blackwater), headquartered in Moyock, North Carolina, is headed by "staunch right-wing Christian" Erik Prince, whose father Edgar helped found the Family Research Council and whose sister Betsy is the daughter-in-law of Amway cofounder Richard DeVos, a key actor in the rise of the New Christian Right.[49]

Where else can we explore the overlap between domestic economy and political economy? The modern regulation of sexuality heightened the stakes in the "defense of marriage" and made government the ally of the church through abstinence education, marriage promotion, kinship-based immigration laws, legislation and constitutional amendments against "gay marriage," and the end of welfare as we knew it.[50] Looking at another wing of foreign policy, journalist Michelle Goldberg offers a fascinating history of the rise of America's "faith-based . . . population policy" as part of her broad analysis of global battles over control of women's fertility from the mid-twentieth century. At the 1984 International Conference on Population in Mexico City, the carefully selected American delegation reversed the United States' former support for family limitation as a key precondition to economic development and began the pattern of de-funding overseas family planning programs that offered or even referred to abortion. With more than a whiff of the supply-side economists' own prosperity gospel, the official U.S. statement assumed that it was governmental meddling in economics that "turned population growth from a potential asset to a liability; thus," Goldberg summarizes, "the answer to overpopulation was laissez-faire capitalism." Using research produced by Catholic and Mormon

[48] Joel A. Carpenter, *Revive Us Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism* (New York, 1997), 177–86; Anne C. Loveland, *American Evangelicals and the U.S. Military, 1942–1993* (Baton Rouge, 1996), esp. xi–xii (quotations), 27; Lori Lyn Bogle, *The Pentagon's Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War* (College Station, Tex., 2004).

[49] Jeremy Scahill, "Blackwater Down," in Betsy Reed, ed., *Unnatural Disaster:* The Nation *on Hurricane Katrina* (New York, 2006), 73–79 (quotation on 78).

[50] Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, *Love the Sin: Sexual Regulation and the Limits of Religious Tolerance* (New York, 2003); Duggan, *Twilight of Equality?* 13–17; Rosen, "Care Crisis."

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prolife think tanks, official U.S. delegations to international conferences during George W. Bush's presidency included Janice Crouse, the leader of Concerned Women for America, and Christian radio host Janet Parshall. Outside official channels, American Christian conservatives could be found making common cause over pronatalism with Muslim fundamentalists at forums like the 2004 Doha International Conference for the Family.[51] Other scholars have explored additional public effects of neoliberal family values: Christian activism over "sex trafficking," for example, has erased mentions of other, far more prevalent forms of coerced labor in legislation as well as rhetoric, while policing consensual adult sex work under the cover of child exploitation.[52] Similarly, writes Roger N. Lancaster, whole new populations have come under punitive surveillance thanks to hysteria over wildly anomalous episodes of stranger abduction and a catchall category of sexual predators that conflates a serial child rapist with a high school senior who "gets lucky" at the junior prom.[53] In short, this work suggests, the content of American religious conservatism owes a great deal to the shape of international economic realignment, and vice versa.

Not surprisingly, then, one promising arena in which to look for the historically specific links among sex, conservatism, and religion is in the ethereal new economy itself, especially the transnational corporations that arose after World War II. Perhaps the purest examples are the direct sales organizations like Amway and Mary Kay Cosmetics, whose near-perfect business model of Christian inspiration, family values, and "belief in the moral virtue of entrepreneurialism" are brilliantly analyzed by Nicole Woolsey Biggart.[54] In the 1980s, too, Arkansas-based Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., employed a director of marriage and family living, who instructed managers on principles of "servant leadership" for

[51] Michelle Goldberg, *The Means of Reproduction: Sex, Power, and the Future of the World* (New York, 2009), 90–102 (first quotation on 94; second and third quotations on 97).

[52] Elizabeth Bernstein, "The Sexual Politics of the 'New Abolitionism,'" *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 18 (Fall 2007), 128–51; Jennifer Block, "Sex Trafficking: Why the Faith Trade Is Interested in the Sex Trade," *Conscience*, 25 (Summer–Autumn 2004), 32–35.

[53] Roger N. Lancaster, "State of Panic," in Collins, di Leonardo, and Williams, eds., *New Landscapes of Inequality*, 39–64. Using federal crime statistics, Lancaster points out that the vast majority of child abductions are in familial custody disputes. For more on the 1980s phenomenon of sex panics that masked children's intrafamily jeopardy, see Debbie Nathan and Michael Snedeker, *Satan's Silence: Ritual Abuse and the Making of a Modern American Witch Hunt* (New York, 1995); for longer historical perspective see Estelle B. Freedman, "'Uncontrolled Desires': The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920–1960," *Journal of American History*, 74 (June 1987), 83–106.

[54] Nicole Woolsey Biggart, *Charismatic Capitalism: Direct Selling Organizations in America* (Chicago, 1989), 12. See also Stephen Butterfield, *Amway: The Cult of Free Enterprise* (Boston, 1985).

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home and work.[55] It was a telling move. The second half of the twentieth century saw an unprecedented feminization of paid work, both in terms of the sex of workers and in terms of the kinds of work to be performed. By the mid-1990s the United States was home to more than twice as many jobs in retail and other services as in mining, manufacturing, and construction combined. In 2002 Wal-Mart passed Exxon-Mobil to become for a time the world's largest company, the first service provider in history to hold that distinction.[56] Logically, this revaluation of service work ought to have forced a new assessment of the people who had traditionally performed it. The work undertaken in stores, hospitals, schools, and restaurants, after all, is the reproductive labor of the household thrown out into a marketplace, the work of care that reproduces a labor force.

But the rise of the service economy instead saw the fall of the service worker. During the late 1980s at Wal-Mart management meetings, at storewide weekend encounter groups, and through the company's personal advice hotline, the director of marriage and family living promoted within Wal-Mart a widespread trend in evangelical culture generally. Urging the men in his audiences to learn from their wives, the Abilene Christian University professor who held the post joined many other Christian leaders in promoting a new style of godly family life. As elaborated in seminars and in churches, Christian advice books, parachurch organizations, radio shows, and evangelical families themselves, this new ordering of intimate relations ceded significant ground to women in exchange for maintaining masculine authority at home and at work. As evangelical men and women circulated through homes and workplaces, the revaluation of women's work provided the pattern for both. Men's precedence required respect for the second shift and for women's allegedly superior people skills, now indispensable for management and marketing as well as humble service work. At the level of the stores, Christian women on both sides of the Wal-Mart checkout line incorporated many of their priorities into the new workplace. More generally, the growing religious identity of the discount store produced distinct experiences of mass consumption, low-wage work, and

[55] Transcript of address by Paul Faulkner to Wal-Mart managers' meeting, February 20, 1987, available through Flagler Productions, Inc., Lenexa, Kans., reference no. 00243A (quotation); profile of Paul Faulkner, www.acu.edu/centennial/profiles/paul_faulkner.html; Sam M. Walton, "Message to Associates: Our Focus for '92," *Wal-Mart World*, February 1992, p. 5. For the full argument, see Bethany Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), chaps. 5–6.

[56] Paola Hjelt, "Global 500: The World's Largest Corporations," *Fortune*, July 22, 2002, pp. 144–47.

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managerial ideology. Christened "servant leadership" by its formal adherents, this new ethic glorified formerly humble, feminine reproductive labor. Taken up by many corporations and Christian opinion-makers and embraced by families in the pews, servant leadership offered something to everyone. Service workers found a measure of respect denied them by the heroic narratives of industry. Managers gained a new claim to authority just as their older ones came to look increasingly implausible. Christian husbands acquired an enhanced status at home despite the loss of the breadwinner's mantle. And many evangelical women found wifely submission a small price to pay for men's reinvestment in the domestic sphere. Crafting this ethos was the cultural work of many people with a variety of perspectives and interests, and the submission-headship bargain was struck by Christians across the Americas. Wal-Mart and its constituencies, however, played a prominent role, drawing on the day-to-day experience of service labor and freely mingling their Christian priorities with the demands of the new economy.[57]

One last snapshot from the neoliberal religious frontier takes us to the foundational myth of modern southern histories. In a recent article, Melani McAlister describes a 2000 video produced by the Oklahoma-based ministry Voice of the Martyrs. It opens with a young Sudanese boy, a victim of the country's civil war, speaking through a translator. He tells how Muslims tried to force him to convert and then looks away from the camera as he raises his shirt to show appalling burn scars, the badges of his refusal to deny his faith. Graphic displays of violated bodies, McAlister shows, have exploded in Christian activism: "Chronicled in magazines ranging from conservative venues like *World* to the moderately conservative *Christianity Today* to the left-leaning *Sojourners*, described in books and on websites, pictured in fundraising newsletters and DVDs sold in church basements, 'the persecuted body'—the physical body of the believer and the body or church of Christ—became an article of faith and a springboard for political activism."[58]

[57] Moreton, *To Serve God and Wal-Mart*, 100–124; Elizabeth Brusco, *The Reformation of Machismo: Evangelical Conversion and Gender in Colombia* (Austin, 1995), 3; Cecília Loreto Mariz and María das Dores Campos Machado, "Pentecostalism and Women in Brazil," in Edward L. Cleary and Hannah W. Stewart-Gambino, eds., *Power, Politics, and Pentecostals in Latin America* (Boulder, Colo., 1997), 41–54. See also Cecília Loreto Mariz, *Coping with Poverty: Pentecostals and Christian Base Communities in Brazil* (Philadelphia, 1994); and Timothy J. Steigenga and David A. Smilde, "Wrapped in the Holy Shawl: The Strange Case of Conservative Christians and Gender Equality in Latin America," in Christian Smith and Joshua Prokopy, eds., *Latin American Religion in Motion* (New York, 1999), 173–86. For the United States, see also the works cited above in note 37.

[58] Melani McAlister, "The Politics of Persecution," *Middle East Report*, no. 249 (Winter 2008), 18–27 (quotation on 19).

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Despite Christian conservatives' rise to formal influence in the United States, McAlister argues, many evangelicals understand themselves to be part of an embattled minority by focusing on modern-day "martyrdom"—the forceful suppression of Christian worship in countries like China and Saudi Arabia, represented by the display of the persecuted body. Although McAlister traces the dramatic display of faith-based injuries to cold war mobilization for Christians behind the Iron Curtain, evangelicals were galvanized by the possibility of winning the world for Christ once communism was in retreat. The evangelical mobilization around Christian martyrdom produced six separate congressional hearings and the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, which mandates presidential action against countries that violate religious freedom. On the heels of that victory—in which Voice of the Martyrs and similar ministries were opposed to business interests and often allied with secular human rights organizations—the representations of physical persecution multiplied across media. With its marked focus on the spectacle of wounded brown and black bodies, the new orientation wrote white American Christians into the story of racial and anticolonial justice as heroes rather than villains.[59]

How profitable would it be for historians to triangulate this Christian "folk pornography of the Bible Belt" with Donald G. Mathews's considerations of the theology of lynching, on the one hand, and David Marriott's analysis of "racial scopophilia," on the other?[60] This explicitly Christian instance "of whites taking a look at themselves through images of black desolation" recasts ritual scapegoating, purity, and objectification under new historical conditions and suggests that the American racialization of sexuality and suffering have broadened their meaning

[59] *Ibid.* Elsewhere I have argued that the Lausanne movement, which focuses on global evangelization, and Christian "racial reconciliation" are in part fueled by white evangelicals' enthusiasm for the sexual conservatism they see among "Third World" Christians and some nonwhite evangelicals in the United States. Bethany E. Moreton, "The Soul of Neoliberalism," *Social Text*, 25 (Fall 2007), 103–23.

[60] Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "'The Mind That Burns in Each Body': Women, Rape, and Racial Violence," in Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharon Thompson, eds., *Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality* (New York, 1983), 328–49 (first quotation on 335); Donald G. Mathews, "The Southern Rite of Human Sacrifice," *Journal of Southern Religion*, 3 (2000), http://jsr.fsu.edu/mathews.htm; Mathews, "Lynching Religion: Why the Old Man Shouted 'Glory!'" in Walter H. Conser Jr. and Rodger M. Payne, eds., *Southern Crossroads: Perspectives on Religion and Culture* (Lexington, Ky., 2008), 318–53; David Marriott, *On Black Men* (New York, 2000), 32 (second quotation). For related analyses, see Trudier Harris, *Exorcising Blackness: Historical and Literary Lynching and Burning Rituals* (Bloomington, 1984); Mason Stokes, "White Heterosexuality: A Romance of the Straight Man's Burden," in Chrys Ingraham, ed., *Thinking Straight: The Power, the Promise, and the Paradox of Heterosexuality* (New York, 2005), 131–49; and Robyn Wiegman, "The Anatomy of Lynching," *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 3 (January 1993), 445–67.

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for conservative Christianity rather than exhausting it.[61] Sexuality and suffering merit consideration in their own right, for pain has a sexual genealogy that lies just below the surface of much Christian practice. As the lesbian journalist and sadomasochism veteran Donna Minkowitz has written of Pentecostals, "I'm not surprised that eros feels so overwhelming to them that they have to go to anti-sexual churches to express it. Until recently, it has often felt that overwhelming to me, too."[62] Sometimes—even in church, even for conservatives, even in southern history—sex is not an alibi but the crux itself.

[61] Marriott, *On Black Men*, xiv.

[62] Donna Minkowitz, *Ferocious Romance: What My Encounters with the Right Taught Me about Sex, God, and Fury* (New York, 1998), 172.

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