



Locating the politics of gender: Patriarchy, neo-liberal governance and violence in Turkey

Deniz Kandiyoti

To cite this article: Deniz Kandiyoti (2016) Locating the politics of gender: Patriarchy, neo-liberal governance and violence in Turkey, *Research and Policy on Turkey*, 1:2, 103-118, DOI: [10.1080/23760818.2016.1201242](https://doi.org/10.1080/23760818.2016.1201242)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23760818.2016.1201242>



Published online: 22 Jul 2016.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 20



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Locating the politics of gender: Patriarchy, neo-liberal governance and violence in Turkey

Deniz Kandiyoti

Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, SOAS University of London, London, UK

(Received 11 October 2015; accepted 5 May 2016)

This article attempts to demonstrate that the politics of gender in Turkey is intrinsic rather than incidental to a characterization of its ruling ideology. It does so by focusing on three central nodes of ideology and practice in three domains: first, the use of gender as a central pillar of populism and a marker of difference that pits an authentically national ‘us’ against an anti-national ‘them’; second, the marriage of convenience between neo-liberal welfare and employment policies and (neo)- conservative familialism and finally, the ‘normalization’ of violence in everyday political discourse and practice. It concludes that soaring levels of gender-based and societal violence are not indicative of a securely entrenched patriarchy but of a crisis in the gender order and the polity more generally.

Keywords: gender; neo-liberalism; violence

Introduction

On a freezing cold day, the 21 February 2015, we were treated to the unusual spectacle of a group of men in skirts marching towards the iconic Taksim Square, which had been the scene of the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013. They were protesting the brutal attempted rape and murder of Özgecan Aslan, a 20-year-old student from Mersin, whose mutilated and partly burnt body was discovered in a riverbed. This came on the heels of numerous nation-wide demonstrations staged by women’s groups. This episode became rapidly politicized, pitting vocal critics of the government’s policies against its defensive sympathizers (Kandiyoti 2015).

Given the alarming statistics on violence against women these reactions may appear understandable. Between 2002 and 2009 the murder rate of women is reported to have increased 14-fold. The watchdog Platform to Stop the Murders of Women reported that in the past five years, 1,134 women have been murdered, most commonly at the hands of husbands, boyfriends or male kin, and that some 94 women were killed over the first three months of 2016, marking a sharp increase from 59 sex-based murders in 2013 (Hürriyet Daily News 2016). If we add the survivors of rape, assault, battery and harassment to these figures a truly dismal landscape emerges.

These epidemic levels of violence are routinely blamed on an ill-defined notion of patriarchy, implicitly understood as a deeply ingrained pattern of culture, or to use the colorful language of some policy-makers as ‘a social disease’ (*toplumsal hastalık*).¹ This

Email: Deniz.Kandiyoti_dk1@soas.ac.uk

characterization conveniently pathologizes the perpetrators without having to address the systemic, institutional underpinnings of these phenomena or their links to governance.

I would like to suggest that we have failed, so far, to provide an adequate analysis of the *location* of the politics of gender in discussions of the Turkish polity. This is partly due to the fact that we have to contend with two parallel tracks of enquiry that seldom intersect or enter into dialogue with one another: on the one hand, attempts at identifying Turkey's regime type and, on the other, analyses of discourses and policies in the domains of sexuality, reproduction, marriage and the family.

The first track, namely, the identification of regime type, is an exercise that displays a somewhat reactive character since analyses tend to respond to rapidly evolving conjunctures. Having started out with terms like 'conservative Muslim democracy' or 'liberal conservatism' in relation to the first term of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) between 2002 and 2006, we now appear to have run the entire gamut of possible illiberal outcomes under formally democratic regimes. By way of example, when President Erdoğan signalled a *de facto* change to an executive presidency in a speech in August 2015, some commentators invoked a 'Bonapartist coup' (Nokta 2016), and sections of the Turkish press treated its bemused readership to quick primers on Marx's 'Louis Bonaparte's 18th Brumaire'.² The concepts of majoritarianism (Lord 2012) and populism (Erdoğan and Öney 2014) have also been invoked as enduring tropes of Turkish politics. Turning to anthropological literature on leadership and legitimacy, Jenny White (2015) invoked 'bigman politics' based on a hierarchy of networks characterized by personalized relations of support and obligation, all revolving around a 'bigman', envisioned as a father figure and a hero. Öktem (2014) pointed to a narrow oligarchic network of power characterized by political cronyism, where a select circle of businessmen, media bosses and political advisers ensure that political power and economic opportunities mutually reinforce each other (Öktem 2014). Cihan Tuğal (2016) went even further by maintaining that the authoritarian turn in Turkey goes beyond mere regime change but also signals mass mobilization in favour of radical-right ideas and the increasing incorporation of radical Islamist cadres to retain a mobilised base, giving the regime a neo-fascist stamp (Tuğal 2016). Others concur, signalling a shift from competitive authoritarianism (Özbudun 2015) to a variant of fascism (Köker 2016).

In contrast to this rich and diverse literature, we have barely begun to come to grips with the various twists of changing policy and discourse in the realms of gender, sexuality and the family. Several turning points have been widely noted and commented upon. After a spate of progressive legislation in the early 2000s,³ one of the first shocks came in July 2010 when then Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that he did not believe in the equality of men and women. Women's principal and preferably sole vocation – home making and motherhood – accords, he claimed, with their biological and divinely ordained nature (*fitrat*). This was followed by the embarrassing Uludere incident in December 2011 (where 34 Kurdish smugglers were killed near the Iraqi border after the Turkish military mistakenly thought them to be Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants) (The Economist 2012) being rather unexpectedly turned into a debate about abortion and a Turkish woman's right to choose. Speaking to a 26 May 2012 meeting of the AKP's women's branches in Ankara, the prime minister declared he considered abortion to be murder. He also suggested that abortion and Turkey's high rate of caesarean section births, which he claimed make it harder for a woman to give birth again, were part of a 'hidden' plot to reduce Turkey's population. Similar pronouncements and a pro-natalist insistence on at least three children per woman have followed with regularity,

and increasing stridency, most recently during the president's address for the 8th March (2016) International Women's Day (T24 2016).

There has been a tendency to treat these interventions as diversionary, as agenda-changing tactical moves, most transparently so in the case of the Uludere massacre morphing into a discussion of abortion rights or the fact that a debate on birth control followed closely on from the December 2013 corruption scandal involving several AKP ministers (The Guardian 2013). Zeynep Korkman (2016) is quite justified in pointing out that these treatments betray an implicit bias that removes issues relating to gender and sexuality from the realm of 'real' politics, thus facilitating their dismissal as merely tactical. This invites us to spell out with a greater degree of precision the various ways in which the politics of gender in Turkey is *intrinsic* rather than *incidental* to a characterization of its ruling ideology.

I propose that policing gender norms and enforcing conservative family values constitute central nodes of AKP ideology and practice in at least three crucial domains; first, in shoring up a populism that privileges gender as a marker of difference, pitting an authentically national 'us' against an 'anti-national' (*gayri-milli*) 'them'; second, in the marriage of convenience between neo-liberal welfare and employment policies and (neo)- conservative familism; and finally, in the 'normalization' of violence in everyday political discourse and practice. I shall examine these in turn.

Gender: a key pillar of populist discourse

A diffuse but persistent trope of public discourse under the AKP has been reliance on a populism that pits 'the people' whose will is represented by the Leader⁴, preferably unencumbered by the checks and balances of liberal democracies, to groups and strata that are either presented as oppressors of the national 'underdog' or as potentially treasonous elements.⁵ This populism relies, in part, on a politics of *ressentiment* that encourages the projection of hatred onto groups or communities seen as either privileged and exclusionary or as potentially treasonous (and sometimes both). The country's metropolitan, secular middle-classes have long been routine targets of this discourse.⁶

However, the circles of 'othering and exclusion that initially relied on the secular/religious dichotomy' (Kandiyoti 2012) have become ever more expansive. They now extend from Alevis, labour activists, environmentalists, socialists and liberals to the Gülen Community, an erstwhile ally now dubbed as a terrorist organization (FETÖ), and finally to Kurds who, once the targets of a so-called 'opening process' in search of peace, are now exposed to the ravages of counter-insurgency operations in the south-eastern provinces.

Whereas a discourse of marginalized and oppressed indigeneity may not appear so outlandish in the populisms of Latin American leaders such as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez or Bolivia's Evo Morales, sustaining this posture in Turkey where Sunni Muslim Turks are not only in the overwhelming majority but the AKP has been in power, unchallenged by any meaningful opposition, for 14 years is a major political feat.⁷ It is therefore worth reflecting upon the ingredients of this formula and the place of gender within it.

Gender norms and specifically women's conduct and propriety play a key role in delineating the boundaries between 'us' (God-fearing, Sunni, AKP supporters), and a 'them' consisting of all political detractors and minorities, cast as potentially treasonous and immoral. Indeed, the state-enforced headscarf ban in public institutions was for a long time held up as the epitome of Muslim injury and was the focus of sustained rights

militancy, also backed by some liberal constituencies.⁸ The same headscarf has now become the symbol of legitimate inclusion into the AKP-defined national community and the visible expression of the will to create a 'pious generation'. Other markers of difference relating to lifestyle preferences, such as mixed-sexed socializing and the consumption of alcohol, are routinely proscribed as alien and immoral.⁹ These modes of 'othering' inevitably expose many sections of the citizenry – not to mention women and sexual minorities – who fail to meet government-decreed norms of propriety to potential intimidation, harassment and violence.

Two episodes, among numerous others, stand out as stark illustrations of this point. The first relates to an alleged attack on a veiled woman in front of Istanbul's Kabataş dock at the height of the Gezi protests during the summer of 2013. Although later challenged by CCTV footage as possibly bogus,¹⁰ this incident had the PM fuming over the affront to 'our sister' that demonstrated the violent and anti-religious disposition of the protesters. An earlier episode concerned the case of a woman demonstrator who in June 2011 climbed on a panzer during a protest in Ankara and was savagely beaten by the police, suffering a hip fracture as a result. The PM, belittling the incident, famously asked at a public meeting: 'was she a girl or a woman, I don't know' (*kız mıdır kadın mıdır, bilemem*). Casting aspersions on her virginity he left his listeners in no doubt that he thought her to be of small virtue, as would be expected from her unseemly, unfeminine behaviour. The message could not be clearer: only the deserving (our sisters) are worthy of protection, the rest, and especially those with the audacity to break the norms of modesty and protest in public put themselves in jeopardy. I shall expand on this theme further in my discussion of the normalization of violence below.

The marriage of neo-liberalism and (neo-) conservative familism

A well documented trend noted by numerous researchers (Kılıç 2008; Buğra and Yakut-Çakar 2010; Yazıcı 2012; Dedeoğlu 2012; Acar and Altunok 2013) points to the consolidation of the dependent status of women, informed by the perception of women as natural care providers, in tandem with neo-liberal transformations of welfare and employment regimes. Although Mine Eder (2009) argues that these changes have much in common with global trends (such as the subcontracting of welfare provision to private actors, the growing involvement of charity organizations, and increasing public-private cooperation in education, health, and anti-poverty schemes), she also points out that this new 'institutional welfare-mix' has created immense room for political patronage and the expansion of state power in Turkey.

Berna Yazıcı (2012) argues that the neoliberal objective of diminishing state responsibility for social protection came with a discursive shift to 'strengthening the family'. The frequent invocation of the 'strong Turkish family' promotes the three-generational extended family, in contrast to the presumed weakness of familial ties in 'the West', as the best agent for social protection of children, the disabled and the elderly. We witness here the paradox of the simultaneous deployment of neoliberal welfare policies with a conservative discourse that denounces neoliberalism's ideological centre, 'the West', which acts as the foil to the 'strong Turkish family' as its imagined and maligned 'Other'. Meanwhile, diminished state responsibility for social protection serves to further undercut already vulnerable families' claims on welfare.

Buğra and Yakut-Çakar (2010) further illustrate how the various effects of welfare reform and a pro-natalist biopolitics compound and complement employment trends and policies. Setting aside the low skill mix of female labour, with a large supply of

unskilled and non-unionized male workers, employers are not predisposed to employ female workers (especially if they have to share the burdens of generous maternity leave that the government proposes).¹¹ Moreover, in this buyers' market for labour, working conditions make it practically impossible for women to reconcile work and family life and there is overt resistance to offering public pre-school and childcare services. Thus, women's domestic vocation is cemented by both labour market trends and welfare policies.

Treating the family as a locus of government intervention in pursuit of the 'ideal' citizen-subject is not new. Nükhet Sirman (2005) coined the term 'familial citizenship' to indicate that the Turkish republic-imagined as a community of equal men was predicated on the distribution of sovereignty to male heads of households. This established a gendered discourse in which the ideal citizen is inscribed as a sovereign husband and his dependent wife/mother rather than an individual, with the result that position within a familial discourse provides the person with status within the polity. Indeed, the idiom of family and kinship and the trope of masculine protection that permeates Turkish public life makes it possible (if not plausible) for the head of state to pose as the *pater familias* demanding obedience and respect.¹² Yet despite continuities with some republican tropes, the particular mix of neoliberal, neoconservative, and bio-political agendas evident in AKP policies may signal a new departure in the gender regime that deserves to be understood in its own right.

Acar and Altunok (2013) address this regime under the rubric of the 'politics of the intimate', noting that neo-conservative disciplinary power manifests itself in the regulation of women's bodies in terms of dress and behavioural codes as well intimate sexual relations, including reproductive choices, abortion, sexual orientation and pre-marital sexuality. Altunok (2016, this volume) draws attention to a useful distinction between conservatism and neo-conservatism noting that the latter is not about preserving values or institutions but about reinventing and re-engineering the social-cultural fabric. In this respect, a salient feature of neo-conservatism is its capacity to shape the future with reference to an imagined or reconstructed past (as is evident in the eulogies to the three generational family noted by Yazıcı (2012) despite the rarity of this family form in demographic terms). This combination of neoliberal rationality and neo-conservative governmentality results in a narrowing of options and a denunciation of claims for different lifestyles, counter imaginations or even liberal rights-based claims of individuals.

These discursive shifts were accompanied by extensive institutional changes. The General Directorate of Women's Status and Problems was established in 1991 as a requirement of the CEDAW process¹³ to act as the national machinery tasked with monitoring gender equality. At that stage, a wide range of women's NGOs were actively incorporated in policy formulation and in lobbying activities. The General Directorate was abolished in 2011 and replaced by the Ministry of the Family and Social Policies where discrimination against women was placed alongside the protection of children, the disabled, and the elderly, clearly marking it out as a social welfare issue. Women were being cast primarily as objects of 'protection' rather than full-fledged civic subjects. Civil society is also currently being populated by a myriad of government approved NGOs many of which are active under the umbrella organization of the Turkish Family Platform (TUYAP). The mission statement of the Platform includes the protection and elevation of the family and of general morality.¹⁴ Needless to say, the coalitions of NGOs that worked tirelessly to achieve the reforms of the Civic and Penal Codes mentioned earlier are totally marginalized and funding flows are now directed towards 'government approved' civil society.

Women's 'buy-in' to this gender regime deserves careful scrutiny. It is not only women of the new Islamic elite who are the leaders and beneficiaries of an expanding array of NGOs, think-tanks and publication outlets who should retain our attention but, more importantly, women of the popular classes. Women who are marginalized in terms of labour force participation and are often home-bound may qualify as beneficiaries of many different types of limited, often in-kind, irregularly distributed transfers which are nevertheless crucial supplements for families trying to survive under conditions of poverty. Indeed, there is a distinctly gendered pattern to welfare distribution: women make up 60% of the welfare aid recipients.¹⁵ Moreover, women are not just passive consumers of benefits but active participants in daily interfaces with public bodies at the local level that deliver services. For instance, municipalities that previously provided only limited charity aid and in-kind poverty relief now have significant financial resources at their disposal and offer a wider range of social services and benefits. These may include, among others, educational services such as vocational training, literacy classes for women, nurseries, tutorial help for school age children and health clinics. Women of popular classes, especially those of rural extraction, may experience a new sense of 'citizenship through entitlement' through these interfaces. Although the funding for these activities may come from taxpayers' money, sometimes augmented by charitable giving, the recipients perceive them not as a right but as the direct result of party largesse and benefaction – a belief no doubt cemented by the distribution of in-kind help for winter fuel and basic foodstuffs from party coffers especially during election periods. If there is a trade-off for being among the ranks of beneficiaries, in the form of acquiescing to party-mandated norms of loyalty, it is easy to see how women may embrace this option in a society where protection has always been conditional on consenting to the terms of a patriarchal contract. I had coined the term 'patriarchal bargain' (Kandiyoti 1988) to analyse these trade-offs principally at the household level. How these dynamics play out at the level of governance, backed by the powerful resources of an official masculinist protection regime, clearly requires further reflection and analysis.

In this respect, Elif Babül's (2015) ethnography on human rights training on questions of violence against women and children provides important insights on the operations of a moral economy of gratitude (based on the presumption of masculinist protection). Rather than being lawful bearers of rights, women and children are portrayed as 'appreciative subjects of their benevolent protectors' (117). The corollary of this stance is that establishing 'victimhood' is the prerequisite for rights bearing, thereby excluding certain groups who do not comply with the dominant image of the helpless victim – such as politically active Kurdish children or women who willingly step outside the normative family institution. This selective and conditional inclusion into the realm of rights means that non-compliance or defiance can readily translate into grounds for symbolic 'expulsion' from citizenship.¹⁶ This has grave consequences for what I call the 'normalization' of violence.

The 'normalization' of violence

I use the term 'normalization' in the Foucauldian sense to refer to social processes that transform ideas and actions into taken-for-granted 'natural' realities.¹⁷ Exploring how these processes play out in the case of gender-based violence may suggest useful points of entry for a broader exploration of the suspension of the rule of law and the operations of impunity more generally.

An obvious starting point is to interrogate the operations of the huge chasm between the laws that are intended to safeguard women's rights and their actual implementation. Although legislation in Turkey is equipped, at this point,¹⁸ to bring perpetrators of violence to justice a multitude of rapists and killers get off lightly benefiting from so-called 'reductions for good behaviour', for nothing more consequential than having a respectful bearing, wearing a tie to court, expressing regret or pleading intolerable provocation to their male honour. The scandalous scale of such judgements and of arbitrary sentence reductions prompted a male journalist to invoke the 'love affair and deep empathy' between male perpetrators of violence and the prosecutors and judges who are supposed to deliver justice to their female victims (Kivanc 2015). Indeed, the task of seeking justice for women often falls on the shoulders of civil society actors such as the *Platform to Stop the Murders of Women* or a dwindling liberal press.

To unpick the mechanisms of 'normalization', it may be worth returning to the debates generated by the gruesome murder of Özgecan Aslan referred to earlier. One of the sources of public outrage triggered by this case rested on the fact that Özgecan fit the profile of the 'innocent victim' to perfection; she was a young student commuting to her home who resisted rape and paid with her life. How, then, did the debates following her murder degenerate into a contest over women's legitimate right to a presence in the public domain? One set of reactions focused on how to better segregate women and minimize their contact with men in order to protect them; a tacit admission that the public domain is out of bounds for women unless they are willing to court danger. Others retorted that enjoying a public presence under conditions of freedom and security is a fundamental human right and that restricting women's mobility as if *they* were the problem is a regressive move. Needless to say those arguing for segregation had conveniently forgotten that most incidents of violence still take place within households, families or immediate neighbourhoods. On this particular occasion, the discourse of masculinist protection was wielded by none other than the president himself who announced that 'men are the custodians of women' (*kadınlar erkeklerin emanetidir*) and are duty-bound to protect them. The demeaning implications of this stance aside, this resonates perfectly with a conception of women as wards of men and beneficiaries of their protection provided they are deserving of it.

However, even under the terms of this discourse (which defines women as objects of male protection) it is difficult to explain why the judiciary appears to hold women's lives and security so cheap. Putting this down to the operations of an unexamined notion of patriarchy simplifies phenomena of greater complexity. Even the most cursory perusal of reporting of murder cases and other crimes of violence against women indicates that perceived female disobedience and insubordination act as primary triggers: women murdered by husbands they wish to divorce, or ex-husbands they have dared to divorce, rejected suitors, and obstinate girls refusing to fall in line with their fathers' or other male kin's wishes jostle on the pages of dailies. According to a survey conducted by the *Platform to Prevent the Murder of Women* the most commonly reported cause of femicide was women's autonomous decision-making regarding their own lives.¹⁹ One of the striking findings of research on violence against women carried out by Altınay and Arat (2009) is that women who earn more money than their husbands are twice as likely to encounter domestic violence. In other words, it is not the unquestioned subordination of women and an entrenched patriarchy that result in heightened violence, but rather a masculinity in crisis that pulls all the stops to shore up male prerogatives.

I propose that a new phenomenon I call 'masculinist restoration' comes into play at a point in time when patriarchy is no longer fully secure, and requires higher levels of

coercion and the deployment of more varied ideological state apparatuses to ensure its reproduction.²⁰ The recourse to violence (or the condoning of violence) points not to the routine functioning of patriarchy or the resurgence of traditionalism, but to its threatened demise at a point when notions of female subordination are no longer securely hegemonic (Kandiyoti 2013). Women's rising aspirations and determined male resistance create a perfect storm in the gender order that manifests itself in both semi-official attempts to 'tame' women and uphold men's privileges (*contra* the letter of written laws, hence attempts at by-passing and eroding them), and in the unofficial excesses of street-level male violence (which the judiciary often meets with leniency).

The existence of a vocal women's movement and of civil society organizations that monitor rights (including those of sexual minorities) and gender-based violence points to forms of organized resistance that can, at times, turn into civic protest (as was in the case of the Özgecan Aslan murder).²¹ It is, therefore, no wonder that a great deal of effort is being expended in countering women's rights and sexual liberties platforms. The co-optation of women's rights issues by government-organized organizations (GONGOs) which, in collaboration with state institutions, aim to side-line and marginalize the women's movement in Turkey has gained full momentum.²² Nonetheless, an outright rejection of patriarchal governance united youth across gender, ethnic and religious/secular divides during the Gezi protests in 2013, hinting at the possibility of a grass-roots politics of democratic participation and new civic sensibilities.²³

Set in this context, the skewed nature of judgements in favour of male perpetrators of crimes against women may be seen as a response by representatives of the state (the judiciary, in this instance) implicitly honouring the terms of a 'familial citizenship' that recognizes men's sovereignty over women, especially if they can detect any indications of women failing to 'know their place' (*haddini bilmek*).²⁴ If women's side of the citizenship bargain is to trade acquiescence and propriety for protection, men's loyalty partly rests on the implicit promise of their untrammelled control over women.²⁵ This underlying premise regularly trumps the letter of the law to the point of courting charges of arbitrariness and impunity.

Is gender-based violence merely the much-publicized tip of a giant iceberg of 'normalized' violence permeating society as a whole? Evidence to this effect abounds. The processes of 'othering' I referred to in my earlier treatment of populism do not only single out certain categories of citizens as unworthy of protection, but even sanction the actions of ordinary civilians who take it upon themselves to discipline alleged 'deviants' with impunity. One such memorable instance occurred during the Gezi Protests in 2013 when machete wielding 'tradesmen' attacked protestors in Istanbul and Ankara with the police forces looking on (LGC News 2013). In a speech delivered to the 4th Council of Tradesmen and Artisans in Ankara, Erdoğan encouraged tradesmen (*esnaf*) to enforce law and order as guardians of national traditions and morality.²⁶ This explicitly gave the green light to pro-government social vigilantism.²⁷ The chilling implications of these exhortations became plainly evident when the head of the AKP youth branch became visibly implicated in an attack on the daily paper *Hürriyet* (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2015). Despite routine condemnations by politicians, the public was under no illusion that criminal prosecution would follow. The same was true when a *Hürriyet* journalist was attacked and hospitalized.²⁸ When a prominent pro-government mafia leader threatened academics who signed an anti-war petition condemning government brutality against its Kurdish citizens in the east, by declaring that he would 'shower in their blood', again, no one expected any retribution to follow (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2016). A child abuse scandal that surfaced in Karaman in March 2016 in an unofficial student guesthouse run

by the Ensar Foundation – an organisation that serves the government’s stated aim of bringing up ‘a pious generation’ – saw the government defensively closing ranks against further scrutiny of the organization.²⁹ It would be fair to conclude that this type of impunity is now routinized and taken for granted.

Increasingly, the AKP legitimizes its rule through a heightened sense of crisis, enjoining followers to sacrifice their lives for country and leader (initially metaphorically, and now quite literally by becoming martyrs in the fight against the Kurdish insurgents). This sense of sacrifice-in-crisis was best encapsulated by the image of a group of AKP youth seeing Erdoğan off on a foreign trip in 2013 enveloped in white shrouds with a placard proclaiming: ‘We have come with our shrouds, we are with you to the death’ (CNNTÜRK 2013). Erdoğan himself has declared in public speeches that he has set out on his path ‘wearing a shroud’ (*biz bu yola kefenimizle çıktık*). Rather than the language of an elected representative whose mandate may be revoked through the democratic process, this is more reminiscent of a messianic leader embarked on a holy mission (Gürsel 2016). This mission (*dava*) is to establish a ‘New Turkey’ (by the iconic date of 2023, exactly a century after the establishment of the Republic) on the ruins of the ‘misguided’ republican project, re-establishing the Turks as the leaders and redeemers of the Islamic *ummah*. The sub-texts of death and martyrdom inevitably invoke violence and potential strife directed at those citizens deemed to be traitors or terrorists (against the more distant backdrop of a powerful external ‘alliance of evil’ *şer ittifaki*). Actual or threatened violence implicitly (and often explicitly) permeates day-to-day discourse, substituting coercion and intimidation to public deliberation. Yet, in the same way that soaring levels of violence against women are not indicative of a securely entrenched patriarchy, but of a crisis in the gender order, a violently enforced monopoly over meaning and social action bespeaks of a political order that is reliant for its reproduction and legitimacy on the costly device of a perpetual state of exception that mobilizes its citizens through fear and loathing of internal and external enemies.

Conclusion

The late Umberto Eco insightfully remarked, ‘Behind a regime and its ideology there is always a way of thinking and feeling, a group of cultural habits, of obscure instincts and unfathomable drives’ (Umberto Eco 1995). In this article, I tried to tease out some of the ways in which the politics of gender have become implicated in and, indeed, constitutive of some of these ‘unfathomable drives’. I contended that terms such as patriarchy, Islamization or authoritarianism fail to capture the increasingly complex ways in which neo-conservative gender discourses and policies are articulated, enforced or resisted. To develop my argument, I focused on three key nodes of regime ideology and practice: the deployment of gender norms in shoring up a populism that pits an authentically national ‘us’ against an anti-national ‘them’, the marriage of convenience between neo-liberal welfare and employment policies with a neo-conservative familism that cements ideals of female domesticity and, finally, the ‘normalization’ of violence where both gender-based and more generalized societal violence indicate signs of a deeper systemic crisis.

The politics of gender was never free from deep and intractable contradictions in Turkey (Kandiyoti 2007). These have been compounded by new layers of paradox. Turkey is among the countries that jumped on the women’s rights bandwagon for geopolitical advantage. It took a lead role for the empowerment of women in the US-led Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) in the context of the

Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD). The reforms of its civil and penal codes furthered its attempts to meet the criteria for EU accession. As a result, women's NGOs played an active role in advocacy and policy formulation and in the representation of Turkey in international forums (Kandiyoti 2010). As a signatory of CEDAW, Turkey's national legislation was increasingly aligned with international standards. This set the scene for tensions and contradictions at all levels: with international treaty obligations and between existing national legislation and the stated policies and goals of the AKP government that contravene both. The women's movement in Turkey has, for a long time, sought and exploited any openings created by cracks in the edifice of male privilege to press for further reforms and to argue for an expansion of rights. This era presages the closure of such spaces, both at the level of civil society and government administration, and a sustained onslaught on the existing legal system.

Ironically, whereas the republican reforms of the 1920s and 1930s were enacted at a point in time when sociological realities were not yet aligned with the possibilities offered by the new legislation,³⁰ it is precisely when substantial societal transformations have heightened youth's expectations – including those of young women – concerning their levels of education, their life prospects and their choices in marriage and divorce that women's rights and entitlements are being made an active subject of contention. This disjuncture accounts for new types of resistance against initiatives aiming to dictate a new 'politics of the intimate'. Conventional categories such as men vs. women, right vs. left and secular vs. religious fail to capture the dynamics of new expressions of discontent. The contradictory pulls of the politics of masculinist restoration on the one hand, and anti-patriarchal resistance on the other, open up new fields of contestation for a new generation of men and women who are more fully alert to the intimate relations between authoritarian rule and forms of oppression based on gender, creed, ethnicity or sexual orientation. Will they have a voice? In any event, the battles being fought on the terrain of gender are nothing short of struggles over the soul of the polity and its democratic future.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Dicle Koğacıoğlu (2004) also invokes the 'tradition effect' in the treatment of so-called honour crimes where a nebulous concept of tradition is made to stand outside the reach of institutions, thus obfuscating the institutional dynamics (and complicity) in their perpetuation.
2. See for instance Murat Yetkin (2015).
3. A major campaign initiated by over 120 women's NGOs from across the country led to a new Turkish Civil Code, passed in November 2001. This code abolished the supremacy of men in the conjugal union and established the full equality of men and women with respect to rights over the family abode, marital property, divorce, child custody, inheritance and rights to work and travel. A vigorous three-year campaign led by a coalition of women's and sexual liberties groups between 2002–2004 – The Platform for the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code – resulted in the adoption of the draft law on 26 September 2004. Amendments were put in place to prevent sentence reduction for 'killings in the name of customary law' (or so-called honour killings); marital rape was criminalized; the article foreseeing a reduction or suspension of the sentence of rapists and abductors marrying their victims was abolished; sexual offences such as harassment at the workplace were criminalized and the

- discrimination between virgins and non-virgins, married and unmarried women in sexual crimes was abolished.
4. It is worth noting that supporters favour the term 'Reis' which translates roughly as 'Chief', a term reminiscent of *caudillo* the title given to the Spanish dictator Franco and various Latin American strongmen.
 5. Mudde's (2004) definition of populism as 'an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people' (543) finds resonance with AKP propaganda as exemplified by the slogan of 'National Will, National Power'.
 6. Let us recall, for instance, that at the height of the Gezi protests of June 2013, Erdoğan told a rally in the conservative central Anatolian province of Kayseri: 'These people have drunk their whiskies for years overlooking the Bosphorus ... and have looked down on everyone else'. The juxtaposition of a prosperous section of the city – the Bosphorus – with the consumption of alcohol deftly combines class hatred with allusions to impiety (Reuters 2013).
 7. In fact, PM Erdoğan went as far as claiming 'we were treated like blacks' (Haber7 2012). Indeed the White Turks/Black Turks dichotomy became a shorthand to indicate a murky terrain of ethnic, socio-economic and lifestyle distinctions (Hürriyet Daily News 2010).
 8. Arat (2010) provides an excellent account of the tortuous process leading to the lifting of the ban. The AKP constructed a hasty coalition with the rightist nationalists and on 7 February 2008 the Turkish Parliament passed an amendment to the constitution (article 10 on equality and equal treatment before the law was amended by adding a clause on equality in 'the procurement of public services', article 42 on the right to education by adding 'no one would be deprived of the right to education unless openly articulated by law') thus allowing women to wear the headscarf in Turkish universities. On 5 June 2008, Turkey's Constitutional Court annulled the parliament's proposed amendment, ruling that removing the ban was against the founding principles of the Constitution. By 2013 the ban was lifted from all public institutions except for the military, the judiciary and the police. This was followed by veiled women parliamentarians joining their peers and finally schoolgirls as young as 10 being allowed to veil. What started out using the language of equal rights and freedom of religion has now mutated into a normative preference in pursuit of a 'pious generation'.
 9. Although any mention of Islamic prohibitions on alcohol was scrupulously avoided, there was a move to prohibit the sale of alcohol to those under the age of 24 in February 2011 on public health grounds and to 'protect youth' from harmful habits. These prohibitions have since been broadened. The general mood facilitated incidents such as the one that took place in Tophane, a popular district of Istanbul, in September 2010 when people attending the opening of an art gallery followed by a drinks party (that had overflowed onto the pavements) were physically attacked by a group of locals. There was no expectation that the perpetrators would be dealt with severely since the victims were presented as being themselves at fault (by doing the wrong thing in the wrong place). However, such measures often backfire especially among youth. For instance, the admonishments to couples to behave decorously in public led to a 'kiss-in' with couples locked in passionate embraces in public spaces like the subway. When the PM announced, at the annual meeting of his deputies in November 2013, that he intended to take legal measures to prevent unmarried male and female students sharing dorms and apartments, again, protests spread like wildfire. Mixed sex groups started posing for photographs bearing protest banners on university campuses across the land.
 10. This was partly due to the depiction of assailants as bare-chested, leather gloved men that appeared to be plucked from the realm of soft porn fantasy- aside from the fact that no CCTV images seemed to have captured them (Oruçoğlu 2015).
 11. As part of the pro-natalist, pro-family package a law to extend paid maternity leave up to six months is being considered. Two decrees on maternity benefits and a dowry account were issued in April 2015. Maternity benefits offer mothers increasing increments for each successive child until they reach the officially sanctioned three children per family. Young married couples have the right to a dowry account to which the government contributes 20% of the balance if they open and keep a bank account for three years.

12. I consider that one of the most subversive sub-texts of the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013 was precisely the rejection by certain sections of youth of this masculinist/paternalist social contract. This type of sensibility seemed furthermore to transcend conventional right/left, religious/secular binaries uniting youth of diverse background and orientations. See Kandiyoti (2014).
13. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 as an international bill of rights for women. Turkey is among the nation-states that have ratified CEDAW. After the legal reforms of the Civic Code in 2001 and the Penal Code in 2004 fuller compliance was achieved.
14. STK Türkiye Aile Platformu. <http://turkiyeaileplatformu.com/>.
15. One of the reasons for targeting women is related to the belief that women are more likely to use assistance to meet the basic needs of their family (i.e. a presumption of maternal altruism). Even the relatively regular and systematically administrated schemes such as Conditional Cash Transfers are targeted at women (see Yılmaz Şener 2016).
16. This threat turned out to be more than symbolic. While I was in the process of writing, on 5 April 2016 President Erdoğan said that Turkey should counter supporters of terrorism by stripping them of Turkish citizenship. He accused academics, journalists, and lawyers critical of his policies of supporting terrorism and called for the legal definition of terrorism to be broadened (Ifex 2016).
17. This operates differently from the banalization of life loss and injury in environments of chronic conflict or repeated terrorist attacks (although these conditions also apply to the current realities of Turkey) or the desensitization that follows protracted exposure to violent content on the media. State institutions are centrally implicated in the normalization process I invoke for the purposes of this article.
18. In addition, Turkey was the first country to ratify the Council of Europe's Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (CAHVIO), the Istanbul Convention, in 2012. However, there are alarming signs that many hard-won rights are being clawed back. The draft report of a parliamentary commission on divorce has created outrage because it threatens to turn the clock back on women's and children's rights under the guise of protecting the family. Well-established experts and women's NGOs were excluded from the process of consultation.
19. <https://www.kadincinayetleriniidururacagiz.net/for-english>.
20. For instance, the Directorate of Religious Affairs has run an extensive network of Family Guidance and Counselling Bureaus (Aile İrşat ve Rehberlik Büroları) since 2002. Although there is a dearth of published work on the operations of these bureaus, there is every indication that they aim to maintain family harmony by reminding women of their religiously mandated obligations as dutiful mothers and wives. Numerous training courses, lectures and seminars offered by 'experts' at the municipal level reinforce these messages.
21. A petition that received over a million signatures went forward with a proposal to parliament for a new law (dubbed the Özgecan law) that would block sentence reductions and the lenient treatment of perpetrators of crimes against women. This public pressure appears to be having some results (<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-ozgecan-milat-oldu-erkek-egemen-gundem-2242403/>). However, this case ended in a further twist of fate when Özgecan's assailant was himself murdered in prison by another inmate. While Özgecan's father deplored this unlawful outcome, the mother and sister of her murderer revealed they had themselves been victims of violence at his hands and that his father (now divorced) had also been a wife abuser – a sad footnote on the pervasiveness of intergenerational transmission of violence.
22. The leading and best resourced organizations are the Woman and Democracy Association (KADEM), Women Healthcare Professionals Solidarity Association (KASAD-D), and the Association for Women's Rights against Discrimination (AKDER). Erdoğan's daughter is the co-founder of KADEM, and (former) Prime Minister Davutoğlu's wife is the 'honorary president' of KASAD-D. KADEM aims to promote a gender discourse that represents a radical break from egalitarian perspectives and to supplant the principle of equality between men and women (despite the fact that it is currently enshrined in the legal system) through an alternative (Islamic) approach.

23. This is not specific to the case of Turkey but was also noted in the youth protests during the Arab uprisings of 2011. Asef Bayat (2013) uses the term ‘post-Islamism’ to identify these new sensibilities while Mariz Tadros (2015) invokes the concept of prefigurative politics (the use of practices that mirror the ends they strive to realize) in her analysis of youth groups’ vigilantism in the struggle against sexual violence in Egypt. For the case of the Gezi protests see Özkırımlı (2014).
24. This has become a key concept indicating stepping out of the hierarchy. In the case of women, the study of what constitutes ‘provocation’ could become the subject of very revealing legal ethnographies. Talking back, irony or being stubborn appear to qualify as provocation in a context where expectations of female obedience are axiomatic, but clearly very imperfectly met.
25. Different facets of the patriarchal contract with male citizens are fascinatingly revealed through Can Açıkoşoğlu’s (2012) ethnography of disabled war veterans and the state policies geared to the restitution and rehabilitation of their masculinities. Likewise, Altınay (2004) points to the role of universal compulsory military service and its public performances and rituals as essential elements to the constitution of masculine sovereigns.
26. ‘In our civilization, in our national and civilizational spirit, tradesmen and artisans are soldiers when needed. They are ‘*alperenler*’ [the historical name given to Turkish-Muslim knights]; they are martyrs, veterans and heroes defending their homeland when needed. They are the policemen who build order when needed; they are the judge and the referees who deliver justice when needed’, Erdoğan said on 26 November, in a speech delivered to the 4th Council of Tradesmen and Artisans in Ankara (Hürriyet Daily News 2014).
27. I thank Maxine Molyneux for drawing my attention to this term (personal communication).
28. The pro-government media that had been proffering open threats on their print pages and on social media were never taken to task after the event (Bianet 2015).
29. Anger was fuelled by the comments of the Minister of Family Affairs, Sema Ramazanoglu, said the case could not be used to smear the Foundation (BBC 2016).
30. These reforms were enacted in a predominantly rural society where the operations of what I call ‘classic patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti 1988) were not as yet disrupted by expanding capitalist markets, attendant processes of commodification, rapid urbanization and the expansion of urban middle-classes. This meant that many legislative changes remained a dead letter except among a relatively thin layer of urbanites (for instance, rural women continued to forgo their inheritance rights in land for many decades to come).

Notes on contributor

Deniz Kandiyoti is Emeritus Professor of Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. She holds degrees from the University of Paris (Sorbonne) and the London School of Economics and Political Science. She was also on the faculty of the Middle East Technical University (1969–74) and Boğaziçi University (1974–1980) in Turkey. She is the author of *Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar* (1997, 2007) the editor of *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey* (2002), *Gendering the Middle East* (1996), *Women, Islam and the State* (1991) and of numerous articles on gender, Islam, post-coloniality, post-Soviet transition in Central Asia and gender and conflict in Afghanistan.

References

- Acar, Feride, and Gülbanu Altunok. 2013. “The ‘Politics of Intimate’ at the Intersection of Neo-Liberalism and Neoconservatism in Contemporary Turkey.” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 41: 14–23.
- Açıkoşoğlu, Salih Can. 2012. “Sacrificial Limbs of Sovereignty: Disabled Veterans, Masculinity, and Nationalist Politics in Turkey.” *Medical Anthropology Quarterly* 26 (1): 4–25.
- Altınay, Ayşe Gül, and Yeşim Arat. 2009. *Violence against Women in Turkey: A Nationwide Survey*. Istanbul: Punto.

- Altınay, Ayşe Gül. 2004. *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Arat, Yeşim. 2010. "Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: Implications of a Democratic Paradox?" *Third World Quarterly* 31 (6): 869–884.
- Babül, Elif. 2015. "The Paradox of Protection: Human Rights, the Masculinist State, and the Moral Economy of Gratitude in Turkey." *American Ethnologist* 42 (1): 116–139.
- Bayat, Asef. 2013. *Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BBC. 2016. "Turkey Child Abuse: Scandal Shocks Karaman." April 19. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36071773>.
- Bianet. 2015. "Journalist Ahmet Hakan Attacked." October 1. <http://bianet.org/english/media/167958-journalist-ahmet-hakan-attacked>.
- Büğra, Ayşe, and Burcu Yakut-Çakar. 2010. "Structural Change, Social Policy Environment and Female Employment: The Case of Turkey." *Development and Change* 41 (3): 517–538.
- CNN TÜRK. 2013. "Başbakan Erdoğan'a kefenli karşılama." [Meeting Erdogan in Shrouds.] December 22. <http://www.cnntrk.com/turkiye/basbakan-erdogana-kefenli-karsilama?page=6>.
- Dedeoglu, Saniye. 2012. "Equality, Protection or Discrimination: Gender Equality Policies in Turkey." *Social Politics* 19 (2): 269–290.
- Eco Umberto. 1995. "Ur-Fascism." *The New York Review of Books*, June 22. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1856>.
- Eder, Mine. 2009. "Retreating State? Political Economy of Welfare Regime Change in Turkey." *Middle East Law and Governance* 2: 152–184.
- Erdoğan, Emre, and Sezin Öney. 2014. "And the Winner of Turkey's Presidential Election is... Populism." *Washington Post*, August 8. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/08/and-the-winner-of-turkeys-presidential-election-is-populism/>.
- Gürsel, Kadri. 2016. "Does Erdogan Believe He's on a Mission from God?, Almonitor." March 9. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/turkey-erdogan-steps-up-politics-in-holy-realm.html#>.
- Haber7. 2012. "Erdoğan: Bize zenci muamelesi yaptılar." [Erdogan: We were Treated Like Blacks.] December 29. <http://www.haber7.com/ic-politika/haber/971049-erdogan-bize-zenci-muamelesi-yaptilar>.
- Hürriyet Daily News. 2010. "White Turks, Black Turks and Grey Debate." November 22. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-search-for-steps-of-wasps-around-anatolia-2010-11-22>.
- Hürriyet Daily News. 2014. "Turkish President Erdoğan Bestows Tradesmen with Policing Mission." November 26. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-erdogan-bestows-tradesmen-with-policing-mission.aspx?pageID=238&nID=74872&NewsCatID=338>.
- Hürriyet Daily News. 2015. "Details of Attack on Hürriyet in 11 Points." September 7. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/details-of-attack-on-hurriyet-in-11-points.aspx?pageID=238&nID=88136&NewsCatID=509>.
- Hürriyet Daily News. 2016. "Femicides on the Rise as Watchdog Releases First Quarter Figures." April 6. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/femicides-on-the-rise-as-watchdog-releases-first-quarter-figures.aspx?pageID=238&nID=97398&NewsCatID=339>.
- Hürriyet Daily News. 2016. "Probe Launched into Mafia Leader's 'Bloodbath' Threats against Academics." January 14. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/probe-launched-into-mafia-leaders-bloodbath-threats-against-academics-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=93884&NewsCatID=509>.
- Ifex. 2016. "Turkey: Proposal to annul citizenship threatens fundamental rights." April 7. http://www.ifex.org/turkey/2016/04/07/annul_citizenship/.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 2010. "Gender and Women's Studies in Turkey: A Moment for Reflection?" *New Perspectives on Turkey* 43 (Fall): 165–176.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1988. "Bargaining with Patriarchy." *Gender & Society* 2 (3): 274–290.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 2007. *Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar* [Concubines, Sisters and Citizens]. Istanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 2012. "The Travails of the Secular: Puzzle and Paradox in Turkey." *Economy and Society* 41 (4): 513–531.

- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 2013. "Fear and Fury: Women and Post-Revolutionary Violence." *Open Democracy*. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/fear-and-fury-women-and-post-revolutionary-violence>.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 2014. "Contesting Patriarchy-as-Governance: Lessons from Youth-Led Activism." *Open Democracy*. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/contesting-patriarchy-as-governance-lessons-from-youth-led-activism>.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 2015. "The Gender Wars in Turkey: A Litmus Test for Democracy." *Open Democracy*. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/gender-wars-in-turkey-litmus-test-of-democracy>.
- Kılıç, Azer. 2008. "The Gender Dimension of Social Policy Reform in Turkey: Towards Equal Citizenship." *Social Policy & Administration* 42 (5): 487–503.
- Kıvanç, Ümit. 2015. "Yüce Yargının Kadınlarla Savaşı." [The War of the Mighty Judiciary Against Women.] *Radikal*, November 10. <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/umit-kivanc/yuce-yarginin-kadinlarla-savasi-1469358/>.
- Koğacioğlu, Dicle. 2004. "The Tradition Effect: Framing Honor Crimes in Turkey." *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 15 (2): 118–151.
- Köker, Levent. 2016. "Otoriter Rejimin Neresindeyiz?" *Yarına Bakış*, April 27. <https://www.yarınabakis.com/2016/04/27/14542/>.
- Korkman, Zeynep K. 2016. "Politics of Intimacy in Turkey: Just a Distraction from 'Real' Politics?" *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 12 (1): 112–121.
- LGC News. 2013. "Man with Machete Threatens Protesters in Ankara." July 11. <http://www.lgcnews.com/man-with-machete-threatens-protesters-in-ankara/>.
- Lord, Ceren. 2012. "The Persistence of Turkey's Majoritarian System of Government." *Government and Opposition* 47 (2): 228–255.
- Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The Populist Zeitgeist." *Government and Opposition* 39 (4): 541–563.
- Nokta. 2016. "Ahmet İnsel: AKP'nin karşısında yüzde 50 yok." [Ahmet Insel: The AKP is not Opposed by 50%.] February 29. <http://www.noktadergisi.info/roportaj/ahmet-insel-akp-nin-karsisinda-yuzde-50-yok-h11376.html>.
- Öktem, Kerem. 2014. "Leviathan in the Lure of Mammon: Limits of Political Islam in Turkey." *Open Democracy*. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/kerem-oktem/leviathan-in-lure-of-mammon-limits-of-political-islam-in-turkey>.
- Oruçoğlu, Berivan. 2015. "Turks, Lies, and Videotape." *Foreign Policy*, March 13. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/turks-lies-and-videotape-turkey-erdogan/>.
- Özbudun, Ergun. 2015. "Turkey's Judiciary and the Drift toward Competitive Authoritarianism." *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 50 (2): 42–55.
- Özkırımlı, Umut, ed. 2014. *The Making of a Protest Movement*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Reuters. 2013. "Turkey's Kemalists See Secularist Legacy under Threat." November 17. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-kemalists-idUSBRE9AG0HQ20131118>.
- Sirman, Nükhet. 2005. "The Making of Familial Citizenship in Turkey." In *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, edited by E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, 147–172. London: Routledge.
- T24. 2016. "Erdogan: Bu ülkede milletin soyunu kurutmak için yıllarca doğum kontrol uygulamaları yapıldı." [Erdogan: Birth Control has been Applied for Years in this Country to Extinguish the Race of this Nation.] March 8. <http://t24.com.tr/haber/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-dunya-kadinlar-gunu-resepsiyonunda-konusuyor,331238>.
- Tadros, Mariz. 2015. "Contentious and Prefigurative Politics: 'Vigilante Groups' Struggle against Sexual Violence in Egypt (2011–2013)." *Development and Change* 46 (6): 1345–1368.
- The Economist. 2012. "Massacre at Uludere." June 9. <http://www.economist.com/node/21556616>.
- The Guardian. 2013. "Turkish Ministers' Sons Arrested in Corruption and Bribery Investigation." December 17. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministers-sons-arrested-corruption-investigation>.
- Tuğal, Cihan. 2016. "In Turkey, the Regime Slides from Soft to Hard Totalitarianism." *Open Democracy*. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/cihan-tugal/turkey-hard-totalitarianism-erdogan-authoritarian>.
- White, Jenny. 2015. "The Turkish Complex." *The American Interest*. <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/02/02/the-turkish-complex/>.

- Yazıcı, Berna. 2012. "The Return to the Family: Welfare, State, and Politics of the Family in Turkey." *Anthropological Quarterly* 85 (1): 103–140.
- Yetkin, Murat. 2015. "Erdoğan's 'Regime Change' and Bonaparte." *Hürriyet Daily News*, August 17. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogans-regime-change-and-bonaparte.aspx?PageID=238&NID=87040&NewsCatID=409>.