

humanity's moral horizons beyond the parochial world of the nation-state and pacify the states-system. So did many liberals and Marxists argue in the nineteenth century.

The question of whether long-term processes of change have begun to fulfil their earlier promise of transforming political life arises once again in the contemporary post-Cold War era (Richardson, 1993). Various disjunctures between the sovereign state and globalisation have been highlighted (D. Held, 1995), and clearer impressions of the impact of long-term patterns of social and economic change upon the state's capacity to perpetuate the totalising project have emerged in recent years.²⁵ Many analyses of these processes point to the declining importance of the state's traditional monopoly powers and observe the erosion of its capacity to promote the closure of political community (Wallace, 1994; Strange, 1996). Many anticipate the imminent demise of the Westphalian era (Rosenau, 1990; Cox, 1992; Zacher, 1992).

Of central interest are the arguments which suggest the obsolescence of war between the major industrial states (Mueller, 1989); the analyses of the rise of new trading states which uncouple economic growth from earlier strategies of conquest (Rosecrance, 1986); and the accounts of the expanding inter-liberal zone of peace (Doyle, 1982, 1986). Each of these approaches to international pacification clearly takes issue with the neo-realist contention that states are powerless to alter the prevalent modes of competitive interaction which are allegedly imposed upon them by international anarchy; and each assumes that the state's monopoly of control of the instruments of violence is less influential in shaping the nature and prospects of international society than it was in earlier epochs. Accounts of the logics of globalisation and fragmentation in contemporary world politics combine with these analyses of the declining significance of force in relations between core states to challenge the neo-realist contention that political life seems likely to revolve around the sovereign state for the indefinite future (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, p. 3; Cochran, 1995). Key features of these accounts are worth noting.

Numerous 'evasions of sovereignty' (Falk, 1990) which are the result of the globalisation of relations of production and exchange undercut the state's traditional power to direct the national economy (Strange, 1996). The state's capacity to regulate the political identities and loyalties of its citizens is weakened by the increase of global interconnectedness which raises awareness of the problems and predicaments of the human species as a whole (Wallace, 1994, p. 55; Strange, 1996, pp. 72-3).²⁶ The role of the state in securing close cooperation between citizens is reduced as the latter turn to various sub-national and transnational actors to promote, amongst other things, measures to secure environmental protection (Hurrell, 1994, p. 162), and look to local or ethnic

communities to resist threats to their identity. Pressures on the doctrine of sovereign immunity arise in the context of the state's greater role as a quasi-firm involved in contractual relations with transnational economic enterprises. Inroads into the state's claim to absolute sovereignty within its territory, and infringements of its claim to be the sole subject of international law, have occurred alongside advances in the international protection of human rights (Beetham, forthcoming). Demands for greater international accountability have multiplied with the rising instances and greater possibilities of transnational harm.²⁷ With globalisation, it is absurd to assume that the most significant moral community comprises fellow-citizens or co-nationals (D. Held, 1995, p. 18). In this context, the question of how the major industrial democracies can preserve democratic governance has emerged as a central problem for political theory and practice (D. Held, 1995). Experiments in national democratic governance have lost much of their value in the context of globalisation, and measures to extend democracy beyond the sovereign state are urgently required, as the advocates of cosmopolitan democracy have maintained (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Habermas, 1994). Seemingly irreversible trends towards the internationalisation of decision-making in economic, environmental and security domains underline the crucial point that national boundaries have become deeply problematical in the modern world (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, p. 9). These are some of the more important developments highlighted in recent accounts of the demise of the Westphalian epoch.

Closer transnational political cooperation is not the only effect of globalisation. As previously noted, war was central to the rise of modern states with their distinctive monopoly powers, high levels of national cohesiveness and clearly defined territoriality. War favoured the survival of the centralised state as the main vehicle for effective political cooperation, and diminished the choices available to minority nations. Faced with the dramatic rise of state power in the nineteenth century, national minorities confronted the difficult choice of whether to struggle to preserve local centres of decision-making power or attempt to democratise the central institutions which followed the growth of state power (Mann, 1994, pp. 250-1 and 354). Warfare settled the matter by promoting the rise and dissemination of unitary states which were hostile to the emergence of potential challengers to their authority in the domestic regions. Intriguingly, globalisation alters the equation. The pacification of core areas of the international system has removed one of the main pillars of national cohesion. Ancient fault lines have been exposed within many national communities, and in several states the myth of national unity and coherence has been shattered. Unprecedented degrees of globalisation and unusual levels of ethnic fragmentation cast

doubt on the efficacy and legitimacy of the nation-state as the primary vehicle for successful cooperation in many core regions within the modern world system (Cochran, 1995). Violent transformation is the frequent consequence in the constitutionally insecure and less industrialised societies.

Globalisation and fragmentation develop in tandem, as Aron (1968) observed some thirty years ago, and not only because of the uneven development of capitalism which is the preferred explanation of classical Marxism or because of the uneven development of industrialisation (Gellner, 1983). The members of culturally marginal groups have a long history of declining the state's invitation to shed their supposedly archaic inherited identities and of resisting total incorporation within the dominant national community. As often as not, the revolt against the national-assimilationist ideologies and practices favoured by the majority of nation-states possesses its own distinctive logic which arises out of the humiliation of prolonged cultural domination rather than the resentment of economic inequality.²⁸ With its homogenising tendencies, globalisation fuels the politics of identity and community. As a result, where cultural and political boundaries do not converge (as in the case of indigenous peoples trapped within settler states, or where migrant populations are exposed to patterns of exclusion in the societies which they inhabit), pressures have mounted to modify traditional conceptions of community and citizenship which are hostile to the creation of group-specific rights (Kymlicka, 1989, 1995; Taylor, 1994). Across the world – and largely because globalisation disseminates similar political projects and creates a common stock of political resources and ideas – minority nations, indigenous peoples and migrant organisations fuel 'the politics of recognition' (Taylor, 1994). Unsurprisingly, since globalisation prepares the way for transnational political activity, these new movements seek global support for their project of reconstructing national communities. One aim of these communities is to create universal norms which establish the principle of respect for cultural differences.²⁹ The increased prominence of the politics of recognition is one key indicator of movement beyond the Westphalian era.

Of course, the interplay between globalisation and fragmentation does not have a singular effect: their interaction provokes different responses in different societies. In Western Europe, particularly, the future of the modern state with its unique fusion of sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship and nationalism is most obviously in question; new forms of community and citizenship seem most likely to emerge within that region (Waller and Linklater, forthcoming).³⁰ An important observation about the process of European state-formation indicates one possible trajectory of political development. As Wight (1978, p. 25) argued, the formation

of the modern European state involved 'a revolution in loyalties' in which 'the inner circle of loyalty' to an immediate feudal superior expanded, and 'an outer circle of loyalty' to Christendom shrank. The ethnic revolt in Europe, coupled with the internationalisation of decision-making and emergent transnational loyalties, provokes the observation that these earlier processes are now being reversed. If so, then more powerful centres of political authority may emerge above and below the level of national governments to supplement the nation-state (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, ch. 9).

Enthusiasm for these developments should not underrate the power of the nation-state and its enduring capacity to rally support for traditional nationalist projects which oppose substantial transfers of power to new authorities. Nor should it underestimate the tenacity of hierarchical conceptions of race, gender and ethnicity which underpin the modes of exclusion to which the members of national and racial minorities, gypsies, migrants and refugees are regularly exposed. Nationalist social and political forces may be decisive at any historical moment, but the fact that they rarely go unchallenged is also an important feature of modern political community. The debates and divisions which occur as national communities wrestle with three traditional questions about the ethics of exclusion which are posed with renewed urgency throughout the whole of Europe with the passing of the bipolar age are deeply significant. The first of these questions is concerned with what Walzer (1995) calls the distribution of membership – the principles by which political communities decide who to admit and who to exclude from their ranks; the second with what can be called the distribution of citizenship – the principles which define the subjects of citizenship rights and the nature of these rights; the third with the distribution of global responsibilities – the principles which govern decisions about the responsibilities of separate states to the rest of humankind. (For further consideration of these issues, see below pp. 79–85.) Many communities are deeply divided over the answers to these questions which the forces of globalisation and fragmentation have compelled them to reopen, and many have lost their former confidence that these are questions which each sovereign state can rightfully answer on its own. Rightly does Derrida (1992, p. 9) argue that in Europe at any rate – although the same observation applies to many other parts of the world – it is unusual to encounter a political community which is entirely at one with itself (see also Devetak, 1995a, p. 45).

No assumption is made here that some invisible hand steers societies towards a condition in which national governments will despatch their powers to new centres of responsibility within and outside their national territories, and strike a better balance between ethical universality and

respect for difference in consequence. All that is argued is that the forces of division and disturbance which Wight identified in past epochs are evident in the current phase of European international society, that a heightened awareness of fluidity and unpredictability prevails, and that less has the air of immutability. Precisely what is in store for the classical sovereign state in Europe and elsewhere remains uncertain, but various trends create the expectation of its steady decline as the most effective and legitimate instrument of close political cooperation (Beetham, 1984; Bauman, 1993, p. 139). The logics of globalisation and fragmentation have disrupted the totalising project and steered many societies to the point where one future course of political development detaches the ideal of cultural distinctiveness from the idea of sovereign statehood and allows new combinations of universality and difference to develop (Tilly, 1992b, p. 705). Under these circumstances it is necessary to reflect upon new forms of political community which sever the links between sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship and nationalism. Increasingly, the central questions of international relations concern the ethical foundations of political community in the post-Westphalian era.

Theorising the Reconfiguration of Political Community

Contra neo-realism, it no longer seems wise to assume that sovereign communities and the anarchic international system will be reproduced indefinitely. A more secure assumption is that globalisation and fragmentation will continue to erode the state's monopoly powers, and that national governments will come under growing pressure to shift important responsibilities to new political authorities (Beetham, 1984). The outline of a post-Westphalian international society has already been traced within Western Europe and may come to include several societies which formerly belonged to the Soviet bloc. Different logics operate in other regions, especially where military regimes dominate weak civil societies, but present trends strongly suggest that globalisation and fragmentation will continue to frustrate the totalising project in the majority of nation-states.³¹ Neo-realism is one manifestation of the failure of mainstream international relations theory to consider alternative forms of political community which are relevant in this context; but contemporary patterns of change tax the Western political imagination more generally.

The tyranny of the concept of the sovereign nation-state (Bull, 1977, p. 275) has impoverished the Western political imagination, and left it ill-prepared for the current challenge of rethinking the foundations of

modern community. Political thought was divided into two largely self-contained branches which reflected the sharp contrast between the domestic and international realms which appeared with the rise of the Westphalian era. Political Science has analysed the nature of organised life within bounded communities, whereas International Relations has considered their prevalent modes of interaction. Various intellectual encrustations formed around these disciplinary boundaries while the sovereign state remained secure as the dominant form of political community. One of the consequences of distinguishing political theory as the theory of the good life from international theory as the theory of survival (Wight, 1966, p. 33) has been the dearth of analysis of the origins, development and actual or conceivable transformation of the bounded territorial state.

The principal countervailing trend, which is best represented by the writings of Kant and Marx, placed bounded political communities at the centre of social and political analysis. Their writings analysed the processes of change influencing the future of such communities and the fate of the unique distinctions between domestic and international politics, inside and outside, the inner circle of harmony and progress and the outer circle of the eternal recurrence of competition and conflict which have typified the Westphalian era. That there are profound weaknesses in their writings is not in question, and efforts to theorise political community in the contemporary world must go beyond the detailed analysis provided by Kant and Marx. Nevertheless, an insightful account of bounded communities which unites normative, sociological and praxeological inquiry emerges in the writings of Kant and Marx. Any approach to the potential transformation of political community which seeks to integrate normative, sociological and praxeological concerns must first settle accounts with their writings.

One of their shared assumptions was that there are no immutable structures which demand that human loyalties must stay confined within the limits of the parochial sovereign nation-state. There are no systemic forces for Kant and Marx (such as the kind which neo-realism conjures into existence) which dictate that the conscious transformation of human society remains a hopelessly utopian goal. There are no structural logics which prevent human beings from recreating political life, or which decree that a progressivist interpretation of international society will forever be frustrated. Kant and Marx stressed the respects in which the extension of the boundaries of association and the enlargement of systems of cooperation had already occurred in world history. Kant's philosophy of history emphasised the long transition from the original, barbaric international state of nature to the civility of the modern society of states and the growing responsiveness to the demands of cosmopolitan

morality. The passage of humanity from an early condition of small and relatively isolated social systems to the modern reality of large, economically interdependent societies governing vast territories was the equivalent theme in the Marxian philosophy of history. For Kant, and even more so for Marx, the destruction of small bounded communities and the dramatic acceleration of the universalisation of social and economic relations were extraordinary dimensions of human history (Linklater, 1990a, chs 6–8, 1990b, ch. 2).

An engagement with these long-term patterns of development underpinned their conviction that it was improbable that the modern sovereign state is the final stage in the development of the human capacity for creating frameworks of close political cooperation. Kant and Marx added specific observations about the main developmental logics in the contemporary era to their reflections on the central dynamics of world history. Kant believed that the universalisation of commerce and the dissemination of republican principles of government in eighteenth-century Europe formed the prelude to the emergence of powerful cosmopolitan sentiments. Marx held that the internationalisation of production and exchange presaged the rise of more universal forms of political cooperation which were embodied first of all in the emergence of transnational bonds and affinities between the members of the world's proletariat. The principal features of their respective sociological accounts of the main universalising processes are sufficiently well known that the discussion can turn to their efforts to integrate a sociology of previous extensions of the boundaries of moral and political community with the normative and praxeological analysis of the emerging post-Westphalian era.

Kant's comments on the ethical limitations of bounded communities indicate that he believed that the bonds between citizens and the state had to be renegotiated since the whole human race comprised a single moral universe. He took issue with the 'miserable comforters', Grotius, Vattel and Pufendorf, who announced that all human beings were obligated by the universal moral principles which reason had the innate capacity to apprehend, but sacrificed or compromised ethical universality whenever it clashed with the interests of the egotistical sovereign state. Kant's response to the conflict between the ties of citizenship and the duties of humanity envisaged a Copernican revolution in political theory in which the international political implications of the cosmopolitanism of the Stoic-Christian tradition would be taken seriously (Gallie, 1978). At first glance, it seems curious that Kant argued that state sovereignty should remain one of the constitutive features of political community. But he believed that the deeper issue was to enlarge the moral, as opposed to the political, boundaries of community, so that stronger

cosmopolitan sentiments would cancel the tendency of states to act as self-regarding autonomous units (Hurrell, 1990).³² Individuals would remain citizens of their respective political communities but they would expose the civic bonds within each independent state to the test of cosmopolitan citizenship. As world citizens, they would exercise their sovereignty with due regard for the principle that all individuals should be regarded as if they were co-legislators in a universal moral community. Kant assumed that the development of a universal communication community would be the defining political aspiration of the post-Westphalian epoch.³³

Kant's philosophy of world history tried to show that what is true in theory, namely that all humanity should act as if it belonged to a universal kingdom of ends, can become true in practice. Universal commerce and the dissemination of republican principles of government demonstrated that a cosmopolitan kingdom of ends was possible but they did not issue a guarantee that one would ever be realised. A philosophy of ultimate ends and a sociology of the prospects for, and constraints upon, the development of a higher form of life were accompanied by a praxeology which explained the means by which human beings could transcend existing conditions. Kantian praxeology offered a vision of future possibilities in the expectation that theory can play a transformative role by delegitimising existing structures and by steering human action to new political objectives; it also considered how human action could best respond to the new historical opportunities in order to secure the gradual transformation of oppressive structures. Kant's vision of a universal society of co-legislators served this task, as did the inventory of maxims crucial to an ethical foreign policy which was advanced in *Perpetual Peace*. That inventory set out the international moral obligations which republican states had to respect if they were to honour their commitment to publicity, autonomy and consent. Immediately binding objectives, such as complying with just war principles, and longer-term aspirations, including the abolition of standing armies, were identified as the means by which republican states could promote the emergence of a universal kingdom of ends (C. Brown, 1992, ch. 2; Williams and Booth, 1996, pp. 86ff). When specifying these measures, Kant assumed that the possibility of new forms of political community was anchored in the ideas of liberty and equality which were intrinsic to modernity.

Marx's analysis of the prospects for universal emancipation dispensed with Kant's appeal to a system of absolute, universal moral truths. A neo-Hegelian perspective which analysed the historical evolution of more profound understandings of the meaning of human freedom and the development of deeper insights into its social and economic precondi-

tions replaced Kant's belief in the existence of a universal human rationality which had the power to comprehend the principles of an immutable morality. The tension between the language of freedom and equality in capitalist society and the alienating effects of the internationalisation of the modern forces and relations of production was central to Marx's sociology. The powerful ethical themes which run through Marx's analysis of capitalism revolve around this elementary contradiction.

Capitalism compounded the tragic quality of human existence by celebrating freedom and equality as political principles while subjecting increasing numbers of the world's population to universal systemic forces which eluded their control. Marx maintained that traditional conceptions of political emancipation failed to recognise that the problems of modern society could not be solved without reconstructing the totality of social and economic life. His ethical commitment to a universal society of free and equal producers, which is reminiscent of the Kantian vision of a cosmopolitan realm of co-legislators, was inextricably linked with a sociology of the impact of capitalism on human society. The praxeological dimension of his inquiry contained a broad outline of future communist society, assuming in common with Kant that social and political theory can have a transformative role. A more robust articulation of the main political objectives of the leading counter-hegemonic movement, the proletariat, whose growing universal solidarity anticipated a new era of human cooperation, was one dimension of Marx's praxeology. His reflections on the importance of capturing state power and comments on the relationship between class politics and national movements sought to demonstrate that revolutionary actors could solve the mystery of how to progress towards universal socialism. Like Kant, Marx believed that modern commitments to autonomy and equality made new forms of human community possible.

It is the form rather than the substantive content of the reformist project in the writings of Kant and Marx which informs the subsequent discussion; nevertheless a brief account of the principal limitations and shortcomings of their respective approaches is necessary before exploring alternative possibilities. The important point to make about Kant's normative inquiry is that his belief in immutable and universal laws of reason clashes with modern sensibilities which emphasise the social construction of knowledge and the diverse, and changing, cultural conceptions of moral truth. The very possibility of moral universals is precisely what is at stake in much contemporary social theory which has been anxious to stress the threats which universalising moralities pose to cultural diversity. Notwithstanding his opposition to the West's treatment of indigenous peoples (Kant, 1970b, pp. 255–6), the question of

cultural difference was hardly a central consideration in Kant's writings. Similar difficulties arise in connection with Marxism. The critics have argued that historical materialism consolidated a binary division between progressive Western civilisation and retarded non-Western humanity which was as problematical in theory as it was pernicious in practice. Marx's exuberance for the loss of self-sufficiency on the part of non-Western peoples (which was echoed in Engels' disparaging remarks about the historyless peoples) revealed an explicit commitment to a process of Westernisation in which little or no value was attached to the survival of radical cultural differences.³⁴ This inclination to privilege universality over difference was challenged by the Austro-Marxists, who argued that the sovereign nation-state should be replaced by new social formations in which higher levels of universality and respect for cultural autonomy could coexist (Bottomore and Goode, 1978). The critique of Austro-Marxism in the Soviet Union delayed the appearance of the wider regard for national and cultural differences which emerged with the rise of Third World Marxism and which postmodernism in more recent times has been especially keen to support.

The Kantian and Marxist sociologies of bounded communities assumed that egotistical national communities were about to be replaced by new structures of transnational cooperation. Unsurprisingly, given their cosmopolitan ethical commitments, they analysed the universalising processes which promised to widen the boundaries of moral and political community. In this regard, they shared the illusion of the epoch. The supposition that commerce and industrialisation would lead to the growing popular acceptance of cosmopolitan ideals, and eventually to the eclipse of the nation-state, informed many of the leading theories of the rise of industrial society in the nineteenth-century (Kumar, 1981). Three main points need to be made about late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century explanations of the emergence of a universal political community. First, there was a tendency, which was pronounced in Marx's thought, to underestimate the tenacity of nationalism and the state, and to fail to anticipate the crucial role which war would continue to play in shaping the boundaries of community. Second, although the rise of nationalist feeling and the increased tolerance of violence in international affairs towards the end of the nineteenth century compelled the analysts of community to reconsider their position on the nation-state, many perpetuated the error of assuming that economic forces remained the primary determinants of social and political development. This preference for imputing causal primacy to the sphere of production is most evident in the Marxist theories of nationalism and imperialism (Linklater, 1990b, chs 3–4). The most innovative strands of Marxist thought shared the Austro-Marxist conviction about the significance of

language and culture throughout human history. Third, the praxeological observations generated by these sociologies focused on the best means of widening the boundaries of moral and political community to ensure justice for outsiders. The question of how to reconstitute political community so that higher levels of respect for cultural differences would flourish internally was less important.

The substantive analysis of normative, sociological and praxeological questions concerning the future of political community in the nineteenth century cast insufficient light on the issues of the modern age; nevertheless, it exemplified a mode of reasoning which escapes the limitations of later realist and neo-realist thought. Kant and Marx have been described as second-image thinkers who believed that the rise of enlightened regimes would inaugurate a new phase of international history in which cooperation and peace would replace conflict and war. A more accurate interpretation of their writings is that they provided insightful commentaries on the long-term processes of change which disrupted the state's capacity to unify citizens in opposition to aliens. Kant and Marx argued that the primary social bonds which hold societies together but which also separate them from the rest of humanity are more tenuous than much social theory has supposed. They sought to identify immanent forces which ran counter to the state's totalising project, and they offered reflections on how the subjects of independent political communities could gradually replace intersocietal estrangement and conflict with universal harmony. For these reasons Kant and Marx remain important for the critique of the immutability thesis in neo-realism and for efforts to create the condition in which a progressivist interpretation of international society becomes a plausible account of world history.

As members of the Frankfurt School argued, it is necessary for philosophy to move beyond Marx just as it was essential to move beyond Kant and Nietzsche (Horkheimer, 1972). The most convincing efforts to construct a critical analysis of community which remains true to the spirit, if not to the letter, of Kant and Marx's analysis revolve around the idea of expanding the realm of social interaction which is governed by open dialogue. This emphasis on dialogue resonates with the liberal principle of publicising intentions and announcing the reasons for action which Kant's political philosophy stoutly defended. Connections between this ideal and the Marxist tradition are less immediately evident although Habermas (1979a) has argued that Marxism can only realise its critical potential if it is committed to the ideals of undistorted communication.³⁵ The dialogic turn in recent social theory is not confined to liberal and Marxist political thought, however. Support for dialogic communities is equally central to postmodernist thought (Lyotard, 1993), philosophical hermeneutics (Shapcott, 1994), feminist

political theory (Frazer and Lacey, 1993; Benhabib, 1993) and to many other contemporary approaches to international relations (Rosenau, 1994; Blaney and Inayatullah, 1994; Jabri, 1996). Several theoretical approaches converge on this central theme and contribute to the project of reconstructing the three-tiered approach to political community which was developed in Kant and Marx's thought. They place the normative ideal of the universal communication community at the centre of the unfinished project of modernity.

Whereas Kant and Marx were at best unclear about the moral significance of cultural differences, more recent efforts to promote dialogic communities are unambiguous about their importance. Habermas argues that reworking the ethical foundations of Marxism involves a sharp break with any substantive vision of the good society which is assumed to have global validity and significance. The emphasis shifts away from universalisable conceptions of the good life to the procedural universals which need to be in place before true dialogue can be said to exist in any social encounter. Theory neither anticipates the outcome of dialogic relations nor assumes that dialogue must culminate in a consensus about the desirable ends of social and political life. Similar arguments exist in postmodern approaches which are suspicious of, and often opposed to, ethical universalism because of the attendant danger that it will consolidate existing forms of cultural domination and generate new modes of exclusion. Those perspectives do not regard dialogue as a vehicle for reconciling value-differences but defend it as the medium through which greater human variety can be discovered and explored. Dialogue holds out the promise that agreements will not be reached by ignoring or suppressing marginal and dissident voices. The logic of the argument is that dialogic communities will be sensitive to the needs of the victims of the totalising project: namely, aliens beyond secured borders and a range of internally subordinate groups. The recent dialogic turn in social theory points towards a normative approach to community which supports greater universality coupled with a deeper commitment to the wealth of human differences.

The key normative issue, which is that political communities should be reconfigured to combine advances in universality with the heightened appreciation of social variety, has profound implications for the sociology of community. The main sociological question is how far different communities are capable of dismantling the unjust systems of exclusion which are directed against internally subordinate groups and aliens. Sociological investigation ought to retain the Kantian and Marxian focus on the universalising processes which encourage the extension of the boundaries of moral and political community, but it needs to supplement the approach by investigating societal potentials for incorporating

greater diversity within modern political life. Social systems reveal different potentials for evolving in this direction. One of the purposes of the critical sociology of bounded communities is to understand them.

Settling accounts with Marxism which made the practice of exclusion central to sociological theory is one central issue. Efforts to transcend Marxist sociology have developed along two fronts. There is, in the first place, the incontrovertible claim that Marxism placed class exclusion at the heart of sociological analysis and neglected the modes of exclusion which are grounded in hierarchical representations of ethnicity, gender and race. In large part because of the influence of Foucault, contemporary critical sociology faces the task of developing a comprehensive analysis of the various barriers to otherness which societies impose (Taylor, 1985). In the second place, there is the equally undeniable argument that the Marxist paradigm of production cannot explain what Habermas has called the grammar of forms of life which includes the sphere of cultural practices (see Roderick, 1986, p. 135). A related point is that the Marxist preoccupation with the sphere of production seriously underestimated the historical importance of the state, geopolitics and war.

Giddens (1985) argues that Marxism failed to understand that the development of the modern state has been shaped by the interaction between internal pacification, geopolitics, capitalism and industrialisation: its evolution cannot be understood as the political effect of the logic of capitalist development alone. Much more is known about the nature of state power as a result of the move to multi-logic explanation (Skocpol, 1979; Mann, 1986; Tilly, 1992a). This critique of Marxist theories of the state also has considerable significance for a sociology of bounded political communities. Mann's inquiry into the development of the forms of social power casts a great deal of light on the expansion of the boundaries of political association and community in the early empires and on the development of the state's capacity to promote totalising projects. That approach intersects with Wight's embryonic sociology of societies of states and with Nelson's analysis of civilisational structures and inter-civilisational relations. All three approaches contribute important resources to the sociology of bounded communities and reinforce the Kantian claim that multiple forces, including commerce, state-building, geopolitics, and developments in the moral-cultural sphere, have interacted to shape the nature of modern political community and its level of responsiveness to universalistic norms. (See below, chapters 4 and 5.) These approaches prepare the groundwork for a sociology of community which analyses societal potentials for developing stronger commitments to universality and difference.

Praxeological innovations are required which correspond with the

normative commitments and the sociological project which have already been outlined. One of the functions of praxeology, according to Kant and Marx, was to give direction to the transgressions of state sovereignty and the disengagements from national community which suggested that a cosmopolitan association was slowly emerging.³⁶ The universalistic commitment which shaped their respective conceptions of praxeology left little scope for measures designed to promote respect for cultural differences. Contemporary praxeological analysis can overcome this limitation by supporting patterns of change which point beyond the totalising project to dialogic communities which are at pains to overcome the exclusion of marginal voices. It can identify ways of institutionalising visions of a universal communication community which diminish the moral importance of shared national identities and embrace the conviction that political decisions lack legitimacy if they are taken without considering their likely effects on systematically excluded groups inside and outside the boundaries of existing forms of life.³⁷

To analyse boundaries in this way is to recognise the continuing importance of the nation-state but to argue that it should adopt new political responsibilities. This is to side with Kant against Marx, whose emphasis on the transformation of global capitalism left central questions about the future role of the state and the possibilities for developing the institutions of international society unanswered. It is to seek to reconstruct the Kantian project of defending the transition from an anarchic states-system in which high levels of distrust, competition and conflict prevail to a society of states in which international-legal and moral principles tame what Kant called the 'barbaric freedom' of sovereign communities; and it is to support further progress towards a cosmopolitan association in which universal principles unite individuals everywhere while respecting the value they attach to their respective cultural differences. To approach the problem of community in this manner is to endorse the argument that the dominant mode of critical theory in the twentieth century, namely Marxism, paid a high price for its preoccupation with the transformation of capitalist relations of production. Its praxeology was ill-equipped for the crisis of the early twentieth century which revealed the tenacity of nationalism, the state and war, and demonstrated the need for different approaches to the eradication of the totalising project. As Derrida (1992) suggests in his comments about the relationship between Marxism and deconstructionism, critical theory has to become more deeply engaged with the sovereign state, nationalism, international law and citizenship. It has to confront anew the question of how to solve the problem of bounded communities.

The inclusion of citizenship in Derrida's list suggests three further

comments on praxeology which complete this part of the discussion. First, various strands of contemporary social and political theory have criticised the exclusionary role of modern conceptions of national citizenship. Recent cosmopolitan democratic theory takes issue with traditional notions of citizenship which deny aliens the right to participate in institutions that make decisions affecting their vital interests (D. Held, 1995). Images of cosmopolitan democracy extend the Kantian theme that moral agents should conceive of themselves as co-legislators within a universal kingdom of ends. They argue for transnational political structures in which citizens and aliens are associated as equal participants in a universal communication community. Second, various strands of contemporary political thought stress the respects in which difference-blind conceptions of citizenship exclude subordinate groups. Group-specific rights are defended by these approaches as a means of breaking with the hegemonic proposition that all citizens must have exactly the same rights and duties notwithstanding their different circumstances and exposure to unequal social possibilities and constraints. Praxeological inquiry can reinforce these pressures to move beyond exclusionary sovereign states by imagining modes of citizenship which weave new relations between universality and difference into the structure of contemporary political life. These are the possibilities which globalisation and fragmentation create within those regions of international society where war no longer plays its traditional homogenising role in the lives of communities.³⁸

Third, these remarks do not anticipate the demise of the state but envisage its reconstruction. The task of praxeological analysis is to assist the development of new forms of political authority and novel conceptions of citizenship which strike the appropriate balance between universality and difference. A central ambition is to facilitate the transition to a condition in which sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship are no longer welded together to define the nature and purpose of political association. This is not to advance the unlikely proposition that conventional state structures either will or should disappear, but rather to suggest that states should assume a number of responsibilities which have usually been avoided in the past. Hegel's conception of the rational state remains insightful in this context. The main insight is that the rational state has ethical responsibilities which other political organisations do not exercise to the same degree. Mediating between the different loyalties, identities and interests which exist in society was, for Hegel, a primary function of the state. The need for political institutions which perform this task would not cease to exist just because national societies had become more responsive to cosmopolitan morality or more sympathetic to claims for the public recognition of cultural differences;

nor would it end were states to share authority with institutions in their domestic regions and international organisations. A crucial responsibility of the modern state is to enable multiple political authorities and loyalties to develop, and to endeavour to bring harmony through dialogue to the great diversity of ethical spheres which stretches from the local community to the transnational arena (Lawler, 1994). The rational state eschews the totalising project, encourages the emergence of new forms of political community in which the potential for higher levels of universality and difference is realised and, in so doing, transcends the limitations of the Westphalian era.

Conclusions

The neo-realist account of international anarchy delivered a profound challenge to the project of the Enlightenment which envisaged the possibility of a cosmopolitan society. Recent responses to neo-realism argue that war is not an inevitable consequence of international anarchy. They take issue with the neo-realist contention that the purpose of international relations theory is to explain the reproduction of the state-system and to promote the smooth functioning of international order. To reduce international relations theory to these tasks is to submit to the consequences of the totalising project. Opposing approaches highlight the incompleteness of states and argue that transforming political community is the primary objective of international relations theory. Practical efforts to promote new relations between universality and difference are a fitting response to the pressures which globalisation and fragmentation have imposed on modern political communities. Critical theory can support these efforts by renewing the normative, sociological and praxeological analysis of community initiated by Kant and Marx. But reconstructing this project is no simple task. Recent developments in social theory have been highly critical of the universalistic normative commitments which were central to their writings. The strengths and weakness of their commitment to the project of universal emancipation are the primary concerns of the next two chapters.