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Anarchy, Authority, Rule

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International Relations and Political Science are constituted as disciplines on the Hobbesian opposition of anarchy and authority. We reject this opposition and the paradigms of anarchy and authority it has come to authorize. We propose instead a single paradigm of rule to account for the pervasive asymmetries of international relations. We show that in German social thought from Hegel to Weber political society consists in relations of super- and subordination—relations maintained through rules and obtaining in rule. We reformulate Weber's three ideal types of rule, show their relation to independently established types of rule, and apply them to political society generally. We then examine diverse efforts in the recent literature of International Relations to challenge the assumption of anarchy, using the paradigm of rule to clear up numerous terminological and conceptual confusions. Finally, we show how the paradigm of rule facilitates an understanding of such contemporary asymmetries as Soviet–East European and North–South relations.

Introduction

“Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests.” With these words, Kenneth A. Oye introduced *World Politics*' recent symposium issue on “Cooperation under Anarchy.” (1985:1) Oye's succinct, forceful, and familiar formulation does three things. First, it conflates formal and substantive definitions of anarchy. A world without central authority is a world without limits. Second, it recalls Thomas Hobbes's opposition between the war “of every man, against every man” and the commonwealth, “the Multitude . . . united in one Person” (1968:185, 227). Third, it affirms at least implicitly the paradigmatic significance of this Hobbesian opposition for the constitution of International Relations and Political Science as disciplines.¹ The former claims

¹ Throughout we use the upper case for disciplines and fields of study, the lower case for what they study.

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anarchy as its proper subject of concern, the latter authority. Between them they account for everything political.

We reject each step in this sequence and find Oye's conception of anarchy untenable. To stipulate political situations in which no central authority is present implies nothing about limits. We take the Hobbesian opposition as warrant for viewing international relations as formally but not substantively anarchical. There are limits wherever there is politics. Finally we hold that the disciplinary division of labor constituted on the Hobbesian opposition forecloses an appreciation of what politics is centrally about, the imposition of limits.

Central authorities impose limits, as Oye observed, but they are not the only source of limits. On the whole, International Relations scholars acknowledge this. Precluded as they are by the disciplinary division of labor from consideration of "authority," they resort to terms like "society," "interdependence," and "cooperation" to suggest that people individually and collectively accept limits in their relations. Yet these terms often suggest conditions antecedent to or independent of politics, as if their presence were not a matter of imposition. Talk about "cooperation under anarchy" neglects anarchy under cooperation or, to say the same, under the imposition of limits.

To consider cooperation or any such term in this way gets back to politics. It does so without making "authority"—the presence of one or more central authorities—synonymous with imposition. Yet we need a term to capture what is political about all social relations, however named. The term we propose is "rule." It is less limiting than "authority," with a different history and, as it turns out, paradigmatic significance in its own right.

We claim that rule is the distinctive feature of political society, which we take to include international relations no less than civil society. In support of this claim, we examine the prevailing sense in which the term "authority" is defined and show that it is wrongly attributed to Max Weber. We show that German social thought from G. W. F. Hegel to Weber focused on relations of super- and subordination in political society—relations maintained through rules and obtaining in rule. This we call the paradigm of rule. Weber identified three ideal types of rule, which indeed fail inspection as "pure" types. We reformulate these types and show their relation to three independently established types of rules mediating the imposition of limits.

The first type of rule is *hierarchy*, which Hobbes posited as an alternative to anarchy and Weber notably developed. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels anticipated the second, *hegemony*, in their early work, and it is clearly identifiable in Weber's rule through charisma. We owe its development, however, to Antonio Gramsci. The third type of rule is implicit in bourgeois practices but disguised in the liberal assumption that agents are autonomous and their rights and duties symmetrical. Weber failed to see the complex of relations so conceived as constituting a distinct and persistent pattern of rule and privilege. One measure of the extent to which this type of rule continues to go unnoticed is the lack of a conventional name for it. We find an appropriate name, however, in Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy: *heteronomy*, which stands in opposition to autonomy. The crucial point is that the presumption of autonomy disguises the persistent asymmetry of heteronomous relations.

Given our view that political society includes those relations conventionally described as anarchical, we hold that international relations are necessarily relations of super- and subordination. A number of scholars share this view, but because most of them accept the claim that international relations are anarchical they generally fail to express their sense of the situation in a conceptually adequate or mutually

intelligible fashion. They use the terms “hegemony” and “hierarchy” indiscriminately and at cross-purposes. Efforts at specification and generalization, however interesting in their own terms, cannot be used to support or develop one another. The paradigm of rule offered in these pages provides a framework for organizing these diverse efforts to penetrate the myth of anarchical international relations. It also allows us to show, by way of conclusion, the pattern of hierarchical relations in superpower spheres of influence, the hegemonial relations supporting those spheres but manifested more generally, and the heteronomous relations pervasive in situations of exchange.

Reclaiming the Paradigm of Rule

International Relations and Political Science both depend on the opposition of war and commonwealth, anarchy and authority. Hobbes appears not to have used the term “anarchy”; nevertheless his characterization of “the natural condition of mankind” (from the title of *Leviathan*’s legendary Chapter XIII) as a “condition of warre” (1968:183–88) is the canonical equation of formal and substantive senses of that term. Hobbes alluded to international relations only in passing. Although sovereigns adopt the “posture of War,” this ought not to be confused with the condition of war because “there does not follow from it [the posture of war], that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men” (1968:187–88).

We could infer a different result from Hobbes’s general position. In a condition of war, people are pretty much equal or can make themselves so “by secret machination, or by confederacy with others” (1968:183). Yet Hobbes admitted that “the joyning together of a small number of men . . . gives encouragement to an Invasion” because “small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory” (Chapter XVII; 1968:224). The small number of sovereigns participating in Hobbesian international relations have just this encouragement to war, because their bodies politic, unlike human bodies, are not often nearly equal and because confederacy among that small number can exacerbate such inequalities. If anything, posturing sovereigns are more dangerous and create more misery than ordinary people in a condition of war (but see Walker, 1987:73).

Obviously Hobbes should not be held solely responsible for the syllogism

A condition of liberty is a condition of war.
International relations are a condition of liberty among sovereigns.
Therefore, international relations are a condition of war.

Yet we can hardly be surprised that readers of Hobbes announce this syllogism in his name. It substantiates the formal opposition of anarchy and authority that Hobbes did author, if only as a thought experiment. Hobbes had more to say on the other side of this opposition but, ironically enough, this had less impact on the substantive terms of discourse. For Hobbes, “the right of doing any Action is called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is always understood a Right of doing any act: and *done by Authority*, done by Commission, or Licence from him whose right it is” (1968:218; Hobbes’s emphasis). Authority if conferred on actors by authors, the latter having authority only in the sense of being authorized to act.

Hobbes’s conception of authority as authorization follows from his preoccupation with rights (see Pitkin, 1967:14–37; McNeilly, 1968:214–22; Hampton, 1986:114–29; Kavka, 1986:387–91). Today, at least in the disciplines constituted on the Hobbesian opposition, the term “authority” is used quite differently. It is conventionally understood as a relation, not a right. This relation has two elements: the use

of power and the acceptance of its use by others. Authority is the legitimate exercise of power.² Hobbes also stressed the “use of . . . Power and Strength” (1968:227), but without concern for acceptance, which in the usual circumstances of power’s exercise is indispensable.³

A further convention attributes this conventional view to Weber. Thus Harry Eckstein observed: “The term [‘authority’] is used most widely as Weber meant it” (1973:1153). Yet in the German text of *Economy and Society*, Weber’s mature statement of political sociology, he used the term “authority” (*Autorität*) only three times (as best we can tell). It first appeared parenthetically and in quotation marks, directly after Weber used the German word “*Herrschaft*” (Weber, 1976:122). The standard English translation reads: “Domination (‘authority’),” with a footnote by Guenther Roth, one of the translators, that *Autorität* was an “alternative colloquial term for *Herrschaft*” (Weber, 1968:212, 299). The second time Weber used the term “authority” was in the phrase “*die Herrschaft kraft Autorität*” (“domination by virtue of authority” in the English text) (Weber, 1976:542; 1968:943; this is unchanged from the original English translation of Shils and Rheinstein in Rheinstein, 1954:324). Weber immediately clarified his meaning parenthetically: “power to command and duty to obey” (Weber, 1968:943). The third use occurs in the same paragraph, in quotation marks and without alteration of the meaning just established.

The term “*Herrschaft*” occurs dozens, possibly hundreds of times in the original text of *Economy and Society*. As we have seen, the standard English translation renders *Herrschaft* as domination, but not exclusively or systematically. It also uses “authority” on numerous occasions (e.g., 1968:213), as well as “dominance” and “dominancy” (e.g., 1968:225, 942; dominancy was Rheinstein’s choice, retained in the standard translation) and “system of domination” (1968:214). Such variability in rendering a word in translation would suggest any one of three possibilities: that the word is used inconsistently throughout the work; that it has an unstable meaning in the original language; or that the language into which it is being translated does not have a precise counterpart for the concept conveyed by that word. We will examine each of these possibilities in turn.

Herrschaft in Translation

The possibility that Weber used the term “*Herrschaft*” inconsistently is suggested by the fact that Talcott C. Parsons, in an early translation of parts of *Economy and Society*, rendered *Herrschaft* as “imperative control” in some contexts and as “authority” in others (Weber, 1947:152–53).⁴ Parsons knew that at least some of the time Weber was writing about a situation abstractly understood as coercive and thus, in Parsons’s translation, a matter of “imperative control.” As is well known, Parsons had a specific theoretical interest in legitimacy. Inasmuch as Weber was engaged in a systematic

² David Easton: “Authority is a special power relationship based on the expectation that if *A* sends a message to *B*—which may be called a wish, suggestion, regulation, law, command, order or the like—*B* will adopt it as the premise of his own behavior . . . the major source for [authority] roles resides in the prevalence of the conviction of their legitimacy” (1965:207–08). Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan: “Authority is . . . the accepted and legitimate possession of power . . . Thus ascription of authority always involves a reference to persons accepting it as such” (1950:133).

³ Consider the complete sentence from which we just quoted: “For by this Authoritie given him [the one Person] by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad” (1968:227–28). The conferral of so much power inspires terror, not a sense of legitimacy.

⁴ Later in the same text and without explanation, Parsons used “imperative coordination” interchangeably with “imperative control” (Weber, 1947:324–27). Neither version is adequate or has survived as an accepted translation.

exposition of the historical circumstances under which control tends to be accepted, he frequently used the term “*Herrschaft*” in keeping with Parsons’s conception of authority as the legitimate exercise of power. On these occasions Parsons translated *Herrschaft* as “authority.” In other words, Parsons introduced etymological inconsistencies into Weber’s text to suit his own programmatic needs. Weber’s English language readers could not help finding in him a Parsonsian preoccupation with consensus and system support (see Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope, 1975).

Other translators and commentators have emphasized Weber’s interest in the coercive structure of relations of control. Reinhold Bendix remarked that Weber “would have been critical of any translation that tended to obscure ‘the threat of force’ in all relations between superiors and subordinates” (1962:482). In his introduction to the standard English translation of *Economy and Society*, Roth echoed this language by calling *Herrschaft* “a structure of superordination and subordination sustained by a variety of motives and means of enforcement” (Weber, 1968:XC). More recently Sociologists have come to realize that inconsistencies in translating *Herrschaft* say less about Weber than they do about contending schools of thought in Sociology. Consensus theorists follow Parsons’s lead; conflict theorists read Weber to contrary effect. The terms “authority” and “domination” crystallize their differences (Wrong, 1980:36–38, Alexander, 1983:82, 173–74).

Herrschaft in German

Weber’s use of the term “*Herrschaft*” evidently poses a “genuine paradox” for social theory: “submission to legitimate authority is voluntary and yet at the same time is experienced as mandatory or compulsory” (Wrong, 1980:39). If inconsistencies of translation reflect a paradox embedded in the term *Herrschaft*, then we should turn to the second possible reason for these inconsistencies, namely, that the term does not have a stable meaning in German. Because of our limited linguistic competence, we are at risk in going beyond the usual observation that *Herrschaft* has a concrete meaning—it refers to the position of the feudal lord (Roth in Weber, 1968:XCIV, 62; Alexander, 1983:172)—as well as the abstract meaning at contention in Weber’s work. Note, however, that Hegel also used the term in a generalizing way in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, as did Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology* and Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.

Hegel juxtaposed the term “*Herrschaft*” with “*Knechtschaft*” in a famous setpiece of just a few pages (Hegel 1952:140–50). Most commentaries refer to it as defining relations of master to slave (e.g., Plamenatz, 1963:153–59, 188–92; Shklar, 1976:57–95; Balbus, 1983:11–21).⁵ The language of slavery suggests domination in the extreme, yet Hegel argued that “slaves” learn from their work while “masters” do not, for the latter do not work. But what do slaves learn? Hegel’s interpretation is often admired—slaves become self-conscious. It is equally possible to see this interpretation as retrograde—slaves learn their place and become stoical (Kelly, 1978:47–50).

Self-consciousness constitutes the paradox disclosed by Weber’s use of the term “*Herrschaft*.” The imposition of demanding limits fosters reflection on the need for control less by those who impose limits than by those upon whom they are imposed. The latter have no other claim to dignity. If domination yields authority, the paradox

⁵ Yet the two widely available translations speak of lord or master and bondsman (Hegel, 1931:228–40; 1977:111–19) and render *Herrschaft* and *Knechtschaft* as lordship and bondage or servitude. Hobbes invoked the relation of master and servant in his discussion of “the Rights, and Consequences of Sovereignty” (1968:251–61, quoting p. 252). Servants have obligations they cannot repudiate no matter how they have been acquired; “Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do not do it of duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their taskmasters” (1968:256; see Hampton, 1986:120–22).

is pointed up by pushing Hegel's formulation to the extreme of the relation of master and slave. Hegel nevertheless may just as well have had lord and serf in mind (they are the concrete referents in German, after all) or may have simply wanted to formulate the relationship and its paradoxical implications in general terms.

Marx and Engels were evidently inspired by Hegel's discussion of servitude and self-consciousness to accept its structure while altering its functional interpretation. By generalizing relations of control in the language of class and substantiating the meaning of work in material conditions, Marx and Engels turned Hegel upside down. Consciousness became a trait of the "masters"—a trait at once collective and detached from the material conditions of work. Only the masters believe that the imposition of limits is acceptable, and they must convey this idea to their subordinates. The paradox disappears. "Domination" is the only word that adequately describes the oppressive and exploitive relationship between them.

Domination subsequently became a powerful normative as well as conceptual device for Marxists focusing on the position Marx and Engels developed in the early years of their association. It happens that the English translation of the famous passage on work and consciousness in *The German Ideology* speaks not of domination but of rule, the ruling class, and ruling ideas (Marx and Engels, 1964:67). The verb "to rule" in the German original is "*herrschen*," and the noun "rule" is "*Herrschaft*" (Marx and Engels, 1978a:46). Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* dates from the same period. In the standard translation we find "domination" on several occasions (and "rule" on one) (Marx, 1954b:101, 105, 107, 111). In every instance, however, the original German is "*Herrschaft*" (Marx and Engels, 1978b:194, 197, 199, 202).

From Hegel to Weber extends an unbroken etymological tradition in which the master concept of *Herrschaft* lends coherence to German social thought for a century.⁶ It posits the permanence of asymmetry, not the elective asymmetry, of authority relations as the central problem of social reality. But what makes asymmetry permanent? Marx could go on to his examination of the system of capital only after he and Engels had answered this question. The centrality of *Herrschaft* in German social thought also helps to explain the growing recognition among scholars that Weber extended rather than opposed Marx's project. As Jeffrey C. Alexander put it: "Weber became important, therefore, not as an alternative to Marx but as a theoretical means of supplying Marxist sociology with a more complex and interdependent model" (1983:133). The term "*Herrschaft*" is point of departure and frame of reference for Hegel, Marx, and Weber. The very stability of its meaning allows a succession of claims to be made about it that should be seen in paradigmatic terms.

Herrschaft as Rule

The third possible reason for the variable translation of *Herrschaft* is that the term has no adequate counterpart in English. If the meaning of *Herrschaft* is fixed through its paradigmatic function in German social thought, we would expect to find a stable

⁶ Indeed it extends back to G. W. Leibniz, whose five levels of "natural society" include that of *Herr* and *Knecht*, conceptualized in terms of rule. See Leibniz, "On Natural Law" in Riley (1972:77–79). Introducing this passage, Riley commented that it "shows, perhaps more clearly than any other, how much some of his political views remained medieval, how much force the ideas of hierarchy and natural subordination had for him. It relates Leibniz to some of his German predecessors—particularly Althusius—and makes clear the gap that separates him from, e.g., the great English theorists of the seventeenth century" (1972:77). See also Holz (1968) on the striking parallels between Leibniz's formulation and Hegel's. Note, however, that Hobbes's medieval conception of the master-servant relation (see note 5) hardly sets him apart. As Hampton observed, "a distinction between personal and political subjugation was not clearly made in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (1986:25).

counterpart to the extent that English speakers orient themselves within the same or a comparable paradigm. A semblance of such a paradigm has appeared in recent decades, especially in the United States in the groundbreaking work of C. Wright Mills on *The Power Elite* (1959), in the debate on democratic elitism (Bachrach, 1971), in William Domhoff's query, *Who Rules America?* (1967), and even in discussions of the "military-industrial complex" and "national security elite" (e.g., Barnett, 1973). The influence of German social thought on this body of work is extensive but indiscriminate. Marx and Weber are names to be invoked, even icons to be admired, but rarely are their questions asked or their answers considered.

Nor is the structural sense of *Herrschaft* to be found. Some protean elite infests institutions—governments at every level, corporations and financial centers, higher education—and uses its "power" to serve its own interest and betray the masses, whose interests many such institutions are presumed to serve. "Ruling class" is a euphemism or epithet and "domination" a term with diffuse cultural and psychological connotations, especially since the belated but rousing reception accorded Herbert Marcuse's work in the United States. If Robert Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto are invoked no differently, less is lost in translation, for the neo-Machiavellian school used terms like "elite" so variably that they never achieved paradigmatic significance in the original. The empirical strain and therapeutic spirit in American social thought appear in radical as well as reformist hues. Lacking a paradigm to stabilize it, however, native radicalism is easily untracked, whether by paranoia and conspiracy theories or euphoria and utopian plans—the structure comes from somewhere.

It would seem then that the term "*Herrschaft*" is difficult to translate because it is paradigmatically alien to English speakers, who are left to choose between the disciplinary paradigms respectively associated with the terms "anarchy" and "authority." Yet "*Herrschaft*" can be given an adequate translation—one that honors its paradigmatic sense in German and permits its systematic use in English language scholarship. The term is "rule." We are hardly the first to propose it—recall the translation of *The German Ideology*. It also has found adherents in regard to Weber. Roth and Bendix both argued for "domination" (Weber, 1968:LXXXIX, 62n; Bendix, 1962:290–97), yet they each referred to rulers and the ruled in relations of domination. Roth also employed the term "rulership" (Weber, 1968:XCIII). Carl Friedrich (1963:182) and more recently Stewart Clegg (1975:56–66) equated *Herrschaft* with rule.

Yet others have explicitly rejected this equation. Wolfgang Mommsen accepted ruler and ruled, but not rule: "For a long time we [evidently referring to himself] thought 'rule' to be the best term, as it does not quite carry the somewhat austere connotation of the word 'domination.' Yet it is also too narrow, covering only the activity of governing" (1974:72). For A. P. D'Entreves, the "proper equivalent" of *Herrschaft* "is neither 'rule' nor 'imperative control'; it is 'power,' power in its strict legal sense, in the sense in which we speak of 'power-conferring rules,' or say that public officials have 'powers.' The emphasis is on legality" (1967:11).

Mommsen and D'Entreves rejected "rule" as the best term to translate *Herrschaft* for diametrically opposed reasons: the former because rule is too legalistic a term, the latter because it is insufficiently so. Both are wrong. They have implicitly taken "rule" to mean "legal rule" in the narrow Austinian sense of formal and enforceable rules. Mommsen objected to the idea that relations of ruler and ruled depend on formally valid rules, D'Entreves to the idea that rules always enforce ruler-ruled relations. Although the term "rule" includes rules that are formally valid and enforced, it does not have to exclude rules formally conferring benefits rather than creating enforceable obligations, or informal but coercive rules effectuating imperative control. Indeed rules need be neither formal nor enforced to qualify as such.

They need only be generalizable statements yielding expectations about warranted (required or permitted) conduct. Rules mediate Weber's paradox of rule—they are what is accepted but seen as imposed.

Mommsen had his finger on the key by accepting the ruler-ruled relation, but he lost it by rejecting rules as the link between ruler and ruled. Bendix and Roth also grasped the key by defining *Herrschaft* in terms of superordination and subordination. The German equivalents are *Überordnung* and *Unterordnung*. "Ordnung" means "order" or "arrangement" in German. It also means "rules" in the spatial or serial sense of ordering matters. English is similar, as in orders, ordinal, coordination; indeed we use "rules" the same way: rules of thumb, methodological rules, and so on. In doing so we acknowledge that rules are always ordered. But German social thought goes further: the expectations that rules engender are always differential, and arrangements of rules must always be one of super- and subordination. That such structures of rules are foundational, not proximate and expedient, is deeply troubling to English speakers, whose view of rules derives from the formal symmetry of rights and duties under the common law—a formal symmetry nesting the elective asymmetry of authority relations.

In the first decade of the century, Georg Simmel elaborated the thesis that "domination" as a "form of interaction" is precisely a matter of super- and subordination (1971:96–120).⁷ We have not treated Simmel's ideas extensively because of his marginal place in the *Herrschaft* paradigm. Yet his Kantian interest in forms led him to view super- and subordination geometrically: "[I]t is only geometry that determines what the spatiality of things in space really is" (Simmel 1971:27). Even if social geometry is insufficient until supplied with content, one nevertheless begins not in space but with spatially and, therefore, rules. It is the Kantian legacy which undergirds the German conception of order, and rule no differently, as an arrangement of rules. *Herrschaft*, as the claim that rule takes the form of rules ordering relations, constitutes a paradigm altogether different from the one constituted by the claim that people elect relations of authority to establish the order they need.

Types of Rule and Their Relation to Rules

Weber is justly famous for proposing three ideal types of rule (*Die Typen der Herrschaft*, as Chapter III of *Economy and Society* is entitled). For Weber ideal types are "mental constructs," but not just an observer's.⁸ Ideal types of rule represent recurrent practical solutions to the problem of how human beings use rules and rule to arrange their affairs, recognized as such by the very people who use them. Weber emphasized both the observer's mental constructs—the types as he abstractly posited them—and the ensembles of practices, supporting attitudes, and material conditions, the coherence of which prompted him to identify the type as recurring through a broad range of human experience (Shils and Finch, 1949:94–97; see also Hekman, 1983).

Weber presented the three types of rule in terms of the beliefs that sustain them; these are "grounds" for rule (1968:215). Each type of rule relates the characteristics of that type to the distinctive grounds under which it is accepted, the first being

⁷ Simmel (1908:134) spoke only of "*Herrschaft*," rendered in the English text as "will-to-dominate" and "desire for domination" (Simmel, 1971:96). "Passion for rule" would be more accurate. Simmel used "*Autorität*" for authority (e.g., 1908:136–37), as indeed had Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Marx and Engels, 1978b:196, 198).

⁸ Also rendered by Weber's translators as "constructions," "analytical constructs," and "conceptual constructs." Weber's term is "*Gedankenbild*" (Shils and Finch, 1949:88–93).

rational, calculating grounds, the second traditional grounds, and the third charismatic grounds. Weber held that the acceptance of rule on rational grounds corresponds to rule by an administrative staff (1968:217–226). Rule accepted on grounds of tradition corresponds to rule by those traditionally accorded personal loyalty and the right to rule (1968:226–241). Finally, rule accepted on grounds of charisma corresponds to rule by someone with extraordinary powers of personality (1968:241–254).

Notice that these correspondences differ logically. The first relates two independent sets of conditions: rational beliefs and administrative skills. The second defines the two sets of conditions (personal loyalty and the right to rule) interchangeably by reference to tradition. The third simply infers one set of conditions (personal traits) from another (beliefs about the extraordinary character of these traits). Weber's scheme is conceptually flawed: it presents one completely articulated type of rule and response to it, a second type in which rule and response are collapsed through co-definition, and a third in which the response to rule is fully articulated and the properties of rule only implied.

Weber called his ideal types “pure” (1968:219). Purity of type can be judged, however, only if types correspond to one another conceptually—otherwise their mutual independence cannot be established. Furthermore, we must know if corresponding types exhaust the possibilities for that set of types. Not only did Weber fail to provide a set of properly corresponding types, he offered no independent basis for concluding that the set is exhaustive. Consequently Weber had to rely on his vast historical knowledge to support his conviction that only three pure types were possible. Many commentators produce different lists, no less supported by history and no better supported conceptually.⁹

Is there a way to develop a set of rule types that can be plausibly offered as the pure possibilities countenanced by the paradigm Weber worked within? We think so. The *Herrschaft* paradigm locates ruler and ruled in an arrangement of rules, so Weber's nexus of rule and response to rule must also be mediated by rules. Weber knew this. The first type of rule (by administrative staff) depends on impersonal orders, or law in the usual sense. The second type of rule (by traditional leaders) depends on orders that are paradoxically personal but not original. By exercising discretion and staying within the bounds of what traditional practice permits (precedent), the ruler gains discretion. The third type of rule (by a charismatic figure) depends on oracular pronouncements, each of which is revelatory and thus completely original.

Weber might be seen as implicitly deploying a typology of rules in which two sets of traits, traditional/original and personal/impersonal, are variously combined. Were he to have done so explicitly, there would be four possible combinations of pure types. But he was content instead to introduce two poorly differentiated and variably decisive criteria for discriminating rule types. Being impersonal is decisive for the first type, being traditional and—as a secondary matter—personal is decisive for the second type, and being original is decisive for the third. While Weber's scheme is clearly inadequate, we do not propose to reconstruct it into a set of four pure types (but see Onuf, 1982:31–33). Weber never really made a case for either of his criteria—they represent merely what he found striking about sundry historical experiences. These criteria are imputed to rules because they happen to suit the characteristics of rulers and responses to their rule.

As an alternative, we propose to start with rules as *rules* by tracing them back to the structure of language. In so doing we acknowledge that rules cannot be distin-

⁹ Thus Friedrich (1963:180–98) identified fourteen types of rule which he culled from Western political thought from Aristotle to Weber.

guished from the words used to formulate them (Black, 1962:100). Either rules are linguistic statements or they must be capable of statement. To know (how to follow) a rule is to be able to articulate that rule. As linguistic statements, rules have two aspects: "(i) a description of a class of actions, possibly restricted to a class of actions performed by a designated class of persons; and (ii) an indication of whether that class of actions is required, forbidden, or allowed" (1962:108).

One of us has argued elsewhere that the second aspect depends on the performative function of language. Language yields social performances through "speech acts." These are utterances which do something in themselves, as opposed to merely representing a state of affairs. They elicit a response from hearers. Rules do the same, but more reliably than do speech acts.

The basic types of speech acts are assertive, directive, and commissive (Searle, 1979; Onuf, 1985). The first takes the general form, I hereby assert, deny, etc., that . . . ; the second, I hereby direct that . . . ; the third, I hereby promise that All social rules stem from these three categories of speech acts and take the same general form. Rules that make assertions about states of affairs we call instruction-rules. Rules that issue orders and requests so as to secure states of affairs we call directive-rules. Rules that hold people to their promises by turning those promises into duties, which then become others' rights to promised states of affairs, we call commitment-rules.

The first of Weber's three types of rule uses directive-rules, as does the second much of the time. The third type uses instruction-rules, as does the second some of the time. What Weber described as the "routinization of charisma" (1968:246–54) yields an arrangement in which rules asserting statuses occupy a significant place. We can now see that while traditional rule is anything but a pure type, the other two types—administrative and charismatic rule—accord a dominant position to directive- and instruction-rules respectively. Obviously the social reality of rule mixes types, as Weber demonstrated in his discussion of the many variations in the pattern of traditional rule—gerontocracy, patriarchy, patrimonial rule, and estate rule (1968:231–41).

Weber granted virtually no attention at all to commitment-rules in his presentation of the types of rule. Yet he was amply aware of their importance: much of his extended discussion of the sociology of law in *Economy and Society* (Chapter VIII) concerns commitment-rules. Weber concluded that commitment-rules did not contribute to rule as an asymmetric arrangement but to the "decentralization of rule" (*"Dezentralization der Herrschaft,"* 1976:542), a phrase he thought described "the whole system of modern private law" (1968:942). That system is the basis of contract, credit, and thus the entire apparatus of capitalism.

Weber excused himself from constructing the complex of commitment-rules into a rule type for a peculiar reason. Obviously all sorts of people have the right to rule some aspect of the activities of others, even those generally holding sway over them. Weber subtly changed the terms of the argument by observing that someone could often be said to have a "ruling" (*"beherrschend,"* quotation marks in the original, 1976:542) position in "the social relations of the drawing room as well as in the market, from the rostrum of a lecture-hall as from the command post of a regiment" (1968:943). What is unconvincing about this shift is that ruling is no longer a matter of commitment-rules but of transitory social arrangements. As Weber correctly noted, "Such a broader definition would, however, render the term 'rule' scientifically useless" (1968:943, "domination" in that text). But Weber himself unnecessarily broadened the definition.

Weber's exposition of three types of rule has struck many writers with its apparently tight logical structure, its "meticulous symmetry" (Mommsen, 1974:72). Meticulous perhaps, but mistaken in conception. We have endeavored to offer a

variation of Weber's set which honors two of his types, dissolves one as a mixed case, and constructs a third from material Weber himself provided. This third type addresses the most puzzling aspect of rule, its "decentralization" through rules creating rights and duties. That Weber failed to recognize it no doubt reflects a paradigmatic presumption that asymmetries in ruler-ruled relations typically reinforce rather than cut across one another. The more complex pattern of commitment-rules conceals asymmetries and deceives the systematizing observer, even one as learned and as meticulous as Weber.

Rule in Political Society

Scholars are generally capable of recognizing rule in the form of instruction- and directive-rules. This is abundantly evident from the constant recourse in our own and allied disciplines to two words describing these respective arrangements of rule: hegemony and hierarchy. The lack of a comparable term for rule through commitment-rules is evidence of the continuing anonymity of that form of rule. We supply a term for it, however, to permit an examination of all three types of rule. Our term is "heteronomy," which from Kant on has meant the opposite of autonomy.

Hegemony

Hegemonial rule refers to the promulgation and manipulation of instruction-rules by which superordinate actors monopolize meaning which is then passively absorbed by subordinate actors. These activities constitute a stable arrangement of rule because the ruled are rendered incapable of comprehending their subordinate role. The ruled cannot formulate alternative programs of action because they are inculcated with the self-serving ideology of the rulers, who monopolize the production and dissemination of statements through which meaning is created.

Marx and Engels identified the central feature of hegemonial rule in *The German Ideology*: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" (Marx and Engels, 1964:67). Yet this judgment sits uncomfortably in a materialist conception of history that finds all ideas and all consciousness "directly interwoven with the material activity and material intercourse of men—the language of real life" (1964:42). Apparently the content of human consciousness is determined by one's place in historically-specific social relations of production. Were this so, ideas would vary with class position, and stable conditions of rule could not depend on the successful internalization by all classes of the ruling class's ideology. Marx intimated as much (e.g., 1954b:101–16; but see Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1980), but a fully developed position would have to account for competing ideologies and their relative impact on different classes. Why, and under what conditions, does exposure to ruling class ideology overwhelm the materially meaningful experience of a subordinate class? Nothing Marx wrote supplies an answer.

Credit for typifying hegemonial rule should go instead to Gramsci, though he never provided a straightforward definition of "hegemony." This has led to some disagreement among Marxist scholars as to what Gramsci had in mind. For example, Nicos Poulantzas (1978:157–59) and Gören Therborn (1980:157–58) argued that for Gramsci hegemony meant both political domination (rule through directive-rules) and ideological domination (rule through instruction-rules). Nevertheless, both Poulantzas and Therborn joined other contemporary Marxists (e.g., Miliband, 1969:180; Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1980:12; Sassoon, 1983:201) in focusing on the notion of ideological domination as Gramsci's principal contribution to the understanding of hegemony. Much of the confusion stems from Gramsci's expanded

conceptualization of the state (the “integral state”), which he defined in terms of rule through “coercion” (or alternatively “command,” “direct domination,” or dictatorship”) as well as through “‘spontaneous’ consent” (Gramsci, 1971:12, 170, 239, 263).

Although Gramsci situated hegemony within an expanded conception of the state, that he contrasted coercion with consent and discussed consent in terms of ideology (1971:12, 181–82) makes clear his concern for hegemony’s distinctive features. Given prevailing relations of production, the superordinate class attains and secures its position by successfully representing its class interests as the general interests of society as a whole. Conditions of rule are stable because the ruling class actually constitutes social reality through its ideology, thereby limiting the capacity of the subordinate class to imagine alternatives which could threaten the ruling position of the superordinate class (1971:12, 181, 238–39). Instead, the ruled accept their subordinate position as natural and inevitable.

Hierarchy

Hierarchy is the type of rule most closely associated with Weber because, as an arrangement of directive-rules, it is instantly recognizable as bureaucracy. The relations of *bureaux*, or offices, form the typical pattern of super- and subordination, but always in ranks such that each office is both subordinate to the one(s) above it and superordinate to the ones below. There being typically fewer offices in any rank than in the rank immediately beneath it, there must also be a top rank with a single office and chief officer. That office has formal responsibility for all the activities undertaken in the ranks below because such activities are guided by directive-rules descending from higher ranks. Logically speaking, if only a higher officer can issue a directive to a lower one, then the validity of any directive is ultimately traceable to the directive of a chief, responsible officer. The visualization of this arrangement of ranks linked by directives is the familiar pyramid of organization charts.

We can surmise that Weber had in mind the military chain of command so much in evidence in the Germany of his time (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1979:218). His formalizing it into a type of rule, however, owes much to the view of law as a system of commands (directives), each of which is valid by reference to the one higher, culminating in a primary validating source of commands. While English speakers are likely to associate this view of law with Hans Kelsen, he is merely the most famous and rigorously formal member of a school of jurisprudence with which Weber was well acquainted. Kelsen himself observed that Weber called an arrangement of commands thus validated “coercive machinery” (as translated in Kelsen, 1945:171; the standard English translation is “coercive apparatus”; Weber, 1968:313); Kelsen used this same terminology.

The formal arrangement of directives coercively deployed takes the standard position of legal positivism that any law is a coercively backed command and fits it into the *Herrschaft* paradigm of rule through relations of super- and subordination. Like Kelsen, Weber was both a positivist and a legal formalist, because that was the only way to progress from coercive backing as a property of properly legal rules to the apparatus of coercion which made bureaucracies a model of rule. Unlike Kelsen, Weber did not restrict himself to the one type of rule—the “legal order”—in which unheeded directive-rules elicit “the enforcement of conformity” (Weber, 1968:313).¹⁰

¹⁰ Bureaucracies are legal orders internally, or relations of super- and subordination, because their chief officer rules all ranks with directive-rules. Bureaucracies do not rule others externally, unless they do so on behalf of (as the administrative staff of) some other legal order (e.g., the state). The “-cracy” of bureaucracy refers only to its internal aspect.

Heteronomy

Heteronomy, as the unacknowledged third type of rule, requires a more thorough exposition than do the other two. Kant chose the term “heteronomy” in *Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals* to refer to the condition of not having autonomy (Wolff, 1969:58). Marx and Weber used this term similarly but only in passing (e.g., Marx, 1954b:103; Weber, 1968:389, 645, 719). Although Kant’s concerns were moral rather than social, his treatment of autonomy and heteronomy supports a social use of the term such as we find in Marx and Weber, but—unlike theirs—one from which we can infer a type of rule.¹¹

In the Kantian system human beings are prudential and rational (Wolff, 1969:26–72). Prudential behavior accords with principles that, by virtue of the necessarily particular nature of contingent situations, must be conditional. Rational behavior accords with principles that are unconditional because rational beings discern them strictly by reference to “the realm of ends” (1969:58), not means. In the first situation, “heteronomy always results” (1969:67); in the second, autonomy is exercised and morality achieved.

For Kant, the point is that rationality and autonomy are conditions transcending social reality. They must be stipulated to investigate moral conduct. For us, the point is that heteronomy describes the actual situation of people relating available means to particular ends. Nevertheless, when people are self-conscious about their individual behavior, they are inclined to see themselves as rational and autonomous. Kant’s transcendent conditions are nothing more than the conclusions that some and perhaps most self-conscious people draw from participating in heteronomous social relations. The social reality of heteronomy begets an awareness of behavior that in turn begets the illusion of autonomy. Heteronomy prompts obfuscation of its own social reality.

Indeed one could say that Kant’s argument about autonomy and morality itself obfuscates the relation of autonomy to heteronomy. Social choice theorists have noted this property of heteronomy but find it paradoxical: when many individuals act rationally, they often find themselves subject to outcomes none of them preferred. The paradox disappears if we make John Harsanyi’s elementary distinction between objective and subjective rationality—between choosing the “best means” to achieve a given end and “what one thinks to be” the best means (1983:231). We are autonomous when and only when this distinction does not hold. When it does, because of contingency and our inability to control outcomes, we can either stay with subjective rationality or objectivize it by introducing risk and uncertainty (cf., Harsanyi, 1983:232). Either way rationality is relieved of paradox and reduced to prudence. (See also Gauthier, 1986:21–59, but note that his conception of prudence differs from the one we adopt.)

Social choice theorists accept a utilitarian conception of rationality—prudence, in Kant’s vocabulary—without also stipulating heteronomy.¹² Instead, they assume the

¹¹ *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language* (1967:667) defines heteronomy as “the condition of being under the rule or domination of another.” The Greek roots “-archy,” “-cracy,” and “-nomy” all suggest a condition of rule, but only “-nomy” conveys the notion of rule as an arrangement. The Latin root “-mony” is too generalized—it refers to a condition or result. Friedrich used the neologism “heterocracy” in passing as an antonym for “autocracy” (1963:196–97).

¹² Social choice theorists often balk at accepting utilitarian ethics along with utilitarian rationality. We may view John Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” (1971:136–42) or Harsanyi’s question, “If you disregarded your own personal interests, what kind of society, with what kind of moral code, would you like to live in?” (1983:243), as efforts to recover a Kantian moral position in the face of a heteronomous social reality.

autonomy of actors and anticipate anarchy in their relations. Cooperation is unlikely and its occurrence difficult to explain (Oye, 1985). Given the social reality of heteronomy, however, actors thinking themselves to be autonomous prudently endeavor to reduce their risks and minimize uncertainty. The “best means” to this end is to exchange commitments about future conduct. Even as we insist on our “right” as autonomous actors to make promises freely, we find that they are not so freely broken. Our promises rule us by taking the form of commitment-rules.

Commitment-rules formalize promises as duties. Corresponding to duties are rights to whatever has been promised. Of interest here are property rights, which formalize the consequences of promises made with reference to the use of or access to the means of production and exchange. If we consider the staggeringly asymmetrical consequences for different actors of acquiring property rights and contractual obligations, and if we consider the appearance of equality among actors by virtue of the reciprocal and thus formally symmetrical arrangement of all contractual relations, then we confront the real paradox of heteronomous rule: rules positing autonomy in relations insure the asymmetry of those relations.

Weber connected “a cosmos of rights and duties” to the conditions of rule found in Western feudalism¹³ (Weber, 1968:1070–85). Relations between lords and vassals were “contractual and subject to renewal, but at the same time inheritable according to established norms” (1968:1082). Thus feudal society was characterized by conditional private property in the sphere of production. Control of productive property by lords carried with it explicit social obligations to other, lesser lords and eventually to serfs on the manor. This, according to Weber, “turned feudalism into an approximation of the *Rechtstaat* [constitutional government]” (1968:1082).

Feudal society lacked a principle of *exclusion* with respect to property rights. Social relations among lords and between lords and serfs formed a chain of rights and obligations that provided cohesion for feudal society. The conditional nature of feudal property rights led Weber to characterize feudal society in what we would call heteronomous terms. In so doing he contradicted his own judgment that decentralized rule is not at all: “Fully developed feudalism is the most extreme type of systematically decentralized domination” (1968:1079).

Altogether different is “the age of the capitalist bourgeoisie,” in which “contract and specified individual rights” (1968:1070) result in exclusive private property and, by extension (Ruggie, 1983:274–75), in sovereignty and territoriality as defining traits of anarchy in international relations. By contrasting feudalism and capitalism, Weber implied that a change in the nature of property rights yields a system of interaction among autonomous individuals who are constrained only by the aggregate outcome of their interaction. We believe this position should be reversed: conditional property rights permit rule, but not rule of a heteronomous nature, while exclusive property rights always imply heteronomy. Weber made two errors: one in fostering the impression that the creation of feudal property rights depends on authentic exchange relations between feudal actors; the second in failing to recognize that the exclusive character of modern bourgeois property rights implies asymmetrical relations between holders of specific, exchangeable property rights.

The issue is not whether conditional feudal property rights are associated with rule, but rather whether feudal rule is heteronomous. Recall that the Kantian conception of heteronomy can be construed to mean more than non-autonomous, conditional action. Kantian heteronomy obscures the absence of autonomy, and it is in this stronger Kantian sense that the characterization of feudal society as heterono-

¹³ In his critique of Kenneth N. Waltz’s paradigmatic recapitulation of international anarchy, John Ruggie (1983:273–79) made much the same connection.

mous becomes misplaced. Weber was so preoccupied with the contractual relations of lords, themselves asymmetric, that he underplayed the primary, materially grounded set of relations in feudalism—the relations of lord and serf.¹⁴

Serfs exchanged the products of their labor with the manorial lord, who in turn provided security for the serfs. Feudal property rights facilitated a monopoly of coercive means in the hands of the nobility. The constant threat of warfare fixed the pattern of feudal relations (Anderson, 1978:140–42). Real or alleged, the serfs' need for physical security compelled them to enter into exchange agreements with local landlords on the landlords' terms. Nevertheless, the coercive character of the exchange and the directive-rules substantiating it was concealed behind the formality of lord-serf relations based on exchange and reciprocity. Weber himself acknowledged the military origins of feudal relations of production (1968:1077–78). He also noted that relations among lords bear the marks of routinized charisma (1968:1070). Indeed, feudalism is a hierarchical form of rule that can be depicted as a flat-topped pyramid: by cultivating the illusion of collegiality, hegemony substitutes for the higher ranks of hierarchy.

To view contingent feudal relations as heteronomous projects modern bourgeois exchange onto the feudal situation. Exchanges between capitalists and workers take place because bourgeois property rights assign capitalists a monopoly on society's productive property and, therefore, upon the workers' means of physical and psychic sustenance. To gain access to the means of their sustenance, workers must enter into exchange relations with capitalists. In capitalist societies, however, the massively asymmetrical character of this exchange and of the content of property rights behind it is obscured by the fact that workers are generally free to choose the specific capitalist with whom they enter into exchange relations and even to organize themselves for collective bargaining.

The coercive character of bourgeois property rights is exposed only at the level of society as a whole. From this vantage point we can see that workers have little choice but to enter into exchange relations with *some* capitalist. At the level of individual experience the worker's right to choose diverts attention from the practical necessity of entering into some exchange on disadvantageous terms. The feudal relation between lord and serf embodies no such mystification of the nature of the exchange, because serfs lack the social mobility of workers who have an exclusive right to sell their labor. Instead feudal relations of rule are directly personified in the relevant actors, leaving no doubt as to who fills superordinate and subordinate roles. Moreover, noble "obligations" are not benefits owed serfs in return for services rendered to the lord. They are costs landlords impose on themselves to assure a reproducible supply of labor. Late in the feudal era, lords eliminated these obligations because contracting for direct labor services proved to be cheaper (Dobb, 1963:54–58; Anderson, 1978:197–208).

If Weber's first error was to confuse contingent feudal relations with heteronomous rule, his second was to confuse unconditional property rights with generalized autonomy. We have already seen that exclusive property rights permit the concentration of productive property in the hands of a few owners, while the many workers who own their own ability to perform useful labor must compete to sell their services. Owners always have alternatives; workers face the practical problem of survival in the absence of a wage contract. In short, asymmetrical consequences of commissively defined relations—combined with the illusion of independence for all parties to these relations—produce the conditions of rule in which rules simply cannot be

¹⁴ But he did not ignore it entirely: "The full fief is always a *rent-producing* complex of rights whose ownership can and should maintain a lord in a manner appropriate to his style of life" (1968:1072, emphasis in original).

identified by discovering the authors of rules. The ruled join the rulers as authors and audience; rules rule their joint proceedings. This is heteronomy's distinguishing feature.

This approach to the wage contract is central to Marxist political economy, with Marx's concept of commodity fetishism (Marx, 1954a:43–87) providing its foundation. The exchange of commodities (including labor power) in the market presupposes exclusive property rights (capitalist social relations of production in Marxist discourse) which render the products of human labor fully alienable (i.e., capable of being sold). Not only are these social relations of production stable and asymmetric, the commodification both of labor and of the products of labor insures their "mystical character" (1954a:76), making them exclusively social and recognizable only by reference to their value in exchange for other such commodities. By capturing social reality, exchange value supplants materially grounded social relations, renders all people equal in their anonymity, and nullifies the concept of asymmetry. Fully realized commodity fetishism is fully effectuated rule. Its extrapolation from the specific character of exclusive property rights makes it heteronomous.

Because bourgeois hegemonial rule portrays the capitalist system of exploitive relations of production as serving the common good, it may appear to be identical to heteronomous rule. Its effects are substantially the same. In practice, analytically distinct types of rule are interdependent and reinforcing, as are the rules they depend on. Marx had difficulty extricating heteronomy from hegemony, and Gramsci hegemony from hierarchy, because all three types of rule are so thoroughly entwined in specific social arrangements. Turning to the rules constituting specific social arrangements helps only so much. Commitment-rules can be and often are asserted as high principles, ranks claimed as rights, and so on. Difficulties in distinguishing types of rule are no less and perhaps greater when social arrangements so resist being specified that they are seen as anarchic. International relations are the obvious case in point.

Rule in International Relations

International Relations scholars have discovered many traces of rule, but most of what they have to say on the subject is muddled. Some of the confusion is terminological. International Relations scholars see hierarchy but call it hegemony. Because hierarchical rule is immediately recognizable as rule, its consideration is scarcely avoidable. Nevertheless, the presumption of anarchy inhibits acknowledgment of hierarchy as such, and "hegemony" is a convenient if inappropriate substitute. Heteronomous international relations represent a different situation. They go unacknowledged not because of terminological confusion and misappropriation but because they are not imagined. Recognition of heteronomy in international relations requires a rejection of what liberal paradigms presuppose—the autonomy of actors.

Hegemony

The term "hegemony" is widely used in contemporary International Relations. It crops up, for example, in discussions of spheres of influence (e.g., Almond, 1986:161). As early as 1950 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan defined hegemony as "supremacy within a control area," which in the instance of international relations is "a *sphere of influence* when control is not accompanied by authority. A hegemonic state is a *major power*; its *satellites* are the states within its sphere of

influence" (1950:257, authors' emphasis; see note 2 for their definition of authority). The equation of position and control renders relations within spheres hierarchical, but this equation is a special case of hierarchy because the ranking state must have a "commanding" lead over the next in the chain. Hegemony is that instance of hierarchy in which the position of the ranking state is so overwhelming that it can dispense with the chain of command and cast directive-rules in a benign form as mere suggestions, and still have its rule effectuated (cf., Bull, 1977:215).¹⁵ The result resembles Gramscian hegemony. Because the leader in such instances is also likely to practice hegemony, the presence of hierarchy is all the more difficult to discern.

Neorealists like Steven Krasner (1976:321–22, 1982:30, 1985:10–13), Robert O. Keohane (1980:132, 1984:32–38), and Robert Gilpin (1981:29, 116, 144–210, 1987:65–80), and world-systemicist Immanuel Wallerstein (1984:4–7, 37–46, 132–45) also treat the strongest state in international relations as "hegemon." Among neorealists, emphasis on military or economic supremacy varies, even in the writings of a single author. In all cases, however, we find the argument that if one state has enough power it will use that power to institute international regimes—complexes of rules enabling the production of public goods like security or liberalized trade—from which it benefits and which are otherwise difficult if not impossible to come by. Presumably because these goods also benefit states that do not contribute to their production, the benefits of these arrangements are offset by their consequences. As Kindleberger has noted (1986:11), "leader" rather than "hegemon" better describes the ranking state.

Neorealism assumes the autonomy and thus the competition of many actors but allows that competition to be imperfect or oligopolistic. Because the distribution of military and/or economic capabilities of states disproportionately favors the leader, this state is relatively unconstrained by the effects of the aggregate behavior which blind lesser actors. Robert Gilpin (1981) has been especially sensitive to this possibility. Neorealists appear to have defined a variant of hegemonial (read "hierarchical") rule within spheres of influence. International regimes turn out to be functional spheres of influence. Some neorealists would seem to doubt that other rule complexes qualify as regimes (Krasner, 1982).

In Wallerstein's world-system view, hegemony is a matter of strength—"the strength of the very strongest state . . . measured by its ability to minimize *all* quasi monopolies, that is, enforce the doctrine of free trade" (1984:5, emphasis in original). This is undeniably a hierarchical conception of rule, with the system itself a chain of command: "Just as the world-economy has expanded over time, its political expression—in the interstate system—has expanded. As the commodity chains have become longer and more complex, and have involved more and more machinery, there has been a constant pressure by the strong against the weak. . . . Parallel to this economic polarization has been a political polarization between stronger states in core areas and weaker states in peripheral areas, the 'political' process of 'imperialism' being what makes possible the 'economic' process of 'unequal exchange'" (1984:4–5).

¹⁵ Hedley Bull held that "unilateral exploitation of preponderance took three forms, which I shall call 'dominance,' 'primacy' and 'hegemony.'" The first "is characterized by the habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland by habitual disregard of the universal norms of interstate behavior that confer rights of sovereignty, equality and independence on these states." The second, primacy, "is achieved without any resort to force, and with no more than the ordinary degree of disregard for norms . . ." The last, hegemony, refers to the situation in which "there is a resort to force and the threat of force, but this is not habitual and uninhibited but occasional and reluctant" (1977:214–15). See also Charles F. Doran's operational distinction between empire and hegemony: "Empire is a matter of direct institutional control. . . . Hegemony tends to create vassal states or international political 'courtiers' of the surrounding entities in a rather apparent heirarchic [*sic*] perpetuated fashion . . ." (1971:16).

In the absence of a hegemon ("moments of true hegemony are rare," 1984:5–6), asymmetric relations follow from the reproductive logic of the capitalist world-system rather than from a chain of command. In Wallerstein's reasoning, without hegemony there is no hierarchy. How asymmetries are then maintained he cannot have said, because the system's relation to the functional behavior of its units remains undetermined (Wendt, 1987:344–49). In this respect world-systems theory is no improvement on systems approaches of the 1950s and 1960s. Wallerstein's preoccupation with exchange relations pointed him toward heteronomy, to which he was nevertheless blind.

A notable exception to the muddled use of the term "hegemony" in International Relations has been Robert W. Cox's (1983) effort to apply a Gramscian conception of hegemony, as the type of rule using instruction-rules, to the question of rule in international relations. Cox also started with the situation of power sufficiently concentrated in the hands of one state that it can institute international regimes. But he argued that these regimes serve primarily to establish universal norms and behavioral expectations that incorporate all actors into an international system of production and exchange and that legitimize this system (1983:171–72). Cox considered such regimes vehicles for hegemonial rule because their particularist nature is distorted by the universalist terms in which regime rules are expressed. It is this consensus-producing characteristic of particularist regimes expressed in universal terms that separates Cox's concept of hegemony from others in the literature. This remains the case even though neorealists have come to acknowledge the connection between regimes and legitimation (Keohane, 1984:39, 44–45; Krasner, 1985:10; Gilpin, 1987:73).

Hierarchy

To the extent that International Relations scholars have expressly concerned themselves with hierarchy, they tend to see it as the Hobbesian alternative to anarchy. Consider Morton A. Kaplan's exceptionally influential depiction of "six distinct international systems" (1957:21–53, quoting p. 21), including one system that is called "hierarchical" and a second, "the universal international system," which is hierarchical "with respect to some functions" (1957:45) but not expressly described as hierarchical. Kaplan further noted that hierarchical systems may be either directive or non-directive: "The non-directive international system functions according to political rules generally operative in democracies. The directive hierarchical system is authoritarian in character" (1957:48). While Kaplan did not equate hierarchy with authority, he did seem to equate it with government. Understandably, Kaplan's readers are likely to conclude that international systems cannot, by definition, be hierarchical.

Kenneth N. Waltz is a well-publicized case in point (1979:52; note Kaplan's reply, 1979:41–42). According to Waltz, political systems may be either anarchical or hierarchical, but international systems must be anarchical. Hierarchy describes "relations of super- and subordination" (1979:81). This means that "political actors are formally differentiated according to degrees of their authority, and their distinct functions are specified. By 'specified' I . . . mean . . . that broad agreement prevails on the tasks that various parts of a government are to undertake and on the extent of the power they legitimately wield" (1979:81). International relations are anarchical because, "[i]n the absence of agents with system-wide authority, formal relations of super- and subordination fail to develop" (1979:88).

There are two problems with Waltz's formulation. To start with, like Kaplan, he understood hierarchy to consist only of formal relations of super- and subordination, or government. Informal relations of super- and subordination based on directive-

rules were not considered, nor were asymmetric arrangements predicated on instruction- and commitment-rules. The other problem is that Waltz, unlike Kaplan, coupled hierarchy to authority. He did so based on two unsupported assumptions. First, Waltz accepted the Parsonsian version of *Herrschaft*, in which power and legitimacy are necessarily tied together. Second, Waltz assumed that when international relations exhibit asymmetries, these relations lack legitimacy and presumably cannot endure. These two assumptions allowed Waltz to take the final step and treat international relations as a matter of anarchy both formally ("absence of government," 1979:114–16) and substantively ("self-help," 1979:111–14).

It is at least as plausible to assume durable and accepted asymmetries in international relations as it is to assume Waltz's alternative. Waltz implied this when he argued that "in any realm populated by units that are functionally similar but of different capability, those of greatest capability take on special responsibilities" (1979:198, see generally pp. 194–211). A more forthright recognition of stable asymmetry informs Steven L. Spiegel's conception of hierarchy as a highly unequal distribution of power resulting in an "international pecking order" (1972:3). Hierarchy offers the occasion for hegemony, defined simply as control over others' policies (1972:17). For Spiegel international relations are more or less hierarchical as power shifts in the system of states. While the current situation is notably hierarchical, hegemonial possibilities for the superpowers are distinctly limited by the complexity of the system and the insubordinate tendencies of "anti-status quo intermediaries between the strongest and weakest states . . ." (1972:115).

Spiegel's scheme defines hierarchy as a particular kind of anarchy, one in which asymmetries decisively affect the relations of autonomous actors but do not give rise to conditions of rule. Indeed they cannot, given the constantly shifting distribution of power under conditions of anarchy. In the same vein, Stanley Hoffmann employed the concept of hierarchy in reference to asymmetric distributions of power capabilities specific to issue areas (Hoffmann, 1980:106–36). The resulting multiplicity of functional hierarchies yields "complex interdependence" instead of control (1980:117–19, acknowledging Keohane and Nye, 1977). Both Spiegel and Hoffmann parted company with Waltz on the question of hierarchy's relation to anarchy. Yet all three acknowledge asymmetry in international relations to be compatible with anarchy, Waltz because asymmetric relations lack legitimacy, Spiegel and Hoffman because they lack stability.

This is quite in contrast to Johan Galtung's conception of hierarchy. In Galtung's system, international relations are characterized by a hierarchy of actors organized on the basis of unequal exchanges. But Galtung was not primarily interested in a quantitative relation of unequal exchange ratios, as are those dependency theorists who posit unequal exchange to explain uneven global development. Rather Galtung was concerned with the qualitatively unequal effects of international exchanges between actors situated at different levels of the core-periphery hierarchy (Galtung, 1971:86–88). In keeping with dependency theory Galtung argued that the exchange of processed for unprocessed commodities is a dominant feature of core-periphery relations. This pattern of exchange generates a distribution of benefits affecting development which asymmetrically favors the producers of processed commodities in the core.

Insofar as he saw rule in terms of property rights and exchange relations, Galtung did not really describe a system of rule premised on directive-rules. Rather he invoked a conception of rule that rests on commitment-rules, which we have termed heteronomy. Galtung's point of departure is a system of exclusive property rights—the international system of formally sovereign state actors and a concomitant unequal distribution of factor endowments within this system. From these properties he deduced that exchanges between formally free and equal sovereign agents (states

engaging in free trade) have vastly different and asymmetrical consequences for these agents. Galtung could have extended his depiction of heteronomous rule in international relations by noting the stabilizing (i.e., obfuscating) effects of formally equal exchanges for this form of rule. Instead he fell back on a “feudal interaction structure” to reproduce his arrangement of rule (Galtung, 1971:89). In other work (1970) Galtung argued that organized social relations are always directly maintained as feudal interaction structures, and he represented them in the pyramid form of an idealized hierarchy.

Evidently Galtung accorded descriptive power to the heteronomous version of rule, at least in the instance of international relations, while retaining general conceptual primacy for the hierarchical version. Lacking a concept of heteronomy, Galtung missed a chance to describe how two types of rule can support each other. We argued above that feudalism as a social formation is primarily hierarchical, although it is also hegemonial at the top. Galtung has described this situation as partial “defeudalization,” which always proceeds from the top down (1970:123). By conceptualizing defeudalization in terms of hegemony, Galtung could have shown the relation between all three types of rule in sustaining the asymmetries of contemporary international relations. But least Galtung’s well-known pictorial representation of this system of asymmetries as a rimless wheel does not preclude a role for any rule type (1971:89; see also Onuf and Ajami, 1975).

Heteronomy

Of the three types of rule, heteronomy is unknown to International Relations scholars. Yet scholars have unintentionally developed the theory of heteronomy in an international context through discussions of “asymmetric interdependence” (Keohane and Nye, 1977:11–19; 1987:728–30) and “unequal exchange” (e.g., Emmanuel, 1972). Galtung’s concern for unequal exchange between states situated at different levels of a center-periphery hierarchy (metaphors confuse here) accords descriptive primacy to heteronomous rule but conceptual primacy to hierarchical rule (as we have just seen). Galtung did not discriminate among categories of rules and therefore could not clarify the mutually supporting character of hegemonial, hierarchical, and heteronomous rule.

Even more striking as a theoretical development of heteronomy is Albert O. Hirschman’s presentation of the influence effect in foreign trade policy (1980:17–52). Hirschman argued that the influence effect obtains from a deliberately constructed structure of trade dependence in which country A entices country B into a trade relationship which A is more capable of terminating than is B. Since the opportunity costs of foregoing the trade relation are greater for B than for A, A can exercise influence over B.

Because Hirschman called this exercise of control an “influence effect,” it might seem that the relation is mediated by a directive-rule—the partner is influenced by the possibility of deprivation to behave as directed. The term “influence” is misleading; it is the “effect” of the situation that is determinative. The partner is more affected than the initiator is, and this is true whether or not the initiator intended this outcome or would wish to use the situation for the purposes of exercising control. Once both partners have chosen to trade, asymmetric opportunity costs, and not subsequent choices by either partner, rule the situation in favor of the partner with lower opportunity costs. Partners choose exchanges more advantageous to others than themselves in these circumstances not because they are entrapped, as Hirschman posited, but because they value a losing deal over no deal.

Hirschman used the framework of anarchy to identify the heteronomy of some international relations, and we can generalize his analysis. The absence of directive-

rules and hierarchical arrangements in international relations results in a division of the world into autonomous units (states) and a correlative uneven distribution of factor endowments across units. The result is a structure of asymmetrical opportunity costs across the entire set of international relations for which states can relate opportunity costs to outcomes, that is, all relations oriented to the exercise of influence.

Formally free and equal agents will always find themselves trapped in heteronomous influence relations because of the asymmetrical opportunity costs that necessarily obtain in systems of exclusive property rights, like international relations. That the structure of opportunity costs is quite stable means that relations of influence are stable too—stable enough to warrant description as relations of super- and subordination. To say this, however, is to switch from the paradigm of anarchy to the paradigm of rule.¹⁶

Conclusion

The paradigm of rule presented here offers a conceptual framework within which to organize the thinking of those scholars who are sensitive to the ruled character of international relations. Of course, the utility of any such conceptual scheme ultimately depends on its relevance to the world we know. In these concluding pages, we apply the paradigm of rule to two sets of ruled relations in the contemporary world, Soviet–East European relations and North–South relations.

We choose these sets of relations for simplicity's sake, because they are obvious instances of super- and subordination resulting in a stable pattern of asymmetrically distributed benefits. Despite common features, the two sets of relations depend on different types of rule—which can be seen by considering the means by which rule is effected in each case. Leaders from the Soviet Union typically obtain compliance from East European subordinates through inter-Party directives backed by the threat of physical coercion (Triska, 1986:9). In contrast, leaders from Northern states rarely directly force Southern leaders into adopting particular domestic policies or conducting trade on liberal principles. Nevertheless, Southern states understand that aid and trade relations with the North are contingent on compliance.

This difference in the means of effecting compliance reflects the workings of two different types of rule—hierarchical rule in Soviet–East European relations and heteronomous rule in North–South relations. In our discussion of feudalism, we saw that the reciprocal exchange of rights and obligations between lord and serf was a formality behind which lay the preconditions for hierarchical rule—the social immobility of the serf and the military superiority of the lord. Without social mobility, serfs could not opt out of relations with particular nobles. The nobility's military monopoly allowed it to compel the subordination of immobile serfs upon pain of physical coercion.

Soviet–East European relations can be viewed in comparable terms. Despite the formal trappings of sovereignty, East European states are effectively barred from opting out of Soviet-bloc security economic arrangements or from adopting internal policies which transgress the parameters of state socialism. Any state contemplating a withdrawal from the Soviet sphere of influence is deterred by the military superiority of the Soviet Union—as exemplified by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and by the not-so-thinly veiled threats of intervention

¹⁶ See Klink (1987:123–29) for a more elaborate interpretation and critique of Hirschman's influence effect as an implicit theory of heteronomous international relations. In personal communication, Hirschman has indicated that he found this interpretation persuasive.

against Poland during the days of Solidarity's prominence. Denial of a formal right to withdraw from the Soviet bloc coupled with Soviet military superiority allows Moscow to rule the rest of the bloc through the medium of directive-rules.

Within the context of North–South relations, “juridical statehood” (Jackson, 1987) implies that leaders of Southern states are not forcibly required to accept trade on liberal principles or to curb the state sector's activity within domestic political economies as a means of maintaining trade and aid relations. These leaders can always refuse to comply with these demands and disengage from the North. But as we have seen in Marx's analysis of the bourgeois labor market and in Hirschman's analysis of the influence effect, the right to disengage is largely a formality. Southerners comply with Northern demands with respect to international trade arrangements and internal policy adjustments because their states are too poor to make substantive use of the formal right to withdraw from economic exchanges predicated on such demands.

How does hegemony fit into this analysis? Hegemony supports other types of rule by making them seem to be so natural and inevitable that rulers and ruled alike have difficulty imagining alternative arrangements. In general, this illusion is accomplished through the claim that hierarchical and heteronomous relations engender benefits that are distributed to all participants. For example, the nineteenth-century notion of the “white man's burden” served to legitimize hierarchical relations of colonial rule by suggesting that such rule conferred the benefits of “civilization” to the ruled. In contemporary times, foreign policy positions such as the Johnson and Brezhnev Doctrines cloak the imposition of rule within spheres of influence in the rhetoric of stewardship. The United States and the Soviet Union are held to be responsible for the preservation respectively of democratic and socialist values wherever found (Franck and Weisband, 1971).

Heteronomous international relations are supported by hegemonial rule as well. Of particular importance here is the neoclassical doctrine of free trade and its institutionalization by liberal international economic regimes (Cox, 1983). Neoclassical trade theory teaches that comparative advantage is the only possible advantage, whatever its costs in effective autonomy. By stressing the benefits of free exchange and by dissociating sovereignty from self-sufficiency, neoclassical doctrine helps to stabilize heteronomously conducted free trade by authorizing it as the optimal foreign policy imperative for all states.

In short, we see international relations as an overlapping web of hierarchical, heteronomous, and hegemonial relations of rule. In contrast to much contemporary scholarship, we do not view the formally anarchic character of interstate relations—as opposed to domestic politics—as the distinguishing *analytical* feature of world politics. Rather, the paradigm of rule forces us to acknowledge the remarkable analytical similarities between domestic and international politics. It does so by turning our attention toward the pervasive presence of rules and rule, and away from the presence or absence of specific institutions.

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