


SOCIOLOGIA DO DESENVOLVIMENTO - A INVENÇÃO DO 'TERCEIRO MUNDO'

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9. Nações pós-coloniais (África e América Latina)

[25 e 26/out] 10. Nações pós-coloniais (África e América Latina)

- Mustapha, Abdul Raufu (2002) “Coping with Diversity: The Nigerian State in Historical Perspective”. In: *The African state: reconsiderations* / edited by Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar. Portsmouth, Heineraann. (pp. 149-176)
- Cyril Obi “Beyond Electoral Democracy: An Anatomy of Ethnic Minority Insurgency in Nigeria’s Oil Niger Delta”. In: Said Adejumobi (2011) *State, Economy, and Society in Post-Military Nigeria*. Palgrave Macmillan (Chap. 4)
- Nancy P. Appelbaum & Anne S. Macpherson & Karin Alejandra Roseblatt *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (2003) [Racial Nations, pp. 1-31].
- Balibar, Etienne & Wallerstein, Immanuel (1991) *Raza, Nación y Classe*. Madrid, Iepala Editora: Cap 3 - Balibar, E. “Racismo y Nacionalismo” (pp. 63-110);

Kuxa Kanema - O Nascimento do Cinema (2003)

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Nação e nacionalismo

Once it is accepted that a nation-state must be “**emotionally plausible**” **as well as “politically viable,”** the nation itself necessarily becomes an object of negotiation and contestation, for nonelite as well as elite groups. Once the sheer novelty of the modern nation-state is evoked, one realizes that **the very capacity to think and feel “nation-ness” only became possible through a radical change of consciousness, a changed sense of space and time, and thus of social relations.** Separation from king and country required a **new consciousness of “we-ness”**—one premised quite literally on novel criteria: not ancient lineage and not obeisance and fealty to an aristocratic polity. People must now picture themselves as part of a physical and conceptual abstraction, their loyalties, allegiances, and **social ties mediated not in face-to-face interactions or embedded in a political-religious hierarchical order.** (Thomas C. Holt, Foreword to Appelbaum et alii)

Nação Nigéria

Nigerian analysts are increasingly forced to ask the question: what is a nation?'. This soul-searching is also reflected in the popular consciousness; in popular Nigerian parlance, the "**national question**" is a burning issue which continues to occupy much journalistic footage. (...) At the heart of this search for a national meaning and direction are very conflicting perspectives on the nature and direction of the Nigerian state. **Understanding the nature of the Nigerian state is both an academic and a political project.** (Mustapha, 2002, p. 151).

Understanding the nature of Nigerian society and the Nigerian state must necessarily proceed by paying due attention to the two most crucial elements determining the character of the society; its size and its diversity. **With over 108 million inhabitants and over 300 ethnic groups, Nigeria is one of the most complex societies in the world.**

O estado nigeriano

“(...) *three* structural and contingent elements are isolated, which, taken together, give a clearer understanding of the nature of the Nigerian state. These are, first, the **deep ethno-regional divisions** in the society which are also reflected in the structure and organization of the state. Second, there is the specific **role of the military in Nigerian society and state**, particularly between 1966 and 1999. **Militarism and authoritarianism** have become complicating factors in the process of state formation and consolidation. Third, there is the complexity posed by **the reliance of the state on oil revenue and the distributive logic of a rentier state**. These three themes are closely related, not least by nationalist rhetoric. In the following three sections, I isolate and analyze these themes from a historical perspective. In the final section, I attempt to recast the Nigerian state against the background of the themes and the previous attempts at theorizing the state.

Nigéria:


- Nações “Multiétnicas”: Nacionalismo X “Tribalismo”; clientelismo étnico-regional;
- As forças armadas: militarização dos conflitos, influência estrangeira e autoritarismo.
- Recursos Naturais (Petróleo), Estados rentistas e; *gate-keeper elites*;

Nações Multiétnicas

Impactos da colonização europeia:


- Criação de jurisdições administrativas que reuniam sociedades com histórias de organização sócio-políticas independentes (e por vezes concorrentes) entre si.
- Dividir para reinar: os colonizadores se utilizaram sistematicamente destas diferenças para governar, transformando diferenças culturais em rivalidades políticas;
- Path-dependence: Muitos dos estados nacionais que emergem da descolonização carregarão estas fraturas sedimentadas no período colonial.

Search Google Maps



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Região que compõe a atual Nigéria, em 1625




Map of West Africa, AD 1625. (Based on Atlas of World History (2007) - Early modern Africa, map.)

1500 AD– 1820 AD

PART 3


African Kingdoms before colonialism

4,000 Years of African
American History




Nigéria: principais grupos linguísticos

Linguistic Groups



Administração Colonial Britânica



Unificação: 1914

Nacionalismo X Tribalismo

Virtually all of the state forms and some of the other communities were composed of people from different linguistic and even racial origins. Importantly, **political organization did not overlap with linguistic boundaries** and even large units with some linguistic unity were often politically divided and differentiated internally. **The scourge of "tribalism" was not a natural state.** On the other hand, **the seeds of ethno-regional fragmentation in Nigeria can also be traced to the same pre-colonial period.** The *potential* for conflict between the evolving identities which were later brought together under British rule existed even before the formal imposition of colonial rule. The pre-colonial period, therefore, has a dual and contradictory influence. The potential for discord apparent in the pre-colonial system was more than realized under colonialism which had the intended and unintended consequence of accentuating the divisions between different groups, and **converting conflict from a mere potential to a reality of everyday life.**

Contrary to the claims of nationalist historians, there was nothing inevitable about the exact scope of the territories unified to form modern Nigeria. If anything, integrative pre-colonial patterns of commercial, cultural, ecological, military, and religious interaction were often counter-balanced by perceptions of threat and difference. **There is nothing to suggest that the groups forced into the borders of the colonial Nigerian state were realizing a "natural" unity.** If anything, such perceptions of threat and difference continue to this day and have been given ample amplification since independence in 1960.

(Mustapha, 2002, p.157)

O Reinado Britânico na Nigéria

Governando por meio de intermediários (*ruling by proxy*):

- Manutenção do Califato ao Norte (Hausa-Fulani), manutenção da ordem social e das relações de produção, insulamento em relação a influências modernizantes presentes no Sul e Oeste; regime de taxaço
- Ao Sudeste (Igbo) cristianização e educação ocidental, alteração das relações de produção pela introdução de novas atividades econômicas (extração mineral, petróleo, construção de estradas e ferrovias), urbanização, maior presença de elementos metropolitanos;
- Sudoeste (Yoruba), área mais urbanizada de todas, concentrando atividades de intercâmbio externo, atraindo migrações de várias partes da África, torna-se a região mais heterogênea

Nacio nalis moS

leadership.⁴⁴ The three “different colonies” produced three “different nationalist movements” with no unifying icon. Nigerian decolonization did not produce an Nkrumah, instead, each ethno-regional bloc produced its own cultural hero. Between 1946 and 1958, Nigerian constitutional development revolved around the efforts of each of these political blocs to consolidate its hold on its home region while simultaneously capturing power at the federal center. The result was an unsteady triangulation—and eventual strangulation—of the political process and the state. Communalism and clientelism became the major levers of the political process, with the majority ethno-regional blocs the main beneficiaries. The minority ethnic groups, found in all the regions, were the first to bear the brunt of this development. Having secured their regional fiefdoms, each ethno-regional bloc struggled to secure a role at the federal center, which quickly became a continuing zone of contention between the different blocs. The unsteady system lurched from one crisis to another between independence in 1960 and 1966 when the military intervened in the political process.

Forças Armadas

the units that later became the Nigerian army were marked by clear racial and ethnic characteristics. For example, at a point in its history, the Royal Niger Constabulary, which later became part of the Nigerian Army, had five British officers, two "native" officers, and 404 men. Yet the annual expenditure on the five Europeans was 10,000 pounds sterling, while the 406 "natives" attracted an expenditure of only 7,700 pounds sterling." Such was the racial domination of the army that it was the last colonial institution to be indigenized.

Even more striking was the ethnicized nature of the various fighting units. The Lagos Constabulary, established in 1865 by Glover, was made up exclusively of runaway Hausa slaves; it was variously referred to as "Glover's Hausas" or the "Hausa Force." (p. 163)

Hierarquias étnicas no exército

The rate of its career liberalization and the effects of the quota system emerged a pyramidally structured army. At the top of the pyramid, the level of Colonel and above. Westerners, mainly Yomba, predominated. They were followed . . . by Easterners, who were mainly Ibo, occupying the ranks of Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors. At the bottom . . . in the ranks between Second-Lieutenants and Captains, came the Northerners, in the main of "Middle Belt" . . .

- “oil power is seized rather than negotiated, and once taken it is defended by force” (Obi, 2004: 4).


Petróleo



Guerra pela secessão de Biafra – 1967-1970




Desigualdades Regionais



Nigeria's presidential elections, winning parties by state

16 April 2011



Number of valid votes: 38.210 million; Jonathan: 22.495 million (58.89%); Buhari: 12.215 million (31.98%)

Voter turnout: 53.7%

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC)

28 March 2015



Number of valid votes: 28.587 million; Jonathan: 12.853 million (44.96%); Buhari: 15.424 million (53.95%)

Voter turnout: 43.6%

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