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[27 e 28/set] 7. Nacional-desenvolvimentismo e Guerra Fria

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Um mundo de Nações: a Guerra Fria e o Nascimento das Nações no III Mundo;

 As Nações no Mercado Mundial; as 3 regiões do Capitalismo no Século XX,

Construção Nacional e Desenvolvimento Econômico

On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson addressed the Congress of the United States and called for a declaration of war against Germany. He argued: "The world must be made safe for democracy." That same year, on November 7, the Bolsheviks assaulted the Winter Palace in the name of the workers' revolution. The great ideological antinomy of the twentieth century, Wilsonianism versus Leninism, may be said to have been born in 1917. I shall argue that it died in 1989. I shall further argue that the key issue to which both ideologies addressed themselves was the political integration of the periphery of the world-system. And finally, I shall argue that the mechanism of such integration was, both for Wilsonianism and for Leninism, "national development," and that the essential dispute between them was merely about the path to such national development. [Wallerstein, The Concept... p. 518]

Universalismo Iluminista

Wilsonianism was based on classical liberal presuppositions. It was universalist, claiming that its precepts applied equally everywhere. It assumed that everyone acted on the basis of rational self-interest and that therefore everyone in the long run was reasonable. Hence peaceful and reformist practice was plausible. It placed great emphasis on legality and on form. Of course, none of these precepts were new. In 1917, in fact, they seemed quite old-fashioned. Wilson's innovation (not invention) was to argue that these precepts applied not only to individuals within the state but to nation-states or peoples within the international arena. The principle of self-determination, the centerpiece of *Wilsonianism*, was nothing but the principle of individual freedom transposed to the level of the interstate system. [Wallerstein, The Concept... p. 518]

Autodeterminação dos Povos (Nações)

"The transposition of a theory that had been intended to apply only at the level of individuals to the level of groups is a very tricky proposition. A harsh critic, Ivor Jennings (1956), said of Wilson's doctrine of self-determination: 'On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people' (p. 56)." [Wallerstein, The Concept... p. 519]

Autodeterminação dos Povos (Proletariado)

Lenin pursued very similar policy objectives under the quite different slogans of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialism. His views were no doubt based on other premises. His universalism was that of the world working class, the soon-to-be singular class that was slated to become literally identical with the "people." Nations or peoples had no long-run place in the Marxian pantheon; they were supposed eventually to disappear, like the states. But nations or peoples did have a short-run, even middle-run reality that not only could not be ignored by Marxist parties but were potentially tactically useful to their ends. [Wallerstein, The Concept... p. 519]

For a brief interval, Wilson stood alone for mankind. Or at least he seemed to stand for mankind. And in that brief interval there was a very extraordinary and significant wave of response to him throughout the earth. So eager was the situation that all humanity leapt to accept and glorify Wilson—for a phrase, for a gesture. It seized upon him as its symbol. He was transfigured in the eyes of men. He ceased to be a common statesman; he became a Messiah. Millions believed him as the bringer of untold blessings; thousands would gladly have died for him. That response was one of the most illuminating events in the early twentieth century. Manifestly the World-State had been conceived then, and now it stirred in the womb. It was alive.

And then for some anxious decades it ceased to stir.

-H. G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come

o Século Americano

(do Norte)

Vive Wilson!

Vive l'Amérique!

Vive la liberté!



Wilson e a "liderança moral" dos EUA

Such perceptions of Wilson as possessor of a "universal moral authority" backed by the "powerful future of immense America" emerged gradually as the shape of Wilson's vision for the postwar world developed and disseminated from mid-1916 on, when he began to make more concerted and visible efforts to play a role in ending the war [Manela, p. 21]

Progresso e Desenvolvimento Nacional

This tension between a basically protectionist versus a free trade stance became one of the major themes of policy-making in the various states of the world-system in the nineteenth century. It often was the most significant issue that divided the principal political forces of particular states. It was clear by then that a central ideological theme of the capitalist world-economy was that every state could, and indeed eventually probably would, reach a high level of national income and that conscious, rational action would make it so. This fit in very well with the underlying Enlightenment theme of inevitable progress and the teleological view of human history that it incarnated. [Wallerstein, The Concept... p. 517]

O "consenso dos governados"

[Wilson] called for the establishment of a mechanism for international cooperation among sovereign states based on two related principles: one was that political arrangements, whether national or international, should be based on popular legitimacy or, in the phrase Wilson favored, "the consent of the governed." The second was that all political units constituted through such arrangements of consent should relate to each other as equals. "We believe," he declared then before a gathering of William Howard Taft's League to Enforce Peace, "that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live" and that "the small states of the world shall enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity."

Soberania Popular e Igualdade entre as Nações

"No peace can last, or ought to last," he intoned in January 1917, in a phrase that representatives of colonized peoples later repeated often, "which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed" (...) International peace required that no one nation seek to dominate another, but that every people should be left to determine their own form of government, their own path of development, "unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."

Imperialismo intra-europeu

The logic of Wilson's argument, that a durable peace required government rule by popular consent, appeared to pose a direct challenge to the imperial arrangements that spanned much of the world at the time. The historian Thomas J. Knock has concluded that the address constituted "the first time that any statesman of stature" had launched what amounted to a "penetrating critique of European imperialism." But Wilson (...) was primarily referring to the situation in Europe, with little thought of dependent territories elsewhere.(...) Wilson's own secretary of state, Robert Lansing, wrote later that the principle of self-determination clearly did not apply to "races, peoples, or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance deprive them of the capacity to choose intelligently their political affiliations." Lansing was convinced of the "danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races," which was bound to "create trouble in many lands" and to "breed discontent, disorder and rebellion." [Manela, p. 24]

Wilsonianism e a integração do III Mundo

Though there is little evidence that Wilson considered the impact that his rhetoric on self-determination would have on colonial peoples or expected the peace conference to deal with colonial questions beyond those arising directly from the war, he also did not exclude non-European peoples from the right to self-determination as a matter of principle. Rather, he envisioned them achieving it through an evolutionary process under the benevolent tutelage of a "civilized" power that would prepare them for self-government. Wilson, historian N. Gordon Levin has written, envisioned an international order that would transcend traditional imperialism and in which "the human, political, and territorial rights of underdeveloped peoples would be respected," and in which their self-determination would obtain through a "careful and orderly" process of liberal reform. [Manela, p. 25]

Wilson e as relações raciais nos EUA

Woodrow Wilson was a son of the American South. He was born in 1856 in antebellum Virginia and raised in Augusta, Georgia (...). As president of Princeton University, he did nothing to open the college to black enrollment, writing in 1903 that though "there is nothing in the law of the University to prevent a negro's entering, the whole temper and tradition of the place are such that no negro has ever applied for admission." The same year, Wilson voiced his opposition to a suggestion that students at the University of Virginia, where he had once studied law, take part-time work as waiters in campus dining rooms. Such work, he explained, was "ordinarily rendered by negroes" and would therefore cause white students "an inevitable loss of selfrespect."

Igualdade futura

Straining to reconcile his principles with his policies, he admitted that both whites and blacks had "human souls" and were "absolutely equal in that respect" but added that the question was one of "economic equality—whether the Negro can do the same things with equal efficiency.' ' Things, he assured his visitors, would "solve themselves" once blacks proved that they could do so, though it would "take generations to work this thing out." By reiterating the principle of equality but relegating its attainment to some distant, indeterminate future, Wilson tried to resolve the dissonance between his ideals and his prejudices. [Manela, p. 27]

John Milton Cooper, a leading and sympathetic biographer, notes Wilson's belief that blacks were "inferior" to whites but adds that he thought that they would eventually achieve parity and evaluates Wilson's racial views as "surprisingly mild" for someone of his background. Like most educated whites of his era, Wilson saw nonwhite peoples generally as "backward," but he also believed that, with "proper instruction," they could eventually learn the habits of "civilization," including self-government.

O eterno fardo do homem branco

"The Filipinos, Wilson found, were not yet ready to exercise responsibly the rights that come with a full-fledged democracy and should not therefore have those rights: "Freedom is not giving the same government to all people, but wisely discriminating and dispensing laws according to the advancement of a people." The United States should not attempt to implement the American system of government in the Philippines prematurely, and would "have to learn colonial administration, perhaps painfully."

"It was America's duty to govern the Philippines for the advancement of the native population, and it could not shirk it." [Manela, p. 29]

What then of the postdecolonization practice?

A close look at the internal realities of the various states reveals, however, that, both in the political and in the economic arenas, there was less difference than the theory or the propaganda would suggest. In terms of the actual political structures, most of the states most of the time were either one party states (de facto or de jure) or military dictatorships. (...) The corollary of such structures tended to be a low level of civil rights--a powerful police structure, arbitrary arrests of opposition figures, a government .. controlled press, and a long list of intellectuals in exile. There was very little difference in this regard to be found among states employing a Wilsonian rhetoric and those employing a basically Leninist rhetoric. [Wallerstein, The Concept... p. 521]

Nor was much more difference to be located in the economic arena. The degree to which private local enterprise was permitted has varied, but in almost all Third World states there has been a large amount of state enterprise and in virtually no state has state ownership been the only property form. The degree to which foreign investment has been permitted has no doubt varied more. In the more "pro-Westem" states it has been encouraged, indeed solicited, albeit quite frequently in the fonn of joint ventures with a state corporation.

Liberalismo X Mercantilismo

Since at least the sixteenth century, European thinkers have been discussing how to augment the wealth of the realm, and governments have sought or were adjured to take steps to maintain and enhance this wealth. All the debates about mercantilism centered around how to be certain that more wealth entered a state than left it When Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations in 1776, he was concerned to attack the notion that governments could best enhance this wealth by various restrictions on foreign trade. He preached instead the notion that maximizing the ability of individual entrepreneurs to act as they deemed wisest in the world market would in fact result in an optimal enhancement of the wealth of the nation. [Wallerstein, The Concept... p. 517]

As três regiões do capitalismo

Indústrias tradicionais, commodities agrícolas e minerais, serviços não especializados Periferia América Central, Caribe, Região Andina, África, Oriente Médio, Ásia Central e Sul.

Semi-

periferia (México, Brasil, Turquia, Polônia, África do Sul, China, Índia)

> Centro (Europa, América do Norte, Japão)

O ciclo de vida dos produtos e a dinâmica espacial do capitalismo

Agricultura de subsistência,

exportação de commodities

Indústrias intensivas em capital e tecnologia, Finanças, Serviços Tecnológicos