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Sociologia do Desenvolvimento – “A  
invenção do Terceiro Mundo”.

Graduação em Relações Internacionais – USP  
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## *[13 e 14/set] 5. A Revolução Industrial e a formação das modernas economias periféricas.*

- Davis, Mike (2002) *Holocaustos Coloniais: Clima, Fome e **Imperialismo** na Formação do Terceiro Mundo*. Rio de Janeiro, Record. [Cap. 9 – “As origens do Terceiro Mundo” (pp. 279-310)].
- Pomeranz, Kenneth (2013) *A Grande Divergência - A China, a Europa e a Formação da Economia Mundial Moderna*. Edições 70. (Cap. 6 - “As Americas como um novo tipo de periferia.” (pp. 264-300).
- Nayar, Deepak (2014) *A corrida pelo crescimento. Países em desenvolvimento na economia mundial*. Rio de Janeiro, Contraponto. [Parte I – “Ficando para trás” (pp. 31 a 84)].

Racismo uma história. Ep. 2 Racismo e Eugenia, BBC, Dublado  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l3tDNCl5kRU&list=PL\\_LWuOG0OXskb65ev9chPPFH7ZT-0Xduv](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l3tDNCl5kRU&list=PL_LWuOG0OXskb65ev9chPPFH7ZT-0Xduv)



# La Belle Époque

A Belle Époque foi um período de **cultura cosmopolita** na história da Europa que começou no fim do século XIX, com o final da Guerra Franco-Prussiana, em 1871, e durou até a eclosão da Primeira Guerra Mundial, em 1914. (...) Foi considerada uma **era de ouro da beleza, inovação e paz entre os países europeus**. Novas invenções tornavam a vida mais fácil em todos os níveis sociais, e a cena cultural estava em efervescência: cabarés, o cancan, e o cinema haviam nascido, e a arte tomava novas formas com o Impressionismo e a *Art Nouveau*. A Belle Époque foi representada por uma cultura urbana de divertimento, incentivada pelo desenvolvimento dos meios de comunicação e transporte, os quais aproximaram ainda mais as principais cidades do planeta. (Wikipedia)




Claude Monet  
The Rue Montorgueil, Paris 1878




# A Grandes Fomes do Fim do Mundo

The Great Famine of 1876–78 (...) began after an intense drought resulting in crop failure in the Deccan Plateau. It affected south and southwestern India (Madras, Mysore, Hyderabad, and Bombay) for a period of two years. In its second year famine also spread north to some regions of the Central Provinces and the North-Western Provinces, and to a small area in the Punjab. The famine ultimately covered an area of 670,000 square kilometres (257,000 sq mi) and caused distress to a population totaling 58,500,000. The death toll from this famine is estimated to be in the range of 5.5 million people. (Wikipedia)



Davis, Mike (2002) *Holocaustos Coloniais: Clima, Fome e Imperialismo na Formação do Terceiro Mundo*. Rio de Janeiro, Record.

- \* [Cap. 9 – “As origens do Terceiro Mundo” (pp. 279-310)].



MIKE DAVIS

# HOLOCAUSTOS COLONIAIS

Clima, fome e imperialismo na formação do Terceiro Mundo






Figure 1.6 Famine Victims, 1877

The original caption of this missionary photograph reads, "Those who have got to this stage rarely recover."

## Holocaustos Coloniais



**Table P1**  
**Estimated Famine Mortality**

India	1876-79	10.3 million	Digby
		8.2 million	Maharatna
		6.1 million	Seavoy
	1896-1902	19.0 million	<i>The Lancet</i>
		8.4 million	Maharatna / Seavoy
		6.1 million	Cambridge
India Total		12.2-29.3 million	
China	1876-79	20 million	Broomhall
		9.5-13 million	Bohr
	1896-1900	10 million	Cohen
		China Total	
Brazil	1876-79	0.5-1.0 million	Cunniff
	1896-1900	n.d.	
Brazil Total		2 million	Smith
Total		31.7-61.3 million	

Source: Cf. William Digby, *"Prosperous" British India*, London 1901; Arap Maharatna, *The Demography of Famine*, Delhi 1996; Roland Seavoy, *Famine in Peasant Societies*, New York 1986; *The Lancet*, 16 May 1901; *Cambridge Economic History of India*, Cambridge 1983; A. J. Broomhall, *Hudson Taylor and China's Open Century, Book Six, Assault on the Nine*, London 1988; Paul Bohr, *Famine in China*, Cambridge, Mass. 1972; Paul Cohen, *History in Three Keys*, New York 1997; Roger Cunniff, "The Great Drought: Northeast Brazil, 1877-1880," Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, Austin 1970; and T. Lynn Smith, *Brazil: People and Institutions*, Baton Rouge, La. 1954. Chapters 3 and 5 have detailed discussions of these estimates.

# Um Grande Bazar chamado Oriente

*“All the diamonds in the world are as nothing compared to what comes from the East.”*

—Austrian Empress Maria Teresa

Fonte: W. Travis Hanes III & Frank Sanello (2004)  
*Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the  
Corruption of Another*. Sourcebooks, Inc.



# Negócios da China?

*“Suppose there were people from another country who carried opium for sale to England and seduced your people into buying and smoking it; certainly you would deeply hate it and be bitterly aroused... Formerly the number of opium smugglers was small; but now the vice has spread far and wide, and the poison penetrated deeper.”*

—Lin Zexu, high commissioner of Canton, in a letter to Queen Victoria, 1839.

*“The use of opium is not a curse, but a comfort and benefit to the hard-working Chinese.”*

—1858 press release from the British firm of Jardine, Matheson & Co., China’s biggest opium importer.

*“I am in dread of the judgment of God upon England for our national iniquity towards China.”*

—William Gladstone, 1842

Fonte: W. Travis Hanes III & Frank Sanello (2010) *Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another*. (p. 1)

Fonte: W. Travis Hanes III & Frank Sanello (2004)

HISTÓRIA E SOCIEDADE

**A GRANDE DIVERGÊNCIA  
A CHINA, A EUROPA  
E A CONSTRUÇÃO  
DA ECONOMIA  
MUNDIAL MODERNA  
KENNETH POMERANZ**

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# A grande divergência

**A corrida pelo  
crescimento**

Fases em desenvolvimento  
na economia mundial

**Deepak Nayyar**

EDITORA  
LIVRO FORTES

# A Grande Divergência: 1820-1950

Nayyar, 2014

Tabela 2.2. Participação do Ocidente e do Resto na população mundial e no PIB mundial: 1820-1950

(em percentagens)

	População mundial					
	1820	1870	1900	1913	1940	1950
<b>Ocidente</b>	<b>25,6</b>	<b>32,2</b>	<b>35,8</b>	<b>36,8</b>	<b>35,2</b>	<b>33,0</b>
Europa Ocidental	12,8	14,7	14,9	14,6	12,8	12,1
Ramificações do Ocidente	1,1	3,6	5,5	6,2	6,7	7,0
Leste Europeu	3,5	4,2	4,5	4,4	4,1	3,5
Antiga URSS	5,3	7,0	8,0	8,7	8,5	7,1
Japão	3,0	2,7	2,8	2,9	3,2	3,3
<b>Resto</b>	<b>74,4</b>	<b>67,8</b>	<b>64,2</b>	<b>63,2</b>	<b>64,8</b>	<b>67,0</b>
Ásia, inclusive	65,2	57,6	53,0	51,7	50,7	51,5
China	36,6	28,1	25,6	24,4	22,6	21,6
Índia	20,1	19,8	18,2	16,9	16,8	14,2
África	7,1	7,1	7,0	7,0	8,4	9,0
América Latina	2,1	3,2	4,1	4,5	5,7	6,5
	PIB mundial					
	1820	1870	1900	1913	1940	1950
<b>Ocidente</b>	<b>36,9</b>	<b>57,4</b>	<b>67,4</b>	<b>70,4</b>	<b>71,0</b>	<b>72,9</b>
Europa Ocidental	22,9	33,0	34,2	33,0	29,7	26,2
Ramificações do Ocidente	1,9	10,0	17,6	21,3	23,2	30,7
Leste Europeu	3,6	4,5	5,2	4,9	4,1	3,5
Antiga URSS	5,4	7,5	7,8	8,5	9,3	9,6
Japão	3,0	2,3	2,6	2,6	4,7	3,0
<b>Resto</b>	<b>63,1</b>	<b>42,6</b>	<b>32,6</b>	<b>29,6</b>	<b>29,0</b>	<b>27,1</b>
Ásia, inclusive	56,5	36,1	25,6	22,3	19,9	15,6
China	33,0	17,1	11,1	8,8	6,4	4,6
Índia	16,1	12,2	8,6	7,5	5,9	4,2
África	4,5	4,1	3,4	2,9	3,5	3,8
América Latina	2,2	2,5	3,6	4,4	5,6	7,8

Fonte: Cálculos do autor a partir do banco de dados de Maddison on-line; ver Apêndice.



**Tabela 2.4. Divergência no PIB *per capita* entre a Europa Ocidental / Ramificações do Ocidente e o Resto do mundo: 1820-1950**

	Proporções do PIB <i>per capita</i>					
	1820	1870	1900	1913	1940	1950
<b>Europa Ocidental e Ramificações do Ocidente</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Leste Europeu	57,2	45,8	45,1	42,5	36,9	33,6
Antiga URSS	57,6	46,1	38,8	37,3	40,2	45,2
Japão	56,0	36,1	37,0	34,8	53,9	30,5
Ásia,* inclusive	48,3	26,6	19,1	16,5	14,4	10,1
China	50,2	25,9	17,1	13,8	10,5**	7,1
Índia	44,6	26,1	18,8	16,9	12,9	9,8
África	35,1	24,5	18,8	16,0	15,2	14,1
América Latina	57,8	33,1	34,9	37,5	36,2	39,9

\* A Ásia exclui o Japão, mas inclui a Índia e a China; \*\* Na China, esta cifra refere-se a 1938.

Fonte: Cálculos do autor a partir do banco de dados de Maddison *on-line*; ver Apêndice.

# Distribuição do Produto Industrial Mundial

**Table 9.3**  
**Shares of World Manufacturing Output, 1750–1900**  
(Percent)

	1750	1800	1830	1860	1880	1900
<i>Europe</i>	23.1	28.0	34.1	53.6	62.0	63.0
UK	1.9	4.3	9.5	19.9	22.9	18.5
<i>Tropics</i>	76.8	71.2	63.3	39.2	23.3	13.4
China	32.8	33.3	29.8	19.7	12.5	6.2
India	24.5	19.7	17.6	8.6	2.8	1.7

Source: Derived from B. R. Tomlinson, "Economics: The Periphery," in Andrew Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, Oxford 1990, p. 69 (Table 3.8).

## Abrindo mercados

“At dawn on September 14, 1793, Macartney met Qianlong. The Emperor was in the twilight of his life and, though he did not realize it, his empire was also about to enter its declining years. During Qianlong’s reign, which began in 1736, **China had become the richest and most populous country in the world.** During his reign, the empire doubled in size and area as its armies conquered huge swaths of Central Asia, Outer Mongolia, and parts of Russia.”



Mercadores, diabos vermelhos.

“After the British mission left his country, the Emperor wrote a blunt letter to the King of England that showed none of the niceties of diplomacy and all the self-confidence of a self-sufficient empire: “Our ways have no resemblance to yours, and even were your envoy competent to acquire some rudiments of them, he could not transplant them to your barbarous land. Strange and costly objects do not interest me. As your ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on strange objects and have no use for your country’s manufactures.”

Fonte: W. Travis Hanes III & Frank Sanello (2004)

# Chá

“Britain’s love affair with tea and all its rituals began in 1664 when King Charles II received two pounds of black, strange-smelling leaves from China. Less than half a century later, tea had become Britain’s beverage of choice with an annual consumption of twelve million pounds a year. By 1785, Britain was importing fifteen million pounds per year from China. While the British people became addicted to the mild stimulant, the British government became economically dependent on tea, because the Exchequer levied a whopping 100 percent import tax on it. (...) Between 1710 and 1759, the imbalance in trade was staggering, draining Britain of silver, the only form of payment China accepted for its coveted tea. During this period, Britain paid out £26 million in silver to China, but sold it only £9 million in goods.”

# Ópio

“The fact that the opium found no eager buyers in China in 1782 suggests that it had not yet become a nation of addicts, although that would change dramatically in the next century. Indeed, fifteen years later, the British were importing four thousand chests per annum into China. **The Chinese government expressed its alarm at the opium invasion with a decree in 1799 that condemned the trade more forcefully than previous bans had.**

In 1773, opium earned the **[East India] Company** £39,000. Twenty years later, the annual revenue from opium sold in China alone had ballooned to £250,000. The popular drug was incrementally beginning to reverse the imbalance of trade between Britain and China. Between 1806 and 1809, China paid out seven million Spanish dollars for opium.”

Fonte: W. Travis Hanes III & Frank Sanello (2004)



“In 1833, a reform-minded British Parliament abolished the East India Company’s monopoly in China. With China open to all comers, within a year the amount of tea imported into Britain quadrupled. The trade in opium to pay for all this tea also dramatically increased. In 1830, eighteen thousand chests of opium were imported from India. Three years later, the number of chests had soared to thirty thousand.

This expensive pastime of the idle *jeunesse dorée* gradually made its way down the socioeconomic ladder. Shopkeepers, servants, soldiers, and even Taoist priests were loading opium pipes and drifting off into weeklong escapes from productivity, responsibility, and consciousness. China’s powerful elite were not blind to the mess that the foreign import had caused. **One courtier estimated that four million Chinese were habituated. A British doctor in Canton suspected that the figure was three times that. The economy, government services, and standard of living all declined because of substance abuse”.**

Fonte: W. Travis Hanes III & Frank Sanello (2004)

# A derrota da Ásia

“A famosa afirmação de Bairoch, corroborada por Maddison, de que as diferenças de renda e riqueza entre as grandes civilizações do século XVIII eram relativamente pequenas: "E muito provável que, em meados do Século XVIII o padrão de vida médio na Europa fosse um tanto inferior ao do resto do mundo". Quando os *sans culottes* atacaram a Bastilha, os maiores distritos manufatureiros do mundo ainda eram o Delta do Yangzi e Bengala, com Lingao (Guangdong e Guangxi modernas) e a litôranea Madras não muito atrás. Só a Índia produzia um quarto dos produtos manufaturados do mundo e, embora a "produtividade da mão-de-obra agrária precapitalista fosse talvez inferior ao nível japonês/ chinês, seu capital comercial ultrapassava o dos chineses"

# Desindustrialização

“A desindustrialização da Ásia, pela substituição de mercadoria têxtil de fabricação local por importações do algodão de Lancashire, alcançou o clímax apenas nas décadas após a construção do Palácio de Cristal. "Até 1831 ", observa Albert Feuerwerker, a "Grã-Bretanha comprou mais Nankeens' (tecido fabricado em Nanquim e outros lugares na região do baixo Yangzi) todos os anos em que vendeu tecido de fabricação britânica para a China". **A Grã-Bretanha exportou 51 milhões de jardas de tecido para a Ásia em 1831; 995 milhões em 1871; 1 bilhão e 413 milhoes em 1879; e 2 bilhões em 1887.**”



“Os teares da Índia e da China foram derrotados não tanto pela competição de mercado quanto pelo violento desmantelamento causado por guerra, invasão, ópio e um sistema de tarifas de mão única imposto por Lancashire. Já em 1850, as impostas importações de ópio indiano haviam escoado para fora do país 11 por cento da provisão de dinheiro da China e 13 por cento do seu estoque de prata. Quaisquer que fossem os freios internos ao rápido crescimento econômico na Ásia, na América Latina ou na África, é incontestável que, de mais ou menos 1780 ou 1800 em diante, cada tentativa seria de uma sociedade não ocidental para implantar um projeto de desenvolvimento ou criar regras de comércio era acompanhada de uma resposta militar, assim como uma resposta Econômica de Londres ou de uma capital imperial competitiva. O Japão, incitado pelos navios pretos de Perry, é a exceção que comprova a regra.”

# China: O Desmonte do Estado




Figure 11.3 A Silted-up Channel in the Wei Valley.



# Modernização Colonial

If the history of British rule in India were to be condensed into a single fact, it is this: there was no increase in India's per capita income from 1757 to 1947.

Only moneylenders, absentee landlords, urban merchants and a handful of indigenous industrialists seemed to have benefited consistently from India's renewed importance in world trade.

"Modernization" and commercialization were accompanied by pauperization". (Davis, 2002; p.312)



# Preparando o holocausto

“In addition to their failure to finance the upkeep or expansion of small-scale irrigation, the British also typically destroyed the social mechanisms that had allowed villages to undertake irrigation works by themselves.

“Settling the land revenue with individual ryots,” Kaiwar emphasizes, “broke down the supra-individual authority needed to direct the working of the co-operative system that provided the structural underpinning for building and maintaining the *bandharas* and regulating water use. In this way, the British methods of taxing agriculture supervened to create a system in which an absolute decline in the technical base of agriculture (e.g., cattle, fodder, manure, tools, and so on) went hand in hand with ecological breakdown (e.g., soil erosion, nutrient depletion, falling or polluted water tables, waterlogging, and so on)”.

## Índia: o mercado como prioridade




Figure 1.5 Grain Stores in Madras, February 1877

**Table 1.1**  
**Indian Wheat Exports to the UK, 1875–78**  
(1000s of Quarters)

1875	308
1876	757
1877	1409
1878	420

Source: Cornelius Walford, *The Famines of the World*, London 1879, p. 127.




Figure 1.6 Famine Victims, 1877

The original caption of this missionary photograph reads, "Those who have got to this stage rarely recover."

Table 12.2  
Rise and Fall of the Sertão Cotton Boom

	Pernambuco		Ceará	
	Kilos Exported	Price	Kilos Exported	
1860	1.3 million	-	0.8 million	-
1862	2.8 million	-	0.7 million	-
1864	8.4 million	1.00	1.0 million	1.00
1866	18.2 million	.62	2.1 million	.74
1869	15.2 million	.71	-	.49
1871	16.8 million	-	7.3 million	.35
1873	15.2 million	.47	5.1 million	.35
1875	11.1 million	.35	5.8 million	-
1877	2.6 million	-	0.6 million	.24

Price: 1864=1.00

Source: Adapted from data in Cunniff, Table II-1, p. 81 and Johnson, *Sharecroppers of the Sertão*, Table 1, p. 20.

## Brasil: A febre de algodão



The Exodus.



# O sertão e a costa

Since the emergence of the great *fazendas de gado* in the late seventeenth century, the ecology and economy of the sertao repeatedly have been reshaped by El Nino droughts. The "Leather Age" of the eighteenth century, when fazendeiros made legendary fortunes selling their longhorned cattle and *carne do Ceara* (dried beef) to coastal sugar plantations and the gold mines of Minas Gerais, was brought to an end by the terrible drought of 1791-93, which decimated the semi-wild herds. **The vast northeast interior became a frontier safety valve for the social contradictions of the coastal.**



“The sertao absorbed the surplus population of the zona da mata during the stagnant periods of the sugar industry and benefited from the labors and energies of those who, for economic, psychological, or whatever reason, could not integrate themselves into the famous *casa grande e senzala* sugar culture.” Between 1822 and 1850, the Empire officially supported this immigration by recognizing homestead claims on land formerly belonging to the sertao's fast disappearing indigenous peoples.

“In the mid-nineteenth century,” estimates Levine, “certainly less than 5% and probably less than 1% of the rural population owned land.” These poor *sertanejos*, unlike the slaves of the zona de mata, were nominally free men, but access to land and water was as tenuous as the life of a laborer confronted by the *capangas* of an angry landowner.

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China: séculos de investimentos em sistemas de irrigação e transporte fluvial permitiram enfrentar ocorrências pretéritas de grandes secas; a falência do estado imperial e a desarticulação de suas instituições provocou o colapso dos mecanismos de “segurança alimentar” pré-existentes;

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Índia: destruição dos sistemas sociais baseados nas comunidades/vilas camponesas, os altos tributos imperiais, os monopólios comerciais e os sistemas de usura exauriram a massa de agricultores;

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Brasil: a febre dos mercados e a absoluta ausência de infraestrutura e de sistemas sociais de solidariedade pré-existentes impediram qualquer reação à catástrofe climática.

# Balança Comercial – Reino Unido




Figure 9.1 World System of Settlements, 1910 (£ Millions)

Source: S. Saul, *Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870–1914*, Liverpool 1960, p. 58.