

LG
Plato. Crito
Prigent A.2

Plato. Crito

DEPARTMENTAL
S.I.S. LIBRARY
Series

Pitt Press

PLATONIS CRITO

WITH INTRODUCTION NOTES AND APPENDIX

BY

J. ADAM B.A.

FELLOW AND CLASSICAL LECTURER OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE
CAMBRIDGE

EDITED FOR THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

134778
21110114

CAMBRIDGE

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1888

[All Rights reserved]

Richard D. Ashmore

NOTES.

Κρίτων [ἢ περὶ πρακτέου. ἠθικός] In the MSS of Plato each dialogue generally has two or even three titles: the Bodleian MS for example denotes the other three members of the first Tetralogy by the names *Εὐθύφρων ἢ περὶ ὀσίου. πειραστικός, Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους. ἠθικός, Φαίδων ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς. ἠθικός*. In each case only the first of these titles dates from Plato, who generally (but not always) named the dialogue after one of the characters appearing in it. The second title was added by Thrasyllus, a rhetorician and literary critic who flourished about the Christian era: it is intended to explain the subject treated of in the dialogue. It is not clear whether the third title was added, as Grote believes (Plato Vol. I. p. 160), by Thrasyllus, or by Diogenes Laertius either on his own responsibility or in obedience to some other authority (see Diog. Laert. III. 49); at all events it is meant to indicate the formal scope of the dialogue—whether a dialogue of exposition (*ὑφηγητικός*, of which *ἠθικός* is a subdivision), or a dialogue of search (*ζητητικός*). Here the Crito is correctly described as an ethical dialogue dealing with a question of duty (*περὶ πρακτέου*: cf. 46 B *σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρῆ ἡμῶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή*)—viz. is it right to save one's life by breaking the law?

Crito was one of Socrates' oldest and most attached friends (Apol. 33 D, Phaedo 115 A foll.). He appears to have been rich and not indisposed to make more money (Euthyd. 304 C). The fact that he had stood surety for Socrates after the trial (Phaedo 115 D) increased his personal danger if Socrates should escape from prison, and reveals in a yet stronger light his devotion to his friend: see note on 45 D. "Plato's picture of Crito is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world, looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentleman, but without any capacity for philosophy".—Archer-Hind's Phaedo p. 42.

The scene is in the prison, just before daybreak.

CHAPTER I.

Crito warns Socrates that the ship is on its way back from Delos, and will arrive to-day.

43 A 1. **τηνικάδε** = 'at this hour' (*τηνίκα* 'at that hour': so *τούσδε* = 'of this sort') (*τοῖος* 'of that sort'). The distinction is like that between *ὄδε* and *οὗτος*. *τηνίκα* seems to have been originally a Doric adverb (*τῆνος* is Doric for *ἐκεῖνος*): the suffix reappears in *αὐτ-ίκα*.

2. **πρῶ**. Socrates is not surprised to see Crito, for we learn from the Phaedo (59 D, cf. Xen. Mem. IV. 8. 2) that he was daily visited by his friends during the interval between his condemnation and his death: but he is surprised to see him *so early*. The prison was generally opened somewhat later (*ἀνεψέγετο γὰρ οὐ πρῶ* Phaed. l. c.). **πρῶ** and not *πρωτῖ* is the correct Attic form of this word. The Bodleian has *πρωί*.

3. **πάνυ μὲν οὖν** = 'imo, valde quidem' (Göbel). *μὲν οὖν* is corrective: see on Apol. 26 B and cf. infra 44 B *ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ᾧ Σώκρατες. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν*.

4. **πηνίκα μάλιστα**. *πηνίκα* means 'at what precise time?' *πότε* only 'at what time?' *μάλιστα* makes the question more vague: 'About what o'clock is it?' So *τί μάλιστα*; = *quid potissimum?* Gorg. 448 D.

5. **ὄρθρος βαθύς** = 'just before daybreak': so Prot. 310 A *ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου*, Ar. Vesp. 216 *ἀλλὰ νῦν ὄρθρος βαθύς*. *ὄρθρος* is the morning twilight, and *βαθύς* implies that it was more dark than light: cf. the expressions *βαθεῖα νύξ*, *βαθεῖα ἑσπέρα*.

6. **θαυμάζω ὅπως**. Stallbaum quotes Xen. Mem. I. 1. 20 *θαυμάζω οὖν ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπέισθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι κτλ.* The idiom means 'I wonder how it was that etc.': *θαυμάζω εἰ* would mean 'I wonder that'. Infra **σοι—ὑπακούσαι** = 'to let you in': *ὑπακοῦειν* is often used of answering the door: cf. Phaed. 59 E *ὁ θυρωρὸς ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακοῦειν* and *ὁ ὑπακούσας* of the porter in Xen. Symp. I. 11.

8. **διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν**. Socrates' friends generally met in the *δικαστήριον*, which adjoined the prison (Phaed. 59 D), and waited till the prison was opened.

9. **εὐηργέτηται**. Where initial *εὐ-* or *οἰ-* precede a vowel in Attic verbs, "that vowel, and not the initial diphthong, receives the augment. Thus—*εὐηγγελίζόμεν, εὐηργέτουν, εὐωδώθη, εὐώρκουν*" (Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 245). "*τι* is equivalent to *εὐερ-*

γασίαν τινά (a tip)" Dyer. *καί*—*καί* above is 'and also.' [B and the editors¹, except Kral, read *εὐεργέτηται*.]

12. *ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι* = 'some little time'. Theaet. 142 A *ἄρτι—ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ*; 'Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

13. *εἶτα*. On *εἶτα* indignabundum see Apol. 28 B (*εἶτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνεις*;) and my note there. For *εἶτα* followed by *πῶς* cf. (with Stallbaum) Eur. Iph. Aul. 894 *κᾶτα πῶς φέρων γε δέλτον οὐκ ἐμοὶ δίδως λαβεῖν*;

15. *οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία κτλ.* = 'no! Socrates, believe me, I could wish that I myself were not so sleepless and sorrowful'. *οὐ* does not anticipate the following *οὐδέ* in *οὐδ' ἂν αὐτός* (ne ipse quidem), but is part of Crito's reply to Socrates' question, since *εἶτα—παρακάθῃσαι = ἐχρῆν εὐθὺς ἐπεγεῖραί με, ἀλλὰ μὴ σιγῇ παρακαθῆσθαι*. For the displacement of *τε* Stallbaum compares Phaed. 94 D *τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν*. Wohlrab takes *οὐ* as merely anticipatory of the following negative: I agree with Göbel.

17. *ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ—θαυμάζω* sc. just as *σοῦ* were lately surprised, supra 43 A *θαυμάζω ὅπως κτλ.* For *θαυμάζω* with gen. see Goodwin's Greek Grammar p. 222. Cron on the other hand takes *ἀλλὰ καὶ* as = 'but furthermore', while Göbel connects *καὶ θαυμάζω* with *καὶ οὐκ ἤγειρον* in the next line—'both—and'.

18. *οὐκ ἤγειρον*. The rest of Crito's reply to Socrates' *πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με κτλ.* By using the conjunctive *διάγης* where at first sight we should expect the optative *διάγοις* in the next line, Crito contrives to indicate that he still wishes Socrates *ὡς ἥδιστα διάγειν*: cf. Rep. V. 472 C *παραδείγματος ἄρα ἔνεκα—ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι—ἵνα—ἀναγκαζώμεθα καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ὁμολογεῖν*. In Apol. 40 D Socrates declares that nothing is *ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον* than sound dreamless sleep.

19. *καί—μὲν δὴ—καί* = 'yes, and': so also *καὶ μὲν δὴ καί—γε* in Rep. V. 464 B.

20. *ἡῦδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου*. Inscriptions of the age of Plato shew that verbs beginning with *εὐ-* regularly had an augment in the secondary tenses: see Rutherford New Phryn. 244 and Meisterhans, Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften 78. Here the mss and edd. (except Kral) read *εὐδαιμόνισα*. On the genitive with *εὐδαιμονίζειν* compare Goodwin's Greek Grammar p. 224: and for the sentiment

¹ By "the editors" I mean Cron, Schanz, Wohlrab, Göbel and Kral: see Preface.

Phaed. 58 E εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο—καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων.

21. ὡς ῥαδίως i. q. ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως (Cron).

24. τηλικούτον ὄντα. Socrates was seventy years of age: v. infra 52 E.

43 C 26. ἀλίσκονται ἐν = 'are overtaken by' (Church). In this sense ἀλίσκεσθαι more often takes the dative without ἐν.

οὐδὲν—ἐπιλύεται—τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν = 'in no way saves them from being indignant'. Verbs of hindering, if negative themselves, are regularly followed by μὴ οὐ with the infinitive, which may or may not have the article. Goodwin MT. 198 foll. With the present example compare Rep. I. 354 B οὐκ ἀπεσχόμεν τὸ μὴ οὐκ—ἐλθεῖν and Aesch. Prom. 918 οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτ' ἐπαρκέσει τὸ μὴ οὐ πεσεῖν ἀτίμως κτλ. Whitelaw (Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society III. 1, p. 41 foll.) endeavours, I think with success, to prove that both negatives have a value, the infinitive being consecutive. Thus while ἐκώλυσε ἐμὲ μὴ εἰπεῖν = 'he hindered me, so that I did not speak', οὐκ ἐκώλυσε ἐμὲ μὴ οὐκ εἰπεῖν = 'he did not hinder me, so that I did not refrain-from-speaking' i.e. keep silence (οὐκ εἰπεῖν).

29. ἀλλὰ τί δῆ. ἀλλά reverts to 43 A τί τημικάδε ἀφίξει, ᾧ Κρίτων; on πρῶ v. note *ibid.*

34. ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα. Note the climax: χαλεπήν—χαλεπήν καὶ βαρεῖαν—ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα. The phrase ἐν τοῖς adds emphasis to the superlative. When occurring with the superlative of adjectives, it is best explained by supplying a fresh superlative to agree with the article: this superlative is sometimes expressed, e.g. Cratyl. 427 E ὁ δῆ δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις μέγιστον εἶναι (so the best MSS, but Schanz rejects *μεγίστοις*): compare also the kindred expression in Symp. 195 E ἐν μαλακωτάτοις τῶν μαλακωτάτων. When as here the phrase is linked to an adverb, we must repeat the superlative along with a participle supplied from the verb to which the adverb belongs: thus ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι = ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα φέρουσιν βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι. In Thucydides the phrase has become purely adverbial and may be used even with feminine adjectives, as in the well-known ἐν τοῖς πλείσται δὴ νῆες III. 17, where see Classen's note. Compare Kühner, Griechische Grammatik II. 27.

35. τίνα ταύτην; sc. φέρων ἀφίξει. ἦ is the Latin *an*? See my note on Apol. 26 B. The annual mission to Delos, during

which no criminal was put to death at Athens, had begun the day before Socrates' trial, when the priest of Apollo decorated the bow of the vessel with garlands. On this occasion the boat was absent thirty days. The mission was intended to commemorate the deliverance of Athens under Theseus from the annual tribute of young men and maidens sent to Crete: see Phaed. 58 A foll. and Xen. Mem. IV. 8. 2.

36. *τεθνάναι* is slightly more emphatic than *ἀποθνήσκειν*: see on Apol. 30 C οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι, and infr. 52 C. The infinitive *θνήσκειν* is hardly used by good Attic prose writers, *ἀποθνήσκειν* being used instead: but *τέθνηκα*, *έτεθνήκη* are alone right, never *ἀποτέθηκα*, *ἀπετεθνήκη*. Rutherford Babrius p. 36.

37. οὐ τοι δὴ ἀφίκται = 'no, it is true that it has not arrived'. 43 D

δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν. So I read with the second hand in B and most of the editors: Schanz reads *δοκεῖν μὲν μοι ἤξει*. With *δοκεῖν*, as with the Latin *videri*, the personal construction is generally preferred: if we follow Schanz *δοκεῖν μὲν μοι* is to be taken as an infinitive used absolutely = 'in my opinion': cf. Ar. Aves 1235 *δεινότατα γάρ τοι πεισόμειθ'*, *έμοι δοκεῖν*, and *κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι* in Prot. 317 A (*έγώ δέ τοῦτοις ἅπασι κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ ξυμφέρομαι*), and the common phrase *έκων εἶναι*. The construction *δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξει* though rare is also allowable: see Phaed. 108 D *ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ έμός*—*τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ έξαρκεῖ*, and compare (with Schanz, *Novae Commentationes* p. 130) Menex. 236 B *ὅτε μοι δοκεῖ συνετίθει τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον*: see also infra on 50 B. For *μὲν* (after *δοκεῖ*) without a following *δέ*—a frequent idiom in a clause with *ἀλλά*, the antithesis to which is really contained in the preceding negative clause—compare (with Stallbaum) Prot. 344 A *οὐ γὰρ εἶναι, ἀλλά γενέσθαι μὲν έστιν κτλ.*

39. *Σουνίου*. Homer Od. III. 278 *Σούνιον ἱρὸν—ἄκρον Ἀθηνέων* (Fischer). Cape Sunium was the great landmark for seamen on the South coast of Attica.

40. *ἀγγέλων* viz. the *ἤκουτές τινες*. *ἄγγελοι* in the sense of 'news' (*nuntii*) is not found before Polybius. *έκ* before *ἀγγέλων* is like *έκ* of the agent (conceived of as the source) after passive verbs, e.g. Tim. 47 B *δωρηθέν έκ θεῶν*. Wohlrab and Kral read *ἀγγελιῶν* with some MSS: Cron, Schanz and Göbel bracket *τῶν ἀγγέλων*, on the ground that *ἀγγέλων* cannot = *ἀγγελιῶν*, and that *έκ* to express the source must be followed by a neuter or inanimate object: but the example I have cited is enough to defend the idiom.

CHAPTER II.

Socrates relying on a vision declares that the ship will not arrive till to-morrow.

1. **τύχη ἀγαθῆ** sc. εἴη = quod bene vortat: 'I pray that it may be for the best'. The formula is frequent on inscriptions and decrees: see Thucydides IV. 118 ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ.—*Δάχης εἶπε, τύχη ἀγαθῆ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ποιείσθαι τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν.* Pl. Symp. 177 E ἀλλὰ τύχη ἀγαθῆ καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος. With εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω compare the last words of the dialogue: *πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγείται.*

44 A 5. **τῇ γάρ που.** This is the introductory γάρ (γ' ἄρα) and should not be translated: see on Apol. 20 E *Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που.*

6. **ὑστεραία—ἡ ἦ.** "ἡ προτεραία et ἡ ὑστεραία perpetuo usu de diebus dicuntur, omisso semper ἡμέρα—προτέρα et ὑτέρα de aliis rebus quibuslibet repetitis, concione, proelio etc." Cobet, *Variae Lectiones* 246. The words are often confused with one another in MSS. *ὑστεραία* being a virtual comparative is followed by ἡ. Note the orthography in *ἀποθνήσκειν*: the *ι* is found in B here and infra 46 D and 48 D: inscriptions also furnish evidence to the same effect: see Meisterhans, *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften* p. 86. *θνήσκω* is connected with *θείνω, φόνος, Skt. hani*: the ending *-ίσκω* is probably on the analogy of *στερ-ίσκω, ἀλίσκομαι* and the like. Compare Gust. Meyer, *Griech. Gr.*² pp. 259, 451.

7. **γέ τοι δῆ.** γέ τοι = 'at all events'.

οἱ τούτων κύριοι viz. οἱ ἑνδεκα, the board of eleven (ten ordinary members and a γραμματεὺς) who had general charge of the prisons and saw that the capital sentence was carried out: Phaed. 59 E, 116 B foll.

9. **τῆς ἐτέρας** 'to-morrow' i.e. the second day)(τῆς ἐπιούσης or that which was just beginning. Soph. O. T. 781 τὴν μὲν οὖσαν ἡμέραν μόλις κατέσχον θ' ἀτέρα δ' ἰὼν πέλας μητρὸς πατρὸς τ' ἠλεγχον. From Phaedo 59 D—E it appears that Socrates was right: the boat did not arrive till the second day.

10. **ταύτης τῆς νυκτός:** genitive of time within which: Goodwin, *Gk. Gr.* 227.

11. κινδυνεύεις in the sense of δοκεῖς: so frequently in conversational style.

ἐν καιρῷ τινι 'peropportune' (Stallbaum). τις, as Cron remarks, has the effect of a litotes: cf. εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον Apol. 31 B.

οὐκ ἐγείραι. Not μὴ ἐγείραι, because οὐκ ἐγείραι is a single notion: compare 43 B καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον.

13. ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον = 'but about the vision—what was it?' For the order compare λέγω δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; Symp. 178 D. Socrates was greatly influenced by dreams and oracles and μαντικῆ generally: see Apol. 33 C ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο ὡς ἐγὼ φημι προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων κτλ. The story of this vision is also told (inaccurately) by Diogenes Laertius, II. 5. 35, and referred to in Cic. de Div. I. 52. For two other examples see Phaed. 60 E and Diog. Laert. III. 5. In his respect for divination Socrates presents the most striking contrast to Plato, who places priestcraft and divination in the lowest of the three classes of arts distinguished in the Politicus (290 C foll.). See on this subject Nohle's excellent essay "Die Statslehre Platos in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung", Jena, 1880.

14. γυνῆ—καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής. Wohlrab points out that a robe of white was significant of joy: compare Legg. XII. 947 B, where Plato in speaking of funerals ordains λευκὴν μὲν τὴν στολὴν ἔχειν πᾶσαν, θρήνων δὲ καὶ ὄδυρμῶν χωρὶς γίγνεσθαι. So in Aeschylus Pers. 301 λευκὸν ἡμᾶρ νυκτὸς ἐκ μελαγχίμου. Probably Socrates identified the vision with ἡ εἰμαρμένη: see Phaed. 115 A ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἦδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη.

16. ἦματί κεν τριτάτῳ κτλ. after II. IX. 363 ἦματί κε τριτάτῳ 44 B Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἰκοίμην, spoken by Achilles. It is possible (as Cron suggests) that the meaning of the line for Socrates lay partly in the fact that Phthia was the home of Achilles: but I feel sure that (rightly or wrongly) Socrates associated Φθίη with φθίω and φθίσις, and derived comfort from the epithet ἐρίβωλον. In Euripides' Electra 836 there is what seems to me a similar play upon the word Φθίας. Orestes has been dissecting a victim with a Δωρικὴ κοπίς, in the presence of Aegisthus. Suddenly he lays it aside and exclaims: οὐχ, ὅπως παστήρια θοινασόμεσθα, Φθιάδ' ἀντὶ Δωρικῆς ὀσει τις ἡμῖν κοπίδα; With this Φθίας κοπίς he slays Aegisthus. I am glad to find that Lambinus (as a pupil has pointed out to me) took the same view of Φθίην in this passage. See also infra on 47 B line 14.

18. ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον. ὡς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον is an inferior

reading. Possibly we should read *ἄπορον*, as affording a better antithesis to *ἐναργές*: *λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν*, is ironical, for it is clear from the sequel that Crito does not believe the vision: see on 46 A.

19. *ἐναργές μὲν οὖν* 'No, it is plain': on *μὲν οὖν* (immo) v. above 43 A *πάνυ μὲν οὖν*.

CHAPTER III.

Crito entreats Socrates to escape and save the reputation of his friend.

1. *ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες*. *ὦ δαιμόνιε* was a favourite mode of address in Athenian society. The adjective meant originally 'more than human': in Homer it is generally used as an epithet of reproach, in Attic, of affection coupled with remonstrance (as here), or ironically. *ὦ μακάριε* is used in the same way. Other kindred expressions are *ὦ βέλτιστε*, *ὦ ἄριστε*, *ὦ λῦστε*, *ὦ θαυμάσιε*: the three first mean 'my excellent friend' or 'my fine fellow' (ironical): the last 'my dear sir' (with remonstrance). Often the precise shade of meaning can only be conveyed by the tone of the voice in translating aloud.

2. *ἔτι καὶ νῦν*. The words imply that Crito had already made many attempts to induce Socrates to escape: cf. infra 48 E *παῦσαι ἤδη—πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι*. *ἔτι καὶ νῦν* means 'even at the eleventh hour': cf. Ar. Ran. 1235 *ἀλλ' ὠγὰθ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀπόδος*. For the collocation of present and aorist in *πέιθου καὶ σώθητι* cf. Gorg. 486 c where the MSS read *ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δ' ἐλέγχων*.

3. *οὐ μίᾳ*=non una='more than one'. The Bodleian has *ὀδεμία*: but this can hardly be right. Crito proceeds to enumerate two misfortunes: the loss of his friend and the loss of his reputation. Observe that Crito thinks his reputation will suffer more if Socrates remains to die than if he breaks his own pledge to the Athenian people by inducing Socrates to escape: see Phaed. 115 D. In Crito's judgment (and Crito here as elsewhere represents the average Athenian gentleman of the day) it is a higher duty to serve one's friend than to be true to one's country. It is this point of view which Socrates combats in the sequel, as utterly fatal to the very existence of the State.

4. **χωρίς μὲν—ἀμελήσαι.** I have retained the reading of the Bodleian, which all the recent editors have changed. *χωρίς* is an adverb, as the balance between *χωρίς μὲν* and *ἔτι δέ* proves (see also Madvig Adv. I. 369): to regard it as a preposition and insert *τοῦ* before *σοῦ* (as Ast does), or to change *σοῦ* to *τοῦ* with most editors, introduces far greater difficulties than those which it is sought to overcome. The construction is *ἀλλὰ χωρίς μὲν* (on the one hand) *<ἐμοὶ ἐστιν>* *σοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι, τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου—ἔτι δέ κτλ.* *ἔτι δέ* is substituted for *χωρίς δέ* in the second half of the antithesis because *χωρίς δέ* would require *καὶ πολλοῖς δοκεῖν <sc. ἐμοὶ ἐστιν>* to balance *χωρίς μὲν σοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι*: this would be awkward, with *ἐστίν* so far removed. For *χωρίς μὲν* followed by *χωρίς δέ* compare Parm. 130 B *αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρίς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα, χωρίς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐ μετέχοντα.* Translate the whole sentence thus: 'For to me your death is more than a single calamity: on the one hand, there is the loss of you, a friend such as I shall never find again, and moreover many men, who do not know you and me well, will think me guilty of neglect, because I might have saved you, if I had been willing to spend money'.

5. **ἐστερηῆσθαι.** *στέρομαι* and its kindred forms have two senses in Plato as in Attic generally: either 'I am debarred from', or 'I am deprived of': an example of the former meaning is Rep. VI. 484 C *οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἐκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως*: for the latter cf. Phaed. 117 D *οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην.*

6. **οὐδένα μῆποτε εὐρήσω** i. q. *οὐ μῆποτε τινα εὐρήσω.* *εὐρήσω* is of course future. *οὐ μῆ* with the future indicative (rare), or (far more often) the aorist conjunctive (cf. infr. 46 C *οὐ μῆ σοι ξυγχαρήσω*), is a strong negative: for the sense of futurity in the aorist conjunctive compare *πί-ο-μαι, ἔδ-ο-μαι* (conjunctives with the short vowel as in *ἀλλ' ἴ-ο-μεν*) and perhaps Latin *faxo*, i. e. *fac-s-o*: see my note on Apol. 29 D and compare Goodwin MT. p. 184.

7. **οἷ—μῆ ἴσασιν.** Not *οἷ—ου* because the clause is virtually conditional: no one who knew Crito and Socrates well could imagine that Crito had treated him with neglect.

ὡς οἷός τ' ὦν σε σῶξιν = 'because' (in *their* opinion, whence *ὡς*) 'I might have saved you'. This clause is explained by *ἀμελήσαι*: it was *because* Crito had the money, and didn't use it, that ignorant men might charge him with neglect: had he been penniless, he would have escaped the charge. Crito was very well off: see Euthyd. 304 C. Cron and Göbel take *ὡς* to mean 'although': so

Schanz in *Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien*, Vol. 20 (1869) p. 87, comparing the concessive use of *ἐπεὶ* or *ἐπει—γε* in Prot. 317 A οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους—ὧν περ ἕνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ προσχήματα, ἐπει οἷ γε πολλοὶ—οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται: but it is only in the modern idiom that even this use of *ἐπεὶ* is concessive: to the Greeks it was causal, 'for, as for the many, they etc.' Note the iota subscript in *σῶζειν*: it is regularly found in the present stem of this verb down to 160 B.C.: see Meisterhans, *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*, p. 87.

44 C 9. ταύτης—ἢ δοκεῖν = 'than this, than to be thought'. ταύτης refers forward, not to *δοκεῖν*, but to ἢ *δοκεῖν*. For a similar case see Gorg. 500 C οὐ τί ἂν μάλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ μικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἀνθρώπος, ἢ τοῦτο κτλ. and Cicero *De Fin.* I. 19 *quomodo nihil turpius physico, quam fieri quicquam sine causa dicere*. For the repetition of *δοκεῖν* after *δόξα* compare *infr.* 53 B βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι.

10. χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιείσθαι ἢ φίλους. Socrates had himself very lofty views on the subject of friendship: see *Mem.* II. 4. 5 καὶ τοι πρὸς ποῖον κτῆμα τῶν ἄλλων παραβαλλόμενος φίλος ἀγαθὸς οὐκ ἂν πολλῶ κρείττων φανείη; *ibid.* § 1 he censures the many for saying that a true and good friend is the best of all possessions, and yet caring more for money than for friends.

13. ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων. See on ὦ *δαιμόνιε* *supra* 44 B.

τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης. Socrates everywhere insisted that the opinion of the many is worthless, in comparison with that of the man who knows: see my introduction to the *Apology* p. x. and the passages there cited.

15. φροντίζειν with a genitive, as often in Plato, e.g. *Soph.* 246 D ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τάληθές ζητοῦμεν.

αὐτά is frequently used, without any expressed antecedent, for the matter under discussion, e.g. 46 C πῶς οὖν ἂν μετρίωτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; Gorg. 509 E ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμιν καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὡς, εἰ μὴ μάθη αὐτά καὶ ἀσκήση, ἀδικήσει;

44 D 18. αὐτά δὲ δῆλα. This use of αὐτά throws light on αὐτίκα in the sense of 'for example'. δῆλα (sc. ἐστίν) is passive: so in *Rep.* I. 348 E νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φῆσεις: the idiom is like 'I see thee, who thou art'. As to the omission of the copula it should be noted that Plato rarely leaves it out except in the present indicative (ἐστίν) is more often omitted than εἶ or εἰμι), and in the present infinitive: see Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, p. 31 foll.

21. ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος = 'falsely accused to them' (Church). ἐν is here used as in Menex. 235 D ὅταν δέ τις ἐν τουτοῖς ἀγωνίζηται, οὐσπερ καὶ ἐπαυεῖ, i.e. it has reference to a court of law. With αὐτοῖς alone the phrase would mean 'at odds with them': πρὸς αὐτοὺς διαβεβλημένος would be 'calumniated to them'.

22. εἰ γὰρ ᾤφελον: formula of wishing: Goodwin MT. 177. Compare our colloquial 'You *ought* to have been there'. εἰ in wishes is not to be explained by assuming an ellipse of the apodosis: it is more probable that εἰ in conditional sentences is a later use, derived from the use of εἰ = σφει, cf. sei in Plautus and sī-c(e) to introduce a wish. See Monro's Homeric Grammar, p. 232 foll.

23. ἵνα οἱοί τ' ἦσαν = 'that they might have been able'. ἵνα, ὅπως, etc. are used with a secondary tense of the indicative (without ἄν) in final clauses depending on a wish that can no longer be realised, or on the apodosis to an impossible protasis: see Goodwin MT. p. 72. A similar rule holds for πρίν and ἕως: Goodwin 145, 144. Scribes frequently misunderstand the idiom and corrupt the text either (a) by inserting ἄν, or (b) by changing the indicatives to conjunctives or optatives: see Cobet, *Variae Lectiones* pp. 102, 359. Two passages, so far as I know, have not yet been emended. Marc. Aurelius, Book II. 11 τῶν δὲ λαιπῶν εἴ τι κακὸν ἦν, καὶ τοῦτο ἂν προεἶδοντο, ἵνα ἐπ' ἡ πάντη τὸ μὴ περιπίπτειν αὐτῷ, where read ἐπ' ἦν. The other is in Solon Frag. 36. 21 (κέντρον δ' ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβῶν—οὔτ' ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον, οὔτ' ἐπαύσατο) πρίν ἂν ταράξας πῖαρ ἐξέλη γάλα, where we should read ἀνταράξας and possibly ἐξείλεν, unless the corruption in ἐξέλη lies deeper.

24. καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν. Not of course dependent on ἵνα, as the ἂν shews, but an independent clause.

The statement that a power to do harm implies the power of doing good rests on the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. If we know what is good, we are good, but we cannot know what is good without knowing what is evil (this Socrates proved by the analogy of the arts), and so being able to do what is evil: conversely, the power to do evil implies the power to do good. This is all worked out at length in the *Hippias Minor* (a genuine dialogue), where it is proved that the veracious man is ὁ δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι: see especially 366 B foll. and 369 B (νῦν οὖν αισθάνει, ὅτι ἀναπέφανται ὁ αὐτὸς ὦν ψευδῆς τε καὶ ἀληθής), and compare Mem. IV. 2. 20.

νῦν δέ = 'but as it is': see on Apol. 18 A and Prot. 335 C (quoted there) ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν—νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ

ἐθέλεις κτλ. The Latin is 'nunc'. οὐδέτερα in the next line is probably adverbial as in Theaet. 184 A (δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα i.e. neither ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψασθαι nor ἱκανῶς σκέψασθαι), although here it would be easy to supply ἐξεργάζεσθαι.

26. ποιούσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχῳσι sc. ποιούντες. This does not mean 'they act wholly at random' (Church), as all the editors take it: had Plato meant that, he would have written πράττουσι as in Symp. 181 B ξυμβαίνει αὐτοῖς, ὅ τι ἂν τύχῳσι, τοῦτο πράττειν. Supply τινὰ implied in φρόνιμον and ἄφρονα: the construction ποιεῖν τί τινα is quite usual: cf. infra 51 A. Translate: 'they treat a man just as it occurs to them'. Cf. Gorgias 521 C ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἶομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὄντινούν ἂν ὅ τι τύχοι τοῦτο παθεῖν. Ibid. 522 C (which Stallbaum actually quotes to illustrate his view, as if πάσχειν could be a passive to πράττειν as well as to ποιεῖν!) ὥστε ἴσως, ὅ τι ἂν τύχῳ, τοῦτο πείσομαι. Socrates means that 'the many' are altogether thoughtless in their treatment of the individual: witness the way in which Miltiades, Cimon and Pericles were treated (Gorg. 515 E—516 E). They would lightly put a man to death and just as lightly bring him to life again if they could: see infra 48 C μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἧ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἂν, εἰ οἶό τ' ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν.

CHAPTER IV.

In this chapter Crito urges Socrates not to let the fear of danger to his friends or exile to himself prevent him from absconding.

44 E 1. μὲν δὴ. This particle is regularly used to indicate that some topic is concluded. So at the end of speeches οἱ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἔλεγον, and the tragic τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα. Note the contrast between ταῦτα retrospective and τάδε prospective.

2. ἀρά γε μή. ἀρα or ἀρά γε (the addition of γε makes the question more animated) merely indicates that a question is asked: ἀρα μή or ἀρά γε μή expects the answer 'no': ἀρά γε οὐ or ἀρ' οὐ expects the answer 'yes'. μή (μῶν) can of course stand by itself in the sense of num? as οὐ in the sense of nonne?

3. προμηθεῖ—μή. προμηθεῖσθαι being virtually a verb of fearing is followed by μή.

4. οἱ συκοφάνται 'the informers'. The great part played by the law-courts and litigation in Athenian life caused a class of informers to spring up, resembling the 'delatores' of the early Roman empire. The origin of the name is obscure: see Liddell and Scott s. v., where a suggestion of Mr Lancelot Shadwell is quoted, according to which the word originally means 'one who brings figs to light by shaking the trees': and then metaphorically 'one who makes rich men yield up their fruit by accusations and other vile arts': cf. Antipho *περὶ τοῦ χορευτοῦ* § 43 *ἔσειε καὶ ἐσυκοφάντει*.

5. πράγματα παρέχωσιν of a prolonged action) (ἀναγκασθῶμεν of the act and nothing more.

6. ἢ καὶ—ἢ—ἢ καὶ = aut adeo—aut certe—aut etiam.

7. ἀποβαλεῖν is used both of voluntary and of involuntary loss (as here): cf. Symp. 179 A *ἄπλα ἀποβαλῶν* (voluntary): Rep. VIII. 553 B *τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα* (voluntary).

ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν: euphemistic for death or exile.

9. δίκαιοι ἐσμεν = 'it is right that we'. The Greek idiom is 45 A personal while ours is impersonal. Goodwin MT. p. 195.

11. μὴ ἄλλως ποίει = 'do not say no'. ἄλλως ποιεῖν is an idiomatic expression = 'to refuse', 'to decline': Symp. 173 E *μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσης*. Rep. I 328 B *ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε*. Aristoph. Aves 133 *καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιήσης*. The expression does not seem to occur except in prohibitions or entreaties with μὴ: see Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae* p. 25.

12. καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι—πολλά. Socrates lets the Laws reply *infra* 53 B.

14. μήτε τοίνυν. Note the effective balance: καὶ ταῦτα—καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, says Socrates: μήτε—ταῦτα—μήτε κτλ. says Crito. The second μήτε is in 45 B, line 24: Crito's earnestness has an injurious effect upon his style: observe for example the recurrence of *ἔπειτα* within three lines just below. Wohlrab takes a somewhat different view: "Crito ut ipse hebetioris erat ingenii, ita oratio eius non nullis locis durior est minusque elegans".

καὶ γὰρ οὐδέ = neque enim.

15. θέλουσι. Even after a vowel Plato more frequently uses *ἐθέλω* than *θέλω*: yet Phaed. 77 C *εἰ θέλετε*: *ibid.* 115 B *μὴ θέλητε*: Symp. 190 D *μὴ θέλωσιν*: Schanz *Nov. Comment. Plat.* p. 102.

17. τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας. τούτους = 'istos' expresses contempt: so very frequently in Greek: cf. Symp. 181 E *τούτους τοὺς πανδήμους ἐραστάς*. Our English 'your' is often used in the same way.

εὐτελείς = 'cheap': Crito contemptuously speaks of the informers as a commodity to be bought. We are told in the *Memorabilia* (II. 9) that Crito had himself suffered much from the *συκοφάνται* until following the advice of Socrates he engaged a vigorous but poor friend Archdemus to retaliate.

18. **ἐπ' αὐτούς** = 'for them': there is much scorn in this phrase. *ἐπί* in this sense is regularly used of inanimate objects (*ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο* line 22): the idea implied in *εὐτελείς* is therefore kept up.

σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει. *σοὶ* is emphatic) (*ἐπ' αὐτούς*).

45 B 19. **ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι ἰκανά**. *ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι* and similar phrases generally precede the word or phrase which they modify: cf. *infr.* 46 D *ὡσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὅτι κτλ.*: *Gorg.* 452 B *ὡς ἐγὼ μαι, πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων*, and *ibid.* 462 A.

ἔπειτα καὶ εἰ: *καὶ* goes with *εἰ* and not with *ἔπειτα*.

20. **ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος**: on account of the danger from the *συκοφάνται*, not of course for the loss of the money. Socrates did not think money a good nor the loss of it an evil, either in his own case or in that of his friends: see *Apol.* 38 B, where he proposes the penalty of 30 minae, to be paid by Plato and Crito and others.

ξένοι οὔτοι—ἀναλίσκειν. As *ξένοι* they would escape the *συκοφάνται*. The pronoun *οὔτοι* is deictic: 'see! here are foreigners ready to spend theirs'. Crito in his animation speaks as if the *ξένοι* were actually present in the prison: "de degentibus in urbe quosque fere quotidie videbat quasi de praesentibus loquitur Crito" (Buttmann). So in *Symp.* 175 A *ἄλλον δὲ τινα τῶν παίδων ἤκειν ἀγγέλλοντα ὅτι Σωκράτης οὔτος ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτόνων προθύρῳ ἔστηκεν*: where Socrates is not as yet visible. *ἐνθάδε* means 'in Athens'. There is a certain awkwardness in the collocation *οὔτοι ἐνθάδε* (for *οὔτοι* implies *ἐνθάδε*): but it is not necessary to omit either of the two words. Crito is somewhat excited and prefers expressiveness to logic: see on 45 A line 14 above. The omission of the copula with *ἔτοιμοι* is common but not universal in Plato: contrast *Prot.* 313 B *ἔτοιμος δ' εἰ ἀναλίσκειν*: see Schanz, *Novae Comment. Plat.* p. 35.

22. **ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο**: see on line 18 (*ἐπ' αὐτούς*) above.

Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος—Κέβης. Simmias and Cebes (who was also a Theban) play a prominent part in the discussion about immortality in the *Phaedo*. See Archer-Hind's edition of the dialogue pp. 40—42.

23. ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. No doubt some or all of those named in Phaed. 59 B—C as present at the death of Socrates.

24. ὅπερ λέγω: viz. supra line 14. In such phrases the present is preferred to the past: see on ὅπερ λέγω Apol. 21 A.

ἀποκάμης. ἀποκάμνειν is to give over from weariness: cf. infra 45 D σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι. Plato uses the verb sometimes absolutely (especially in phrases like Rep. IV. 435 D μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκάμης ἀλλὰ σκόπει: see Schanz, N. C. Pl. 25 note 2), sometimes with a participle: this seems to be the only passage where he has an infinitive following it, but cf. Eur. Ion 134—135 μοχθεῖν οὐκ ἀποκάμνω. Jacobs is here guilty of the solecism μὴ ἀποκνής, which is also printed by Schanz in his text.

25. ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ: Apol. 37 C—D.

δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω = 'trouble you'. It may have seemed little to Crito that Socrates should be false to what was said in the excitement of his defence when he himself was ready to break his deliberate promise to the Athenian people: see above on 44 C line 3. On μὴ with the 3rd person of the Aorist Imperative see Goodwin MT. 181.

26. οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν κτλ. Apol. 1. c. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι κτλ. This shews that ἐξελθὼν refers to quitting Athens, not to quitting the prison.

27. πολλαχοῦ—ἄλλοσε. We should expect ἄλλοθι: πολλαχοῦσε would not mend matters, since ἀγαπᾶν ποι is not Greek. The phrase is not strictly grammatical: καί = 'also', not 'and'. ἄλλοσε is of course attracted to the following relative, as in βῆναι κείθεν ὅθεν περ ἦκει in Soph. O. C. 1227.

28. εἰς Θετταλίαν. According to Diog. Laert. II. 5. 25 So- 45 C crates declined invitations from Scopas of Crannon and Eurylochus of Larissa. The story that he refused an invitation to the court of Archelaus (whither Euripides, Agathon, Zeuxis and others went) is better authenticated: see Arist. Rhet. III. 23. 1398^a 24 Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον ἕβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως εὖ παθόντα, ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. Crito's connection with Thessaly is significant as to his political sympathies: in so far as he felt any interest in politics, he favoured the καλοὶ κάγαθοί or oligarchical party.

CHAPTER V.

Crito concludes his appeal to Socrates by urging that it is wrong to choose the more indolent course and remain to die: he ought to think of his children and his friends.

1. **ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ δίκαιον.** With the form of expression compare Apol. 35 B (the concluding part of Socrates' appeal as this is of Crito's) *χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὧ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι κτλ.* It is not correct to translate *δίκαιον* here as 'just': it is 'right', 'moral'. This is the original meaning of the word, and far more frequent than the other, i.e. just)(*σώφρων, φρόνιμος, ἀνδρείος*—the other three cardinal virtues. Aristotle recognises both meanings of the word: see Eth. v. 1129^b 25 where the pseudo-Theognic line *ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετῇ ἐνι* (Bergk 147) is quoted to illustrate the wider meaning. It was this sense that Socrates assigned to the word when he declared τὸ *δίκαιον* to be identical with τὸ *νόμιμον*: see Mem. iv. 4. 12 and cf. Introd. p. xiii. This wider meaning survives in the English 'justify'.

2. **ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα.** *ἐπιχειρεῖν* may take the accusative of a neuter noun denoting some inanimate object. Wohlrab compares Isocrates I. 3 *καλὸν μὲν ἔργον ἐπιχειροῦσιν. σαυτὸν προδοῦναι* is explanatory of *πρᾶγμα*, to which it stands in apposition.

3. **καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις.** There is more force and indignation in *σπεύδεις* than *σπεύδειν* would have conveyed.

Crito means that Socrates' defence was meaningless unless he regarded it as important that he should live. He had spoken of himself as God's minister to the Athenians: was he to desert his post because they rejected him? See Apol. Chapter XVIII.

5. **σὲ διαφθεῖραι**—"σέ is accented for emphasis, and to disconnect it from *ἔσπευσαν*". Dyer.

7. **υἱέις.** Socrates had three sons: Lamprocles and two others. Lamprocles was the eldest (Mem. II. 2. 1); but he was still a youth when Socrates died (Apol. 34 D): the other two were children (Apol. l. c. and Phaed. 116 B). We do not know whether they suffered in any way from their father's death. For the form *υἱέις* see my note on Apol. 20 A: the forms of the second declension (except *υἱέος υἱεῖ* as well as *υἱοῦ υἱῶ*) are preferred in the singular: those of the third in the dual and plural. Attic inscriptions of Plato's time more often omit the *ι* than not (*υἱός υἱέος* etc. See Meisterhans, Gram-

matik der Attischen Inschriften, p. 62): there are traces of the same omission in some MSS of Plato, and Schanz now everywhere writes the word without the *ι* (see his preface to the Laws p. VIII).

προδιδόναι = *ἐπιχειρεῖν προδοῦναι*, whence the present. So *διδόναι* often means 'to offer'.

8. *ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι*: their *τροφή* and *παιδεία* was 45 D already begun: whence the preposition: cf. infra 50 E *ἐξετράφη*s (Socrates was a grown man) *καὶ ἐπαιδεύθη*s. *τροφή* is rather personal and moral surveillance than intellectual: *παιδεία* *vice versa*.

9. *οἰχήσει καταλιπών* = 'you will leave in the lurch'. The words imply that there would be something selfish and cowardly in the betrayal. *τὸ σὸν μέρος* = *pro tua parte, quod ad te attinet* (Cron): so infra 50 B.

ὅ τι ἂν τύχῳσι (sc. *πράττοντες*) *τοῦτο πράξουσιν* = 'they will have to fare as chance directs', 'they will have to take their chance in life': ὅ τι ἂν τύχῳσι as in 44 D. With *τοῦτο πράττειν* cf. *ἀγαθὸν τι πράξοντες* Alc. II. 141 D.

11. *ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις—ὀρφανούς*. Göbel points out that the repetition of the idea has a pathetic effect.

12. *ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρητὴ...παιδεύοντα*. Crito here pleads that one owes a duty to one's family as well as to the State: Socrates placed his duty to the State before his duty to his family. *ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας* i. q. *παιδοποιεῖσθαι*.

14. *σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι*. I cannot but think that Crito contrasted the indifference of Socrates with the zeal displayed in his behalf by himself and the others: there is a touch of injured friendship about these words. See the reply of Socrates in 47 A (*καὶ οὐκ ἂν σὲ παρακρούοι ἢ παροῦσα ξυμφορά*) and my note there.

16. *φάσκοντά γε δή* = *quippe qui dicat*. The touch of sarcasm in *φάσκοντα* is made sharper by the addition of *δή*. For the assertion itself compare Apol. 30 A and 37 B. *διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου* has more force if taken with *φάσκοντα* than with *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*.

17. *ὡς ἔγωγε κτλ.* *χρητὴ αἰρεῖσθαι* being virtually an imperative may be followed by *ὡς* in the sense of 'for'.

18. *μὴ δόξῃ*. For *αἰσχύνομαι* followed by *μὴ* cf. Theaet. 183 E 45 E *Μέλισσον—αἰσχύνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν*.

19. *ἀνδρὶα τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ*. Here the taunt of cowardice (already implied in *ῥαθυμότατα* of 14 and *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείος* of 15) is openly made: for by *ἡμετέρα* (as is clear from *ὑπὲρ σοῦ* in

17 and οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτὸν in 25) Socrates is meant as well as Crito and his friends. It is implied that death requires less courage than life—a view which Socrates himself held. The reproach is made less biting by *τινί*.

20. καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος—καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν—καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτὶ—δοκεῖν. This explains in detail ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα. There is clearly an allusion to the stage. The tragedy begins—(εἴσοδος) develops (αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν)—and ends in a fiasco (ὡσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως): “solvuntur risu tabulae”. The words are carefully chosen to suggest the comparison. εἴσοδος may be used both of the entrance of an actor (compare the use of εἰσάγειν in Apol. 35 B), and of the coming on of a law-suit (see on Apol. 24 D): ἀγὼν signifies ‘acting’ as well as ‘pleading’: the word always implies rivalry as well as publicity.

21. εἰσῆλθες. So I read with E and the second hand in B: the editors (except Stallbaum) generally read εἰσῆλθεν. The latter is very idiomatic Greek, for εἰσέρχομαι is used in this way as the passive to εἰσάγω: compare Dem. πρὸς Λάκριτον 49 ποῖ οὖν δεῖ ταύτην εἰσελθεῖν τὴν δίκην, but (see following note) εἰσῆλθες goes better with ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν: cf. also on 45 E infra κακία τινί—δοκεῖν.

ἐξὸν (sc. σοι) μὴ εἰσελθεῖν. Crito probably means that Socrates might have effected his escape in the interval between the lodging of the indictment with the King Archon and the actual trial. Had he done so, the case would have been decided against him by default, see on ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες Apol. 18 C. If we read ὡς εἰσῆλθεν and not ὡς εἰσῆλθες, we must understand αὐτῇ i.e. τῇ δίκῃ after ἐξὸν: this can hardly be right, for even if Socrates had absconded the trial would have come on: the only difference would have been the absence of the defendant. There is no good authority for the tradition that Anytus wished to make terms with Socrates after the indictment had been lodged; nor would such a course have been tolerated by Athenian law, since ἀσέβεια was a γραφή or offence against the State, not a δίκη or lawsuit with a private individual.

22. τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτὶ = ‘last of all this present scene’: the περιπέτεια as it were or catastrophe of the tragedy. The Bodleian has δῆπου.

23. ὡσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως = ‘a *reductio ad absurdum* as one might say of the whole affair’. τῆς πράξεως is an objective genitive: cf. Aesch. Ag. 1264 τί δῆτ’, ἐμαυτῆς καταγέλωτ’, ἔχω τάδε καὶ σκῆπτρα καὶ μαντεῖα περὶ δέρη στέφη; See the retort of the

Laws infra 53 D ἴσως ἂν ἠδέεω σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες κτλ. On κατάγελως (καταγέλαστον) see infra 53 A.

κακία τινι—δοκεῖν = 'that you should be thought to have given us the slip, through a sort of cowardice and unmanliness on our part'. *δοκεῖν διαπεφευγέναι* is explanatory of *τουτί*, exactly as *σαντόν προδοῦναι* is of *πράγμα* in 45 C line 2. The subject to *δοκεῖν* is *σε*: this is easily supplied from the context (*τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σέ* in 19 and *ὡς εἰσηήθη* in 21). For the expression compare Phaed. 115 C *ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκ φύγω ἡμᾶς*, and for *διαφεύγω* with a personal object see Symp. 174 A *χθές γὰρ αὐτὸν διέφυγον τοῖς ἐπινηκίοις*. Göbel takes *ἡμᾶς* as subject to *δοκεῖν*: Wohlrab *τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί*: the other editors fail to give any clear explanation of this difficult passage. There is some awkwardness in having *δοκεῖν διαπεφευγέναι* as virtually a subject to *δόξη* in line 18 above: but the grammatical subject is *τουτί*, to which *δοκεῖν* is in apposition. Mudge conjectures *δοκῆ*, but the text is quite sound.

25. **οὐδὲ σὺ σαντόν**. The relative clause passes into a main 46 A sentence as in Xen. Anab. I. 4. 9 *ἰχθύων—οὓς οἱ Σύριοι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐκ εἶων, οὐδὲ τὰς περιστερὰς*: compare also Gorg. 452 D *τί ἐστι τοῦτο ὃ φηῖς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι—καὶ σέ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ*, and see my note on Apol. 40 A *ἄ γε δὴ οἰηθείη—καὶ νομίζεται*.

οἶόν τε ὄν καὶ δυνατόν. The twofold expression is for emphasis: cf. infra line 31 *ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἶόν τε*. *οἶόν τε* is 'feasible': *δυνατόν* 'possible'.

27. **ἅμα τῷ κακῷ**. *ἅμα* is used in much the same way as *πρός*: *τῷ κακῷ* is substantival. So in the Gorgias (474 E foll.) *τὸ αἰσχρόν* is defined as that which is at once *λυπηρόν τε καὶ κακόν*: see also 475 B *οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἰσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἦτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστι καὶ λύπη ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις*;

28. **μᾶλλον δέ**=vel potius, as in Gorg. 449 A *μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἶπέ*. *οὐδέ* is *ne—quidem*.

29. **βουλευέσθαι)(βεβουλευῆσθαι**. "Charm. 176 C *οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί βουλευέσθον ποιεῖν; οὐδέν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευέμεθα*." Jacobs. Note the fourfold recurrence of *βουλευέσθαι* (*βουλή*).

30. **τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτός**. Apparently Crito does not believe the vision (see on 44 B above): the *γυνὴ καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής* left Socrates one night more in which to effect his escape. With *τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτός* cf. *τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας* in 44 A.

33. **μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει**: see on 45 A *μὴ ἄλλως ποίει*.

CHAPTER VI.

Crito's pleading is now concluded. In reply, Socrates begins by laying down the principles which should guide his decision. He first recalls one great doctrine on which he had insisted throughout all his life, viz. that no opinions are worth regarding except the opinions of those who know. See Introduction pp. xi and xii.

46 B 2. πολλοῦ ἀξία sc. ἐστίν, although εἰ—εἴη follows: a "mixed conditional sentence" Goodwin MT. 118. It would not be possible to understand ἂν εἴη: if the optative of the copula is omitted in an apodosis with ἄν, the ἄν must be inserted: see Meno 96 B οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοι εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε; But even apart from this, in cases like the present Greek prefers the more dogmatic form of expression. Note εἰ—εἴη and not εἰ—ῆν: Socrates speaks as one who has not yet made up his mind—ready to follow ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρη (Rep. III. 394 D).

4. σκοπεῖσθαι is placed in the emphatic position at the beginning of the sentence as if = σκοπεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ προθυμείσθαι.

5. οὐ μόνον νῦν. So the MSS: there is no reason to read οὐ νῦν πρῶτον with Nauck and Schanz. The omission of the copula is not very common in Plato except when it is ἐστίν: yet cf. Prot. 335 C ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος: Theaet. 169 B ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. εἰ and ἐσμέν are also sometimes omitted: ῆν rarely, except in the phrase εἰ μὴ διὰ τινα (σέ or the like): parts of the conjunctive and optative are very seldom omitted: εἶναι however is left out very frequently. See Schanz, Novae Comm. Pl. 31—35.

6. τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι. This is the reply to Crito's πείθου μοι (46 A), for τῶν ἐμῶν includes Socrates' friends as well as everything else that could be called his.

7. ἡ τῷ λόγῳ—φαίνηται. A faithful description of Socrates' rule of life. For example, before entering on a line of conduct he would inquire if it harmonised with the conception or definition (λόγος) of τὸ δίκαιον which he had arrived at by the exercise of his reason: and if it did, nothing ever deterred him from so acting: see my Introduction to the Apology p. xi; compare also Phaed. 100 A, where Plato uses the phraseology of the Socratic method to describe his own procedure ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῆ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι

ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα—ἂ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. See also Euthyphr. B E ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν διδάξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾗ, ὧν ἂν ἡ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττη, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ: and compare as to this point Dr Jackson on the "incomplete Protagoreans" of the Theaetetus in Journal of Philology, Vol. XIII. 249—250.

9. ἔλεγον: imperfect, because Socrates is referring to the teaching of his whole life. Infra ἐκβαλεῖν = 'throw over', 'discard', as in Rep. VI. 503 A τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μὴτ' ἐν πόνοις μὴτ' ἐν φόβοις μὴτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας. μοι γέγονεν is 'has come to me': cf. Euthyphr. 3 B σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φησ σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι.

10. ὅμοιοι (sc. λόγοι) is probably the subject and not the predicate, otherwise in place of ἐκβαλεῖν we should expect a word = 'to change': the predicate is φαίνονται (sc. βέλτιστοι). ὅμοιοι is not = οἱ αὐτοί (idem) but = Latin similes: the two ideas are carefully distinguished in Theaet. 159 A εἰ ἄρα τι συμβαίνει ὁμοίων τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον—ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταῦτὸν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον; ἀνάγκη. Socrates becomes more confident as he goes on: σχεδὸν τι ὅμοιοι—καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρὸς βεβύω κτλ.

11. πρὸς βεβύω is a lofty and somewhat poetic word, frequently 46 C used of regard paid to the gods.

12. βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν = βελτίους ἔχωμεν λόγους.

13. οὐ μὴ σοι ξυγχωρήσω: see on 44 B οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω. οὐδ' ἂν πλείω—μορμολύττηται: πλείω is adverbial like ἐλάττω in Rep. 396 D ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἦττον—ἐσφαλμένον: cf. also infra 53 A ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας. The Μορμώ was well known in the Greek nursery (see Theocr. xv. 40 οὐκ ἀξῶ τυ, τέκνον. Μορμώ—δάκνει ἵππος). Other bogies were Ἀκκῶ, Ἀλφιδῶ, Λαμία, Γοργῶ, Μορμολύκη, Ἐμπούσα: see Becker's Charicles E. T. pp. 224—225. Compare the well-known passage in the Phaedo (77 E) ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται· τοῦτον οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

It should be noted that the order of the words ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς is very idiomatic: the effect is almost to identify the objects compared. If ἡμᾶς preceded ὥσπερ παῖδας the connection between the two would be much less close. Still more idiomatic is the

construction in similes with ὥσπερ and a preposition. If it is wished to bring the objects compared into the closest possible union, ὥσπερ (ὡς) with the preposition is placed first, and the preposition itself written only once: see for example Rep. VIII. 545 E ὡς πρὸς παιῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, Theaet. 170 A ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάσταις ἄρχοντας. Manuscripts however often violate the rule so far as the omission of the preposition is concerned: see Cobet, *Variae Lectiones* p. 165 foll.

15. **δεσμούς καὶ θανάτους κτλ.** δεσμοί = chains) (δεσμά = imprisonment: see on Apol. 32 C. The plural (δεσμοί, θάνατοι, χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις) adds to the rhetorical effect: the many have a variety of deaths etc., from which to choose our μορμώ.

16. **ἐπιπέμπουσα**: compare Phaed. 62 C πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ. The word means 'inflicting on' (Church), not of course 'threatening with'. Socrates means that death is only a μορμώ, not simply in the anticipation but in the actual suffering of it. Dr Verrall suggests ἐπέμπουσα as if = 'assuming the forms of' like the Empusa. I am not quite satisfied that ἐπέμπουσα is rightly formed, nor even allowing this does the construction seem quite natural: but I am convinced that Plato wrote ἐπιπέμπουσα rather than ἐπιφέρουσα let us say, because the ending is identical with ἔμπουσα: see my note on 47 B line 14 for more examples of the play upon words in Plato.

17. **αὐτά** = 'the question': see on 44 C ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπράχθαι.

πρῶτον μὲν: repeated infra 48 A (ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτη οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ), where the first inquiry is concluded: the second point is then raised by way of protest against the first (ibid. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἂν τις, οἶοί τε εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινύναι): hence πρῶτον μὲν has no εἶτα or εἶτα δέ to balance it.

18. **τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν** = 'recur to this view': οὗτος is often = 'that of yours', here made clearer by ὃν σὺ λέγεις. ἀναλαμβάνω is 'iterum sumo'—'take up where I laid down' as in Rep. VI. 490 D πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν. The reference is to 44 B—D, and 45 E.

19. **πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο κτλ.** This depends on ἀναλάβοιμεν: cf. Apol. 19 A ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τίς ἢ κατηγορία ἐστίν; In English we must say 'recur—and ask if'. The subject to ἐλέγετο is ὁ λόγος, to be understood from τοῦτον τὸν λόγον: it is defined by the clause ὅτι ταῖς μὲν—οὔ. The imperfect is used because Socrates

refers to the teaching of his whole life, see on *ἐλεγον* in line 9 above. *ἐκάστοτε* means on every occasion when the subject was discussed. If there was one thing on which Socrates insisted more than any other, it was that no man's opinion is worth anything on any subject which he has not studied: see Grote Vol. VIII. p. 239 foll.

20. *ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ κτλ.* Three alternatives: either (a) the doctrine that only some *δόξαι* are worthy of regard was right, or (b) it was wrong, or (c) it was right then and wrong now. In his statement of the third alternative Socrates substitutes the application for the statement of the general principle—was I right in thinking it my duty to *die* then, although others thought otherwise, and am I wrong now?

21. *ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν.* Apol. 40 B *κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγενῆσθαι:* and Socrates must often have said the same in declining Crito's former invitations to escape: see on 44 B *ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι.*

22. *κατάδηλος ἄρα:* i.e. of course *ὁ λόγος:* with *δηλος* as with *δίκαιος* Greek prefers the personal mode of expression. *ἄρα* = 'after all' expresses surprise and disappointment. See on Apol. 34 C *ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω.*

ἄλλως [ἐνεκα λόγου]. I believe *ἐνεκα λόγου* to be a gloss on *ἄλλως:* the expression (*ὁ λόγος*) *ἄλλως ἐνεκα λόγου* is excessively awkward. For *ἄλλως* used in this way (= 'otherwise than it ought' i.e. nearly = *εἰκῆ* temere) cf. Phaed. 76 E *ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη,* and the adverbial expression *τὴν ἄλλως,* as in Theaet. 172 E *οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' αἰετὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ.*

23. *ὡς ἀληθῶς.* Like *τῷ ὄντι* and *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* this expression is frequent in the dialogues of Plato's early and middle period: in the later dialogues *ἀληθῶς, ὄντως* and *ἀληθείᾳ* (less frequent) are more common: see Schanz in Hermes (1886) XXI. 3, pp. 439—459. As for the origin of the phrase, Schanz accepts the explanation given by Fox, according to whom *ὡς* is the ablative of the article, as *ἀληθῶς* is of *ἀληθές:* but surely *τῶς* and not *ὡς* is the ablative of *τό.* The old explanation (which I prefer) is to regard the phrase as parallel to *ὡς ἐτέρως, ὡς ἄλλως* etc., and due to attraction like *θανμασίως ὡς: ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς* (Phaed. 63 A) for example is short for *σοφοὶ οὕτως, ὡς ἀληθές ἐστιν.* Kühner's Ausführliche Grammatik II. p. 921.

24. *ἐπισκεῖσθαι κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ.* *κοινῇ σκοπεῖν, κοινῇ ζητεῖν* etc. were almost technical terms of the Socratic dialectic: see *Introd.* to Apol. p. xv.

25. **ἀλλοιότερος**, like *ὁ αὐτός*, is in the predicate.

27. **τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν**. Socrates means himself primarily: but he chooses a phrase which will include Crito too, so as to make his conclusion appear as the verdict of all right-minded men. **λέγειν τι** (*οὐδὲν λέγειν*, 'to be right') ('to be wrong': so in English 'there is something in what you say'). So **τι ποιεῖν** = 'to be making something of it' in Symp. 173 A. **ᾧδε** before *ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων* refers forward to *ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν—τὰς δὲ μῆ*.

28. **ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον** goes with the following clause: in Eng. 'that as I said just now': see on 45 B *ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι ικανά*. *νῦν δὴ* = *ἀρτίως* as so often (see my note on Apol. 37 C): Cobet would write *νυνδῆ*, and Schanz now follows him: B too has *νυνδῆ* here. There is no special force in the imperfect: *ἔλεγον* and *ἔφην* (like *ἐκέλευον* in Phaed. 59 E and Phaedr. 228 B) are sometimes used as aorists. See also Goodwin MT. 8.

τῶν δοξῶν ἄς—δοξάζουσιν...τὰς δὲ μῆ: contrast this with 46 C lines 19—20. The principle is enunciated more precisely because upon it hinges the argument down to 48 A.

46 E 30. **πρὸς θεῶν**: only in entreaties, not in asseverations: Apol. 25 C.

31. **ὅσα γε τάνθρώπεια** = 'in all human probability': for *ὅσα γε* cf. infr. 54 D *ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα*.

ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν—αὔριον. Why *αὔριον*? It is certain that Socrates believed that he would die upon the *third* day, but as Crito disbelieved the vision (see on 46 A) Socrates waives the point for the present. *μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν* = *ἀποθανεῖσθαι*.

47 A 33. **παρακρούοι**. Like *σφάλλειν* this word is probably a metaphor from the palaestra: cf. Theaet. 168 A *τὰ σφάλματα ἅ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο*. The original meaning may have been to give an unfair blow, hit below the belt. There is a touch of irony in *οὐκ ἂν σὲ παρακρούοι*: Socrates knew well that it was Crito and not he whose mental vision was dimmed by the coming doom (see Phaed. 84 E). I think the words are meant as a reply to Crito's taunt in 45 D *σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρέεσθαι*, where *σὺ* is emphatic: see note. For this reason I have printed *σὲ* with an accent.

34. **οὐχ ἱκανῶς**: infra *οὐχι καλῶς* in line 36 is stronger: cf. in 46 B the change from *ὅμοιοι* to *τοὺς αὐτούς*: see note in loc. Hirschig's *οὐχι καλῶς* (the one tolerable suggestion of the thirty odd

suggestions which he has made on the Crito) completely misses the point.

36. ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ; After these words some inferior MSS (and the second hand in B) read οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ; Apart from their slender MS authority, the words are objectionable (α) because they correspond to nothing either in 46 C (ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ), or in 46 D (τῶν δοξῶν αἷς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσιν κτλ.); and (β) because they anticipate line 42 χρῆσται δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; Plato is especially careful to avoid any premature indications of the course of an argument: he professes to follow ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ (Rep. III. 394 D).

CHAPTER VII.

In this chapter Socrates recalls the familiar illustrations by which he used to enforce the doctrine that no opinion deserves to be considered except that of those who know, and applies them to the case in point. Introduction p. xii.

1. τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο. τοιαῦτα refers to what follows: so in Rep. VI. 488 A νόησον γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἢ γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν νεῶν περὶ εἴτε μίας. It is a mistaken idea that τοιοῦδε is invariably prospective, and τοιοῦτος retrospective. The imperfect ἐλέγετο is used because Socrates is recalling the doctrines taught throughout his life: see on ἔλεγον in 46 B.

2. γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ κτλ. For the asyndeton cf. Rep. I. c. 47 B ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν καὶ βώμῃ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηϊ πάντας, and Apol. 22 A (where see note) ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθον τι τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν μάλιστα κτλ.

καὶ τοῦτο πράττων = 'and making this his work': hoc agens. Buttman compares Xen. Hell. IV. 8. 22 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναί, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ, πρὸς ᾧ εἶη ἔργω, τοῦτ' ἔπραττεν. Compare πρᾶγμα = 'profession' in Apol. 20 C.

5. ἱατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης: see Gorg. 452 A foll. The ἱατρὸς is there regarded as the δημιουργὸς ὑγείας: the παιδοτρίβης as the man whose ἔργον is καλοῦς τε καὶ ἰσχυροῦς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα: and so Soph. 228 E περὶ μὲν αἰσχος γυμναστικῆς, περὶ δὲ νόσον ἱατρικῆς; φαίνεσθον. In another passage of the Gorgias (464 B foll.) ἱατρικῆ and γυμναστικῆ are described as the two

branches of the art which looks after the body (*ἡ τοῦ σώματος θεραπεία*); they are correlative (*ἀντίστροφοι*) with *δικαιοσύνη* (*δικαστική*) and *νομοθετική*, the two subdivisions of *πολιτική* or the art which pays attention to the soul. Plato frequently places the two professions side by side: e.g. Prot. 313 D *εἰ μὴ τις τύχη γυμναστικός ἢ ἰατρός ὢν*: Polit. 295 C et al. Cron remarks that both professions were united in the person of Herodicus of Selymbria: compare Rep. III. 406 B *Ἡρόδικος δὲ παιδοτρίβης ὢν καὶ νοσώδης γενόμενος, μίξας γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικῆν, ἀπέκναισε πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτὸν, ἔπειτ' ἄλλους ὕστερον πολλοῦς.*

9. *ἀλλὰ μὴ*: *ἀλλὰ* is regular in such antitheses: see on Apol. 23 D.

12. *ταύτη—ἦ ἄν κτλ.* Note the position of *ταύτη*: it serves to throw special emphasis on the clause introduced by *ἦ ἄν*.

καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον: this explains *πρακτέον*. In *ἐδεστέον γε* the *γε* is added because what follows inculcates obedience to the *ἰατρός* as *γυμναστέον* to the *παιδοτρίβης*: *καὶ—γε* is frequently used in this way to introduce something which belongs to a different class from the things already enumerated. Gorg. 450 D *ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπτευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι*: here the first three arts hang together, being all concerned with number or mathematics. On the food of a Greek athlete cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. II. 1106^a 36 ff. *οὐ γὰρ εἴ τω δέκα μναῖ* (a mina was about 15·2 oz. Troy) *φαγεῖν πολὺ, δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἐξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ.*

13. *τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαῖοντι*. The argument gains additional point if it is noted that the word *ἐπιστάτης* suggests *ἐπίσταμαι* and so leads up to *ἐπαῖοντι*: Socrates wishes to deduce from the example of training the general principle that only he who knows deserves to be regarded. The word *ἐπιστάτης* is sometimes used in the sense of a trainer: cf. Xen. Mem. III. 5. 18 *ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι πείθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις* (=paedotribis, as Schneider correctly explains it), and see also Rep. VII. 521 E *σώματος γὰρ αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως ἐπίσταται* (sc. *γυμναστική*). Plato repeatedly thinks of *ἐπίσταμαι* when he uses the words *ἐπιστάτης* or *ἐπίστατῶ*: see for example Prot. 312 D foll. *εἰ δὲ τις ἐκεῖνο ἔροιτο· ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστι; τί ἂν ἀποκρινάμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι—ἦ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν*

λέγειν;—ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστῆς περὶ τίνος δευδὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπίσταται; cf. *Crat.* 414 E τὸν σοφὸν ἐπιστάτην, and 390 B ἄρ' οὐχ οὗτος ὃς ἐπίσταιτο ἂν ἐργαζομένῳ κάλλιστα ἐπίστατεῖν: *Rep.* IV. 443 E σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτη τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην. I have no doubt that Socrates thought it a real confirmation of his view that knowledge should everywhere hold rule when he found that ἐπιστάτης and ἐπίσταμαι seem to be connected, and I think Plato hints at this in such passages as *Polit.* 311 C ὁπόταν—ἄρχη τε καὶ ἐπίσταται. 'God and Nature do nothing in vain': even the similarity of names is not without its significance: hence Plato wrote the *Cratylus*. A precisely similar phenomenon appears in the case of the word εὖ πράττειν. Just as here ἐπιστάτη forms the transition to ἐπαῖοντι, so in *Charm.* 173 D εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν is the link between ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοιμεν and εὐδαιμονοῖμεν (ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοντες εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῖμεν): see also 172 A and *Alcibiades I.* 116 B and compare *Aristotle Eth. Nic.* I. 1098^b 20 συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα. So also in *Phaed.* 99 C δέον (which has two meanings) forms the link between ἀγαθόν and ξυνδεῖν—καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν: where it should be noted that the omission of the article before δέον (as here before ἐπαῖοντι) favours my view. Similarly in *Symp.* 204 C, where Plato proves that τὸ ἐρώμενον is καλόν by means of the middle term ἐραστόν ('lovely' as well as 'loved'): καὶ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ἐραστόν τὸ τῷ ὄντι καλὸν κτλ.: the entire passage from 203 A to 204 D is full of such double meanings and constructions. See also *Symp.* 196 C. This sort of chain-inference (incorrectly called *Sorites*) was afterwards very popular in the Stoic school: see *Reid on Cic. Acad. Pr.* 49.

I have insisted on this point partly because the editors have ignored it and partly on account of the light it throws on the meaning of the vision in 44 B: Socrates was greatly influenced by similarity of name.

It should be noted that ἐπαῖειν is a favourite word of Plato's, but less common in other authors. Protagoras used the word frequently: according to *Kock on Arist. Nubes* 650 it was probably an importation from the Ionian philosophical schools into the sophistic and philosophical circles of Athens.

17. εἶεν was pronounced εἶέν with intervocalic aspiration as in ταῶς: the derivation is doubtful, but it can hardly come from εἶμι:

see on Apol. 18 E. Possibly it is connected with εἶα: for as Timaeus s. v. says, it is not only *συγκατάθεσις τῶν εἰρημένων*, but also *συναφή πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα*: whence Suidas explains it as = ἄγε δὴ. Here for example it leads up to ἀπειθήσας δὲ κτλ.: cf. Symp. 204 C εἶεν δὴ, ὦ ξένη· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις· (parenthetical) τοιοῦτος ὧν ὁ Ἔρως τίνα χρείαν ἔχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;

47 C 18. τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους—τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους: so all the best MSS. The difficulties felt with regard to the text arise from a misapprehension of the argument. Socrates is gradually passing from the illustration to the case which it was intended to illustrate. Hence at first when he is only elucidating the illustration he introduces more detail: supra 47 B φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάξασθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους: as the application draws near there is somewhat less detail (ἀτιμάσας τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους): when we are on the verge of the application, there is only τιμήσας τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους, because it is a λόγος τῶν πολλῶν which all this was meant to illustrate, viz. that Crito and his friends and Socrates himself are cowards in leaving Socrates to die. Schanz brackets and Kral omits καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους: the other editors rightly retain the words. Ziwsa in the Zeitschr. f. d. öst. Gymn. 1879 p. 106 reads ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαίνους.

22. ποῖ τείνει: ποῖ = εἰς τί. Infra εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος is like 46 B τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ.

25. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα—οὕτως: “verbo omisso, ut Lach. 181 A εὐ γε νὴ τὴν Ἡραν—ὅτι ὀρθοῖς τὸν πατέρα”. Wohlrab.

26. καὶ δὴ καὶ is used to introduce a climax, or (as here) the crowning point of the reasoning—the application: see on Apol. 26 D.

27. δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων: Cron draws attention to the chiasmic arrangement:

δικαίων ~~αἰσχροῶν~~ ἀγαθῶν
ἀδίκων ~~καλῶν~~ κακῶν (Dyer).

47 D 31. μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους: supra 47 B μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ξύμπασιν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

32. εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα. εἰ μὴ with fut. ind. is more vivid and impassioned than ἦν μὴ with aor. conj. λωβᾶσθαι is to add insult to injury. ἐκεῖνο is νοῦς: cf. Rep. VII. 527 D—E ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ ἀναξωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρείτ-

τον ὄν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὀρᾶται (and truth is seen by νοῦς, cf. Rep. VI. 508 C—D and Symp. 212 A). Observe that the doctrine of the duality of soul and body is implied throughout the whole of this passage: it is one of the most distinctive traits of Plato's teaching, as it was of his master's: see Phaed. 79 C, 82 E (the soul investigates things by looking out of the prison-house of the body). To Plato the body is but the ὄργανον of the soul: Theaet. 184 D δεινὸν γὰρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλοὶ τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τιὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ἧ διὰ τούτων ὄν ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά: compare also Rep. V. 469 E, where those who wreak their vengeance on the dead bodies of their enemies are likened to hounds αἰ τοῖς λίθοις οἷς ἂν βληθῶσι χαλεπαίνουσι τοῦ βαλόντος οὐχ ἀπτόμεναι.

33. ὁ—ἀπώλλυτο: 'which, we used to say, is improved by right, and disabled by wrong' (Church): see last note. For this use of the imperfect cf. Rep. VI. 490 A ἡγεῖτο δ' αὐτῷ, εἰ νῶ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια κτλ. Goodwin MT. 8. The use of ἦν='is ex hypothesis' does not differ greatly from this.

CHAPTER VIII.

Here Socrates finally disposes of the first point raised by Crito, viz. that we should regard the opinions of the many, and proceeds to discuss the second (see above, 44 D)—that the many can take away our lives.

2. ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους. νοσώδες is not here='diseased', but 'causing disease', 'unwholesome',)(ὑγεινόν: so in Theaet. 171 E τὰ ὑγεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη.

3. πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ. Note the position of μὴ: Plato has arranged his words so as to express the double meaning of μὴ πειθόμενοι τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, and πειθόμενοι τῇ τῶν μὴ κτλ., for the text at once suggests ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπαϊόντων. Compare Legg. II. 671 D νήφοντας τῶν μὴ νηφόντων στρατηγούς, ὧν δὴ χωρὶς μέθῃ διαμάχεσθαι δεινότερον ἢ πολεμίους εἶναι μὴ μετὰ ἀρχόντων ἀθορύβων sc. ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἀρχόντων νηφόντων. Hirschig foolishly corrupts the text to πειθόμενοι τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ.

6. τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο is of course in the predicate: Wohl- 47 E rab is wrong in reading τοῦτο σῶμα with Buttman; for σῶμα without

the article is 'body' generally, i.e. 'matter', not 'the body': cf. Symp. 211 A οὐδ' αὖ φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἶον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν σῶμα (i.e. body, matter) μετέχει.

8. **μετὰ μοχθηροῦ.** The preposition *μετά* is far more frequent than *σύν* in Plato, as in Attic Greek generally (except Xenophon): *σύν* denotes a much closer connection. *μοχθηρός* like *πονηρός* meant originally 'afflicted' (as here), then 'depraved', 'corrupt', for τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων οἶον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἀγῆσι πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε (Hom. Od. xviii. 136—137). So also Ar. Av. 493 χλαῖναν γὰρ ἀπώλεσ' ὁ μοχθηροῦς Φρυγίων ἐρίων διὰ τοῦτον: compare (for *πονηρός*) Solon Frag. 14 οὐδὲ μάκαρς οὐδεὶς πέλεται βροτός, ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ πάντες, and Hesiod Frag. 95. 1 (ed. Götting) πονηρότατον καὶ ἕριστον (of Heracles). It is we and not the Greeks who by suffering are made strong. Cf. Simonides Frag. 5. 10—13 ed. Bergk.

10. **οὐδαμῶς.** Plato held that it is better to die than to suffer incurable disease: Gorg. 512 A—a passage which is parallel to this both in respect of the illustration and the application—εἰ μὲν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανε κτλ.: where see Thompson on the "meditative skipper". The whole subject is discussed in Rep. III. 405 foll. The presence of too many doctors, says Plato, proves that a city is physically unsound just as a plethora of *δικασταί* proves that it is unsound morally: *ibid.* 410 A it is prescribed that doctors in the ideal state shall only endeavour to cure τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς—τοὺς δὲ μὴ, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι, ἀποθνήσκουσιν ἐάσουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν. This is declared to be the most merciful way of treating the patients themselves and the best thing for the State. Herodicus is censured as *μακρὸν—τὸν θάνατον αὐτῷ ποιήσας* (406 B), because he prolonged his life by a course of medical treatment: the right view is that οὐδενὶ σχολὴ διὰ βίου κάμνειν ἰατρευομένῳ (*ib.* 406 C).

11. **ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρ' ἡμῖν κτλ.** So I read with the Bodleian: the editors mostly follow less good MSS and read *ἀλλ'*—*ἄρα*. The *ἀλλά* introduces a fresh point in the argument: cf. Apol. 37 C ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; For the collocation *ἀλλ' ἄρα* (*ἄρα* in this connection generally invites the answer 'no') compare Lysis 208 D ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐπειδὴν οἴκαδε ἔλθης παρὰ τὴν μητέρα, ἐκείνη σε ἐᾷ ποιεῖν ὅ τι αὐ βούλη κτλ.; Euthyd. 292 C ἀλλ' ἄρα

πάντας καὶ πάντα ἀγαθοὺς;—οὐκ οἶμαι ἐγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Here *ἄρα* is separated from *ἀλλά* in order to let the full stress of the sentence-accent fall on *μετ' ἐλείνου*, which introduces the application.

12. *ὧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται*. Elsewhere Plato uses the accusative after *λωβίσσθαι*: the dative is here preferred in order to avoid the appearance of ambiguity. Ar. Eq. 1408 *ἴν' ἴδωσιν αὐτὸν οἷς ἐλωβᾶθ' οἱ ξένοι*. The verb of kindred meaning *λυμαίνεσθαι*—not found in Plato—may also be construed with a dative as well as with an accusative.

13. *ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα κτλ*. Compare Xen. Mem. iv. 3. 14 *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχὴ ἢ εἶπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει κτλ*. and Prot. 313 A *ὁ δὲ περὶ πλειονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγεί, τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ σὰ ἢ εὔ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ γενομένου κτλ*. Socrates never wearied of asserting the dignity of the soul.

14. *περὶ ὃ ἢ τε ἀδικία κτλ*. In Rep. x. 609 B injustice is de- 48 A scribed as a disease of the soul: *τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψυχῇ ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακὴν; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ἃ νῦν δὴ διῆμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀμαθία*.

19. *οὐκ ἄρα—πάνυ ἡμῖν οὔτω*: *οὔτω* goes with *πάνυ*. I think this more probable than to take *οὐ πάνυ* together: *πάνυ* seems too emphatic to admit of this interpretation.

20. *ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὀ ἐπαίων*. The Bodleian has *ὅτι*, which may be right, as the Greeks probably considered *ὅ τι* and *ὅτι* to be the same word (=quod): see my Apology p. 123.

22. *πρῶτον μὲν* instead of being followed by *εἶτα* or *ἔπειτα* (*δέ*) corresponds to *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ* in line 25 below: the second argument of Crito is quoted as an objection to Socrates' refutation of the first: see on *πρῶτον μὲν* in 46 C.

εἰσηγεί, εἰσηγούμενος. The word *εἰσηγεῖσθαι* (auctor esse) means to introduce a subject or a proposal in a formal way: see Thuc. iv. 76. 2 *Πτοιόδωρου—εἰσηγουμένου τάδε αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθη*, and Pl. Symp. 176 E *τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληθούσαν ἀληθρίδα χαίρειν ἔαν κτλ*. Perhaps Plato chooses the word in order to suggest that Crito as it were *εἰσηγε δίκην κατὰ τῶν νόμων*—the Laws being on their defence: see Introd. pp. vii—xi.

25. *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ*: here begins Socrates' reply to the second point raised by Crito: see above 44 D. *μὲν δὴ* = 'for that matter', 'as to that': cf. Gorg. 471 A *εἶπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; 492 E ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βλος*:

Rep. III. 406 A καὶ μὲν δὴ—ἀτοπὸν γε τὸ πῶμα οὕτως ἔχοντι: *ibid.*
III. 409 B.

26. ἀποκτινύναι is preferred by Plato to ἀποκτείνειν.

48 B 27. δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα κτλ. = 'of course, that is also evident: yes, Socrates, he will say so'. If the text is right, I think δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα is an aside: the answer to Socrates' remark is contained in φαίη γὰρ ἄν. Crito (who is not yet convinced by Socrates' reasoning) first declares that the power of the many to put one to death (ταῦτα) is as obvious as the necessity of regarding what they think of one (καί): he then assents to Socrates' remark. See above 44 D αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἱοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ κτλ.

With Cron and Kral I have retained the vulgate, because I think it presents the fewest difficulties. Wohlrab gives δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα to Socrates, φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ᾧ Σώκρατες to Crito, and ἀληθῆ λέγεις to Socrates: Schanz brackets φαίη γὰρ ἄν, and gives both δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα and ἀληθῆ λέγεις to Crito: Göbel prints "δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα", φαίη γὰρ ἄν ᾧ Σώκρατες. Σω. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. I think the text is probably right as it stands: but if not, I should transpose and read φαίη γὰρ ἄν δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, ᾧ Σώκρατες, taking δῆλα δὴ as an adverb as it is in the MSS (δηλαδῆ).

29. ᾧ θαυμάσιε: see on ᾧ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες in 44 B.

οὗτός τε: τε corresponds to καί in καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει line 31. There is virtually an anacoluthon, since οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος—δοκεῖ leads us to expect καὶ ὅδε αὖ ὁ λόγος (sc. δοκεῖ ἔτι ὁμοιος εἶναι), ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν κτλ.: but whether the second principle is still binding or not, has not yet been decided: whence καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει κτλ.

30. ὅμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον: the MSS read τῷ καὶ πρότερον: but as τῷ πρότερον for τῷ προτέρῳ or τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ is, to say the least of it, unusual, and the καί is awkward, I follow Wex, Madvig and recent editors (except Göbel) in reading καὶ πρότερον. ὅμοιος καὶ πρότερον = similis quam antea: see above 46 B σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ, οὐσπερ καὶ πρότερον.

32. οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶ ζῆν. Socrates held this view during the trial: see Apol. 28 B and ch. XXIII. Compare Gorg. 512 E μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσον δὴ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐάτεον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ—σ κεπτέον τίν' ἄν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλει χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιώη.

35. τὸ δὲ εἶ—ταυτόν ἐστιν: Cron remarks that this clause is

necessary because εὖ ζῆν has a double meaning (see above on 47 B τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαύοντι): it is necessary also to identify εὖ with δικάως because the next chapter opens with the question πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι.

It should be noted that ταῦτόν τοσοῦτον τοιοῦτον τηλικούτον are regular in Plato, not ταυτό and the like: see on Apol. 24 C. Schanz now thinks it probable that Plato always used the forms in -ν: see his Preface to the Laws p. vi.

CHAPTER IX.

This and the following chapter make a kind of interlude. Socrates has now reached his principle or λόγος, viz. ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περιπλείστον ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικάως ζῆν. Before introducing the Laws to prove that if Socrates made his escape he would violate this principle, Socrates pauses to emphasize the full force and meaning of this λόγος, and the irrelevancy of every other. Throughout this and the following chapters it must be borne in mind that Socrates identified τὸ δίκαιον with τὸ νόμιμον: see Introd. p. xiii.

1. ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων: the present as in ὅπερ λέγω and the like (Graser quoted by Wohlrab). See above on ὅπερ λέγω in 45 B. τοῦτο refers forward to πότερον δίκαιον κτλ.

2. πότερον δίκαιον κτλ. δίκαιον is 'right': see on 45 C above. Crito had put the question on the same grounds in the passage referred to ἔτι δέ—οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα. ἀφιέναι is not 'to permit' (ἐφιέναι), but 'to let go free', as in Apol. 29 C ἀφιέμεν σε.

4. ἢ οὐ δίκαιον: more emphatic and clear than ἢ οὐ: so in B 48 C above μένει ἢ οὐ μένει.

6. αἷς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις: viz. in 45 A—46 A. The relative clause is placed first so as to let emphasis be thrown on σὺ) (ἐγώ: αἱ δὲ σκέψεις αἷς σὺ λέγεις would be much less pointed. Cron remarks that when the antecedent is adopted into the relative clause, the article is more usually omitted, as in οὗς ἢ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων. Tr. 'as for the considerations you mention, about' etc.

8. ὡς ἀληθῶς: see on 46 D above.

9. σκέμματα ἦ. σκέμματα is of course in the predicate. The antecedent to ταῦτα is not σκέψεις but ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης

καὶ παίδων τροφῆς. On μή ἤ (=nescio an sit) see Goodwin MT. 83: probably some word expressing fear or apprehension ought to be understood: see on Apol. 39 A μή οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπόν.

τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων κτλ. Gorg. 521 C (quoted above on 44 D) ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῆδε τῇ πόλει ὄντιν οὖν ἂν ὅ τι τύχοι τοῦτο παθεῖν. We are of course not justified in seeing here an allusion to the alleged remorse of the Athenians after Socrates' death: the tradition about their repentance is late and untrustworthy: see Grote, Vol. VIII. p. 302. For ἂν with the participle in apodosis cf. Legg. VI. 781 A πολὺ ἄμεινον ἂν ἔχοντα, εἰ νόμων ἔτυχεν: Goodwin MT. 114. The word ἀναβιώσκεισθαι more often means 'to come to life again': for the causative sense cf. Phaed. 89 B εἴνπερ γε—μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.

10. οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ. Wohlrab compares Ar. Nub. 580 ἦν γὰρ ἤ τις ἐξοδος μηδενὶ ξὺν νῶ. Plato occasionally uses ξὺν in such adverbial phrases, e.g. ξὺν πολλῶ θορύβῳ Rep. VI. 492 B: otherwise it generally occurs in religious uses like Legg. III. 682 A ξὺν τισι Χάρισι καὶ Μούσαις, or where the connection is a very close one, as in Legg. III. 678 C ξὺν ταῖς τέχναις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντα σχεδὸν ἀπολώλει; Gorg. 513 A ξὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἢ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει: see also note on μετὰ in 47 E.

τοῦτων τῶν πολλῶν: οὗτος like the Latin iste expresses contempt. Note in the next sentence the emphatic place assigned to ἡμῖν) (τοῖς πολλοῖς.

11. ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ = 'ratio ita evincit' (Cron) is a frequent phrase in Plato: see Parm. 141 D ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ. Sometimes the object is expressed as in Rep. X. 607 B ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἤρει. Near akin is the use of αἰρεῖν = 'to secure a conviction', as in Apol. 28 A τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἴνπερ αἰρήῃ, where see note.

12. νῦν δῆ. See on 46 D above.

48 D 14. καὶ χάριτας: the plural is preferred to the singular, not only because Socrates is speaking for Crito as well as for himself, but because it balances the plural χρήματα more neatly. It is hardly necessary to supply εἰδότες from τελοῦντες: τελεῖν χάριν (χάριτας) is to 'pay a debt of gratitude'.

15. ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι: ἐξάγων τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενος would be more logical and less grammatical.

τῇ ἀληθείᾳ: see on ὡς ἀληθῶς 46 D.

17. μή οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι: for the syntax compare note on

μη ὡς ἀληθῶς—ἦ in 48 C. ὑπολογίζεσθαι is 'to entertain a reflection pointing to the opposite line of conduct from that which we are, or ought to be, pursuing': see on Apol. 28 B. We have the same sentiment and the same mode of expression in Apol. 28 D δεῖ—μέροντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχυροῦ. παραμένοντας differs from μένοντας as 'staying here' from 'standing fast' or 'holding our ground'.

19. οὔτε ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν: so the MSS. Schanz reads οὔτ' εἰ after Forster. εἰ δεῖ is to be supplied from the preceding clause.

20. καλῶς—λέγειν—ὄρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν: it is time for deeds, not words: supra 46 A ἀλλὰ βουλευόν, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλευέσθαι ἔτι ὄρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευῆσθαι. δρῶμεν is the deliberative conjunctive.

24. παῦσαι. In Attic 'stop!' is παῦσαι or παῦε (not παύον, 48 E though in Homer παύεο is found). παῦε is the only form of this word used intransitively in good writers: the plural is παύεσθε and παύσασθε: see Cobet V. L. pp. 264, 367, and Rutherford on Babrius 28. 8.

26. πείσαι σε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος ταῦτα πράττειν. The MS reading πείσαι σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος cannot be right: for apart from the awkwardness of ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος, ταῦτα πράττειν could only mean 'to let me remain and die': an impossible meaning, since it leaves ταῦτα without an antecedent, Socrates as yet professing not to have made up his mind but to be willing to follow ὅπη ἂν ὁ λόγος ἄγῃ: see line 22 σκοπῶμεν, ὧ ἀγαθῆ, κοινῇ κτλ. I follow Meiser (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1874, p. 40) in transposing ταῦτα πράττειν and ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος (sc. σοῦ): ταῦτα πράττειν (= 'to do what I do', 'to act herein') depends on περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι, and is coordinate with and not subordinate to πείσαι, which is used absolutely. Translate: 'for I think it important to persuade you, and not to act in this without your consent'. Cron, Schanz and Kral retain the MS order, changing πείσαι to πείσας, with Buttman, Hermann and Madvig: Wohlrab alone among recent editors retains the MS reading. By Wex (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. for 1856, p. 669) πείσαι is rejected as "ein erklärendes Glossem zu dem falsch verstandenen πράττειν. Platon also schrieb ὡς ἐγὼ—ποιοῦμαι σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος sc. πρᾶττε". Göbel discusses the passage at length in his Fulda program 1882 p. 10 foll., and claims to have solved all difficulties by the change of πείσαι to παῦσαι: but in reality this is

only mending one fault by two others, for (a) *παῦσαι* would inevitably lead to *ἄκοντα*: (b) *ἀλλὰ μὴ* is not 'aber nicht', but 'nicht'; i.e. it must introduce not a mere qualification, but a direct antithesis to some word in the preceding clause: and *πέισαι* (or *πέισας*) is exactly such a word. The choice clearly lies between Meiser's view and that of Cron: I prefer the former, because (a) even if *πέισας* were right I think Plato would either have written *περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πέισας σε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος, ταῦτα πράττειν*, or (less likely) *περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι ταῦτα πράττειν πέισας σε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος*, and (b) because in *ταῦτα πράττειν* = 'do what I am doing', 'act in this matter', the force of *ταῦτα* seems to me more obscure if it follows *σε* than if it follows *ἄκοντος*.

27. *ὄρα*—*τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐάν κτλ.* For *ὄρα* followed by *ἐάν* compare (with Wohlrab) Rep. IV. 432 C *ὄρα οὖν καὶ προθυμοῦ κατιδεῖν ἐάν πως πρότερος ἐμοῦ ἔδης καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσης. ἐάν* is not here = 'whether' (a meaning it never bears), but 'si forte', 'in case': in such expressions there is no real ellipse of the apodosis: see Monro's Homeric Grammar, p. 212.

τὴν ἀρχὴν is 'the outset', 'the start': from its use in such examples as the present it came to mean 'principle', as so often in Aristotle.

49 A 29. *ἧ ἂν μάλιστα οἴη*, i.e. in the way to which your opinion most inclines: *ἧ* is adverbial and goes with *οἴη*, as in *οἴεσθαι ταύτη*: *ἔχειν* is not to be understood.

CHAPTER X.

In this chapter Crito is made to admit (a) that it is wrong to requite wrong with wrong or evil with evil, and (b) that it is our duty to carry out in practice that which we have in theory admitted to be right. Introduction p. xii.

1. *οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ—ἀδικητέον εἶναι.* For the syntax compare Gorg. 507 D *τὸν βουλούμενον—εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον κτλ.*, and for the sentiment itself Apol. 37 B *πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαντόν γε ἀδικήσεων*: Gorg. 469 B *μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὄν τὸ ἀδικεῖν*: and Rep. I. 335 D.

2. *ἧ τινὶ—τινὶ ἐξ οὗ*: *τις* is here accented because it is em-

phatic: see on Apol. 26 C (εἶναι τινὰς θεούς), where I refer to Theaetetus 147 B τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτηθεῖς.

3. ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν: note the force of γε: τό γε ἀδικεῖν nearly = τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἅτε ἀδικὸν ὄν: cf. infra 49 B, line 14.

4. ὡς πολλάκις—ὠμολογήθη. It has been doubted by Zeller and others whether the doctrine here maintained was ever held by the historical Socrates: but I have no doubt that it was. In harmony with his egoistic principles, Socrates denied that it is ever right to wrong another, because wrongdoing has an injurious influence on one's own soul: see Introd. p. xii.

5. ἢ πᾶσαι. In the MSS ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο is written before ἢ πᾶσαι: but as there is nothing to which the words can be referred, I agree with recent editors in omitting them. The alternative (Meiser) is to write ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο after ἢ and take the words as an allusion to 46 D νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως [ἔνεκα λόγου] ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς.

7. ἐκκεχυμέναι. The metaphor (as Göbel remarks) is probably from losing or throwing goods overboard at sea: cf. Rep. VIII. 553 B πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐκχέαντα τὰ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑατόν. So in Aesch. Pers. 826 μηδὲ τις—δλβον ἐκχέη μέγαν: compare 46 B above τοὺς δὲ λόγους οὖς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν.

8. πάλαι—ἄρα. πάλαι goes with ἐλάθομεν—διαφέροντες: ἄρα as usual expresses surprise: see on Apol. 34 C ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω;

τηλικοῖδε. After τηλικοῖδε the MSS read γέροντες ἄνδρες: I think with Cron and Schanz that γέροντες is a gloss on τηλικοῖδε. Fischer and Wohlrab defend the word on the ground that γέροντες ἄνδρες makes a good antithesis to παίδων: but the phrase γέροντες ἄνδρες is a trifle awkward, and ἄνδρες alone seems to me more forcible as the opposite of παίδων.

9. σπουδῆ is emphatic, nearly = σπουδῆ ἄλλ' οὐ παιδιᾶ (suggested by παίδων in the next line).

10. παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες is almost a proverbial phrase, as 49 D Wohlrab remarks: compare Theaet. 177 B ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκένη πωσ ἀπομαραινεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν: Prot. 342 E ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. Here and indeed generally διαφέρειν means 'to be better than' and not simply 'to differ'.

11. παντός μᾶλλον = 'assuredly' (i. e. more than anything) is frequent in Plato, e. g. Prot. 344 B παντός μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστι.

12. εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή. For the form of the sentence compare Apol. 27 C εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά, ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμονία γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. Asyndeton is regular in this kind of explanatory clause: see on Apol. 22 A. I have printed a colon before εἴτε φασὶν, cf. Apol. 1. c. ὁμῶς in line 14 thus becomes more easy and natural.

13. εἴτε καί = 'or if you like': so in Apol. 27 E ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἴππων μὲν παῖδας ἠγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων.

14. τό γε ἀδικεῖν: see on 49 A, line 3.

καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχροῦν. In Gorg. 474 C foll. it is shewn that ἀδικεῖν is both κάκιον and αἰσχίον than ἀδικεῖσθαι. Note the symmetry throughout this speech of Socrates: it begins with οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ and ends with παντὶ τρόπῳ: and the two alternatives are presented in such a way that the one which finally prevails is placed both first and last: the order is a.b.a.b.a.

19. οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν: ἄρα is of course 'therefore': for ἀδικούμενον ἀνταδικεῖν is ἀδικεῖν πως. Socrates does not in this assume that he has been wronged by the *laious*: only by men: see on 54 C.

ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται. The ordinary Greek view is well summed up in the prayer of Solon (Frag. 13. 4—5) εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὥδε φίλους, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρὸν, τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν. Just so Medea in Euripides (807—810) μηδεῖς με φαύλην κάσθενῆ νομιζέτω μηδ' ἠσυχαίαν, ἀλλὰ θατέρου τρόπου, βαρεῖαν ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοι-σιν εὐμενῆ· τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων εὐκλεέστατος βίος. Socrates himself declares that this was the prevailing morality in Greece: Mem. II. 3. 14 καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, ὃς ἂν φθάνη τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν: but everything is against the supposition that this view commended itself to him, and even Pittacus, if we may trust Diogenes Laertius (I. 4. 78), had already declared against it in the memorable words φίλον μὴ λέγειν κακῶς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἐχθρόν. See Introd. p. xii.

49 C 22. τί δὲ δῆ; = 'once more' introduces a new departure: with τί δέ; (infra line 24) the departure is less new: from ἀδικεῖν to κακουργεῖν the transition is greater than from κακουργεῖν to ἀντικα-κουργεῖν.

23. οὐ δεῖ δίπῳν: contrast this with οὐ φαίνεται in 21: here at

least Crito can answer without hesitation, for *κακουργεῖν* suggests the idea of a criminal or malefactor: see L. and S. s. v.

27. τὸ γὰρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν κτλ. In Rep. I. 335 B foll. *ἀδικεῖν* is identified with *κακοὺς ποιεῖν* rather than *κακῶς ποιεῖν* through the middle term *βλάπτειν*.

30. *κακῶς ποιεῖν*—*πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν* is circumlocutory for *ἀντι-κακουργεῖν*. For *οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν πάσχη*=*ne tum quidem si quidvis patiatur*, compare Rep. VII. 522 E *εἰ καὶ ὀτιοῦν μέλλει τάξεων ἐπατεῖν*: Polit. 297 B *οὐκ ἂν πλῆθος οὐδ' ὠντινωνοῦν*. The subject to *πάσχη* is understood from the unexpressed subject to *ἀνταδικεῖν* and *κακῶς ποιεῖν*: see note on Apol. 29 A *δοκεῖν γὰρ εἶδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν*.

32. *καθομολογῶν*: the *κατά* points to the gradual piecemeal character of the admissions: cf. Gorg. 499 B *πάλαι τοῖ σου ἀκροῶμαι καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῶ ὀτιοῦν, τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια*: see also Rep. VI. 487 B—C where it is said that Socrates leads one on little by little till lo! when at the end all the little admissions are added up *μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις*.

33. *οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ—δόξει*. This confession that his 49 D doctrines are for the few and not for the many is more in the vein of Plato than of Socrates. It is possible that Socrates may have been led to hold this language by his condemnation on an unjust charge: but while actively engaged on his mission he was as far as possible from despairing, as is clear from Xen. Mem. III. 5. See Introduction p. xv.

34. *οἷς οὖν—τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή*. Compare Apol. 31 E—32 A and Phaed. 82 D *τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν—ἐκείνοι οἷς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς—χαίρειν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ἔπη ἔρχονται*: *ibid.* 64 B—C *εἶπωμεν—πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις* (sc. *τοῖς πολλοῖς*).

36. *ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν*: the many laugh at the philosopher (Rep. VII. 517 A), and if the philosopher laughs at them, *ἦττον ἂν καταγελαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῶ εἴη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἠκούση* (sc. *ψυχῆ*): Rep. VII. 518 B.

38. *κοινωνεῖς* is used with reference to *κοινὴ βουλή* in 38: so *infra* in 42. *ἐντεῦθεν* in the same line=*ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου* and is explained by *ὡς οὐδέποτε κτλ.*: compare (with Jacobs) Prot. 324 A *ἐνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὐσης*.

40. *οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν*. After these words we might expect

οὔτε τοῦ κακουργεῖν, but as Göbel points out ἀδικεῖν has already been identified with κακουργεῖν (in C above, line 27): and besides it is on the injustice of τὸ ἀντικακουργεῖν rather than of τὸ κακουργεῖν that the rest of the dialogue turns.

49 E 42. τῆς ἀρχῆς: said with reference to ἀρχώμεθα in 28: see note on 48 E above.

44. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο = 'my next point': see on Apol. 39 B.

48. μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ = vel potius interrogo: Socrates said his say by questions oftener than by answers: see Apol. 33 B. For μᾶλλον δέ see above on 46 A.

50. ἔξαπατητέον: to believe a theory and yet not carry it into practice is a living lie: to Socrates this seemed not only wrong, but impossible, since knowledge is virtue and οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει: see Introd. to Apol. p. xi.

CHAPTER XI.

With this chapter the third division of the dialogue begins. Crito has now admitted the major premise which is to determine the action of Socrates, viz. that under no circumstances is it right to do wrong or requite wrong with wrong or evil with evil. The minor premise is still wanting, and to establish this Socrates introduces the Laws of Athens, who endeavour to prove that if he complied with Crito's invitation, Socrates would be guilty of wrongdoing, and retaliation in wrong-doing. In this chapter they urge that escape would be wrong because it would mean the entire negation of the State and civic life. See Introduction pp. x—xiv.

1. ἐκ τούτων = 'in the light of this', 'starting from these premises': so in 48 B ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων.

50 A 4. οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δίκαιοις οὖσιν = τοῦτοις ᾧ ὁμολογήσαμεν δίκαια ὄντα with a reference to 49 E πότερον ᾧ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἔξαπατητέον; δίκαια ὄντα is attracted to οἷς = τοῦτοις ᾧ: for a similar case see Apol. 37 B ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔχωμαι (MSS ἔλωμαι) ὧν εὔ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων i.e. τούτων ᾧ εὔ οἶδ' ὅτι κακὰ ὄντα.

6. οὐκ ἔχω—οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ: the words are full of pathos: Crito sees but too clearly what the conclusion will be.

8. ἀλλ' ᾧδε σκοπεῖ: ᾧδε and not ὦδε is the reading of B. It is characteristic of Socrates to let the Laws speak for themselves:

like Plato he was nothing if not clear and emphatic. For a similar example see Theaet. 166 A foll. I think too that Plato wished to save Socrates from the charge of selfishness and lack of feeling, when his friends were so deeply moved, and hence the fatal argument comes not from his mouth but from the Laws.

μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν: the dative depends on *ἐπιστάντες*: Cron compares Symp. 192 D *εἰ αὐτοῖς—ἐπιστάς ὁ Ἡφαιστος—ἔροιτο*.

9. **εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο.** *ἀποδιδράσκειν* suggests a runaway slave or a deserter, and these words are added to spare Crito's feelings, "mitigandae orationis causa" (Stallbaum). For the Greek Stallbaum compares Legg. I. 633 A *περὶ τῶν τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς εἶτε μερῶν εἶτε ἅττ' αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεῶν ἐστὶ*.

10. **ἐλθόντες—ἔροιτο:** cf. Rep. VII. 538 D *ὅταν—ἐλθὼν ἐρώτημα ἔρηται, τί ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν*. The synonym *τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως* is added with a view to *τὴν πόλιν* (line 15) and *ἡ πόλις* (22) afterwards. The editors refer to Prot. 319 D *τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει* and Cic. Verr. II. 2. 114 *a communi Siciliae*. It is possible that Cicero had the whole passage in view when he wrote (Cat. I. 17) *Quae (sc. patria) tecum Catilina sic agit et quodam modo tacita loquitur*.

11. **ἐπιστάντες** is regularly used of a vision 'standing over' one: see Symp. 192 D (quoted on line 8 above). The word occurs naturally to Socrates, who had a devout belief in visions: see on *ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον* in 44 A. Lucr. III. 959 *et necopinanti mors ad caput adstitit*.

12. **ἄλλο τι ἢ** = *aliudne quid quam?* i.e. *nonne?* see on Apol. 24 C: *ἄλλο τι* alone can bear the same meaning. With *ῶ ἐπιχειρεῖς* contrast 45 C *ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα*: the influence of the preceding *ἔργῳ* causes *ῶ* to be preferred to the more usual *ὄ*.

13. **τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι:** *ἡμᾶς* is emphatic, almost 50 B deictic: the voice should pause before and after it. The laws and constitution of Athens are arraigned before Socrates: whence *ἀπολέσαι* 'to kill', 'destroy', viz. by giving an adverse verdict. So in Legg. IX. 857 A, where the metaphor is still kept up: *προδότῃ καὶ ἱεροσύλῃ καὶ τῶ τοῦς τῆς πόλεως νόμους βία ἀπολλύντι*—the parricide, as it were, of his country's laws. See Introduction pp. vii—viii.

τὸ σὸν μέρος: 'as far as lies with you': so in 45 D above. In *ἦ δοκεῖ σοι οἶν τε* it is better to regard *δοκεῖ σοι* as parenthetical ('think you') and understand *ἐστίν* with *οἶν τε* than to understand

εἶναι after δοκεῖ: cf. Phaed. 108 D ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ—οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ: see on 43 D above.

14. ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι: Buttman reads πόλιν πόλιν εἶναι: but εἶναι here = 'exist') (ἀνατετράφθαι: it is not the copula.

16. δίκαι is here 'judgments', 'decisions' not 'lawsuits': this use is frequent in Homer, but rare in Attic. γενόμεναι = δικασθεῖσαι as in line 20.

17. ἄκυροι is opposed to κύριαι: see line 21.

19. ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ: the imagery of a trial is still kept up: see Introduction p. vii.

20. ἀπολλυμένων: see note on line 13 above. Cron remarks that throughout all this passage there is an allusion to the custom of appointing *συνήγοροι* or advocates to defend any law which it was proposed to repeal.

21. ὅτι introduces the direct quotation as in Apol. 21 C ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὐτοσί ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἐφησθα: infr. 50 C.

50 C 22. ἤδικει γάρ: the force of γάρ is clear ('Yes, I do mean to wrong the laws) for' etc. Instead of ἤδικει Heindorf requires ἀδικεῖ: the present of this verb is frequently used of an injury committed in the past because the injury is supposed to continue till it is atoned for. But Socrates speaks as one who has outlived the sense of injury: the imperfect ἤδικει is thus in keeping with the spirit of his motto ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρῆ τελευτᾶν (Phaed. 117 E).

23. ἔκρινεν: the Aorist, not the imperfect, in spite of ἤδικει.

CHAPTER XII.

The Laws proceed to argue that Socrates is their child and slave, bound to render them all the obedience due to parents and masters, or rather more, because one's fatherland should be more to one than parents.

2. καὶ ταῦτα = 'this too', viz. the reservation that you were to question our decrees, and disobey them if they seemed to you wrong. The antecedent to ταῦτα is implied in the words ἤδικει γάρ—ἔκρινεν (50 C). The suggestion of Keck to read ταῦτά for ταῦτα obscures the connection and leaves καὶ unexplained: the meaning of καὶ is fixed by the following line: ἢ ἐμμένειν—δικάζῃ, i.e. 'or to abide by the

decisions delivered by the State', sc. without *any* clause of reservation.

3. **ταῖς δίκαις**: *δίκαι* = 'decisions', 'judgments', as in 50 B, line 16.

4. **αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων** = 'should be surprised at their language': *θαυμάζειν* is regularly followed by a genitive of the person: Goodwin, Gk. Gr. 222.

5. **ὅτι**: see on 50 B. *Infra* in line 7 *καί* = 'also'.

8. **τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι** = *τῷ διαλέγεσθαι* by a common periphrasis: Stallbaum refers to *Phaed.* 75 D *καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι*.

10. **ἀπολλύναι**: see on 50 B, line 13. *πρῶτον μὲν* corresponds 50 D to *ἀλλά* in line 14: the second question thus becomes more vivid: for a similar case compare 48 A and 53 B. *ἐγενήσαμεν* = *γενέσθαι ἐποιήσαμεν* 'called into existence': Aristotle has *γεννώντων αὐτόν* (sc. *τὸν οὐρανόν*) = *γενέσθαι αὐτόν λεγόντων* (*De Cael.* II. 283^b 31).

11. **καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν—ἐφύτευσέν σε**; This explains *ἐγενήσαμεν*. Note *λαμβάνω* in the sense of 'I take to wife': so *Eur. Alc.* 325 *γυναικ' ἀρίστην ἐστὶ κομπάσαι λαβεῖν*. Göbel remarks that the imperfect calls up the circumstances and provisions of the courtship (if there was any) and wedding: for the collocation of the imperfect and the aorist cf. *infra* 52 C *οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἡροῦ καὶ ὠμολόγεις—καὶ παιδῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω*.

12. **τούτοις ἡμῶν τοῖς νόμοις**: here and in line 17 Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing *τοῖς νόμοις* (*νόμοι*): but the addition of these words makes the Greek far more explicit and emphatic. *τούτοις* is deictic.

13. **τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους**: Cron remarks that Socrates is thinking chiefly of the laws which established the legal validity of marriage and as a consequence the legitimacy of the children. Some account of the laws relating to marriage is given in Becker's *Charicles* E. T. pp. 473—498.

14. **ἔχουσιν** is probably the participle: *τι* points to this (Cron). For *ἀλλά* v. note on line 10 above.

15. **τροφὴν τε καὶ παιδείαν**. Plato frequently uses this expression to denote the upbringing and education of a child: e.g. *Rep.* IV. 445 E *τροφῆ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσάμενος ἢ διήλθομεν*. *τροφή* is the wider term, including the general care of the body: in *παιδεία* the care of the soul is the prominent idea.

16. ἢ οὐ καλῶς: ἢ—the less authenticated reading—would = Lat. An? ἢ οὐ is simply Nonne?

οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι: the antecedent to τούτοις is implied in τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν (line 14). The word παραγγέλ-
λοντες is not to be pressed: it is doubtful to what extent Athenian
parents were compelled by law to educate their children: see
Becker's Charicles E. T. p. 228.

18. μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ: the two branches of Greek edu-
cation—the end being to produce a sound mind in a sound body:
Pl. Rep. II. 376 E ἔστι δέ που ἡ μὲν (sc. παιδεία) ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμ-
ναστικῇ, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσικῇ. The latter in its wider signifi-
cation included γράμματα (reading, writing, and arithmetic), κιθάρισις
(lyre-playing), and learning by heart passages of the poets, especially
Homer. See Becker's Charicles E. T. 226—236.

50 E 19. καλῶς. This only commits Socrates to the utility of μουσικῇ
and γυμναστικῇ: whether μουσικῇ and γυμναστικῇ were rightly taught
is quite another question. It is impossible to believe that Socrates
approved of Athenian methods of teaching: for he never wearied of
attacking the ignorance of his countrymen, and knowledge according
to him could be taught. In the Protagoras (339 foll.) Plato makes
him prove by an elaborate caricature of the popular way of expounding
the poets that no true education comes from that quarter. Plato
himself rejected the popular education both in its actual curriculum
and still more in respect of its method: see Rep. VII. 521 C foll.

εἶεν: see on 47 B above.

20. ἔξετράφη: ἔξ- signifies that Socrates was no longer a child:
so Ar. Nub. 1380 ὠναίσχυντέ, σ' ἐξέθρεψα.

21. καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος: Cron compares Hdt. VII. 104,
where Demaratus says of the Lacedaemonians ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἔδντες
οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γὰρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος. See also
Pl. Legg. III. 700 A οὐκ ἦν—ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῶν παλαιῶν νόμων ὁ δῆμος
τινων κύριος, ἀλλὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἐκὼν ἐδούλευε τοῖς νόμοις.

22. αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι: Socrates is, so to speak,
δοῦλος καὶ δοῦλων. With this form of expression compare Apol.
42 A δίκαια πεπονθῶς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ νιεῖς.

23. ἀρ' ἐξ ἴσου—καὶ ἡμῖν = 'do you think that your rights are
on a level with ours?' (Church): καί = atque, as in pariter atque.
The καί after ἡμῖν is explanatory, as in 50 D, line 11.

25. ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα—πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα. An *a fortiori*
argument: you may not retaliate on your parent or your master:

how much less upon your country and her laws! Compare Apol. 28 E δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος—εἰ ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον—τότε μὲν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι ἔταπτον ἔμενον—, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος—φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν—, ἐνταῦθα δὲ—λίπομι τὴν τάξιν: see my note on the passage. Here, as usual, ἄρα expresses surprise: the presence of ἄρα in both clauses makes the antithesis more pointed, and increases the rhetorical effect: Cron compares Prot. 325 B—C τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς νιεῖς διδάσκονται—, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ ἦ τε ζημία θάνατος—καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ξυλλήβδην τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται. The position of σοι between the preposition and its noun is noteworthy: it is the less remarkable, because σοι τὸν πατέρα is nearly equivalent to σὸν πατέρα: cf. Eur. Med. 324 μὴ πρὸς σε γονάτων: and the well-known “Lydia dic per omnes te deos oro” of Hor. Carm. I. 8. 1.

26. οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν: the imperfect implies that Socrates' father is dead. οὐκ goes closely with ἐξ ἴσου: beware of taking it as= nonne?

27. εἴ σοι ὦν ἐτύχχανεν= ‘if you had chanced to have one’. It is not necessary to supply οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον: οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν is the apodosis, for Greek (like Latin) prefers the more direct and dogmatic mode of expression (ἦν, erat, rather than ἦν ἂν, esset): Goodwin MT. 97.

ὥστε ἄπερ πάσχοις: this explains ἐξ ἴσου: if there had been equality of rights, Socrates might retaliate: otherwise not. As οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου forms a single negative idea) (ἔσται sc. ἐξ ἴσου in line 30, we might have expected ὥστε οὐχ ἄπερ πάσχοις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, just as in 31—33 we have a positive clause with ὥστε to explain the positive ἔσται ἐξ ἴσου: Plato however prefers to illustrate ἐξ ἴσου, rather than οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου. Perhaps he was anxious to avoid the accumulation of negatives.

28. οὔτε κακῶς—ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά. This is not epeexegetic of ὥστε—ἀντιποιεῖν (as the editors say) but explains οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον: supply οὐκ ἦν σοι τὸ δίκαιον. κακῶς ἀκούειν (male audire) is the passive of κακῶς λέγειν (male dicere): so ἀποθνήσκω φεύγω etc. serve as passives to ἀποκτείνω διώκω etc.: see on Apol. 17 A.

29. τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν: see the amusing scene in the 51 A Clouds 1409 foll. Phidippides beats his father Strepsiades, justifying himself in these words: καὶ πρῶτ' ἐρήσομαι σε τουτί· παῖδά μ' ὄντ' ἔτυπτες; Στρ. ἔγωγέ σ', εὐνοῶν γε καὶ κηδόμενος. Φειδ. εἰπέ δή μοι· οὐ κάμει σοι δίκαιόν ἐστιν εὐνοεῖν ὁμοίως, τύπτειν τ', ἐπειδήπερ τόδ'

ἐστὶν εὐνοεῖν, τὸ τύπτειν; It should be noted that one of the charges falsely brought against Socrates was that he set sons against their parents: see Introduction to Apol. p. xxx.

30. ἔσται σοι sc. ἐξ ἴσου τὸ δίκαιον. The MSS read ἐξέσται, which Stallbaum vainly defends. The choice lies between ἐξ ἴσου ἔσται σοι (Hirschig) and ἔσται σοι (Schanz). I prefer the latter, both because it changes less, and because I dislike the cadence of the first: I think Plato, had he chosen to repeat ἐξ ἴσου, would have omitted σοι. I have added a mark of interrogation after ἔσται σοι: see on line 32.

31. ὥστε κτλ. A result deduced from ἔσται σοι (sc. ἐξ ἴσου). Note the emphatic σέ) (ἡμεῖς and in the next line σὺ) (ἡμᾶς: I follow Göbel and Kral in writing σέ against σε of the MSS.

32. καὶ σὺ δέ κτλ. In place of καὶ σέ ἡμᾶς—ἐπιχειρεῖν κτλ.—as we should naturally expect after ὥστε, a vivid question is substituted: compare on 50 D line 10. At the same time a better antithesis is provided for ἐὰν σέ ἐπιχειρώμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι, and the awkwardness of the two accusatives in καὶ σέ ἡμᾶς κτλ. is avoided. For καὶ—δέ see following note.

33. ἐπιχειρήσεις is of course an independent question: I know no case of καὶ—δέ in a dependent sentence. This example is instructive as to the origin of the combination καὶ—δέ= 'and also': the καὶ goes with the intervening words (cf. Aesch. Prom. 972—973 χλιδῶ; χλιδῶντας ὧδε τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἐγὼ ἐχθροὺς ἴδοιμι· καὶ σέ δ' ἐν τούτοις λέγω). The precise force of δέ in this place is difficult to explain. The editors say that it is used "ad augendam oppositionis gravitatem: pro simplici καὶ σὺ ἡμᾶς dictum est: καὶ σὺ δέ ἡμᾶς, usu haud infrequenti" (Stallbaum). For this 'not uncommon use' no parallels are quoted: and I prefer to regard it as the δέ found sometimes in interrogative sentences, e.g. Prot. 312 A σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτὸν σοφιστήν παρέχων;

34. ταῦτα ποιῶν sc. ἡμᾶς: cf. 50 E line 24 and note on 44 D ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν. τῇ ἀληθείᾳ is bitterly sarcastic: Socrates habitually professed ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς: see Apol. 30 A and 41 E: ἐπιμελεῖσθαι indeed was almost a technical term in Socrates' preaching: see Xen. Mem. I. 2. 3, 4 etc. Sarcasm is frequently brought out by adding a qualifying participial clause at the end of a sentence in this way: e.g. Apol. 34 A εὐρήσετε—πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτόιμους τῷ διαφθεύροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἔργα ζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. It should be noted that the manu-

scripts of Plato often fluctuate between *ἐπιμελούμενος* and *ἐπιμελόμενος*: here the Bodleian has *ἐπιμελόμενος*. On the adverbial phrase *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* see supra note on *ὡς ἀληθῶς* 46 D.

35. *ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφός*. The Bodleian has *ἦ* without accent: other MSS read *ἦ*. *ἦ* is a far superior reading: for the Laws having first taken Socrates at his own estimate (*ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος*) now proceed to take him at other people's. It is clear from Apol. 18 B that *σοφός* (like *φροντιστής*) was almost a nickname of Socrates. Here of course the word is used with bitter irony, as indeed it often was in Socrates' time: cf. Meno 75 C *τῶν σοφῶν—καὶ ἐριστικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν*: Xen. Mem. II. I 21 *Πρόδικος ὁ σοφός*.

36. *λέληθέν σε ὅτι κτλ*: it is implied that the new *σοφία* (of which Socrates and the Sophists were thought to be the professors) tended to lessen the hold of the State upon the individual: see Ar. Nubes 889—1104.

μητρός τε καὶ πατρός. For the order compare with Cron Prot. 346 A *οἶον ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων*: infra 51 C *οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα*. For the sentiment Stallbaum compares Cic. De Off. I. 57 "Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares: sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est: pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus?" That one's country has the first claim on one, and one's family and friends only the second, was the recognised principle of both Greek and Roman civic life, during their most flourishing periods. In setting self-study above political life Socrates was unconsciously preaching a view whose logical issue amounted to the dissolution of the old life which it was his aim to restore.

37. *τιμιώτερον—καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον* is a climax: *τίμιος* is one of the loftiest epithets that can be applied to *τὰνθρώπινα*: *σεμνός* is applied to *τὰ θεῖα* as well: *ἅγιος* almost exclusively to *τὰ θεῖα*. Translate 'worthier and more august and more sacred'.

38. *ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ*: an elevated and somewhat poetic expression: Cron compares Hdt. II. 172 *καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιῇ μοίρῃ μεγάλη εἶχον*.

39. *ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι*: few and far between: see Tim. 51 E *νοῦ δὲ θεοῦ* (sc. *μετέχειν φατέον*), *ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι*.

41. *καὶ ἢ πείθειν* sc. *δεῖ*. For *πείθειν* used absolutely cf. Apol. 35 C *διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν*, and supra 48 E *πείσαι σέ*.

43. **ἐάν τε** ('whether') **τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι** sc. *προστάττη*. This is to explain **ἐάν τι προστάττη παθεῖν** of line 42.

44. **ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον κτλ.** **ἐάν τε** is here='and if': the apodosis is *ποιητέον ταῦτα*. Socrates had himself fought bravely for his country at Potidaea (432 B.C.), Delium (424 B.C.) and Amphipolis (422 B.C.): see on Apol. 28 E.

46. **καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον—λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν.** *ὑπέικειν* is to give way (it may be slowly) before the enemy, rather than remain to die (*ἀποθανούμενον* in 45): cf. Rep. VIII. 555 E *τὸν ἀεὶ ὑπείκοντα—τιτρώσκοντες*. *ἀναχωρεῖν* is to retreat: Symp. 221 A *ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῆ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον*. *λείπειν τὴν τάξιν* suggests the *λιποταξίου γαφή*. The whole clause is meant to elaborate the idea in **ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα**.

51 C 49. **ἢ πείθειν** sc. *δεῖ*, to be supplied from *ποιητέον*, by a frequent idiom. Stallbaum quotes Gorg. 492 D *τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐὼντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμύθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν*.

50. **βιάζεσθαι.** *βιάζεσθαι* and *πείθειν* are often connected or opposed: cf. Gorg. 517 B *πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο*: Rep. VI. 488 D *ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον*.

CHAPTER XIII.

In this chapter the Laws insist that to remain in Athens is to have pledged oneself to obey them, for emigration is free to all.

2. **ἀληθῆ** is of course predicative, like *οὐ δίκαια* in the next line.

5. **γεννήσαντες ἐκθρέψαντες παιδεύσαντες**: see on 50 D and on 50 E.

51 D 8. **προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι**='we proclaim inasmuch as we have given permission'. *τῷ βουλομένῳ* depends on *ἐξουσίαν*, and *Ἀθηναίων* is a partitive genitive after *τῷ βουλομένῳ*. *ἐπειδὴν—νόμους* is also to be taken with *ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι*: the permission is *ipso facto* accorded as soon as the *δοκιμασία* is past. In line 10 *ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς* depends on *ἐξεῖναι*, which itself belongs to *προαγορεύομεν*. The apparent awkwardness of the sen-

tence is due to the use of *ἐξουσίαν* without a following infinitive: but this use is not uncommon in Plato, e.g. Rep. VIII. 557 D where it is said of democracy *πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν*: *ἐξουσία* was perhaps one of the familiar watchwords of Athenian democracy: cf. Thuc. VII. 69 *ὑπομνηστικῶν—τῆς—ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν—ἐξουσίας*.

9. *ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῆναι*. On attaining the age of 18, every Athenian was enrolled in the *ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον* or register of his deme, after the usual *δοκιμασία* or examination. This particular examination was called *δοκιμασία εἰς ἄνδρας* to distinguish it from the *δοκιμασίαι* which the various magistrates had to undergo before entering upon office. It marked the coming of age of the young Athenian citizen: but it was not till he was 20 that he took part in the public assembly and attained the full privileges of citizenship. From 18 to 20 he had to serve in the *περίπολοι* or patrol which guarded the frontiers of Attica. Stallbaum compares Aeschin. in Timarch. § 18 *ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐγγραφήν εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον καὶ τοὺς νόμους γινῶ καὶ εἰδῆ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἤδη δύνηται διαλογίζεσθαι τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ κτλ.*

11. *λαβόντα*, in spite of the preceding dative *ᾧ*: cf. Euthyphro 5 A *ἄρ' οὖν μοι—κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῆ σῶ γενέσθαι καὶ—αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ὅτι ἔγωγε κτλ.* Aesch. Choeph. 410 *πέπαλται δ' αὐτέ μοι φίλον κέαρ τόνδε κλύουσας οἴκτον.*

12. *καὶ οὐδεὶς—βούληται*: omitted by mistake in B.

14. *ἀποικίαν*: an Athenian colony: contrast *μετοικεῖν* in 15. *ἀρέσκομεν* is changed by Madvig (Adv. Crit. I. 369) into *ἀρέσκομεν*: but the text is quite sound. *εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν* is the protasis to the apodosis implied in *βούληται—εἰς ἀποικίαν ἰέναι*: it explains why one might wish to emigrate: tr. 'if any of you wants to go to a colony, supposing we and the State should not satisfy him'. *οὐδεὶς—ἀπαγορεύει, εἰάν—βούληται* is the regular form of a general (as opposed to a particular or special) conditional sentence: Dem. Ol. 2. 12 *ἅπας μὲν λόγος, ἂν ἀπῆ τὰ πράγματα, μάταιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ κενόν*: Goodwin MT. 108.

15. *ἐλθῶν* is not otiose: since *μετοικεῖν* = 'be an alien' (*μέτοικος*): for *μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσε ἐλθῶν, μετοικῆσαι* might have been substituted. See Goodwin MT. 24.

19. *ὠμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ τήμιν* = 'to have virtually covenanted 51 E with us'.

21. **γεννηταῖς**: so B, rightly: inferior MSS have *γεννήταις*. "*γεννηταί* sunt *genitores*: *γεννήται* *gentiles*.—Legg. XI. 928 D *διαφοραὶ πατέρων τε πρὸς αὐτῶν παῖδας γίνονται καὶ παίδων πρὸς γεννητὰς μείζους ἢ χρεῶν*. Contra *ib.* IX. 878 D *τοὺς γεννήτας καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς*". Wohlrab. MSS however do not always observe this rule.

22. **τροφεῦσι**: Socrates, so to speak, would have paid no *τροφεῖα*: Rep. VII 520 B.

ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι: *ἡμῖν*, as Göbel remarks, is to be taken with *ὁμολογήσας*. For the present *πείθεσθαι* cf. 50 C *ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο—ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις*: and *infr.* 52 D *ὠμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι*. In each of these passages Madvig (*Adv. Crit.* I. 370 note 1) changes the present to the future infinitive, on the ground that *ὁμολογῶ με ποιεῖν* = *confiteor me facere, promitto me facturum* = *ὁμολογῶ με ποιήσειν* (not *ποιεῖν*). The truth is that *ὁμολογεῖν* has two meanings, viz. 'to confess', and to 'bargain' or 'promise': and, since the word 'promise' itself implies futurity, it may even in this sense be followed by a present infinitive, although the future is preferred, when the notion of futurity is more prominent. Just so in English we can say 'I promise to do' as well as 'I promise that I will do'. The same distinction holds in my opinion for *ἐλπίζω, ἐλπίς ἐστι, προσδοκῶ, ἐπίδοξός εἰμι, οἶμαι, φημί, νομίζω, δοκῶ, εἰκός ἐστι* etc. with the present and future infinitive: although Madvig, Cobet, and the stricter school of critics generally insist that the notion of futurity must be expressed by the infinitive as well. See Madvig *Adv. Crit.* I. 156 foll., Cobet *Var. Lect.* 97 foll., Rutherford's *Babrius* p. 13, and on the other hand Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II. p. 163 ff.

24. **προτιθέντων**: the object is *ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν*. *προτιθέναι* is to propose some course of action, without, at the same time, excluding an alternative: this is still further brought out in *ἄλλ' ἐφιέντων δυοῖν θάτερα κτλ.* *ἀγρίως ἐπιτάττειν* suggests the angry tyrant: Gorg. 510 B *τύραννος—ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος*: Rep. I. 329 C *ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγῶν*. For the *asyndeton* see on *τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο* 47 A above. I have printed a colon before *προτιθέντων* as in 49 B.

CHAPTER XIV.

It is here argued that Socrates, if he were to abscond, would more than any other Athenian be guilty of a breach of bargain, because throughout all his life, even during the trial as well as before, he had shewn that Athens was more to him than any other city.

1. **Σώκρατες.** So B: inferior MSS read $\tilde{\omega}$ Σώκρατες. The 52 A effect of omitting $\tilde{\omega}$ is to increase the impressiveness, since $\tilde{\omega}$ Σώκρατες is the regular mode of address: in English we obtain the same effect by exactly the opposite means.

2. **ἐνέξασθαι** i. q. **ἐνοχον ἔσασθαι.**

4. **ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.** See above on *ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα* 43 C.

5. **καθάπτουσιντο.** *καθάπτεσθαι* (in Homer with acc., in Attic with gen.) is 'to fasten on', 'attack': Thuc. VI. 16. 1 *ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρξασθαι, ἐπειδὴ μου Νικίας καθήψατο.*

9. **τούτων** refers forward to the clause introduced by *ὅτι.*

52 B

11. **διαφερόντως:** differently from, i. e. more than: so too *διαφέρειν.* For the repetition of *διαφερόντως* in the protasis cf. Apol. 31 D *εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη.*

13. **ἐπὶ θεωρίαν** = "ad spectandos ludos sollemnes, videlicet Olympicos, Nemeaeos, Isthmios, Pythios, ad quos spectandos ex universa Graecia homines confluebant". Stallbaum.

14. **ἐξῆλθες.** An hypothetical clause *οὐ γὰρ ἂν—ἐπεδήμεις* is now followed by an unconditional statement of fact. After *ἐξῆλθες* in inferior MSS and in the margin of B are found the words *ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν.* The interpretation (for such it probably is) was already in the text used by Athenaeus: see V. 216 B *ἐν δὲ τῷ Κρίτωνι,—Πλάτων οὐδὲ ποιήσασθαι ποτε ἀποδημίαν τὸν Σωκράτη ἔξω τῆς εἰς Ἴσθμόν πορείας.* Nowhere else in Plato do we find any mention of such a journey, and at least one passage seems distinctly to deny it: Phaedr. 230 C *ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὐτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς οὐτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι.* Diogenes Laertius seems to have found the story in Favorinus, but not in Plato: he also attributes to Aristotle (no doubt wrongly) a statement to the effect that Socrates visited Delphi as well: see II. 5. 23 *καὶ Πυθώδε ἐλθεῖν Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς Ἴσθμόν, ὡς Φαβωρίνος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων.*

εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος: viz. at Potidaea, Delium, and Amphipolis: see on 51 B above, and Apol. 28 E.

15. ἀποδημίαν. Cron remarks that οὐδεμίαν is omitted after ἀποδημίαν for the sake of euphony.

16. ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι: 'Philosophi praesertim'. Forster. Cf. Hdt. I. 30, where Croesus says to Solon: περὶ σέο λόγος ἀπίκται πολλός—, ὡς φιλοσοφῶν γῆν πολλήν—ἐπέλελυθας.

ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως—ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι. By an idiom analogous to οἰδᾶ σε τίς εἶ the object of the infinitive εἰδέναι is made dependent on the word (ἐπιθυμία) upon which the infinitive itself depends: cf. Gorg. 513 E ἐπιχειρητέον ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν: Rep. IV. 443 B εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζουσιν. So in Latin quarum potiendi spe (Cic. de Fin. I. 60).

52 C 19. ἦροῦ—ὠμολόγεις—ἐποιήσω: for the combination of imperfect and aorist see on 50 D καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε. With ὠμολογεῖς πολιτεύσεσθαι contrast 51 E ὀμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι: see note *in loc.*

20. τά τε ἄλλα καὶ = 'and in particular'. The τά τε ἄλλα goes grammatically with ὠμολόγεις, not with πολιτεύσεσθαι (Cron) or with καὶ ἐπολιτεύου to be supplied from it (Stallbaum, Wohlrab, Göbel): to beget children in the city was virtually to *pledge oneself* (ὀμολογεῖν) to obey its laws.

21. ἔτι τοίνυν. τοίνυν = 'moreover', as often in Plato and the orators. Apol. 33 E.

22. φυγῆς τιμῆσασθαι = 'to propose the penalty of exile'. Cf. Apol. 37 C ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμῆσωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμῆσαιτε. In an ἀγὼν τιμητός, like Socrates' trial, it was the duty of the accused, should he be found guilty, to propose a counter penalty to that demanded by the prosecutor. Socrates proposed a fine of 30 minae: see Apol. 38 B.

24. ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν: viz. in Apol. 37 C—38 A. So Theaet. 195 D καλλωπιζόμενος ὡς τι εὐρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.

25. τεθνάναι: see on τεθνάναι in 43 C above.

26. λόγους αἰσχύνει: quite different from ἐπὶ λόγους αἰσχύνει: here the λόγοι are personified. Cf. Charm. 169 C ἡσχύνετο τοὺς παρόντας.

27. ἐντρέπει. 'Turn to' naturally passes into 'give heed to', 'regard': so advertere in Latin.

52 D 28. διαφθεῖραι: because the Laws are personified: see Introd. p. vii.

29. ἀποδιδράσκειν is the regular word to denote the running away of a slave: see on 50 A above.

30. ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι: see on ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι in 51 E.

33. ἔργω belongs to ὁμολογηκέναι: see 51 E ἤδη φάμεν τοῦτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργω ἡμῖν ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσῃν. ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ is bracketed by Göbel, after Hoenebeek: but the words serve to emphasize ἔργω—'with deeds, not with words'. It is implied that a verbal compact is less binding than one in which deeds take the place of words. The opposition of λόγος and ἔργον is familiar from Thucydides. For ἀλλά see note on 47 B.

34. ἄλλο τι ἢ = 'nonne': supra on 50 A. ὁμολογῶμεν is a deliberative conjunctive: like imperatival expressions generally, the deliberative conjunctive can be used in subordinate as well as in principal clauses: as here the full construction is ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ (=quam, not aut) ὁμολογῶμεν. Cf. Crat. 425 D εἰ μὴ ἄρα δῆ—ἀπαλλαγῶμεν i.e. 'unless perhaps we are to get off'. See Postgate in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. III. Part I. pp. 50—55.

37. ἂν φαίην: for the position of ἂν compare Phaed. 87 A τί οὖν, ἂν φαίην ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς;

38. ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. αὐτούς seems to emphasize ἡμᾶς: there is no reflexive meaning. Cron compares Phaed. 79 A ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχῆ; For αὐτούς Göbel conjectures σαυτοῦ, comparing 54 C: at first sight there seems no occasion for the unusually emphatic mode of expression. I think the meaning is 'bargains made actually with us': bad as it always is to break a bargain, it is still worse when the party to it is one's country: cf. 51 A—C μητρός τε καὶ πατρός καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ πατρίς κτλ.

41. ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα: Socrates was born in 469 B.C.

52 E

ἐν οἷς ἕξῃν σοὶ ἀπιέναι: hardly accurate: see 51 D.

44. ἄς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖσθαι: as in Xen. Mem. III. 5. 15—16 and IV. 4. 15, and often in Plato e.g. Prot. 342 A foll. and Rep. VIII. 544 C ἢ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινουμένην, ἢ Κρητικὴν τε καὶ Λακωνικὴν αὐτῆν καὶ δευτέρα κτλ. What Socrates most admired in Crete and Sparta was their implicit obedience to the law: they formed the best possible illustration of his principle—τὸ δίκαιον ἰς τὸ νόμιμον: see Introd. p. xiii. ἐκάστοτε sc. quotiescumque de iis loqueris (Stallbaum).

45. οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν. Socrates had occasional glimpses of a world beyond the pale of Hellenism, if we may trust Phaed. 78 A πολλή μὲν ἢ Ἑλλάς—πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητούντας τοιοῦτον ἐπῶδόν. It should be noted that οὐδέ goes closely with οὐδεμίαν : it of course has nothing to do with the preceding οὔτε.

53 A 46. ἐλάττω—ἀπεδήμησας : comparative of ὀλίγα—ἀπεδήμησας. For the statement itself see note on ἐξήλθες in 52 B above

47. ἀνάπηροι are “quicumque carent vel membro aliquo et parte corporis vel certe eius usu”. Fischer. For the ἀνα- cf. ἀναπλέως, ἀναπιμπλάναι in their medical sense : see on Apol. 32 C.

49. δῆλον ὅτι : adverbial : ὅτι as in εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι. The adverb is placed for emphasis at the end of the sentence as εἰκότως is so often in Demosthenes : just so in Symp. 195 B φεύγων φινγῆ τὸ γῆρας, ταχὺ ὄν δῆλον ὅτι· θάττον γοῦν τοῦ δέοντος ἡμῖν προσέρχεται.

50. ἄνευ νόμων goes closely with πόλις : ‘a city without laws’. The other meaning which suggests itself—‘who could like a state without liking her laws?’—cannot be got out of the Greek : ἄνευ νόμων cannot = ἄνευ τοῦ νόμου ἀρέσκειν. The reasoning is—no one could like a state which had no laws : you like your state, therefore you like her laws. Schanz (after Hirschig) brackets δῆλον ὅτι—ἄνευ νόμων : but the clause contains a valuable and strictly relevant idea, viz. that a πόλις ἄνευ νόμων is a πόλις ἄπολις.

νῦν δὲ δή = ‘but now forsooth’. οὐκ ἐμμένεις is better than οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς (so Schanz with the second hand in B) : cf. πράττεις and παραβαίνεις in 52 D.

51. εἰάν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ = ‘yes, if you take our advice’. For the form of expression cf. 53 E οὐδεὶς ὅς ἐρεῖ ; ἴσως, ἂν μὴ τινα λυπῆς : see also 53 C—D and 54 B.

καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει = ‘and at least you will escape being laughed at’. This reappears in 53 D. τὸ καταγέλαστον makes one καταγελᾶν : τὸ γελοῖον only γελᾶν. Hence γελοῖον often = ‘funny’ ‘amusing’. Symp. 189 B (loquitur Aristophanes) φοβοῦμαι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθῆσθαι, οὗ τι μὴ γελοῖα εἶπω, τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν κέρδος εἴη καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας μούσης ἐπιχώριον, ἀλλὰ μὴ καταγέλαστα.

CHAPTER XV.

The Laws now reply in detail to the arguments of Crito: see Chapters III—V and compare Introduction pp. viii—ix. Escape will bring danger on his friends, misery and disgrace upon himself, and to say the least will leave his children in no way better provided.

1. **σκοπεί γάρ δή** 'Just consider'. **γάρ** is introductory: see on 44 A.

παραβάς καὶ ἔξαμαρτάνων. Note the difference of tense: an **ἀμαρτία** remains so till it is expiated. Cf. **ἡδίκηει** in 50 C, where see note. **ταῦτα** in **ταῦτα παραβάς** is not 'these duties' (Göbel), but 'these transgressions': a cognate accusative.

4. **σου οἱ ἐπιτήδαιοι** is preferred to **οἱ σοὶ ἐπιτήδαιοι** for reasons of sound, and also perhaps because **ἐπιτήδαιοι** is still felt to be an adjective. 53 B

5. **καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν** = 'et ipsi exulare': sc. as well as you: **καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως** i.q. **ἄτιμοι γενέσθαι** sc. by banishment. On **στερηθῆναι** see above, note on 44 B. The Laws here reply to Crito's pleading in 44 E and 45 E.

6. **σχεδόν τι** 'pretty nearly', propemodum. **σχεδόν τι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**, and **ἐμβραχὺ** all mean much the same: the first generally goes with adjectives, the second with **οὐδεὶς** or **πᾶς**; the third is found only with relatives (**ἐμβραχὺ περὶ οὗτου ἂν βούληται** Gorg. 457 A).

7. **πρῶτον μὲν**: the second alternative comes infra in D **ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἢ ξεῖς δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν κτλ.** See on **πρῶτον μὲν** in 50 D.

9. **Θήβαζε**. For **Θήβαςδε**: ζ was in fact pronounced *dz*: see Gustav Meyer, *Griechische Grammatik* 2 p. 219. So **Ἀθήναζε θύραζε χαμάζε**. Note the double accent in **Μεγάραδε** (so Bekker, Cron, Schanz, Göbel: Wohlrab however reads **Μεγάραδε** and Kral **Μεγάραδε**): **δε** is enclitic. The constitution of Thebes and Megara was oligarchical: hence **εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφοτέραι** is said (not without a touch of sarcasm) from Socrates' point of view.

10. **πολέμιος ἦξεις τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ**. Because even though you approve of their constitution, you have violated your own, and may violate theirs next, now that you have ceased to believe that **δίκαιον** is **νόμιμον**. **τούτων** is masculine.

12. **ὑπαβλέψονταί σε** = 'will eye you askance'. So in *Symp.* 220 B **οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ὑπέβλεπον αὐτὸν ὡς καταφρονοῦντα σφῶν**.

ὑπο- is 'from under the eyebrows': i.e. with a scowling expression (ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας Phaed. 117 B), or sometimes furtively, of the stolen glances of lovers: see L. and S. s. v.

διαφθορέα τῶν νόμων: see on 50 B and Introd. p. vii.

13. βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν ὥστε δοκεῖν. τοῖς δικασταῖς is a dativus commodi. For τὴν δόξαν ὥστε δοκεῖν see on 44 C τίς ἂν αἰσχιῶν εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν κτλ.

53 C 15. σφόδρα που—διαφθορεὺς εἶναι: since it is easier διαφθεῖ-
ρειν ἀνοήτους ἀνθρώπους than reasonable laws. νόμων and ἀνθρώ-
πων are opposed. The indictment of Socrates is to be found in
Apol. 24 B Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα
καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά.

18. κοσμιωτάτους: κόσμιος is ὁ κόσμον ἔχων Gorg. 506 E.

19. ἡ πλησιάζεις τούτοις. τούτοις=τοῖς κοσμιωτάτοις: whence
ἀναισχυντήσεις.

20. τίνας λόγους;—ἡ οὔσπερ. More vivid than τοὺς αὐτοὺς
λόγους οὔσπερ. B has ἡ: so Cron and Göbel. Schanz and Wohlrab
read ἡ with some MS authority. ἡ=Latin -ne? ἡ=Latin an?: see
on Apol. 26 B.

21. ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ—πλείστου ἄξιον: see Apol. 30 A—B, and note.

53 D 23. ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι. On ἂν with future participle see
Goodwin MT. p. 60. Hirschig reads ἀναφανεῖσθαι.

τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα='Socrates and everything about
him'. So οἱ περὶ Ἄνυτον='Anytus and those with him': Apol.
18 B. There is some contempt in the expression: cf. Hipp. Maior
286 E φαῖλον γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐμὸν πρᾶγμα καὶ ἰδιωτικόν. Χρῆμα is
used in much the same way, only with still more contempt, e.g.
Rep. VIII. 567 E ἡ μακάριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα.
Weariness and disgust are expressed by a similar phrase in the first
line of the Clouds: ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ χρῆμα τῶν νυκτῶν ὄσον.

24. οἴεσθαι γε χρή: a way of answering one's own question:
so infra 54 B.

25. ἀπαρεῖς: Socrates as an exile moving from city to city: cf.
Apol. 37 D καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι, τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ
ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. The
Laws are now replying to Crito's proposal in 45 C.

26. πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία. ἀταξία is the opposite of
κοσμιότης: ἀκολασία of σωφροσύνη: see Gorg. 506 D—507 A. Thes-
saly and Macedonia were almost proverbial for licence and de-
bauchery: see (for Thessaly) Xen. Mem. I. 2. 24 Κριτίας—φυγῶν εἰς

Θεταλλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρωμένοις : and Theopompus ap. Athen. XII. 527 ζῶσι μὲν σὺν ταῖς ὀρχηστρίσι καὶ ταῖς αὐλητρίσι διατρίβοντες, οἳ δ' ἐν κύβοις καὶ πότοις καὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἀκολασίαις διημερεύοντες, καὶ μᾶλλον σπουδάζουσιν ὅπως θῦψαν παντοδαπῶν τὰς τραπέζας παραθήσονται πλήρεις ἢ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον παρασχῆσονται κεκοσμημένον.

27. ὡς γελοίως: see on καταγέλαστος in 53 A.

28. ἀπεδίδρασκες: the pictorial imperfect. σκευή is dress or apparel of some kind, generally unusual, as for instance the dress of an actor.

29. ἡ διφθέραν λαβῶν ἢ ἄλλα: two kinds of σκευή are specified. The διφθέρα was a shepherd's skin coat.

30. ἐνσκευάζεσθαι = induere.

καὶ τὸ σχῆμα μεταλλάξας: καὶ corresponds to τε in σκευὴν τέ τινα (line 28). The clause refers to personal disguises not connected with dress. B has καταλλάξας corrected to μεταλλάξας in the margin. μεταλλάσσειν = 'to change': καταλλάσσειν = (1) 'to exchange' (2) 'to reconcile'.

33. οὕτως αἰσχροῦς goes with ζῆν and is explained by νόμους 53 E τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς.

34. οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ: with omission of the copula as in οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ.

35. ἀκούσει serves as passive to ἐρεῖς: see on 50 E. εἰ δὲ μὴ = alioquin: cf. (with Forster) Phaed. 91 C ἐὰν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε.

36. ὑπερχόμενος = 'cringing to', 'fawning on'. In this sense (= θωπεύω, πρὸς χάριν ὀμιλῶ) ὑπέρχομαι may be used outside pres. Indicative in good Attic: when = 'go under', then like ἔρχομαι and its compounds generally, it supplies the other parts from εἶμι (ἦα, ἴω, ἴοιμι, ἴθι, ἰέναι, ἰών, fut. εἶμι). Cobet, *Variae Lectiones* pp. 34, 307.

βιώσει. "Verbum ζῆν habet ἀπτικιστί has formas ζῶ, βιώσομαι, ἐβίω, βεβίωκα, βεβίωται μοι. βιώ et ἐβίουν nemo dicit, sed ζῶ et ἔζω ἐξῆς ἐξῆ. βιοῖ et similia Ionica sunt. ζῆσω apud Atticos semel et iterum comparat." Cobet, *Var. Lect.* p. 610.

37. δουλεύω is not otiose, as Stallbaum points out: for the δοῦλος is a degree below the κόλαξ.

τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος. τί = τί ἄλλο: cf. Meno 86 E εἰ μὴ τι οὖν, ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον. Rep. VI. 509 C καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύση, εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ—διεξιῶν. For εὐωχούμενος used in connection with the luxury of the north cf. Ar. Ran. 83—

85: 'Αγάθων δὲ ποῦ 'στιν; ἀπολιπὼν ἔμ' ὄχεται, ἀγαθὸς ποιητῆς καὶ ποθεινὸς τοῖς φίλοις. ποῖ γῆς ὁ τλήμων; ἐς μακάρων εὐωχίαν: Agathon had settled at the court of Archelaus king of Macedon. Schanz brackets and Kral rejects ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ: but there is rhetorical force in the double mention of Thessaly at the end of the two clauses: see on 53 D line 26.

38. ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον—Θεσσαλίαν; added with bitter scorn to explain the Θεσσαλῶν εὐωχία.

54 A 40. ἀλλὰ δὴ: alluding to Crito's plea in 45 C—D. ἀλλὰ δὴ is like 'at enim' 'oh but', and introduces a counter-argument: see Protag. 338 C ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἰρήσεσθε τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ.—ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν, ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἐλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἰρήσεσθε κτλ. In accordance with this and other examples, I have printed a full stop after παιδείσης: the other editors take the sentence as interrogative.

42. τί δέ;=quid vero? Note the emphatic place of εἰς Θεσσαλίαν: Thessaly had an evil name: see on 53 D.

43. ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν: τοῦτο=τὸ ξένοι εἶναι. ἀπολαύειν has ironical force: the word is ordinarily used of something good. So in Eur. Phoen. 1204—5 Κρέων δ' ἔοικε τῶν ἐμῶν νυμφευμάτων τῶν τ' Οἰδίπου δύστηνος ἀπολαύσαι κακῶν κτλ. ἀπολαύω is construed generally with gen. of the object from which the enjoyment is derived, except where that object is a neuter pronoun: inferior MSS here read τοῦτό σου.

44. οὐ i.e. οὐκ ἔσται. παιδευθήσομαι is used as well as παιδεύσομαι in the passive sense: θρέψομαι is however better than τραφήσομαι.

45. ξυνόντος. ξυνεῖναι and ξινουσία are regularly used in Plato of the relation between teacher and pupil, e.g. Gorg. 515 B τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποικέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῆ; Hence the τόκος ἐν καλῶ of Symp. 206 B.

46. ἐπιμελήσονται: see on 51 A line 34 above. Schanz brackets ἐπιμελήσονται here, reading οἱ σοὶ αὐτῶν πότερον κτλ.: but the sentence is spoken from Socrates' point of view.

54 B 49. σοὶ of course goes with ἐπιτηδεῖων. For οἶσθαί γε χρή in the next line see on 53 D.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Laws conclude their appeal by asking Socrates to think of the future world as well as this: see *Introd.* pp. viii and xvi.

2. **τροφεύσι:** see 51 A. Meiser reads *τοῖς σοῖς γεννηταῖς καὶ τοῖς σοῖς τροφεύσι.*

3. **πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου** after *πλείονος*, as after other comparatives in *Phaed.* 99 A *εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾧμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἢν τιν' ἀντάττη.* Cobet needlessly rejects *πρὸ:* see Wohlrab in *Fleckeisen's Jahrb.* for 1876 p. 126. For *δικαίον* see note on 45 C *ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ δικαίον* above.

4. **ἵνα εἰς Ἄιδου ἔλθῶν:** the belief in a future life is expressed more dogmatically here than in the *Apology*: see 40 C foll. Compare *Introd.* p. xvi.

5. **τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν:** compare *Gorg.* 526 D—E *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν—ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχὴν—καὶ ὀνειδίξω σοι ὅτι οὐχ οἶός τ' ἔσεισαν τῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ἦ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἦν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἔλθῶν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν, ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμῆσει καὶ λιγγιάσει οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ.*

7. **οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον.** *οὐδέ* joins *ἄμεινον* to *δικαιότερον*: *οὔτε* in line 6 corresponds to *οὔτε* in line 8. *δικαίον* is τὸ προσήκον περὶ ἀνθρώπους: ὄσιον, τὸ προσήκον περὶ θεούς: see *Gorg.* 507 B.

8. **οὐδὲ ἄλλω.** *οὐδέ* joins *σοι* in line 6 to *ἄλλω.* *ἐκεῖσε* of the future world: see on *Apol.* 40 E *ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεώτες*: cf. *τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν* in line 5 and *ἐκεῖ* in C line 16.

10. **οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων:** the *ἀνθρωποι* are the *δικασταί*, falsely so called: see *Apol.* 24 D—E. For the full significance of this sentence see *Introduction* pp. x—xi: and cf. note on 49 B *οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν.* Hence *ἀνταδικήσας* and *ἀντικακουργήσας* in 11 and 12 have for their object not the laws, but the *δικασταί*. 54 C

11. **οὕτως αἰσχροῦς** goes with *ἐξέλθῃς* and is explained by the two participles that follow. There is an allusion to 49 B—D.

13. **παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος:** these participles explain *ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας.*

14. οὐς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτὸν τε κτλ. Note the emphatic place of *σαυτὸν*: oneself is the last person one should injure. Compare Apol. 37 B *πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ γε δέω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν*. Socrates' philosophy was egoism: see *Introd.* pp. xii—xiii. *σαυτὸν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς* sums up the argument of Chapters XI—XV.

16. οἱ ἐν Ἄιδου νόμοι: Cron refers to Soph. Antig. 450 foll. οὐ γάρ τί μοι Ζεὺς ἦν ὁ κηρύξας τάδε, οὐδ' ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν Δίκη τοιούσδ' ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὤρισεν νόμους.

54 D 19. μή σε πείσῃ: Goodwin MT. p. 181.

CHAPTER XVII.

Socrates concludes by giving his verdict in favour of the laws and constitution of Athens. *Introd.* pp. xi and xvi—xvii.

1. ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων. There is pathos and sympathy in this unusually long mode of address: Cobet and Naber utterly spoil the passage by omitting *Κρίτων*: Göbel omits *ἑταῖρε*.

2. οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν. The Corybantes were priests of Cybele whose worship was attended with much clamour of dancing and music on the flute. Lambinus aptly compares Hor. Epist. I. I. 7 'est mihi purgatam crebro qui personet aurem'. Göbel omits *δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν*, but the text as it stands is far more impressive. Just so the demonstrative is repeated in *αὐτῇ ἢ ἄλλῃ τούτων τῶν λόγων*, and in the last line of the chapter: *πράττωμεν αὐτῇ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται*.

5. βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. Socrates might have said much the same of his *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*: compare Apol. 40 A—B. I think Plato meant to suggest that the pleading of the Laws coincided with the voice of the divine sign: see *Introd.* p. xvi.

6. ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα. Socrates' diffidence is characteristic: cf. Rep. VI. 506 E *πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν* ('what is after all only my present opinion'). Compare Gorg. 527 A and Phaed. 85 C—D. For the syntax cf. 46 E *ὅσα γε πάνθρώπεια*.

11. ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται. Compare the words with which the Apology concludes (42 A) *ἀδελον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ*. The voice of the Laws seems to Socrates to be the voice of God: his divine sign would not allow him to escape. See *Introd.*, p. xvi.