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Brazil and the World

This essay is an analysis of Brazil's international relations in the twentieth century. Such an analysis brings together a range of themes and problems. The organizing perspective of this survey, though, is that foreign policy is public policy whose purpose is translating domestic needs into possible foreign relations.

The Legacy of Rio Branco

For the history of Brazilian diplomacy, the nineteenth century stretched into the first decade of the twentieth century. This decade was the final phase of the career of José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., Baron of Rio Branco. Rio Branco's service as Brazil's minister of foreign relations from 1902 to 1912 crowned an exemplary diplomatic career. Rio Branco completed Brazil's primary task as a newly independent nation: consolidation of the national territory.¹ Setting international borders is always a key challenge in any country's foreign policy. The first problem on a new country's diplomatic agenda is establishing the difference between the "domestic" and "foreign" and, therefore, the specificity of foreign policy as public policy.

The detailed process of setting Brazil's borders, begun in the colonial and imperial periods, culminated in the republican era with Rio Branco's numerous efforts. In bequeathing to the nation the legal title to a continent-sized territory, Rio Branco brought to a positive close the activity of navigators, wilderness tamers, and diplomats since 1500, the year that Portugal laid claim to Brazil. These were the agents of history that, based in their Lusitanian heritage, managed to create "the body of the homeland."² Rio Branco managed to conclude this feat through peaceful means—through arbitration and negotiations that led to

treaties. In the estimation of a recent ambassador to the United States, Rubens Ricúpero, the work of Rio Branco was a diplomatic undertaking with few parallels in the history of international relations, especially if one considers that Brazil has more neighbors than most countries and that, moreover, several other continent-size countries, including Russia, India, and China, still have not fully resolved their border problems.³

Setting the borders fixed Brazil's place in the world and allowed the release of the "deep forces" of economics and geography that would distinguish Brazilian foreign policy in the twentieth century.⁴ It is the peculiarities arising from these "deep forces" that I will outline in this essay. These characteristics are expressed in Brazil's relationships with its neighbors, its posture in relation to the major powers, the affirmation of a "goal-oriented nationalism," focused on the development of the nation's territory, and the conduct of foreign policy in a Grotian mold, which, over time and space, has used diplomacy and law, without naivete, to deal with conflict and cooperation on the international level while addressing national interests.

The Best Policy for the Continent

By relieving Brazil of its border-drawing tasks, Rio Branco left the country free and at home in its South American setting—the site of Brazil's diplomatic first person, as José Ortega y Gasset would say. Once he had legally consolidated the map of Brazil, the next stage of Rio Branco's vision was to ensure peace and stimulate progress in South America.⁵ In the twentieth century, Rio Branco's plan became a conduit for Brazilian foreign policy, which addressed the deep forces of economics and geography in diplomatically constructive ways. Indeed, a climate of peace in South America was an important condition for the development of Brazil's territory, and it was the predominant direction in Brazil's foreign policy after Rio Branco. This was why, in the 1930s, Brazil actively sought conciliatory solutions to the Leticia Conflict between Colombia and Peru and to the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. The role of Brazil in the 1990s as one of the guarantors of the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro that settled the Ecuador-Peru border dispute follows this same line.

This line of foreign policy that Rio Branco envisioned, directed toward peace and progress in South America, is representative of the classic concept of diplomacy: countries should try to make the best policy for their geography. In the course of the twentieth century, this principle was elaborated to foster develop-

ment, the modern expression of the concept of progress. From this comes the driving idea that it is good to make not only the best foreign policies but also the best economy for one's geography. For example, Europe has been doing this since the 1950s through its integration process. This also explains the recent effort to transform Brazil's borders from classical frontier barriers to modern frontiers of cooperation. This line of Brazilian diplomatic policy toward its neighbors is rooted in the fact that South America is a physically contiguous whole that affords opportunities for economic cooperation. This cooperation maximizes the comparative advantages of the region in the global economy by adding value and reducing costs while stimulating trade and investment connections in a peaceful climate.

There are several landmarks in foreign policy aimed at strengthening regional cooperation, facilitated by Brazil's geographic and economic reach. These include the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) founded in 1960, followed in 1980 by the Latin American Integration Association; the River Plate Basin Treaty of 1969; the 1973 Itaipu Treaty with Paraguay to build the Itaipu hydroelectric dam; the 1979 accord among Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay for use of the Itaipu and Corpus hydroelectric plants; and the Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline opened in 1999.

Of course, the paradigm for this transformation of borders in South America is Mercosul (in Spanish Mercosur), the result of an effective strategic restructuring of relations between Argentina and Brazil. The most significant groundwork for Mercosul came after the end of the region's military regimes in the 1980s. Thanks to the initiatives of Presidents Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina and José Sarney of Brazil, the two countries reached a new level of understanding. The landmark for this new plateau was the 1988 Integration, Cooperation, and Development Treaty, which, in its broadest framework, the political one, undertook the consolidation of democratic values and respect for human rights. It accomplished this through confidence-building measures between the two partners meant to reduce strategic and military tensions, especially in the nuclear arena.

Mercosul proper was the achievement of Presidents Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso on the Brazilian side and President Carlos Menem on the Argentine side. Established in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción, Mercosul not only brought Paraguay and Uruguay into the integration process but also created an associative connection with Bolivia and Chile. Mercosul expresses a vision of open regionalism, works toward the compatibility of domestic and foreign agendas for modernization, and is a benchmark for countries that

are integrating democratically. Notwithstanding the economic difficulties that the countries have been facing since the 1980s, Mercosul is a symbol of the new presence of South America in the post-Cold War world.

Just as the understanding between France and Germany built the foundation for the European Community, the understanding between Brazil and Argentina that is at the heart of Mercosul has an international security scope, especially in the nuclear arena. The confidence-building measures of the 1980s culminated in the 1990s in the creation of a formal mechanism for mutual inspections. These opened the two countries' nuclear facilities to international supervision and put the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits nuclear arms in Latin America, into full force. When Brazil ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1998, the international nonproliferation regime broadened its scope, since Argentina and Brazil were no longer "threshold states."

In summary, as a function of its geography, of its historical experience, and of the dominant diplomatic line of the twentieth century, the South American component of Brazil's international identity is one of the deep forces of economics and geography, and it is a positive force in Brazil's foreign policy at that. In a world that is simultaneously globalizing and regionalizing, Brazil's neighborhood fosters peace and development, in contrast to those of China, India, and Russia—also countries of a continental scale. Brazil charts its course into the future toward what Cardoso called the organization of the South American space.⁶ In the new millennium, the specter of worry about the organization of this space lies in a feature of global security that has changed since the end of the Cold War. The threats of war and confrontation that can affect Brazil directly have been effectively reduced. In their place, though, diffuse risks of nameless violence have increased. In South America, these risks come from the potential weakness of state power among some of Brazil's neighbors. This weakness makes it difficult for some states to deal with centrifugal forces that lend themselves to upheavals by distinct groups, among these organized crime, drugs, and guerrilla warfare.

The Best Policy for the World Stage

As Brazil established the South American component of its international identity in the twentieth century, it did so through foreign policy activity based on a relative equality among states. Evidently, the farther South America was from the dynamics of the international system's political and economic center, the more this basis was affected by what Ambassador Ricúpero describes as "axes

of asymmetrical relation.” These are the interactions between Brazil (and other South American countries) and states that have appreciably different amounts of political and economic power.⁷ At the beginning of the twentieth century, the “unwritten alliance” that Rio Branco forged with the United States took this asymmetry into account. From the Brazilian point of view, this alliance had two goals. On its axis of asymmetrical relations, it relieved Brazil of the political and economic burden of its previous relations with the European powers. The alliance also preserved the relative symmetry of relations with Brazil’s neighbors, so as not to be contaminated by the asymmetrical axes. Rio Branco had always viewed Washington as “the main center of intrigues and petitions for intervention against Brazil by some of Brazil’s neighbors, whether permanent rivals or momentarily adversaries.”⁸

Preserving an autonomous space in establishing Brazil’s vision of Pan-Americanism was a concern shared by both Rio Branco and Joaquim Nabuco, then ambassador to Washington, who presided over the Third Pan-American Conference in 1906. In the course of the twentieth century, this concern would mark Brazil’s posture in both multilateralism and relations on the asymmetrical axis. For example, Brazil interpreted the Monroe Doctrine not as a unilateral declaration of the United States but rather as a part of international law in the Americas, applicable through the cooperative action of the principal republics. In other words, the multilateral interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as a constituent part of Brazilian foreign policy doctrine entailed a controlling role over unilateral U.S. interference based on its premise of “manifest destiny.”⁹

This political containment of the major powers was part of what came to be Brazil’s vision of its role in twentieth-century international stratification. This vision did not arise clearly in the nineteenth century because, situated as it was on the geographic, political, and economic periphery of the Concert of Europe, Brazil had no way of proposing alternatives to an international political system that attributed power to manage the world order exclusively to a balance among the major powers. Although Brazil had no way of opposing this system of power exercised through the diplomatic logic of the Concert of Europe, it was not comfortable within it. This discomfort with the system eventually, after the legal consolidation of its territory discussed above, appeared as a deep force in Brazil’s foreign policy.

This is the paradigmatic significance of senior statesman Rui Barbosa’s actions as Brazil’s ambassador to the Second Peace Conference in The Hague in 1907. This was Brazil’s diplomatic debut in international forums. Representing repub-

lican Brazil, with the support of Rio Branco, and based on the principle of the legal equality of states, Barbosa claimed a role in developing and applying norms for governing the major international problems of the time. He thus questioned the logic of the major powers. This questioning of the world order gained conceptual clarity during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Brazil participated as a consequence of its role, albeit modest, in World War I. The discussion of the conference's rules led to the Treaty of Versailles and the pact creating the League of Nations. The debate over Article 1 posed a distinction between the warring nations with "general interests" (the United States, France, England, Italy, and Japan), who would participate in all of the sessions and commissions, and the other warring nations with "limited interests." The latter would participate only in sessions in which matters that affected them directly would be discussed. Martin Wright has judged this to be the best definition of "major power" because these countries believed that having "general interests" meant having interests that were as broad as the international system itself, which in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been global. This universality of interests and ambitions—to aspire to the whole world, "to the sum of human affairs" in Campanella's words—was illogical from Brazil's point of view. This was because the new inspirational principle of the League of Nations, based on Wilson's Fourteen Points, was opposed to the logic of the old Concert of Europe in that it affirmed the equality of nations before the law. Applying the rule of Article 1 would negate this concept, relegating those countries that were not major powers to the background, as satellites of the others, according to Brazil's delegate in Paris, Pandiá Calógeras. This would mean, in his estimation, allowing the more powerful nations to serve as tribunals for judging the interests of the less powerful ones. It was because of this assessment that Brazil took initiative along with the other countries with "limited interests" to force the major powers to accept the presence of less powerful nations in the various conference commissions.¹⁰

The affirmation that Brazil had "general interests" or, rather, that it had a view of the world and its operation, and that this view was important for protecting and guiding the specific interests of the country as made clear after World War I, became a constant of Brazil's international identity and another deep force in its foreign policy in the course of the twentieth century. The locus standi for this affirmation lies in the diplomatic competence with which Brazil has continuously conducted its international affairs as a midsize power of continental scale and regional relevance.

It is not easy to imagine what a "midsize power" is. In his 1589 book *The Reason*

of State, Giovanni Botero pointed out that these powers have the characteristic of not being so weak that they are exposed to the violence that less powerful countries suffer. At the same time, they do not provoke the same envy that the major powers do as a result of their greatness. Moreover, because those in the middle participate in the two extremes, they have, in principle, the sensitivity to exercise the Aristotelian virtue of seeking the mean. The Aristotelian middle ground is a formula for justice and therefore can be a case for legitimacy, depending on the diplomatic circumstances. Such an approach is apt to achieve a general inclusiveness that is of interest to other global protagonists. Under these circumstances, midsize powers can and do act in the realm of politically viable diplomatic proposals, and in this arena they can become articulators of consensus.¹¹

Brazil has shown a capacity for articulating consensus. It has frequently been a third-party mediator among the more and less powerful countries on the multilateral stage. The legal standing for this role—that is, of working toward the possibility of harmony—came from a detail that conferred on Brazil a unique identity in the international system. Brazil is a continent-size country, like the United States, Russia, China, and India. George F. Kennan, taking into account not only geographic and demographic data but also economic and political facts and the magnitude of their problems and challenges, considers these “monster countries.”¹² At the same time, Brazil is not a monstrous country. In the first place, it does not have “an excess of power or an excess of cultural, economic, or political attraction,” according to Ambassador Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro. Thus it needs to build its international presence on the basis of confidence, expressed as coherence.¹³ Even if Brazil is a midsize power because of its limited means, it is a continent-size one as well. This condition naturally confers on it a world-class quality. Brazil plays an international role because of its size, but not as a scary monster, because it behaves according to a Grotian reading of international reality. It does so because of its history and place in the world, both in symmetric and asymmetric relations. This group of factors gives Brazil the credibility of a “soft power,” necessary for exercising the Aristotelian virtue of the middle ground. Contributing to this competence is a repertoire of comprehension of the world derived from an ample store of diplomatic relations that the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations has cultivated over time. This comprehension also comes from the experience of economic development in the twentieth century, through which Brazil earned diversified markets in international trade and foreign investments from a range of sources in its domestic economy.¹⁴ Brazil’s mediating role in the sphere of international relations is not a given, however; it is a challenge

in each diplomatic circumstance. Success or failure in these challenges depends on the relative intensity of tensions and controversies on the world scene at any given time.

Brazil has been playing the role of a “soft power” with the goal of assuring a position from which to defend its national interests. This function is a matter of a deep force of Brazilian foreign policy focused on the international stratification that arose in the course of the twentieth century, through the broadening of multilateralism as a result of the increasing activity of the United Nations after World War II. This broadening multilateralism has occurred in three areas: in the strategic and military arena, concerning the risks of war and the chances for peace; in the economic and financial arena, leading to norms of mutual cooperation directed toward the creation of international and regional legal frameworks for managing the interdependence of national economies; and in the area of values, which is related to discrepancies and affinities in conceptions of society.

In the course of the twentieth century, the latitude for mediating action adjusted to the varied and variable possibilities that both domestic and foreign circumstances offered. As Brazil enters the twenty-first century, the deep force of mediation is a positive one, both in the international sphere and in the sphere of domestic imperatives. In the international sphere, this is a function of the contribution that Brazil can make in reducing the precariousness of world order, which is being shaped by the centripetal logic of globalization and contested by the centrifugal logic of fragmentation characterized by an undeniable deficit of governability in the international system. In the sphere of domestic needs, the reason for Brazil’s diplomatic actions came into sharp focus in the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These events marked the end of what Eric Hobsbawm has called the “short twentieth century.”¹⁵ The twentieth century was also short for Brazil because, at the same time that world events offered Brazil the chance for positive outcomes from globalization, these events made even clearer that Brazil’s specific interests were more than ever tied to the “general interests” in the dynamics of the new world order. This observation is based on evidence that I will point out in the next section.

Development and Goal-Oriented Nationalism

There are present dilemmas that are connected with putting into operation Brazil’s “goal-oriented nationalism,” another deep force of its foreign policy in the twentieth century. By addressing the issue of borders in the early twentieth cen-

tury, Rio Branco made it possible for his successors to dedicate themselves to the line of diplomacy that has been and continues to be the distinguishing feature of Brazil's foreign policy, even given changes in domestic and foreign circumstances: development of Brazil's territory. The theme of development is a deep force in Brazilian foreign policy whose formulations were permeated by analyses of and reflections on national identity in the course of the twentieth century. These formulations were provoked in part by the issue of international stratification, that is, by perception of the Other that derived from power asymmetries among nations. At the same time, discussion about Brazilian development emphasized the contrast between the potential and the reality of a continent-size country like Brazil. This is the context in which one must examine the role of nationalism in the construction of Brazil's *international* identity. One thrust of this nationalism has been toward internal integration of Brazil's huge land area. It is not, therefore, an expansionist nationalism like some others. Instead, it is compatible with the conduct of diplomacy that characterized Brazil's relations with its neighbors and with the major powers in the twentieth century, described above.

The term "nationalism" carries multiple meanings. Summarizing a multifaceted debate, we can say that, on the one hand, there is a more naive trend of nationalism that patriotically exalts the potential of a new country. An early Brazilian example is Afonso Celso's 1900 book *Porque me ufano do meu país* (Why I Am Proud of My Country). On the other hand, there is a more profound trend of nationalism that entails a hard, realistic evaluation of the country's shortcomings. In Brazil, this evaluation has its roots in the classics of Brazilian social science of the 1930s by Gilberto Freyre, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, and Caio Prado Jr. (see chapter 2) and their successors in the following decades, for example, Celso Furtado, Raimundo Faoro, and Florestan Fernandes. These scholars sought to interpret Brazil, and their work formed the basis of important academic production that, with differing methodological and political orientations, tried to explain the faults in the country's development. In this connection, the Revolution of 1930, a political, economic, and cultural watershed in twentieth-century Brazilian history, signaled a general change in perspective (see chapter 3). As a consequence, Brazilian nationalism deepened its critical understanding by posing the notion that Brazil was an underdeveloped country.¹⁶

The consequence of this process of growing awareness was that creating a national consciousness would require a plan that could systematically overcome the faults in development, one of which is social exclusion. From this came the driv-

ing idea of a nationalism devoted to national integration based on development. The result was a goal-oriented nationalism, which Hélió Jaguaribe described in the following terms: “Nationalism is not an imposition of our particularities, nor is it a simple expression of our national characteristics. On the contrary, it is a means to an end: development.”¹⁷

The context that guided these reflections clearly fed Brazilian foreign policy and diplomatic activity beginning in the 1930s. According to Horácio Lafer, this policy and its activity had two main lines. The first was “to cultivate the autonomous space,” that is, “to preserve the freedom to interpret the reality of the country and to find Brazilian solutions for Brazilian problems.”¹⁸ The second line was to identify the external resources in various international circumstances that could be mobilized to meet the domestic imperative of development.

In the Brazilian diplomatic logic of goal-oriented nationalism prior to the 1990s, these main lines meant developing ways of controlled integration into the world economy and mobilizing resources to deepen the process of import-substitution industrialization. This brought together the domestic market and state intervention to promote development. These lines also meant an effort to create conditions of sovereignty by putting moderate distance between Brazil and the poles of power with which Brazil had asymmetric international relations. This distance might be more or less depending on conditions afforded by the dynamics of global politics. This diplomatic behavior was made possible both by Brazil’s continental scale and by the fact that Brazil was not on the front lines of tensions in the international system.

The effort to translate domestic necessities into foreign possibilities and thus to broaden the country’s control over its destiny within the logic of goal-oriented nationalism took shape during the different phases of the first government of Getúlio Vargas (1930–45; see chapter 3). This period began amid the impact of the global economic crisis of 1929 on Brazil, which interrupted capital flows and caused the fall in the price of coffee, Brazil’s primary export crop. The first problem was to obtain foreign exchange to service Brazil’s foreign trade and financial obligations. In light of these needs, the Vargas government exploited gaps in the international system by pragmatically keeping an equal distance from the major powers. It sought short-term credit from England; it renegotiated international financial commitments; in 1935 it reached a bilateral trade agreement with the United States; and, at the same time, it maintained intense compensatory trade with Germany in spite of opposition from the United States. The circumstances

were not only economically difficult but increasingly tense politically, marked by ideological struggles at home and abroad and by bellicose rivalry among the major powers that led to World War II. Under these challenging circumstances, Vargas waded diplomatically with the potential strategic importance of the country to garner external resources for meeting internal needs.

Gerson Moura shows that the eruption of World War II led Brazil from pragmatic equidistance to an effective alignment with the United States in recognition of a fact: the weight of the United States in the inter-American context. Vargas was very aware of this, and it resulted in the care with which he cultivated his relationship with Franklin Roosevelt. At the same time, this alignment was negotiated in light of the diplomatic logic of goal-oriented nationalism. What lent weight to Brazil's position was what the country could offer to the war effort: essential raw materials and military bases in the Northeast, important for the war in Africa. This negotiation was expressed on two complementary levels: the strategic-military and the economic.

On the strategic and military level, the Vargas government's goal was to promote the country's development through a controlled entry into the world economy, which was compatible with what was occurring in the rest of the world. The example par excellence was the financing that Brazil got from the United States, after much negotiation, for the National Steel Company (Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, CSN) and the establishment of the steel industry.

On the economic plane, the goal was to promote the reequipping of the armed forces and to get the proper support from the United States for the Vargas government's decision to participate in the war by sending the Brazilian Expeditionary Force to the European theater. This decision gave Brazil, in contrast to Argentina, for example, the legal standing and trustworthiness of a country truly allied with the winners, who were going to build the postwar world order.¹⁹

During the term of Eurico Dutra (1946–50), the rigid bipolarity of the Cold War and the United States' priorities in rebuilding Europe through the Marshall Plan made the legal standing of the Brazil-U.S. alignment one of the few compensations for the diplomatic logic of goal-oriented nationalism. For the same reasons, during his elected term (1951–54), Vargas had scant room to maneuver in the international arena since the Korean War limited the pragmatic diplomacy of the sort that he had used prior to World War II. This did not impede the progress, however, of Brazil's controlled entry into the world economy by moving forward with import substitution.

Fissures in the international system, revealed in the struggles over the Suez Canal in the 1950s, the 1955 African-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution created a space for Brazilian foreign policy to exercise diplomatically its style of nationalism. This was the context for the Pan-American Operation (Operação Pan-Americana), the great initiative through which the diplomacy of President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–61) articulated Brazil's domestic imperative for development within the scope of the inter-American system. Conditions for greater maneuverability within the international system along with domestic circumstances allowed the independent foreign policy of Presidents Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961–64) to broaden the scope of the Pan-American Operation to include the whole globe.

The installation of the military regime in 1964 temporarily reduced the autonomy that an independent foreign policy had recently afforded Brazil. This was because the military government, which was arrayed against the Left at home, reaffirmed Brazil's alignment with the United States in an international context increasingly marked by the East-West divide. Soon, however, the deep forces of goal-oriented nationalism flowered again, revealing a continuity in Brazil's international identity. This happened through developments in the domestic sphere and in light of the international system's activity that made room for the North-South divide in global life, for example in the rise of OPEC. In Brazil, the clearest affirmation of this flowering was the "responsible pragmatism" of President Ernesto Geisel (1974–78). This policy shift was a consequence of the 1973 oil shock, and it loosened the strict alignment with the United States to improve foreign trade options and lessen Brazil's dependence on foreign energy sources. Further evidence of the loosened alignment came with the 1975 accord with West Germany to help build nuclear power plants and Geisel's 1977 renunciation of the military alliance with the United States.

To synthesize, whenever an international system of defined polarization prevailed, for example East-West or North-South, and whenever the processes of import substitution based on the continental scale of the country were economically energetic, then Brazilian foreign policy sought autonomy through distance, within the logic of goal-oriented nationalism. This quest worked in a constructively flexible way through the Grotian conduct of diplomacy directed toward exploiting niches of opportunity offered by the competitive experience of bipolarity. According to Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas, politician, diplomat, and champion of Brazil's "independent" foreign policy, the goal was for Brazil to

develop itself in order to free itself—in the international sphere from the weight of the asymmetry of international stratification and in the domestic sphere from the weight of social exclusion, one of the shortcomings in the country's development.²⁰

From the 1930s to the 1980s, Brazilian society changed significantly as a result of the whole of its public policy, including its foreign policy inspired by goal-oriented nationalism. Brazil urbanized, industrialized, experienced periods of authoritarianism, redemocratized, diversified its exports, and broadened its portfolio of diplomatic relations. In brief, it modernized and improved its international standing. Yet Brazil did not address the failing of social exclusion. Domestically, the 1980s were a decade of political success, with the transition from military regime to democracy. Economically, however, the country stagnated amid the foreign debt crisis, inflation, and the exhaustion of the import-substitution model.

This exhaustion became even more acute with international changes after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Under the impact of cost reductions in transportation and communication, thanks to advances in computer technology, the logic of globalization allowed the dilution of the financial and economic significance of borders. In a world of undefined polarities, this narrowing tests the efficiency and dynamism of the internalization of production chains through controlled insertion into the world economy. Aside from the dizzying acceleration of capital flows, the logic of globalization has envisioned the dismantling of production chains on a global scale. It has made outsourcing a routine business practice and has thus made foreign trade and domestic production of goods and services two sides of the same coin. For this reason, economic development managed by the state within a relatively distant and controlled insertion into the world economy, elaborated through the prior logic of goal-oriented nationalism, now became unworkable. The world that Brazil managed as an “external” phenomenon had become internalized, incorporating the effective repertoire of solutions assembled since the first Vargas government.

Again, from the point of view of Brazil's place in the world, the twentieth century was a “short century.” It had as its starting point the results of Rio Branco's career at the end of the first decade of the 1900s. Once the legal borders of this continent-size country had been consolidated, Brazil could distinguish between the “foreign” and the “domestic.” This released the deep forces of diplomacy based on goal-oriented nationalism. The endpoint was the consequences of the

fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union after 1989. These consequences, in anticipation of the fulfillment of the logic of globalization, narrowed the differences between the “foreign” and the “domestic.”

Brazilian Foreign Policy in a Global World

Brazilian foreign policy, conceived as public policy, is directed toward development of the national territory, and this continues to be the paramount theme of its diplomatic activity. What are the consequences of the new global reality from the point of view of foreign policy? To what extent does the style of the conduct of foreign policy that has characterized Brazil in the twentieth century, associated with diplomatic activity in both the South American context and in relation to the major powers, offer answers to this question? These are the issues discussed in this last section.

The acceleration of time and the shortening of distances through the centripetal force of globalization that have diluted the differences between foreign and domestic have also intensified the questioning of the specific nature of a foreign policy as public policy within an international system that is predominantly international and intergovernmental. Because of this, scholars tend to define the field of international relations as one of complex networks of interactions, both governmental and nongovernmental, that structure the world's space and governance. From this arises the notion of global diplomacy, with a wide array of actors that includes transnational companies and nongovernmental organizations, media (in their role in forming public sensibilities and opinions), political parties, and labor unions.

At the same time, broadening the field of international relations and the scope of diplomacy does not eliminate the importance of states and nations in the dynamic of international life. On the contrary: not only do individuals continue to project their expectations, claims, and hopes onto the nations to which they belong, but the well-being of the vast majority of human beings continues to be closely linked to the performance of the countries in which they live. For these reasons, nations and the states that represent them have been and will continue to be indispensable public entities for mediation. They are domestic phenomena that mediate between political institutions and a population that shares within its territory an array of economic goods, technical and scientific knowledge, information, and culture. They are also phenomena of mediation with the world. This foreign mediation arises from a vision of collective identity, of a “we” that under-

scores our specific characteristics. Among these characteristics are geographic location, shared historical experience, linguistic and cultural codes, levels of development, and features of social stratification. This differentiation obeys a logic of identity that interacts with the logic of globalization within the international system. It is this interaction that shapes the world's pluralism. From it arises the reason for distinctions of strategic, political, and economic interests and of views that, in turn, give rise to the organizing perspective and the possible latitude of a country's insertion into the world.

Ortega y Gasset noted that perspective is one of the components of reality. Perspective does not distort reality; it organizes it. This general epistemological assessment is extremely appropriate for the analysis of foreign policy, which is naturally the expression of a country's point of view on the world and how it works. This point of view can have a dimension of continuity explicable as a result of the impact of certain persistent factors in a country's place in international life, as in the case of Brazil. These are the deep forces: the facts of South American geography and the importance of relations with numerous neighboring countries; territorial and linguistic unity; distance since independence in 1822 from the focal points of tension in the center of the international stage; and the circumstances of a continent-size country that has the issue of global stratification and the challenge of domestic development as priorities on its diplomatic agenda. These persistent factors contribute to explaining important features of Brazil's international identity.

The Ministry of Foreign Relations has contributed much to the construction of Brazil's international identity. It has succeeded in affirming itself, throughout the country's history, as a permanent national institution, able to represent Brazil's interests because it is endowed with authority and memory. In the twentieth century, in addition to peacefully establishing Brazil's continental-scale borders, Rio Branco was the ministry's great institution builder. Itamaraty, as the ministry is informally known, for the Itamaraty Palace it once occupied, to this day benefits in its authority from the aura of this great national figure. Rio Branco is also the inspiration for the style of diplomatic behavior that characterizes Brazil in light of its circumstances and history. This style is one of constructive moderation expressed in the capacity "to downplay the drama of the foreign policy agenda; that is, to reduce conflicts, crises, and difficulties in diplomatic currents," according to Gelson Fonseca Jr. This constructive moderation is permeated by a Grotian reading of international reality, identifying within it a positive ingredient of sociability that allows it to deal, though diplomacy and law, with conflict and

cooperation and, in this way, reduce the force of “power politics.” Brazil’s agenda is sensibly guided by realism in its assessment of the determinants of power in international life. Based on the information absorbed from the facts of power, but without either paralyzing immobility or Machiavellian or Hobbesian impulses, Brazilian foreign policy tries to find new diplomatic and legal solutions as it channels themes related to Brazil’s place in the world. Knowledge and memory of a Grotian diplomatic tradition confer on Brazilian foreign policy a coherence that derives from an amalgam of lines of continuity with lines of innovation in an “open work” geared to building the future.²¹

What is the meaning of this tradition, which acquired conceptual precision in the twentieth century, for the challenges facing the twenty-first century? What is the significance especially for a foreign policy conceived of as public policy directed to development of the national territory? Like Fonseca, I believe that, if in the twentieth century the country established the autonomy possible with reasonable success through a relative distancing from the world, then at the beginning of a new century this possible autonomy, which is necessary for development, can be maintained only through active participation in the elaboration of norms and agendas managing the world order. It is for this reason that the “open work” of continuity within change that characterizes Brazilian diplomacy requires that it deepen the lines of foreign policy begun in The Hague in 1907 in multilateral forums today. At the same time, Brazil must make a new push toward organizing the South American space to reinforce its standing and that of its partners within a world that is simultaneously globalizing and regionalizing.²²

From the point of view of developing the national space and addressing poverty—the domestic imperatives of Brazil’s foreign policy—the real challenge facing Brazil is in the negotiation of foreign trade and financial agendas. The goals of these negotiations include gaining access to markets and taming the online timing of capital flows, whose volatility has produced successive crises in the emerging market countries that struck Brazil directly and indirectly in the 1990s. In addition, a goal of negotiations must be to find space for the conduct of public policies, a space that has been reduced with the internalization of the world within the country as a result of globalization. In a country with Brazil’s characteristics, development will not result automatically from just the right combination of fiscal, monetary, and exchange policies, even though these are the macroeconomic conditions of its sustainability. Development requires a broad array of public policies that are congruent and compatible with the broad macroeconomic balances that ensure currency stability, reduce inequality, and

drive national development, giving economic agents, within their scope, the conditions for competitive equality before the law that allow them to face the challenge of globalization.

In conclusion, to repeat a musical metaphor I have used elsewhere, the challenge of Brazilian foreign policy in the early twenty-first century is to find ways to play the melody of the country's specific conditions in harmony with the world. It is not an easy challenge given the size of Brazil's domestic problems and the general cacophony resulting from the prevailing ruptures in the functioning of the system that characterizes the contemporary world. The challenge requires an effective reformulation of the way in which Brazil put its goal-oriented nationalism to work in the twentieth century. This is not easy for a country traditionally turned inward rather than outward. The historical experience of this continent-size country has accustomed it to autonomy through distance, and, for this very reason, it has not fully internalized the world. It is, however, a challenge for which the other components of the deep forces of Brazil's place in the world in the twentieth century—including its relations with its South American neighbors, its posture and legal standing in relation to the major powers, and its conduct of foreign policy within the Grotian mold—offer a meaningful basis for successful action.

Notes

1. Luis Felipe de Seixas Corrêa, "Política externa e identidade nacional brasileira," *Política Externa* 9, no. 1 (June–July–August 2000): 28.
2. Synésio Sampaio Góes Filho, *Navegantes, bandeirantes, diplomatas* (São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1999); Demétrio Magnoli, *O corpo da pátria* (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade Estadual Paulista/Moderna, 1997).
3. Rubens Ricúpero, *Rio Branco: O Brasil no mundo* (Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto/Petrobrás, 2000), 33–34.
4. Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Introduction à l'histoire des relations internationales*, 4th ed. (Paris: Cocin, 1991), part 1.
5. Argentine diplomat and politician Ramón Cárcano spelled this out in Article 1 of the 1909 draft treaty among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Álvaro Lins, *Rio Branco*, 3rd ed. (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1996), 432–89.
6. *O Presidente segundo o sociólogo: Entrevista de Fernando Henrique Cardoso a Roberto Pompeu de Toledo* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1998), 127.
7. Ricúpero, *Rio Branco*, 34–41.
8. J. Penn, "O Brasil, os Estados Unidos e o monroísmo," in *Estudos Históricas*, vol. 8,

- Obras do Barão do Rio Branco* (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1948), 151. See also Bradford E. Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), chapter 8.
9. Lins, *Rio Branco*, 318, 322; João Frank da Costa, *Joaquim Nabuco e a política externa do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1969), 109.
10. Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and Carsten Holbrad, eds., *Power Politics* (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1979), 50; Hedley Bull, ed., *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), 136–41; Pandiá Calógeras, “Conferência de Paz: Diário,” entries for 13, 18 January 1919, in *Calógeras na opinião dos seus contemporâneos*, ed. Roberto Simonsen, Antonio Gontijo de Carvalho, and Francisco Salles de Oliveira (São Paulo: Siqueira, 1934), 66, 689; Eugenio Vargas Garcia, *O Brasil e a Liga das Nações (1919–1926)* (Porto Alegre/Brasília: Editora da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul/Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2000).
11. Giovanni Botero, *La razón del estado y otros escritos*, trans. Luciana de Stefano, ed. Manuel Garcia Pelayo (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1982), book 1.5, 96–97, book 2.5, 113; Gelson Fonseca Jr., *A legitimidade e outras questões internacionais* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1998), 171–248.
12. George F. Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 143.
13. Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, lecture at the War College, Rio de Janeiro, 23 September 1982, *Resenha da Política Externa do Brasil* 34 (July–August–September 1982): 80–82.
14. Celso Lafer, “Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” *Daedalus* 129, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 218–22.
15. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994).
16. Antonio Cândido, *Vários escritos*, 3rd ed. (São Paulo: Duas Cidades, 1995), 293–305; Antonio Cândido, *Teresina, etc.* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980), 135–52; Antonio Cândido, *A educação pela noite e outros ensaios* (São Paulo: Ática, 1987), 140–62, 181–98.
17. Hélio Jaguaribe, *Nacionalismo na atualidade brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, 1958), 52.
18. Horácio Lafer, speech at the inauguration of the minister of foreign relations, 4 August 1959, in *Gestão do Ministro Lafer na pasta das Relações Exteriores* (n.p.: Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Imprensa Nacional, 1961), 83.
19. Gerson Moura, *Autonomia na dependência* (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1980); Gerson Moura, *Sucessos e ilusões: Relações internacionais do Brasil durante e após a Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1991); Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, *O Brasil e a economia mundial: 1930–1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1999).
20. Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas, “Política externa e desenvolvimento,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, year 8, no. 27 (September 1964): 524–25.

21. Fonseca, *A legitimidade e outras questões internacionais*, 356; Celso Lafer, *Política externa brasileira: Três momentos* (São Paulo: Fundação Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1993).

22. Fonseca, *A legitimidade e outras questões internacionais*, 353–54; Celso Lafer and Gelson Fonseca Jr., “Questões para a diplomacia no contexto internacional das polaridades indefinidas,” analytic notes and some suggestions, in *Temas da política exterior II*, vol. 1, ed. Gelson Fonseca Jr. and Henrique Nabuco de Castro (Brasília/São Paulo: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão/Paz e Terra, 1994), 49–77; Celso Lafer, “Brasil y el nuevo escenario mundial,” *Archivos del Presente*, year 1, no. 3 (Summer 1995–96): 61–80; “Brasil: Dilemas e desafios da política externa,” *Estudos Avançados* 14, no. 38 (January–April 2000): 260–67.