
Chapter Four: Dominican Republic, 1965


4. VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, xiv–xv, 106, 112–113; Dallek, Flawed Giant, 106, 269.


6. VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, xiv, 25, 216, 220.

7. Quoted in Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 252–253. According to VanDeMark, “LBJ seemed determined, even obsessed, with avoiding Truman’s ordeal. This dread of a conservative backlash—much more than personal pride or fear of another ‘‘Munich’’—conditioned Johnson’s basic attitude toward Vietnam. As he had remarked in private shortly after assuming the presidency: ‘I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went’” (VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, 25).

8. Beschloss, ed., Taking Charge, 213n6, 7; Dallek, Flawed Giant, 106; VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, xv.


20. Telegram, Connell to Rusk, 25 April 1963, in Crisis in Panama and the Dominican Republic: National Security Files and NSC Histories (1963–1969), ed. Paul Kesaris (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982), microfilm, reel 5, frame 0022. “We believe there is serious threat of Communist takeover in country and that very little time remains in which to act,” the embassy reported the following day (telegram, Connell to Rusk, 26 April 1965, in ibid., reel 5, frame 0047).


28. Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 431. As Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright observed in September 1965: “The specter of a second Communist state in the hemisphere—and its probable repercussions within the United States and possible effects on the careers of those who might be held responsible—seems to have been the most important single factor in distorting the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men” (*Congressional Record*, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, 111, pt. 18, 23859; also quoted in Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, 32n).


30. Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 71–73, 79, 81, 96–97, 137, 167; Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, 41; Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*, 69, 87, 109; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 651, 708. Felten concludes that “the conservative, anti-communist bias of its Dominican contacts colored the embassy’s reporting from the beginning of the crisis” (Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 72). Slater recounts a “story told by a wealthy oligarch sympathetic to the constitutionalis. On the first day of the revolution he received a telephone call suggesting that he contact all his friends and ask each to tell the American Embassy that the revolutionaries were ‘Communists’” (Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation*, 41).

According to Felten, the loyalists also endeavored to influence U.S. public opinion: “The loyalists intended to create a political climate in the United States which made accommodation with the rebels impossible. To this end, the loyalist military helped Jules Dubois, the rabidly anti-communist Chicago Tribune Latin America correspondent, enter the Dominican Republic before any other English-language reporter. Like nearly all involved, the coup caught the media by surprise, so no members of the U.S. press were in the country when the crisis broke. The subsequent chaos kept foreign reporters out, despite a large number clamoring to get the story. Dubois, however, had unparalleled access to the loyalists, interviewing by telephone General Wessin on April 27 and arriving at a loyalist airport early the next morning, the first foreign reporter to enter the country since hostilities began. Dubois served as a mouthpiece for the loyalists, whom he called the ‘anti-communist forces.’

He repeated Wessin’s claims that ‘Bosch is a communist sympathizer’ and that ‘this country came within 12 hours of a communist takeover’ on April 26. By using journalists like Dubois, San Isidro conducted a propaganda offensive aimed at both official and public opinion in the United States” (Felten, “The 1965–1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic,” 96–97).}


36. Gleijeses, *Dominican Crisis*, 43; Martin, *Overtaken by Events*, 651; Smith, *Last Days of the Monroe Doctrine*, 128. Ambassador Bennett referred to the Castro analogy in a 30 April television interview: “I don’t think it’s so important the actual number [of communists on the rebel side] when one recalls that Fidel Castro first took to the hills with only twelve men. I think it’s a question of training, of determined objectives and of being able to influence others who, for very legitimate motives, may be in the fight” (quoted in Draper, *The Dominican Revolt*, 160). Secretary of State Rusk’s analogies extended farther back in time. On 26 May, he stated that he was “not impressed by the remark that there were [only] several dozen known Communist leaders and that therefore this was not a very serious matter. There was a time when Hitler sat in a beer hall in Munich with seven people. And I don’t believe that one underestimates what can be done in chaos, in a situation of violence and chaos, by a few highly organized, highly trained people who know what they are about and know what they want to bring about” (quoted in ibid., 160).


41. Palmer, Intervention in the Caribbean, 19.

42. Martin, Overtaken by Events, 739. Martin admitted that his interpretation of the president’s motives was a “guess.” Experience had convinced him, however, that “the makers of foreign policy must take into account domestic public opinion, that is, domestic politics” (ibid.).


48. VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, chaps. 4–6; Dallek, Flawed Giant, chap. 5.


52. Johnson, Vantage Point, 152. In March 1965, national security adviser McGeorge Bundy had informed Johnson that the “cardinal” objective of U.S. policy in Vietnam was “not to be a Paper Tiger.” Quoted in VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, 101. “The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam,” Bundy advised the president (ibid., 60). That same month, a Defense Department study concluded that the predominant U.S. goal in Vietnam was “To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as guarantor) [of South Vietnam’s security].” It was “essential,” the Defense Department study concluded, that the United States be seen as having “kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the US will behave in future cases of particular interest to those nations—regarding US policy, power, resolve and competence to deal with their problems” (The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam [Boston: Beacon, 1971], 3: 695, 700).

53. Dallek, Flawed Giant, 100, 244–246; VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, 47, 60, 96–97, 106, 213. National security adviser McGeorge Bundy had played heavily on Johnson’s political fears in lobbying for a major U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Arguing in February 1965 for a U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam, Bundy advised Johnson that even if the bombing failed, “the policy will be worth it... . At a minimum, it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own” (ibid., 67; emphasis added). The following month, Bundy advocated the deployment of U.S. ground forces to South Vietnam, asking Johnson, “In terms of domestic politics, which is better: to ‘lose’ now or to ‘lose’ after committing 100,000 men? Tentative answer: the latter”—because, according to Bundy’s reasoning, “if we visibly do enough in the South, any failure will be, in that moment, beyond our control” (quoted in ibid., 101, and in Dallek, Flawed Giant, 255).

54. Johnson, Vantage Point, 324.


56. Johnson, Vantage Point, 187.

57. Quoted in Dallek, Flawed Giant, 100.


60. VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, 133–134; Gardner, Pay Any Price, 209, 211–212.


Chapter Five. Chile, 1970


5. Falcoff, Modern Chile, 1970–1989, 31; Robert Moss, Chile’s Marxist Experiment (Newton Abbot, UK: David & Charles, 1973), 49; Faúndez, Marxism and Democracy in Chile, 164–171, 196–197; Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 33; Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, 140. Also see the revealing assessment of former Allende supporter Roberto Ampuero,